SKALOZUB PUBLISHING

Skalozub Publishing offers a
comprehensive publishing service.

We accept scripts from novices
as well as from established authors.

Skalozub Publishing is interested in
issuing books for a broad audience.

We are interested in issuing literature
of the highest quality.

We provide a translation service for
Russian writers from Russian to English.

For more information visit us at
www.skalozub.com

THE
TOP SECRETS
IN THE HISTORY OF THE USSR

Collection of declassified
CIA Cold War documents

VOLUME 11:
documents issued in 1968-1969 years

Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Skalozub Publishing
Chicago

Contents

(continuation of the numbers order of the first volume)

In continuation there will be issued more books in this series of documents

The continuing sensitivity of some documents in the series requires that they be withheld from declassification.

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

HR70-14
(U)

THE STALIN ISSUE AND
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXXII)

5 July 1968
RSS No. 0030

226503

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

Preface

Since the ouster of Khrushchev in the fall of 1964 the domestic political scene in the Soviet Union has witnessed a struggle for power within the leadership. Two of the key figures in this struggle, Brezhnev and Shelepin, have attempted to gain the support of the old-guard party apparatchiks by espousing orthodox policies; of the two Shelepin has been the more aggressive and Brezhnev in general the more cautious, but thus far Brezhnev has clearly gained the upper hand in the competition. Accompanying the struggle has been a gradual but continuing reversion toward the ideological orthodoxy, rigid controls, and repression which characterized the Stalin years. One aspect of this move toward orthodoxy has been the resurrection of Stalin's reputation and the cleansing of his tarnished image, developments which many Soviet citizens fear may mark a return to "Stalinism."

The reign of Stalin covered some 30 years, more than half the history of the Soviet Union. It was a period of intense industrialization, of forced mass collectivization, and of the great sacrifices of World War II. It was also a period of terror and repression during which millions of Soviet citizens died in the purges. Although the term "Stalinism" has a number of connotations, to Soviet citizens in general and to the intellectuals in particular, the term conjures up memories of total police control, repression, terror, purge trials, and labor camps. It is in that context that the term is used in this paper.

The scope of the paper is limited to the general use by the leadership of the Stalin issue in the struggle

for power and the practical implications of a rehabilitation of Stalin for intellectual freedom in the Soviet Union. The paper does not deal with specific policy implications often involved in the use of the issue--such as military expenditures, agriculture, nationalities problems. Neither does it deal with other policy questions dividing the leadership.

The bulk of detailed evidence and analysis upon which the report is based will be published separately as an Annex. The research analyst responsible for preparing this report is Carolyn Ekedahl.

John Kerry King
Chief, DDI Special Research Staff

Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Special Research Staff and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates.

THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

Since the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964 a gradual restoration of Stalin's political respectability within the Soviet Union has coincided with a return to more orthodox policies and increasingly repressive methods of dealing with non-conformists. The issue of Stalin's rehabilitation has been used by various leaders, most notably Brezhnev and Shelepin, in their attempts to attain the top position in the Party hierarchy. The aim of each has been to gain the support of the party apparatchiks, both high and medium level, many of whom were dismayed and felt threatened by Khrushchev's reformist tendencies. Thus, each has tried to demonstrate that he and he alone is the legitimate leader of the party faithful. In order to do so, each has supported orthodox views and each has attempted to reach around the reformer Khrushchev to Stalin in an effort to establish a direct line of legitimacy from Lenin.

Thus far, Brezhnev has prevailed over Shelepin in the ongoing struggle for power; in order to do so he adopted the neo-Stalinist position first assumed by the Shelepin faction. Brezhnev has also managed to stave off attempts by moderates within the leadership, represented by Podgornyy and Kosygin, to push their own policy views; in the process he has apparently gained a measure of support from them, possibly by convincing them that the alternative to him was even less desirable--e.g., Shelepin. However, while Brezhnev has emerged as the strongest of the Soviet leaders, his position is still limited by the nature of the leadership; for a majority of the Soviet leaders has a vested interest in preventing Brezhnev from acquiring too much power.

The Issue And What It Means

The Stalin issue evokes a great emotional response among those who suffered during the Stalin years and fear a return to the harsh repressive methods of those years.

At the same time the issue has great political significance. To Communists, history is not a matter of academic concern; rather it is a vital element in political life. Communist ideology is based upon the inevitability of a certain historical progression, and the continued justification of the system as it exists is based upon the perpetuation of that concept of history. Thus, all policies must at least have the appearance of conforming to the ideology, and for this reason each successive Soviet regime has felt the need to rewrite Soviet history in order to support its own policies.

The classification of Stalin touches upon the very nature and legitimacy of the world's foremost Communist system. It was impossible to denounce Stalin without placing in question the myth of the party's infallibility and undermining its ideological authority; this is precisely what happened in the Soviet Union following Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of the Stalin period and its cult of personality. The continuing but gradual rehabilitation of Stalin is part of an attempt to return the party and the system to a position of ideological legitimacy. The damage done to the party's credibility by the denunciation of Stalin took its toll in the morale of the party apparatchiks. Thus the rehabilitation of Stalin also represents an attempt to reassure these old-guard--and by nature conservative--cadres that the party retains its legitimacy and authority.

Khrushchev's attack on Stalin represented an attack on orthodoxy and inflexibility; it was the beginning of a drive for change. In general, those who support continued de-Stalinization are those who also favor change, reform, and liberalization. They tend toward pragmatism and prefer to adapt theory to the needs of the country rather than vice-versa. Their inclination toward reform in general creates an atmosphere conducive to more open discussion and, as a result, more freedom. A positive characterization of Stalin, on the other hand, suggests a more rigid, dogmatic approach to politics and economics. Those who view the Stalin era in a favorable light have generally argued the case for doctrinal continuity and have emphasized the ideological role of the party. Their approach

necessitates tight control and close supervision of the pragmatists and the intellectuals, and a corresponding lessening of personal freedom.

Alignment within the hierarchy on the Stalin issue, as well as on other policies, is quite complex, and the assignment of classifications to individuals and groups is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. It nonetheless serves the purpose of identifying and highlighting shades of difference in approach and in points of view. There are several groupings within the leadership which might well wish the rehabilitation of Stalin--but for different reasons and to different degrees. The old-line apparatchiks who tend to be dogmatic would, in all likelihood, welcome a return to an atmosphere of tight control and rigid, unquestioned views; this is the atmosphere in which they rose to the top and in which they would feel more comfortable. Individuals who seem to fit this description, best represented by Suslov, will be referred to as orthodox.

Another, seemingly more coordinated, group of individuals took the early lead in actively pushing an end to criticism of Stalin's cult of personality and in urging tighter controls on the content of published material. For this reason they are referred to as a neo-Stalinist faction. Their main purpose seems to have been to capitalize on the views of the orthodox apparatchiks in order to gain support in their drive for power. This faction is composed primarily of young members of the hierarchy, many of whom came up through the Komsomol and have been closely aligned with Shelepin. The neo-Stalinists have demonstrated an ability to be quite pragmatic, unlike the orthodox grouping, and even to shift positions in order to attain their main goal, the acquisition of the instruments of power.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the moderates or pragmatists see a need for change and reform in the Soviet Union and tend away from rigid, orthodox positions. Kosygin and probably Podgornyy (at least at one time) belong in this category. They would be inclined to oppose a rehabilitation of Stalin. Even more to the

reform side of the spectrum are the liberals. The member of the hierarchy who came closest to representing this position, Mikoyan, was dropped from the Presidium in March 1966. The main strength of the liberals is found among the intellectuals--for example, the chief editor of the liberal journal Noviy Mir, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy. The intellectuals want more freedom to write, to speak, and to dissent. They have actively opposed the restoration of Stalin's image.

Shifts in policy concerning various aspects of the Stalin issue are reflected first in the intellectual community. Reversion to a favorable view of Stalin has required historians and writers to adhere to the new line. The re-Stalinizers have demanded that criticism of Stalin cease and, in the past three years, they have had considerable success in efforts to untarnish Stalin's historical image. The re-Stalinizers also demand that written material be judged according to the principles of socialist realism--which means that, when writing on the Soviet Union, criticism is out of order and only the achievements and promises of Communism may be discussed. In order to restore Stalin's political respectability, therefore, it has been necessary to reimpose prescribed, rigid formulas, and to clamp down on non-conformists.

Increasing pressure on intellectuals to conform has, in fact, accompanied the gradual rehabilitation of Stalin. In the three years since Khrushchev's ouster, the regime's warnings, threats, and outright repression have intensified. Frustrated in their efforts to continue their moves toward greater freedom and frightened by what they considered to be a move back toward Stalinist methods, the intellectuals have responded with demonstrations, petitions, and letters of protest. These, in turn, have resulted in even stronger measures by the regime--including expulsion from the party, arrests, commitments to mental institutions, and incarceration in labor camps. The result has been a spiraling cycle of action and reaction resulting in increasingly harsh measures.

Alignment of Forces

The regime's moves toward harsher policies have generated considerable public opposition, and have been accompanied by--indeed are a part of--an ongoing struggle for power within the hierarchy. In the first few months after Khrushchev's ouster, the new Soviet leaders were preoccupied with establishing their positions and organizing their forces. Both Shelepin, a neo-Stalinist, and Podgornyy, a moderate, seemed to be in fairly powerful positions, with Brezhnev seemingly occupying a middle ground. The existence of this somewhat diffused political situation was reflected in the lack of a clear policy on culture, resulting in considerable freedom for the intellectuals. Liberal articles were numerous and criticism of Stalin widespread.

If any faction seemed to have a slight edge at the time it was the moderates. Apparent Presidium-level supporters for a moderate policy included Podgornyy, Kosygin, and Mikoyan, while those who clearly seemed to favor a hard line were Shelepin, Shelest, and Suslov. With the Presidium divided in this manner, a balancing group, conservative by inclination and headed by Brezhnev, possessed considerable power to swing votes in favor of one group or another. Polyanskiy and Kirilenko probably belonged to this group.

Infighting Begins

Brezhnev apparently saw his biggest threat as coming from the moderates. In February 1965 an attack was launched against Khar'kov Oblast, Podgornyy's former bailiwick; the author of the article was Shcherbitskiy, the First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Brezhnev's old power base. In the same month members of the neo-Stalinist faction (Pavlov and Yegorychev) attacked those who criticize the period of the cult of personality. Thus, the struggle for power had begun, with the moderates coming under attack from both the neo-Stalinists and Brezhnev.

By the early spring of 1965 the backers of a rehabilitation of Stalin had a well-coordinated campaign underway to restore Stalin's World War II image. Although Brezhnev's statements at the time were not so harsh as those of such neo-Stalinists as Moscow City Chief Yegorychev and Komsomol First Secretary Pavlov, he must have supported the proposal to restore Stalin's reputation and have swung a decision in favor of it. He probably had various reasons for doing so. In order to justify Khrushchev's ouster it was useful to demonstrate that Khrushchev had strayed from the true party line; thus, if virtually the whole period of party rule was not to be in disrepute, the respectability of the Stalin era (and of Stalin himself) must be restored. Secondly, Brezhnev too was fighting for the leadership and must have felt that he needed the support of the orthodox apparatchiks.

