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Intelligence Memorandum

STRAINS IN SOVIET-EAST GERMAN
RELATIONS: 1962-1967

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXIX)

SECRET

STRAINS IN SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS: 1962-1967

Prefatory Note

This working paper of the DDI/Research Staff examines Soviet-East German relations during the period of comparative calm in Europe that has followed the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

The paper is an expanded and revised version of an unpublished study of Khrushchev's 1964 tactics on the German question written in December 1964 by Irwin Halpern, a former member of the Staff, and Leonard Parkinson. Although the final version of the paper has not been coordinated with other offices, the paper has benefited much from the author's discussions with colleagues in OCI, ONE, FDD, FBIS, and ORR. In particular the author of the final version of the paper, Leonard Parkinson, thanks [redacted] both of OCI and [redacted] both of ONE, for their suggestions. The author also thanks [redacted] of ONE for contributing Appendix One, originally an unclassified essay on Soviet policy toward Germany in the months following Stalin's death.

The author alone, however, is responsible for the conclusions of the paper. The DDI/Research Staff would welcome further comment on the paper, addressed to Mr. Parkinson, or the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Staff [redacted]

STRAINS IN SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS: 1962-1967

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STRAINS IN SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS: 1962-1967

Summary and Conclusions

The diminution in Soviet tensions and the comparative improvement in Soviet-West German relations that has followed the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has had an adverse effect on Soviet-East German relations.

The East Germans have shown concern that, if a rapprochement develops between West Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies on the other, then the East German state will first be weakened by that accommodation and then eventually fall victim to a policy of reunification. Moscow's foreign policy since the 1962 missile crisis has not consistently pursued the tactic of improving relations with Bonn, and Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly tried to convince East German leaders that they have not decided to reverse their long-standing policy--of consolidating the status quo in Germany--in the interest of advancing reunification. However, military developments, political changes in Western Europe, alterations in West German policy, problems with East European allies and the Chinese Communists, internal Soviet concerns and other elements which led the East Germans to make that radical assessment in the last two years of Khrushchev's reign have not fundamentally changed during the Brezhnev-Kosygin administration.

Thus, strains in USSR-GDR relations will probably persist as long as the present Kremlin regime holds a flexible position vis-a-vis the West Germans, and as long as Moscow refrains from its 1958-1962 strategy of trying to force a German settlement on its terms.

Khrushchev's strategy of brandishing military threats and serving ultimatums on Berlin between 1958 and 1961 (the period of the supposed "missile gap") had not

only failed to bring about the desired results, but proved to be counter-productive, first, in drawing the Western powers closer together, second, in showing by several backdowns that Moscow recognized its strategic inferiority. Frustrated, he made a final, unsuccessful attempt in 1962 to break the East-West deadlock over the German question with a badly miscalculated venture to place strategic missiles in Cuba. The humiliating and costly failure of that venture, which weakened Khrushchev's position at home, marked an important turning point in Soviet policy --the tactic of trying to force a German settlement was gradually shelved.

Following Khrushchev's recovery in internal Soviet policy debates in the spring of 1963 and following the rather aimless drift in Soviet policy on the German problem during the remainder of FRG Chancellor Adenauer's administration, evidence began to accumulate that Khrushchev's tactics, and perhaps his goals, with respect to Soviet-West German relations were being modified. The establishment of a new Bonn Government, interested in a "policy of movement" and in taking soundings of Moscow's attitude toward German reunification, was privately greeted with Khrushchev's probes for a meeting with Adenauer's successor, Chancellor Erhard, and Khrushchev's expressions of interest in greatly expanded trade relations with West Germany. Apparently to mollify the increasingly anxious and disgruntled East German leaders, the Soviets in June 1964 signed a friendship treaty with the GDR (which changed nothing basic in the Moscow-East Berlin equation). But this holding action had little positive effect on East German anxieties. For Khrushchev continued to press forward in his own policy of movement with Bonn. In July Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey in his visit to Bonn to make advance soundings made repeated statements suggesting that East German party chief Ulbricht was an obstacle that would not long stand in the way of greatly improved USSR-FRG relations. Adzhubey also renewed Khrushchev's earlier expressed interest in a Moscow-Bonn accommodation along the lines of the 1922 German-Soviet Rapallo Pact. Adzhubey, who was snubbed by Ulbricht on the return trip through East Berlin, coauthored in August

two highly conciliatory articles in Izvestiya on the "changed" mentality of the West German people and their leaders. Meanwhile, Chinese and Albanian propagandists were charging an intended "sell-out" of the GDR, and East German leaders were making remarks suggesting concern over the possibility of a Moscow betrayal. Then on 2 September, Khrushchev accepted Erhard's informal invitation to come to Bonn for talks--which, had the visit taken place, would have been another Khrushchev first.

The unique acceptance of Bonn's invitation was as far as Khrushchev had gone in implementing his new German probes before his opponents in the presidium intervened. On 6 September, two days after it was publicly announced (outside the USSR only) that Khrushchev would go to Bonn, a technician attached to the West German Embassy in Moscow was attacked with mustard gas, touching off a scandal that imperiled Khrushchev's invitation. The Soviets did not offer Bonn an acceptable apology until 12 October--the day the CPSU presidium voted in camera to oust Khrushchev. Also, in September, there were a number of other developments that suggested that Khrushchev's opponents were resisting him and were gaining the upper hand: a conciliatory statement by Adzhubey about FRG political leaders was deleted from a Pravda version of his remarks but was published in Izvestiya (25 September); the GDR-Soviet friendship treaty was at last ratified after a three-and-a-half month delay (also 25 September); Pravda warned that it would be a mistake to think that an improvement in the Soviet-FRG relations could take place at the expense of the GDR (27 September); TASS announced on 28 September that Brezhnev, not Khrushchev as would have been expected, would go on to the GDR anniversary celebration. Then Suslov "guaranteed" that the GDR would not be sold out (5 October), and Brezhnev pledged (6 October) that there would not be any deals made with Bonn behind the backs of the East Germans. A week later, Khrushchev was stripped of all powers. The timing of these developments, in view of the importance of the German question and the allusions to Khrushchev's misconduct of German affairs reportedly raised at the 14 October CPSU Central Committee trial, would seem to suggest that Khrushchev's German policy was at least one of the factors that led to his downfall.

The new cautious and conservative leaders soon made clear that they were not ready to take risks or come up with typically Khrushchevian attempts to achieve breakthroughs by bold initiatives in policy. Their restraint on German issues was evidenced in the shelving of Bonn's invitation and the alteration of certain earlier German formulas; a "settlement" replaced calls for a German "peace treaty" and references to the need to alter the status of West Berlin were eventually omitted from the new Soviet statements on the German question. The East Germans, while enthusiastic about the new regime's attitude toward a Bonn visit, reacted to Moscow's holding operation by obstinately holding on to the old peace treaty-West Berlin demands throughout the first half of 1965 in a continuing, heated discourse with the Soviets. Ulbricht publicly vented his anger over Moscow's shelving of the West Berlin demands, raised the subject of German-Soviet strains during the early postwar Russian occupation days, repeated plaints (first made in the week before Khrushchev's ouster) over the Soviet reparations rape of the Eastern Zone, and praised CPR support for GDR policy.

In the latter half of 1965 and early 1966, however, Moscow-East Berlin relations improved. This respite was generally coincident with the heating up of the Vietnam situation and the attendant cooling of Moscow-Bonn relations. The "threat" of West Germany was emphasized at that time as part of Moscow's rationale for its limited activity in Vietnam and as part of Moscow's defensive counter to Chinese Communist charges that the Soviets were planning to withdraw from--rather than open up--the front in Europe.

The respite, however, was shortlived. Conditions on the European front had not grown more threatening; indeed, the opening up of another Moscow-initiated crisis over Berlin and Germany--particularly at a time when France's de Gaulle had withdrawn from meaningful participation in NATO and when the U.S. was concentrating on the war in Vietnam--would again have been counterproductive to Moscow's long-standing interest in weakening NATO and

driving a wedge between the U.S. and its remaining continental allies. In the wake of the CPSU Congress in April 1966 tensions with the East Germans reappeared, as Moscow renewed conciliatory gestures toward the West Germans. Moscow made plans to renew the USSR-FRG trade treaty and began a direct, private exchange with West Berlin Mayor Brandt, while Ulbricht publicly revived the fears about an abandoned GDR which he had expressed in the days before Khrushchev's ouster. Ulbricht was upset by his ally's exchange with Brandt, and, unlike Moscow, particularly upset by the subsequent political coalition--in December 1966--of Brandt's party (the SPD) with the party of Erhard's successor, Chancellor Kiesinger (the CDU/CSU).

Currently, relations are strained over the FRG coalition's efforts to establish diplomatic relations with East European states. (Rumania has already established formal ties.) And Moscow has not given effective support to East Berlin's insistence of formal West German recognition of East Germany as the precondition for the improvement of relations with East European nations.

I. THE SHELVING OF KHRUSHCHEV'S FORCEFUL GERMAN STRATEGY: OCTOBER 1962 - OCTOBER 1963

1. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

In 1962, frustrated by the failures of four years of Berlin ultimatums and realizing that the Soviet strategic position had to be drastically improved if the United States were to give in to Soviet demands in Western Europe, Khrushchev made a final, unsuccessful attempt to break the Berlin deadlock with a hard-line approach. This was the venture to place offensive missiles in Cuba in order to improve the strategic balance in his favor --if not militarily, then psychologically--long enough to make another ultimatum on Berlin produce the desired results.

The timing of his Cuba missile plans was closely tied in with his effort to overcome his earlier German policy blunders. Shortly before the U.S. discovery of the missile launcher construction activity in Cuba, a 12 September 1962 TASS statement on Cuba pledged that no initiatives on the German problem would take place before the "U.S. elections," which at that time were close at hand. In retrospect, what the statement betrayed was that no new Soviet initiative with a chance of success could take place before the establishment of the Cuban missile bases, which was also close at hand.

The 12 September TASS announcement with its threat to liquidate the occupation regime in West Berlin was discussed in a classified Soviet Foreign Ministry position paper dated 30 September, which also presented the Soviet's "problem /of/ how to reconcile /sovmestit/ a USSR-GDR peace treaty with the West's interests in the FRG and West Berlin." The position paper cited Gromyko's overly optimistic 24 April 1962 Supreme Soviet analysis of the 11 March 1962 Geneva meeting with U.S. Secretary Rusk. Reflecting the wishful thinking in Khrushchev's Cuban venture in general, the position paper did not report the U.S. State Department's reaction to Gromyko's assessment--a reaction which did not support Gromyko's optimism on the possibility of reconciling the West's

interests in West Germany and West Berlin--and emphasized only the "positive factors" that Gromyko saw leading to a reconciliation of Soviet and Western interests:*

> A.A. Gromyko noted, after a meeting with Secretary Rusk in Geneva in March 1962, 'as a positive factor...the declaration of the American side that it does not see obstacles to the combining of free access to West Berlin with the demand for respect of the sovereignty of the GDR.' With respect to the question of the non-arming with nuclear weapons of the GDR and the FRG, A.A. Gromyko noted that 'on the American side there is understanding of the importance of this question. This is a positive fact, if, of course, these sensible gleams do not die out here under the influence of other winds.' A.A. Gromyko further noted that 'in the course of exchanges of views between the Governments of the USSR and the U.S. there was achieved in principle mutual understanding regarding the necessity of concluding, in one form or another, a pact of non-aggression between NATO and the Organization of the Warsaw Pact. This is a move in a useful direction.'

The classified position paper went on to claim that the Government of West Germany had successfully "applied pressure on Washington in order to disrupt the contemplated agreement /sic/", but, in conclusion, left the impression that the Soviets could still force a wedge between Washington and Bonn and accomplish the intended Moscow-East German maneuver:

> The U.S. does not want to leave West Berlin. But in this case, after the transfer of

*Five days after the Rusk-Gromyko meeting, Khrushchev in his 16 March 1962 speech made his first comment on a USSR-GDR peace treaty since his 17 October 1961 central committee report to the 22nd CPSU Congress, when he withdrew his threat to sign the treaty before the end of 1961.

> control to the GDR of the routes to West Berlin, the Americans will have to negotiate with the Government of the GDR on questions of access. There is a discussion in the U.S. press with regard to the degree to which the U.S. should recognize the sovereignty of the GDR. In this matter it is borne in mind that Chancellor Adenauer is against any kind of recognition.

And [redacted] reports [redacted] stated at that time that the Soviet Union was making extensive military and political preparations for the signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany in November 1962*--the election month which would also have marked the completion of 40 missile launchers in Cuba. Khrushchev for the first time may well have seen himself, once the missile bases were in Cuba, in a much more favorable position either to employ successfully his one-sided demands that the West upgrade the position of East Germany by negotiating access procedure with the GDR Government, or to offer the withdrawal of the Cuban bases for Western concessions in or withdrawal from Berlin.

The failure of the Cuban venture turned out to be an important turning point in Khrushchev's German policy: with that event, the policy of trying to force a German settlement upon the West began to founder.

2. THE AFTERMATH OF THE CUBAN CRISIS: THE DIMINUTION OF THE GERMAN CRISIS

The earliest high-level pronouncement to the effect that Moscow was attenuating the crisis atmosphere on the German problem which had preceded and accompanied the Cuba missile crisis was given in Kosygin's 6 November 1962 speech on the anniversary of the 1917 Communist counter-revolution in Russia.

*The classified Foreign Ministry position paper cited --and did not deny--press reports to the effect that after November 1962 the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty, and that "a new 'blockade' of West Berlin will take place."

> The Soviet Government has announced /sic/ and is announcing now that the peaceful normalization of Germany can be implemented without detriment to the interests or the prestige of any country or group of countries through a goodwill agreement on the part of all interested sides.

Kosygin in his November speech did not threaten a separate USSR-GDR peace treaty, as had other Soviet leaders prior to the week of the missile crisis, such as presidium member Kozlov in a 6 October Moscow speech on the GDR's 13th anniversary. Nor did Kosygin demand the withdrawal of the Western occupation forces from West Berlin--a "precondition," said Foreign Minister Gromyko on 24 October in East Berlin during the week of the Cuban crisis, for any agreement leading to a German peace treaty.

The decrease in the intensity of hostile, threatening remarks from Moscow did not, however, follow an even pattern after Kosygin's 6 November speech. In fact on the day of Kosygin's remarkably mild call for a "goodwill agreement," Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Pervukin in an East Berlin Neues Deutschland article threatened that after a separate peace treaty with East Germany, control of access to and from West Berlin and other areas within East Germany would be turned over to the GDR. And Khrushchev and Gromyko renewed the separate treaty threat in their Supreme Soviet speeches of 12 and 13 December 1962, respectively.

But following the Supreme Soviet session, threats of a separate treaty diminished, and by early 1963 such threats had virtually disappeared from Soviet propaganda. (For example, SED media, but not CPSU media, publicized an 18 January East Berlin interview in which Khrushchev made his last recorded reference to a separate treaty. The reference, incidentally, was couched in conditional terms and stressed the desire to reach an agreement with

the West "so that no unilateral actions will be taken."*) And along with the diminution of such threats, pressure for a German solution decreased in elite Soviet comments.

Khrushchev himself in his 16 January 1963 East Berlin speech made the argument that the conclusion of a peace treaty was no longer the problem it had been before the construction of the Berlin wall (13 August 1961) in an exceptionally defensive passage which attacked the views of "some people" who "think that four years /of Soviet policy on the German question/ have been wasted." In fact, Khrushchev's 1958-1962 diplomacy for the Germanies represented an inglorious record of policy failures. He had tried and failed to drive a wedge between West Germany and other Western powers and to set West Germany adrift from NATO,** to prevent the recrudescence of a German military threat to the Soviet Union by keeping Germany divided; to conclude a peace treaty with the

*In response to a question, reported Die Wahrheit (the organ of the West Berlin SED) on 31 January, Khrushchev on 18 January in an interview with West Berlin SED representatives replied that "if we sign a peace treaty without the Western powers, we will leave West Berlin untouched. We shall merely take the following road: the line of communication will be placed under the jurisdiction of the GDR; the occupation will end; the rights of the occupation powers will end, for order on this territory will then be guaranteed by the peace treaty. This is our position. However, we are seeking to reach an agreement with the West so that no unilateral action will be taken, after all we are not demanding any gains for ourselves, we are demanding nothing, we want to finalize what exists."

**As a result, the Western powers drew closer together and built up their forces in Europe, thereby helping the Soviet champions of stronger theater forces to halt the troop cut instituted earlier by Khrushchev and to push through their preferred defense programs at the expense of Khrushchev's schemes for general economic progress.

Germanies on Soviet terms and to alter the status of West Berlin; to force a withdrawal of U.S. forces from German soil; to make East Germany a viable sovereign state and to gain non-bloc recognition for East Germany; to expand Soviet influence in West Germany and promote Soviet hegemony in Western Europe; to get West Germany to relinquish claims to territory lost to East Europe after World War II; to cut back substantially Soviet forces stationed in East Germany; or even to achieve some degree of military disengagement through an East-West nonaggression pact.

One of the "some people" that Khrushchev on 16 January 1963 was rebutting may well have been presidium colleague Kozlov, who did not reiterate Khrushchev's 16 January substitution of the Berlin wall for a German peace treaty, and continued to appeal for the "swift conclusion of a German peace treaty and normalization, on the basis of that treaty, of the situation in West Berlin" (Leningrad election speech, 26 February 1963). Almost as if he were replying to such "people" and as if he were trying to allay fears in some quarters that he might consider abandoning the GDR, Khrushchev in his 27 February 1963 election speech pledged that the Soviet Union would not engage in a bargain with the "West German revanchists" to solve territorial disputes by purchase. Later, in his 8 March 1963 Moscow speech, Khrushchev criticized Beria and Malenkov for making "the provocative proposal to liquidate the GDR as a socialist state."*

*The first reference to an East German sell-out was given in the Soviet press in the days following Khrushchev's 22d CPSU Congress withdrawal of the 1961 deadline for a peace treaty. It was also a time when (as in early 1963) Khrushchev's freedom of maneuver was hampered. His aggressive policy had brought about mobilization and increased combat efficiency in the West and had led to the suspension of his proposed one-third troop cut plan. The source of the sell-out reminder was an Ulbricht speech published in Pravda in November 1961 which included a passage stating that "it is known" that Beria, like Malenkov, opposed the building of socialism in East Germany. The appendix (pages 94-104) examines the "Beria heresy."

3. THE DETENTE AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

In mid-April, Kozlov, whose influence on Soviet policy in general was at its height, left the Soviet political scene, the victim of a heart attack.* Khrushchev in the spring of 1963 than managed to get the upper hand in the internal policy debates, and foreign policy began to take a more deliberate course in the general direction of relaxed tensions.**

*During the winter and early spring of 1963, many of Khrushchev's earlier policies were either halted or reversed. And Kozlov in public speeches at that time appeared to be leading the challenge to Khrushchevian policies relating to the correct role for the CPSU, resource allocation, reform in agriculture, art and literature, and Yugoslavia. (Kozlov's heart attack came at about the time of the unique 10 April Pravda "correction" in the 1963 May Day slogan that Yugoslavia "is building socialism." The original 8 April release of the slogan did not state that Yugoslavia is "building socialism"--a Kozlovian, but not a typically Khrushchevian omission.) By late May 1963, Kozlov's name, which had followed Khrushchev's in protocol rankings since the October 1961 CPSU Congress, was and continued to be listed in strict alphabetical order.

**Chief of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament talks, Tsarapkin (currently Ambassador to the FRG), made a "big concession" at Geneva and accord was reached on a Washington-Moscow direct communications link, the "hot line"; the Soviets asked for resumption of bilateral talks on Berlin and Germany, etc. The new course gained momentum, with the signing of the partial test ban treaty in July, the signing of a UN agreement to ban orbital nuclear weapons in October, the announcement in December of a reduction in the military budget, a "contemplated" cut in the size of Soviet forces, and a policy of arms reduction by "mutual example."

But even in the new warmer atmosphere Khrushchev continued to be troubled by the German question, because so many of his other foreign policy goals were tied to it. The German question stood in the way of substantial progress toward improving East-West relations, greater stability in Europe, and controlling the arms race, which would have permitted him to press forward with his ambitious economic programs. In addition to the German question, political relations with Communist China added urgency for the achievement of Khrushchev's post-missile crisis objectives with the West. Particularly after the crisis, there was growing evidence that their neighbor to the East was being looked upon by Soviet military planners more as a potential military opponent than as an ally. Soviet military capabilities against possible incursions by Chinese troops along the vast borders were being gradually build up, and the Soviets were beginning to develop a new and more flexible military doctrine suitable for dealing with the kinds of military threats short of "massive retaliation" which China might pose for the USSR.

In this environment, Khrushchev, who seemed to be moving toward a political showdown with the Chinese Communist Party, began to reveal the desire to alleviate the military threat from the West and to consummate his objective of detente with the West. And throughout the summer of 1963 Soviet propaganda references to Western "misuse" of West Berlin and the air corridors to Berlin, to the importance and urgency of settling the German problem, to the need to "liquidate" the Western occupation regime, and to other past crisis themes took on a perfunctory air while references to the possibility of better Moscow-Bonn relations recurred more frequently.

The desire for good relations with Bonn, for example, was given unusual stress in Khrushchev's 2 July 1963 East Berlin speech. Thus Khrushchev, while indicating that the Soviet Union could certainly live without a German peace treaty for the time being, gave considerable emphasis in his lengthy speech to the need to normalize economic and trade relations between West Germany and the USSR. He even recalled personal experiences in the Donbass coal mines working near German engineers during the period of

the Rapallo Pact after World War I "when German statesmen mustered the strength and courage to acknowledge that friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union would benefit both countries and both peoples." But he also went out of his way to reassure Ulbricht that he would not sell-out the GDR for the price of good relations with the FRG. Without naming Beria or Malenkov, he stated that the condition put forth by "statesmen of the FRG" for a "change in the policy and social system of the GDR" for good relations with the Soviet Union had been "smashed to smithereens 10 years ago." (This was the last recorded instance of a no sell-out pledge from Khrushchev, as well as the last time he alluded to the "Beria heresy.")

However, another figure, FRG Chancellor Adenauer, remained as a brake on any major Khrushchevian policy innovations regarding Germany. Adenauer's near intransigent "no experiments" policy toward the East gave Khrushchev little flexibility with which to explore economic and political matters with Bonn and, in Khrushchev's lights, did not reflect the "strength and courage" which he ascribed in July to early post-World War I German policy. Khrushchev's apparent inability to set a German policy in motion during the last year of Adenauer's reign was perhaps reflected in an intransigent statement of his own, made [redacted] in September 1963 that a "reunited Germany could, in the Soviet view, only be a Communist Germany."*

*But one year later, when Khrushchev spoke about the future political composition of a reunited Germany, he avoided making a Communist system a condition for German reunification. (Page 22)

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S GERMAN POLICY: OCTOBER 1963 - OCTOBER 1964

1. EVALUATING THE NEW CHANCELLOR

With the Erhard administration taking over in mid-October 1963, however, Khrushchev began a cautious reconnaissance of Bonn's "policy of movement" toward the East.* In fact, Khrushchev's initial movement on the German question may have been little more than a reaction to Erhard's more flexible approach toward Moscow-Bonn problems. Moscow's generally favorable evaluation of Bonn's new course was reflected in the propaganda which in the main treated the new chancellor with circumspection, and in Soviet diplomacy which did not attempt to frustrate Erhard's (and the FRG businessmen's) "policy of movement" in regard to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Soviet propagandists criticized Chancellor Erhard's first Bundestag policy statement (18 October 1963) as a continuation of the "anti-detente" policies of his predecessor. But in the months that followed, the propaganda took a more conciliatory turn, the German "anti-detente" policy theme was dropped, and, with rare exceptions,* the image

*While the "policy of movement" originated in the last two years of the Adenauer administration (the policy was authored by Foreign Minister Schroeder), it was limited in scope by Adenauer and was not given impetus until Erhard's administration. Under Adenauer, the policy's main success was the exchange of trade missions with Poland in March 1963.

**Possibly to lay the groundwork for Mikoyan's talks with Ulbricht, Moscow in a TASS release on 6 March 1964 launched its second propaganda criticism of the Erhard government. But even in the middle of Mikoyan's visit to the GDR, Moscow [redacted] affirmed its intentions to maintain highest level contacts with the Erhard government.

of a German Chancellor was no longer presented to Soviet citizens as that of a revanchist, militarist, and intransigent demagogue of the former Hitlerite Reich. Rather, Moscow propagandists greeted statements by Erhard on improving relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with optimism and expressed hope that "practical deeds" would follow the new Chancellor's policy statement. (Erhard, in the meantime, had been probing for new trade contacts with the East.)

At the same time, the Soviet press and radio made very little mention of such dissonant themes as checkpoint "violations," intra-Berlin traffic incidents, wall "provocations," "provocative" occupation maneuvers in West Berlin, "revanchist" meetings, and "violations" in access procedures to West Berlin. Regarding access, for example, the October and November 1963 U.S. Berlin convoy incidents were played down in Soviet propaganda. The first incident (10-12 October) was publicly regarded by Moscow radio as a meaningless event (the "incident...is not worth a farthing"); the second (4-6 November) evoked a short lived and relatively mild reaction which, without elaboration, ambiguously warned of possible "undesirable consequences" of future U.S. checkpoint "violations." Instead of dissonant themes, attention was paid to West Berlin-GDR cooperation, which Moscow encouraged. For example, the ground-breaking West Berlin-GDR agreement of 17 December 1963 on West Berlin holiday passes to visit East Berlin was said, in an 11 March 1964 Soviet memorandum, to have led to a certain "detente" between East and West Germany; it was said, too, that "as additional similar agreements are reached, they will further efforts toward reunification." Also, significantly, Bonn-Moscow cooperation became a common theme in private statements and practical steps were taken. For example, in the early spring of 1964 the West German industrial firm, Krupps, was permitted by Moscow to open the first West German commercial office in the USSR.

An important development in this period, a watershed in Khrushchev's new approach toward Germany, occurred on 11 March when Ambassador Smirnov delivered a message from Khrushchev to Erhard that gave rise to the first

speculation in the Western press that Khrushchev might be considering a meeting with the new head of the West German state. The message itself reportedly made no basic changes in the prior Soviet positions on the German question; it was only a gambit, but the first of many which led to a greatly improved atmosphere in Moscow-Bonn relations during the remainder of Khrushchev's effective control of Soviet foreign policy.

Also significant was the fact that Moscow's public reaction to an offer made in late 1963 by Erhard to purchase the GDR was one of silence--rather than the ridicule and disdain that spiced Khrushchev's early 1963 public pledge that the USSR would not engage in bargains related to territorial purchase. Erhard, when he first discussed the idea of reunification-through-purchase with a U.S. official in early October 1963, said that Germany might contribute industrial installations for the development of Siberia over a 10-to-20 year period if Khrushchev would agree to a phased German unification program. And [redacted] had [redacted] suggested that West Germany might extend $2.5 billion of aid a year for ten years for reunification. That Moscow subsequently became acquainted with at least the general idea of Erhard's reunification scheme is almost certain. For in early June, Erhard's message was plainly conveyed in a U.S. News and World Report interview with him.

> We are ready to conclude a trade treaty. I can only repeat we would not shun sacrifices, if by economic means we could improve the lot of the German people in the Soviet occupation zone, or could move a step toward reunification and self-determination.*

*Emphasis supplied here and elsewhere in this paper, unless otherwise noted.

Moscow's propaganda in June scored Erhard's "self-determination" appeal ("it means the absorption of the GDR by the FRG") but remained silent on the expressed willingness of Erhard to make economic sacrifices in the interest of promoting reunification and self-determination. Similarly, Khrushchev, in extensive remarks on the German problem in his 12 June Kremlin speech criticized self-determination as a "non applicable" reunification principle, but nowhere in that or any other public speech mentioned Erhard's economic approach to reunification, Khrushchev, in fact, failed in 1964 to make any explicit "no sell-out" pledges; these, significantly, were first made by Khrushchev's presidium opponents a week before the Kremlin coup.

2. TROUBLE WITH EAST GERMANY

The shelving of Moscow's strategy of trying to force a German settlement and the concomitant diminution of East-West and, in particular, Soviet-West German tensions in Europe had begun to adversely effect East German relations with the Soviet Union. As if to counter the openly expressed fears of Ulbricht and his East German SED colleagues about a Bonn-Moscow detente, a stream of high-level Soviet leaders arrived in the GDR.

Mikoyan's 10-12 March trip to East Berlin, ostensibly to celebrate the 70th birthday of inactive Premier Grotewohl, was particularly curious in light of the fact that no other bloc dignitaries of Mikoyan's rank attended. Mikoyan's appearance seemed to represent a Soviet effort to assuage East German fears on certain economic and military* points of disagreement. However, judging from

*At this time, Ulbricht may already have been aware of a contemplated Soviet scheme, reports of which surfaced in June, to withdraw some 20,000 troops from the GDR. Ulbricht may have also been concerned with the consequences of a planned reorganization of the Group (footnote continued on page 14)

the East German propaganda treatment of Mikoyan and the subsequent--and possibly related--visits of Marshals Grechko and Malinovskiy, the Soviets' mid-spring effort to reassure the East Germans was not entirely successful.

One of the most likely topics of discussion during Mikoyan's March visit was the GDR's resentment of the action of other East European countries in signing trade agreements with West Germany that recognized West Berlin as part of the West German currency area. The East Germans

(footnote continued from page 13)

of Soviet Forces/Germany (GSFG). That Ulbricht felt--at least during March and early April--that the proposed Soviet military changes might be less than advantageous for GDR security is suggested by East Berlin's and Moscow's propaganda treatment of the visits of Grechko and Malinovskiy. The TASS and ADN reports of the 9 April Malinovskiy-Ulbricht meeting atypically deleted the stereotyped references to cordiality; ADN devoted six full paragraphs to Ulbricht's invective on Bonn's nuclear appetite, ignored Malinovskiy's reply, and thus left the impression that Ulbricht had delivered a stern lecture to Moscow on the true nature of the West German menace. East German media apparently ignored Grechko's visit altogether.

However, subsequent developments suggest that Ulbricht's anxiety over Soviet military plans was at least partly assuaged. The 13 June Soviet-GDR joint communique recorded Ulbricht's praise for Khrushchev's policy of "mutual example" in a manner that could be read as giving approval in principal to further Soviet efforts in that vein, including a reduction in the GSFG.

were publicly critical of East Germany's allies for having participated in this West German "scheme" to isolate the GDR, and their criticism was candidly expressed in the SED politburo's 15 February report to the 3-7 February 1964 SED plenum.

No direct evidence bearing on Mikoyan's stand on the "Berlin clause" controversy surfaced during his discussions with Ulbricht. That the Soviets had adopted a "hands-off" policy on the problem, however, was reflected in Moscow's propaganda, which virtually ignored the SED's campaign against the Berlin clause, and Moscow's intra-bloc diplomatic positions. For example, Moscow did not express displeasure when Bulgaria on 6 May signed a West German trade agreement which included a Berlin clause and thus joined Poland, Hungary and Rumania in the FRG "scheme" to isolate the GDR. Another example of Moscow's "hands-off" line may be read into article six of the 12 June 1964 Soviet-GDR friendship treaty. The stipulation in article six that "West Berlin is regarded as a separate political unit" allowed the Soviet Union to conclude economic treaties with West Germany that might include West Berlin without recognizing it as part of the Federal Republic politically.*

*After Khrushchev's ouster, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov in a talk with FRG Ambassador Groepper on 10 November in Moscow flatly stated that article six of the USSR-GDR friendship treaty barred inclusion of a Berlin clause in a USSR-FRG trade pact. However, Semenov promptly suggested a means of getting around article six. His suggestion, discussed on page 71, in effect recognized that Berlin is part of the West German currency area. Semenov's proposal was later shelved during a period of cool Moscow-Bonn relations in 1965.

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Buying Time with the Friendship Treaty

The signing of that Soviet-East German friendship treaty on 12 June afforded Khrushchev an opportunity to mollify Ulbricht, who was becoming increasingly restive over Khrushchev's "detente mood" and, in particular, its meaning for the German problem. For example, this mood was reflected in Khrushchev's efforts to notify in advance the United States, Britain and France that the treaty with Ulbricht would not affect existing Western rights in West Berlin. While the treaty and the subsequent 13 June joint communique endorsed demands for a German peace treaty and a change in the status of West Berlin, the friendship treaty was in fact a further postponement of long-standing Soviet demands.

Some curious developments tend to betray Khrushchev's interest in signing a friendship treaty with his German ally at that time. First, within hours of Ulbricht's departure from Moscow on 13 June, Khrushchev called in the West German Ambassador for a conversation in which he indicated his interest in meeting with Chancellor Erhard who only five days before had been quoted in the press as having favored making economic sacrifices in the interest of achieving reunification. (As in the case of the [redacted] Khrushchev, continuing to play the delicate diplomatic game at this stage, reportedly made no change in the Soviet position on the German question.) Second, Khrushchev, in projecting the nature of future Soviet-West German relations, reportedly [redacted] that it was only a question of time before the Rapallo solution of 1922 would prevail.* Third, despite East German pressures to ratify the friendship

*Interest in a Rapallo-like rapprochement appeared in the Soviet press in August under the editorship of Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey. See pages 26-28.

treaty at an early date, the Soviets managed to delay ratification for three-and-a-half months.

The Early Summer Quarrel With Ulbricht

In the latter half of July, the unrelieved tension between Ulbricht and Khrushchev over the direction in which Soviet policy then appeared to be moving spilled over into the public domain. Differences between them were reflected in the open press both during and following the Polish 20th anniversary celebrations.

Significant differences appeared, for example, in the 21 July anniversary speeches given by Khrushchev, Gomulka, Novotny, and Ulbricht. Khrushchev, unlike the other three, completely ignored the issues of borders, Bonn's alleged appetite for nuclear weapons, the NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF) issue, any reference to the danger of revanchism, and surprisingly, any call for a peace treaty. (On the same day in the West German city of Dortmund, Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey, in a remarkably conciliatory speech which stressed the need for better West German-Soviet Union relations, pointedly stated that the German press should pay attention to Khrushchev's simultaneous remarks in Warsaw.) Khrushchev's failure to mention publicly the peace treaty issue undoubtedly offended Ulbricht. In addition, Khrushchev's treatment of the source of the main military threat was somewhat different than that of his East European colleagues. Khrushchev placed the sole onus on "imperialist forces...who are threatening a war." Gomulka and Ulbricht presented the main military threat as originating, in the first place, in West Germany and, secondarily, in the "imperialist" countries.*

*On this point, Gomulka's remarks seem to be directed not only to the West but to Khrushchev as well. Under the section entitled "West German Militarism Is Still the Main Threat," Trybuna Ludu gave Gomulka's veiled remarks to Khrushchev:
(footnote continued on page 18)

Ulbricht's hurt feelings were bared in a speech he delivered in East Berlin on 23 July, upon returning from Warsaw. In the speech Ulbricht mentioned Khrushchev's name only twice, and then only in passing. But Ulbricht mentioned Gomulka some ten times, dwelled on Gomulka's remarks at Warsaw, and repeatedly expressed GDR agreement with Gomulka's views. The implied invidious comparison with the state of Soviet-GDR relations and the adroit slighting of Khrushchev could hardly have escaped the notice of Ulbricht's listeners. Moreover, in the same speech, Ulbricht hinted that agreement had not been reached among the Communist leaders on the matter of meeting the MLF problem. While he said that "full agreement" had been reached on other matters, he said only that the MLF issue had been "studied". (Khrushchev's 21 July Warsaw speech, however, belied the suggestion that agreement had been reached on many matters under discussion at the Warsaw meeting.)*

(footnote continued from page 17)

> The invariable response from the West is that we only imagine this threat /of West German militarism/, that the NATO powers keep a tight hand on West German militarists, and that West Germany follows a peaceful policy...We have never imagined anything.

See page 51 for post-coup indications that Gomulka was not pleased with Khrushchev's overtures to Bonn.

*A TASS report on 28 July 1964 stated that GDR Foreign Minister Bolz had called on Gromyko for a "friendly" talk on "a number of questions of interest to both sides." Coming so soon after his participation in Ulbricht's state visit, and at a time when Adzhubey was seeing Erhard, the Bolz visit may have reflected new East German apprehensions.

While Khrushchev and Ulbricht were quarreling in Warsaw, Khrushchev's son-in-law--who was then the subject of rumors in Moscow to the effect that he would shortly replace Foreign Minister Gromyko--was making a series of remarkably conciliatory comments in the territory of Ulbricht's chief "enemy," West Germany.

3. ADZHUBEY'S LAST AMBASSADE

Conciliatory Comments in the FRG

Adzhubey arrived in West Germany on 20 July. One of his primary missions there, evidently, was to determine Erhard's intentions about meeting Khrushchev and about the scope of issues to be discussed. In a conversation Adzhubey obliquely asked the Chancellor if he were serious about desiring a meeting with Khrushchev. (Khrushchev on at least two previous occasions--in March and June--had reportedly acquainted Bonn with his interest in such a meeting.) In addition to a meeting, Adzhubey, in response to a question in a late July interview in West Germany, stated that he could "visualize" a confidential exchange of letters between Erhard and Khrushchev, and that "nothing but good can come of it." (Der Spiegel, 2 August 1964)

Trade, Adzhubey let it be known, was to be one of the subjects of the Khrushchev-Erhard exchange. Also on 27 July Adzhubey told Bundestag member Erler that he (Adzhubey) could appreciate the close commerical connection between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, the fact that West Berlin

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had the same currency, and so forth. According to Erler, Adzhubey was confident that "due account" could be taken of the Bonn-West Berlin relationship in future trade agreements. Thus Adzhubey--who had let it be known to FRG journalists upon his arrival on 20 July that he had met with Soviet Minister of Trade Patolichev before he (Adzhubey) left the USSR--seemed to suggest that the Soviet Union could take due account of the economic ties between West Berlin and Bonn without getting into the question of the political ties between them and the friendship treaty ties between Moscow and East Berlin. And in talks with the chief editors of the Rheinishe Post (Dusseldorf), Adzhubey reportedly stated that West Germany should have no difficulty in consummating a trade and cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, since all the two parties had to do was to find a "face-saving" formula on the Berlin issue.

The issue of West Germany and the NATO multilateral nuclear force proposal was also treated with remarkable candor. In a discussion with prominent Bundestag members on 27 July, Adzhubey indicated that the nuclear armament of West Germany within three years through the MLF or the force de frappe was a planning assumption on which Soviet policy toward West Germany was based. Adzhubey did not link this prediction--a nuclear armed FRG by 1967--to any threat, but merely stated his assumption as a fact which the Soviet policy planners were taking into account. On the next day, Adzhubey made his concern about German nuclear armament known Adzhubey said that the German interest in nuclear armament was represented by its support of the multilateral nuclear force. And he seemed to have been trying to convey the thought that West German participation in the MLF would wreck any chances of a negotiated settlement of the German question.

On the next day (28 July) and on the subject of the Soviet zone, Adzhubey told in an unofficial talk that the 12 June friendship treaty with the GDR was not intended for eternity and that it contains within its provisions for amendment.