The decision to rehabilitate Stalin was implemented first with respect to Stalin's image as a wartime leader. Various military leaders made increasingly favorable comments concerning Stalin as a wartime leader. The military has been in the forefront on the Stalin issue no matter which line the party has adopted--always using the issue to defend the prerogatives of the military. When de-Stalinization was the line, the military criticized Stalin for not listening to the professionals. Now, they began to praise him because he did listen. Another indication of the trend was the partial suspension in the spring of 1965 of the program of rehabilitating Stalin's victims. This partial rehabilitation of Stalin was given official sanction in May 1965, when Brezhnev became the first member of the hierarchy to mention Stalin's name in public; at this time he referred to Stalin as the wartime head of the State Defense Committee.

In the summer and early fall of 1965 the liberals fought back against the onslaughts of both the neo-Stalinists and Brezhnev. Publication of rehabilitations of Stalin's victims was resumed and a number of liberal articles appeared. In early September a liberal defense of the intellectuals, signed by Pravda editor Rumyantsev,

a possible associate of Podgornyy, appeared in Pravda. This counterattack by the liberals was, however, short-lived. Rumyantsev was fired in mid- September and replaced by Zimyanin, a Belorussian closely associated with Belorussian leaders Mazurov and Masherov, both of whom were to express neo-Stalinist opinions subsequently. Also in September the writers Daniel and Sinyavskiy were arrested for having published works abroad; this marked a victory for a hard-line approach.

Shelepin's Bid Fails But Hard-Line Prevails

Shelepin's drive for power, begun in February 1965, intensified throughout the summer and early fall; but it had been decisively defeated by the December central committee plenum. The Party-State Control Committee which he headed was abolished, and he was removed from his position as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, the moderates also received a set-back at the plenum, indicating that the strength to strike at Shelepin had not been mobilized by them, although they might well have supported it. Podgornyy replaced Mikoyan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a position with far less political power than his position on the party Secretariat, which he lost. Furthermore, Mikoyan's removal indicated that this strong supporter of a moderate position was on his way out. Thus, the net gainer at this time was Brezhnev, who probably had gained the support of Suslov by supporting orthodox views.

Brezhnev's support for re-Stalinizing and the need for conformity had been revealed in the publication in October 1965 of an article by an apparent protege of his, Trapeznikov, instructing propagandists that the period of the cult should not be viewed negatively and indicating that this applied not only to the question of wartime leadership but to other aspects of the period, such as collectivization and industrialization. A Pravda article the following January instructed historians to stop describing the Stalin era as the period of the cult of personality,

as this time in history had been characterized by many positive achievements. Consequences of this move toward orthodoxy include the arrests in September 1965, and trial the following February, of the writers, Daniel and Sinyavskiy, for unauthorized publication of their works in the West.

The 23rd Congress

On the eve of the 23rd Congress, which opened in late March 1966, there were numerous reports that Stalin would be formally rehabilitated. A number of hard-line articles and speeches given during this period supported the rumors, as did the apparently well-coordinated program to improve Stalin's historical reputation. The rumors were also supported by the resurrection of a number of Stalinist terms--such as cosmopolitanism, sharpening of the class struggle (used in reference to the 1930's), and enemies of the people. The prospect of a rehabilitation of Stalin drew strong negative reactions from several foreign Communist countries and frightened reactions from Soviet intellectuals, who sent Brezhnev a letter urging that Stalin not be rehabilitated.

Perhaps in response to these reactions the Soviet leaders stepped back from a full-scale formal rehabilitation, and when the congress opened only the vestiges of such a program remained--the restoration of the terms Politburo and General Secretary. While the return of these Stalinist terms was purely symbolic, it nonetheless demonstrated the mood of the Soviet leadership and suggested the direction in which it wished to go. Brezhnev's acquisition of the title General Secretary set him apart from his colleagues, distinguished him from Khrushchev, and identified him with Stalin, the only other Soviet leader ever to hold this title.

Brezhnev's success was further reflected in the fact that both the moderates and Shelepin again suffered set-backs at the congress. Mikoyan was dropped from the Politburo; Shelepin, apparently at this time, was assigned

responsibility for light industry, a clear step down for him. Brezhnev and the orthodox element in the party gained, however. Pelshe, the Latvian First Secretary and reportedly a Suslov associate, became a full member of the Politburo, and Kunayev, a Brezhnev protege, became a candidate member. The continued strength of Shelepin's views was suggested by the appointment as a candidate Politburo member of Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, who, while not a protege of Shelepin, supported many of the same views.

Brezhnev's speech at the congress was mild compared with some of those which followed, indicating that in spite of the adoption of an increasingly hard-line stand, pressure by the neo-Stalinist faction for even harsher methods continued. Some of these speakers called for administrative action against non-conformist writers, and such liberal journals as Noviy Mir and Yunost' received strong criticism. After the congress these threats were halted for a period, perhaps because of the sharp protests, both foreign and domestic on the eve of the congress, or possibly as a result of Shelepin's defeat.

Liberal Initiative

Perhaps encouraged by the failure of the congress to formally rehabilitate Stalin and the reassurances given to them that Stalinist times would not return, the liberals proceeded to write and publish a number of articles in the late spring and early summer of 1966. In particular, there was a temporary upsurge in the program of rehabilitating Stalin's victims, and a number of articles criticizing Stalin for his role in collectivization appeared. This initiative was quickly squashed however, and articles casting Stalin in a favorable light soon predominated once again.

In spite of the prevalence of a conservative influence, the liberals continued to voice opposition throughout 1966. In February and in the summer, two

meetings were held, one to discuss a book by A. Nekrich criticizing prewar preparations, and the second to discuss the third volume of the History of the CPSU. At each of these meetings those in charge lost control and attacks were launched by participants on Stalin and the personality cult. A number of petitions also were circulated; for example, in December a group of intellectuals protested the passage of a decree extending an article of the RSFSR criminal code to include any form of "slander" of Soviet society; the intellectuals feared that this would open the way for further repression of the intellectuals. Also in December Literaturnaya Gazeta published an article demanding a truthful examination of the past. Orthodoxy still dominated, but resistance to the pressure to conform continued.

Leadership Tension Continues

Friction within the leadership was reflected in a debate which was waged in the press during the summer and early fall of 1966. The issue was that of collective leadership versus individual responsibility and all factions participated. The neo-Stalinists opened the debate with several articles stressing the importance of collective leadership and warning of the dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule. They received support from an unlikely direction--the liberals who used the cult of personality and the resulting violations of legality to illustrate the evils of one-man rule. Both of these factions clearly had a vested interest in retaining collective leadership and in preventing Brezhnev from acquiring too much power.

Brezhnev and his backers responded to the concerted attacks with several articles emphasizing the need for responsibility and discipline, stressing the importance of individual leadership, and quoting Lenin to the effect that irresponsibility must not be permitted to hide beneath references to collectivity. Brezhnev also responded by mentioning favorably that most notable of individual leaders--Stalin; in a November speech in Tbilisi, he referred to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary."

A rigid, orthodox policy clearly prevailed in early 1967. The rehabilitation program was halted and refurbishing of Stalin's image continued. Dissident intellectuals were arrested, particularly in the Ukraine and Leningrad, where party leaders Shelest and Tolstikov supported the neo-Stalinist line. Other examples of the ascendancy of orthodoxy were the harassment of Noviy Mir and the replacement of two key members of its editorial board, and the expulsion of the historian Nekrich from the party in July for his criticism of Stalin's handling of the prewar situation.

Shelepin's Defeat

With the moderates on the defensive, Brezhnev and his followers next turned their big guns on Shelepin. In May 1967, Shelepin's protege Semichastnyy was removed as head of the KGB and the following month the most outspoken neo-Stalinist, Yegorychev, was removed as Moscow City First Secretary. Shortly before his dismissal, Yegorychev had reportedly attacked the leadership at a Central Committee plenum for its handling of the Middle East crisis. Shelepin was apparently held responsible for Yegorychev's attack and his power was curtailed; in July he became head of the Soviet Union's trade union organization and then in September he was removed from the secretariat.

In the face of Brezhnev's organizational victories, Shelepin's backers began to issue more warnings in the press against high-handed leadership methods. As they had in 1966, they again stressed collective leadership, but they came down most strongly on the right of party members to criticize their superiors, citing the dangers involved in having a leader who cannot take criticism. Two of these articles used the cult of personality (one directly and one indirectly) to illustrate the dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule--meaning Brezhnev's. The adoption in both 1966 and 1967 of an anti-Stalin line of argument by Shelepin's neo-Stalinist

supporters was an indication of their desperation. Finding themselves in a vulnerable position, they used arguments best suited to help prevent both the acquisition of further power by Brezhnev and their own subjection to more political defeats. Some individuals not in sympathy with Yegorychev's views might also have feared the precedent set by Yegorychev's abrupt dismissal.

The defeats suffered by Shelepin and the neo-Stalinist faction in the spring of 1967 briefly encouraged the liberal intellectuals. At the end of June several articles critical of censorship and urging its abolition were published, but almost immediately they were repudiated and the hard-line reaffirmed by articles in the central press. The arrests and trials of dissident intellectuals continued; clearly the defeat of Shelepin did not entail a corresponding defeat for hard-line policies.

Postlude and Prospects

During the first few months of 1968, the atmosphere of threat and repression grew still more menacing. Intellectuals were prosecuted for "anti-Soviet" activities; liberal articles and anti-Stalin references disappeared from publication.



Brezhnev continued to gain strength and to hack away at Shelepin's position during the first half of the year. In April, First Secretary Katushev of Gorkiy Oblast, who had supported Brezhnev on several occasions previously, became a Party Secretary and, in May, Shelepin's protege Pavlov was relieved of his position as Komsomol Chief. Late in March Brezhnev delivered his most militant cultural statement to date. Emphasizing the importance of ideology, he described the "sharp ideological struggle" being waged and charged that bourgeois imperialists were trying to influence Soviet citizens. He attacked Soviet renegades and hypocrites who fall into the imperialist net and warned that they would not go unpunished. He again announced that what he termed ideologically "weak works" would be given a strict appraisal. Less than two weeks later a central committee plenum adopted a resolution calling for a further tightening of ideological controls. While it seems clear that Brezhnev's speech and the resolution were at least partially in reaction to the revolutionary liberalizing events taking place in Czechoslovakia in early 1968, both were consistent with the trend which had existed in Soviet policy over the previous three-and-a-half years.

While the current atmosphere is less restrictive than that of the Stalin years, when terror and repression were the order of the day, it is much more stifling than that which existed during Khrushchev's tenure. The situation varied under Khrushchev; when he was relatively strong there was a corresponding relaxation of ideological controls, and when he was on the defensive (for example in late 1962 and early 1963) there was a tightening in cultural policy and less freedom of expression. Nonetheless, the current clamp-down far exceeds in severity any clamp-down which occurred during the Khrushchev years.

At the present time there seems little likelihood of a return to a more liberal policy. Over the past three-and-a-half years there have been few personnel changes at the highest levels of the party, but those that have occurred have tended to strengthen the hard-line forces apparently dominated by Brezhnev. As long as the leadership balance remains essentially intact the prevailing policy is likely to remain orthodox and, if anything,

become more repressive.

On the other hand there would also appear to be a limit to the extent of regression to Stalinist tactics as long as the current leadership structure remains. In 1956 when Khrushchev in his "secret speech" condemned Stalin's crimes he implicitly pledged that such methods would not again be employed, thus limiting the potential for control by an individual and laying the groundwork for the sanctifying of collective leadership. While the rehabilitation of Stalin and the crackdown on the intellectuals have raised the spectre of a complete return to Stalinist terror tactics, such a reversion virtually presupposes the ability of one individual to impose his will and authority. Barring a crisis situation in which one man might have to make the decisions, the diversity still existing within the Politburo would seem to work against such a possibility.

Each member of the hierarchy, whether moderate or orthodox, has an interest in preventing any other individual from acquiring too much power. Thus, although Brezhnev is quite clearly first among equals, and is more secure than ever before, his power is far from unlimited. For example, while he has undermined Shelepin's position considerably, he has not yet been able to oust him from the Politburo, and a number of Shelepin's supporters remain in important positions. Each member of the hierarchy has a vested interest in seeing that Brezhnev's ability to exert his will remains limited.

SECRET

SECRET

[redacted]

(13)

SECRET

[redacted]

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

ANNEX:

THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXXII)

RSS No. 0030A/68
17 July 1968

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

This Annex supplies the bulk of detailed information and analysis upon which the Intelligence Report entitled, "The Stalin Issue and the Soviet Leadership Struggle," published 5 July 1968, was based. It is being circulated as a reference for the benefit of those who follow Soviet internal affairs in detail.

The Annex is divided into three chronological sections with three further sub-divisions in each. The first sub-division deals with the use of the Stalin issue in the Soviet leadership struggle. The second considers the practical effects on intellectual freedom resulting from a policy of greater restrictions and central controls. The third sub-division traces the treatment of the Stalin issue in Soviet communications media.

The Annex is not a coordinated document. The research analyst responsible for preparing the study is Carolyn Ekedahl.

John Kerry King
Chief, DDI Special Research Staff

Contents

Page

POINT COUNTERPOINT

From Khrushchev's Fall to Shelepin's Set-Back
(October 1964-December 1965)

LEADERSHIP

The Sides Are Formed

After the ouster of Khrushchev, the Soviet leaders were preoccupied with the task of rewarding those who had cooperated in overthrowing Khrushchev and reversing some of Khrushchev's more unpopular measures. The man who seemed to benefit the most from the early appointments was Aleksandr Shelepin, former Komsomol and KGB Chief.* He was promoted to full membership in the CPSU Presidium in November and several of his associates and proteges received promotions within the party apparatus.** Shelepin also appeared to benefit from changes made in the leadership of the press and propaganda organs.***

Podgornyy's position also seemed to be fairly strong at this time. Aleksey Rumyantsev, who had been secretary for propaganda and agitation in Khar'kov Oblast', probably when Podgornyy was there, became chief editor of Pravda.

*At this time Shelepin was a Party Secretary, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the Party State Control Committee.

**Petr Demichev, a former First Secretary of Moscow City, became a candidate member of the Presidium. He is reportedly a good friend of Shelepin and owes his position to him. Vladimir Semichastnyy, KGB Chief and a Shelepin protege, was promoted from candidate to full membership on the central committee.

***Vladimir Stepakov, who had come up in Moscow City under Demichev, became editor of Izvestiya and Nikolay Mesyatsev, who had served under Shelepin in the Komsomol, became Chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Television. Another subordinate of Shelepin's in the Komsomol, Mikhail Khaldeyev, became Chief of the RSFSR Propaganda and Agitation Section in January 1965.

Podgornyy gave the main report at the November party plenum, and at the November anniversary celebrations, the toast to the party was given by Podgornyy rather than Brezhnev, who followed with a toast to the military. More importantly, moderate trends with which Podgornyy was subsequently to associate himself seemed to prevail throughout this period. The 1965 budget included a reduction in the overt military budget and concessions to the consumer, both of which Podgornyy favored.

Condemnation of Khrushchev began almost immediately after his ouster; this was necessary if the new leaders were to justify their own action in getting rid of him. However, these attacks were frequently accompanied by support of collective leadership and occasionally accompanied by condemnation of the cult of personality as well.*

The approach to the Stalin issue by members of the hierarchy remained essentially as before. On 6 November an article by Latvian First Secretary Arvid Pelshe, who has been associated with Suslov, appeared in Pravda; in it he discussed the cult:

> The ideology and practice of the personality cult, alien to Marxism-Leninism, has done considerable harm to our party and the Soviet state. The personality cult reduced the role of the masses and of the party, minimized collective leadership, undermined intra-party democracy, and suppressed the activity, initiative, and independent action of the party members . . . .

*For example, a November Kommunist Belorussii editorial stated that where the cult of personality takes root, collectivity of leadership is impossible. And a January 1965 article in Kommunist Sovetskoye Latvii, probably controlled by Pelshe, attacked the cult of Stalin's personality in harsh terms and stated that it had done serious damage to party and state leadership, adding, however, that this could not and did not change the nature of the socialist system.

> The 20th CPSU Congress put an end to this. It was thus a turning point in the party's history . . . The Congress recommended to the Party Central Committee 'not to relax the struggle against the remnants of the personality cult' . . . .

Similarly, in December, First Secretary of Kazakhstan, Kunayev,* a Brezhnev protege, spoke at a commemorative meeting for Saken Seyfullin, a writer who had died in the purges. On 6 December, a strong attack on Stalin was carried in a Pravda article, which also strongly praised the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses.

In February 1965 the journal Partiynaya Zhizn' (Party Life), scoffed at the suggestion that criticism of the cult would cease:

> Some people abroad have begun to speculate and even assert that after the October plenum of the Central Committee the CPSU will give up criticizing the cult of Stalin's personality and revise its general line, elaborated at the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses. Vain hopes! . . . The process begun at the 20th Party Congress is an irreversible process. There is no return to the old ways, and there will be none. It is not a matter merely of somebody not wanting this return, but of the objective conditions of life of Soviet society and of the Communist Party at the present stage.

That some party figures felt the need to reassure the party and public that there would be no return to the past may well have reflected the fact that there was indeed pressure being exerted to do just that.

*D. A. Kunayev was reappointed First Secretary in December 1964. He had held this post from 1960 to 1962 and had then been named Chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers.

Shelepin's Drive For Power

The expression of the neo-Stalinist views that Stalin should not be criticized and that intellectuals should be made to conform began somewhat sporadically, but seemed clearly to come from a Shelepin-oriented group. The first, and for a number of months, the only, favorable reference to Stalin appeared on 6 November in Komsomolskaya Pravda, the organ of the Young Communist League (Komsomol); the Komsomol had been headed previously by Shelepin and Semichastnyy, and since 1959 its chairman had been their protege, Sergey Pavlov. In this article Stalin was referred to as one of Lenin's "comrades-in-arms."

In February Kommunist published an article by Moscow City First Secretary Nikolay Yegorychev,* who has been one of the most violent spokesmen for the neo-Stalinists. This may well have been the opening salvo in Shelepin's attack on Brezhnev's position. Yegorychev advanced a number of themes which were subsequently to be stressed by the neo-Stalinists. After paying lip service to the important measures taken to root out the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality, he concentrated his attacks on the sins of the Khrushchev era. He stated that "events of recent years" had caused doubts among ideologically unstable youths, and he criticized those who take what he called a one-sided view of the past and stress only shortcomings.

> In connection with this, we must lodge a complaint against those of our creative intelligentsia who sometimes are too attracted by describing the willfulness of the period of the cult of personality and the moral experience and physical deprivation of innocently condemned people.

He coupled this criticism with a call for more patriotic and ideological training. This represented precisely the sort of statement which Partiynaya Zhizn', in the same month, had indicated was impossible.

*Yegorychev rose to his position through the Moscow Komsomol and party apparatuses; he succeeded Demichev as first secretary there.

Yegorychev continued to press his point at the Second Congress of RSFSR Writers early in March. He attacked a number of articles which had appeared in liberal journals, as well as Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, a sensational novel published during the Khrushchev period which graphically described life in a Stalin labor camp. He condemned those who permit criticism of shortcomings to degenerate into blackening the "glorious history" of party and people. He called on writers to instill in youth pride in the great achievements of their history, and said that

> The instilling of such views is hardly facilitated by the excessive enthusiasm of part of our creative intelligentsia for depicting the cruelties and willfulness of the period of the cult of personality . . . .

Komsomol Chief Pavlov, a Shelepin protege who also spoke at this congress, scored pessimistic works which, he said, as a rule are "connected with the cult theme. The opening statement to the congress by Party Secretary and Presidium member Andrey Kirilenko* had been somewhat less harsh than these speeches; while he had stressed the party's demands on writers, he had not criticized writers for dwelling on the cult nor had he condemned criticism of shortcomings.

From 24 through 26 March an agricultural plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held. The main order of business was the agricultural report delivered by Brezhnev and the adoption of his proposed five-year program designed to bolster the agricultural sector of the economy. A number of personnel changes were also made at the plenum. Demichev, probably a Shelepin supporter, became party secretary responsible for ideological matters. Kirill Mazurov** was named a full member of the Presidium and was succeeded as Belorussian First Secretary by Petr Masherov,*** who also

*Kirilenko served in the Ukraine under Brezhnev, but at times has seemed closer to Podgornyy in his policy views.

**Mazurov was First Secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol during the late 1940's--when Shelepin was all-union Komsomol secretary for cadres.

***Masherov rose through the Belorussian Komsomol and Party organizations after Mazurov.

became a candidate member of the Presidium. Both Mazurov and Masherov had served in the Belorussian Komsomol and may well have become aligned with Shelepin. Masherov's subsequent statements would indicate his clear support for Shelepin's neo-Stalinists; Mazurov's views have not been made as clear.

During 1965 there were indications of increasing dissension within the leadership. Evidently, the Stalin issue was a major, if not the major, source of conflict. A number of reports were received in the West in the spring and summer, all asserting that the leadership was planning to rehabilitate Stalin.* The [redacted] varied, however, in their analysis of who was promoting the rehabilitation. One [redacted] stated that Brezhnev favored it but that Suslov felt himself too committed to de-Stalinization to change. Another said that Mikoyan was violently opposed to making any concessions to the Chinese and was supported in this by technologists like Kosygin, but that under pressure from ideologues who look back nostalgically to the days when Moscow was undisputed leader of orthodoxy, they might have to succumb to the point of finding justification for Stalin's actions. One [redacted] included both Brezhnev and Kosygin in a middle-of-the-road grouping being pushed by a military hierarchy composed of Stalinists.