That reunification could be one of the subject to be discussed by Khrushchev and Erhard was also made clear by Adzhubey in his Der Spiegel interview (2 August edition): in response to a question regarding the subjects to be examined if such a meeting were to occur, Adzhubey

*The reunification-MLF withdrawal offer may not have been immediately affected by the October change in the Kremlin leadership. Western press reports on 17-18 November 1964 cited Bonn sources to the effect that West Germany was planning to seek a clause in the MLF treaty that would provide for German withdrawal in the event of reunification. As if to dampen the new Soviet leadership's propaganda campaign against Bonn's interest in the MFL, the 17-18 November reunification-MLF withdrawal reports were circulated three days after a TASS statement warning of the dangers of a nuclear-armed FRG and threatening vague countermeasures to the MLF. Moscow's initial reaction to the reunification-MLF withdrawal reports betrayed a sense of interest in the "deal." Moscow Radio commentator Zakharov in a broadcast to Germany on 23 November 1964 stated that West Germany is not sincere in its desire for reunification, but the commentator went on to indicate that an FRG withdrawal from "dangerous policies" (i.e., the MLF) would be a precondition for reunification. After the MLF proposal was placed in abeyance at the end of 1964, interest in such a "deal" was not pronounced and has not recurred recently in monitored Soviet propaganda.

answered that "if you are referring to the German problem it may very well be among the subjects of discussion." And in a 22 July luncheon in Essen and in a 29 July TV interview Adzhubey repeatedly stressed the need for the two to talk without a fixed agenda and without preconditions. Although Adzhubey made no explicit concessions with respect to the question of German reunification, his remarks on the subject were unusually mild. He diplomatically sidestepped a question by Der Spiegel editors in an interview shortly before his departure as to whether he could visualize a reunification of Germany under non-Communist auspices; he did not reiterate the line that a reunited Germany could be only a Communist Germany.*

*Nor did Khrushchev when he spoke about the future political composition of a reunified Germany on 15 September 1964 in a [redacted] meeting with Japanese parliamentarians in Moscow:

> The ruling class of the Federal Republic of Germans wants a united Germany founded on capitalism while the people of the German Democratic Republic want a unified Germany founded on socialism. In all probability, the status will continue for some time and the problem will be solved by history. However, you probably would not be surprised even if I, as a communist, should express my belief that a unified socialist Germany will emerge. When will it emerge? I do not know. Who will decide it? It should be decided by the Germans themselves.

Thus Khrushchev appeared to have moved from his unambiguous policy position made in a [redacted] conversation in September 1963 that a reunified Germany had to be Communist (page 9) to a vague expression of belief that it would be so.

Adzhubey also commented, in response to a question by Der Spiegel editors as to whether he foresaw any chance of relaxing the Bonn-Moscow atmosphere, that "a really big step" should be taken to improve relations. The nature of the "really big step" Adzhubey may have had in mind was not defined. But Erhard's stunned reaction to the fall of Khrushchev some months later makes tempting the speculation that Erhard's hopes for a "really big step" on the German question had indeed been raised. [redacted]

Adzhubey's cryptic reference to a "really big step" tends, in retrospect, to add further interest to his [redacted] statement to the editors of the Rheinishe Post that "there are a lot of little Molotovs"* who make it difficult for Khrushchev to carry out his policies, and his public statement in the 29 July TV interview that if the media of the FRG and USSR "were now to create certain tendencies in anticipation of the /Khrushchev-Erhard/ talks this would not be good either for Erhard or for Khrushchev." Adzhubey, in effect, seemed to be striving to leave open the possibility of a dodge for his father-in-law. For indeed, had Khrushchev become convinced that a discussion of the reunification question with Erhard at that time would have been a failure and/or would have led him into irreversable difficulties with his Kremlin colleagues, then he would have been able to repeat his past practice

*Molotov was one of the chief opponents of Khrushchev over the 1955 Austrian peace treaty. See Appendix, page 101.

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of executing a turnabout and covering up the intent with a high degree of demagogic skill. And in this contingency, the letters [redacted] which reportedly made no change in the past Soviet position on the German question, could have been used in defense of Khrushchev's "innocence."

Adzhubey while in the FRG combined his conciliatory gestures toward the FRG with frequent disparaging remarks toward the CPR. In a 26 July conversation [redacted] Adzhubey reportedly asserted that Communist China was a "threat" to the Soviet Union and [redacted] reported that Adzhubey left the "clear implication" that this threat necessitated better relations with Germany. Two days later in his conversation [redacted] Adzhubey, in the context of scoring CPR militancy, made the point that Russia had once already defended Europe from the Tartars. And in a 28 July conversation with Muenchner Merkur chief editor Kurt Wessel, Adzhubey said that the Russians were interested in having a peaceful Germany at their back during this time of trouble with China.

And that Ulbricht should not be regarded as an insurmountable obstacle in the way of a Bonn-Moscow rapprochement was indicated in Adzhubey's repeated allegations about the seriously deteriorating condition of Ulbricht's health. Adzhubey made at least three remarks to the effect that Bonn ought not to worry about a "cancer-ridden" Ulbricht who would not be around too much longer.*

*At the September 1964 Pugwash meeting held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, Soviet General Talenskiy, a leading military theoretician, also discussed the East German-China problem. He reportedly stated [redacted] that the major Soviet problem was Communist China and that the USSR "is eager to have the Chinese Communist nuclear potential smashed." He reportedly added that the Soviet Government was embarrassed by the Ulbricht regime, but they were so involved "at the present time" that they cannot disengage themselves. But in the decades ahead, [redacted] revealed
(footnote continued on page 25)

Ulbricht's Conspicuous Snub

On his way home from his three-week tour of West Germany, Adzhubey on 1 August stopped over in East Berlin for one day. During this short visit the temperamental Ulbricht remained "unavailable" and chose as his representative that East German leader--Norden--whom Adzhubey had publicly embarrassed prior to his trip to the FRG. Norden had authored an article that appeared in Izvestiya in which he referred to West German President Luebke as a "collaborator of the Nazi Gestapo." Adzhubey, in order to prepare a more favorable Moscow-Bonn atmosphere for his visit, had promptly ordered his duty editor to deliver an oral apology to the West German Embassy in Moscow for Norden's harsh remark. Adzhubey's apology stated that the publication of Norden's article had been a "mistake of the duty editor" and that Izvestiya did not agree with Norden's contentions.

Adzhubey's reception in East Berlin, thus, was a poor second to his grand tour of the FRG. His comments on his FRG visit with Norden and Norden's response did not surface,* but assuming that they were as enthusiastic

(footnote continued from page 24)
[redacted] in early January 1965, Adzhubey had implied that Russia might relinquish East Germany over a 10 to 20 year period, but the principal difficulties at that time were Moscow's prestige within Eastern Europe and the concomitant weakening of the Soviet position vis-a-vis China. [redacted] said that [redacted] had implied that Russia expected to be so busy with the Chinese problem over the next two decades that the Soviet Union might have to make concessions as to its western boundary.

*Peking's People's Daily on 8 September 1964 reported a Norden statement made after Adzhubey's visit that appeared to be a reprimand to Adzhubey and Khrushchev. See page 34.

as his subsequently published Izvestiya accounts (discussed presently) Adzhubey may well have added to the GDR leaders' concern about the extent to which Moscow would go in its "rapprochement" with Bonn. And in what appeared to be an effort to reassure the East German leaders, one German language radio commentary broadcast the day after Adzhubey returned to Moscow tried to balance his efforts to develop trade with the FRG with a rather vague assertion that "unrealistic political deals" are the "main obstacle" to further expansion of FRG-USSR trade.

The Adzhubey "Rapprochement" Articles of 9 and 11 August

Upon returning to Moscow, Adzhubey evidently reported directly to Khrushchev alone on his Bonn mission, rather than to the party presidium. According to post-coup reports, Adzhubey did not give an accounting to the other members of the presidium until two days after his private talk with Khrushchev. The difference, if any, between his private report to his father-in-law and his report at the presidium meeting is not known; it is tempting to speculate, however, that the charge that Adzhubey had given a private version of his Bonn visit before his formal presidium debriefing may well have fanned the suspicions, whether justified or not, of Khrushchev conspirators. (Khrushchev was not present at that reported presidium meeting; he had left on a tour of southern RSFSR.) But Adzhubey's articles in Izvestiya on his German trip probably reflected the tone of his report to the presidium and/or to Khrushchev.

A week after his return from Germany, Adzhubey and three colleagues* published two articles in Izvestiya, entitled, "We have Seen West Germany." The tone set by the articles was not one of antagonism and rasping on the theme of German militarism and revanchism. Rather,

*Y. Lednev, N. Polyanov and E. Pralnikov.

the authors adroitly soft-pedalled those traditional themes, and against the background of a West German landscape--painted in warm colors and nostalgically recollected in verse--they set about the business of persuading their readers that the West German people and their present leaders have changed, that they have become more reasonable and realistic, by and large, and that it has therefore become possible to negotiate outstanding differences with them.

The first, more cautious article warmed up the audience gradually to Adzhubey's extraordinary depiction of the "new" German mentality. One passage in the first article that stood out from the remaining, rather turgid, commentary seemed to convey the main message. The authors described how, during a press conference, a director of one of the large Ruhr steel firms passed them a note saying: "Now is the time for a new Rapallo." Then Adzhubey and his colleagues drove their point home: the Germans have changed. Commenting on the note, they wrote:

> This was an interesting detail. How much ingenuity has been expended by Bonn's official propagandists on blackening Rapallo in the eyes of the Germans! Rapallo was the treaty which took its name from the small Italian town where it was signed in 1922, a treaty between young Soviet Russia and the Weimar Republic. Rapallo was the first breach in the tight ring of international isolation which had been clamped around both conquered Germany and the Soviet Republic. Of course much has changed in the past four decades or more, and it would be naive to try to reconstruct the Treaty of Rapallo in its original form. Obviously the author of the note was not thinking of doing so. He was probably thinking of the spirit of Rapallo, of the spirit of realism in relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR. And incidentally, at present this is by no means to the

liking of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Yet the little piece of paper pushed across the table became, as it were, the symbol of an important and intelligent idea, of a profound understanding of the state of the modern world, at which everyone who wants to be a realist would willy-nilly arrive.

This plug for the "spirit of Rapallo" was used by Adzhubey to introduce the remarks of Berthold Beitz, the managing director of Krupp who had interrupted his vacation to return to Essen and meet the Soviet group. Beitz was reported as being convinced that there is a real possibility of raising the USSR's share of West German foreign trade to six percent.* But Adzhubey's purpose in boosting the "spirit of Rapallo" may have gone beyond trade exchanges. He may have been paving the way for another Soviet attempt at "Leninist compromises" in foreign policy, one of which was the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. (An entire article was devoted to a discussion of "Leninist compromist" in the June 1964 issue of Problems of History of the CPSU.)

In the second installment, Adzhubey and his colleagues took unprecendented liberties in depicting the new

*Exports to the Soviet Union amounted to a little more than 1.5 percent of West German foreign trade in 1964. This small amount was reduced by almost one half to .8 percent for 1965 (though a puzzling TASS addendum to Brezhnev's 29 September 1965 plenum speech, cited on page 70 claimed that the Soviet trade with the FRG remained "approximately on the former level"), and for the first seven months of 1966 (the best available recent information) the decline continued with only .6 percent of FRG trade going to the USSR.

face of West Germany. After asserting that the question of postwar border changes in Europe could not be the subject of "political negotiations or political deals," the authors made it clear that other parts of the German question could be settled in that way. The authors said that while there were still some militaristic types who boasted that there is no "German question" which cannot be solved by German military forces, most of the German leaders, including Strauss (the bete noire of earlier Soviet propaganda), fully appreciated the futility of any such thoughts. The authors quoted Strauss as saying that a new world war would mean "biological extinction" for the Germans. Erhard, for his part, was quoted as having described Khrushchev as the man "representing in the best way the great Soviet power."

They pointed out that they had not originally planned to meet with West German political leaders, and interpreted the fact that they were received by "so many prominent leaders as a tribute to the enormous importance of the USSR, its government, and to Khrushchev personally." Moreover, they said, in the FRG, "among people of different political, social and economic positions, there is ripening or beginning to ripen a more sensible view of the contemporary world from which there is no escaping." They concluded with an anecdote about an incident during their visit: their car had crashed into a road barrier upon leaving Erhard's office, and they explained to curious onlookers that "we wanted this barrier to be the last on the road of improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG."

4. MOUNTING GDR INSECURITY

As the Soviet-West German "rapprochement" began to grow into a more serious affair in the late August and early September days, the East Germans grew increasingly restive. Several developments in particular gave them cause for alarm.

First, Khrushchev cast the die for talks with the West German head of state. On 2 September Soviet Ambassador Smirnov conveyed a letter from Khrushchev formally expressing his desire for a meeting with him in Bonn. (The letter left the details of the agenda to be worked out, but emphasized the need for careful advance preparations in the talks.) To make matters worse for Ulbricht, Moscow may not even have informed him directly through official channels about Khrushchev's definite intention to visit Bonn. Rather, on 4 September, the Soviet Embassy in Bonn informed the Bonn correspondent of the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland that Khrushchev would visit West Germany. On that day, at least one GDR radio commentator flatly stated that Moscow "officially" informed the GDR of Khrushchev's visit through the newspaper's Bonn correspondent.

Second, at about the same time, Khrushchev attended a high-level conference in Prague at which he and Gromyko were engaged in secret consultations with Novotny and the foreign ministers of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Conspicuously absent from the meetings was an East German representative. Yet Germany may have been one of the principal topics discussed. Peking's NCNA on 7 September pointedly noted that the "leaders of the GDR were not invited to the meeting which discussed the German question." It does appear from the composition of the group and the joint Soviet-Czech statement of 4 September that a number of foreign policy questions affecting bloc relations with the West were discussed.*

Third, over the weekend of 4-6 September, reports in the West German press stated that West German industrialists

*The ostensible occasion for Khrushchev's visit to Prague--the 20th anniversary of the Slovak uprising--did not warrant a figure of his rank. The 15th anniversary of the founding of the GDR, however, did warrant Khrushchev's attendance; Khrushchev, at the "insistence" of the presidium, went to Sochi, and Brezhnev to Berlin.

were ready to offer Moscow a deal ransoming the GDR for long-term credits (some reports said 30 years). Reflecting Ulbricht's uneasiness, a GDR radio commentator on 4 September promptly ridiculed the "speculation" of a GDR sell-out, but he did not go on to reassure his listeners that Khrushchev would reject such an offer. Similarly, on the same day another GDR commentary on Khrushchev's visit called the GDR sell-out concept "absurd," but left the impression that Moscow and Bonn might, nevertheless, consider such an absurdity. It is absurd, the GDR commentator said, to think that "an improvement of Soviet-West German relations could be implemented at the expense of any third state, for example the GDR; the GDR is not a country which could be bought from someone in the calculating way of a huckster." East Berlin, hence, was publicly warning its principal friend and its principal enemy not to conclude a bilateral arrangement at the expense of the GDR behind its back.

Peking Plays on GDR Sensitivites

Peking media seized upon the sell-out issue in a vitriolic propaganda campaign skillfully designed to play on anxieties of the East Germans and at the same time to discredit Moscow's good faith toward its allies.*

*While Peking was accusing Khrushchev of a "GDR sell-out," CPR considerations for a "GDR backout" were reportedly discussed by the Chinese in talks with the West Germans.

reported in late 1964 that the Chinese Communists indicated that they might be willing to move their embassy to Bonn, provided that the FRG opened an embassy in Peking, and the Chinese indicated they would be willing to remove the CPR embassy from East Berlin and reduce its representation there to something like a trade mission. Regarding CPR trade policy toward Bonn, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in a May 1964 interview with a correspondent of the Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung (5 May edition) indicated that CPR trade relations with the FRG are not entirely determined by political relations with the GDR. Chen Yi made the remarkably noncommittal statement that "it is certainly not our intention to exploit our relations with West Germany to place East Germany under pressure, nor to exploit our relations with East Germany to put West

(footnote continued on page 32)

Peking's propaganda barrage opened on 7 September with an NCNA report* which stated that the agenda for the forthcoming Khrushchev-Erhard talks was not restricted, that Erhard was willing to "pay a high 'price' economically for a political deal with the Soviet Union on the German question," and implied in conclusion that Khrushchev might accept Bonn's deal. Reported NCNA:

> UPI on 4 September quoted 'informed sources' in Bonn as saying that West German Government leaders were prepared to offer Khrushchev 'large trading credits' in return for Soviet 'political concessions.' The concessions would 'have to include a reorganization of the Communist regime in East Germany.' It added that some West Germans saw 'a ray of hope' for such a Soviet concession in the fact that the Foreign Minister of the GDR did not participate in the Prague meeting of the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders with the Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian foreign ministers.

On the next day the report of West German trading credits for Soviet political concessions was transmuted and amplified by Peking into an elaborately documented charge of

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Germany under pressure." Less than two weeks earlier, SED politburo member Matern had roundly scored CPR policy toward the GDR in a speech in East Berlin (22 April). According to ADN, Matern charged that in its final consequence "the endeavors of the Chinese leaders amounts to complete abandonment of the GDR as the western outpost of the socialist world system in Europe and to a new form of the German policy of the Beria clique which has been repulsed by the CPSU Central Committee under the leadership of Comrade Khrushchev." The lengthy Neues Deutschland account (on 23 April) of Matern's speech did not include this passage, which among other things, explicitly exonerated at least the CPSU Central Committee from the"Beria heresy."

*It appeared in People's Daily on the next day and was summarized in the foreign language Peking Review for 11 September.

a planned Soviet sell-out of East Germany. "A conspiracy that warrants attention" was the opening judgment of an authoritative People's Daily article, transmitted on 8 September by NCNA, on what it called the "current maneuvers" for a "dirty political deal to sell-out the GDR." Then, the article posed the leading questions:

> What makes the Bonn revanchists so bold as to advance barefacedly such an insolent plan of buying the GDR? And what makes them regard the GDR as something put on sale by certain persons? Can it be that they have received tacit approval or hints from those who recently talked like a minion in praise of the West German militarists? But in so doing, these people are reckoning without their host. They should know that the days of Munich are gone for good.

Finally, the article proceeded to provide its evidence for its opening guilty verdict by juxtaposing certain statements by Adzhubey in July and August with contrasting positions taken by Ulbricht during the same period. The contrast, which People's Daily sharpened by editorializing upon Adzhubey's statements, encompassed divergent remarks on the possibility of fruitful negotiations with the West German leadership and on the basic nature of West German foreign policy. With regard to negotiations, People's Daily reported that Ulbricht held that there were no grounds for the idea that the Erhard Government would make peaceful and reasonable policy shifts, while Adzhubey held that the West German leadership held a realistic attitude toward negotiating with the East. And with regard to Bonn's basic intentions, the CCP paper reported that Ulbricht saw no change in the "revanchist" policy of Bonn, while Adzhubey was reported as stating that Bonn had abandoned the idea of wiping out the Soviet Union. In addition, Ulbricht-Khrushchev differences were implied by People's Daily treatment of the presumed participants in negotiations on the future status of Germany. Ulbricht was quoted as stating that the German question cannot be settled in the absence of or in opposition to

the GDR, nor "can it be settled by other countries." Yet, implied People's Daily, this was precisely what was in store in light of the GDR's exclusion from the early September Prague meeting of the Soviet, Czech, Hungarian, and Bulgarian officials. The People's Daily article reiterated the earlier NCNA item that the GDR was not invited to the meeting which "discussed the German question," and added that Khrushchev's decision to visit West Germany had been taken at the Prague conference. The final point in the article was a quote from the highest East German leader, Norden, with whom Adzhubey talked during his short stopover in East Berlin in early August. According to the article Norden said that it was obvious that "it is impossible to annex the GDR, or buy it from any other Socialist country, or isolate it from its socialist neighbors."

And on the 11th, CPR media carried an extensive summary of an article in the East Berlin quarterly Freie Welt entitled, "How Much Does the GDR Cost?" The article scored as "sinister" the idea that the GDR could be bought as a kind of merchandise. However, the Chinese report included the East German article's curious exoneration of Khrushchev's role in the sinister idea. (A side effect of the exoneration, however, was to keep alive the suspicion of an insidious role on Khrushchev's part.) According to NCNA's extensive summary, the article maintained that:

> we would not be insulting Khrushchev if we shielded him from suspicion. This in no way concerns Khrushchev's personality, but the political understanding of the speculators who have no moral sense to speak of. No man in his right mind can imagine that the head of government of the Soviet Union, a world power, concluded a treaty of friendship with the GDR only to send his friend to the butcher at the first opportunity. But in Bonn (and not only there) there are people capable of such imagination.

Albania's capability for just that was soon displayed in a Zeri I Popullit article on 23 September which charged, among other things that

> there is no doubt that behind this visit /Khrushchev's proposed visit to Bonn/ a new N. Khrushchev conspiracy is hidden... In the name of 'peaceful coexistence' and a rapprochement with imperialism, from which it hopes to draw political and economic advantages, the renegade N. Khrushchev group does not hesitate to deal with the imperialists at the expense of the socialist countries. It does not hesitate to make a bargaining pawn of and to sacrifice a socialist country like the GDR. But the GDR is a sovereign socialist state which cannot be annexed easily and still less be sold or bought by anyone.

5. THE PRESIDIUM OPPOSITION INTERVENES

That Khrushchev's new approach to the German problem may have encouraged opposition in Kremlin ruling circles, and hence figured in the coup against him, is worthy of consideration. One well-known incident that occurred in early September raised speculation in the West that some Soviet leaders, with the assistance of the KGB, tried in an underhanded fashion to torpedo Khrushchev's planned visit to Bonn. On 6 September, only two days after it was announced in public (not in the USSR) that Khrushchev was going to Bonn for talks with Erhard, electronic technician Schwirkmann attached to the West German embassy in Moscow was mysteriously attacked with mustard gas. The episode caused a scandal in West Germany and it was touch-and-go for a while as to whether Erhard's invitation to Khrushchev would be rescinded. On 24 September, the Soviet Government formally rejected a West German memorandum protesting the affair, with the haughty and deceptive statement that the "Schwirkmann

case' venture was needed by certain quarters of the German Federal Republic to prevent an improvement of Soviet-West German relations." Curiously, the Soviet Government did not offer Bonn an apology acceptable to them until 12 October--the day the CPSU presidium voted to oust Khrushchev from power.

The long delay on the part of the Soviets could be interpreted to mean that Khrushchev could not marshal sufficient power to prevail upon the presidium to extend a formal apology to the West Germans.* To be sure, the mustard gas incident can only be regarded as circumstantial evidence of a plot to foil Khrushchev's plan to visit Erhard. Still, the incident seems to have been a turning point in Khrushchev's efforts to develop a warmer Soviet-West German atmosphere. For after the incident, his forward momentum, which had been gaining through July and August, was brought to a dead stop.

Another indication of a dispute in the Kremlin over Khrushchev's German policy turned up on 25 September. Pravda and Izvestiya were at variance in reported remarks made by Adzhubey on the previous day--the day that Moscow rejected Bonn's protest over the mustard gas incident.

*By way of contrast, Adzhubey promptly apologized to the West Germans over the Norden incident in July.

Brezhnev, through the coercive power of the KGB, may have taken the lead in trying to torpedo Khrushchev's German policy by authorizing the Schwirkmann affair, according to [redacted] Since the mustard gas incident took place on the same day Khrushchev returned from his visit to Czechoslovakia, runs the hypothesis, the operation may have been approved in his absence. And due to Brezhnev's responsibilities of the CPSU secretariat at that time, the KGB would have had to seek clearance for such an operation from Brezhnev in Khrushchev's absence. The hypothesis concludes that had the KGB been acting without clearance, a speedy apology would have been issued.

In reporting a meeting of the foreign affairs commissions of the Supreme Soviet convened to discuss the Soviet-GDR Friendship Treaty, Izvestiya (then under Adzhubey's control) printed--but Pravda deleted--Adzhubey's following statement:

> Sometime ago, I was in West Germany, visited its cities, and talked with quite a number of its political and state figures. This trip and these meetings once again confirmed the opinion that it would be completely incorrect to consider all Germans who live in the FRG to be revanchists.

Both Pravda and Izvestiya carried his next sentence which said that

> The overwhelming majority of the working populace of West Germany want to live in peace and friendship with all peoples. There are sober reasonable figures even among the bourgeoisie and in business circles. We will hope that it is they who will gain the upper hand in the Bonn political arena.

Hence, the truncated Pravda version did not make clear that West German political leaders were among the sober elements of West German society, while the Izvestiya version suggests that they were and that it was feasible to discuss political matters with them.

That the presumed opponents of Khrushchev's German policy had gotten the upper hand by this time is suggested by several other developments. On 25 September, after a very long delay that could only have been embarrassing for the GDR regime, Moscow at last exchanged instruments of ratification of the friendship treaty with East Berlin. (On the day before, the extra-legal procedure of the East German People's Chamber in ratifying the treaty displayed signs of haste: the requirement of two readings

of the 12 June treaty was not mentioned in the published proceedings of the late June and early September People's Chamber meetings.) Khrushchev did not attend the ceremony in Moscow, although he was in town at the time and although he had been a cosigner--with Ulbricht--of the treaty and had participated in a meeting held to honor it in June.

On 27 September, a Pravda editorial devoted to the ratification of the friendship treaty included a warning that may have been addressed to Khrushchev and Adzhubey as well as Erhard. Pravda gratituously asserted that "whoever thinks that an improvement of relations between the USSR and West Germany can be achieved in the slightest degree to the detriment of the interest of the GDR is deeply mistaken."

On 28 September, TASS announced that Brezhnev--not Khrushchev, whose rank should have dictated his presence at the East Berlin celebrations--would head the Soviet delegation to the GDR's 15th anniversary festivity.

On 30 September, Khrushchev left for a vacation in the south at the "insistence" of the presidium, according to [redacted] And the last available statement by Khrushchev on future Soviet policy toward West Germany--that he (Khrushchev) expected West Germany, which was not then and is not now a member of the United Nations, "to contribute greatly" as a future member of the United Nations--was reportedly made on 3 October in Sochi before a group of visiting Japanese Parliament members. According to former Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama in an interview with the Washington Post at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. on 22 October 1964, Khrushchev in Sochi brought up the subject of West Germany in an oblique reply to Fujiyama's suggestion that the UN Security Council be broadened to include Japan. Khrushchev, said Fujiyama, replyed that "Japan, India, and West Germany would in the future contribute greatly to the U.N."

On the day Khrushchev left for his vacation in Sochi, GDR leader Willi Stoph made a sudden visit to Moscow and commenced an intensive three-day series of

talks with Kosygin and other high-level Kremlin leaders. The timing of Stoph's visit--ostensibly for the purpose of opening an exhibit devoted to the 15th anniversary of the GDR--suggests that it may have been more concerned with finding out the actual consequences of the new Soviet line toward West Germany than with the more mundane subject of trade matters.

Then in rapid succession, Suslov and Brezhnev came forward with strong statements reassuring the East German leaders about Soviet intentions toward Germany. Suslov made a flat no-sell-out pledge in Moscow on the same day (5 October) that Brezhnev was welcomed in East Berlin by Ulbricht, who had refused to greet Khrushchev's son-in-law two months earlier. Ulbricht on 6 October responded with a rather defiant lecture on the limits of Soviet interference in GDR sovereignty. And at the same podium Brezhnev promised that there would be no "behind-the-back" deals detrimental to GDR interests.

Suslov's Guarantee

Suslov in his 5 October speech at a Kremlin meeting devoted to the GDR anniversary went out of his way to deny the possibility of a Bonn-Moscow deal at the expense of the GDR's "sovereignty." Suslov voiced the flat "guarantee" that "even if all the gold in the world were offered," the relations between Moscow and East Berlin would still not be for sale. He seemed to take seriously the idea that there had been a deal in the offing:

> Of late the revanchist circles of West Germany have begun to spread illusions about the possibility of making a commercial deal with the USSR at the expense of the GDR. If the USSR wants to be on good terms with West Germany, let it sacrifice the interests of the GDR. To say that such plans are of a provocative nature is putting it mildly.

They prove how pig-headedly bourgeois their authors are, who, in our times, still believe in the possiblity of managing the fates of peoples by means of purchase and sale. The treaty between the USSR and the GDR puts an end to these foolish illusions. It says to those gentlemen: First, the GDR is a sovereign state, and no one has the right to be the master of its interests except its people; second, the relations of fraternal friendship and socialist solidarity linking the USSR and the GDR are not for sale, even if all the gold of the world were offered for them.

Forget your foolish illusions, gentlemen revanchists; they will never come true. As far as normal relations between the USSR and West Germany are concerned, both sides are equally interested in them. These relations can be successfully developed, not on the basis of some shady deals, but on the basis of good will and cooperation in the interests of all the European states, of the cause of peace and international security.

And in a rejoinder to the 8 September People's Daily articles on the "shady deals" between Moscow and Bonn, Suslov added:

And we are firmly convinced that no intrigue of imperialist reaction in West Germany, no provocations of the Chinese leaders, who attempt to introduce discord into relations between the USSR and the GDR and to start quarrels between the SED and the CPSU, can for a minute shake the fraternal unity, eternal friendship, and comprehensive cooperation between our states, our peoples, and our Marxist-Leninist parties.

Suslov also took this occasion to give the German peace treaty issue a higher priority than it had been given in Soviet propaganda in late summer. He stated that "one of the most important problems, on the solution of which depends the liquidation of tension in Europe and in the entire world, is a peaceful German settlement." In addition, Suslov, like Kozlov in February 1963, injected a sense of urgency into the quest for a peace treaty. He stated that "from the viewpoint of the vital interests of European security, the need for a German peace treaty is becoming more and more imperative." He also tried to put on a face of unity among the Kremlin leaders by attributing to Khrushchev the statement that there are no differences in outlook between the CPSU and the SED. But a summary of his speech in Pravda on 6 October deleted this reference to Khrushchev, thereby dissociating him from Suslov's line. (Izvestiya ignored the Suslov speech altogether.) Moreover, in the light of the reported major role that Suslov played in the ouster of Khrushchev, Suslov's policy pronouncements indicate that a decision had been taken on certain aspects of the German issue (e.g., Khrushchev's Bonn visit, Ulbricht's tenure) in the absence of or without the approval of Khrushchev.

Ulbricht's Challenge

Ulbricht in his own way exacted retribution from Khrushchev by totally ignoring him in a lengthy speech (over 26,000 words) on 6 October, delivered at the East Berlin celebration of the GDR anniversary. And in that speech he made the startling statement that the East Germans paid all of the war reparations for the two Germanies, implying that the GDR had "purchased" its "sovereignty" from the Soviet Union. He also declared in an indignant tone that the "sovereign" GDR cannot be "purchased" by anyone else.

Ulbricht's startling discussion of the sensitive World War II war reparations matter was couched in an anti-Bonn framework, rather than in terms of resentment directed toward Moscow's heavy postwar drain on the

economy of the Soviet zone. But Ulbricht, nevertheless, placed the main onus of the GDR's postwar economic problems on the Soviet Union:

> The year the GDR was founded many ruins were still not eliminated; it was still a main concern to deal with the needs and to make restitution for what German imperialism had done to the Soviet Union and other nations. The citizens of the small GDR at that time made restitution for all Germany through hard work.

Ulbricht did not go on to discuss the amount of restitution the GDR had made to the Soviet Union, but he cited a "Social democratic scientist"* who verified this statement through his studies of the first postwar period and who "came to the conclusion that West Germany owes the GDR a few dozen billion marks." In addition to the "few dozen billion marks," Ulbricht cited 30 billion marks West Germany allegedly owes the GDR for "ruthless exploitation of the open border in Berlin in the years prior to the wall."

Peking propaganda seized upon Ulbricht's remarks and carried a brief report of the speech under the headline "GDR Pays USSR War Reparations for Two Germanies, Says Ulbricht." On 13 October, the Hong Kong Communist Ta Kung Pao cited Ulbricht's statements and related assertions to show "the East German people's resentment at the Soviet demand to pay their debts when East Germany was having a difficult time and at Khrushchev's attempt to sell out their country to West Germany.

*Identified by Ulbricht in his April 1965 SED Central Committee speech, examined on page 61, as a Dr. Badde. Presumably this is economics professor Dr. Fritz Badde of Kiel University, an SPD member who retired from the Bundestag in 1965.

Later in his speech of 6 October, Ulbricht renewed the line that a reunified Germany can only be Communist and again placed on the record his anti-Beria argument that the building of Communism can take place in a divided country. Then, by indirection, he informed the Soviet Union that it had no right to put a price on the GDR. He may have had Khrushchev as well as Erhard in mind when he said that

> a reunification also cannot be had in the way that some incorrigible fools imagine, namely that the GDR be bought from somebody. The GDR belongs to itself, it belongs to its citizens who are not prepared to sell either themselves or their republic to the imperialist Western powers. For this reason, one should finally put an end to speculations on such foolishness in West Germany once and for all and face life as it is.

It is possible that Ulbricht at the time of his speech had been told about presidium resistance to Khrushchev's overtures to Bonn. The fact that Khrushchev was conspicuously slighted in Ulbricht's two-hour speech, combined with Ulbricht's "hands-off-the GDR" challenge and an indirect war reparations barb, suggested that Ulbricht, at any rate, was confident enough to serve notice that he would not surrender his posts without a fight. (In private, and after Khrushchev was removed, the Soviet leaders reportedly informed some visiting delegations of foreign Communist parties that Adzhubey during his German trip had committed a grave error by criticizing Ulbricht's leadership.) Ulbricht's challenge also seemed to warn that if a major change occurred in Soviet policy toward West Germany,* Ulbricht would publicly retaliate by

*And Adzhubey in the FRG, according to [redacted], was regarded as the harbinger of "major" change in USSR German policy.

directly raising and elaborating upon embarrassing issues. (Such issues might well have included Soviet exploitation through war reparations, failure to support the GDR through substantial credits in the early years of its development, vacillation on Soviet policy regarding the peace treaty matter, and, perhaps, other specific grievances accrued during almost two decades of East German peonage.)

Brezhnev's Pledge

After Ulbricht left the rostrum, Brezhnev arose to read a Khrushchev-Mikoyan anniversary greeting, which contained a rather ambiguous passage to the effect that any "plot" against the GDR will be rebuffed. Then Brezhnev plunged into his own speech in which he pledged that no deal would be struck with Bonn politicians "behind the back of the GDR" that would be detrimental to GDR national interests and security. The realization that Khrushchev was planning to visit such politicians, and the accompanying insecurity of leading SED members that Khrushchev might agree to a policy detrimental to and "behind-the-back" of the GDR was only thinly veiled in earlier speeches by leading SED members in Brezhnev's audience. And after Khrushchev's ouster an SED politburo member in an East Berlin speech on 6 November harked back to Brezhnev's pledge and publicly tied Brezhnev's public statement to Suslov's 5 October flat promise that the GDR cannot be purchased.*

*The SED official, Verner, stated: "Anyone in Bonn or elsewhere still harboring illusions that the GDR can be negated, or that it is possible to make agreements behind the back of the GDR harmful to its interest, shall be reminded of the statements of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev at the festive meeting on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of our republic in Berlin. He said at the time: 'Today it is possible to state with the best of reasons that without the GDR it is impossible to solve either questions concerning the German peace settlement or other
(footnote continued on page 45)

Hence, it would seem that in early October Brezhnev and Suslov intervened to prevent Khrushchev from further developing his West German overtures and to reassure the East Germans that their interests would not be sacrificed for Soviet policy gains.

(footnote continued from page 44)

problems connected with the consolidation of security in Europe and the guarantee of peace." And anyone in the same places still dreaming that there is a price for which the GDR can be purchased, or even believing that, in the manner of horse traders, agreements can be concluded at the expense of the GDR and improved relations with the Soviet Union, should carefully read the statement of Comrade Mikhail Suslov made at a Soviet-German friendship rally on the 15th anniversary of our republic in Moscow. He said: 'Such plans testify to the bourgeois narrowmindedness of their authors who, in our present era, still believe in the possibility that the fates of nations can be decided through purchase or sale. The treaty between the USSR and the GDR tells these gentlemen: one, the GDR is a sovereign state, with no one except the people having the right to decide on its interests; and two, relations of brotherly friendship and socialist solidarity uniting the USSR and GDR cannot be sold or bought, even if all the gold of the world were offered.' This is true and clear, and the gentlemen on the Rhine will be well advised to consider this more seriously."

III. THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE GERMAN QUESTION: OCTOBER 1964 - JANUARY 1967

1. THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND THE COUP

The leaders who came to power in the Soviet Union in mid-October found little leeway for maneuver on the German question. With political power diffused among a coalition of men with diverse viewpoints on various policy questions, the new Soviet leadership was also hamstrung by a variety of problems inherited from Khrushchev, the solution of which was made difficult by unchanged objective circumstances. With respect to the German question, they did not admit in public that there was substance to the Chinese Communist charge that Khrushchev had been trying to make a deal with Bonn to sell-out the GDR for economic gain, though Soviet and East European sources in November and December 1964 privately stated that Khrushchev had favored a deal with Erhard at the expense of Ulbricht. The new Soviet leaders may also have tried to convince the East Germans that it was in their mutual interest not to implicate Khrushchev in a deal to sell-out the GDR.

East Germany's Reaction to the Coup

The initial GDR reaction to Khrushchev's ouster and its treatment of the sell-out question was ambivalent. On the one hand, there was evidence to suggest that Khrushchev's removal brought quick relief to the leaders in East Berlin about the fate of East Germany's future. The GDR's first official reaction to the Kremlin coup, which was registered in the 17 October communique of the SED Central Committee--the first Eastern European party statement on the Khrushchev ouster--was that the friendship treaty of June 1964 will be carried out "honorably," implying, perhaps, that there was some question among the East German leaders as to whether it would have been honorably implemented prior to Khrushchev's ouster. As

far as Ulbricht himself is concerned, his personal reaction in the first few weeks following Khrushchev's ouster was not made public.*

On the other hand, the SED central committee's communique of 17 October declared in another passage that Khrushchev's removal caused "deep agitation in our party and among our people," and that Khrushchev had merit in implementing "Marxist-Leninist policy as worked out by the CPSU Central Committee." Also, Verner, the SED politburo member who found it necessary to recall the pledges of Suslov and Brezhnev about no deals behind the back of the GDR, in a speech of 6 November, exonerated Khrushchev by name by saying that he had merit for having advocated the policy of a "peaceful and democratic solution of the German question." Though he followed this statement with the blanket charge that Khrushchev had "disregarded" and "violated" collective leadership, presumably including that worked out in the Central Committee, Verner did not explicitly connect these charges with errors in policy.

These discrepancies in the GDR's initial reaction, may be explained by any of several possibilities: division in the SED, initial lack of direction from Ulbricht and/or the new Kremlin leadership, or a cautious attitude on the part of the SED in an effort to evaluate the intentions of the new Soviet leadership with respect to the German question.