Although none of these reports mentioned Shelepin as a major proponent of re-Stalinization, other indicators discussed below, suggested that he and his faction were strongly backing the drive to restore Stalin's name. On 16 April at a meeting of central committee ideological specialists, Demichev, in his new role as ideological spokesman, reportedly proposed changes in policy toward the intellectuals and called for "more balanced treatment" of Stalin.

In May Brezhnev became the first member of the new leadership to mention Stalin's name in public. The occasion

*With the exception of one Reuters report in May which indicated that the Soviets wanted to abolish the system under which political losers became unpersons and that Stalin would be mentioned in an historical context--but not rehabilitated.

SECRET

SECRET

was the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II. In his speech Brezhnev stated that as was well known the war had begun under unfavorable conditions for the Soviet Union and that great efforts had been made to strengthen the country:

> The . . . The State Defense Committee was formed with the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, Josif Visarionovich Stalin, at its head to exercise leadership over all action in the matter of organizing the repulse of the enemy.

Brezhnev went on to pay tribute to the armed forces and the intellectuals for their wartime performance, but did not mention either of Shelepin's organizations, the KGB or the Komsomol. Thus, while supporting the neo-Stalinist position on the Stalin issue, Brezhnev was clearly shying away from any support, implied or explicit, of Shelepin. Brezhnev had thus made clear his support for a policy of at least partial rehabilitation of Stalin. His reasons for doing so probably include the fact that as party first secretary he had the most to gain from such a rehabilitation. If he could establish that much of Stalin's power position was both legitimate and desirable, he could hope to acquire at least some of this power.

Rumors concerning impending changes in the leadership began in the summer of 1965 and ended somewhat abruptly in September. The common thread of all these reports was that Shelepin would replace Brezhnev, who was portrayed as a bumbling incompetent. There were a number of variations and subsidiary themes. According to one source, Suslov was the most prominent member of the leadership, but did not want the top position. Several reports indicated that Mikoyan would retire, that Brezhnev would take his place, and that Shelepin would take Brezhnev's position. Some claimed that Kosygin would also be relieved.

One of the issues causing disagreement among the leaders at this time was that of politics versus economics. Support for the dogmatic position which views the party as a political and ideological body was indicated by Suslov,

SECRET

Shelest, and, most strongly, by Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze, who, in June, invoked Stalin's words to support his position. After expressing his hostility to the influx into the party of a large number of people with production expertise, he stated:

> Proceeding from the Leninist principle of building our party, I.V. Stalin, acutely and figuratively, said at one time, 'Our party is a fortress the doors of which open only to the tested.'

Indications of controversy within the leadership also came in the form of several strong statements on the need for collective leadership. Such a defense appeared in Pravda on 15 April and an even stronger one appeared in the Uzbek paper Pravda Vostoka on 20 April. The latter article praised the 22nd Party Congress, which had strongly condemned the cult of personality, and attacked the cult as well as the methods of personal dictatorship, suggesting that its target was a neo-Stalinist individual or faction. Thus it would appear that the First Secretary in Uzbekistan, Rashidov, was at this time giving some support to a moderate faction which felt itself losing ground, probably to Brezhnev.

During the spring and summer Podgornyy seemed to be losing strength, while Shelepin was acquring it. In April party secretary Titov, a Podgornyy associate, was sent to Kazakhstan as second secretary; he was removed from the secretariat the following September. In May Shelepin supporter Stepakov was promoted from chief editor of Izvestiya to head of the central committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department.* That same month all Moscow-resident Presidium members with the exception of Podgornyy received medals for their wartime contributions. And in May and June a large number of articles extolling the virtues of the KGB appeared in the press.

*The Izvestiya post was to remain vacant until October, an indication that the leaders could not agree on the appointment.

In July the central committee reprimanded Kharkov Oblast, with which Podgornyy had been associated, for serious shortcomings in the work of party admissions. An 11 August Pravda editorial reported this and also criticized the oblast' for emphasizing numerical over qualitative growth. This marked the climax of a campaign of criticism of Podgornyy's oblast' which had begun in February with an article by Brezhnev protege Shcherbitskiy. This suggests that Brezhnev was pushing the campaign, probably with the concurrence of neo-Stalinist and orthodox elements.

In August and September, on the eve of the economic plenum, forceful articles appeared from both the neo-Stalinist and liberal camps. On 29 August Pravda published an article by Komsomol Chief Pavlov, a Shelepin protege, who again attacked those who look at history through the "prism of the negative results of the personality cult." He urged that the great achievements of the 1930's be stressed.

Pavlov's theme was picked up by a secretary of the traditionally hard-line Leningrad city party committee, Yu. Lavrikov, in a 9 September speech. He too condemned a "one-sided" approach to the complexities of the cult. And, on 15 September, First Secretary of Leningrad Oblast' V. Tolstikov came down strongly on the side of orthodoxy with an article criticizing the lack of positive heroes and ideology in literature and art. The Azerbaydzhan first secretary, V. Akhundov, also stressed a hard line in his speech in September to a plenum of the republic's creative unions. Interestingly, KGB Chief Semichastnyy, a Shelepin protege, had served briefly as Second Secretary under Akhundov in the late 1950's, an indication that Akhundov might be in league with the neo-Stalinists.

On 9 September the liberals launched a counterattack with the publication of Rumyantsev's second liberal defense of the intellectuals in Pravda.* In this article he criticized the call for positive heroes as the sole criterion of a work and said that shortcomings should not be ignored. Sometime before 21 September, when the official

*See page 18 for further discussion of this article.

announcement was made, Rumyantsev was relieved as Pravda's editor and succeeded by M. Zimyanin;** this was a real blow to the moderates, and represented a major defeat for Podgornyy. Rumyantsev's identification several months later in a fairly responsible position** indicated, however, that Podgornyy still retained considerable strength.

Shelepin may have made his major push for power in September. About this time several articles were published defending the Party-State Control Committee--which he headed--suggesting either that the organization was under attack, that Shelepin was trying to strengthen this organization, or both. This committee had been established in 1962. Its function was to find and punish party and government officials guilty of misconduct. The existence of such an extra-party organization had been controversial and Shelepin's position as head of the committee gave him a fairly powerful base from which to operate. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, the Belorussian paper, in a 13 August editorial, described party state control as an "inherent, integral part of party organizational work." This was an indication of the support being given Shelepin by the Belorussian party and its leader Masherov. Also, in mid-September the writers Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuriy Daniel were arrested by the KGB for publishing works in the West under pseudonyms. The timing of these arrests may have represented an attempt by the neo-Stalinists to seize the initiative on the eve of the September plenum. But the Presidium must have agreed to the action, indicating that Brezhnev approved and had taken a number of key votes with him.

According to a report [redacted] opposition before the September plenum to proposals to reform the economic structure through de-centralization and an emphasis

*Zimyanin rose to prominence through the Belorussian Komsomol and Party; he also served as deputy minister of foreign affairs.

**Rumyantsev's identification in November as Acting Academician Secretary of the Department of Economics indicated that he still had support.

on profits, came from Shelepin and Suslov, who feared the increased freedom for plant managers would weaken central control of the economy. The reform adopted at the September party plenum represented a compromise with the economic reformers, backed by Kosygin, achieving only a portion of their goal. [redacted] reported that while reform was a significant issue, the major political issue before the plenum was the proposal to partially rehabilitate Stalin. There were those, he reported, who favored political as well as historical rehabilitation. It was decided, however, to leave the rehabilitation at the level of the 20th anniversary of the end of the war--public reference to Stalin's existence as an historical figure when obviously called for. Thus, on both issues--the economy and Stalin--a compromise position seems to have prevailed. At the Supreme Soviet session which followed the plenum, Brezhnev was named a member of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium, a largely honorific post, but still indicative of his growing strength. Polyanskiy was named a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming Shelepin's senior in the government. Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin mentioned Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee in his speech, a fairly obvious omission.

Brezhnev Undermines Shelepin

Brezhnev's support for the neo-Stalinist position both on re-Stalinizing and cultural policy was revealed shortly after the plenum. A protege of his, Sergey Trapeznikov who in June had been appointed Chief of the central committee's Section for Scientific and Educational Institutions, wrote an article which appeared in Pravda on 8 October, in which he strongly asserted the supremacy of theory over practice. Trapeznikov said that no party is guaranteed against tactical errors, but that the main question is the depth of these mistakes and the timely correction of them. He condemned one-sided approaches to industrialization, collectivization, and, of course, the war. Thus, several specific policies were added to the subject of Stalin's wartime leadership as being no longer suitable topics for criticism. The official, and clearly

Brezhnev-supported, line on the cult of the personality was made clear:

> . . . Certainly the cult of personality brought significant harm to the cause of socialist construction in certain spheres of the life of society. However, neither the cult of personality itself nor its consequences flowed in any way from the socialist system and did not change and could not change its character. Therefore, it cannot be recognized as either theoretically or factually correct when in some of our scientific or artistic publications life is portrayed only from the viewpoint of the manifestations of the cult of personality and they thereby cloud the heroic struggles of the Soviet people who are building socialism . . . .

This article by Trapeznikov was followed on 20 October with an instructional letter, sent out by Trapeznikov's department to schools, calling for changes in the treatment of the Stalin and Khrushchev periods in history courses. It called for increased emphasis on the role of the central leadership in mobilizing economic resources for defense during the war and for restoration after it. The letter also stressed the need to reveal the harm of subjectivism. These two Trapeznikov statements clearly demonstrated that a policy had been adopted, that Brezhnev had endorsed that policy, and that the line was orthodox.

Thus, the major protagonists in the struggle taking place within the leadership at this time both seemed to be supporters of the neo-Stalinist line. That Shelepin, leader of a neo-Stalinist faction, was involved was clearly revealed in the ongoing dispute over the future of the Party-State Control Committee. On 8 and 12 October respectively Izvestiya and Pravda asserted that the role of the committee would rise under the new ministry system set up at

the September plenum. On the 15th Krasnaya Zvezda supported the role of the control groups in the armed forces and demanded that persecution of them stop. However, Partiynaya Zhizn followed the line taken by Kosygin and Brezhnev at the September plenum, and completely ignored the role of party-state control organs, referring to party organs as the checking bodies. And Soviet State and Law criticized party-state control groups quite strongly. This sharp divergence over an organization closely connected with a Presidium member, Shelepin, clearly revealed the intensity of the struggle.

Shelepin's neo-Stalinists continued to push their position. Demichev addressed members of the RSFSR Writers Union in Moscow and reportedly called for an end to "camp" literature (i.e., literature concerning Stalin's crimes) and for an emphasis on the "heroic" aspects of Soviet history. In early September he had reportedly apologized to the writers for excessive attacks on them; now he was pushing the attack again. On 28 November a Pravda article by RSFSR Agitprop Chief Khaldeyev, a Shelepin associate, also emphasized a hard-line approach. He criticized a one-sided approach in literature and called for improvement in the ideological and political indoctrination of youth. He particularly called upon the Komsomol to do more in this area. Deputy Chief of the central committee's cultural section, G. Kunitsyn, in November's Kommunist, threatened nonconformist artists with expulsion from creative unions.

A central committee plenum was held from 4 to 6 December and was followed by a two-day session of the Supreme Soviet. A number of high-level personnel changes were made, thus vindicating to some extent the flood of rumors of the previous summer. Mikoyan, who had undoubtedly opposed any rehabilitation of Stalin and would continue to push the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims, "resigned" as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and was succeeded by Podgornyy. Podgornyy probably simultaneously left his position on the CPSU Secretariat, although this could not be announced until the next central committee meeting--the congress in March 1966. This action marked a real set-back for the moderates. However, it was matched by a blow to Shelepin. The Party-State Control Committee

was abolished and Shelepin lost his position as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In his speech to the plenum Brezhnev said that there had been shortcomings in the work of the committee, a clear slap at Shelepin. A protege of Brezhnev's, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, was named a candidate member of the Presidium. Thus, Brezhnev seemed to have emerged the victor from this particular skirmish. He had administered a decisive rebuff to the moderates and had also managed to stave off Shelepin's challenge, dealing him a severe defeat in the process.

INTELLECTUALS

Press For More Freedom

The unsettled nature of the leadership and the lack of an agreed position during the first few months after Khrushchev's ouster was reflected in relatively more freedom for the intellectuals. Liberal articles were published and attacks on conservative views were commonplace. Literaturnaya Gazeta's 12 November criticism of a conservative novel, for example, recalled the harsh methods of the Stalin years. The book being reviewed had called for a militant struggle for party-mindedness in art; the review stated that the struggle for socialist realism had been complicated by the "subjective approach of Stalin" and by attempts at administrative solutions to complicated problems.*

On 13 December 1964, A. Bocharov in Izvestiya made a plea for a liberal artistic policy, stating that criticism should persuade and educate, not suppress. His closing statement was quite pointed:

> In order to be authoritative, a critic must be guided by the highest interests of the people and not by group predilections, not by the 'literary policy' of the moment, which too often resembles literary confusion.

*The application of the term subjective to Stalin is unusual, for at this time the term was being applied primarily to Khrushchev.

An article by Noviy Mir's chief editor, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, commemorating the journal's 40th anniversary appeared in the January issue of that journal. Tvardovskiy defended the need to present the whole truth, arguing that there is no such thing as truth of life versus truth of fact--that there is only truth.* He continued his attack on orthodox cultural viewpoints by stating that each work cannot present the whole picture--that only literature as a whole can do that--and that no hero is able to represent all things. He stated that at one time (i.e., under Stalin) the exaltation of the hero had taken the place of reality.

Tvardovskiy was answered on 9 January by a Pravda editorial which argued that the artist must present life in full historical perspective and criticized works which concentrate on the negative aspects of life. These contradictory views, as expressed by the most liberal journal published in the Soviet Union and the party paper, recur repeatedly in the dialogue between liberal intellectuals and the conservatives.

In February Pravda published two contrasting articles on cultural policy. The paper's editor Rumyantsev, an apparent Podgornyy supporter, was the author of the first, which appeared on 21 February and was moderate. Rumyantsev made the necessary bows toward the need for party spirit in all forms of creative work, but he concentrated his energies on support for the "highest humanist ideal," the free all-around development of every individual in conformity with the general interest. Rumyantsev then connected a strong defense of collective leadership with the concept of the freedom to create, thus reflecting the knowledge

*This particular issue bears a somewhat frightening resemblance to the basic question in the purge trials in the late 1930's--did it matter in fact whether or not the accused person had conspired against Stalin; or was it enough that he had the potential to do so? The facts in other words are irrelevant. The argument for the truth of life is that any fact which does not support the official view is out of tune with the truth of life, is therefore wrong, and should not be expressed. It is an attempt to suppress by the use of jargon any honest and objective attempt to describe and assess history and life.

and fear of the intellectuals that the emergence to dominance of a single man, be he Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev, greatly increases the chances of arbitrary interference.

> Neither the right of leadership in and of itself nor the post occupied gives grounds for intervening in the course of life; only competence in one or another sphere of knowledge and practice entails this right.

The second Pravda article appeared on 26 February and was written by Yu. Barabash, who was not further identified. Barabash strongly defended socialist realism and the "positive hero." He presented the basic arguments for the truth of life, stating that the good artist even if he depicts ugly and alien phenomena does so in the context of an affirmation of what is wonderful. Writers fail, he stated, when they do not rise above superficial, empirical observations to the great generalizations. Barabash ended his article with a statement concerning the world-wide struggle for the minds of men, stating that the question of the goals of art concerns the place of the artist in the struggle of ideologies. This somewhat vague linking of the issues of creative freedom and alien ideology was to become a basic tenet of the neo-Stalinists attacks, and is very reminiscent of Stalin's attacks on intellectuals, accusing them of internationalism and cosmopolitanism. The publication of these two, conflicting articles in Pravda suggests that at this point the official position on culture was still being sharply disputed, reflecting the unsettled nature of the leadership struggle. Podgornyy may have backed the first, moderate article; the quick appearance of an orthodox article revealed that the backers of a hard line would not be defeated easily.

The Neo-Stalinists Push; The Moderates Counter

The pressure of the neo-Stalinists in the leadership began to be reflected in cultural trends in the spring of 1965. On 27 April an article appeared in Literaturnaya Gazeta which called for the restoration to respectability

of the literature of the Stalin period, and the repudiation of subjectivism (i.e., Khrushchevianism) in the study of the history of Soviet literature. The article stated that although the cult of personality had inflicted losses on the development of Soviet literature, it never cut short its progressive movement. An article in that same paper two days later appealed to writers to seek historical truth "in all its entirety."

> For this it must be kept in mind that genuine penetration into the truth of life of those years is the thorough investigation of many objective factors and not merely the depiction of Stalin's errors and miscalculations.

Arrests and demonstrations apparently began at least as early as April. In that month the two young intellecuals, A. Amalrik and A. Zverev, were reportedly arrested; one was sentenced to two and a half years in exile for parasitism--the other apparently was released. There is also a report that in April leaders of the central executive committee of SMOG* planned a demonstration. This was held on 14 April and resulted in several arrests and several university expulsions.

The hard-line view taken by the Leningrad organization, particularly its oblast' first secretary, Tolstikov, was reflected in a 30 June Leningradskaya Pravda article which reported that a meeting of party members from the Leningrad writers organization had acknowledged that "justifiable criticism" had been leveled at Leningrad writers by a plenum of the city party committee.

However, the liberal intellectuals were far from cowed. In July the theatrical journal Teatr published an article by A. Anikst, criticizing the theater of the Stalin era and praising the theater of the early 1960's. The

*A loose, illegal organization of young dissidents taking its name from the first letters of the Russian words for word, thought, form, and profundity.

liberal journal Yunost' in July took a similar line on films and defended the portrayal of diversified types of heroes. And, on 1 August, Pravda published an article by Tvardovskiy defending against an attack on his poem "Terkin in the Other World" made in a 30 July letter to Pravda. Tvardovskiy stated that "anyone who reads the poem without prejudice" would see that is presents a satirical picture of those aspects of reality--stagnation, bureaucracy, formalism--that hamper Soviet progress.

In September there were several important articles representing the liberal point of view. Noviy Mir published an editorial which again denied the validity of counterposing small and large truth, arguing that truth is truth. And on 9 September Pravda carried the previously mentioned liberal editorial by its chief editor Rumyantsev, in which he made a liberal defense of the arts. He stated that positive heroes are certainly important but should not be the only criterion of the artistic value of a work. He argued that socialist realism should not be oversimplified and that criticizing faults is not alien to socialist realism; on the contrary, ignoring shortcomings may lead to nihilism. He also supported the Noviy Mir position that no writer, let alone in one work, can do that which is possible only to literature as a whole. Rumyantsev criticized those who try to set the intelligentsia against party spirit, stating that this amounts to a demagogic attack on culture. He supported party guidance of the arts, but explained why some people question this guidance:

> One can see in such questions the legitimate alarm caused by recollections of the fact that not so long ago words about party guidance sometimes masked crude rule by decree in the sphere of artistic life, and categorical, diletantist judgments about certain artists and their works.

Furthermore, Rumyantsev's concept of party guidance differed somewhat from the conservative view; he emphasized that the party should defend the artist's right to select his own theme and style.

On 19 September Pravda, in another editorial, presented a conservative version of Rumyantsev's article, suggesting that the decision to fire Rumyantsev had already been made, and another article on the 24th was even more conservative. Radio Moscow, however, continued to carry Rumyantsev's editorial in broadcasts for two weeks. A certain inability to decide just what the offical line was at this time was displayed by Izvestiya which published two contradictory articles in a three-day period. On 23 September F. Kuznetsov made a plea that works be judged by their artistic merit, not their ideological content. Three days later V. Shcherbina stated that these two concepts are inseparable.

According to one report, in October the 70th birthday of the poet Yesenin was marked and the poet Yevtushenko read an unpublished poem "Letter to Yesenin" which was clearly an attack on Komsomol chief Pavlov:

> When a rosy-cheeked Komsomol chief
> Bangs his fist at us poets
> And wants to knead our souls like wax
> And wants to fashion them in his own image,
> His words, Yesenin, do not terrify us,
> Although it is hard to be happy . . .
> You were more party-oriented than all the scoundrels
> Who tried to teach you to think like the party.

In a November Kommunist article a man named V. Ivanov attacked the "so-called theory of deheroization," and refuted the Noviy Mir editorials on "the truth of life versus the truth of fact." He quoted Lenin to the effect that facts in totality are definitely conclusive, but taken out of context and totality are fragmentary and arbitrary.

The arrests of Daniel and Sinyavskiy in mid-September frightened the intellectual community, and on 5 December a demonstration was held in Moscow to protest these arrests; a number of persons were arrested, some of whom were subsequently tried. Also in December the first of what was to be a series of written protests was sent by Sinyavskiy's wife to Brezhnev, the USSR Procurator General, and various

Soviet newspapers. In it she recalled the trials of 1937 and termed her husband's arrest an example of lawlessness.

Thus, throughout 1965, while the liberals and moderates managed to score occasional points, the clear trend was toward an increasingly more orthodox line. By the end of the year Noviy Mir stood virtually alone in its defense of the liberal position. In its November editorial it again quoted Lenin to support its view that ideological persuasion is only effective when accepted voluntarily, a plea that there be no clamp down on the intellectuals.

STALIN THEMES

Criticism of Stalin Continues

The unsettled nature of the struggle for power in the Soviet Union opened the way for a push by the intellectuals to attain greater freedom. It also permitted the continuation of harsh criticism of Stalin as a leader and continued rehabilitation of those who suffered and died in the purges.

The liberal journal Noviy Mir published a number of articles in the months after Khrushchev's fall which were highly critical of Stalin's handling of the pre-war situation. Ivan Mayskiy,* in memoirs published in that journal in December, attacked Stalin for failing to heed warnings about an impending attack and for failing to strengthen defenses. The writer Ilya Erenburg, in a January article, attacked Stalin's extermination of army commanders before the war. These have been the main criticisms of Stalin's pre-war leadership.