Subsequently, the GDR's public line suggested a greater sense of security with respect to the new Soviet leadership. Some GDR spokesmen obliquely contrasted the

*It does not seem likely that the Soviet conspirators would have made (or felt it necessary to make) a break in past practice by bringing a foreigner (like Ulbricht) into an internal CPSU matter--i.e., the 12 and 13 October presidium arraignment and the 14 October Central Committee prosecution. The evidence that Ulbricht went to Moscow on 12 October is weak, dubious and solely speculative. Ulbricht was absent from the East Berlin scene from 12 to 27 October; unlike other East European parties, there was no public announcement of an East German party fact-finding commission being sent to Moscow; and all of the other East European leaders except Rumania's Gheorghiu-Dej were reported to have been in their respective countries on the fateful days, 12-14 October.

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situation under Khrushchev with the one at hand, pointing up their grave suspicions about Khrushchev's intentions earlier in the year. Ulbricht, for example, in his speech at the SED plenum on 5 December 1964, stated that the SED was not disturbed by the "slander" created (he said) in the Western press in connection with Adzhubey's July Bonn visit because

> ...anyone can see for himself that the friendship treaty between the USSR and the GDR, as stated in the CPSU telegram of 29 October 1964, constitutes the basis on which the relations of overall fraternal cooperation between our states and parties are further developed.

Ulbricht thus seemed to be admitting that it took a post-coup telegram to put an end to the anticipation of adverse and radical change which had disturbed the SED during the last few months of Khrushchev's regime. SED politburo member Honecker--often mentioned as Ulbricht's successor--at the SED plenum went further than Ulbricht in explicitly stating that "even our enemies...have had to admit that the SED and Ulbricht have emerged from the aforementioned events /Khrushchev's ouster/ not weakened but strengthened."

Other Post-Coup Incriminations

The fact that the new Kremlin leadership, since taking over, avoided any specific public charge that Khrushchev had mismanaged Soviet policy on the German questions, stands in contrast to the Brezhnev-Suslov line of early October, that implied that there were elements in the USSR interested in striking a deal with the West Germans at Ulbricht's expense. Brezhnev's failure to renew a no sell-out pledge in his 29 October reply to Ulbricht's congratulations on the former's new "promotion" is particularly curious in light of Brezhnev's 6 October "guarantee." In his statement of 29 October, Brezhnev said only that "the CPSU will do all they can to guard that historical achievement--the unshakable friendship between our peoples--like the apple of their eyes, and to further develop the

relations of all-around fraternal cooperation between our parties and states." The new leadership's failure to give such "guarantees" appeared to reflect the decision not to implicate Khrushchev in a deal to sell-out the GDR. This phenomenon, along with other indications of the new Soviet policy toward the German problem, raised suspicions that the new leaders concluded, in light of their already limited maneuverability, that open disclosure of any devious Khrushchevian intentions toward the GDR would have made the new Kremlin leadership vulnerable to attack by friend (e.g., the GDR) and foe (e.g., the CPR) alike, and would have unnecessarily complicated Soviet diplomatic relations with the East European allies.

Even the public charges leveled against Khrushchev by Pravda contained only one possible link with an earlier indirect charge against Khrushchev's overtures to Bonn.

Brezhnev's 6 October 1964 East Berlin speech	17 October 1964 Pravda editorial on Khrushchev's ouster
Only short-sighted politicians who have completely divorced themselves from realistic policy, like some gentlemen on the banks of the Rhine, can indulge in the hope of solutions and agreements behind the back of the GDR, to the detriment of its national interests and security. No, gentlemen, this will never happen. These gentlemen will never find that we will do this.	The Leninist party is an enemy of subjectivism and drifting in communist construction. Hare-brained scheming, immature conclusions, and hasty decisions and actions divorced from reality, bragging and phrase-mongering, commandism, unwillingness to take into account the achievements of science and practical experience are alien to it.*

*Sheer coincidence cannot, of course, be ruled out. The link may be strengthened, though, by Ulbricht's use of a somewhat similar rhetorical device to depict a "divorce from realistic policy" when he revived similar worries after the 1966 CPSU Congress ("No one who has command of his five senses" can believe that the USSR would abandong the GDR. See ahead page 75) Freie Welt's use of the similar device (page 34) is another case in point.

An explicit indictment alluding to Khrushchev's misconduct of German affairs which Suslov was purported to have presented at the 14 October Central Committee trial of Khrushchev was included in some reports written by non-bloc Communist reporters in Moscow. The Communist-controlled Italian weekly Paese Sera on 30 October, for example, printed a list of "29 charges" against Khrushchev, one of which criticized Khrushchev for sending his son-in-law to Bonn as an authorized private emissary. (The existence of the "29 charges" was denied in a Moscow-datelined report printed in the Italian Communist party paper L'Unita on 31 October. Interestingly, TASS on 3 November chose to deny the authenticity of the indictment printed in the Italian leftist weekly L'Espresso on 1 November which did not include the Adzhubey-as-emissary charge.)*

[redacted] stated that Khrushchev had contemplated trying to "negotiate an agreement" with Bonn at the expense of Ulbricht. [redacted] reportedly commented that "this idea" of Khrushchev [redacted] not in any sense new, that Khrushchev had suggested it on several occasions in the past, and somewhat along the lines of Erhard's initial assessment (page 23) of the policy implications of the coup against Khrushchev, [redacted] said that with Khrushchev's ouster there would not be any agreement between Moscow and West Germany or the West on the Berlin question for "many, many

*While in the FRG Adzhubey reported directly to Khrushchev by phone, or so he told Der Spiegel editors in an interview they published on 2 August. In response to another question, Adzhubey himself suggested that he was Khrushchev's private emissary. He stated that "now I must give away a secret. The Premier wants us to come /back to Moscow/ as quickly as possible." For a careful examination of the other reported charges against Khru-

[redacted]

years." The "agreement" was not spelled out in the report of [redacted] remarks, [redacted] was explicit on the nature of Khrushchev's "idea", or part of that idea. According to [redacted] Khrushchev told Gomulka prior to 20 September 1964 that he (Khrushchev) had been negotiating with the West Germans, that the West Germans had agreed they would recognize the Oder-Neisse line if Khrushchev would remove the Berlin wall, guarantee free elections in East Germany and promise the removal of Ulbricht upon completion of his term of office. The report, which listed no other West German offers, stated that Khrushchev told Gomulka that he faced a "hard fight in Moscow" if he was to push through this scheme. Whatever the value may be of the report, other post-coup reports from Warsaw stated that Gomulka was apparently mistrustful of Khrushchev's intentions toward West Germany. According to the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, Gomulka was "upset" by Khrushchev's efforts to improve relations with West Germany. Thus, reported the embassy, Khrushchev's removal disturbed Gomulka less than other Communist leaders. Gomulka himself said cryptically on 28 October 1964 that there had been "justified grounds" for the ouster of Khrushchev. On 17 October the Polish Central Committee Press Bureau briefed newspaper editors on the removal of Khrushchev and reportedly stated that Khrushchev was becoming too friendly with the West and his proposed trip to West Germany was specifically mentioned as a factor leading to his downfall.

2. SIGNALS OF RENEWED DISQUIET

Soon after Khrushchev was replaced, the new Soviet leadership altered Moscow's long-standing formula on the need for a German peace treaty and a "neutral, free city," of West Berlin. The new leadership referred to a German "settlement" rather than a peace treaty, and frequently omitted references to West Berlin in the Soviet formulas. The East Germans, however, obstinately and polemically

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held on to the old peace treaty-West Berlin demands throughout the first half of 1965. Ulbricht's polemical remarks to the effect that the West Berlin issue ought not to be shelved were complimented by his rewriting of early post-war history which exaggerated his role and independence under the Soviet occupation, by his renewal of the delicate subject of the Soviet reparations rape of the Soviet Zone, and in late April by his praise of CPR support for GDR policy.

Holding Off on the German Issue

The new leadership may have felt that other more pressing domestic and foreign matters demanded their initial concentration and that any major diplomatic action --such as the Bonn visit--on the German question should be postponed. Concentration on other foreign and domestic matters may also explain, in part, Moscow's dropping of any element of urgency in the new Soviet peace treaty line. An initial attempt by the new leadership to introduce the urgent element, by calling for an "early" solution of the problem of the German peace treaty in the 17 October joint Soviet-Cuban communique, was shortly afterwards undone. Brezhnev, in his 6 November October Revolution anniversary speech and the major 13 November Pravda editorial on post-Khrushchev foreign policy made no reference to the need for an "early" solution.

In addition to dropping the formulation calling for the "speediest conclusion" of the German treaty, another switch present in Brezhnev's 19 October and 6 November speeches and in Kosygin's 25 November speech, was the reference to "settlement" rather than German "peace treaty." And a third switch in the formula shelved the long-standing effort to alter the status of West Berlin on the basis of a peace settlement. Moscow's new line on solving the German problem frequently contained no proviso for West Berlin. The standard line since Khrushchev's 1958 treaty ultimatum had been the solution of the German peace treaty and the normalization, on that

basis, of the situation in West Berlin.* Brezhnev in two speeches (6 November and 3 December) and Pravda in its authoritative foreign policy editorial (13 November), by dropping the Berlin rider to Moscow's German formula indicated that the new Soviet leadership was trying to dissociate itself from Khrushchev's six year old policy failures. (The status of West Berlin and the peace "treaty," however, were not consistently ignored in the first few months of the new leadership. The status of West Berlin was broached--but not tied to a peace treaty-- in formulations which reiterated the continuing Soviet view that West Berlin remained a polity separate from West Germany. For example, the 4 December 1964 Soviet-Czech communique stated that "the whole international situation would be helped by the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two sovereign German states and also an agreement on the status of West Berlin as an independent political unit.")

Ulbricht's Pique

The shelving of the old peace treaty and West Berlin formulas upset Ulbricht. A glaring affront to his wishes was displayed on the day of Brezhnev's 6 November 1964 speech, which ignored the subject of West Berlin and referred to a German "settlement." GDR leaders telegraphed Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan on 6 November and pointedly included the urgent appeal that "the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states and, on this basis, the transformation of West Berlin into a neutral free city are of extra-ordinary importance in the struggle for the unity and solidarity of the Communist world movement."

*This formulation--dating from the 1958 Berlin crisis-- had been reiterated in the 1 October Soviet-Indonesian communique (pre-ouster) as well as in the announced October revolution slogans (post-ouster, but announced prior to Brezhnev's speech).

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Brezhnev did not link the solution of the German problem to the world Communist movement, and referred to it as only one of a "number of unsolved problems" causing instability in the world.

And though Ulbricht stated that during his Kremlin talks with Brezhnev and others on the weekend of 6-7 November "complete agreement" was reached on the requirements of a German peace "settlement," other SED spokesmen continued in public and private to call for the "speediest conclusion" of a peace treaty with the two German states and on that basis to solve the West Berlin situation. The SED's continuing (though sporadic) references to the old peace treaty-West Berlin demands in November and December were, perhaps, particularly polemical in light of the fact that the 13 November Pravda editorial had pointedly criticized "some people" who do not reject old doctrines and concepts in efforts to insure European security.

Ulbricht's displeasure with the altered West Berlin line from the new Moscow leadership was renewed shortly after the 19-20 January 1965 Warsaw Pact meeting in Warsaw. In a 24 January East Berlin interview on the Pact meeting, Ulbricht in response to a leading question about Bonn's "revenge policy" and Bonn's "claim" to West Berlin, emphasized that the West Berlin question "is to us of as much importance as the question of the Oder-Neisse peace frontier is to People's Poland." The question of Europe's existing borders had appeared in the Warsaw Pact communique while the Berlin question was ignored, and the decision not to mention Berlin in the communique was, according to a high level Polish Foreign Ministry source, a "political one" in which "all delegations did not agree." Ulbricht's naked complaint regarding the continuing importance of the Berlin question was overlooked in Soviet propaganda, which throughout 1965 devoted the bulk of its German-related copy and time to the virtually dead MLF issue.

Kosygin's Cold Reception

East German displeasure over the Soviet shelving of the peace treaty-West Berlin issues may have accounted, in part,* for the surprisingly low-key treatment given by the GDR to Kosygin's 27 February-2 March 1965 visit to East Germany to take in the annual Leipzig trade fair. Kosygin's arrival was noted in Neues Deutschland in a one paragraph report under a news item about the return of the Polish delegation from the Leipzig fair. Ulbricht's greeting was a curt two-sentence telegram sent from Cairo** on the day Kosygin left the GDR, and during his visit East German protocol and publicity for the new Soviet premier did not measure up to the red-carpet treatment given by the GDR to the ceremonial head of state (Mikoyan) in his visit twelve months earlier.

*In addition to the peace treaty-West Berlin issues, reported that Ulbricht in the winter of 1964-1965 was greatly agitated" over the Soviet's laissez faire attitude toward continuing West German economic probes with East European Governments. Recent reports on East Germany's concern over Bonn's efforts in late December 1966 and January 1967 to establish diplomatic ties with Eastern Europe (pages 84-85) reflect a generally similar attitude on Moscow's part--that is, to diplomatically caution the East European nations to go slowly and shrewdly in their accommodation with Bonn, but not to exacerbate relations with the East Europeans by attempting to block their dealings with the FRG.

**Ulbricht was in Cairo engaged in a vain attempt to achieve a major breakthrough in non-bloc diplomatic recognition. (For GDR loans and credits equivalent to 100.8 million U.S. dollars, the UAR agreed only to open a consulate general in East Berlin.) The Cairo trip had long been planned; thus Ulbricht's absence, perhaps, was not in itself a major insult to Kosygin.

Almost the only East German report evincing enthusiasm during the visit was the 27 February scoop by ADN's correspondent in Moscow which cryptically cited "official circles of the Soviet Foreign Ministry" for the tidings that Kosygin had not accepted an invitation to visit West Germany. The invitation had been conveyed by [redacted] in Moscow, and it had been well received by Kosygin. Kosygin on the 23rd asked [redacted] to express his thanks for Erhard's invitation, which Kosygin called a friendly act designed to improve relations. He could not reply at once to the invitation, explained Kosygin (perhaps with the Khrushchev lesson in mind), since he had to consult his colleagues. Whatever the decision of his colleagues may have been, it remained curious that the means of conveying the answer to the FRG was by an East German correspondent in Moscow who reported the news while Kosygin was on his way to the GDR. (The day after East German media publicized the Moscow-datelined story by ADN's correspondent, Kosygin, in response to a question, reportedly told an AFP reporter that he was preparing no trip to Bonn.)

East German coolness toward Kosygin stood in contrast to Kosygin's warm praise in his 1 March Leipzig speech for East Germany's economic structure and his boost for Ulbricht's prestige--Kosygin disclosed that Ulbricht called the January 1965 Warsaw Pact meeting. By this and other gestures, Kosygin's visit seemed to bear much in common with the Mikoyan mission to East Berlin one year earlier; that is, to reassure the East Germans that their security was not in jeopardy during a period of diminished Soviet-West German tensions. Thus Kosygin in his 1 March speech balanced temperate references to West Germany ("the Soviet Government by no means intends to consider West Germany as an outcast where everything is bad and nothing is good") and faint hints of interest in the Rapallo line (he praised the fair as a "trading bridge between East and West," stressed that the FRG's interests were better served by "normal good neighborly relations" with the East, and, in private, reportedly expressed interest in expanding Soviet-West German cooperation in the fabrication and construction of fertilizer plants in a meeting with West German steel

executives) with sharp accusations alleging "manifestations of revanchism in Bonn." And, Kosygin tried to reassure East Berlin that the Soviet Union would not sacrifice the GDR's vital interests to West German revanchism: "We would like to make it quite clear to the West German leaders," emphasized Kosygin, "that they should not expect any concessions on our part where the program of revanchism is concerned." And to further the Soviet effort to assuage East Berlin, a flood of high-level Soviet officials* arrived in the GDR on 6 March to visit the Leipzig affair and meet with East German leaders. The rank and number of Soviet visits constituted a record high in Moscow's efforts to solidify intra-bloc views.

Two Views of A Bundestag "Provocation"

But trying to have it both ways with the two Germanies still did not sit well with Ulbricht, who returned from the Cairo visit on 6 March and proceeded to talk tougher in the next few months not only to the West Germans but also, in thinly veiled formulations, to the Soviets.

Ulbricht's diatribes concentrated, at first, on the 7 April 1965 Bundestag session in West Berlin. The session evoked an official protest by the Soviet Union, Soviet fighter planes buzzed the Reichstag building in West Berlin during the Bundestag session, and the GSFG conducted military maneuvers with GDR forces which at times halted autobahn traffic to and from West Berlin.

*Kosygin's belated retinue consisted of two full presidium members (Voronov and Shelest), two members of the CPSU Secretariat (Titov and Rudakov), five deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers (first deputy Ustinov, soon to be given a chair on the secretariat and a candidacy in the presidium, Dymshits, L. V. Smirnov, Rudnev, Novikov) and 17 ministers.

But Moscow soft-pedalled, while East Berlin highlighted, the events surrounding the Bundestag session. And Brezhnev in his 8 April Warsaw speech appeared to further downplay the significance of the session by calling it a "political provocation." Ulbricht equated the session with supposed military provocations, renewed and again emphasized his disputatious reference to the Soviet backaway from the Berlin issue,* and revived the hoary image of blockade and war in a single paragraph of an article that appeared in the May 1965 edition of World Marxist Review:

> The illegal appearance of the Bonn government in West Berlin and the Bundestag session there were a dangerous and reckless provocation, as important a component of the policy of revenge as the 'forward strategy,' the atomic-mine belt** and participation in a multilateral nuclear force. Bonn thinks that in this way it will succeed in annexing West Berlin and using it as an outpost to "eliminate" the GDR and force the door open to the East. But we have made it absolutely clear that West Berlin does not and will never belong to the Federal Republic. The question of West Berlin involves the vital interests

*The Soviet May Day slogans for 1965, for another example, made no reference to the need for a "free city of West Berlin."

**The atomic-mine belt, or the late-1964 West German proposal for a zone of atomic mines along the forward edge of the battle area in West Germny, evoked Soviet protest on 18 January 1965 which, interestingly, further placed the peace treaty issue on the ice. The note to the U.S. claimed that "pending the conclusion of a German peace treaty" the Soviet Union, along with the USA, Britain and France, continues to have a hand in FRG policy on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement.

> of the GDR. It is every bit as important to us as the question of the Oder-Neisse border is to Poland. We recall that under Hitler the Danzig corridor issue was used not only to foment revanchism, but also to prepare war. Thus, the question of ways of access to West Berlin could become a question of war and peace. Therefore the crime should be prevented in good time. Those who want normal communication with West Berlin through GDR territory by land, water and air should accustom themselves to concluding permanent agreements with the German Democratic Republic. /Emphasis in original/

Brezhnev's relatively temperate analysis of the Bundestag session in his 8 April Warsaw speech constituted the only comment on the subject during the 4-10 April Brezhnev-Kosygin visit to Poland. No Berlin blockade threats were made by the Soviet leaders and the Polish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed by the two parties on 8 April included the first Soviet reference in a treaty to the Oder-Neisse line. (The 12 June 1964 GDR-Soviet treaty--which had not been listed in Pravda's 1 January 1965 tally of Soviet foreign policy successes in 1964--guaranteed but did not specify the GDR borders. Neues Deutschland's 10 April 1965 article on the Soviet-Polish treaty stated that the "Oder-Neisse border has been confirmed by the treaties concluded between the GDR and Poland" and made no reference to the vague 1964 Soviet-GDR border guarantee.)

Reaction from Ulbricht, which constituted an admonishment to the Soviets that the GDR cannot be taken for granted, was not long delayed.

Ulbricht's Rewriting of East German History

Nine days after the signing ceremony in Warsaw, Neues Deutschland took the unusual step of publishing

"for the first time" a five year old Ulbricht speech on the testy subject of the scope and role of Germans in the Soviet zone of occupation in the immediate post war days. The speech, which held that the scope of German activity was large and their role was not fully subservient to the Soviets, was purportedly delivered on 12 May 1960. If so, it may have registered Ulbricht's pique over one of Khrushchev's backdowns on earlier threats to sign a separate USSR-GDR peace treaty. (Khrushchev, on the heels of the Paris summit meeting, made such a tactical backdown in a speech in East Berlin on 20 May 1960).* Presumably its belated publication served to register similar feelings over the backaway by Brezhnev and Kosygin on the peace treaty-West Berlin issues. The 1960 Ulbricht speech made it clear that its purpose was to correct the "not quite correct" historical accounts of the development of East German civil administration under the Soviet occupation. Gratefully acknowledging that "capitalist contradictions" were liquidated and a new administration was established with the help of the Soviet Army and the Soviet occupation organs, the newly published Ulbricht speech claimed that Soviet assistance "is only part of the story." The rest of the story concerned Ulbricht's personal role in forming the SED and the early activities of Germans guided by the "leadership of the SED." "This is the essential point which I wanted to explain here as a historical lesson," declaimed Ulbricht. The publication of the delayed history lesson was soon followed by Ulbricht's return to another sensitive East German-Soviet issue--reparations.

Reparations for all of Germany were made by the GDR, repeated Ulbricht in his SED Central Committee plenum speech published by Neues Deutschland on 28 April. After

*A similar rationale appeared to underlie Ulbricht's November 1961 charge (page 6), made after another Khrushchev backdown on a separate USSR-GDR peace treaty, that Beria and Malenkov did not favor the construction of socialism in East Germany.

charging that the FRG owes the GDR an amount "approaching" 120 billion deutsche marks for the Soviet war reparations and for West German economic "exploitation" of East Germany in the days before the Berlin Wall put a stop to the GDR's manpower drain, Ulbricht bemoaned the limited scope of East Germany's national economy ("just imagine what our national economy would be like if we had invested this additional amount of approximately 120 billion deutsche marks") and, thus, as he had done in his 6 October 1964 speech, indirectly placed the blame on the Soviet Union for its dismantling of the Eastern Zone during the early post war years.

The speaker's personal role during the early years and his newly claimed independence from Soviet tutelage in the 'forties--he lauded the wisdom of his 1945 precept that "the way of the Soviets" could not be followed*--were again glorified in Ulbricht's lengthy SED Central Committee speech (over 37,000 words). He made no reference to Kosygin, or to the Soviet leader's visit to Leipzig one month earlier, though the Leipzig fair was a topic covered in Ulbricht's speech. Nor did Ulbricht mention Brezhnev, or convey Brezhnev's 8 April formulation on potentially favorable forces for the development of West German-Soviet relations.**

In Praise of Peking

While conspicuously slighting the Soviet Union and its leaders, Ulbricht warmly praised Communist China's support for GDR policy. His 28 April praise for the CPR

*Unlike the way of the Bolsheviks, the German Communist Party (KPD) merged with the Social Democrats (SPD) in the Soviet zone in 1946.

**Somewhat like Kosygin's 15 March 1965 formulation, Brezhnev balanced charges of West German revanchism with the assertion that "West Germany is not populated by revanchists alone. There are many peace-loving people, and there are forces which reject revanchist ravings and support a realistic foreign policy."

was particularly glaring since Peking propaganda the day before commended its public attack on the post-Khrushchev leadership. (NCNA on 27 April transmitted the publisher's note to the fifth volume of Khrushchev's statements in Chinese translation which scored "Khrushchev's successors" for "following in his footsteps.") And Ulbricht praised the CPR in a passage which indirectly suggested his displeasure over his allies' activities with Bonn.

> The Bonn government avails itself of provocations because it believes that it can exploit differences of opinion with the CPR and the various national interests of certain people's democracies. The Bonn government believes that the economic relations of the people's democracies with the West German Federal Republic can force the Warsaw Pact states to yield ground in the event of provocations against the GDR. The contrary was true, as demonstrated by the recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact states. The Bonn government was quickly reminded of the limits of its power. The statements of the CPR Government, too, indicate that the Bonn government has again speculated erroneously.

Peking's flirtation with East Berlin commenced in earnest shortly after the January Warsaw Pact meeting, which, contrary to Ulbricht's distorted denial (above), did not lead to a GDR-bloc agreement on dealing with West Germany's economic policies toward the East. In late February Peking announced an agreement which, unlike most other Chinese-East European trade agreements at that time, provided for an increase in trade. (CPR propaganda said that the agreement provided for a "remarkable increase" in trade). The GDR reciprocated with several friendly gestures; one was a press conference given by the GDR Ambassador to the CPR who thanked the Chinese for their support of Ulbricht's foreign policies. And

surrounding the development of improved CPR-GDR relations, Peking propaganda in April sporadically referred to the indications of Ulbricht's dissatisfaction with the extent of Soviet and East European support. In May, the propaganda returned to the September line of the previous year, that is to allegations of Soviet policy to sell out East Germany. (See pages 31-35) In a speech by CCP Politburo member Peng Chen at the PKI anniversary celebration in Djakarta on 25 May:

> If they /the new Soviet leadership/ truly have departed from Khrushchev's course of revisionism, then why do they continue pursuing Khrushchev's policy to sell-out the GDR. When West Germany's militarists insolently held the Bundestag session in West Berlin and launched their insensible provocation against the GDR, why did they not dare to take measures to repulse this provocation? Why did they put in cold storage the suggestion for reaching a peace treaty with Germany as soon as possible and for solving the West Berlin issue, and, moreover, not daring to touch on the subject again?

Kosygin's Second Mission

Prior to Peng Chen's charge, the Soviet Union had again attempted, through another Kosygin visit to the GDR, to demonstrate that East Germany would not be forsaken during a period of improved Soviet-West German relations. The occasion for Kosygin's second visit in one year was the 20th anniversary of VE Day. And in the morning before his arrival, Ulbricht found occasion to

provide contrasting backdrop for Kosygin's subsequent performance:

Ulbricht, 5 May People's Chamber speech	Kosygin, 7 May East Berlin VE Day speech
Political Atmosphere in West Germany	
"...the criminal Hitlerite ideology /of revanchism/ prevails in Bonn..." "Twenty years after the liberation, there prevails again in Bonn's domestic policy the spirit of the war-economy leaders, the Hitlerite army officers, the S.S. specialists in the police, and Hitlerite blood judges in the judiciary. Apart from some exceptions, the politically and morally inferior mass press, ruminating on the most base instincts, systematically poisons public opinion."	"The Soviet Union by no means holds that all West Germans are imbued with the ideas of revanchism. We understand that most of the people of the German Federal Republic want to live in peace." "It is being said that the new generation of Germans who have grown up in the Federal Republic since the war cannot be held responsible for the crimes committeed by nazism. It would indeed be unjust to saddle today's West German youth with this grave responsibility."
Reunification	
"The road toward unification of the German states leads via disarmament and a peace treaty, and also through elimination of the remnants of World War II and completion of the great work of liberation from militarism and imperialism and fascism in West Germany."	"...whoever really wants to look for genuine ways leading to German reunification must not seek them through political and military adventures but on the basis of a voluntary agreement between the two German states.

West Berlin Solution	
"No debates and no conflict would be necessary because of West Berlin if West Berlin did not let itself be misused by the Bonn revanchists, if West Berlin becomes a neutral free city.	(no reference to a West Berlin solution)

In addition to remaining silent on a West Berlin solution, Kosygin did not broach Ulbricht's 5 May repeated call for 120 billion marks from the FRG, his militant complaint regarding the Bundestag meeting in West Berlin, and his distress over alleged Western proposals to the GDR's eastern neighbors--one of which, Ulbricht disclosed, was a U.S. scheme to buy off "in dollars" and border guarantees interested East European countries in return for East European support for Bonn's "revanchist policy toward the GDR." This charge, presumably, was Ulbricht's interpretation of the U.S. bridge-building proposal. The FRG's trade-building proposals were interpreted in a similar distorted fashion, and in May, Neues Deutschland printed a flood of articles cautioning its allies on Bonn's supposedly subversive trade tactics, the aims of which were also seen as strengthening Bonn's "revanchist policy" toward the GDR.

3. THE RESPITE, THEN THE RENEWAL OF THE TRIANGLE

East German expressions of confidence in Soviet support followed Kosygin's second mission to the GDR in May. Ulbricht's confidence may have stemmed from the particularly hostile Soviet attitudes, expressed in private as well as public statements, toward West Germany. The Soviets were then inflating the West German "threat" in order to support the rationale for limited activity in Vietnam. The inflated "threat" may also have been a defensive response to CPR charges that the Soviets were planning to pull back from, rather than open up, a "second

front" in Europe. The respite during this period of cool relations between Moscow and Bonn still did not restrain Ulbricht in July from his rewriting of East German history or Brezhnev in early September from sounding out the West Germans on the possibility of improving relations in the indefinite future. But in late September, after Ulbricht's trip to the Soviet Union, the Soviets appeared to have adopted the GDR's harsh assessment of the FRG. And after the conclusion of a long-term trade pact in December 1965, Ulbricht appeared to have nothing but servile salutatinns to extend to the Soviet Union.

The period of comparative tranquility was not long lived. After the CPSU Congress in April 1966 Ulbricht publicly revived old fears about an abandoned GDR while Moscow was making plans to renew the USSR-FRG trade treaty which had expired in 1963. And though the Soviets were quick to reject new West German offers to buy out the GDR, Soviet-GDR differences on a number of key developments were not papered over. Contrasting views were exposed over the proposed SED-SPD talks from which the East Germans backed away while the Soviets expressed the view that the exchange would be welcome and useful; over Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov's direct talks with West Berlin Mayor Brandt about which the GDR was not pleased; and over the evaluation of the "grand Coalition" in Bonn to which Moscow attached some hope while East Berlin painted the new FRG Government in hues as black as the GDR depicted the Erhard and Adenauer predecessors of the coalition.

Signs of "Correct" But Cautious Soviet-GDR Relations

The red carpet treatment given to Kosygin on his second visit to the GDR in 1965 was followed by expressions of confidence in Soviet commitments by Ulbricht and other GDR leaders. For example, Ulbricht expressed such confidence in rebutting SPD leader Erler's April 1965 Foreign Affairs proposition that since it was hopeless to talk with the East German regime about the terms for its liquidation only Moscow could negotiate German reunification. Thus, in opposing Erler's proposition,

Ulbricht's chief argument in his speech at the 10th SED plenum (23-25 June 1965) was that "the Soviet Union has unequivocally declared that normalization of relations and reunification of the two German states is a matter for the Germans." Other SED speakers, such as Herman Axen, pointed to the talks between Ulbricht and Kosygin in East Berlin and Honecker and Stoph with Brezhnev and Kosygin in Moscow in which "the leading Soviet comrades emphasized that the alliance between the Soviet Union and the GDR is firm and indisoluble." And by early July, Ulbricht came close to endorsing Kosygin's 7 May "voluntary agreement" formula--a formula reminiscent of Kosygin's November 1962 appeal for a "goodwill agreement." In a 4 July speech in Rostok, Ulbricht said that reunification is possible only through establishment of "good peaceful relations" in Germany itself.

Independence on Ulbricht's part, however, continued to season his rewriting of early postwar history in the Eastern Zone. And in a speech on 13 July, Ulbricht directly referred to the existence of early differences of opinion with the Russian occupiers. The post war antifascist parties in East Germany, Ulbricht boasted

> can take credit for the great success of establishing a firm unbreakable alliance of friendship with the Soviet Union. This was not always easy. After our liberation from Hitlerite terror, the Soviet Union protected our antifascist democratic reconstruction and helped us fulfill many tasks. However, our Soviet friends could not take from our shoulders independent creative thinking and independent initiative in taking the democratic road of the antifascist democratic order and socialist reconstruction in accordance with the special conditions in Germany.

And through early August Ulbricht, while maintaining an atmosphere of "correct" relations with Moscow, was still sticking to his West Berlin formula: "we are willing to

guarantee access to a free and neutral city of West Berlin" he responded in an interview with the Indian paper Blitz (Bombay) on 5 August.

During this period of correct relations, Moscow did not close out the possibility of an eventual normalization of affairs with the FRG. Expressions of Moscow's willingness to eventually improve relations with Bonn, for example, preceded FRG State Secretary Carsten's September trip to the Soviet Union--a visit directly aimed at ascertaining the prospects for improving Bonn-Moscow relations. On the eve of Carsten's visit, Brezhnev in a 14 September speech at a Soviet-Czech meeting in the Kremlin, seemed to be offering hospitality to the West German foreign affairs expert:

> In the Soviet Union we would naturally welcome the normalization of relations with the Federal German Republic, but one thing must be clear once and for all. Such a normalization cannot be attained on the basis of satisfying revanchist claims by Bonn. There can be no normalization at the expense of the interests of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Polish People's Republic, or any other socialist country. This shall not be. And if in West Germany there really exists the intention of developing relations with the Soviet Union, then an end must be put to the futile aggressive desires, and the basis of reality accepted without ignoring the results of the war and postwar development in Germany and in Europe.

Thus while pledging that the interests of the GDR (among others) would be guarded by the USSR, Brezhnev left wide open the possibility of improved relations with the FRG. A like suggestion was made directly to Carstens during his farewell dinner. Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov emphasized at the dinner that the West Germans and the

Soviets should set aside their differences and "get on with our business." And, according to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Carsten's hosts also allegedly assured him that a way could be found to exclude recognizing the East Germans in any NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty.

Signs of Close and Confident Soviet-GDR Relations

But after Carsten's visit and Ulbricht's September visit to the USSR, the possibilities for improved relations were flatly disclaimed by Brezhnev himself in his 29 September speech at the CPSU plenum. However, some ambivalence was preserved by TASS's curious and as yet unexplained addendum to the text of Brezhnev's address:

> /With regard to West Germany/ we are dealing with the main center of reaction and militarism in Europe and with the main ally of aggressive U.S. imperialist circles, and it is but natural that under these conditions there are no possibilities for fruitful development of relations with West Germany. (Although economic links on mutually profitable basis continue to exist, in particular our trade with the German Federal Republic remains approximately on the former level--TASS)

And leaving the impression that Moscow was willing to sacrifice that mutually profitable trade for USSR-GDR political principles, Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov, according to a 4 November ADN account of an interview in East Berlin, proudly pointed out that "for about three years /the USSR/ has signed no trade and cultural agreements with the Federal Republic because Bonn is trying to include West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic in these agreements." Abrasimov's public statement thus provided further evidence that the Soviets had turned

from the conciliatory line that had been raised anew after Khrushchev's ouster.*

East German leaders favorably responded to Brezhnev's and Abrasimov's strong support for Ulbricht's intransigent line toward West Germany, and GDR expressions became particularly warm when it became clear that the statements by Abrasimov and others accurately indicated that Moscow's discourse with the FRG had in fact taken on the symptoms of political anaemia. Politburo member Axen, who had praised the "indissoluble" GDR-USSR alliance in June, amplified that theme in a 5 November anniversary speech which scored "imperialist politicians and so-called Kremlinologists who try to deceive the working people and themselves about the bankruptcy of their own policy with silly and equally boring speculations about discord between the GDR and the USSR." Axen delivered another punch to "those gentlement" who entertain designs on the GDR by lecturing that the widely propagandized "October Storm" Warsaw Pact maneuver in East Germany was an "auxiliary lesson" aimed at dampening the ardor of the West German "imperialists." Axen also demanded that the CPR press discontinue its public polemics against the Soviet Union--a demand which was another gesture on behalf of the Soviet Union inasmuch as the GDR Foreign Ministry had earlier denied rumors circulated in West

*That is, that a Bonn-Moscow trade pact could in effect include some type of Berlin clause, such as the recognition, implied or explicit, that the D-Mark West (FRG currency) area includes the area of West Berlin. A Soviet overture to this effect surfaced [redacted] 1964 when Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov [redacted] suggested [redacted] a means of resolving the Berlin clause issue. He suggested that Bonn could present a letter to the Soviets defining the area covered in the bilateral trade agreement as D-Mark West Area, rather than making an explicit reference to the West Germans Lands and territory of West Berlin as the area covered by the trade treaty.

German media that Ulbricht would visit the CPR sometime within the next three months.* And Ulbricht's history lessons shifted from the theme of East German troubles with the Soviet Union to the theme, which he repeated over and over in a 7 November TV discussion, that cooperation and alliance with Russia had been and will remain the Germans' wisest and most important foreign policy accomplishment.

With the knowledge that Brezhnev in late September had disclaimed the possibility of improving relations with Bonn, Ulbricht in the TV discussion safely and hypocritically asserted that "as far as we are concerned, we, the representatives of the GDR, are willing to do everything in our power to promote the development of friendly relations between the West German Federal Republic and the Soviet Union."

Economic policy support was, at that time, another accomplishment that Ulbricht may well have had in mind. His subsequent and frequent references to Soviet support conveyed the impression (later born out) of a denial to the West German news reports that the Soviet Union was planning a substantial cut in its economic commitment to the GDR. And following the conclusion on 3 December of a five year trade treaty, Ulbricht meticulously glossed over the technical troubles which preceded, and may have been related to, the dramatic suicide of East German planning chief, Erich Apel. Thus Ulbricht in his 17 December praise of the treaty at the 11th SED Central Committee meeting did not provide support to the Western reports that Apel had shot himself to death on the day the treaty was signed due to his opposition to the USSR's trade policy toward the GDR. Instead, Ulbricht indicated that

*Handelsblatt (Dusseldorf) reported on 26 October 1965 that Ulbricht would visit Peking in December at the earliest, and February at the latest. Der Spiegel on 3 November reported that Ulbricht would visit Peking in February 1966.

Apel had been maneuvered into a quarrel "between the interests of society on the one hand...and the interests of branch interests, which frequently address unrealistic demands motivated by wishful thinking and which cannot be implemented by /Apel's/ State Planning Commission." And in support of the long-term trade pact with the Soviet Union, Ulbricht rationalized that its conclusion "is a pain for reactionary circles in West Germany because they had hoped to be able to blackmail the GDR by economic measures. These gentlemen now understand that concluding thds long-term agreement ruined their plans."

But one year later, when the long-term trade agreement was up for annual readjustment and when relations had been showing signs of strain since the CPSU Congress in April 1966, East German dissatisfaction with the Soviet's trade policy toward the GDR was not suppressed.*

*The five year trade agreement praised by Ulbricht (above) over Apel's body called for, but apparently was not followed up in its second year by, a substantial increase in total trade. And treatment of the 10 December 1966 trade agreement signed in Moscow betrayed East German disenchantment: Neues Deutschland's announcement of the second year of the long-term trade agreement omitted the traditional trappings--which Pravda's announcement provided--of the "cordial atmosphere" of the trade talks and of the "full agreement" achieved. Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev in a 12 January 1967 Izvestiya interview diplomatically sidestepped any indication that the long-term trade agreement signed in December 1965 would increase as rapidly as earlier planned. Envisaging that Soviet trade volume in 1967 with socialist countries will increase "not less than nine percent," Patolichev did not tie the projected increase with trade activities with the GDR, which he, nonetheless, described as "the principal Soviet trading partner."