Voprosy Istorii KPSS, the organ of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, published a number of anti-Stalin articles during this period; in November it carried several such articles. One deprecated Stalin's revolutionary theories and charged that he had in fact conspired with Kamenev and Zinovyev against Lenin in 1917 on the question of whether

*Mayskiy was Ambassador to London before the war. In March 1966 he was to be one of the signers of an appeal to Brezhnev not to rehabilitate Stalin.

the time was ripe for armed revolution. Another criticized Stalin's theory of disproportionate rates of development, claiming this had, in fact, caused a decline in production.* A third article attacked Stalin for issuing contradictory directives, for indulging in wishful planning, and for making decisions alone. In February Voprosy Istorii KPSS carried an article attacking the cult of personality, stating that it had delayed the modernization of Soviet armed forces; the article charged that the most dangerous consequence of the cult was the destruction on the eve of the war of many talented military leaders.

Various other anti-Stalin articles were also published in the months following the coup. In December Kommunist carried an article concerning the signers of a peace treaty with Germany in 1917. Lenin favored the treaty, but Stalin, according to the article, vacillated and committed the unpardonable error of siding with Trotskiy in the dispute. After Lenin sharply criticized Stalin, he reportedly admitted his mistake and supported Lenin.

The rehabilitation program continued uninterrupted in the first months after Khrushchev's fall, with Pravda carrying particularly strongly-worded articles. In November an inkling of things to come appeared, however. The 75th birthday of purged Ukrainian leader S. Kosior was marked by praise from most papers. However, Pravda Ukrainy pointed out that Kosior had erred in joining the "left communists" on the issue of signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. This paper would prove to be one of the most outspoken of the neo-Stalinist organs, probably reflecting the position of Ukrainian party leader Shelest.

Volume 7 of the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, which was presumably an official publication, was signed to the press in March 1965, although it did not appear

*The question of disproportionate rates of development between heavy and light industry continues to be explosive. The dogmatists think heavy industry should develop at a faster rate; the liberals argue that the gap between the two rates should close.

until the following October. The tone on a number of issues was clearly anti-Stalin, indicating that as of March the official line on the Stalin question had not been changed. An article on collectivization by V. Danilov praised the policy itself, but criticized Stalin's role:

> Starting in the fall of 1929 the tendency toward excessive forcing of collectivization, which reflected the position of I.V. Stalin, sharply increased. This policy was based on a scornful attitude toward the opinions of the peasant, ignoring his attachment to his individual farm, ignoring the instructions of Engels and Lenin, the party decisions on the impermissibility and harmfulness of haste and force in cooperatizing small farms . . . . The theoretical justification of the forcing of collectivization was Stalin's article published on 7 November 1929 in Pravda entitled 'The Year of the Great Breakthrough,' which asserted that the basic masses of the peasantry had already joined the kolkhozes and that 'the deciding victory' had already been attained.

Danilov stated that in early 1930 directives were issued for a retreat, but that Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success," in blaming local officials for the chaos, had caused even greater mistakes.

The volume also used very strong language in discussing Stalin's crimes:

> Stalin began to misuse power and crudely violate the Party Statute and Soviet laws . . . . The cult of personality engendered careerism and servility, suspicion and distrust, and in the field of theory it engendered dogmatism and alienation of theory from practice. Having established his own personal control over organs of the NKVD, Stalin dealt summarily with officials whom he did not like. In 1937 . . . Stalin advanced the harmful and theoretically mistaken thesis that as socialism becomes

> stronger and the Soviet state moves further ahead, the class struggle in the country will become sharper and sharper. This thesis served as justification for mass illegal repressions against prominent leaders of the party and state, members and candidate members of the central committee, important military leaders, and many other people who were guilty of nothing . . . . The repressions began at first against ideological opponents, the majority of which were represented as agents of imperialism and foreign intelligence, and then the very same false accusations were made against other Communists who had never taken part in any opposition . . . .

The language used in this article is very reminiscent of Khrushchev's secret speech denunciation of Stalin. As stated above, the fact that this was signed to the press in March indicated that no decision to totally restore Stalin to a position of respectability had yet been made.

Drive to Restore Stalin's Image Begins

Meanwhile, the neo-Stalinist drive for power which began in February 1965 was quickly reflected in articles relating to the Stalin issue. A sharp reduction in rehabilitations of Stalin's victims began in February and the first indications of an organized effort to restore Stalin to respectability appeared about the same time; this first concerted effort was concentrated on Stalin's wartime image.

Soviet military figures have generally been in the forefront of the shifting lines on the Stalin issue, but always pushing the same point. Their main interest is increased control of military matters by the military. When the party line was anti-Stalinist, the military argued that Stalin had been an incompetent wartime leader because he had failed to listen to the professionals. Now, with

the start of re-Stalinizing, military figures were to argue that Stalin had been an effective wartime leader precisely because he had listened to his military advisors. A February article in Krasnaya Zvezda by Marshal Bagramyan credited Stalin with participation in successful military planning--after he had listened to military advice.

In April 1965, according to a Reuters report, Soviet historians were ordered to stop picturing Stalin only as a "muddle-headed military failure" during the war. In the future, it said, history books would show him neither as a military genius nor as a complete imbecile in matters of strategy. This order was reflected in a reported interview of several Soviet historians with journalists in April. The spokesman for the group stated that Stalin had made a mistake in thinking that Hitler would not attack and in not taking more precautions. However, he warned that Stalin's merits should not be ignored and quoted Stalin himself to prove that he had consulted others and had admitted his own mistakes.

Articles commemorating the 20th anniversary of victory over the Germans in World War II began appearing in April; these reflected the new "balanced" approach to Stalin and the war. A first step was simply to identify Stalin in his wartime positions without further comment, a technique used by Brezhnev in his 8 May speech. A second approach was to ignore the deplorable state of Soviet defenses at the start of the war, dismissing all discussion of miscalculations, purges, and defeats as subjective and one-sided. Still a third method was to blatantly lie about the state of Soviet defenses on the eve of the war. For example, a 30 April Pravda article defended military-industrial preparations for the war. The author, Vasiliy Ryabikov, then First Deputy Chairman of USSR Sovnarkhoz and later First Deputy Chairman of USSR Gosplan, had a special axe to grind as he had become Deputy Peoples Commissar for Armaments in 1939; however, the publication of the article in Pravda indicated that his argument had high-level support. In this article Ryabikov dated the drive to prepare for the war from 1939, and claimed that the

> powerful industry established in the Soviet Union before the war ensured the Soviet army's uninterrupted supply of everything necessary for the rout of the enemy.

The vehicle used most widely to convey a favorable portrait of Stalin was the memoirs of military figures who simply reported their wartime contacts with Stalin, presenting him as a reasonable, if fallible, leader. Marshal Konev, a former First Deputy Minister of Defense, performed this function in a series of interviews and articles published during the spring of 1965. In one article Konev described his success in persuading Stalin to change his mind on a military plan, and in another he credited him with participating in the forming of plans to capture Berlin. In his memoirs in Noviy Mir in May, he stated that Stalin was a wise leader who was "particularly alert to the political and economic overtones of his military decisions." And in a press conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 28 April, Konev expressed the new "balanced" formulation of Stalin's wartime role:

> Stalin played a certain positive role in the cause of insuring victory over the enemy, but in the first period of the war and before its beginning, there were miscalculations and shortcomings in Stalin's activities and these have already been mentioned.

A similar approach was taken by Marshal Bagramyan in a 17 April article in Literaturnaya Gazeta, as well as by Marshal Sokolovskiy in a May interview with a L'Unita correspondent. Bagramyan did criticize the purge of military figures on the eve of the war and stated that there had been strategic miscalculations before the war. However, he stated that measures had been taken to prepare the country. Sokolovskiy went further than this, stating that the "main" reason for early defeats was that the young Soviet state had not had time to build the necessary military-technical base, and that for this reason Stalin had tried to delay the war.

On 8 and 9 May various celebrations were held in honor of the 20th anniversary of the victory in World War II, and numerous speeches were given. The most important of these was one by Brezhnev, in which he identified

Stalin in his wartime role; he also glossed over the errors made in the early stages of the war:

> It is well known that the first stage of the war took place in conditions that were unfavorable to us, and advantageous to the enemy. On the side of the fascists who committed this insidious and treacherous attack was the factor of surprise . . . .

He thus ignored the numerous warnings of impending attack, and made no reference to failure to prepare defenses.

The start of re-Stalinizing was reflected in various articles on other Stalin-related issues, although there was not the same uniformity as in the articles relating to his wartime role. An April article in a Turkmen journal discussed the rise of the cult of personality and the 20th congress in a "balanced" manner. The article stated that the cult had been the result of exceptional conditions, and that various factors, including imperialist encirclement, had demanded strict centralized leadership and certain limitations on democracy. The article went on to state that Stalin's personal shortcomings had, however, caused the cult of personality to emerge. While the article stated that the 20th congress had criticized the cult, it emphasized that the June 1956 central committee decree on the cult had analyzed the cult profoundly and had rebuffed attempts to use criticism of the cult to undermine the socialist system. The call to use the June 1956 decree as a guideline for statements on the Stalin issue would be made with increasing frequency in the months ahead. This decree had marked a sharp modification of Khrushchev's February 1956 denunciation of Stalin. The decree had praised Stalin as a Marxist-Leninist and leader, but said that he had had certain negative character traits which had lent themselves to the development of the cult. The decree's sharpest criticism was reserved for enemies who tried to use the issue to sow confusion and undermine socialism. Thus, the attempts to restore this decree as the basic guideline on the Stalin issue was a clear step toward re-Stalinizing.

During the summer and early fall of 1965 there were a number of instances in which Stalin was mentioned without comment. A July Voprosy Istorii KPSS article included Stalin in a list of persons who had played an important role in the struggle against the Trotskiyites. The film The Aurora Salvo which was released in October 1965 contained one scene of Stalin--smoking a pipe and voting in favor of Lenin's call for armed action. On 12 September Pravda carried an excerpt from a book on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, in which Stalin is simply included in a list of those who voted "correctly" (i.e., for the treaty.)

Whereas Volume 7 of the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, signed to the press in March 1965, had dealt harshly with Stalin on the subject of the repressions, volume 8, signed to the press in October 1965, represented a more "balanced" approach, similar to the line of the June 1956 decree. This volume emphasized that iron discipline and some restrictions on democracy had been necessary under the complex conditions of the times, but that these had always been considered temporary. The article praised Stalin for fighting deviation, organizing the building of socialism, and protecting Lenin's attitudes on the possibility of building socialism in one country. It then went on to criticize the cult and the use of administrative methods. The article closed by stating that the party had liquidated the violations of socialist legality.

Anti-Stalinists Continue to Resist

During this period articles attacking Stalinist positions continued to appear, indicating that those who wished to prevent a rehabilitation of Stalin had not been subdued. On 15 April Kommunist Ukrainy published an article on the contributions of the Ukrainians to the defeat of the Germans, and included Khrushchev in a list of those who had held responsible posts. The moderate position taken by this paper suggests that it was under the influence of Podgornyy, rather than the more orthodox Shelest. The journal Voprosy Istorii KPSS, while acceding to the

apparent directive to identify Stalin in his wartime positions, also blamed early military reverses on various factors, tracing many of these to violations of collectivity under Stalin's cult of personality.