Concern After the CPSU Congress

Emphasizing in public the stale line that the West German militarists are poised to pounce on the lost territories to the East, Moscow [redacted] was telling the West Germans in early March 1966 that they would like to begin trade negotiations "without any preconditions" after the 23rd CPSU Congress (29 March-8 April).*

And in the Congress speeches by Soviet officials, the only precondition for improved relations was the vague insistence that Bonn should pursue a policy of peaceful cooperation. In the context of this insistence, Gromyko at the Congress referred to Moscow's desire for the "normalization and improvement" of relations with West Germany where "far from all Germans...are poisoned by the ideas of revanche." He had made similar points in his 9 December 1965 Supreme Soviet reply to interpellations from Soviet deputies, but the tone of his 2 April 1966 Congress speech was much less strident and demanding on other Soviet-FRG related matters. For example, in December he stated that Chancellor Erhard's 10 November 1965 policy statement "is an aggregation of militarist and revanchist ideas which is rarely met in such a naked form." In April, Gromyko judged Chancellor Erhard's generally similar 25 March 1966 policy statement as only a "mixup of notions." In April, Gromyko stated that "we stand for the normalization and improvement of relations with the FRG on the basis of its turning to the policy of peaceful cooperation and realism." In December 1965, he had required that "good relations" were possible "only if there is a change in the FRG's policy.../from/ militarism

*One month earlier, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov told [redacted] that one precondition would have to be met-- politics" would have to be excluded in any trade talks. The talks, which began on 3 October 1966, were subsequently recessed, and are expected to commence with the new Bonn coalition government early this year.

and revanchism." Former Chancellor Adenauer, who was derided by Gromyko in December, was applauded by Gromyko in April for making "quite a reasonable admission" regarding the Soviet Union's demonstrated desire (i.e., the Tashkent talks) for peace. And Gromyko, who in December had threatened a "due rebuff" to attempts to include West Berlin into the FRG, followed the example of the other Congress spokesmen in his Congress speech in not even mentioning West Berlin. Nor did Gromyko repeat the threat presented in his harsh December 1965 speech which struck a line somewhat similar to Ulbricht's demands for FRG retribution for war debts.*

Ulbricht promptly took note of Gromyko's Congress bids and displayed earlier fears of being abandoned in his 11 April statement on the return of the SED delegation from Moscow:

> Comrade Gromyko clearly stated that the Soviet Union, which is linked with the GDR through ties of close friendship and cooperation, desires good and objective

*Gromyko's unusual December demand, which has not been repeated, held that "the Soviet Union and the other states which fell victim to German aggression are in the right to present a bill for all damages inflicted by the war unleashed by Germany: for the death of millions of people, for the crimes perpetrated by German fascist troops on occupied territories, for the millions of people tortured to death in Nazi torture chambers and concentration camps, for the destroyed towns and villages, and for the innumerous brutalities which marked the road of the Hitler armies. This bill cannot be erased from the memory of our people. And if the recklessness of the policymakers in West Germany makes it necessary, our people will present this bill."

On the subject of "bills," and in a sharply contrasting tone, Adzhubey in his 21 July 1964 speech in the West German city of Dortmund stated that neither the USSR nor the FRG owed the other any debt.

> relations with West Germany. However, he left no doubt that it is the task of the West German Government to prove by deeds that it is willing to make a contribution to peace and to abandon the adventurous policy of revanchism.
>
> The 23rd congress also was designed to end all speculation by incorrigible revanchist politicians, and to induce them to abandon their foolish hope that they can make some kind of deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of the GDR. The SED delegation is convinced that implementing the decisions adopted at the 23d CPSU Congress will contribute to the further strengthening of the good and fraternal relations of friendship and objective cooperation between our parties and states.

Pravda's report (13 April) of Ulbricht's statement deleted all references to West Germany and its "foolish hope" of dealing with the USSR behind the GDR's back, though Pravda printed the last sentence of Ulbricht's above statement. And nine days later Pravda and other Soviet media deleted another example of Ulbricht's fear of being betrayed by Moscow. The deleted passage in his 21 April speech in East Berlin marking the 20th anniversary of the SED dealt with Ulbricht's display of concern over unrequited policy support:

> The fairytale spread by West German anticommunists that the socialist countries of Europe could be played up against each other has burst like a soap bubble. The 23rd CPSU Congress testified to the inner strength, creative force, and purposefulness of Lenin's party and the peoples of the Soviet Union. No one who has command of his five senses can believe that in this period when the majority of the people of Europe live in the Soviet Union and in

socialist states, the Soviet Union could be willing to favor the dismantling of socialism in the GDR.

And in his 21 April speech, he rattled the old closeted skeleton of the January 1959 Soviet draft peace treaty and caustically recalled that "the Soviet Union declared that it would do everything in its power for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany." (That the new regime had placed that "power" in abeyance was instanced by the omission of the eight-year old call for a German peace treaty in Moscow's 1966 national day slogans, released on 17 October.)

While Soviet media failed to record Ulbricht's post-Congress references which kept alive the notion of an abandoned GDR, West German statements on the subject of economic sacrifice for a reunited Germany drew prompt and negative reactions from Moscow in the spring of 1966.* For example, within hours of Chancellor Erhard's comments on the publication of an FRG White Paper on the subject of reunification, a 30 April Moscow Radio commentary beamed to Germany concluded with the pledge that "there will be no reliable satisfaction of the aggressive claims of the industrial and financial oligarchy and its political puppets at the cost of the GDR and the territories of other states." (The lengthy FRG White Paper released on 29 April contained 193 previously published documents describing Bonn's efforts since the 1955 Geneva conference to achieve reunification. None of the documents shed any light on former Chancellor Adenauer's late March 1966 statement made at the CDU convention, that when the German archives are open for historians, the world will then know what he had offered for reunification.) And a similar prompt Soviet pledge aimed at crushing any East German doubts followed Bundestag member Barzel's 17 June 1966 New York speech in which he presented a unification

*Silence greeted such proposals in the spring of 1964. See pages 12 and 13.

plan which offered the stationing of Soviet troops in a reunited Germany and the assumption of East Germany's economic commitments to the Soviet Union for the next twenty years. For the same time period, he suggested a yearly expansion of 5 percent in the shipment of "advantageous supplies." Izvestiya quickly rejected Barzel's economic temptation, and Pravda writer Mayevsky on 19 June referred to Barzel's novel troop idea as "the Teuton's crude, though it is presented as naive, proposal to 'guarantee' the presence of Soviet troops in Germany." Mayevsky said that the "hopes of some 'deal'" at the expense of the GDR's sovereignty are futile"and avowed that "all the socialist countries guard the gains of the GDR."

Two Key Developments, Two Different Attitudes

Soviet pledges notwithstanding, the renewed exposure of Ulbricht's concern over the degree of Soviet support and Moscow's renewed bid for improved relations with West Germany and West Berlin were common features in the two principle post-Congress developments relating to the German problem during the remainder of Erhard's administration--the scuttling of the proposal for SED-SPD talks, and the development of direct Soviet contacts with Berlin Mayor Brandt.

SED-SPD talks, aimed at "breaking the ice in the German question" by bringing together the "two strongest German parties" to discuss what type of future nation "German workers" would like to see built, were proposed in an open letter of 7 February from the SED Central Committee signed by Ulbricht. The invitation was repeated in another "open letter" of 24 March, and on the day the CPSU Congress convened (29 March), Neues Deutschland published another Ulbricht history lesson which warmly praised the 1946 merger between the German Communist Party (KPD) and the East German SPD. But following the CPSU Congress and following SPD leader Brandt's "open answer" of 14 April which accepted the SED invitation, Ulbricht seemed to display second thoughts about the risks of the

venture (such as SED party solidarity, and East German popular reactions*) in debating the SPD. In light of the potential risks involved, it has been argued that the venture was initiated by Ulbricht for the sole purpose of repeating past propaganda tactics that would follow an expected SPD refusal. Indeed, claims of SED reasonableness and SPD obstructionism had followed Ulbricht's 1963 and 1964 invitations, which were not accepted. On the other hand, if the proposal was intended to be more than a repeat of a hollow propaganda gimmick, it may have been aimed at promoting differences between the SPD and the West German government over their approaches toward East Germany. Thus the talks would have been part of a serious GDR effort to project a better image abroad in order to support the GDR's protracted effort to gain eventual non-communist recognition. If the latter was the case, then full and credible Soviet support to offset the SED's potential risks would have been essential. And following the Congress, Ulbricht's concern over Soviet support** accompanied references which suggested that Ulbricht was

*East German citizens reportedly purchased over one million copies of Neues Deutschland's 26 March edition which printed the SPD's first (and non-committal) "open answer" of 18 March to the SED's 7 February "open letter." The SPD's second answer of 14 April which explicitly accepted the invitation was not printed until 29 May by Neues Deutschland--at which time East Germans again snapped up the SED paper.

**Inasmuch as Ulbricht in the past had evinced concern over Soviet plans for withdrawing troops from the GDR, it seems noteworthy that his renewed anxiety was coincident with post-Congress reports in the Western press on an impending major withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany. The magnitude of the reported withdrawal had grown to five divisions in the West German press by mid-June. (Die Welt, 15 June 1966.) And Soviet sources in late June alluded to the "possibility" of a reduction of its force in East Germany. Whatever may have been the Soviet plans at that time, no subsequent reduction in the GSFG for 1966 was confirmed.

also concerned about the risks of the SED-SPD speaker exchange.

The urgency of the exchange which permeated his February and March open letters notably contrasted with his post-Congress statement on the talks. For example, the 7 February letter stated that "it is really high time" to create conditions leading to joint action. But the tone of Ulbricht's 18 April remarks to visiting labor union delegations--his first comment after the Congress on the accepted invitation--suggested that his interest had shifted into a lower gear: in briefly acknowledging the SPD's acceptance, he said that the main thing is "gradually" to achieve joint action of German workers. And in his 18 April speech, as in the two post-Congress speeches cited earlier (11 and 21 April) Ulbricht did not touch upon pre-Congress references to Soviet support for GDR attitudes and policies toward West Germany. In fact, Soviet views toward West Germany and the SPD in particular contrasted with GDR propaganda in May and June and the divergent treatment evidenced in commentaries on the 1-5 June SPD Congress in Dortmund was pronounced.* East German treatment of the SPD Congress was almost wholly negative--it even roundly attacked leading [redacted] SPD speakers (Brandt, Wehner, Erler, Schmidt and others), some of whom were to participate in the proposed exchange with the SED. Soviet treatment, on the other hand, was remarkably mild. A 6 June article by Pravda correspondent V. Mikhailov approvingly quoted remarks by the leading SPD speakers:

> Helmut Schmidt, who delivered the main thesis on foreign policy, spoke of 'better chances for peace and limitation of armaments,' he spoke of 'an all-European system of collective security,' he said that 'there is not a single

*For a good examination of divergent East European reaction to the SPD Congress, see [redacted]

nation in the world which could support the illusory dreams about changing the Oder-Neisse frontier.' He also indicated that it would be possible 'to reach agreement on disarmament without any preliminary political conditions'and even on 'guarantees of the inviolability of the frontiers' of the German Democratic Republic. Willy Brandt, the party chairman, expressed the idea, although rather timidly, about the possibility of qualified coexistence of the two parts of Germany.'

With the contrasting SED attacks on the SPD becoming shriller, more demanding and more frequent, SED Politburo member Norden in a 29 June press conference signalled the withdrawal of the SED from the exchange. In an aggressive tone, Norden made it clear that the GDR considered that a safe-conduct law passed on 23 June by the Bundestag made the exchange impossible: the law "is a gross chauvinistic provocation which even transgresses Hitler's legislation...it cements the division of Germany." In a defensive tone, Pravda commentator Mikhailov's belated 6 July reaction to the FRG law was a circuitous rebuttal of a statement by a Bonn spokesman to the effect that the law removed all obstacles on the road to the dialogue (which, in fact, it did). Mikhailov did not echo Norden's and other East Germans' hostile interpretation of the law as a regression to Nazi jurisprudence, did not reiterate GDR calls for the repeal of the law, did not conclude that the law finalizes the division of Germany, and did not support the GDR's view that the law sounded the exchange's swan song.

The Brandt-Abrasimov talks in the meantime had been underway since early May. And by the 6 June meeting (the day Pravda's Mikhailov approved certain SPD Congress statements) Abrasimov dismissed the violent SED attacks on SPD official Wehner as "being of little importance" and conveyed the impression, which Pravda's Mikhailov sustained in his 6 July article, that the Soviet Union was assuming that the SED-SPD dialogue would take place. (Brandt himself in a 28 June interview with AP

correspondent John Hightower, said that Abrasimov had given him no reason to believe that the Soviets opposed the exchange.) In the 6 June meeting, Abrasimov also seemed to be trying to arouse Brandt's interest in a meeting with Soviet leaders in his closing remark to the effect that Brandt had made a serious tactical error in refusing to accept Khrushchev's January 1963 invitation to meet in East Berlin because, said Abrasimov, "Khrushchev had had some interesting things to say" to Brandt.* And in the weeks following another Brandt meeting with Abrasimov on 29 September, mounting East German worries were reflected in their escalating propaganda attacks on the West Berlin Mayor. Thus on 12 October--the day Brandt, by Soviet prearrangement bypassed East German border guards on his way through Checkpoint Charlie into East Berlin (his first visit since the Berlin wall was built) to meet Abrasimov--East German propagandist Eisler authored a sharply critical article in Berliner Zeitung denouncing Brandt for, among other things, "committing a crime against the German workers class" by "riding the oxen of anti-communism." And on the day after Brandt's check-free passage through the wall, the GDR's People's Chamber passed a law empowering East German authorities to prosecute all West Germans and West Berliners who have ever committed the crime of "persecuting or helping to persecute"

*East Germany's enthusiastic reaction in January 1963 to Brandt's refusal to visit Khrushchev in East Berlin betrayed the same general sense of relief reflected in the GDR treatment of Kosygin's February 1965 shelving of an invitation to visit Bonn (pages 56-56). With gusto, the GDR promptly scored Brandt's decision not to visit Khrushchev during the January 1963 SED Congress. Soviet comment on the affair, which somewhat more mildly scolded Brandt for not making use of a chance to discuss "vital problems concerning the West Berlin situation," did not surface until early February 1963.

East Germans.*

At the 22 November meeting, Abrasimov made more explicit his earlier hints of a Moscow invitation--he said that his people in the Soviet Union would be happy if Brandt could visit Moscow--and, said Brandt, Abrasimov seemed quite interested

*The law, which on the surface appeared to be the GDR's retaliation for Bonn's 23 June safe-conduct law, represented another GDR-sponsored threat to West German use of the access routes through East Germany. Control over Allied use of those access routes also appeared to be the motive behind a series of East German probes in late August along the autobahn between Helmstedt and Babelsberg, from which the Soviets dissociated themselves. And the Soviets did not back up the GDR position on the Elbe River incident in mid-October, though East Berlin sought to engage their support. (British officers accompanied West German Elbe patrol officials in response to East German attempts to prevent a West German survey boat from conducting soundings along the GDR-claimed eastern shore of a segment of that river.) In contrast to the harsh and public GDR protest on 20 October--the Elbe incident "is a repetition of the practices of the Hitler regime"--the Soviets mildly protested to British military headquarters in Germany. And, as in the case of a mid-November Pan-American Airways cargo plane crash on East German territory, the Soviets did not give the East Germans opportunity to upgrade the "sovereignty" inasmuch as the Soviets, not the East Germans, delivered what remained of the PAA crew and cargo plane.

in Wehner's 12 October proposals for an economic integration of East and West Germany.

One week after the 22 November Brandt-Abrasimov meeting (the fifth known meeting), Ulbricht in a Neues Deutschland interview vented himself in an outburst of redirected rage against Brandt for his acceptance of a CDU-CSU proposal for a West German political integration--the "grand coalition."

4. THE COALITION AND THE CONTRASTS

The "grand coalition," said Ulbricht in a 29 November East Berlin interview, is a government of "rightwingers" in which Brandt "is to act as diplomatic advertising chief for the adventurist policy" and Wehner "is to enrich the psychological warfare against the GDR with new methods." And in even blacker terms, GDR propaganda axman Eisler in a radio roundtable discussion with high-level SED leaders (Matern, Norden, Winzer) unleashed another vitriolic barrage against SPD leaders, and Wehner in particular, on 4 December. But in a Soviet radio roundtable discussion on the same day the inclusion of Social Democrats in the new government was treated not only with restraint --which had characterized earlier Soviet comment on the prospect of such a merger--but also with a touch of optimism. One speaker said that the presence of Brandt and Wehner in the new government "provides the Social Democratic leaders with certain opportunities" to make a "realistic" turn away from Bonn's past policy.

Discussion of the new Chancellor, Kiesinger, and new Finance Minister, Strauss, followed somewhat similar patterns: East German propaganda and GDR leaders made harsh and frequent attacks on both, while Soviet public media was restrained. Soviet propaganda noted but did not emphasize Kiesinger's past membership in the Nazi Party and acknowledged but did not stress Strauss' nationalist sympathies. And Soviet leaders were notably circumspect in their discussion of the top coalition leader. Kosygin, for example, reportedly replied to a Deutsche

Presse-Agentur (DPA: Hamburg) correspondent in Lyons France on 6 December that it is up to Kiesinger to make the first move to improve Soviet-West German relations. And according to DPA, Kosygin in response to a question did not shut the door on a possible visit to Bonn. "At the moment I have no reason to envisage a journey to Bonn; after all, I cannot go the Federal Republic as a tourist."

In addition to their contrasting restraint on the political complexion of the new Bonn government, the Soviets have continued to hold on to their subtle--and flexible--formulation regarding the relationship between Bonn and East Berlin and the significance of that relationship for Bonn-Moscow relations. That is, Moscow, unlike East Berlin, does not lay down the condition of formal West German recognition of East Germany for the improvement of Moscow-Bonn relations. Thus, Kosygin in Paris on 3 December reiterated earlier Soviet formulations that West Germany's policy contribution to European security involved, among other things,* "acknowledgement" of the actual situation in Europe "that we have two German states, the GDR and the FRG, and that no outside force can change it." (Less ardently, but to the same effect of preserving an element of flexibility, the 5 July 1966 Warsaw Pact Declaration called upon the FRG to "take as a point of departure the existence of two German states," and Kosygin in Sverdlovsk on 13 October 1966 stated that to insure European security means "to proceed from the fact that two German states exist.")

But Ulbricht in his 15 December SED Central Committee speech, while praising Kosygin's Paris remarks on the existence of two Germanies, purposefully disregarded the subtlety of the Soviet formulation in support of his strident and rigid demand that West Germany and West

*Such as, said Kosygin, recognition of existing frontiers and renunciation of efforts to gain nuclear weaponry.

Berlin must "recognize" East Germany as the quid for all negotiations. (At the time the quo was the Christmas/New Year pass agreement, which, for the first time since it was initiated in December 1963, was not renewed.) And in his 15 December speech, Ulbricht, in roundly scoring Kiesinger's 13 December policy statement, made the explicit demand that the "establishment of normal state relations through official negotiations" between the two Germanies must be part of the new Chancellor's policy calling for diplomatic relations with East European countries. In effect, Ulbricht's demand of FRG-GDR recognition as the prerequisite for FRG-East European recognition represented another effort on East Germany's part to try to undermine the FRG's claim to sole representation of Germany.

The growing West German contacts with certain East European governments prompted Ulbricht in a New Year's reception speech in East Berlin to caution, again, the ambassadors and other bloc representatives to the GDR not to be tricked by Bonn's new policy of "expansion and hegemony"--which, in Ulbricht's lights, merely reflect old covetous designs on his possession. Ulbricht, however, did not voice Neues Deutschland's bitter lament at the turn of the year that "members of sister parties have nothing better to do than to stab German Marxists-Leninists in the back." But his New Year's warnings and Neues Deutschland's plaint were sustained in a 26 January 1967 "authorized ADN statement" which implicitly exhorted East Berlin's allies against legalizing the FRG's "aggressive expansionist program" by establishing diplomatic ties with it.

In the meantime, Soviet spokesmen continued to echo the Soviet's calculated vagueness on this issue by reiterating Brezhnev's 13 January 1967 Gorky formulation which did not specifically tie improved relations

and negotiations with the FRG to its recognition of East Germany.* Soviet spokesmen have also voiced Brezhnev's comment in his Gorky speech on Chancellor Kiesinger's December policy statement, which, like Kosygin's statements in Paris and Lyons, left the door open for talks and called for "deeds not words." And Brezhnev's expressions reflected both Moscow's caution toward Kiesinger's grand coalition program--which "unfortunately" contains "ample evidence" that old imperialist goals remain unchanged--and Moscow's willingness to support "appropriate steps" undertaken by the FRG:

> Chancellor Kiesinger said specifically that his government will strive to deepen mutual understanding and trust between the German Federal Republic and the Soviet Union in order to provide requisites for future successful meetings and talks. But so far there are only words. And these words, by the way, are denied by other statements in the program of the new government of the German Federal Republic.
>
> Naturally, we shall support everything that is sensible and useful for peace in Europe, including appropriate steps by the German Federal Republic, should such steps be taken.

*Without referring specifically to the FRG, he said that the USSR "is firmly convinced that unconditional recognition of the GDR as a sovereign independent state is, in our time, one of the basic prerequisites for real normalization of the situation in Europe." In his 21 June 1966 meeting with de Gaulle in the Soviet Union, Brezhnev reportedly voiced the similar line that progress could be made once the "West" recognized "the reality of the two German states."

The step of West German-Rumanian diplomatic recognition, and the advance reaction in Moscow and East Berlin to that groundbreaking development (formally consummated on 31 January), provides this study's final case in Soviet-East German contrasts on the Bonn coalition. Instead of the backdrop of alarmist caveats that Ulbricht's redundant appeals and ADN's "authorized statement" offered to the GDR's allies, Moscow on 28 January issued a Soviet Government statement which did not include passages pressuring its allies to block the FRG recognition campaign and did not flatly demand that the FRG's recognition of the GDR ought to be the prerequisite for a policy of recognition and cooperation with the East. In fact, the Soviet statement alleged that the Soviet Government would "continue to work for...cooperation between East and West European states, including, of course, the German Federal Republic." And like Brezhnev in Gorky, the statement saw both hopeful and menacing indications in the Kiesinger Government's policy statement. One of the menacing indications included the particularly malicious "attentive analysis" that "in the final count there are numerous common features in the political orientation of neo-Nazis of different shades and in the official revanchist-militarist course of the German Federal Republic ruling circles."* However, the accompanying note to the statement to the FRG included a remark which tended to separate the West German Government from neo-Nazis; the accompanying note, according to TASS on 28 January, stated that the Soviet Government "expected the government of the FRG to take appropriate measures to curb the dangerous activities of neo-Nazi and militarist forces."

*This hostile association may well have represented an attempt to humor Ulbricht, who in his New Year's pleonasm had gone one step further in charging that the Bonn government was "infiltrated from top to bottom" by "millions of little Nazis."

IV. CONCLUSION: FACTORS FOR CONTINUING STRAIN IN USSR-GDR RELATIONS

Ulbricht himself, taking rigid, black-and-white views of the nature of West German intentions, has represented a factor opposing the development of improved Soviet-West German relations since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In the period of diminished tensions in Europe, he has, at the least, acted as a catalyst bringing to the surface the inherent problems in the relations between his artifically-supported regime and the freely constituted Bonn government on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. And this triangular relationship in the post-missile crisis period has been viewed, logically, by Ulbricht in a form as sharp as his view of the unchanging nature of Bonn politics. That is Ulbricht's seemingly monomaniacal fear that if a real rapprochement develops between Bonn and Moscow (and the capitals of Eastern Europe), then Ulbricht and his ersatz state will be "stabbed in the back" and will, inevitably, wither. Ulbricht's rigid premises have not consistently fit Moscow's foreign policy interests since the shelving of their 1958-1962 forceful strategy on the German problem, and thus Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly tried to counter Ulbricht's apocalyptic conclusion. But objective conditions, which have influenced the broad outline of Soviet policy since the 1962 Cuban missile venture, have not radically changed and will likely remain in the near future. And these objective conditions (discussed below) have led Ulbricht, and perhaps his successors,* to the radical conclusion that the

*One school of thought on the political makeup of the SED leadership feels that the evidence is too thin to be able to discern major political differences with Ulbricht's policies. Another school, which includes West Berlin Senat officials who claim to have credible information from East German sources, holds that two factions exist; the "hard-liners" are represented by heir apparent Honecker and the "soft-liners" center around Premier Stoph.

shelving of Moscow's forceful German strategy meant that the Soviet Union might well have decided to reverse the objective of consolidating the German status quo and to pursue, step by step, a policy of accommodation and eventual reunification.

Military considerations constitute one such operative factor on Soviet policy making. Strategically, Khrushchev had been strongly of the opinion that Soviet deterrence and wartime requirements for the European theater did not require large ground forces in forward areas in view of the massive IRBM/MRBM forces and on that basis strove to cut back Soviet ground forces across the board. The commitment of 20 nearly full strength divisions in East Germany, then, was seen by him as unessential for strategic purposes. And though the Soviet military theoreticians in the post-Khrushchev period have strongly argued for the continuing relevance of ground forces in contemporary conditions of war, the fact remains that the modernized East European forces--which began to take over a greater share of the defense burden on the Western frontier in the early 1960s*--and the projected developments in Soviet airlift capabilities could serve as the basis for an eventual, low-risk withdrawal of a large number of the costly and oversized Soviet force from Ulbricht's supported state. The apparent East German anxiety over the contemplated partial Soviet withdrawals in the spring of 1964 and the spring of 1966 might well recur in case of an actual implementation of a major Soviet redeployment in the future.

Political considerations regarding Western Europe, particularly in light of current military developments, also augur ill for the smooth functioning of the Moscow-East Berlin relationship. For example, Soviet leaders themselves have occasionally acknowledged and applauded

*See CAESAR XXVI of 7 June 1965, "Warsaw Pact Military Strategy, a Compromise in Soviet Strategic Thinking" RSS No. 0007/65.

de Gaulle's frequent pronouncements, which surrounded his defection from effective participation in NATO, that the danger of war in Europe is slight. And the consequent debilitating effect on the Soviet forces' raison d'etre in East Germany has tended to present Moscow with something of a dilemma. If they choose to inflate the military "threat" from Western Europe in order to rationalize their static position, then they stand to impale themselves on the horn of Ulbricht's political inflexibility. And current Soviet policy--with its interest in driving a wedge between the United States and its remaining NATO allies--would not be helped by reverting to the 1958-1962 crisis strategy which tended to upgrade the importance of the GDR while it proved to be counterproductive for Soviet interests.

East European and Chinese Communist considerations add other complications to the Moscow-East Berlin relations. With regard to the former, the new Soviet leadership, unlike the GDR leadership, apparently sees little advantage in trying to block the development of mutually advantageous FRG-East European relations. The addition of new elements of friction with Moscow's East European allies would add an unnecessary complication, particularly in light of the long range consideration that West Germany's involvement in Eastern Europe might further long range Soviet interests--that is, to weaken the FRG's ties with the West, to develop an eastward-looking peaceful Western Germany, to settle border issues, to prevent Bonn's nuclear armament, and to gain long-term economic benefits, or to work out collateral and commerical interchanges reminiscent of the Rapallo treaty. At any rate, tension on Moscow's western front would constitute another complication to Soviet policy makers, particularly in light of Moscow's sustained and expanding difficulties with the CPR. Relieving tensions in the West to concentrate on the hostility of China was a Khrushchevian formula (1963-1964) that has not been consistently rejected by the new leadership. And the effort to strengthen Soviet defenses along the Sino-Soviet border that got well underway after the reorganization of the KGB border guards in 1963 has continued under the new Kremlin leadership with the addition of four divisions along the border and the

movement of Soviet combat advisers and air defense specialists into Mongolia.

Finally, internal Soviet problems, particularly the cumulative effects of the economic imbalance stemming from the monumental military claims on the Soviet budget, were exacerbated during Moscow's attempt to force its will on Western Germany. And the opening up of another Moscow-initiated crisis in the West in order, among other things, to upgrade East Germany would do little to further the ambitious Soviet economic programs announced by Brezhnev and Kosygin in 1965 and 1966. A new crisis would, in addition, do little to further Moscow's current interest in easing internal strains by making a major increase in trade relations with Western Europe. These considerations, when viewed in light of East Germany's actual economic value to the USSR, take on added significance when the examination of the extreme case--giving up control of East Germany--has led to the conclusion that the Soviet Union in purely economic terms has little to lose.* In fact, since the GDR payments for Soviet occupation costs were discontinued in 1959, virtually all that remains is the Soviet interest in the East German uranium mines.

*Colleagues in ORR have recently reaffirmed the conclusions of an ORR report entitled "Economic Interest of the USSR In Control of East Germany" of August 1965 which held that after a political settlement on Germany, the accompanying changes in trade terms and commodity composition would "involve little or no net economic loss to the USSR." The study, which took into account the probability that Soviet-East German trade would decline after such a settlement, stated that "the USSR could readily make the necessary economic adjustments at little cost, mainly by shifting from the production of certain goods now taken by East Germany to the production of substitutes for some goods now imported from East Germany. Under any such settlement, however, the Soviet government probably would insist on retaining control of the East German uranium mines until they are exhausted."

In spite of assurances that the GDR's interests will be protected and that the Soviet Union will strive to prevent the isolation of the GDR, Moscow's current effort to maintain the broad outline of the status quo in Central Europe will not in itself relieve the strains in Soviet-East German relations. For, Soviet vital interests take precedence over the interests of their German satrapy. And East Germany leaders will most probably remain fearful that in the long term, if the gains are good enough or the danger great enough, Moscow will again sacrifice German Communists in order to further Soviet internal and international interests.

APPENDIX: THE ORIGIN OF THE "SELL-OUT" IDEA

The idea that the abandonment of East Germany would be a Soviet gain is not new to Soviet policy-making circles. Its roots may be traced back to 1953, to the thinking of Beria, Malenkov, and possibly even Khrushchev in the months following Stalin's death. Khrushchev laid the 1953 sell-out idea entirely on the doorsteps of Beria and Malenkov. To date there has been no public Soviet allegation that Khrushchev himself had toyed with the idea as early as 1953, or that he was trying to develop a policy leading to the sell-out of East Germany in 1964.

1. Beria Moves to "Undermine" the SED

According to Khrushchev, Beria began his effort to "undermine" Soviet relations with fraternal countries in the "first few days" after Stalin's death. This may refer to a warning which the GDR premier, Grotewohl, received while he was in Moscow for Stalin's funeral. When he returned to East Germany he told his colleagues that the Soviets would be unable to fulfill many of their economic commitments to the GDR. Moscow promised to discuss this question further, but Grotewohl had been put on notice. In view of Grotewohl's rank in the hierarchy and the state of Soviet politics at that time, it is probable that he held discussions with Malenkov, Beria, or Molotov. Despite this warning, the East German leaders responded by appealing to the Soviets in early April for "advice and action," on the grounds that they had concluded that they could not make the "necessary changes" in economic policy quickly enough by themselves. (Sometime in April Moscow replied by urging the SED leaders to soften their rigorous economic policies and take measures to improve the lot of the populace.)

Meanwhile, the GDR regime introduced no changes in its political or economic policies. In effect, Ulbricht still hoped to gain some economic subsistence to see his regime through the summer, and to permit the party to continue with its hard political line. It is possible that he chose to ignore Soviet recommendations on the advice of patrons in Moscow. At any rate, he was clearly heading toward a crisis.

During this period, a definite group of opponents to Ulbricht began to take shape. The group was led by Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of Neues Deutschland, and the Chief of the Security Service, Wilhelm Zaisser. Herrnstadt was a candidate member of the politburo and Zaisser a full member. They had the support of at least three other candidate members of the politburo: Anton Ackermann, acting foreign minister, his former wife Elli Schmidt, head of the East German Women's Federation, and Hans Jendretsky, chief of the East Berlin party organization. Other lesser functionaries supported this group. The most prominent was Max Fechner, Minister of Justice.

This opposition group went so far as to draft a written program. From what has been alleged about this document, it looked to sweeping changes and a basic revision of policy. Its main premise was that the entire course of East German policy since the war was incorrect, because of the impossibility of "building socialism" in a divided country. The new program advocated a complete reformation of the SED into a People's Party which would represent all classes. A new economic plan would be adopted, and in effect, the GDR would prepare to dissolve itself into a "new Germany". Herrnstadt would become head of the party, Zaisser Minister of Interior. In effect, the program called for a new party which might cooperate with West German Socialists in a new state.

It is highly unlikely that this group would have contemplated such a drastic policy reversal if they did not have good reason to believe that the Soviets would support them. There is various evidence indicating that, in fact, Beria was their patron until his undoing in June 1953. After the purge of Herrnstadt and Zaisser,

in early 1954, Ulbricht publicly linked them to Beria, but of course there was no mention of Malenkov. In an unpublished report to the central committee, Ulbricht revealed Beria's private contacts with Zaisser, as well as some of the details of their efforts to replace the SED leaders. As subsequent denunciations of Zaisser and Herrnstadt were made, the connection with Beria was strengthened. In March 1954, for example, the head of the SED Control Commission reported that the "factional activity of Herrnstadt and Zaisser must be viewed in relationship to the influence of Beria." In addition, Zaisser was accused of following a policy which would have resulted in Western control of the GDR, a policy which corresponded with the "views of Beria."

The Soviet party also linked Beria to the German situation, in a private letter circulated to Communist parties after Beria's fall. According to this version Beria had imposed on the GDR leaders the harsh policies which precipitated the riots in East Germany; the other Soviet leaders were aware of Beria's machinations but were powerless to act.

These accusations are, of course, post facto. But they are confirmed in general by the evidence from former East German Communists Heinz Brandt and Fritz Schenk.* Both of them became aware of Ulbricht's fall from Soviet favor, and Brandt learned of Beria's involvement directly from Herrnstadt. Moreover, he concluded that Malenkov was supporting an anti-Ulbricht movement as part of a foreign policy line which foresaw the dissolution of the GDR in return for negotiated concessions from the West. It was believed by Brandt and his colleagues that Malenkov was preparing for or already engaged in secret negotiations with the

*Fritz Schenk, Im Vorzimmer der Diktatur, Cologne, 1962, p. 182; Heinz Brandt, Review, Imge Nagy Institute, October 1959, p. 99 ff.

A connection between Beria and Zaisser, at least, is quite plausible on other grounds. As the now notorious "General Gomez", Zaisser was one of Moscow's agents in the Spanish Civil War. He returned to the USSR and may have been imprisoned for a time. As chief of State Security in the GDR he was almost certainly involved with Beria. After Stalin's death, Beria moved rapidly to regain complete control over the Soviet security apparatus in East Germany. Herrnstadt was a journalist who went to Moscow in the early 1950's where he served in Soviet military intelligence. East German party functionaries regarded both of them as having special connections with the Soviets.

Ulbricht was aware of this opposition, although he may not have realized what degree of Soviet support they had. His move against Franz Dahlem in early May was probably a preliminary to a more drastic purge. Just prior to May Day 1953, party members learned that Dahlem, a politburo member and considered by some as second only to Ulbricht, was to be expelled in a Slansky-like affair. The purge of Dahlem, however, was only part of Ulbricht's counteroffensive. At the 13th party plenum which announced the Dahlem affair (14 May) two other forward moves were made by Ulbricht. First the work norms were to be raised by 10 percent by 1 June. Second, Ulbricht's 60th birthday on 30 June, was to be transformed into a stupendous occasion for glorifying the General Secretary.

Moscow's disapproval of these developments was evident in the public reaction. Pravda and Izvestiya published only short TASS accounts of the plenum which briefly mentioned the Dahlem affair, but ignored both the long harangues on the "lessons of the Slansky trial" and the economic decisions. Tension between Berlin and Moscow is also suggested in the exchange of messages on the anniversary of V-E Day. No message from the Soviet Control Commission was published, although an East German message was printed on 9 May by Pravda and Izvestiya. Moreover, Malenkov's formal greeting to the GDR was curt, with no mention of the usual slogan about building East German "socialism." Molotov and Mikoyan, were the only prominent Soviet leaders to attend an East German

reception in Moscow, and the celebrations in Berlin were marked by the absence of the GSFG commander, General Chuikov.

The growing tensions inside the East German party were dramatized by the long delay between the conclusion of the party plenum on 14 May and the approval of the new work norms by the GDR Council of Ministers on 28 May, too late for implementation by 1 June, and rescheduled for 30 June instead. On the following day Pravda announced a change of policy for Germany. The Soviet Control Commission was dissolved, and replaced by a High Commission similar to the structure of the Western powers' administration in West Germany. The new Soviet High Commissioner was V. S. Semenov, who would assume all the occupation functions hitherto performed by the Soviet military in Germany. In early June General Chuikov was recalled and replaced by Colonel-General Grechko.

The change of Soviet policy was a major event, but what it meant for East Germany was not completely clear until 3-5 June, when Semenov returned to Karlshorst and summoned the East German politburo. He presented for immediate adoption an outline of a new economic policy which would emphasize production of consumer goods and repudiate the harsh measures already taken against the populace. From that point forward the politburo was almost constantly in session, with Semenov in virtual control. Speed was supposedly of the greatest importance because of the impending "negotiations" with Churchill. Herrnstadt was assigned the task of drafting a new policy statement based on the Soviet outline and proposing a reorganization of the politburo and secretariat. Ulbricht was party leader in name only. Soviet officials discreetly sounded out East German officials on their reaction to the possible removal of Ulbricht. Semenov caustically suggested that Ulbricht celebrate his birthday as Lenin did his 50th birthday, that is, by inviting in a "few friends." One East German functionary said that Moscow became impatient and simply forwarded a Russian text for translation and publication. The politburo's statement on the new course was finished on 9 June and published on 11 June.

Even so, Ulbricht managed to salvage something in those few days. First, in violation of the party statutes, the central committee did not meet to approve the new economic measures. This was a partial victory for Ulbricht because if the central committee had been convened Ulbricht probably would have been removed. Second, the pronouncement of 9 June did not contain a revocation of the new work norms. Thus Ulbricht managed to withhold some of the substance of the new policy while formally enforcing it.

Despite Ulbricht's limited success in preventing a complete repudiation of his past policy, the next few days after the decision of 9 June indicated that a major change was underway. The Soviet occupation newspaper emphasized that the new resolutions had great "international significance." The actual texts of the politburo decision also hinted at a change of Soviet policy on the German question by claiming that the new economic decisions would facilitate German unification. On 11 June, the Berlin party organization was instructed to remove quietly all slogans and posters which contained any reference to "building socialism" in the GDR. This is a significant aspect in view of Khrushchev's accusation that Beria and Malenkov "recommended" that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany abandon the slogan of the struggle to build "socialism."

After the announcement of the new course, the struggle continued in Berlin. On 14 June, Herrnstadt used an editorial to attack the failure to revoke the norm increase announced a month earlier. By 16 June it was clear to Semenov that further measures were needed. At a session of the politburo it was decided to abolish the new work norms and the decision was announced that evening. It was too late, of course; rioting had already begun, and it broke out in full fury the following day.

2. The Fall of Beria, the Rise of Ulbricht

The 17 June uprising and the Soviet intervention did not end the policy struggle, but it must have decisively

weakened the position of Herrnstadt, Zaisser and Beria. However, until the arrest of Beria (26 June at the latest), there were signs of vacillation both in Moscow and East Berlin.

The East German party remained overtly divided, as indicated in public pronouncements by the various leaders, until early July. For example, on 20 June Zaisser received the traditional birthday greetings from the SED central committee and Herrnstadt continued to carp at party mistakes in the columns of Neues Deutschland. At the party plenum of 21 June there were no major personnel changes, and the "new economic course" was re-endorsed for "many, many years to come." Ulbricht remained in the background, while Grotewohl made the main address to the plenum. Max Fechner was so bold as to justify publicly the demands of the workers who participated in the uprising and this statement was reprinted in both Neues Deutschland and Taegliche Rundschau (29 and 30 June).

The decline and fall of Beria, however, turned the tide in Ulbricht's favor. At first, both Izvestiya and Pravda were reticent on the events in Berlin. On 21 June, however, Pravda published an editorial calling for "heightened vigilance" and the suppression of all intrigues of "imperialist intelligence"--almost exactly the same line taken after Beria's fall. But on 19 June and again on 22 June, Pravda and Izvestiya reprinted editorials from Neues Deutschland (presumably by Herrnstadt) that were critical of the regime and sympathetic to the "honest people of good will who were seized with distrust" of the party. Then on 23 June Pravda published an editorial linking the events in Berlin to the release of prisoners of war in South Korea as part of a western plot. Pravda stated that: "The collapse of the foreign hirelings venture in Berlin opened the eyes of many who had believed the false claims of the propagandists opposing peace." By June 26, the day of Beria's arrest, there occurred an obvious change from this vacillation: Pravda devoted its entire second page to reports of support for the GDR regime; on 28 June, in the same issue of Pravda that carried the announcement that all the leaders except Beria attended the ballet, there was extensive

coverage of Soviet workers' meetings supporting the GDR, and reports of solidarity meetings in East Germany.

The fall of Beria must have encouraged Ulbricht to act against Beria's allies in the East Zone. The official record against Herrnstadt-Zaisser refers to a "week-long debate" after the uprising of 17 June. Herrnstadt supposedly revealed his program for the party, and Zaisser proposed Herrnstadt for the post of first secretary. Herrnstadt even threatened to appeal to the "masses." According to the party's version, Jendretsky, Ackermann and Schmidt supported the opposition "in the beginning," but later abandoned them after they "capitulated." It is not known exactly when Ulbricht carried the day, but on the basis of the change in Neues Deutschland tone, this struggle was probably resolved by 12 July, that is two days after the announcement of Beria's arrest. Certainly Herrnstadt had lost by 16 July when Max Fechner was removed from office.

The formal charges were unveiled at the central committee plenum of 24-26 July. The purge of Zaisser and Herrnstadt, however, was developed carefully. Moreover, they were not excluded from the party. Not until a month later (22 August) after the East German leaders had been invited to Moscow by Molotov, did the party issue further indictments against them. And not until January 1954, after Beria's "trial" in December, were they removed from the party.

3. Unanswered Questions of the "Beria Heresy"

How far Beria was actually prepared to go in negotiating away the Soviet position in Germany is still open to

Malenkov's role is also not clear.* Until Ulbricht's speech after the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, no allegations were made about Malenkov's support for Beria's plan to "liquidate" the GDR. However, Khrushchev could have had good reasons for avoiding this question. After Malenkov's resignation as Premier in early 1955, it would have been imprudent for Khrushchev to accuse him of a conciliatory policy on Germany, since at that time Khrushchev was quarrelling with Molotov over a somewhat similar situation (in which Khrushchev was the conciliatory figure) in Austria and Yugoslavia. Also in 1957 after the defeat of the anti-party group it would still have been unwise to link Malenkov with Beria's plans for Ulbricht and East Germany, since the general line against the anti-party group was that it was Stalinist and opposed new initiatives,

*Malenkov and Khrushchev have changed roles as opponents of Beria. The original indictment of Beria credited Malenkov with proposing his removal. Later only the central committee received credit. In the 1962 version of the party history, however, the central committee, "after hearing Khrushchev's statement adopted his proposal and curtailed the criminal activity of Beria."

such as the rapprochement with Tito, the Austrian treaty, and the high level contacts with the West.

Nevertheless, the actual alignment of forces in Moscow in the spring of 1953 is still an intriguing question. After Stalin's death the entire presidium apparently accepted the necessity for some major economic changes in Eastern Europe, but there was a division on how far to carry such moves in both the USSR and Eastern Europe. On some issues, Beria and Malenkov were probably natural allies against the primacy of the party under Khrushchev. They are believed to have reorganized the top command of the government immediately after Stalin's demise. Until 1955, relations with East Germany were carried on primarily through government rather than party channels. Malenkov obviously had definite ideas about foreign policy and the situation in Eastern Europe. He is closely identified with the fall of Rakosi and the promotion of Imre Nagy. For his part, Rakosi identified Beria so completely with the new economic and political course in Hungary that he attempted to renege on his promises after Beria's fall, and had to be warned by Khrushchev. One student of Soviet affairs associates Malenkov and Beria with German policy under Stalin and credits Malenkov with initiating the soft line which preceeded the Soviet notes of March-April 1952* that

*The 1952 Soviet proposals were virtually identical to the early 1954 Soviet proposals on the peace treaty issue. That is, the 1952 and early 1954 Soviet proposals both insisted that the two German regimes should independently conduct their own elections--rather than the Eden plan's call for Big Four election guarantors.

embodies Stalin's offer to conclude a German peace treaty.* Thus, it is possible that both Beria and Malenkov looked toward a negotiated settlement on Germany as a prerequisite to a relaxation of tensions in order to implement their economic policies.

Knowledgeable East Germans credit Molotov and Kaganovich with saving Ulbricht at the critical moment before the uprising.** Molotov's entire record would place him in opposition to any experiments in foreign policy. Similarly, Kaganovich's record suggests a thorough-going conservative outlook. Mikoyan also seems linked with this group; his appearance with Molotov at the V-E Day reception points in this direction. Moreover, one of his proteges, I.F. Semichastnov, seryed as General Chuikov's deputy. Obviously, other powerful leaders must have opposed Beria. But opposition to Beria, because of fear of his growing power, does not mean that he did not have some sympathy for his policies.

It is possible that Khrushchev and other presidium members may have equivocated over Beria's plans for Germany. When Ulbricht accused Beria and Malenkov of wanting to restore capitalism in Germany, he mentioned that Beria became "outraged and I argued against" him; this suggests a personal confrontation, which must have taken place in Moscow. Ulbricht also mentioned Shepilov's opposition to Ulbricht's "characterization of Stalin's errors." This too suggests a personal confrontation, which took place according to Ulbricht at the "Higher Party School." If Ulbricht did plead his case before the Soviet leaders including Beria, as Rakosi did, then he clearly did not win unqualified endorsement. His mention of Shepilov may indicate Khrushchev's position was equivocal, because at that time and until 1957 Shepilov was generally regarded as Khrushchev's protege. If

*Brandt, op. cit., p. 101.

**Boris Meissner, Russland, Die West Maechte und Deutschland.

Shepilov opposed Ulbricht, and did not subsequently suffer for it, then he must have been protected by Khrushchev. All this suggests that Khrushchev may have been willing to consider the possibility of abandoning East Germany in 1953.

APPENDIX TWO: KHRUSHCHEV'S REPORTED SUPPORT FOR AN ANTI-ULBRICHT CABAL IN 1956

Abandoning Ulbricht in 1956 is one interesting topic in a book to be published in early March this year by former East German Communist Heinz Brandt (whose earlier work was cited on pages 95 and 103) entitled Ein Traum, Der Nicht Entfuhrbar Ist (A Dream That Is Beyond Reach). According to a Der Spiegel report on 20 February 1967, Brandt's book, after examining the 1953 Malenkov-Beria "arrangement" to sacrifice the GDR (the report does not implicate Khrushchev in the 1953 "heresy"), discusses in some detail Khrushchev's alleged approval in 1956 of the idea to oust Ulbricht.

The possibility of an Ulbricht ouster in 1956 has been the subject of much analysis. For example, Carola Stern in her exemplary biography Ulbricht: A Political Biography (1965 Praeger) concluded that influential East Germans viewed Ulbricht's dismissal as the most important consequence to be drawn from the decisions made at the 20th CPSU Congress (pages 152-170). Stern's general conclusion is strengthened by Brandt's more specific recollections. The highlights of Der Spiegel's excerpts of Brandt's new book follow:

> Karl Schirdewan [Ulbricht's heir apparent in 1956, expelled from Politburo in February 1958] asserted that he had told Nikita Khrushchev the following on the occasion of a visit to Moscow after the 20th Congress, when the two of them were alone:

> 'You had to cope with your Beria, and we have to cope with our German Beria--otherwise the results of the 20th Congress of the CPSU will not have any effect among us.'
>
> The German Beria was Walter Ulbricht.
>
> According to Schirdewan, Khrushchev advised caution. He mentioned his own rather difficult position.
>
> 'Tomorrow Ulbricht will ally himself with all those who can make trouble for you because they think that you are going too far,' Schirdewan urged.
>
> Nikita Khrushchev: 'There must be no new outburst or shake-up in the GDR. The change in the leadership must be smooth. You must guarantee this.'
>
> There is no doubt that Nikita Khrushchev was for a short time in favor of the idea and even worked toward the idea of having Karl Schirdewan promoted to First Secretary of the SED and to establish a new Political Bureau.
>
> At that time he saw in Schirdewan the German Gomulka and he promised him his support: 'But be cautious, very cautious; you have many duraki (dopes) among you.'
>
> 'Ulbricht's crimes are so tremendous,' Schirdewan persisted and assured Khrushchev, 'that we will be able to disclose them to the German [Communist] Party only in small doses, drop by drop.'

After a discussion of Schirdewan's alleged plans to de-stalinize and liberalize political and economic conditions

within East Germany, Der Spiegel excerpts a passage of Brandt's new book which discusses elite SED approval of such changes:

> So long as Khrushchev gave his well-meaning approval, Otto Grotewohl, Fritz Selbmann, Franz Dahlem, Fred Oelssner, Gerhart Ziller, Kurt Hager, and a number of other high and very high party leaders more or less extensively sympathized with Schirdewan's plans.* But when Khrushchev ran into growing difficulties after the Hungarian debacle, and after all he was accused of having triggered phenomena of dissolution in the hitherto

*Of the six officials named by Brandt above, three were accused of being members of Schirdewan's "anti-Party" group: Selbmann, at that time the GDR's Deputy Planning Chief, was removed from the SED Central Committee under criticism of his support of the Schirdewan group; Ziller, then SED Secretariat member responsible for the economy, shot himself to death in 1957 and was posthumously accused of having been a member of Schirdewan's group; and Oelssner was expelled from the Politburo in 1958 because of his role in Schirdewan's "opportunistic group" and because of his criticism of economic and agricultural policy. Prime Minister Grotewohl died in October 1964; Hager is currently chairman of the Politburo's Ideological Commission; Dahlem is First Deputy State Secretary for Universities and Technical Schools.

> 'monolithic' East Bloc with his secret speech and his thaw policy--he found himself forced to drop the Schirdewan-Wollweber* front.
>
> Walter Ulbricht once again was firmly in the saddle and now launched a ruthless counterattack.

Like the 17 June 1953 Berlin uprising, the Hungarian revolt which began on 23 October 1956 turned the tide in Ulbricht's favor. Or as Stern concluded in her biography, Ulbricht's stock rose in Moscow since he had made sure that the Polish example was not followed and since he had prevented the Hungarian revolution from spilling over into East Germany. However, well over a year passed before Khrushchev agreed to Ulbricht's purge of Schirdewan, Oelssner and Wollweber, announced in Neues Deutschland on 7 February 1958--the year which marked the beginning of Khrushchev's forceful strategy on the German question.

*Ernst Wollweber, in 1956 Minister of State Security, was expelled from the SED Central Committee in 1958 due to his collaboration with Schirdewan. Schirdewan, after his expulsion from the Politburo in 1958, remained chief of the GDR State Archive Administration until September 1965. Der Spiegel on 20 February 1967 reported that Wollweber in 1958 retired on a government pension in the Soviet Union. This information on Wollweber's whereabouts contrasts with a [redacted] report from a former SED functionary to the effect that Wollweber was not pleased about SED instructions to move from a villa he had occupied since 1957 in the Berlin-Karlshorst compound--where he "enjoyed the protection of powerful Soviet friends"--to new quarters in East Berlin's Stalinalle in late January 1960.

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

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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

This working paper of the DDI/Special Research Staff examines the internal politics of the highest policy-making body in the Soviet Union--the politburo of the CPSU central committee--and examines the policies advocated by the various politburo leaders.

Although this study has not been coordinated with other offices, the authors, Leonard Parkinson and Carl Linden, are grateful to colleagues in other offices of the Agency for their suggestions and, in particular, for the review of the draft by [redacted] both of OCI.

The DDI/SRS would welcome further comment on the study, addressed to Mr. Parkinson or to the Acting Chief of the Staff, [redacted].

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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

Contents

SECRET

SECRET

List Of Illustrations

SECRET

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

SECRET

POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

Conclusions

A majority of the politburo members have echoed General Secretary Brezhnev's position on most foreign and domestic policy matters. The emphasis in Brezhnev's overall position is on the persistence of international dangers. He has pictured U.S. "imperialism" as on the offensive in various parts of the world, and has stressed the need to build Soviet strength to increase the effectiveness of Soviet policy in the external world. Some members of Brezhnev's politburo majority have enthusiastically taken up his platform, others have lent him only lukewarm support. However, the salient feature of this majority is its complex mixture. That is, while certain leaders support Brezhnev on major policy matters, the same leaders have chosen to back up certain key segments of Premier Kosygin's domestic and foreign policies. Kosygin has struck optimistic notes on long-term international trends. He has tended to leave more room for further improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, as a condition favoring major efforts at overcoming economic imbalances at home.

Divergent treatment of the nature of the Vietnam war highlights the contrasting world outlooks of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Brezhnev has pictured the Vietnam war as only one of many obstacles blocking any substantial improvement of relations with the United States. In his various speeches he has presented the Vietnam war as a symptom rather than a cause of what he regards as a historical period of "danger" and "complications" in international affairs. On the other hand, the Vietnam war has been the central problem for Kosygin's line on foreign policy in general, and policy toward the United States in particular. The implementation of his major foreign and domestic policies has suffered reversals which have coincided with the intensification of the Vietnam conflict. These goals, such as a reduction in the Soviet military's share of the budget and a substantial expansion

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of U.S.-Soviet trade, which he outlined during his first months as premier, have been sidetracked. During the first few months of his incumbency, Kosygin's statements on Soviet aid to North Vietnam fitted his detente-oriented outlook, while Brezhnev's displayed a tendency to minimize prospects for improving relations with the United States. For example, in December 1964--before the stepped-up U.S. military effort in North and South Vietnam--Kosygin's line on aiding the North was made conditional on what unspecified "aggressors" might do; Brezhnev's line pointedly threatened to render military assistance to the North on the basis of what U.S. aircraft and naval vessels had already done in early August and mid-September 1964. Subsequently, Brezhnev repeatedly debunked U.S. efforts to bring the Vietnam issue to the negotiating table, while Kosygin expressed favor for the exploitation of opportunities to commence talks. This past spring, Kosygin was indirectly criticized for being "naive" on this score by Brezhnev--a consistent advocate for Soviet defense interests.

Regarding the matter of Soviet defense allocations, Kosygin has employed the Khrushchevian argument that an East-West war "would inevitably be" thermonuclear and fatal for many countries. Brezhnev has argued that such a war "could become" thermonuclear and he has stopped short of spelling out the consequences. Brezhnev's argument is the one used by the Soviet military high command in justification of its effort to expand the conventional branches of the Soviet defense force rather than reduce those forces which (in Kosygin's view) would not be put to use in the East-West cataclysm. Accordingly, Brezhnev has placed great emphasis on the priority development of the heavy industry-defense sector of the Soviet economy and has regarded consumer well-being as a future consequence of industrial and agricultural successes. Kosygin on the other hand, has generally placed consumer welfare before defense and heavy industry in listing the domestic tasks of the party.

The complex character of Brezhnev's majority is manifested by the other politburo leaders' treatment of

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the sensitive matter of resource allocations.* Thus, while Podgornyy, Polyanskiy and Kirilenko have (with varying degrees of warmth) generally hewed to Brezhnev's hard line toward the United States, those same three leaders make an about-face with regard to Brezhnev's line on the preferential development of the heavy-defense industries sector. On the issue of industrial priorities, six of the eleven politburo members have clearly expressed favor for the continued dominance of the heavy industry sector--Brezhnev, Suslov, Shelepin, Voronov, Mazurov, and Shelest; four have favored a more balanced economy--Kosygin, Podgornyy, Polyanskiy, and Kirilenko; only one, Pelshe, has skirted the problem. And while Voronov has sided with the "metal eaters" on this domestic issue, he has voiced, along with Podgornyy and Polyanskiy, Kosygin's emphasis on the influence of domestic economic example for the "world Communist revolution."

The composition of Brezhnev's policy majority becomes further complicated on examining each individual leader's support for certain politically-related issues, such as the apparent effort to circumscribe the executive authority of Kosygin's Council of Ministers by strengthening

*The chief responsibilities of the other politburo members are as follows: Podgornyy, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (the titular head of state); Polyanskiy, one of two First Deputy Chairmen on Kosygin's Council of Ministers (Polyanskiy's chief responsibility is agriculture); Kirilenko, member of the secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of RSFSR party affairs; Suslov, a secretariat member in charge of foreign affairs and ideology; Shelepin, a secretariat member demoted in July this year to head the Soviet trade union organization; Voronov, a member of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Soviet Union's largest republic, the RSFSR; Mazurov, the other First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Mazurov's chief responsibility is industry); Shelest, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian party; and Pelshe, in charge of party control (discipline).

Podgornyy's parliament, the Supreme Soviet. On this score, for example, only five of the eleven full politburo members--Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Shelest, Suslov and Pelshe--have on the record endorsed proposals to increase the role of the Supreme Soviet in its dealings with the Council of Ministers. The line-up in the oligarchy on the parliament-versus-ministry matter perhaps best illustrates one type of restraint imposed on Brezhnev's drive for power. That is, that Brezhnev must act with caution because any move that would result in sudden and major gains in his personal power could precipitate adverse and (politically) fatal reaction by a majority in the "collective" leadership.

The fact of the matter remains that Brezhnev has a strategic advantage organizationally over his actual and potential competitors. All the signs suggest that he has gradually strengthened his position. The signs also suggest that Brezhnev, at least for the near future, will continue his hard line toward the United States (but avoid high risk in genuine crises) and continue his effort toward Western Europe aimed at (1) removing the U.S. presence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position and influence in the Warsaw Pact, and (4) expanding CPSU influence through the agency of local parties in West European politics. In this connection, Brezhnev has been speaking of the applicability of the peaceful coexistence concept to the European continent, despite his tendency to downplay the concept in general and in particular with regard to U.S.-Soviet relations.

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POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

Introduction

Israel's lightning-swift and massive victory over the Soviet-equipped Arab forces in the recent Middle East crisis was one of those sudden and illusion-shattering external events that can have a deep but unpredictable impact on the internal politics of the Soviet leadership. At the least it has already produced an unprecedented degree of turbulence and visible strain within the post-Khrushchev oligarchy. The leading group had succeeded relatively well in conveying a public image of effective, though uninspired, "collectivity" despite internal differences. Throughout the crisis, indeed, there was no change in the leadership's most notable characteristic. It was militant in theory but careful in practice, harsh in word but restrained in action. In the Middle East crisis Moscow's tough statements and hackneyed diatribes against Israel and "imperialism" were counter-balanced by Kosygin's talks with President Johnson at Glassboro and the avoidance of high-risk in the heat of the crisis. This pattern was rooted both in the closed system of politburo* politics which emerged after Khrushchev's fall and in the strong reaction in the party apparatus and the state bureaucracy against Khrushchev's brand of innovation, risk-taking and dynamism. Such factors have tended to produce a kind of conservatism marked by a revival of ideological orthodoxy but not genuine militancy, and a politics of compromise, log-rolling, and coalition among the oligarchs. The result has been action by the

*The presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was renamed politburo at the 23rd Party Congress (29 March-8 April 1966).

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leadership in those policy areas where its members have found common denominators among themselves on practical if not theoretical grounds, but also inaction and conspicuous stalemates in many other spheres of policy as well. This state of things and the prevailing mood of the oligarchy came under challenge during the Middle East crisis. Moscow party chief Yegorychev's apparent sally against the top leaders' handling of the crisis at the June 20-21 plenum--although a fiasco for this young militant, who was sacked for his temerity*--is a symptom of disagreement within the party over the direction and effectiveness of post-Khrushchev policy.

The obvious and most difficult question is whether the repercussions within the leadership of Israel's success will move Soviet politics off its present resting point. No direct answer can be given for the simple reason that it depends on the course of factional struggles within the leading group. It is a time when the intangibles of politics carry more weight than normally: when the persuasiveness of a leader, his ability to grasp unexpected opportunities, his skill in tactical maneuver and building a winning faction, his accumulated assets and liabilities, and his luck are thrown into the political balance. However, it is possible to some extent to discern

*On 27 June Yegorychev was replaced by Grishin, a candidate (non-voting) member of the politburo. Then on 11 July, Yegorychev's presumed patron Shelepin was demoted to the trade union chieftaincy (formerly held by Grishin). Another member of Shelepin's clique, KGB Chief Semichastnyy, had been removed on 18 May (i.e., prior to the Middle East war).

SECRET

the outlines of the leadership conflict, the issues at hand, the policy courses that could be taken, the strengths and weaknesses of the main contenders, and where various leaders stand in terms of policy, power and influence.

PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN THE POLITBURO

POWER AND POLICY ORIENTATIONS

The struggle under Khrushchev over the question of whether "politics" and "ideology" on one hand, or "economics" on the other hand, should determine policy still remains the underlying issue in the post-Khrushchev leadership. The conflict divides the members of the leading group roughly into an ideologically-oriented and an economically-oriented wing. Where Khrushchev gave the lead to "economics" over politics, the ideologically-oriented forces--the defenders of the primacy of "politics" and "ideology" in formulating the party general line--have been pre-eminent since Khrushchev's fall. However, this broad division of the leadership into two wings is quite loose, despite its usefulness. Some further sub-divisions must be distinguished if the post-Khrushchev pattern of leadership politics is to be adequately understood.

At the extreme of the ideologically-oriented side of the political spectrum are the militants who have been led by Shelepin up to now and have included such younger figures as the hapless Yegorichev. These "young turks" have fallen on bad days of late. Next in order comes a very influential, old-line conservative element best represented in the person of the ideologue Suslov. Brezhnev has deferred to this element and has himself rather consistently adhered to a conservative, ideologically-oriented position. He has been careful not to expose himself to the vulnerabilities Khrushchev assumed when he pursued policy lines which tended to alienate party conservatives and the military. On the other side of center Kosygin has represented the economics-oriented and reform-minded elements in the leadership who are more concerned with

the balanced growth and modernization of the national economy than with revolution abroad. The more radical Khrushchevian variant of reformism which envisaged the party rather than the government becoming the main economic manager and which promoted basic and rapid shifts in allocations favoring consumer economics has faded from the present scene. (Of course there are variations, even inconsistencies, that complicate the placement of some members of the leading group in the political spectrum. Moreover, there are a significant number of fence-straddlers.)

The caution of the leadership majority both in the Middle East crisis and in other situations is a reflection of their awareness of the realities of American power since Cuba rather than an attachment to "moderation" in policy. Excluding the militants, both the conservatives and the reform-minded members agree that this has not been a period to test the United States by force or the threat of force. Nor is the majority disposed to allow Soviet power to be drawn into a direct confrontation with the United States through the actions of its clients, as was underscored by its flat rejection of Nasser's attempt to do just this.

However, party conservatives are at serious odds with the reform-minded on what general policy line should be pursued in response to the American power advantage. For the conservative this is a time for keeping one's powder dry and a time for internal consolidation while building Soviet strength for the future. During this period the party conservatives are concerned with preventing any blurring of the hostile divide between the "enemy" and themselves. Thus, it is not a time for getting along with the United States; but neither is it a time for brinkmanship, or in Soviet parlance, "adventurism."

It is worth recalling in this connection that Molotov and even Stalin were disposed to caution. It was Khrushchev who was disposed to "adventurism." From the point of view of the party conservative, Khrushchev's risk-taking not only undermined the efficacy and credibility of Soviet policy in world politics, but in the Cuban crisis even endangered the Soviet Union itself. On the other side of the coin, Brezhnev suggested at the 23rd Congress that Khrushchev's concentration on an over-ambitious, consumer-

oriented domestic policy also involved another kind of adventurism--the neglect of Soviet defenses. Most relevantly to the present leadership's conduct in the recent Middle East crisis, it is worth recalling that the presidium's indictment of Khrushchev in October 1964 reportedly charged him with "dangerous rashness" in the Suez crisis of 1956 for "committing the Soviet armed forces to a possible intervention, bringing the country thus to the brink of war, without having consulted with sufficient clarity the high executive organs of the USSR." It was widely rumored at the time of Khrushchev's October 1964 central committee "trial" that Suslov had delivered the indictment. In sum, conservative principles demand that militancy be tempered by a judicious weighing of available resources and of the actual opportunities in pursuing policy goals. For the party conservative the cardinal virtues are patience and careful calculation in the struggle with the "class enemy" abroad.

The ill-fitting term "moderate" makes somewhat more sense when it is applied to the reform-minded and economics-oriented wing of the leadership. Unlike the conservatives, they see internal consolidation as a prime goal in itself dictated by pressing internal needs rather than by the demands of a long-term struggle with an increasingly aggressive imperialism. They see a policy of limited accommodation with the United States and the West as desirable not so much for its own sake, but as a condition favoring major efforts at economic reform and at overcoming imbalances in economic growth. While not renouncing support of revolution in the underdeveloped world, they balk at commitments that would involve a constant drain on resources that could be used at home, and they emphasize the line on influencing the world revolution through Soviet economic "example." Kosygin has been the leading representative of this viewpoint in the post-Khrushchev leadership. Among politburo members, he was the most explicit endorser of the "mutual concessions" theme that Khrushchev employed in 1959-1960 and subsequently used to cover his backdown in Cuba; he pressed an abortive policy of "mutual example" in reducing military costs in the months after Khrushchev's fall; he has struck optimistic notes on long-term world trends while Brezhnev has stressed the persistence of international dangers; and he clearly tends to leave more room than Brezhnev for future improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

CONSERVATISM IN THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE

While the Kosygin-led economics-oriented wing of the leadership has not been without influence, it has had to work within the restrictive confines of a general party line which has largely been defined by the party conservatives. The latter have had the main say in framing major party pronouncements. They have established the broad context within which foreign and domestic policy is made. A pronounced conservative trend has been reflected in the editorials in the party theoretical journal Kommunist devoted to the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution and also in the central committee's anniversary "Theses."* The Theses provide a comprehensive statement of the party's current general line and give a clear expression in doctrinal formulas of the conservative platform. The Theses were approved at the June 1967 plenum of the party which dealt with the Middle East crisis. They were undoubtedly drawn up well in advance of the crisis--though they were obviously altered in places to take the crisis into account. It is still perhaps rather early to tell whether the impact of the crisis on leadership politics has been such as to produce significant shifts of line in one way or another. So far there has been no sign of new elements in regime statements since the crisis. Nevertheless, an acquaintance with the basic formulations of the Theses can provide a useful gauge against which future signs of change or continuity in line can be measured.

The central committee Theses mark the 50 years of Soviet rule with a rather somber picture of a world full of dangers. They offer little more to the Soviet citizenry than the prospect of a long and bitter struggle of indefinite duration with a wily class enemy. Gone from the Theses is any trace of the Khrushchevian theme that "Communism" is just around the corner in the USSR along with

*The pervasiveness of this trend is made further evident by the revision early this year of the Handbook for Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. The revisions, in effect, instruct the low-level party secretaries to give first place to "ideology" and "politics" and not to production questions in their party activities. Nonetheless, the revisions call for "more effective" control over the economic apparatus in view of the freer hand "economic leaders" have been given under the 1965 economic reforms.

the idea that the Soviet people would be entering an era of peace and plenty by 1980. Instead, the Theses dwell on the long drawn-out nature and the complexity of the process of building Communism. Rather than tying party policy to a blueprint for the future, the Theses reflect the leadership's stress on the "immediate" and "unresolved" tasks facing the party at home and, in effect, say that there is no shortcut to Communism.

The postponement of the Communist utopia at home is implicitly but unmistakably connected in the Theses with the burdens of the class struggle abroad. According to the Theses the increased aggressiveness of imperialism the world over, American imperialism in particular, is responsible for a period of intensified international tension. The Theses do not suggest that this condition is temporary but that it arises from a fundamental historical factor--namely the sharpening of the general economic crisis of world capitalism. According to this theme, the imperialists are led to take desperate measures to prevent further deterioration of their positions. As a consequence, they pursue "adventurist" policies in world politics. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam is cited as a symptom of the crisis. While the Theses speak of imperialism's increasing inner weaknesses, the document does not suggest that the enemy has become an easy mark. Rather, according to the Theses, capitalist monopolies have united and joined their power to that of the state and have been able to mount menacing counter-attacks on the revolutionary movement at various points around the world.

On the basis of this perspective, the Theses unambiguously subordinate welfare goals to the main business of increasing the economic and military "might" of the country. The Theses reassert the line that narrowing the gap between consumer and heavy industrial production remains dependent on the preferential development of heavy industry. One of the "main conclusions" of the past 50 years, according to the Theses, is the primary importance of building Soviet military strength as a "real counterbalance" to an aggressive imperialism. Where Khrushchev

once emphasized building Communism at home--to such an extent that Molotov accused him of neglecting the party's world-wide revolutionary goals--the Theses stress the "indivisibility" of the party's international and national aims. Hence the Theses closely tie building Communism in the USSR with tipping the balance of forces against imperialism and providing the basis for the world-wide victory of socialism abroad.

The conservative tenor of the Theses is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in their revised formulation of the "state-of-the-whole people" (or "all peoples' state") doctrine originally introduced under Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. Khrushchev intertwined that doctrine with the prospect of increasing internal relaxation and decreasing external danger as the Soviet Union moved toward Communism. At the time of the 23rd Congress last year there were clear signs that the doctrine was under critical reappraisal. It was conspicuously ignored at the congress and in the May Day slogans. The Theses now present a reformulation of the doctrine which fits in more harmoniously with the present political line.

The Khrushchevian version of the all-peoples' state was focused almost entirely on its domestic functions. The present version gives equal emphasis to the Soviet state's external and revolutionary functions. The Theses add the themes that the all-peoples' state "continues the cause" of the dictatorship of the proletariat and "wages class war" together with other socialist states against imperialism in the international arena. Thus the continuity of the doctrine of the all-peoples' state with the dictatorship of the proletariat doctrine is underscored rather than the Khrushchevian idea that the Soviet state had entered a new stage which marked the end of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR.

The influence of Suslov's thinking in the revision is unmistakable. He was at odds with Khrushchev on the question of the Soviet state before the 22nd Congress. He had promoted the concept that the USSR and bloc functioned as a dictatorship of the proletariat for the world

revolutionary movement but failed to get this notion into the new Party Program at the 22nd Congress. However, he did have some success in toning down Khrushchev's line that the Soviet state was now "withering away" insofar as its internal role was concerned.* Now in the Theses Suslov seems to have gained both points. The Theses re-emphasize the Soviet state's revolutionary mission abroad and say nothing about the withering away of the state at home. Rather, the Theses stress the argument that the state must be further developed as the way to "public self-rule"--a line that bears kinship with what the Yugoslav's ridiculed as Stalin's theory of "the state that doesn't wither."

In harmony with the renewed emphasis on the external revolutionary function of the Soviet state as well as on the need for a strong state internally is a diluted neo-Stalinist formulation on the contemporary ideological struggle. (In the 1930's, Stalin introduced the thesis that the domestic class war increases in intensity as the Soviet Union proceeds toward the building of socialism. Stalin's thesis, which was used to justify his purges in the 1930's, came under harsh attack by Khrushchev in the 1956 "secret" speech and again at the 1961 Party

*At the 1961 Congress, both Suslov and Khrushchev stated that the dictatorship of the proletariat had fulfilled its mission of building "socialism," and that the proletarian dictatorship had been transformed into the "state of the whole people" whose mission was to build "Communism." But Suslov concluded (1) that state apparatus would be strengthened during the period of the "state of the whole people" and (2) that the state would create the "material and technical base of Communism." Khrushchev held (1) that the existing state apparatus would wither during the period of the state of the whole people and (2) that the party would be called upon to create the material and technical base of Communism. The party program, adopted at the 1961 Congress, reflected Suslov's more conservative conclusions on the "state of the whole people."

Congress by Mikoyan, a former confidant of Khrushchev's who lost his presidium membership and Supreme Soviet chairmanship in December 1965.) The Theses, asserting that the ideological struggle has become "extremely acute" in the external world, warn that the greater the successes of socialism the more insidious become the efforts of the imperialists to lure the people away from Marxism-Leninism and infect them with "bourgeois ideology." Hence the party faces a "serious" task in fighting the influence of "alien morals and traditions," and overcoming "negative manifestations in the consciousness and behavior of the people." Here, of course, is an indication of the deep disturbance within the party apparatus over Western influence in the USSR. The above formula also obviously relates to the regime's troubles with the uncowed liberal intellectuals who are seen as being corrupted by "individualism" and "apolitical attitudes."

BREZHNEV AND THE POWER STRUGGLE

Kosygin's Problems

The predominance of conservative themes in the Theses underscores once more the handicap Kosygin faces in leadership politics. At present Kosygin and his supporters do not hold the high ground which gives its occupiers the prime advantage in defining the party line. This ground of course is the CPSU central committee secretariat and is now held by Brezhnev and Suslov. The Theses were undoubtedly drafted under their direct supervision--as the contents of the document suggests. While this does not mean that Kosygin has not succeeded in having any of his positions on specific questions incorporated into party documents--for example, the Theses section on "economic reform"--it does reflect the fact that Kosygin's views have taken a distinctly secondary place. But if his views are to make real headway, command the attention of the officialdom, and be adopted in other than piecemeal fashion, he and his supporters must be in a position to shape the basic formulations of the general line as well. Such incidents as the

"hardening" by TASS through editorial alterations of Kosygin's statements at a 25 June 1967 press conference in New York--most likely under guidance from the secretariat--underlines his predicament.*

Brezhnev

Kosygin

*See ahead, page 42 and 43, for a discussion of the highlights of the TASS censorship of Kosygin's press conference remarks.

Many observers (and they may be correct) have been persuaded that Kosygin as a long-time technocrat has neither acquired the skill nor is disposed by character to alter the situation by factional political struggle and to aim at ultimately acquiring Brezhnev's job. Indeed, there have been few signs that he has been engaged in such an effort.

However, Brezhnev has often acted as if he regarded Kosygin as a competitor rather than a trusted collaborator. (Evidence for this proposition is examined at length in part two of this report.) Further, quite aside from the personal motives of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the division of executive authority between them is a source of cleavage within the leadership structure itself. Add to this the many indications that the two leaders do not see eye to eye on policy and the fact that Kosygin is a leader with his own base of power and not a dependent of Brezhnev, and the potential for conflict is intensified. Khrushchev solved the problem of shared rule by downing Malenkov, then backing Bulganin's appointment to the post, and finally taking on the post himself in addition to his party job, after Bulganin had gone over to the "anti-party" opposition in 1957. Brezhnev might be tempted to do the same, but here he would have to move carefully so as not to arouse the fear and provoke the opposition of his fellow oligarchs in the "collective leadership" against his drive for power. While it must remain conjectural, Brezhnev may have already contemplated a step in this direction last year, but then thought better of it, when rumors were circulated in Moscow on the eve of the August Supreme Soviet that Kosygin was ready to resign.*

*Rumors that Premier Kosygin is to be removed were reportedly circulating again in high government circles in Moscow, according to a late July piece of information passed through a subsource (described as fairly reliable) from a Soviet economic official in East Berlin. According to the report, Kosygin's expected removal is due to severe differences (which the report did not elaborate upon) between Kosygin and Brezhnev occasioned by the
(footnote continued on page 13)

The fact of the matter remains, however, that Brezhnev holds the main track in the political arena of the leadership. He has something of a strategic advantage organizationally over his actual and potential competitors. If anything, all the signs suggest that he has steadily strengthened his position, especially in view of the manifest decline of Shelepin and his entourage in the past eighteen months.

Shelepin's Unsuccessful Struggle

Up to now, at least, Brezhnev rather clearly has regarded Shelepin rather than Kosygin as a more immediate and more dangerous rival for power. Some of the major reasons for Brezhnev's judgment are quite evident. Shelepin represented a threat from within the party apparatus, not from without as is the case with Kosygin. He had emerged from Khrushchev's fall--in which he played a key role--in a position of strength second only to Brezhnev s within the party. He had a foot in both the presidium (now politburo) and the secretariat, was deputy premier

(footnote continued from page 12)
former's recent visit to the United States. Despite the fact that the sources of rumors cannot be easily pinned down, it should not be forgotten that rumor-spreading is a time-worn device in factional politics. The former Bulgarian Premier Yugov and his faction, for example, were accused by the victorious Zhivkov faction of having spread rumors of Zhivkov's impending fall at a certain juncture. It is tempting to speculate, therefore, that Shelepin's faction was behind another flurry of rumors in the summer of 1965 that Brezhnev was about to fall.

of the Council of Ministers and chief of the party-state control apparatus (a unique organization with a great potential for exercising power over both the officialdom of party and state) and had a protege (Semichastnyy) installed as head of the KGB as well as a coterie of followers in influential positions in the party apparatus.

Not only Brezhnev, but probably other senior leaders, saw a common danger in the youthful, militant and ambitious Shelepin. Shelepin apparently had not taken his colleagues' concern sufficiently into account and moved too quickly and boldly to gain power. During the summer of 1965, in any case, the rumors that Shelepin



Shelepin

was scheming and intriguing to get Brezhnev's job were followed by leadership action curbing his (Shelepin's) power. In December 1965 the party-state control agency which he had headed was abolished and by the time of the 23rd Party Congress he was deprived of a direct role in cadre appointments in the party.

The circumstantial evidence suggests that Shelepin was a principal in what was evidently a bold but abortive attack on Brezhnev's handling of the Middle East crisis at the June 1967 plenum. This affair led not only to the ouster of Shelepin's presumed ally Yegorychev as head of the Moscow party but to his own demotion to chief of the trade unions--an action that most probably portends his removal from the secretariat, and, possibly, his eventual downgrading from voting-member status on the politburo. However, the Yegorychev affair may have been less a prime cause than a pretext for Brezhnev to take one step further in his gradual effort to dispose of his adversary. Before the Middle East crisis broke Brezhnev had already succeeded in forcing Semichastnyy out as KGB chief--here Svetlana Stalin's defection came as a windfall--and moving an (apparent) ally, the party specialist in Soviet bloc affairs, Andropov, into his place. The latter action not only strengthened Brezhnev's grip on the police apparatus, but along with Andropov's elevation into the politburo as a candidate member, raised the political status of that agency to its highest point since 1953, when it suffered a major reduction of its powers after Beria's execution. Thus, in this connection, it is difficult to credit the idea offered recently by some Western analysts that Brezhnev still faces a major threat from the Shelepin forces other than perhaps in the sense that they may survive to fight another day. Rather, Brezhnev seems to have succeeded to a large degree in defusing the threat from his most dangerous challenger.