From February through April 1965, the journal Noviy Mir published the memoirs of Soviet writer Il'ya Erenburg. Erenburg was highly critical of Stalin and the cult; he attacked Stalin as a military leader.

> . . . Litvinov and Mayskiy told me that the pact with Hitler had been necessary--Stalin had succeeded thereby in frustrating the plans of the Western allies . . . But Stalin did not use the two-year respite to strengthen defenses--military men and diplomats alike have told me this. I have written that Stalin was extraordinarily suspicious and saw in his closest collaborators potential "enemies of the people," but for some reason he trusted Ribbentrop's signature. The Hitlerites' attack caught us by surprise. At first Stalin lost his head. He did not dare to announce the attack himself; he charged Molotov with doing so . . . .

Erenburg also denounced at some length the purges. He discussed the "deification of Stalin and Stalin's responsibility for all that occurred, ridiculing the attempt to shift blame elsewhere.

> A group of writers was invited to the central committee where one of the secretaries explained to us the reasons for Beria's arrest . . . . The comrade who spoke with us said: 'Unfortunately, in the last years of his life Comrade Stalin was strongly influenced by Beria.' When I later thought about these words, I recalled the year 1937. Would someone then say that at that time Yezhov had influenced Stalin? It was obvious to everyone that such insignificant people could not have prompted Stalin's political course.

SECRET

SECRET

Another voice of moderation came from the journal Soviet State and Law in an article by Deputy Procurator General Zhogin, attacking Vyshinskiy and Stalin. Zhogin charged that Vzshinskiy had cooperated with the NKVD, had suppressed attempts to enforce legality at the purge trials, and had engineered the purges of those who protested. He said that all of this was the fruit of the cult of personality and that Vyshinskiy had carried out Stalin's orders. Vyshinskiy's words had served as "theoretical justification of tyranny and coercion and of the mass persecution of entirely innocent people." Zhogin called for the exposure of these distortions in order to strengthen socialist legality.

In May there was a sudden upsurge of rehabilitations in the press which lasted through June. Voprosy Istorii KPSS resumed its publication of rehabilitation items with no apparent change in formulation. Izvestiya and Sovetskaya Rossiya carried rehabilitation items as did Krasnaya Zvezda. Kommunist Estonii published a strongly worded article on the suffering of the Estonian party in the purges.

Noviy Mir persisted in its resistance to re-Stalinizing trends. In September it published an article by V. Kaverin in which he discussed a number of writers who had had difficulties in the 1930's. He stated that the 20th party congress had put an end to arbitrariness, and, in discussing the trials of the 1930's, said that it had turned out that those convicted had been right and the accusers had been devoid of any moral values. And in October, Noviy Mir published an article reviewing the book The Last Two Weeks by A. Rozen.* The author of the review, A. Kondratovich, sharply criticized a TASS statement which had been issued a week before the outbreak of World War II, denying the possibility of war. He said that it would have been one thing if it had come from a man who was excessively trustful, "but we all know that Stalin was distinguished by completely different qualities." He then attacked those who argue for the "truth of life" as opposed to the "truth of fact:"

*This book was published in February 1965 and criticized the handling of the two weeks before the war.

SECRET

Sometimes the attempt is made to link the 1941 defeats to a petty "truth of fact" which it is said is a far cry from what "truly occurred;" those writers who examined that threatening summer of 1941 in an attempt to understand how it happened, have been called "narrow-minded writers." But in those months we lost hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people, and we surrendered to the enemy, even if only for a time, a huge territory, and to call this petty, non-essential "truth of fact" is really a blasphemy. To "dissuade" writers from the "1941" theme means at the very least to show a lack of interest in historical truth . . . Much of what A. Rozen writes about looks unbelievable. During the reading one often asks the question how could such things happen? But even this astonishment is a blessing; that means we have come a long way from those times . . . .

Re-Stalinizing Dominates

The strength of the conservative position was reflected in the fall of 1965 in the reduction in the number of rehabilitations appearing in the central press,* and the modification of the language used in those that did appear. For example, on 3 September Pravda carried

*The provincial papers continued to publish some rehabilitations, particularly the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Armenian papers.

an article about V. Knosin, former Comintern Secretary, but failed to mention his death in the purges, simply giving 1937 as the last date in his career. In general, this was the new format to be followed in the months ahead.*

In October there was a report that a number of military leaders were beginning to speak favorably about Stalin in private. Marshal Chuykov was reportedly one of these as was one of Marshal Rotmistrov's deputies. They argued that Stalin had made mistakes during the war, as had Churchill and Roosevelt, but that he had led the nation to victory. Although he was guilty of excesses before and after the war, these had been necessitated to an extent by the need for harsh measures to insure the build-up of the armed forces.

In September, October, and November, the memoirs of Admiral N. Kuznetsov were published; these carried on the process of presenting a "balanced" view of Stalin. While somewhat critical of Stalin's behavior on the eve of the war, Kuznetsov's emphasis was on Stalin's positive achievements. He indicated that Stalin had been a competent and reasonable leader and he denied the "malicious" story that Stalin had planned strategy on a globe (Khrushchev's story) and said that he could vouch for numerous cases where Stalin was engrossed in pinpoint detail and "knew everything right up to the position of each regiment." He stated that more and more during the war Stalin had listened to his front commanders, and he added that every man made mistakes and that wartime errors should not always be blamed on an "incorrect evaluation of the situation by Stalin."

In December a fairly clear step toward rehabilitation of Stalin as a revolutionary was taken in the pages of Pravda Ukrainy. The article concerned the 1917 Sixth Party Congress and the question of whether or not Lenin should

*There were of course exceptions to this. On 17 November, the 76th birthday of Kosior, Radio Moscow stated that "in 1938 Kosior was defamed and arrested. S.V. Kosior perished . ... as a victim of arbitrariness."

appear before the court of the Provisional Government. This article glided gently over Stalin's position, stating that

> in the past few years contradictory data have been presented on the position of individual delegates concerning the problem of V.I. Lenin's appearance before the court . . . Some delegates considered it possible for the leader of the party to appear before the authorities under certain conditions. I.V. Stalin made the solution of this problem contingent upon guarantees for Lenin's safety. Since there were no guarantees he was against an appearance before the court at the given moment. . . .

The appearance of this positive appraisal of Stalin's revolutionary role in the Ukrainian paper suggests once again the neo-Stalinist position of Ukrainian leader Shelest.

SUMMARY

For the first several months after Khrushchev's ouster, the new leaders were busy undoing some of Khrushchev's policies and making personnel appointments. Shelepin, leader of a neo-Stalinist faction, emerged with considerable strength after the November plenum, and successfully installed many of his proteges in the party and state apparatuses, particularly in the cultural and information media. He also maintained his previous strength in the KGB and Komsomol.

Podgornyy, a moderate, also appeared to have gained some strength after the ouster, and for several months a moderate policy prevailed, more in keeping with Podgornyy's views than Shelepin's. This line was reflected in the publication of numerous liberal articles on cultural matters and by the continued criticism of Stalin and rehabilitation of his victims. If anything, more freedom

to write existed in the first few months after the coup than had previously been the case, possibly reflecting the fact that the leadership situation was in a state of flux and that no agreed upon position existed.

In February 1965 the paper Partiynaya Zhizn' (Party Life) published an article stating that there would be no return to the pre-1956 view of Stalin. While this article was reassuring on the surface, it indicated that there were those who feared such a revival and therefore probably also those who supported it. Support for re-Stalinizing was revealed almost immediately. Kommunist, in February, published an article by Moscow city chief Yegorychev which raised for the first time a number of neo-Stalinist themes--including the idea that many people had gone overboard in criticizing events of the period of the cult of personality. This line was picked up by various individuals and journals quite quickly; in February Voprosy Istorii KPSS, which had been publishing a number of anti-Stalin articles, suddenly stopped its program of rehabilitating Stalin's victims.

A party decision must have been made early in 1965 on the question of mentioning Stalin in his wartime positions. The uniform nature of the campaign and the public approval given it by Brezhnev in May, as well as the importance of the issue, indicated that this decision had been made at the highest level. Given the split between moderates and hard-liners existing in the presidium at this time, it seems clear that Brezhnev must have supported the rehabilitation, along with the neo-Stalinist and orthodox members of the presidium. Rehabilitation of Stalin as a wartime leader was the most logical place to start a total rehabilitation; for the issue was a war from which the Soviet Union emerged victorious and in which Stalin, at least as a unifying symbol, played an important part.

However, Brezhnev must have been aware that a total rehabilitation of Stalin would be a real shock and he was prepared only to move gradually. This was indicated by several equivocal statements made by him as well as by the fact that persons closely associated with him, such

as the First Secretary of Kazahkstan Kunayev, were not pushing the neo-Stalinist line. Thus, while the decision to restore Stalin's wartime image was being carried out fairly consistently during this period, uniform rehabilitation of Stalin in other areas did not occur. Both praise and criticism of his general role continued to be expressed.

The neo-Stalinists used various other issues in their assault on the liberals in the spring of 1965. In April articles were published urging the restoration of Stalin-era literature to respectability and strongly asserting the argument supporting "truth of life," Also in April arrests of dissident intellectuals began, although on a relatively small scale compared with what would come later. In June the Leningrad newspaper indicated that the intellectuals in that area had been criticized by the city party committee, revealing the hard-line posture being taken by that party organization. In the spring the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims was also halted for several months.

During the summer the liberals enjoyed a brief but not unchallenged resurgence as reflected in the resumption of the rehabilitation program and the publication of various liberal articles; these articles were subjected to sharp criticism, however. In September the liberals apparently attempted to defend their position with the publication of a very bold article by Pravda editor Rumyantsev, who may well have been speaking for Podgornyy. This liberal push was quickly repulsed. Rumyantsev was fired and at almost the same time Daniel and Sinyavskiy were arrested, marking a real clamp-down on the liberal intellectuals.

Signs that the neo-Stalinists were pushing hard at this time could be seen in the various defenses made of Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee. Defense of the committee came from the Belorussian paper, suggesting that Shelepin had the support of that republic's organization headed by Mazurov and Masherov. The new Pravda editor Zimyanin, who had replaced Rumyantsev, had risen in Belorussia, and Pravda from now on would support a fairly consistent hard-line, another indication of the Belorussian

orientation. Pravda expressed its support for party-state control (i.e., Shelepin) in December--after that committee had been abolished.

Shelepin received a rebuff at the September central committee plenum; neither Kosygin nor Brezhnev mentioned party-state control, an obvious omission. Polyanskiy was named a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming senior to Shelepin in that organization. And a compromise economic reform program, reportedly opposed by Shelepin, was passed.