It is important to keep in mind that while there has been a distinct cleavage in the policy outlooks of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the notable aspect of the Brezhnev-Shelepin rivalry has been that both sought to occupy much the same political ground--with the difference that Shelepin

has taken a more clear-cut militant stand, Brezhnev a fuzzier position. In short, Shelepin has been holding out the promise to the ideologically-oriented wing of the party that he could do what Brezhnev was claiming to do with greater dynamism and efficacy. Brezhnev has repeatedly represented his policy as one which would increase the "effectiveness" of party efforts in the struggle against "imperialism" and in building economic and military strength at home--implying a contrast with the alleged ineptitude of Khrushchevian policy. Yegorychev's apparent sally against the leadership's cautious actions in the Middle East crisis--undertaken, perhaps, with Shelepin's blessing--added up to accusing Brezhnev himself of ineffectiveness, of propounding a hard line without teeth. Vulnerability to this complaint of the party militant remains a basic weakness of the kind of cautiousness Brezhnev has adopted so far. While Brezhnev nonetheless has strengthened his grip on the organizational positions in the leadership, he is undoubtedly seeking for ways of making more credible his emphasis on making party policy "effective."

With the successive defeats the Shelepin faction has suffered, Brezhnev would now seem to enjoy more elbow room and be in a better position to consolidate his conservative line. But how he shall move remains in question. Involved in the answer are both the disposition of forces with which Brezhnev must reckon within the leading group and the very difficult matter of his own motives and inclinations as a leader.

Suslov's Influence

Despite Shelepin's decline, there remains the powerful influence exercised by Suslov on the side of traditionalism. While probably not a direct contender for Brezhnev's position, he can act as a strong restraining influence on the general secretary from his position in the secretariat. While Suslov would be close to the young militants on broad ideological grounds, he probably considers them immature and adventurist as other senior leaders who also

may agree that they need to be held in check. On the other hand, he probably does not want them driven completely from the field, inasmuch as the young militants may be considered a useful check to Brezhnev's expansion of power. Moreover, he also stands guard against any dilution of the basic conservatism of the overall party political line. Brezhnev may also be currently held back by a purely tactical consideration--much as was Khrushchev in his struggle against Malenkov in 1954 and early 1955. To move too obviously away from this conservative-leaning stance, would inevitably make it appear as if he were "me-tooing" Kosygin. Further, the strength of conservative opinion within the party, may make it imprudent in Brezhnev's eyes to change line.

Finally, Brezhnev's rather consistent identification with the ideologically-oriented wing of the party since Khrushchev's fall may arise from personal conviction as well as from his judgment of the balance of forces within the regime. So far, at least, he has shown no sign of shifting from his positions as a result of his defeat of Shelepin and concurrent gains in organizational strength. His July 1967 speech to military graduates some two weeks after the June plenum was an emphatic restatement of his previous line. He fitted the Israeli-Arab war into the picture he has drawn of coordinated attempts by the "imperialists," especially the Americans, to regain lost positions through counter-attacks against the revolutionary movement. He rejected the notion that the crisis was the result of national strife between Israel and the Arab states. He professed to see it as another engagement in the world-wide class struggle and asserted that the "arrogance" of the imperialists required "still greater" attention to building Soviet military strength.

Brezhnev's Prospects

Brezhnev, in any case, has three broad options for his future course: (1) a turn toward a high risk militancy in foreign affairs, (2) continuing his present hard line toward the United States but avoiding brinkmanship in genuine

crises, and (3) seeking a more relaxed relationship with the United States and giving greater attention to internal problems.

The first course has been rejected by Brezhnev and the pressures in its favor have been reduced for now by Shelepin's steady decline. Correspondingly, movement toward the third option is now easier for Brezhnev but the fact that Kosygin has so far preempted this line acts as a deterrent as long as he remains premier. The prospect at least for the near future actually seems to favor a continuance of the second course perhaps with some veering to one side or the other. At the same time, this course leaves some room for flexibility in developing strategies for various local situations. Brezhnev has evidently been trying to develop such a strategy toward Western Europe aimed at drawing Europe away from its associations with the United States and increasing Soviet political leverage in the area. In this connection, Brezhnev has been speaking of the applicability of the peaceful coexistence concept to the European continent, despite his tendency to downplay the concept in general and in particular with regard to U.S.-Soviet relations.

Brezhnev's problem as a leader, even more so now than before, has been his difficulty in maintaining forward momentum for his foreign and domestic programs. He rode to power on the wave of reaction in the oligarchy to Khrushchevian leadership, but the time has long since past when Khrushchev provided a convenient whipping-boy. Brezhnev must take the rap when things go wrong.* It is just

*As if he were in search of a scapegoat, Brezhnev went out of his way to defend politburo policy during the Arab-Israeli war; he did not defend past Soviet policy for the Middle East in his 5 July address. In this connection--and in what appeared to be a classic KGB effort to try to shift the blame of a glaring failure from their ultimate boss, Brezhnev, to his competitor, Kosygin--a known KGB agent claimed in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that the dismal failure of the UAR to meet Soviet expectations "may put Kosygin in a bad position." One month later the same KGB agent seemed to provide an apologia in Brezhnev's defense. The agent stated that the USSR "would prefer an Egypt which is defeated but remains a socialist country to a victorious Egypt which would become a capitalist country and no longer need Soviet aid."

as true of a Soviet Communist leader as other leaders--if not more so--that he must sustain the appearance of forward movement in his policy. Otherwise he can become prey to other pretenders to power around him. (Khrushchev's fall, for example, came after his own program had been foundering. His Cuban venture, two years earlier, itself was a desperate attempt to restore momentum to his leadership.) While the Middle East setback was not his "Cuba," the outcome of that war did not help Brezhnev. The problem of forward movement remains.

PART TWO: PATTERNS IN POLITBURO LEADERS' POLICY STATEMENTS

The following textual analysis of the public speeches of Soviet leaders reveals basic differences on major foreign and domestic policy issues. The analysis reveals a remarkable degree of consistency in the individual treatment of major issues by the leaders. Patterns emerge which permit the identification of distinct policy preferences of the individual Soviet policy-maker, which, in turn, throws light on Kremlin policy cleavages. (The patterns also serve a vital political function within the Soviet power environment--that is, the communication of an individual leader's line to the lower-ranking party and government members.)

It is apparent that, as in the past, speeches are frequently subjected to coordination by members of the politburo. The early November revolution anniversary addresses appear to be heavily coordinated. But other speeches, in particular the annual election speeches for the Supreme Soviet (parliament) speeches at the party congresses and plenums and at Supreme Soviet sessions display considerably divergent formulations on various issues. And on the whole, the conscious effort at presenting a coordinated line makes the differences that do appear the more noticeable.

The following section, which concentrates primarily on policy issues--rather than on political alignments per se--examines the patterns derived from the politburo leaders' remarks since the fall of Khrushchev.

BREZHNEV: HOSTILITY ABROAD, DISCIPLINE AT HOME

From the outset of his incumbency Brezhnev has developed his policy lines around the theme that the Soviet Union must face a world full of dangers for an indefinite future. He thus has tacitly but unmistakably dissociated himself from Khrushchev's optimistic themes of a steady, if uneven, trend of declining danger of war and the prospect of "removing war from the life of society." Brezhnev has sought to give new life to the sense of external danger which has animated Soviet politics but which was dulled by Khrushchevian doctrines. While not going so far as to renounce Khrushchev's pronouncement that the "capitalist encirclement" of the USSR has ended, he has sought to provide something of a functional equivalent of that discarded doctrine by stressing that the Soviet Union remains in "a hostile capitalist environment."

Where Khrushchev turned the party toward internal ideological goals focussing the new party program more on building Communism at home than on revolution abroad, Brezhnev so far has chosen a more traditional course. He has tried to draw the party's attention back towards its external ideological purposes--toward the "anti-imperialist struggle," to restoring unity in the Communist movement and among bloc states. Correspondingly, he stresses the primary need to develop the economic and defensive "might" of the Soviet Union in order to cope with the "world-wide aggressiveness" of imperialism, especially of the United States.

A. The Hard Line Toward the United States

Unlike Kosygin, Brezhnev pictures the Vietnam war as only one of many obstacles blocking any substantial improvement of relations with the United States. In his various speeches he has presented the Vietnam war as a symptom rather than a cause of what he regards as a historical period of "danger" and "complications" in international affairs. The underlying cause in Brezhnev's view is U.S. "imperialism" which he pictures as being on the offensive in various parts of the world. The recent Arab-Israeli war is seen simply as another front in the current imperialist offensive. In short, Brezhnev has taken radically different situations and made them fit into his simplistic conception of an imperialist master plan.

Brezhnev has displayed a consistent tendency to minimize prospects for improving relations with the United States. This tendency was evident even prior to the stepped up American involvement in Vietnam in early 1965. Within three weeks of Khrushchev's political demise, Brezhnev devalued the coexistence theme. The peaceful coexistence line so heavily stressed and singled out by his predecessor now appeared far down the list on a six-point foreign policy formula which subordinated coexistence to other Soviet external goals. This major change was introduced under the guise of continuity, but it involved a significant reshuffling of priorities in policy in which the themes of anti-imperialist struggle and national liberation rose while the theme of preventing a world war fell. Brezhnev called for:

> guaranteeing peaceful conditions for constructing socialsm and communism, for strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood; a course directed towards support of revolutionary liberation movements, toward every possible development of solidarity and cooperation with the independent states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, toward affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, toward the deliverance of mankind from world war.

Brezhnev's six-point "general course" of Soviet foreign policy was repeated almost verbatim two-and-one-half years later in the CPSU central committee Theses on the 50th anniversary of the Communist revolution.

A notable omission from Brezhnev's formulations on Soviet foreign policy has been any assertion of the Khrushchevian corollary that the policy of coexistence involved mutual concessions. Rather, Brezhnev has been disposed to give the doctrine of coexistence a militant cast. And in December 1964 he began to redefine the theme of coexistence in a defensive, negative form: "Just because we are convinced supporters of peaceful coexistence, we resolutely and implacably speak out against those who want to violate this peaceful coexistence. We give a rebuff to the provocations of the imperialists and to their encroachments on the peaceful life of the peoples of the socialist countries, on the freedom and independence of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The tone of militancy was present in his first major foreign policy speech (6 November 1964); he stressed that "in implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence we base ourselves on the might of the countries of the socialist camp." He combined this statement with the assertion that "we shall maintain our defense potential on the highest possible level"--the strongest presidium-level pledge for support to the Soviet military during 1964. These statements set the pattern for Brezhnev's position on foreign policy right up to the present.

Renewed Emphasis On The World Revolution

Brezhnev's upgrading of the line on supporting national liberation movements was combined with his failure to mention Khrushchev's strictures against attempts to export revolution.* Within a month of his assumption

*This line has not disappeared entirely. It has appeared in the key "consensus" speeches, that is, in Polyanskiy's 6 November 1965 revolutionary anniversary speech (in the wake of the abortive Indonesian coup) and Pelshe's 6 November 1966 speech on the same occasion.

of power, he followed up his formulations with actions which clearly portended a deterioration of relations with the United States. And during this period he sounded the call for a "single anti-imperialist front" to counter what he said were U.S. "encroachments" on socialist states and underdeveloped states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. (3 December 1964 Kremlin speech)

The most obvious move in this direction at the time was Moscow's decision to send military support to the Congolese rebels allegedly in response to the U.S.-Belgium rescue effort at Stanleyville (now Kisangani) in late November 1964. The only generally comparable previous Soviet move to directly aid indigenous forces came during the 1960-1962 phase of Khrushchevian bellicosity toward the West when military equipment was sent to combatants in Laos. The aid to the Congolese rebels was accompanied by a vitriolic anti-U.S. propaganda attack as well as by Soviet-staged demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. In his 3 December speech Brezhnev made the first presidium-level attack by the post-Khrushchev leadership against the Johnson Administration. Brezhnev charged that "the bloody slaughter perpetrated in Congolese towns by the Belgian paratroops, brought in U.S. aircraft with the blessing of the White House and with the approval of the NATO Council, is a striking example of the collective piracy by the colonialists." He went on to allude to Soviet armed support of Africans, who, he said, were no longer "unarmed" in the face of the imperialists.

An emerging divergence between Brezhnev and Kosygin on the question of world revolution was reflected in Kosygin's comments in late 1964 on the Congo crisis. In his comprehensive discussion of Soviet foreign policy at the Supreme Soviet on 9 December 1964, Kosygin, unlike Brezhnev, made no allusions to strengthening the Congolese rebels and claimed only that the "world"--rather than the USSR in particular--was "profoundly indignant" over the actions of "certain [unnamed] Western powers." (This was the same speech in which Kosygin called for a policy of mutual example between the United States and the Soviet Union in reducing military budgets.)

That these early differences were not merely tied to a specific situation but entailed distinct outlooks was underscored at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966.* Kosygin assumed a more pragmatic, Brezhnev a more orthodox position regarding the goal of world revolution. Kosygin cited Lenin as authority for the statement that the Soviet Union "exercises its chief influence on world revolution through its economic policy," and he predicted that success in the 1966-70 economic plan would "secure further changes on the world scene in favor of peace and socialism" and would "unquestionably exert a far-reaching influence on the world situation." Diverging from Kosygin's emphasis on winning the world by "example," Brezhnev's Congress report did not refer to Soviet economic policy as the "chief" or basic contribution to world revolution. Rather, Brezhnev forecast that success in the 1966-70 economic plan would serve to "consolidate the unity of the world socialist system," would increase the Soviet Union's economic and defense might and, lastly, would bolster its international prestige.

The Congo crisis was not, of course, the only situation Brezhnev exploited to justify his developing hard line toward the United States during the first months of his leadership. (But that matter, like U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic beginning in April 1965, was used as an element in Brezhnev's portrayal of U.S. aggressiveness on all fronts.) Of course, the issue of Vietnam was soon to become another example cited by Brezhnev in support of his hard line toward the United States.

Characteristically, it was Brezhnev who initiated the post-Khrushchev condemnation of U.S. actions in North and South Vietnam (6 November 1964 speech) and who first spoke of Soviet readiness to extend military aid to North Vietnam (3 December 1964 speech)--well in advance of the

*For a good examination of this issue at the 23rd Party Congress see "Conflict and Consensus in the Soviet Leadership" (Soviet Division, OCI, memorandum of 27 February 1967)

actual intensification of the Vietnam war in February 1965. (The contrasts between Brezhnev and Kosygin on Vietnamese-related issues will be discussed in the section dealing with Kosygin's policy positions.)

Renewed Emphasis On The U.S. "Threat" in Europe

Brezhnev, however, has not treated Vietnam as the central issue for Soviet foreign policy. He has given particular attention to U.S. military activity and supposed intentions in Europe--rather than dwelling on U.S. activity in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. He has drummed up a picture of a "serious threat" to both Soviet and general European interests raised by U.S. collusion with West German "revanchism." This line seems to be intended to advance four goals of Soviet policy emphasized by Brezhnev: (1) removing the U.S. presence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position and influence in the Warsaw grouping, and (4) expanding CPSU influence through the agency of local parties in West European politics.

In an effort to justify these objectives in doctrinal terms, Brezhnev has introduced a novel amendment to Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Brezhnev has pushed the coexistence line with regard to Western Europe--and only Western Europe--in order to "prove" that there is no need for NATO.

Removing The U.S. Presence From Western Europe:
Thus, Brezhnev in his 1967 election speech stressed that:

> In its relations with the capitalist countries of Europe, the Soviet Union steadfastly follows the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

He did not, however, apply the notion to U.S.-Soviet relations. To the same effect, Brezhnev's single reference to peaceful coexistence in his 24 April 1967 Karlovy

Vary (Czechoslovakia) speech was made in one of his interlaced arguments for the removal of the U.S. military presence and U.S. political and economic influence in Europe. Among the arguments were, for example, that the U.S. had "fabricated the myth" of Communist aggression in order to impose its will on West European governments through the NATO pact; that the "over 300 billion dollars" the European states belonging to NATO had spent on military preparations had slowed down their economic, scientific and cultural progress; that the "brain drain" of West European scientists to the U.S. was a conscious American policy; that the large areas used to quarter U.S. forces imposed a burden on the West European populace; that the U.S. had tried to poison relations between East and West Europe by building "subversive espionage and sabotage centers and broadcasting stations"; and that the U.S. presence in Europe encouraged West German "militarism" and threatened peace in Europe.

Brezhnev set forth the rationale for concentrating on Europe in his April 1967 Karlovy Vary speech. After pointing out that the United States had been unsuccessful in its "stubborn efforts" to involve its NATO allies in the Vietnam war "as occurred during the Korean war," Brezhnev argued that "tying down the forces of imperialism in Europe" limits the scope and hampers the success of capitalist ambitions on "all other continents." On the surface, Brezhnev's rationale is inconsistent, inasmuch as it appeals for the removal of the U.S. presence in Europe but goes on to imply that the military status quo in Europe works not only to the advantage of the North Vietnamese party but also to the advantage of the CPSU. However, the stress on the U.S.-West German "threat" in Europe provides both a pretext for Moscow's limited activity in Vietnam and a counter to Chinese Communist charges that the Soviets are planning to pull back from, rather than open up, a "second front" in Europe.

The "threat" in Europe also harmonizes with the priority Brezhnev has given to strengthening Soviet leadership in East Europe. Secondarily, Brezhnev has used the theme of war danger in Europe to persuade the West Europeans of the danger of a continued U.S. presence in Europe and of the desirability of a Europe detached from American--but not Soviet--influence.

Strengthen The Soviet Bloc, Fragment NATO: Trying to have it both ways, Brezhnev has drummed up fears to keep the Warsaw pact consolidated while extending inducements to wean the West Europeans away from America. Clearly, the most important goal for Brezhnev is that of assuring national and bloc unity; the less important, gaining substantial cooperation with the capitalist countries of Europe. In his 1967 election speech he defined the objectives of the Soviet Union's European policy as follows:

> First, to consolidate and to strengthen the gains of the peoples achieved as the result of the most cruel war in the history of mankind and of the radical class social changes in Europe which followed it; second, to isolate the forces of imperialist aggression, not to allow the West German militarists and revanchists to unbridle themselves, and above all to prevent them from gaining access to nuclear weapons; on that basis to strengthen the security of our western borders and the borders of the socialist countries allied with us, and to create the conditions for broad and fruitful cooperation in Europe of countries with different social systems.

Brezhnev's formulations on this theme are a mixture of old Stalinist themes and more recent detente themes. Thus on the one hand, he calls for unrealistic, extreme preconditions for European security which subordinate constructive moves toward meaningful European detente to the consolidation of the Soviet bloc. For example, he called for the dissolution of NATO by its 1969 renewal date and other one-sided propagandistic demands, such as the liquidation of military bases and the removal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean. On the other hand, he dangled before the West Europeans attractive--and double-edged--"detente" proposals, such as the construction of

a natural gas pipeline from the USSR to Western Europe.* The gas pipeline, argued Brezhnev on 24 April, would be one measure leading to the "liberation" of Europe from the U.S. "dollar diktat." Notable among Brezhnev's other bids were general proposals for cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology and culture on both a bilateral and an all-European basis, and specific proposals for the establishment of a unified color television system for Europe, cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy, and joint activity in river and sea purification and disease eradication.

Expanding Communist Influence in West European Politics: The Karlovy Vary conference of the European parties also marked an intensified effort on Brezhnev's part to increase CPSU influence in European politics through the agency of local parties. Brezhnev spoke of the growing role of the West European Communist parties in the recent period and implicitly claimed credit for the increasing influence of those parties during his incumbency. Thus he stressed that "the past few years have shown quite clearly that in conditions of slackened international tension the pointer of the political barometer moves left." This period of leftist progress was implicitly set off against the record under Khrushchev. Alluding to his predecessor's rocket-rattling and associated threats over Germany and Berlin, Brezhnev stated that the atmosphere of military threats had been counterproductive

*The pipeline project had been [redacted] discussed with Austrian and Finnish officials as early as 1964. With the 1966 announcement of the end of the NATO embargo on wide-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe the proposal was publicly aired by Supreme Soviet leader Podgornyy with the Austrians in November 1966 and the Italians in January, at which time Podgornyy said talks were "underway" to construct a pipeline to provide natural gas to Italy.

for the West European Communist movement.* He went on to conclude that during the present period (which in this context he portrays as a quiet period) Communist party influence had increased correspondingly:

> Certain changes in relations between communists and social democrats in certain countries, a noticeable falling off in anticommunist hysteria, and the increase in the influence of West European Communist parties is most directly correlated with the reduction in tension which has taken place in Europe.

On the matter of working with social democratic parties, Brezhnev's remarks contained cautious currents --in this particular case, endorsing in principle Communist party cooperation with the social democrats and then undercutting that call with sharp attacks on the two major West European social democratic organizations. Thus he went out of his way, as he has done in the past two years, to score the British Labor Party and the West German SPD--two major West European parties which, in Brezhnev's lights had shown themselves unwilling to "march with us."

*Accordingly, Brezhnev did not comment on the need for a German peace settlement (a call also deleted in the CPSU's 1967 May Day slogans), though he repeated the remaining six points of the European security program approved at the July 1966 Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the Warsaw Pact (develop intra-European relations, liquidate NATO and then the Warsaw Pact, adopt several partial disarmament measures, prevent the possibility of West German nuclear armament, recognize Europe's postwar frontiers, call a conference on European security). In his Karlovy Vary speech, Brezhnev called only for the "recognition of the existence of two German states" rather than diplomatic recognition of East Germany per se--as GDR leader Ulbricht insists.

Brezhnev's repeated critical comments on the two major socialist parties in Europe have closely conformed to the early post-WWII Cominform line on the European social democratic parties introduced in late September 1947 by Zhdanov--a Stalinist henchman praised by Brezhnev in a Leningrad speech on 10 July 1964 as "an outstanding politician and statesman." Paraphrasing Zhdanov's pejorative comments on the West German social democrats, Brezhnev in Bucharest in the latter part of July 1965 reportedly stated in private that the Soviet Union had no confidence in the leadership of the SPD because the Socialist International, of which the SPD is a member, is "a headquarters of the struggle against the socialist camp in the capitalist world." In his 29 March 1966 report to the central committee at the 23rd CPSU Congress Brezhnev, without elaboration, charged that difficulties encountered in the Communists' struggle for unity with working class movements are due "above all to the right-wing leaders of the social democratic parties." Brezhnev scored the SPD's role in the Bonn coalition government in his 1967 March election speech by seizing a quite routine matter; he told Moscow electors on 10 March that "although social democrats now hold a number of ministerial positions in Bonn, the new government has already found time to announce its intention to continue the ban of the party of the German working class"--the KPD-Communist Party of Germany).* The KPD ban was also mentioned in his next two major speeches which, in citing other spurious examples, served to expand his attacks on the SPD. In East Berlin on 18 April Brezhnev said that the SPD, the party "that calls itself the party of the working people

*This routine announcement, which has almost always been ignored in comments by Soviet leaders, was alluded to by FRG Chancellor Kiesinger in a 3 March interview with Neue Revue, and the Chancellor, who reportedly expressed his "fundamental skepticism" about a ban on extremist political parties in general, went out of his way to state that the KPD could again be legalized when the topic of reunification "enters an acute stage."

of West Germany," had "in no way" effected a change from the FRG's "aims of revenge and war preparations to aims of peaceful cooperation and...European security." And in his 24 April Karlovy Vary speech, he attacked the SPD for refusing to adopt an independent foreign policy and for following "in the wake of the CDU, the party of the German monopolies." Brezhnev also derided the British Labor Party, the "prime example," he said, "of a party betraying the working class" for its support for NATO.*

Brezhnev topped his call for (limited) united tactics with an appeal for a novel propaganda forum--"a congress of the peoples of Europe on the broadest possible basis"--to discuss problems of peace and European security. Brezhnev's "people's congress" call explicitly excluded U.S. participation--an exclusion only implied in Brezhnev's 29 March 1966 CPSU Congress call for a "general European conference" on European security.** Kosygin's past remarks

*Kosygin has criticized [redacted] the British Labor Party leadership. In a conversation [redacted] 1965 Kosygin criticized Prime Minister Wilson for being "more American than the Americans" on the Vietnam and NATO nuclear-sharing issues. But he reportedly went on to stress that "it must, after all, be possible for the Communist and social democratic movements to find certain common views."

**Without naming the participants in his 1966 Congress report Brezhnev expressed the need to "initiate talks on European security; discuss the proposals of socialist and other European countries on a relaxation of military tension and a reduction of armaments in Europe and the development of peaceful, mutually advantageous relations between all European countries; convene an appropriate international conference for this purpose; and continue to look for ways of settling one of the cardinal problems of European security, that is, a peaceful settlement of the German problem by recognizing the now existing borders of the European countries, including those of the two German states, in order to completely remove the vestiges of World War II in Europe." Deleting the "cardinal problem" of Germany, the Karlovy Vary communique merely supported "the idea of convening a conference of all European states to study problems of security and the development of European cooperation, as well as other initiatives toward the same purpose."

on the Brezhnev-proposed European security conference have, in fact, reflected a more realistic effort aimed at actually negotiating East-West problems in Europe--rather than engaging in an anti-American propaganda forum, such as Brezhnev's "peoples' conference." Thus, reflecting a high degree of seriousness underlying the idea of a security conference, Kosygin [redacted] made the first specific suggestions for the time and means of organizing the conference. He said that the conference should be held in 1968 and that a "preparatory commission" should commence working "at once." Finally, while his statements on West European policy (discussed presently) display the desire to increase Soviet influence there, they are generally not cast in the hostile form used by Brezhnev in his arguments on the need to diminish U.S. economic influence and to cripple NATO's military capabilities.

B. Defense And Vigilance At Home

As in the case of his foreign policy formulations, Brezhnev has stayed close to the conservative lines set in his early pronouncements on domestic economic policy. And his pronouncements, reflecting his views on external conditions, have consistently favored (1) the defense and heavy industry sector and (2) the agricultural sector. Other sectors--and in particular the consumer-related sector of the Soviet economy--are subordinated.

Brezhnev's traditionalist formulation on the "prime task" of Soviet resource allocation policy was made in his first public address as CPSU First Secretary (now General Secretary): Brezhnev called for strengthening the country's defenses and stated that

> in the sphere of domestic policy the party regards it as its prime task to develop the productive forces of our society, to raise steadily on this basis the welfare of the Soviet people, to develop socialist democracy in every way.*

Brezhnev's formulation in this speech (19 October 1964) was an accurate preview of the February 1966 directive on the "main tasks" of the five-year plan which were justified, in large part, by an alleged necessity to react to the increased "aggressive" activity of American "imperialism." Thus with a similar conclusion, the current five-year plan directive--after claiming that the Soviet Union is required to strengthen its defense might in the next five years due to the "aggravation of international tension caused by American imperialism which unleashed military aggression in various regions of the world"--presents the development of the productive forces as the "main tasks" and "thanks to this [the development of the productive forces], the achievement of a substantial rise in the living standards of the people." (A similar formula was incorporated into the 1967 Theses.)

The second main part of Brezhnev's economic program--major allocations for the agricultural sector--was previewed in his 20 November 1964 Tashkent speech in which he argued for strengthening Soviet defenses, "our national and international duty," and for increasing at the same time Soviet agricultural productivity, "our paramount and nationwide task." The two tasks were not regarded by Brezhnev as being mutually exclusive, in the sense that the funds for Brezhnev's subsequent grandiose agriculture plan announced in March 1965 were not to be taken out of the military budget. In fact, in his 27 March 1965 central committee speech which introduced his plan to invest 71 billion rubles in state and collective farms, Brezhnev completely ignored the subject of military allocations.

*Emphasis supplied here and elsewhere in this study, unless otherwise noted.

More recently, Brezhnev's bias in favor of the "productive forces" sector was prominent in his 1967 election speech. Here he called for "the strengthening of the economic and defensive might of the socialist motherland, for [note the order] the growth of the people's welfare and culture, and for durable peace the world over." While he stated that "improving the life of our people" is the "main aim of the policies of the Communist party," his formulation on the attainment of that main aim included prerequisites--such as success in agriculture and industry--which placedany significant increase in the standard of living in the future.* (It should be noted here, however, that the rate of growth of consumer production has increased somewhat during the post-Khrushchev leadership period.) And warning against complacency with regard to defense matters, he said in his 5 July 1967 speech (his first public address following the Israeli victory) that "defense is in the forefront of all our work." Thus his recent remarks sustain his two 1966 election pledges that (1) Soviet defenses "will be maintained at the very highest level...and will continue to preserve the superiority of our army" and (2) that "the priority development of heavy industry is the unchangeable principle of our economy." Reinforcing his traditionalist economic position, Brezhnev has not recently reiterated the 23rd CPSU Party Congress call for bringing together the rates of growth in the heavy and light industry sectors of the economy. (On the other hand, politburo leaders who echo Kosygin's economic views have recently reiterated the congress' line on proportional growth.)

While in the past two years Brezhnev has discussed the need for material incentives in the pursuit of Soviet national economic policy, he (like Podgornyy) has given noticeable stress to "moral" incentives--that is, the effort

*Certain other politburo members (such as Kirilenko, see page 83) have recently argued that present economic conditions permit a significant increase in the standard of living "now."

to imbue the workers with party-approved attitudes.* For example, in his 10 June 1966 election speech he called for "selfless work" in building Communism and equated that call with a World War Two political officer's slogan: "Communists, forward." In his 1967 election speech he said that this year's slogans are "shock labor in the jubilee year...not a single man lagging behind but at your side!" And he summed up his hackneyed sloganeering on incentives, as well as his overall foreign and internal views, in one concise statement:

> Great persistent work and daily conquests on the labor front in combination with constant vigilance regarding the intrigues of the imperialists--this is the only key to a shining Communist tomorrow toward which our people are moving confidently under the leadership of their Leninist party.

*Kosygin, on the other hand, has given particular emphasis to the extension of material incentives through capital construction (though he has also mentioned the need for educational and cultural facilities which, presumably, serve to imbue the workers with party-approved attitudes). Interestingly, those who favor material incentives over moral incentives have come under attack. For example, Stalin's former chief theoretician Chesnokov wrote in Pravda on 27 February 1967 that "the disregard of some leaders for cultural-educational work and the broadening of the material and technical base of culture, as well as attempts to set off economic building against cultural building, can only be explained by political naivete or ignorance. Quite recently voices were heard in some places demanding that the construction of clubs and other cultural and enlightment institutions be curtailed under the pretext of 'concern' for economic construction. Such a vulgarized approach to cultural construction violates correct Marxist understanding and the solution of the problem of balancing material and spiritual culture in the development of society."

Preserve The "Leading" Role of the Party: Unlike his 1966 campaign performance, Brezhnev in his election speech this year did not discuss the party as a "productive" force in the life of the nation. Rather, he fell back on the more traditionalist view that the party "leads," "guides" and "organizes" the nation's productive forces. Last June, in the context of calling for a new Soviet constitution to "crown the majestic half century of Soviet power" (a project to which he has not since publicly referred) he discussed the productive economic tasks of rank and file party workers. He said in the 1966 campaign that the party is called upon to "formulate the basis of the country's economic policy, the main principles and methods of management and to put these into practice."* Brezhnev's revived emphasis on the traditionalist role of the party also occurs at a time when Soviet media have been sharply attacking developments in both the Chinese and Yugoslav parties for departing from "sound principles" and following policies which allegedly debilitate the party's leadership over the society.

KOSYGIN: COOPERATION ABROAD, REFORM AT HOME

The keynote of Kosygin's more optimistic foreign policy outlook was sounded in the introductory passages of his 6 March 1967 election speech. In evident rebuttal of Brezhnev, Kosygin explicitly placed troubles with the capitalists in the "contemporary international atmosphere" and looked to the "future [which] will bring a considerable relaxation of international tension" and will create conditions, he said, for the Communist tomorrow. Kosygin

*As the spokesman for the politburo's coordinated line on the occasion of the last revolution anniversary celebration (6 November 1966) Pelshe cited Brezhnev's 1966 party congress remark that the party "organizes and inspires" the people--rather than citing Brezhnev's less traditional 1966 election comment that the party puts economic policy "into practice."

went on to emphasize that relaxation of international tension is a "principle," not a tactic or diplomatic game:

> Our party and government, in their foreign political activity, have always proceeded and continue to proceed from a concern for strengthening peace and creating the conditions for peaceful socialist and Communist construction. We do not regard the search for ways to strengthen the security of the peoples as questions of tactics and diplomatic maneuverings. For us this is a line of principle, corresponding to the desires of hundreds of millions of people who hope that the future will bring a considerable relaxation of international tension.

Thus Kosygin has persisted in the optimistic foreign outlook mirrored in his 3 August 1966 Supreme Soviet report --that is, that Soviet foreign policy "takes into account the broad perspective of international development." Unlike Brezhnev's projections which magnify present troubles, Kosygin's forecasts have, in the main, looked beyond contemporary conflicts and have generally been capped with optimistic, pacific conclusions. Kosygin told Supreme Soviet delegates in August 1966 that

> to orientate correctly in policy means not to shut oneself up in present-day events, but to see the main trends of long-term significance. If we look at things broadly, we shall see that these tendencies, despite the present tension caused by imperialist aggression, are favorable for the forces coming out for peace and international security.

A. Improving Relations With the United States

The Vietnam war has been the central problem for Kosygin's line on foreign policy in general, and relations with the United States in particular. The implementation of his major foreign and domestic policy goals have suffered reversals which have coincided with the intensification of the Vietnam conflict. These goals, such as a

reduction in the Soviet military's share of the budget and an expansion of U.S-Soviet trade, which he outlined during his first months as premier have been sidetracked.

Vietnam: Kosygin's Obstacle, Brezhnev's Opportunity

During the months prior to February 1965 and the bombing of North Vietnam, subtle differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin were reflected in their public remarks on Vietnam. Kosygin's more circumspect statements fitted his detente-oriented outlook, Brezhnev's, his consistently harsh view of the United States. For example, with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong on the platform, Brezhnev in his 6 November 1964 revolution anniversary speech initiated the new Soviet leadership's condemnation of the "intervention of American imperialism" in South Vietnam. Apparently with the early August and mid-September 1964 U.S. retaliatory strikes on North Vietnam in mind, he charged that "we resolutely condemn the provocations against the DRV." In his first public remarks on foreign policy after Brezhnev's attacks, Kosygin (in his 25 November anniversary speech in Ashkhabad) did not even mention North Vietnam and the acts of unnamed "imperialists" in South Vietnam were briefly passed over. Kosygin's reticence was particularly noticeable in light of the facts (1) that Moscow-Hanoi relations had greatly improved in the wake of Pham Van Dong's return from the early November visit,* and (2) that Soviet conventional air defense materiel

*Soon after Pham Van Dong's return from Moscow, an article by a DRV spokesman who had consistently engaged in anti-Soviet polemics was suddenly deleted from the November issue of the DRV party's theoretical journal (Hoc Tap), the title of the contents page was inked over, and a loose insert of a nonpolemical speech by a North Vietnamese politburo member was added. And the DRV's subsequent lack of criticism of the Soviet party stood in sharp contrast to Hanoi's unfriendly actions prior to the Soviet leadership changes, e.g., non-technical Russian newspapers and periodicals were reportedly withdrawn from circulation in the DRV and students returning from Moscow were being given political re-education courses.

had arrived in Vietnam in either late December or early January. In short, it is probable that the Soviet decision to reverse, at least tentatively, Khrushchev's 1963-1964 withholding of significant Soviet military support to the DRV was taken in early November, and that the decision had not evoked Kosygin's public endorsement as of late November 1964.

Constrasting comments by Kosygin and Brezhnev in December 1964 tend to strengthen this conclusion. Kosygin in his 9 December speech based his formula for a military budget cut on a "certain change for the better" in relations with the United States and pointed in this context to a U.S. pledge to reduce military outlays. Less than one week earlier (3 December) Brezhnev was emphasizing the worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations on the basis of U.S. military actions in Vietnam. Brezhnev pointedly threatened to render military assistance to the DRV on the basis of what "U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels" had already done in early August and mid-September. Kosygin's line on aiding the DRV, on the other hand, was made conditional on what unspecified "aggressors" might do.

Brezhnev's 3 December 1964 Kremlin speech	Kosygin's 9 December 1964 Supreme Soviet Speech
Recently DRV territory was again subjected to raids and bombardment by U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels. These acts of aggression cause indignation throughout the world. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have already declared for all to hear that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a fraternal socialist country, and that it is ready to render the necessary aid to it.	The Soviet Government is attentively watching developments in the Caribbean, in southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. After all, the actions of aggressive imperialist circles are exacerbating the situation. The Soviet Union states that it will not remain indifferent to the destinies of such fraternal socialist countries as the DRV and the Cuban Republic, and is ready to render them necessary aid should the aggressors dare to raise a hand against them.

Kosygin's initial line on "rendering necessary aid" to the DRV--his sole reference to that country in his lengthy speech--was also diluted by including Cuba in the same formula. Brezhnev capped his anti-U.S. remarks with a warning that the policy of peaceful coexistence does not prevent the Soviet Union from "giving a rebuff" to those who interfere in the affairs of bloc nations, and in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Kosygin's remarks on imperialist aggressiveness, however, followed a passage urging a "considerable increase" in East-West trade, as well as an optimistic passage on prospects for improved Washington-Moscow relations.

Kosygin did not lend his full endorsement to DRV defense aid until February 1965. And at that time, he apparently linked Soviet military support with a negotiations effort that failed in the following month.* Then for several months in his numerous speeches he tended (unlike Brezhnev) to confine the scene of U.S. "aggressiveness" to Southeast Asia.

While continuing to stress that Vietnam was the obstacle to improved relations with the United States, Kosygin in May 1965 gradually began to expand his view of the supposed scope of U.S. "imperialism" and to switch

*It has been plausibly concluded that the Soviets were attempting (successfully) to increase their influence in Hanoi by granting military support while simultaneously urging negotiations on the Vietnam war, apparently because the DRV had been considering the possibility that the U.S. might be willing to use a conference as a cover for U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. The sustained U.S. bombing in the north shattered Hanoi's and Moscow's illusions regarding the degree of U.S. resolve.

temporarily to the Brezhnev rationale for strengthening Soviet defenses.* His gradual--and temporary--backing away in the summer of 1965 from his own version of detente abroad and concentration on civilian economics at home may well have reflected a tentative compromise aimed at preventing a rout--such as the defeat of his economic reform plan (adopted in September amid rumors of his imminent retirement). Nevertheless, Kosygin refrained during this period from emphasizing the threat from the U.S. in Europe.** The exception to this general pattern appeared in Kosygin's atypical remarks in a 6 December 1965 interview with New York Times columnist James Reston. It should be pointed out, however, that Reston apparently provoked Kosygin with some rather blunt badgering into a bellicose position on several issues. (Thus the interview may be a less useful source for the purpose of comparing statements than are speeches written by Kosygin or his staff.) At any rate, during the interview Kosygin argued that the increase in the Soviet military budget (announced the next day) was in reaction to U.S. intentions in Europe and nuclear sharing proposals for NATO. In his next comment in the interview, Kosygin forecast that "the next few years will set the pattern for the next 10 to 15 years. One prospect is for the arms race and the increase in

*Prior to this period, the signs of political pressure on Kosygin were evident in two political slights to which he was subjected. Publication of his 19 March 1965 Gosplan speech (discussed presently) was delayed until April and then carried in the small circulation journal, Planned Economy, rather than in the larger circulation press. Secondly, a proposed April trip to Poland was, according to the Soviet press in March, to be led jointly by Brezhnev and Kosygin; in April the same media announced that Brezhnev led the delegation and gave him the overwhelming attention while slighting Kosygin on several points of protocol.

**For example, only in one speech in 1965, and then in passing, did he note that the U.S. was in Europe in a military capacity--7 May speech in East Berlin.

military budgets." He did not comment on any other prospect. Thus, Kosygin at that time appeared to have retreated from his December 1964 positions.

His retreat was shortlived, for in early 1966 he began again to speak of the Vietnam war as the sole obstacle in the way of improved relations with the United States. In his 3 August Supreme Soviet speech last year he based the increase in the Soviet military budget (which he described as "immense...it weighs heavily on the working people") solely on one specific situation--the Vietnam war. And while he scored U.S. "interference in the internal affairs of other nations," he did not follow Brezhnev's practice of elaborating upon such charges (such as U.S. support for Bonn "revanchists," etc.) and using such specific charges as the bases for increased Soviet defense spending. In fact, Kosygin went out of his way to acknowledge the presence of "sounder tendencies in Washington." He said he looked forward to the time when "sounder tendencies" would predominate over the "present... aggressive moods."

Kosygin's characteristic position on substantial cooperation after Vietnam was most recently renewed in response to a question posed during his 25 June 1967 news conference at the United Nations. He said that

> the cause of the improvement of Soviet-American relations could best be served by one first step and that is an end to the American aggression in Vietnam and to improve those relations it is necessary first and foremost to end that war and then several--quite a big group of questions and steps could be charted which could all be designed to improve those relations and these questions could be the improvement of economic ties, cultural ties, technological exchanges and the solution of various important political issues which exist in the world today and which could be resolved through cooperation between the two nations.

Significantly, Kosygin's response was censored in TASS' 26 June version of the UN press conference which rendered his remarks on improving relations in a tougher, more

strident vein. TASS recorded Kosygin as stating that "it is impossible" to count on improved relations as long as the U.S. commits "aggression" against Vietnam. (A similar line was taken in an Izvestiya editorial on 30 June.) The TASS version altered Kosygin's remark on the possibility of mutual cooperation to read "cooperation between the two nations together with other nations."* And TASS deleted Kosygin's reassuring judgment, which followed his remarks on the possibility of Washington-Moscow cooperation, that "we are equally sure that the people of the United States [like the people of the Soviet Union] do not want war."**

Negotiations on Vietnam: The divergent conceptions held by Kosygin and Brezhnev on the nature of U.S.-USSR relations beyond Vietnam have recently been set against apparent differences on the possibility of East-West negotiations on the Vietnam war. Brezhnev has harshly debunked U.S. efforts to bring the issue to the table, while Kosygin has sought to use recent opportunities to try to commence discussions.

*On the subject of cooperation with capitalist states of Europe, Brezhnev and Podgornyy in their 1967 election speeches stressed the line that the Soviet Union was acting jointly with other nations of the Warsaw Pact.

**Izvestiya on 26 June carried TASS' censored version of Kosygin's press conference and also quoted from President Johnson's 25 June remarks on the Glassboro talks, but Izvestiya did not cite the President's statements that his talks with Kosygin made the world a little less dangerous. Kosygin's judgment that Americans do not want war was not the conclusion drawn in a 19 August Pravda article by its correspondent Kurdyumov. Kurdyumov, who reported that he had sampled U.S. public opinion about the Vietnam war, concluded that the "majority is probably composed of those who have been deftly sold on the idea of imperialist superiority: America has never lost a war. How can it throw in the towel to the Viet Cong?"

The contrasts between the two leaders on this issue surfaced in the wake of Kosygin's February 1967 London discussions on the possibility of settling the Vietnam war. Brezhnev, in one particularly polemical passage in his March 1967 election speech, said that "now even the most naive people realize that U.S. ruling circles deceived the world and their own people when they stated that they were striving for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue." As if defending himself, Kosygin in his election speech explained that in early February 1967 "there appeared a real possibility of beginning talks on the Vietnam question...[and] only one thing was demanded of the leaders of the United States: that they...unconditionally halt their aggressive actions against the sovereign DRV. The American Government, however, did not make use of this opportunity."* Brezhnev, who did not discuss such a "real possibility" and unused "opportunity" to begin talks, concluded sharply that the alleged purposefully deceptive efforts of the U.S. leaders to try to "mislead naive people have crumbled." Kosygin plaintively concluded that the U.S. destroyed genuine "hopes" with what later proved to be "empty words calculated to deceive public opinion."**

On the general subject of the efficacy of negotiations, it is interesting to note that in his 19 June 1967 United Nations address Kosygin judged the peaceful resolution of "dangerous developments" in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or any other place" as an imperative of state policy. He went on to tell the delegates that

*Pravda correspondent Yuri Zhukov stated in a late June 1967 conversation with U.S. Senator Hartke that the resumption of bombing the DRV was "costly" to Kosygin "who staked his personal prestige on the effort" to commence negotiations.

**Similarly, Khrushchev was subjected to indirect but unmistakeable attack in the journal Oktyabr after the 1960 U-2 incident for having been hoodwinked into accepting President Eisenhower's "talk about peace."

No state or government, if it genuinely displays concern for peace and the prevention of a new war, can reason that if some event takes place far from its borders it can regard it with equanimity. Indeed, it cannot. A seemingly small event or so-called 'local wars' may grow into big military conflicts. This means that every state and government should not only refrain from bringing about new complications by its action, but it must undertake every effort to prevent any aggravation of the situation and moreover, the emergence of hotbeds of war, that should be quenched whenever they appear.

The Nature Of An East-West War: On the subject of a major military conflict, Kosygin in his U.N. speech introduced the first politburo-level discussion since the fall of Khrushchev on the mutually destructive nature of a future world war. Dwelling on the consequences of war --that is, that it would be inevitably fatal for many countries--has not been characteristic of post-Khrushchevian leadership pronouncements. And Kosygin's discussion of the nature of a worldwide conflict--and his assessment that it was essential to resolve the issues that might precipitate it--was broached in a distinctly argumentative passage which sought to deny the rationality of engaging in war under contemporary conditions. In his United Nations speech, he said:

No nation wants war. Nowadays nobody doubts that if a new world war starts, it would inevitably be a nuclear one. Its consequences would be fatal for many countries and peoples of the world. The more far-sighted statesmen from various countries, outstanding thinkers and scientists, warned of this from the very first day nuclear weapons came into existence. The nuclear age has created a new reality in questions of war and peace. It has vested in the states a far greater responsibility in all that pertains to these problems. This cannot be questioned by any politician, any military man unless he has lost the capacity for sensible thinking--all the more so since military men can imagine the aftermath of a nuclear war better than anyone else.

Kosygin then dramatically underscored the urgency of resolving conflicts by asserting that the Vietnam war "is fraught with a terrible danger of escalating into a major military clash between the powers."

His remarks on the nature of war revealed subtle and significant differences with Brezhnev's past references to the subject. The major implication of the differences concerns not only the relative emphasis on the importance of resolving limited conflict, but also the matter of Soviet defense allocations. For example, at Karlovy Vary, Brezhnev stated that "if a new war started in Europe it could become [mozhet stat'] thermonuclear and envelop the whole world," while at the United Nations Kosygin stated that "nobody doubts" that a new war "would inevitably [neizbezhno byla by] be a nuclear one." This argument, which Khrushchev developed in the early 1960s, has significant policy implications; the "inevitable" school has argued (1) that due to the mutually destructive effect of the use of nuclear weapons, all means must be taken to prevent the outbreak of the inevitable cataclysm that would result, and (2) that due to the fact that a major war would inevitably become a nuclear one, there is little need to maintain costly across-the-board preparations to fight a conventional conflict. The Brezhnev argument, elaborated upon by several Soviet military theorists in late 1965 and 1966,* asserts (1) that the possibility of a non-nuclear war should not be excluded under contemporary conditions for political and security reasons (such as the need for a credible rationale for the conventional role of the non-nuclear allies under the command of Moscow) and (2) that reliance on "massive nuclear retaliation" is not sufficient to prevent the outbreak of a war and that practical steps to deal with contingencies short of massive nuclear war should be taken. Accordingly, Brezhnev, more than any other politburo member, has stressed the need to improve the conventional

forces. In his 3 July 1965 speech, for example, while speaking of Soviet ICBM and ABM* advances, he went on to emphasize the "great role belonging to conventional types of armament." He told his audience that the Soviet Army "is being constantly supplied with the most up-to-date tank, aviation, artillery and other equipment." Thereby he identified himself with the combined arms school of the late Defense Minister Malinovskiy, who one month earlier in the restricted military journal Military Thought argued, in the present tense, that "we consider it premature to 'bury' the infantry, as some people do."

Favoring the non-nuclear forces is also implicitly reflected in Brezhnev's rather conspicuous failure to spell out the mutually destructive "consequences" of a nuclear war. According to a [redacted] Brezhnev said that as Chairman of the Defense Council" he was "familiar with the consequences of modern war. Unfortunately there were certain people who did not understand this." (This particular remark was drawn in the context of an explicit attack on the Chinese Communist leadership.) To the same effect, Brezhnev said in his 5 July speech this year that the measures taken by the Soviet Union to "stay the [Israeli] aggressor's hand" prevented the three-day war from "reaching a size dangerous for all mankind." Thus he stopped short of employing the typically Kosyginesque conclusion (which weakens the argument for across-the-board preparations to fight a conventional war) that the war would necessarily have ended in a nuclear, universal conflagration.

*While there have been indications of differences within the Soviet military over the ABM issue, politburo-level statements on strategic defense spending have not reflected differences. This is not to suggest that the politburo has decided to commit Soviet resources to an expanded deployment of the existing ABM system. In fact, the differing treatment given to key features of the sensitive ABM issue (such as the ABM's role in modern war, Soviet AMB capabilities, negotiations aimed at a U.S.-Soviet accord, etc.) by Soviet military leaders and commentators may reflect general indecision (or dissension) in the politburo on the matter of moving ahead with the expensive ABM program. At any rate, in the context of discussing Soviet ABM deployment, one Soviet official privately stated in early 1967 that Kosygin, "in particular," was "very desirous" of holding down arms expenditures in order to meet various economic needs.

Expansion of U.S.-Soviet Trade: The Vietnam "obstacle" hindered the development of Kosygin's proposals in late 1964 for greatly expanded U.S.-USSR trade. That Kosygin's plans were ambitious was suggested by the remarks of a group of visiting U.S. businessmen who reported that Kosygin in a 19 November 1964 closed session with the businessmen commented favorably on the possibility of settling Moscow's wartime lend-lease debts to the United States.* Kosygin's offer for a mutually agreeable compromise on the debt--the main political issue limiting U.S.-Soviet trade--was never made public in the Soviet Union, although Moscow propaganda pegged to the businessmen's visit with Kosygin displayed a strong interest in expanding East-West, and particularly U.S.-USSR trade. Kosygin also urged reduced armaments spending** and improved U.S.-Soviet economic relations in remarks to Western correspondents on 19 November 1964. He made a similar appeal in the context of his 9 December Supreme Soviet announcement that the USSR and the U.S. intended to spend less money on armaments. He said that the U.S. and the USSR "have every opportunity" to consolidate and continue joint efforts for better relations "by searching for and seeking solutions to controversial political questions and [questions] in the sphere of economic, cultural, and scientific ties." Later he called for a "truly extensive" expansion of trade with the West and stressed the possibility of "increasing considerably the capacity of the Soviet market."

While Brezhnev has not neglected the subject of external trade, his remarks have generally amounted to

*In the wake of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Kosygin commented on a lend-lease settlement in his 6 November 1962 revolution anniversary speech.

**Reducing the Soviet armed forces to ten percent of its present size and eventually eliminating that force was regarded as a "happy prospect" by Kosygin in a conversation with the U.S. Ambassador on 7 November 1964.

little more than reiterations of earlier ambiguous formulas expressing a Soviet readiness to develop "foreign business relations." He has made no recent calls for expanded U.S-Soviet trade. Kosygin, on the other hand, has continued to comment on the sensitive subject of trade with the U.S. During his 9 February 1967 BBC press conference, he repeatedly pointed out that the Soviet Union would like technical and trade cooperation with Western Europe "as well as the United States," but that "certain circumstances" precluded the possibility of active cooperation with the United States. He added, however, that "we would help and also certainly welcome the development of such cooperation with all nations, including the United States."

Western Europe: Toward A Meaningful Detente

Kosygin displayed his preference in pursuing Soviet national objectives through Soviet-West European cooperation on what he has called in numerous speeches this year a "pan-European basis."*

*The Gaullist-tinted vision of "pan-Europeanism" has been a favored and a frequent subject in Kosygin's speeches this year. On 8 February at the Guildhall in London for example, he painted the following utopian economic scenario:

> The European states would receive great advantages from the expansion of their mutual economic, scientific, and technical ties. If, for example, we take the nations belonging to different social systems under conditions of an international detente and a safeguarded security, they could boldly go forward toward a more profound international division of labor in Europe and thereby more effectively use the opportunities of each state to the advantage not only of its own self, but to the advantage of all the participants in international economic exchanges. And it may be said with confidence that with a reasonable utilization of all the available natural wealth in Europe, including the resources of the Soviet Union, and the reasonable use of the industrial potential, the accumulated skills,

(footnote continued on page 50)

Kosygin's theme that political and military security and economic progress can be achieved through European cooperation is devoid of Brezhnev's three prerequisites --maintain the status quo, isolate the West Germans, strengthen frontiers of the socialist camp--which amount to restraints on the development of meaningful intra-European cooperation. In his election speech his year, Kosygin pointedly argued that "it would be naive to expect [European cooperation] to occur automatically without any application of effort, without struggle." In short, he seemed to be denying Brezhnev's proposition that the attainment of the earlier-discussed three objectives would, ipso facto, create the possibilities for fruitful, Soviet-West European cooperation. Kosygin went on to emphasize favorable developments (instead of dwelling on future possibilities) involving current cooperation with specific

(footnote continued from page 49)

> experience, and the knowledge of the toiling people, Europe is capable of forging ahead in the vanguard of the world's economic, scientific, and technical progress.

Political and military security were the chief themes of his pan-European remarks in his 6 March Moscow election speech:

> In this region [Europe], burned in the conflagrations of two world wars, new tendencies are clearly displayed. These tendencies consist of the fact that in many West European states the insolvency of a political course connected with the activities of the NATO military bloc is being recognized. The idea is penetrating deeper and deeper into the awareness of the broadest strata of the population that security in Europe and the solution of its problems could be best insured by strengthening relations between West and East--the developments of cooperation on a pan-European basis.

And tariff reforms were added to the above political and military security pitches in his 21 March references to European cooperation

West European countries. Brezhnev in his election speech briefly acknowledged that the USSR "is working tirelessly" to develop mutually advantageous contacts and to strengthen cooperation with "those countries seeking such cooperation" (presumably France in particular). Yet unlike Kosygin, he placed the realization of cooperation in Europe as a whole in the indefinite future by asserting that Soviet contacts with West European governments are "preparing good ground for wider and more fruitful cooperation between the states of Europe."

Relations with Bonn: West Germany was not one of the "cooperating" nations singled out by Kosygin, though in the past two-and-one-half years he has voiced a relatively temperate position on dealing with West Germany. (Brezhnev, meanwhile, has concentrated solely on the prerequisites to FRG-USSR cooperation, such as a renunciation of "revanchist claims" and so forth.) For example, in his 1 March 1965 Leipzig speech, after having expressed interest in expanding Soviet-West German cooperation in the chemical fertilizer industry, Kosygin said that "the Soviet Government by no means intends to consider West Germany as an outcast where everything is bad and nothing is good." In his 7 May 1966 East Berlin VE Day speech he said that

> the Soviet Union by no means holds that all West Germans are imbued with the ideas of revanchism... It is being said that the new generation of Germans who have grown up in the Federal Republic since the war cannot be held responsible for the crimes committed by nazism. It would indeed be unjust to saddle today's West German youth with this grave responsibility.

And, finally, in his 9 February 1967 BBC interview he said that the Soviet Union shall always entertain respect for the German people, but "what we do hate is any new display of fascism."

Brezhnev's recent comments on "good Germans" have been directed solely toward the working class which, he said in his Karlovy Vary speech, "have shown in the class

clashes that a movement against militarism and fascism is growing in West Germany itself." In his 18 April 1967 East Berlin speech Brezhnev indicated that the "eternal mark of Cain" might be erased once West Germany reversed its principal domestic and foreign policies, after having twice asserted that one must regard Communists as "very naive people" to hope that they would not see the supposedly insidious motives behind Bonn's East European recognition campaign. Kosygin balanced repeated appeals for cooperation and a readiness to develop Soviet-West European cooperation with attacks against West German "imperialists" in Paris in December 1966, London in February 1967 and Moscow in March. But he cast no aspersions on the FRG's recognition campaign and made no indictment of the SPD for its failure to legalize the KPD.* Kosygin in the past has not infrequently referred to the "party of the German working class" (in his view, the KPD), but, as in the typical case of his 9 February BBC press conference, he did not go on to criticize the West German social democrats and, in fact, exonerated the German people from past crimes against the working class.

*A seeming aberration in Kosygin's comparatively moderate statements on Germany appeared in his election speech this year. He voiced the particularly malicious distortion that "quite recently Chancellor Kiesinger made a statement which made it clear that he did not exclude the possibility of setting up a coalition government of the Federal Republic with the participation of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party. Who can guarantee that the ruling circles of Bonn will not later on call for the establishment of a purely fascist government." No "recent" statement made by Kiesinger even remotely "makes it clear" that the NDP would be welcomed in a coalition government. On the contrary, Kiesinger has repeatedly and explicitly excluded the NDP from the current coalition government. For example, in his 3 March Neue Revue interview (the one in which he discussed the possibilities of legalizing the KPD), Chancellor Kiesinger referred to the NDP as a "radical group" and stated that the most effective means of "fighting" radical groups is an efficient policy.

B. Balancing The Domestic Economy

Generally consistent with his assertions since Khrushchev's ouster, Kosygin's recent speeches have continued to place consumer welfare before defense in listing the domestic tasks of the party.

Kosygin's position on this sensitive matter of allocations was first suggested in remarks given within hours of Brezhnev's first speech as party leader. Like Brezhnev, Kosygin bowed to the military in his 19 October 1964 reception remarks in mentioning the supposed necessity to strengthen defenses, but he took a different tack than Brezhnev in placing no prerequisites before what he (Kosygin) called the most "lofty and vital tasks...of insuring a steady growth of the living standards and welfare of the Soviet people."* That Kosygin's support was strong for the consumer sector was further suggested by the fact that his remark on "steady growth" followed the sober reminder to the costly defense and space industry that "while storming the skies we do not want to forget about the earth, about our great earthly affairs." A similar tone was struck in his public remarks on 19 November 1964; according to Western press sources, Kosygin lamented the U.S. and Soviet consumers' sacrifice to the high cost of defense and stated that "the whole of mankind eagerly awaits the day when we [the United States and the Soviet Union] both spend less money on armaments and more on meeting the needs of the individual."

*Kosygin's appeal for a "steady growth" of consumer goods may well have reflected his principal argument with Khrushchev, who in September 1964 had advocated a dramatic redistribution of the economy in the direction of the consumer. While Kosygin's remark suggested that he did not favor a drastic sudden change in favor of the consumer sector, his statements also suggested that he did not favor the policy of continuing to give the massive proportion to the heavy industry sector.

The initial differences on this economic issue later developed into a pattern in the first half of 1965, with Kosygin generally placing consumer interests in front of heavy industry in his public remarks. Brezhnev, as mentioned earlier, reversed the order.

Kosygin's identification with consumer interests was reinforced by his public and private support for a proposal to cut the Soviet military's share of the 1965 budget by 500 million rubles. Brezhnev did not take a public position on the military budget cut. Thus, he joined the leading marshals, with whom he had closely associated himself,* in their "conspiracy of silence" on the planned defense cut.

Brezhnev's silence on Kosygin's plan was particularly conspicuous in light of his (Brezhnev's) practice under Khrushchev of promptly reacting to proposals to reduce the military budget. He was among the first to endorse the Khrushchev-sponsored defense economy measures of January 1960, December 1963 and February 1964 --though not Khrushchev's eleventh-hour proposal in September 1964. In October 1964 both Brezhnev and Kosygin had given generally similar pledges to strengthen the might of the Soviet Union in their early post-coup speeches, but in November 1964 Brezhnev made a stronger appeal for "the highest possible level" for Soviet defenses. In 1965 Brezhnev took the lead in promoting a program of stepped up military spending. Kosygin only belatedly

*The U.S. embassy in Moscow reported that at the 7 November 1964 Kremlin reception Brezhnev toasted the armed forces (and Malinovsky by name) and later called upon Malinovskiy, who delivered an attack on U.S. policy. Malinovsky went on to claim that the USSR could crush the U.S. The embassy reported that Kosygin then tried to smooth things over with the U.S. Ambassador after Malinovsky's diatribe, with statements to the effect that the "main preoccupation" of the new Soviet leadership would be to overcome various shortcomings in the USSR.

gave his support to the reversal of his position. At the time, he accused the U.S. policy-makers of perfidy in increasing the Pentagon's budget and thus undermining his position on the Soviet military cut.

Though he lost ground in 1965 to those pressing for increased spending in the heavy-defense industry sector, his early call for a "steady growth" of the proportion of the Soviet budget devoted to consumer production nonetheless was incorporated into the 23rd CPSU Congress resolutions. And unlike Brezhnev, Kosygin in his 1967 election speech commented upon the proportional development theme endorsed by the Congress. He said:

> The bringing together of the rate of growth of agricultural production and the rate of growth of industry, and of the rate of growth of production of consumer goods and the rate of growth of production of the means of production, has started. All this is needed in order to raise the well-being of the Soviet people more rapidly.

Two years earlier he had asked for a readjustment in economic proportions in order to "improve the living standards of the people more rapidly." He combined his request with criticism of "some leaders [who] may have doubts or event raise objections when discussing the question of proportions." (9 March 1965 speech to the officials of Gosplan USSR). "Some of these people cannot but be influenced by the departmental approach, which runs counter to the national interests," he charged. Reporting to his 1967 electors "with satisfaction" the tidings that the "first important steps" had been taken in the direction of the improvement of the main ratios in the proportional development of the national economy, Kosygin continued to complain that the demand for clothing, footwear, refrigerators, furniture and television sets "is far from being met fully today." And he warily concluded that the "major measures" being taken "should" lead to an increase in such consumer goods. Brezhnev acknowledged that the production of such goods is insufficient, but he confidently assured his electors on 10 April 1967 that "we are reacting to these difficulties."

The "Productive" Role of the Ministries: Predictably, Kosygin has promoted the prerogatives of his ministerial empire. In his recent remarks, he has welcomed a recent party-state decision which expands the rights of ministers in the sphere of capital construction. Kosygin explained that union republican building ministries have been formed which would carry out "both industrial and housing, civil communal construction"--in other words a clear mandate to perform tasks that had been, at least in part, the concern shared by certain city soviets.

And in the context of discussing the expansion of ministerial powers, Kosygin--who had paid deference to the party throughout most of his speech--placed his ministerial apparatus before the party in discussing the execution of one important sphere of policy. Here he revived a highly sensitive point last employed by one of his predecessors, Malenkov. Kosygin said:

> A radical improvement of capital construction is now a task of cardinal national economic importance. On its solution should be concentrated the attention and forces of [note the order] ministries and departments, party organizations, soviets of workers deputies, and our entire public.*

Conspicuously, Pravda's 7 March account of Kosygin's speech (which was broadcast live) deleted the above remark, though Pravda printed Kosygin's next comment which was that the "party and the government" unswervingly pursue the line of raising the level of the life of Soviet people.

Concurrently, with regard to the subject of party leadership, Kosygin has frequently invoked the self-

*Malenkov in his 8 August 1953 Supreme Soviet speech stated that "the government and the Central Committee" had decided to make certain changes dealing with the personal income of collective farmers. After his fall Malenkov was accused of placing the state over the party.

protective "collective leadership" and associated themes. In both his 1966 and 1967 election speeches Kosygin referred to collectivity--a subject about which Brezhnev in both his last two campaign speeches was notably silent.*

PODGORNYY: FIRMNESS ABROAD, WELL BEING AT HOME

Since December 1965--when Podgornyy was kicked upstairs to the largely honorific Supreme Soviet chairmanship (replacing Mikoyan) and removed from the secretariat--he has had to operate from a relatively weak organizational position. Following the assumption of his Supreme Soviet job, Podgornyy has shifted his domestic views from an outright supporter of pro-consumer interests to a more conservative line, though he has not fully endorsed all of Brezhnev's economic formulations. The switch from his earlier policy position displays the characteristics of a politburo apparachik opportunistically maneuvering to improve his relative power position (in this case, by joining the Brezhnev "bandwagon").

While subtle differences with Brezhnev may be found in certain foreign policy statements recently made by Podgornyy, his comments have reiterated his earlier harsh line, particularly on Soviet policy toward the United States, and, on balance, his foreign policy statements have generally been a reflection of those of the general secretary.

*Brezhnev's last reference to the modes of leadership was reminiscent of Khrushchev's remarks on his 70th birthday on 17 April 1964 ("not everything depends on me; I work in a collective"). Accepting the Hero of the Soviet Union award (19 December 1966) Brezhnev said: "In face of the great and intricate tasks which have to be accomplished, I am encouraged by the awareness of the fact that in the politburo, in the secretariat, in the entire central committee, and in the government we are working as a smooth, harmonious collective, relying on each other's assistance."

Podgornyy

A. Hostility Toward America, Cooperation With Europe

Support for Brezhnev's foreign views was clearly displayed in Podgornyy's 9 March 1967 election speech in which he went so far as to revive the Stalin-Zhdanov postwar thesis that the world was divided into "camps of war and peace." In this vein, he claimed that the "wild men" in the "war" camp "are ready to go as far as to unleash a new world war,"* and, consistent with his recent statements,

*Podgornyy hastened to add that such "wild men" are "in fact being helped by those in China who today call themselves the utmost revolutionary leftwingers; that is those who do not exclude a world military conflict from the possible means of attaining their adventurist aims."

asserted that the strength of the socialist bloc "is the main bulwark in the struggle for peace and against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism." Accordingly, Podgornyy has been careful not to stray from the emphasis given by Brezhnev on joint bloc action with regard to the Soviet Union's policies toward West Europe.

Somewhat inconsistent with his harsh rhetoric and not unlike Kosygin, Podgornyy gave high priority in his 1967 election speech to furthering cooperation with the governments of Western Europe. And while reflecting Brezhnev's lowered emphasis on peaceful coexistence, Podgornyy did not limit the pursuit of peaceful coexistence to the capitalist countries of Europe:

> While conducting a resolute and strenuous struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialism, our country is at the same time consistently pursuing the Leninist course of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. We favor normal relations with the capitalist countries and are developing economic, trade, cultural, and other relations with them.

He did not, however, go on to make an explicit call for better U.S.-Soviet relations, a subject upon which he (like Brezhnev) has been notably reticent in public.

Within three weeks of Khrushchev's political demise, Podgornyy joined the Brezhnev-sponsored move in the leadership to upgrade the national liberation and anti-imperialist themes. He stressed the need to oppose the "export of counterrevolution," and like Brezhnev at that time, he did not mention its Khrushchevian corollary, the inadmissibility of Communists "exporting revolution":

> The Soviet people actively support the national liberation movement, the struggle of the once oppressed and dependent countries for their complete political and economic emancipation. It firmly and consistently rejects any imperialist exportation of counterrevolution; it supports the people's sacred right to fight for their liberation,

> including just wars against subjugators. (5 November 1964, Cuba Socialista article by Podgornyy)

Brezhnev's line giving increased priority to supporting national liberation movements and sacrificing improved relations with the United States continued to be voiced by Podgornyy through 1965. In one case, in his 24 July 1965 Sevastopol speech, Podgornyy used a particularly sharp illustration to show the "principles of proletarian internationalism." He boasted that Soviet material support (i.e., surface-to-air missiles) to the DRV had turned U.S. airplanes "into piles of metal scattered in the Vietnamese jungles." U.S. activity in Panama, the Congo, the Dominican Republic and West Germany were also attacked by Podgornyy in 1965 and 1966. He laced his attacks on the "worldwide" scope of U.S. ambitions with repeated references to the dominance of the "hawks" in American foreign policy-making. Unlike Kosygin, he has not pointed to the existence of "sounder tendencies" in Washington policy-making circles. Characteristically, in his 1967 election speech Podgornyy spoke only of the "hawks" on the Vietnam issue in American politics. Thus he stressed that "quite a few U.S. political figures" wanted to end the Vietnamese war by a "radical intensification" of U.S. military action in order to "speed the collapse of the [Vietnamese peoples] resistance and force them to their knees."

In [redacted] conversations with U.S. officials, however, Podgornyy, for reasons (apparently) of diplomacy, has talked a milder line. Thus in his 11 November 1966 conversation with departing U.S. Ambassador Kohler, Podgornyy mentioned only the Vietnam problem as an impediment to major U.S.-USSR cooperation. With regard to cooperation, he expressed his pleasure in the fact that in spite of Vietnam limited agreements could be reached. (He cited the U.S.-Soviet air agreement, the negotiations on the now completed outer space agreement, and the possibility of an extension of desalinization agreements.)

B. Personal Prosperity and Production

While Podgornyy's dual emphasis in the past on foreign danger and domestic well-being appeared to be inconsistent, it is noteworthy that his recent remarks on internal affairs suggest a marked shift toward more conservative views. Podgornyy's recent formulations, nevertheless, contain significant aspects of Kosygin's domestic preferences--such as an emphasis on the proportional development thesis and on the need for greater efforts to improve the standard of living. But, like Brezhnev, Podgornyy has recently placed special emphasis on successes in agriculture and industry as a prerequisite for meeting consumer demands:

> The indisputable successes have been achieved in agriculture...and [in] the insuring of raw materials for industry. This is one of the most important conditions of the implementation by the party in the last few years of the course of bringing the pace of growth of heavy industry closer to the pace of growth of the light and foodstuffs industry. At present one can already see the results. Yet, it is still insufficient. The demand of the population is not met completely.

A mixture of both Brezhnev's and Kosygin's formulations was presented in other remarks on internal policy by Podgornyy in his 9 March election speech this year. Podgornyy stated that "in the future we shall...have to expand heavy industry at a high rate," and "continue to take all measures to constantly maintain the military might of the Soviet state at the level necessary to crush any aggressor." Yet, like Kosygin, Podgornyy stressed consumer needs and placed welfare before defense in his discussion of party tasks as he had done in his election speech last year: "The further development of the economy will allow us to meet the people's requirements increasingly better and [secondly] constantly strengthen the might of the Soviet state."

The salient feature, as mentioned earlier, is that Podgornyy's March 1967 formulas mark another step in the evolution of his extreme consumer-oriented policy views. His most extreme views were presented in his 1965 speeches which provided support for the 1963-1964 "butter-over-guns" policy proposals of Kosygin's predecessor.* With regard to "guns," Podgornyy was the only presidium member to publicly praise the military budget cut plan (5 January 1965 speech in Turkey) announced by Premier Kosygin. With regard to "butter," Podgornyy in his 21 May 1965 Baku speech went so far as to employ one of the key arguments used in support of proposals for a fundamental shift in the Soviet economy in favor of the consumer sector voiced by Khrushchev shortly before his fall. In Baku Podgornyy said:

> There was a time when the Soviet people deliberately accepted certain material restrictions in the interests of the priority development of heavy industry and the strengthening of our defense capacity. This was fully justified, because it is precisely production which is the material basis for the growth of culture and of the welfare of our people, and a defenseless socialist state would have been inevitably crushed by imperialism.
>
> Now with each passing year our social wealth is multiplying and the necessary conditions are being created better to satisfy the ever-growing cultural and domestic ambitions of the working people.

Podgornyy did not repeat such explicit pro-consumer views after his December 1965 "honorable demotion" to the Supreme Soviet chairmanship. In fact, he noted in his 9 June 1966 election speech that the Soviet Union maintains the "high rates of development of heavy industry and we are

*Favored development of light and consumer industries was an implicit part of Khrushchev's December 1963 and February 1964 renewed appeals for a Soviet troop and military budget cut.

steadily concerned with strengthening the defense capability of the country." He went on, however, to stress that "at the same time" the party's task "is to secure a higher rate of growth of the national income, particularly in the sector spent on consumption."

Finally, Podgornyy's formula presented in his recent election speech (cited earlier) moved even closer to the economic views of Brezhnev. And in what seemed to be a dual effort to further the "cult of Brezhnev" and to represent Brezhnev's views as similar to his, Podgornyy added to the reasons that had been given in the official message on the occasion of the award of the Order of Lenin to Brezhnev. Where the official message stressed Brezhnev's military contributions, Podgornyy's remarks highlighted Brezhnev's supposed contributions in economic, social, and political fields as well as in the military.*

Expanding the Role of the Supreme Soviet: Renewing the line emphasized in his June 1966 election speech and August 1966 Supreme Soviet speech, Podgornyy stressed the allegedly more active role of his Supreme Soviet, implicitly

*18 December 1966 Party-Government message to Brezhnev: "...for outstanding services to the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the building of Communism, the strengthening of the country's defense potential, for great services in the struggle against the German fascist invaders on the fronts of the Patriotic War, and on the occasion of his 60th birthday."
19 December 1966 Podgornyy presentation remarks: "... for an exceptionally great contribution to the activity of the party and state in the restoration of Leninist principles and standards, in switching the economy to scientifically motivated development, in strengthening the defense potential of the country, and in implementing major social developments for the good of the people."

argued that it was not a "rubber stamp" parliament, stated that the soviets control and check "all the state organs" (Kosygin's domain), and praised the expanded activity of the permanent commissions of the supreme and republic level soviets.* Podgornyy in his 2 August 1966 speech had gratefully acknowledged that Brezhnev at the 23rd CPSU Congress had raised the issue of creating new Supreme Soviet permanent commissions. The new commissions, which were set up in August 1966 and staffed with party apparachiks, were apparently designed to strengthen the Supreme Soviet in its dealings with Kosygin's Council of Ministers. In short, it appears that Brezhnev--who in December 1966 became a member of Podgornyy's Supreme Soviet presidium--concluded that greater party control was needed over the formulation and execution of state legislation. And by instilling some life into the comparatively weak organization headed by Podgornyy, Brezhnev could check Kosygin's power without giving Podgornyy enough organizational authority to eventually rival his (Brezhnev's) position.

Brezhnev has continued his apparent effort to play off Podgornyy against Kosygin. In his 10 March 1967 speech, Brezhnev revealed that the central committee "a few days ago" had adopted a resolution which, in effect, backed up Podgornyy's 9 March 1967 appeal for enhanced authority of the local soviets in their dealings with Kosygin's all-union ministries. Podgornyy had stressed that every local soviet "should make fuller use of its rights and obligations" in the fields of economic, cultural and "all matters of local significance."

Interestingly, the apparent squeeze play against Kosygin has not been going smoothly. For example, divergent

*Permanent commissions are bodies which continue to work between the biannual Supreme Soviet sessions. While the commissions are nominally empowered to check on ministerial activity and to implement resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet, the commissions in the past have been effectively bypassed by the Council of Ministers. Ministerial bodies, acting on the approval of the central committee, have implemented the vast majority of state legislation.

handling by the party's and the government's newspapers of the substance of the Brezhnev-introduced party resolution on the local soviets (discussed above) suggests that that particular issue was not settled by the resolution. (This surmise is strengthened by the fact that the text of the resolution was not printed, it was only reported upon.) A Pravda report (11 March) on the Brezhnev-introduced party resolution suggested that the recommendations of the local soviets are henceforth to carry greater weight and that Kosygin's local "organizations and institutions" are now obliged to carry out the recommendations of the local soviets:*

> The CPSU Central Committee emphasized that the rural and settlement soviets of workers' deputies are the highest organs of state power on their territory that decisions and instructions of the rural and settlement soviets taken by them within the sphere of their competence must be carried out by all authorities as well as by all enterprises, organizations and institutions located on the territory of the soviet.

Reflecting Kosygin's preference, Izvestiya's belated editorial comment (25 March) on the party resolution deleted the passage underlined above, but included a subsequent passage which stated that the local soviets "must coordinate" their recommendations with the "enterprises, organizations and institutions" on each particular soviet territory.

*In 1966, some republic Supreme Soviet leaders, such as Arutyunyan (an Armenian Supreme Soviet official) had complained that the all-union ministries had been ignoring the recommendations and orders of the local soviets.
For an examination of the development of the ministry-parliament issue in 1965 and 1966 see "The New Soviet Constitution And The Party-State Issue In CPSU Politics, 1956-1966" (CAESAR XXVII, 21 July 1966) pp. 83-88.

And on the larger issue of the powers of the Supreme Soviet permanent commissions vis-a-vis the powers of Kosygin's Council of Ministers, controversy may be reflected in the delay in the adoption of new statutes for the permanent commissions--a statute which had been called for in "the near future" by Podgornyy in August 1966. In the meantime, the government press continues to spotlight the active role of the permanent commissions of the presidium of the Council of Ministers.*

Plenum Preferences: The Brezhnev-Podgornyy "alliance" is also reflected in the emphasis the two give to the March 1965 CPSU plenum--at which Brezhnev presented his agricultural proposals--and the corresponding de-emphasis given to the September 1965 CPSU plenum--at which Kosygin presented his industrial reform plan. In his election speech, Podgornyy concentrated solely on the salutary effects of the March agricultural plenum. Like Brezhnev, Podgornyy made no specific reference to Kosygin's September industrial reform plenum though he combined, and warmly praised, recent industrial reorganization and agricultural measures.

Kosygin, for his part, praised the decisions of the plenum associated with Brezhnev, but he made it clear that the March 1965 decisions were not the sole reason for the increase in agricultural gross production in 1966:

*Thus prior to the decision regarding capital construction that Kosygin introduced in his election speech, Izvestiya reported on 26 February that "a few days ago a conference, held at the Council of Ministers USSR, discussed a draft, worked out by the commissions of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers USSR, of a general statute on the USSR ministries. It also discussed drafts of decisions to further expand the rights of the USSR ministers and to refer questions of economic and capital construction to council of ministers of union republics for further determination."

The economic measures worked out by the March plenum of the central committee and the labor upsurge of the workers, collective farm workers and specialists were the decisive condition for speeding up the development of agriculture.

And, unlike both Podgornyy and Brezhnev, Kosygin specifically praised the decisions of his September 1965 industrial plenum in a passage (in his 1967 election speech) that did not combine industry with agricultural production.

SUSLOV: U.S. MAIN FOREIGN DANGER; PARTY "IMPURITY" MAIN DOMESTIC DANGER

Foreign Views: Suslov's positions parallel Brezhnev's on matters of Soviet foreign policy. In his capacity as



Suslov

the party's chief ideological guardian, Suslov has given particular attention to the formation of an "anti-U.S. imperialist front" to meet what he consistently portrays as a worldwide threat from U.S. imperialism. U. S. support and encouragement for "West German militarism" has also been a frequent theme in Suslov's assessments. But his general theme as it was expressed in his 27 January 1966 speech at the Italian Communist party congress, has been that the U.S. is purposefully and persistently undermining the policy of peaceful coexistence by increasing international tension.

To remedy this supposedly formidable threat, Suslov has insistently called for Communist unity under the CPSU aegis. While Suslov has attacked the Chinese in private discussions with Communist party members, he, unlike other Soviet leaders (with the exception of Shelepin) has exercised conspicuous restraint on the Chinese issue in his public statements. Since Khrushchev's fall he has avoided attacking the Chinese by name. Even his indirect public attacks have been mild. At a time when other leaders were openly castigating the Chinese, he only alluded obliquely to Chinese obstreperousness. For example, in his 2 November 1966 Helsinki speech, instead of attacking Chinese "splitting" activities, he merely indicated their refusal to join in unity efforts by saying that "the great majority of the sister parties" are trying to strengthen the world Communist movement. Thus it was left to the listener to recall that the Chinese were not part of that majority. Suslov was an early promoter of the early post-Khrushchev policy of not engaging in polemics with the Chinese. Other sources have reported that Suslov has been optimistic about the possibility of an accommodation with the Chinese after Mao.

Suslov has even argued for a modified version of the old Comintern line of thirty years ago, in the context of calling for a united front of "all democratic, anti-imperialist forces." In this connection, in his 4 October 1965 speech Suslov equated the policy of the present U.S. administration with pre-war fascism. But at the same time,

Suslov betrayed reluctance about cooperation with West European social democratic leaders. He reasserted Stalin's spurious judgment that the right-wing social democrat leaders were responsible for the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II as a result of splitting the European workers' movement in the 30's.

Domestic Views: The conservatism of Suslov's foreign policy pronouncements complements his rigid, doctrinaire domestic pronouncements, particularly those on the role of the CPSU, on the priority development of the heavy industry sector, and on the need to instill discipline and vigilance in the populus.

Suslov in his 1966 election speech set the stage for his comments on the CPSU's internal disciplinary tasks by first unearthing the early postwar Soviet dichotomic world view. "We cannot forget for a single moment," Suslov argued, "the fact that a bitter class struggle between the two systems, socialism and capitalism, is taking place in the international arena." And on the basis of capitalism's "psychological war" aimed at subverting socialism, Suslov appealed for a return to Zhdanovism in Soviet cultural affairs:

> It goes without saying that the enemies of socialism cannot stop the progress of the Soviet society to Communism, but should we be complacent, they can create difficulties and obstacles in this path. And that is why, in relation to this, it is necessary to maintain vigilance, and our ideological work must be of a militant nature in exposing in its true light the bourgeois ideology and the liberal attitude toward it. The Communist Party sees as its main task the preservation of purity and generally multiplying the glorious fighting traditions of the party and the working class and in mobilizing all the efforts and energy of the Soviet people toward the achievements of big new triumphs in the building of Communism.

Preserving the party's traditional role in the nation's economic affairs was emphasized in Suslov's 2 June 1965 speech in Sofia. He attacked the Khrushchevian

concept of the economic-oriented party (the 1962 "party production principle"). He emphasized (as he had done under Khrushchev) the primacy of the party's political-ideological role. In this connection, Suslov's views of the correct role for the party and for the state (though differently motivated) resemble Kosygin's. That is, that the state is to be concerned with the day-to-day operation of the nation's economic life, while the party is to be the guardian of the Marxist-Leninist ideological teachings and the director (but not the operator) of the state. This division of responsibilities was set forth in the 1961 Party Program--a document recently ignored by Brezhnev, but favorably mentioned by Suslov in his 2 November 1966 Helsinki address and in his 4 March 1967 campaign speech.

But on the issue of economic priorities, Suslov (like Brezhnev) has listed the heavy and defense industry before light industry. In the available versions of his 1967 election speech he dwelt only on achievements in the heavy industry sphere (power generation, machine building, chemical and oil refining industry). With regard to the light industry-consumer sector, Suslov appeared to rest content that the problems were being adequately met. This complacent tone was reflected in his Helsinki remarks in 1966 in which he emphasized Soviet industrial developments and then briefly claimed that "light industry and food production are developing today at a greater speed than heretofore." In his 1966 election speech he stated that in spite of the "aggravation of the international situation" and the underfulfillment of certain parts of the seven-year plan (he mentioned agriculture in particular) the Soviet Union, nonetheless, "had done a lot in the struggle to raise material well-being."

Material compensations to induce workers to step up production have not been completely ignored by Suslov, though he has put his usual emphasis on moral incentives. For instance, in his 2 November 1966 Helsinki speech, Suslov singled out material compensations for farm workers as only one of many party-approved factors that spurred agricultural production.

SHELEPIN: MILITANCY ABROAD, THE HARD LINE AT HOME

Foreign Views: Of all the politburo members Shelepin has drawn the most consistently harsh and ominous picture of the world situation, and has promptly endorsed and even sharpened themes introduced by Brezhnev. Shelepin was the first politburo (then presidium) member to endorse Brezhnev's 3 December 1964 threat to aid North Vietnam (27 December 1964 Cairo speech). Shelepin was the first to expand upon Brezhnev's altered definition of peaceful coexistence. In response to a question asked at his 28 December 1964 Cairo press conference Shelepin reportedly replied that "there were many obstacles in the way of peaceful coexistence [with the U.S.], but the most significant one is U.S. imperialism's interference in the affairs...of the peoples of Vietnam, Cuba, and the Congo." Shelepin then went on to judge as false what he called the U.S. view that the USSR is afraid of war: "All peoples realize that we do not fear war, and this is what the United States should understand also." (Reflecting sensitivity on the policy implications of that reported boast Soviet accounts of the press conference deleted Shelepin's remark.) In his 1965 visits to North Korea and North Vietnam he tailored his remarks for his audiences by avoiding any mention of peaceful coexistence as an element of Soviet foreign policy.* In his most

*In his visit to North Vietnam in February 1965, Kosygin not only referred to "peaceful coexistence," but he defined it in terms used by Khrushchev. In his 7 February speech in Hanoi, TASS reported that Kosygin declared: "Invariably following the Leninist policy of peace and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the Soviet Union threatens no country. The Soviet people regard the peoples' struggle for peace as a struggle for creating the most favorable conditions for the consolidation and development of the socialist community, for promoting the revolutionary workers and national liberation movements." And in the wake of the U.S. Air Force bombing of the Dong Hoi and Vinh Linh areas on 7 and 8 February, the text of the 11 February USSR-DRV joint (footnote continued on page 72)

recent remarks on that subject (9 December 1966 Kalinin speech) Shelepin virtually buried coexistence in an appeal for greater vigilance and military strength in order to render a "shattering rebuff to any imperialist aggressor."

Shelepin was the first political spokesman following Kosygin's December 1964 proposal for a military budget cut to mention the necessity of "strengthening the defense might of our country" (25 February 1965 war veterans conference in Moscow). He was the first to explicitly forecast that the new five-year plan would concentrate attention on the "further strengthening" of the Soviet military (24 June 1965 Severomorsk speech) due to what he portrayed as the worldwide aggressive ambitions of the United States. In his July 1965 speech he not only echoed Brezhnev's line that the world was living through a period of unrelieved international tension, but Shelepin went out of his way to raise the alarm of supposed American military actions directed against the Soviet Union. Cast in the first person singular, his object lesson for vigilance in July 1965 was presented dramatically:

> British and American submarines appeared recently near our northern shores. I believe that it is probably not out of love for the beauty of the Far North that in these days the American icebreaker Northwind is plowing its severe waters.

(footnote continued from page 71)
statement on the visit included a Kosygin-like reference to the effect that defending peace means (among other things) struggling "for the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence between countries having different political and social systems, and for the settlement of international disputes through negotoations." Interestingly, the above reference was not prefaced by a phrase indicating joint agreement, as in the case of other sections in the joint statement. In brief, it appears that Kosygin was not willing to delete peaceful coexistence from the elements of Soviet foreign policy in order to please his audience.

The speed with which a war can come to Soviet shores was highlighted in a remark in Shelepin's 2 June 1966 Leningrad election speech which came close to refuting the Khrushchevian emphasis, dating back to the 1956 CPSU Congress, on the non-inevitability of war. Shelepin stated that the party and the state must "explain tirelessly to the masses the real position of how mysteriously war is born, how it can descend on us at the most unexpected moment." Comments from other politburo leaders shortly thereafter suggest that they thought Shelepin had gone too far, and they offered counter-balancing arguments. Thus five days later, Suslov in his Leningrad election speech countered with the 1956 party-approved position that while the threat of a new war does exist, "it does not mean that it will be inevitable" due to the "real forces" in the world which were capable of thwarting the "imperialist's" intentions. In Karlovy Vary in 1967 (with Shelepin as the number-two man in the Soviet delegation) Brezhnev took a somewhat intermediate position by telling the delegates that "we do not want to exaggerate the danger of war, but neither do we wish to underestimate it." The central committee's Theses on the 50th anniversary do not address the issue of the non-inevitability of war, and the Theses turn around the Khrushchevian emphasis of the 1960 CPSU Congress' line on the possibility of preventing war. The 1967 document states that "the peoples now have sufficient might to avert the outbreak of a new world war by active and coordinated actions. However, as long as imperialism exists the threat of aggressive wars remains."

With regard to his emphasis on the continued possibility of war, Shelepin's comments on the desirability of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement were particularly revealing: in Cairo on 28 December 1964 he reportedly forecast that the dispute will "inevitably disappear," that Moscow's and Peking's "ultimate aims are one and the same," and that "like them, we adopt a staunch attitude against imperialism." And his provocative attitude toward the U.S. rescue effort in the Congo was displayed in his comment to [redacted] that the presidium decided to aid the Congo rebels rather than rely on "weak and ineffective protests."

Shelepin's more recent remarks on foreign matters sustain his earlier expressed bias in favor of an aggressive foreign line. In his last recorded speech in which he commented on the international situation (Kalinin, 9 December 1966)*, he held on to the precept that "the situation in the world...has seriously deteriorated as a result of the strengthening of the aggressive attempts of the imperialist states." Shelepin backed that Brezhnev-like formulation with harsh attacks on the United States and, in particularly sulphurous tones, on West Germany. Regarding West Germany, he echoed East German leader Ulbricht's distortion by saying that "in the German Federal Republic revanchism is raised to the level of state policy." (Brezhnev made a similar statement in July 1966.) Shelepin discussed not only the standard theme of the supposed West German hunger for nuclear weapons, but also the less discussed, highly emotional issue of alleged West German claims to Soviet territory (presumably East Prussia, now Kaliningradskaya Oblast). And he capped his remarks with an alarmist conjuration dealing with the potential of the FRG to develop into a power "which is able to plunge the world into another, a third world war."

Domestic Conservatism: Shelepin's 3 March 1967 election remarks on domestic policy matters dovetailed logically with his December foreign policy pronouncements. On the subject of the state of the Soviet economy, Shelepin discussed consumer goods production "briefly" (his word) --though consumer goods production was then his chief politburo task.** (He gave considerable attention to

*The excerpted passages of Shelepin's 4 March 1967 Kalinin election speech as rendered by Moscow domestic radio did not include remarks on international affairs. And his speech on 12 May on the occasion of presenting the Order of Lenin to the Bryansk Region was only noted in the press.

**His assignment to consumer affairs in the secretariat and, more recently, his downgrading to trade union chief, seems to have been among the consequences of moves within the ruling group to curb his influence in organizational questions and cadres appointments within the central committee. Shelepin's slide highlights the influence of Kremlin power politics over policy, inasmuch as he was one of the most eager backers of the hard line introduced by Brezhnev.

consumer goods production in his June election speech last year, but in that speech he was careful to list the task of "considerably increasing" production before the task of increasing the standard of living.) And in his election remarks this year he reiterated his past view that the party and government are "firmly adhering to the priority development of heavy industry."

POLYANSKIY: REFORM AT HOME, CAUTION ABROAD

Internal Policy: The contrasts between the domestic policy formulations of Polyanskiy and the "metal eaters" on the politburo have been striking. Polyanskiy's 2 March 1967 election speech attacked "conceited comrades" who were arguing for a cut in allocations to the agricultural sector--the sector, in Polyanskiy's view (23 July 1966 Syktyvkar speech), which determines "to a large extent" the growth of the nation's economy as a whole and the raising of the Soviet citizen's standard of living." Thus in launching his barrage against the heavy industrialists, Polyanskiy did not call (as Shelepin did on the next day) for the utilization of the supposed "big reserve existing everywhere." Polyanskiy said:

> Above all, to insure fulfillment of the plans envisaged, there must be full allocation and the best possible utilization of planned capital investments and material-technical means. This has to be said because the good results of the last agricultural year have gone to the heads of some comrades. Some people are beginning to argue that collective and state farms are now able to develop with less substantial aid, that melioration plans can be cut and supplies of technical equipment and mineral fertilizers reduced. Such arguments are extremely dangerous, for they could delay implementation of the planned program and any attempts in that direction must be resolutely nipped in the bud.

(That Polyanskiy has been fighting an uphill battle is suggested by Moscow's official mid-year status report on the Soviet economy which indicates that the growth rates

for agricultural and chemical equipment for the first six months of 1967 are down relative to the rates of growth of the two preceeding periods in 1966. The status report for 1967 also suggests that expanding military expenditures have virtually pre-empted the planned expanded production of agricultural machinery.)

In his next major speech (10 June in Blagoveshchensk) Polyanskiy reiterated earlier arguments for a "more correct and more proportional development of all branches of the country's production" and presented the consumer's case in argumentative terms (which of course, may be read as an attack on Chinese Communist fanaticism):

> Let some personages [deyateli] who have lost their mind talk as though the desire to live better is a bourgeois prejudice.

With regard to the heavy industry sector, Polyanskiy stated that the party "will continue to devote special attention to the continuous growth of heavy industry"--rather than stating Shelepin's different tack that the party "firmly adheres to the priority development" of that sector. In other words, Polyanskiy was arguing that the party should not go overboard with, and be inflexible toward the development of the heavy industry sector. (The party should merely devote attention to continue industrial growth, rather than "firmly adhere" to the "priority development" of heavy industry.)

Polyanskiy has repeatedly argued that discipline alone is not the method to overcome economic shortcomings. (Shelepin, on the other hand, called for tightening discipline throughout the economy and cracking down on those who "rest content," who are "conceited" and who "close their eyes to shortcomings," and called upon such sinners to engage in "self-criticism.") In his election speech in June 1966, Polyanskiy aimed an attack at the disciplinarians by warning that a policy of tightening discipline would fail unless it was combined with "comradely feelings" toward honest workers and responsiveness to the urgent needs and demands of everyone. And in line with Kosygin's emphasis on "collectivity," Polyanskiy in his June 1966 speech asserted (in the present tense) the

importance of "constantly" observing Leninist norms and style of party and state leadership and he declared that the party must eradicate "subjectivist" approach, "willfulness," "rudeness" and an "incorrect attitude" toward fellow workers. To emphasize his argument, he cited Lenin's assertion--a reference to Lenin's comments on Stalin's behavior--that rudeness in contacts with fellow workers and subordinates was impermissible.*

While advocating a tactful approach in personnel policy, Polyanskiy's comments on liberal Soviet writers have been as dogmatic as Suslov's and Brezhnev's blasts at the "anti-social" and alien trends in Soviet society and literature. For example, Polyanskiy in Blagoveshchensk accused American anti-Communists of endeavoring "to use for hostile activities any scum, from Kerensky to crazy story writer Tarsis. And now, enticed by the American dollars, Alliluyeva [Stalin's daughter], the fanatical servant of God and God seeker, has been drawn into this dirty cause."

Foreign Views: Polyanskiy has frequently cited the same "facts" used by his hard line politburo colleagues to demonstrate that U.S. activity is both worldwide and aggressive. In particular in his 23 July 1966 speech in Syktyvkar, Polyanskiy played down the potential dangers of the U.S. activity in Vietnam (U.S. action here has led to a "more tense" world situation) and fanned the fears of a conflagration emerging from the West:

> Great anxiety is caused among Soviet people by another hotbed of tension in the very center of Europe. The West German imperialists, supported by U.S. ruling circles, are working to gain access to nuclear weapons. They shout openly about revenge and about a review of the existing frontiers. This is nothing but the unleashing of a new world war.

*He also cited Lenin's statement that "heads" have no right to be "rude and nervous" precisely because they are heads. Polyanskiy's admonitions against rudeness and nervousness almost surely mirrored bruised feelings over the conduct of somebody (a "head" apparently) in the "collective" leadership.

But his statements on the required level of Soviet defense expenditures (like his statements on the heavy industry sector) have cautioned against going overboard. And his defense-related formulas have generally been embellished with references to past sacrifices, the adequacy of present Soviet might, the need to avert war, and the need to simultaneously continue "constructive work" while working on defenses.



Polyanskiy

Voronov

VORONOV: PRODUCTION AND PRAGMATISM

Voronov has been careful to hew to Brezhnev's line since Khrushchev's fall stressing the primacy of production over consumption in economic policy. ("The main economic task for the new five-year plan consists of insuring a further considerable growth of industry, steady development rates in agriculture, and, thanks to this, of achieving

a substantial rise in the people's living standards." (10 December 1966 Smolensk speech.) But like Kosygin he has stressed the efficacy of science and technology as the means of raising labor productivity and meeting consumer needs. Thus, he has been an outspoken defender of the technocracy. In his 3 June 1966 election speech, for example, he stressed that Kosygin's economic reform entailed recognition on the part of the party that "economic and engineering-technical workers have accumulated great experience in socialist and Communist construction and can decide independently important complex tasks with an awareness of what they are doing." Kosygin has also made a similar--but not so explicit--reference to the important role of the technocrats, but such references to the autonomous role of technicians are not frequent in leaders' speeches.

Paralleling the bulk of his domestic policy pronouncements, he has sided with those who stress the influence of economic example--rather than militancy--on the issue of world revolution. Voronov has also voiced Kosygin's line on establishing bilateral business-like relations with the states of Western Europe. In the wake of his late 1966 visit to the U.K., he repeatedly spoke of the "unexploited possibilities" for the development of bilateral economic and cultural contacts between Britain and the Soviet Union.

MAZUROV: IDEOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE AND CONSERVATISM

Mazurov has displayed a basic conservatism on questions of economic policy. He was closely associated with the ministerial re-centralization after Khrushchev's fall and in his 20 May 1966 election speech pointed out that the post-Khrushchev restructuring of industrial management (i.e., along more traditional lines) was based on "ideological principle"--the implication being that Khrushchev's reforms lacked this essential characteristic. He recalled in his 1966 and 1967 election speeches the charges against



Mazurov



Shelest



Kirilenko



Polshe

Khrushchev's policy (many leaders have now dispensed with this)--namely, the underestimation of objective economic laws, voluntarism and subjectivism. In his 1966 and 1967 election speech he was careful to note that new plan's aim of accelerated growth rates for both heavy and consumer industry was occuring under the umbrella of the maintenance of the preferential development of the means of production.

Mazurov has stressed the role of economics in policy citing Lenin on the point but not the Khrushchevian formula that politics is subordinated to economics. In the past he has used the formula on economics as a most important policy which was used under Khrushchev by those who did not accept the more explicit and radical Khrushchev formulation. Mazurov has also given stress to ideological indoctrination. He said that "Communist morality, strict and conscientious discipline is possible only in uncompromising, persistent struggle against bourgeois ideology and propaganda, against indifference to politics, survivals of private ownership attitudes a...nihilistic attitude toward national ideals and triumphs" (20 May 1966). And in his recent Leningrad speech, he took a different tack on labor policy than that taken by Polyanskiy. Mazurov emphasized solely the "struggle for strict labor discipline."

On foreign policy issues, Mazurov has closely adhered to Brezhnev's policy guide lines. Regarding Europe, his recent Leningrad remarks stressed joint bloc receptivity to West European interest in economic cooperation. He was sharply critical of the "hostile policies" of the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition which, he said, were backed by the U.S. in order to try to "maintain tension and dissidence" in Europe. A similar goal is assigned by Mazurov to U.S. activity elsewhere in the globe.

SHELEST: ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE AND DEFENSE

Like Mazurov's, Shelest's foreign and domestic policy statements bear the conservative trademark. He has made consumer well-being conditional on future successes in the industrial and agricultural sector. He has repeatedly emphasized the need for increasing discipline--citing on one occasion (25 November 1966 Ukrainian plenum report) Brezhnev's 1966 election statement that "people's rule was unthinkable without conscious discipline and a high level of organization." He, like Suslov, has also strongly seconded Brezhnev's and Podgornyy's proposals for strengthening the powers of the Supreme Soviet vis-a-vis Kosygin's Council of Ministers.*

With little variation, Shelest's comments on external affairs have stressed the need to strengthen defenses, raise vigilance and "intensify the struggle against the American imperialists and the perfidious intentions of the West German revanchists." Not all his comments, however, have echoed this line: on one occasion (26 January 1967 speech) he resurrected, in part, one of Khrushchev's favorites by asserting that "the world socialist system is winning ever new victories in the economic competition with capitalism." (Under Khrushchev, "peaceful economic competition" was regarded as the "main" arena of struggle with capitalism--not as one of many struggles, as Shelest and the 50th anniversary Theses have it.)

*While he has apparently adopted positions on economic and organizational questions that contrast with those held by Kosygin, on matters of nationalities policy--in particular the rarely discussed matter of the status of Jews in the Soviet Union--Shelest's 17 October 1965 remark that Jews made an important contribution to the Ukrainian victory in World War II followed Kosygin's unusual 18 July 1965 assertion that anti-semitism was alien to the Communist world outlook. The other politburo members have apparently remained silent on this issue.

KIRILENKO: REFORM AND WELL-BEING "NOW"

Kirilenko has consistently displayed a pro-consumer bias. He was one of the first Soviet leaders to press for the growth of consumer goods at a rate similar to the growth of heavy industry (24 July 1965 Vladivostok speech). And his recent remarks on the need for greater attention to the consumer sector are reminiscent of Khrushchev's mid-1964 reference to "goulash Communism." Kirilenko cited Lenin's "testament" that under socialism "everyone wants the good things of life," and Kirilenko went on to state that the CPSU "fulfills Lenin's testament in every way." In the same speech, Kirilenko paraphrased Podgornyy's 1965 Baku formula (discussed on page 62); Kirilenko argued that in light of the party's solicitude for production, consumer industries are "now able to advance more quickly." Unlike Brezhnev at the 1966 Party Congress, Kirilenko did not base an increase in consumer goods production upon "successes achieved in the development of heavy industry," nor did he voice Brezhnev's congress line that the party would give "more rapid development" to the heavy industry sector. And in the same address, Kirilenko strongly endorsed Kosygin's economic reforms and pointedly criticized "certain workers" who adhere to the "old ways."* A similar criticism was recently leveled in an Izvestiya editorial (19 August 1967) against ferrous metallurgy planners who "frequently do not

*But on matters of domestic politics (not policy), Kirilenko has done much to contribute to the Brezhnev "personality cult." On 1 December 1966 Kirilenko at Novorossiysk bestowed on Brezhnev qualities once reserved for Khrushchev; Kirilenko said that "it gives me great pleasure to mention that the general secretary of our party's central committee, L.I. Brezhnev, who at that time was head of the political section of the 18th Army, was among the ranks of the servicemen who fought for Novorossiysk and among the defenders of the "Little Land" [the location of a landing operation in February 1943]. Under his leadership, many-sided party and political work was conducted among the units and groups of units under complex fighting conditions. Participants in the struggle for Novorossiysk remember with great warmth the indefatigable activity of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, his personal bravery and steadfastness and his profound ideological conviction, which served as models of partymindedness and military valor."

take into consideration the achievements of science and technology" and "implement decisions based on yesterday's positions."*

On foreign policy subjects, particularly U.S.-USSR relations, Kirilenko has generally hewed to the Brezhnev line. That is, that an end to U.S. "interference" in the internal affairs of foreign countries (i.e. not just Vietnam) is the precondition to improving relations with the Soviet Union. Kirilenko in Chile in October 1965 also strongly endorsed CPSU support for anti-American popular fronts.

PELSHE: THE CAUTIOUS NEWCOMER

Pelshe, elevated to the politburo at last year's party congress, has skillfully skirted virtually all the major controversial domestic economic issues. He has discussed both industrial and consumer production but, apparently, has not linked the two sectors in a formula that would clearly betray his personal preference. In his seemingly well-coordinated speech at the French CP Congress in early January this year, Pelshe listed the party's task of satisfying the "material and spiritual interests" of the Soviet people after the task of increasing "economic and political strength." On another occasion as the politburo spokesman, Pelshe discussed in somewhat more detail and gave more effusive praise to Soviet accomplishments in the heavy (rather than light) industry sector. (6 November 1966 revolution anniversary speech) But as mentioned earlier, the fact that these speeches appear to be heavily coordinated renders them less useful for the purpose of defining individual positions on key themes.

Treading very cautiously as a new politburo member, Pelshe has given praise to the decisions reached at Brezhnev's March 1965 agricultural plenum and Kosygin's September 1965 industrial plenum. But in his 30 March speech at the 23rd Party Congress, Pelshe repeatedly praised Brezhnev by name and endorsed Brezhnev's suggestion to create a system of "elective collective farm cooperative bodies." The cooperative

*Interestingly, the Izvestiya editorial did not state that the allocations would be increased in the ferrous metallurgy sector for 1968. Rather, the editorial, after reporting that the 1968 state plan for this sector was "recently confirmed," concluded that the "growth of production of steel and rolled metal is in the main intended to be through an improvement of the work of the operating units."

system (of which Podgornyy also approved), if ever implemented, would do little to enhance the authority of the recentralized Ministry of Agriculture under Kosygin's Council of Ministers.

In the sphere of external policy, it is interesting to note that in his congress speech Pelshe reshuffled the goals that Brezhnev had set for Soviet foreign policy. Pelshe listed "peaceful coexistence" at the top, strengthening the socialist camp at the bottom of a list of Soviet foreign policy goals. Other than his particular listing of the USSR's external goals, Pelshe's positions on key foreign policy issues have not been made clear.

CANDIDATE (NON-VOTING) MEMBERS

Andropov: Andropov (the new KGB chairman) has sided with Brezhnev on most major foreign policy issues. For example, in his election speech (4 March 1967 Novomoskovsk) Andropov referred to "peaceful coexistence" in a passage devoted only to improving relations with West European states. Regarding Soviet relations with the United States, Andropov voiced the line most consistently espoused by Brezhnev; that is, that the supposed worldwide masterplan of the United States precluded the development of U.S.-Soviet relations. Andropov said:

> In the interests of international peace, our country is also ready to improve relations with the United States. However, comrades, U.S. officials talk a great deal about their love of peace, about the need to respect human rights and the dignity of the peoples; but what are their actual deeds? The United States supports the militarist circles of West Germany. The United States is the inspirer of all the aggressive blocs in the world. Any people who rise up to fight for their national liberation are confronted with direct or indirect aggression by U.S. imperialism. That is what happened in Korea, Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and finally, as everyone knows, that is what is happening in Vietnam.

Regarding domestic economic positions, Andropov seemed to favor the consumers' interests inasmuch as he listed "people's well being" before raising "production" (heavy industry) and by reiterating the reformers' trademark--the formula calling for an approximation of the

rates of growth in the heavy and light sectors of the economy. Andropov's "liberal" image was sharpened by one report received after his KGB promotion which stated that certain Soviet intellectuals welcomed his new status. On the other hand, [redacted] recently reported that the Moscow intellectual community was alarmed by the rumor--which circulated immediately after Andropov's KGB appointment--that the Soviet censorship organ, Glavlit, would soon become part of the KGB.

Demichev: In his speeches Demichev in one way gives the appearance of being a neo-Zhdanovite ideologue who takes a strong line on combatting the influx of "hostile bourgeois ideology" in the USSR and intensifying indoctrination and ideological controls within the country. Thus he seems to have been very much allied with the post-Khrushchev re-emphasis on the party's ideological role in Soviet society. On the other hand, he also conveys the impression of sophistication seeking ways of revitalizing

and adapting official doctrine to contemporary Soviet conditions. He clearly is not a rigid neo-Stalinist, and has stressed the need for theorists to come to grips with the new social science disciplines.

Nonetheless, in his speeches, Demichev strikes all the main themes of the 23rd Congress on ideological matters. He has often spoken of the "ideological war" being waged against the USSR by the West and attacks the "notorious tactics of building bridges" which he asserts are designed to soften and corrupt Communism from within. Demichev also stressed the "still existing heterogeneity of our society." This suggestion that all traces of the class struggle in the USSR internally have not been removed is a line dampening to Khrushchev's notion of a society which had become homogeneous and a state of the whole people. Notably, in this latter connection, Demichev plugged the line (which Polyanskiy tacitly criticized) on the need for intensification of work discipline and the struggle against "anti-social phenomena." Demichev stressed that this was not a short-term campaign caused by extraordinary circumstances and linked it with the broad campaign to educate the new Soviet man. He also repeated the theme that the enemy sought to implant nihilism in Soviet youth by exploiting the shortcomings and errors "which occurred in our history" (the Stalin period). Demichev read the party's message to the 22-27 May 1967 Soviet Writers Congress ordering that the writers' union work to defeat the enemy from within; the union "must continue to work for rallying creative forces on the fundamental party basis, to shape collective views on fundamental ideological-creative problems, to promote the ideological tempering of writers, to shape their Marxist-Leninist outlook, devoting particular attention to young writers." At the same time in his comments on economic policy, Demichev has portrayed himself as a spokesman for traditional interests.

Kunayev: Kunayev, an unmistakable protege of Brezhnev,* has stuck closely to his principal concern--Kazakh agriculture. Notably, he strongly boosted the ambitious program for land reclamation presented by Brezhnev at the May 1966 plenum and in his 1966 election speech made claims for the program not unlike those once asserted for Khrushchev's virgin lands project. Kunayev thus noted that the new policy will help produce increases in agricultural output "in a short time" and warned--perhaps aiming his warning at those lukewarm toward reclamation as a panacea--that "we must all understand" the land reclamation project was not a short-lived campaign, but a long term program of planned expansion of agricultural lands. On broader areas of policy--such as the hard line toward the United States, and the heavy industry priority--Kunayev has echoed Brezhnev.

Grishin: Conservative economic formulations emphasizing production over consumption and appeals for the strengthening of the Supreme Soviet mark Grishin, the newly apppinted Moscow city secretary, as a Brezhnevite. (Though at the November 1962 plenum, Grishin showed himself to be a proponent of economic accountability--a

*When Belyayev was made the scapegoat for failures in the virgin lands in December 1959--January 1960, Kunayev who was the second highest official in Kazakhstan next to Belyayev emerged unscathed. The interesting thing is that Khrushchev heaped abuse on Kunayev equal to that he gave Belyayev, but Kunayev subsequently prospered and Belyayev went into oblivion. Brezhnev who was linked with the virgin lands project in 1954-55 and who was involved in the purging of Belyayev undoubtedly was instrumental in saving Kunayev's political neck at the time. It would seem that Kunayev's gratitude has not diminished with time. His election speech in June 1966, for example, is replete with references showing that Kunayev regards Brezhnev as his boss and personal leader. ("As Comrade Brezhnev recommended..." "the Central Committee and Comrade Brezhnev personally..." "in his May plenum report Comrade Brezhnev said,..." and so forth.)

reform stressed by Kosygin in 1965.) Grishin has strongly seconded agricultural proposals introduced by Brezhnev, and like Kunayev, Grishin in his public speeches has often praised Brezhnev by name. Generally steering clear of contentious foreign policy issues, Grishin in an 18 November 1965 speech in Belgrade seconded Brezhnev's December 1964 and Suslov's October 1965 call for an anti-imperialist united front and called for joint action of all European trade unions to oppose the nuclear arming of the West German Army. Grishin's comments on the supposed global ambitions of the United States have not varied substantially from Suslov's or Brezhnev's.

Mzhavanadze: In line with Suslov, Georgian party leader Mzhavanadze has concentrated on the ideological role of the party and on what he has called the "purity of the party ranks." In his 12 June 1967 Georgian central committee speech he cited Stalin (as he had done in his 23rd Congress report and his report at the June 1965 Georgian central committee plenum) on the matter of selecting faithful party members. And in his election speeches of the last three years he has stressed the need for discipline and vigilance against the "slightest deviation" from Marxism-Leninism. Mzhavanadze has employed Stalin's device of pledging that the individual and his welfare is the "highest aim" of the party, and then going on to list industrial production before the other tasks of the party, such as increasing living standards. Not only has he listed the party's tasks in the style of Leonid Brezhnev (and Stalin), he has also given particularly obsequious praise to the current general secretary. In his 1 November 1966 Tbilisi speech, for example, Mzhavanadze thanked "dear Ilich" (Brezhnev's and, incidentially, Lenin's patronymic) for giving an award to the Georgian republic and assured "our dear Leonid" that existing shortcomings in the republic would be eliminiated. Georgian problems have occupied the bulk of Mzhavanadze's time. Accordingly, he has given only sporadic attention to routine theme of "U.S. imperialism" in Vietnam.

Rashidov: Borrowing a term used by his Chinese neighbors, Uzbek party leader Rashidov has occupied himself with what he called in his 1967 election speech the

"leap forward" in industry and agriculture in his republic. While only a few of his policy remarks have been made available, the pattern that emerges wears a Brezhnev look. On the issue of the relative powers of Kosygin's Council of Ministers and Podgornyy's Supreme Soviet, Rashidov concentrated (in his 13 April speech this year) on increasing the role of the latter on a national level, such as increasing soviet control over the ministries, and on a local level, such as granting added authority to the village and settlement soviets. And on the matter of thwarting the alleged global and villainous actions and intentions of the United States, Rashidov in a Djakarta speech in late May 1965 voiced Brezhnev's and Suslov's call for united action of all "anti-imperialist forces." Repeating that call at the 3-12 January 1966 Tri-Continental Congress in Havana, Rashidov unveiled the particularly militant definition that Moscow's peaceful coexistence doctrine did not apply in the underdeveloped world where people are fighting for their "liberation."

> We believe that relations between sovereign states with different social structures should be based on peaceful coexistence. However, it is quite clear that there is no peaceful coexistence, nor can there be peaceful coexistence between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors--the colonialists and the imperialists, between the imperialist aggressors and their victims.

(In the wake of strong reaction from Latin American governments, the Soviet Foreign Ministry took the unusual action of privately disavowing Rashidov's statements and passed the word through Brazilian and Uruguayan ambassadors that Rashidov had spoken to the conference as an unofficial, "non-governmental" delegate. The disavowal appeared to be hypocritical, since Rashidov was most likely given explicit guidance both prior to and during the Havana conference.)

Shcherbitskiy: A Brezhnevite of long-standing, Ukrainian Council of Ministers chairman Shcherbitskiy has consistently displayed a bias in favor of heavy industry interests, and in December 1965 he took exception to CPSU

Secretary Kapitonov's listing of the three main features of the 1966 budget. The budget as presented by Kapitonov (then a member of the Budget Commission of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union*) called for a general upsurge of the nation's economy, a growth in living standards, and, thirdly, a strengthening of the nation's military might. Shcherbitskiy at the same session (7 December 1965) reversed the order of the last two features and in his subsequent speeches he proceeded to press even more vigorously for defense priorities. In his 3 March election speech this year, for example, he interpreted his nomination as a candidate to the Supreme Soviet as a signal of "complete approval" of the CPSU's "general policy line and its unremitting struggle to strengthen the Soviet Union's might." He has frequently paid deference to Brezhnev, citing the general secretary on such subjects as the importance of moral incentives and "Bolshevik" self-sacrifice. Shcherbitskiy has given attention to the matter of selection of qualified party cadres, but unlike his colleague Mzhavanadze, Shcherbitskiy has stressed the practical--not ideological--need for party cadres to study economics and modern methods of production.

Ustinov: Befitting his party responsibilities as Brezhnev's defense-industry expert, Ustinov has based his frequent appeals for increased defense expenditures on the "belligerent tendencies" of West German "revengers" in Europe and on the U.S. policy of "armed attack" on the DRV and "constant pressure" on Cuba and North Korea. Accordingly, Ustinov has consistently given priority to the heavy industry sector. In an apparent effort to expand his heavy-defense industry empire, Ustinov seemed to be promoting the idea of diversification by pressing for

*Kapitonov, incidentally, was not re-elected to the budget commission, which was reorganized into the 51-man Planning-Budget Commission at the August 1966 Supreme Soviet session. He retained, however, the important chairmanship of the central committee department that controls personnel appointments.

the utilization of certain defense industry plants for Soviet automobile manufacture. He promoted the production of Soviet automobiles in his 4 June 1966 election speech, and did not comment on the planned domestic production of the Italian Fiat car--a consumer industry project associated with Kosygin. (The heavy industry sector was not linked to the project to expand automobile production which Kosygin introduced in his 19 April 1965 Gosplan speech. In fact, in his private discussions with the president of Fiat later in the year, Kosygin reportedly indicated the desire to reduce defense industry costs and, with the attendant savings, to shift from the production of conventional armaments and nuclear weapons to more intensive development of the consumer industries.)

Masherov: Like his republic party predecessor (Mazurov), Belorussian First Secretary Masherov has emphasized the "preferential development of the production of the means of production belonging to group A"--the heavy-defense industry sector. And in his brief March 1967 Minsk election speech he ignored the consumer industries altogether and concentrated solely on industrial growth in Belorussia. In his 1966 election speech he talked about production of refrigerators, television sets and so forth, but he concluded his remarks on that subject by counter-balancing material goods and Communist ideals.

While showing constant care for improving the material well-being and the cultural level of the Soviet people, the party simultaneously gives great attention to the

upbringing of everybody in the spirit of Communism. The moulding of the Communist world outlook and of high ethical standards will lead to a further strengthening of conscious discipline among workers.

And with regard to strengthening Soviet military might, Masherov has proved to be a loyal supporter of the defense interests. He also has employed one of Stalin's old practices of using military terminology in referring to organs of the party. Thus, in Masherov's style, the CPSU central committee is "the battle headquarters."

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION

In conclusion, the vagaries of Kremlin politics must be kept in mind, for the patterns in the leader's policy statements described in part two of this paper are not immune from substantial transformations. The pursuit of a given policy in the Soviet environment has not infrequently been subordinated to political expediency on the part of a given leader and his coterie. (In addition, Kremlin cliques have been notoriously precarious. All are unstable.) Kosygin's gradual and temporary backing away in the summer of 1965 from his own version of detente abroad and concentration on civilian economics at home may well have reflected a tentative compromise aimed at preventing a rout--such as the defeat of his economic reform plan (adopted amid rumors of his imminent retirement)--in the face of his losing battle to cut the Soviet military budget. The identifiable policy patterns have, nonetheless, displayed a remarkable degree of consistency during the post-Khrushchev period. The remarks of the individual leaders have reflected power and policy struggles and should provide a useful backdrop against which future struggles can be better understood.