The appearance in the beginning of October of a dogmatic article by Sergey Trapeznikov, Brezhnev's protege who had been appointed chairman of the department of Scientific and Educational Institutions the previous June, revealed Brezhnev's support for the hard-line, re-Stalinizing policy. This article exempted from criticism various new aspects of Stalin's policies--collectivization, primacy of heavy industry, politics over economics; in addition, Trapeznikov criticized "some" rehabilitations. Brezhnev's pre-emption of a major portion of the neo-Stalinist platform served to weaken Shelepin's basis for arguing that he (Shelepin) deserved to be the party's leader.

At the December party plenum, the Party-State Control Committee was abolished and Shelepin was removed from his position as deputy chairman of the council of ministers. At the same time the moderates were weakened by Podgornyy's appointment as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which also meant that he had lost his more powerful position on the party secretariat. Furthermore, he replaced Mikoyan, suggesting that this moderate was finished as a political force.

NOVEMBER 1964	MARCH 1965
CPSU PRESIDIUM	CPSU PRESIDIUM
Full Members	Full Members
BREZHNEV	BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO	KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN	KOSYGIN
PODGORNYY	MAZUROV[2]
POLYANSKIY	MIKOYAN
MIKOYAN	PODGORNYY
SHELEPIN	POLYANSKIY
SHELEST	SHELEPIN
SHVERNIK	SHELEST
SUSLOV	SHVERNIK
VORONOV	SUSLOV
	VORONOV
Candidate Members	Candidate Members
DEMICHEV	DEMICHEV
GRISHIN	GRISHIN
MAZUROV	MZHAVANADZE
MZHAVANADZE	RASHIDOV
RASHIDOV	USTINOV[2]
YEFREMOV	YEFREMOV
CPSU SECRETARIAT	CPSU SECRETARIAT
ANDROPOV	ANDROPOV
BREZHNEV	BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV	DEMICHEV
IL'ICHEV[1]	PODGORNYY
PODGORNYY	PONOMAREV
PONOMAREV	RUDAKOV
RUDAKOV	SHELEPIN
SHELEPIN	SUSLOV
SUSLOV	TITOV[3]
TITOV	USTINOV[2]

1. Dropped in March 1965.
2. Elected in March 1965.
3. Dropped in September 1965.

CREEPING CONSERVATISM

The 23rd Congress--Before and After
December 1965-November 1966

LEADERSHIP

Build-Up To The Congress

Following the December plenum an orthodox, hard-line approach to cultural matters as well as to the Stalin issue seemed to prevail in the leadership. At the same time, however, the neo-Stalinist members of the Shelepin faction expressed less extreme views than had previously been the case, suggesting that they were reacting cautiously to Shelepin's set-back in December. For example, in a 25 December speech Demichev retreated somewhat; although he called for approval of all that is new and truly communistic and criticized lack of principles and ideals, he closed by stating

> The party has a cautious and careful regard for the intelligentsia, trusting it, being concerned for the future of talent, and the directing of it so that it is socially useful, and about the healthy, normal development of it. 'Talent is a rare thing,' said Lenin, 'it must be methodically and cautiously encouraged . . . .'

In January 1966 reports that two volumes of Stalin's works were to be published appeared. The first secretary at the Italian Embassy in Moscow expressed surprise at this because another report which had come into the embassy in December indicated that Shelepin had suffered a setback when the majority in the leadership blocked distribution of two works of Stalin which had already been printed. The source of this report stated that the Stalin issue was being used as the touchstone of the opposition in the

hierarchy and that favorable evaluation of certain aspects of Stalin's works was merely a reflection of political struggle.

The fact that Shelepin's set-back in December had not meant a corresponding set-back for neo-Stalinist views was quickly demonstrated, however. On 30 January Pravda published an article by three historians which urged that the use of the term "period of the cult of personality" be discontinued, and called for more positive portrayals of the Stalin era. They argued that emphasis should be put on the enormous successes of the period and that the cost in human suffering should be minimized. They attacked those who pay tribute to "unprincipled opportunism," apparently a reference to Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization. Also in January the Moldavian paper Sovetskaya Moldaviya published an article by a member of the council of the House of Political Education of the Moldavian Central Committee, analyzing the cult and its exposure. The article instructed propagandists to refer to the June 1956 decree; it attacked those who turn criticism of the cult into a campaign and told propagandists to emphasize that the party had dealt with all that had conflicted with the lines of the 20th Congress. Both of these articles reflect the carrying out of the instructions issued by Trapeznikov in October 1965 and mark a further step in the road to re-Stalinization.

The clearest expression of the prevailing orthodox approach was the trial in February of the writers Daniel and Sinyavskiy, an action which must have been approved by the Presidium. According to the writer Valentin Katayev, Kosygin had opposed the trial and "the whole damned thing" but had been outvoted. It seems likely that Mikoyan would have opposed it and probable that Podgornyy, too, would not have supported it. It seems clear that Brezhnev, in league with the neo-Stalinists and other orthodox members of the hierarchy, supported the action. The two men received five and seven years respectively for their "crime" of publishing so-called anti-Soviet works under pseudonyms in the West.

In January 1966 a letter was reportedly circulated in party meetings on the subject of the upcoming party congress. A similar, perhaps identical, letter which was

sent to the Soviet Embassy in Athens, stated that Stalinism had not been bad except for the cult of personality and that many Stalinists would be rehabilitated during the congress. It was explained to [redacted] that the change on the issue of Stalinism would neutralize the Chinese ideological grounds for attacking the Soviet Union.

Numerous reports circulated during the months before the congress to the effect that Stalin would be rehabilitated, and Eastern European countries apparently received some warning. For example, in mid-January the Soviets reportedly told a Czech delegation led by Novotny that Stalin would be partially rehabilitated at the congress. These reports caused some anxiety in these countries. On 15 February the Polish party organ Trybuna Ludu published a strongly worded editorial in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the 20th CPSU Congress. This editorial could be read as a warning to the Soviet Union, linking as it did the coming 23rd Congress with the heritage of the 20th, which it said had become "a common gain for the entire Communist movement." In contrast, the anniversary received only muted attention in the Soviet press.

On the eve of the 23rd congress, a number of republic and regional party meetings were held, at which party leaders expressed for the most part hard-line sentiments. The most strident voice came, not surprisingly, from Mzhavanadze's bailiwick, Georgia, where party secretary Sturua spoke of the "costs" of de-Stalinizing, saying it had brought nihilism and cosmopolitanism (an old Stalinist term with anti-Semitic connotations), as well as attempts by some authors to bring back Trotskiyism and other deviations. He condemned the term period of the cult of personality, claiming that it belittled a period of heroic victories and enormous successes. And, finally, he attacked those who undervalue ideological work and write about shortcomings. He stated that this does not help the building of communism. And he closed with a call for party coordination of ideological work.*

*The Italians reacted quickly to Sturua's speech. On 27 March Unita warned that if the 23rd congress re-evaluated Stalin and minimized the negative judgment of the 20th congress, "we cannot accept it."

At the Belorussian congress first secretary Masherov stated that de-Stalinization had brought into disrepute "an entire historical era" in the country's life. He also criticized those who distort certain events of the war and emasculate the class content of history. First Secretary Bodyul, in Moldavia, implied that the uncrowning of Stalin had led to a distortion of the historic achievements of the party in its struggle for socialism. In Latvia Pelshe emphasized the importance of party education and criticized those writers and artists who are disposed to fault finding and exaggerating existing shortcomings and difficulties. In the Ukraine Shelest used Sholokhov's formulation that when the heart of each artist belonged to the party, he would be free to write as his heart dictates. And, at the Leningrad Oblast' Party conference, Tolstikov presented his neo-Stalinist solution to the problem of non-conforming intellectuals:

> Under present conditions, we are faced with having to strengthen the party's influence on the creative intelligentsia, and to help it, by its creative works to strengthen Communist ideals.

At the end of March several warnings were sounded about the proposed rehabilitation of Stalin. One came from the journal Voprosy Filosofii (Questions of Philosophy) which warned that reversion to one-man rule was still a possibility:

> In the conditions of the application of socialism there exists the possibility that while taking part in collective work, definite personalities may pursue aims which are their own or which are aims of a faction. Moved by ambition, they have personal aims and cause harm to the common cause, particularly if those personalities have leading positions.

The article then proposed that reforms be adopted to "prevent the repetition of past mistakes."

The second, and most spectacular, warning came from 25 Soviet intellectuals. These individuals sent an urgent appeal and warning against the rehabilitation to Brezhnev.* The letter stated that the authors saw nothing to indicate that condemnation of the personality cult had been mistaken--on the contrary, they said, many horrifying facts remained to be revealed. They said that any attempt at rehabilitation would cause great dissension within Soviet society, and would be interpreted by the world as capitulation to the Chinese.

The Congress Opens

The 23rd Congress opened on 29 March and proved to be much less interesting than the build-up to it. The reported rehabilitation of Stalin amounted only to the restoration of the terms "Politburo" and "General Secretary;" these were perhaps the symbolic vestiges of an abandoned plan. Whether the proposed rehabilitation was abandoned because of opposition in Eastern Europe, internal protest, or power shifts in the Presidium is not clear; it seems most likely that the leaders were startled by the vehemence of the reaction, both at home and abroad, and decided that it would be wise to move cautiously.

In his speech to the congress, Brezhnev mentioned neither Stalin nor Khrushchev by name, but he did refer to the miscalculations, undue haste, and subjectivism of recent years (a clear slap at Khrushchev). He called for party-mindedness and a class approach, although he rejected arbitrary influence (an apparent rejection of the more neo-Stalinist recommendations of Tolstikov). Brezhnev's speech was less extreme in tone than many of the pre-congress speeches had been, perhaps a reflection of the leadership's decision to pull back; nonetheless, the tone of his speech was orthodox:

> The party will always support art and literature which confirm beliefs in our ideals and will wage an uncompromising struggle against all manifestations of ideology which is alien to us.

*See Appendix Item A and page 49 for further discussion.

> Socialist art is deeply optimistic and cheerful . . . . This, of course, does not mean that one must write only about what is good. As everyone knows, we have many difficulties and shortcomings and the truthful criticism of them in works of art is useful and necessary; it helps the Soviet people to eliminate the shortcomings. Unfortunately, one also encounters those hacks in art who, instead of assistance to the people, choose as their specialty the blackening of our system and the slander of our heroic people. Of course, we have only a few such people. They do not to any extent reflect the feelings and mind of our creative intelligentsia who are linked inseparably with the people and with the party . . . .

After Brezhnev spoke, a number of speeches were given which were more hard-line than his. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, warned against relaxing ideological work, and stated that some "bearers of petty bourgeois licentiousness" under the pretence of struggling against the consequences of the cult of personality and others under the guise of advocating historical truth, run down the heroic history and struggle of party and people, and try to blacken Soviet reality and minimize the grandeur of our triumphs over fascism.

The series of neo-Stalinist reports was begun by Yegorychev, that stalwart supporter of the Soviet Union's heroic past, who started by reassuring those who had been frightened by the spectre of Stalinism:

> The personality cult, the violation of Leninist norms and principles of party life and socialist legality--all that has hindered our movement forward--has been decisively rejected by our party, and there will never be a return to this past!

He then proceeded, however, to attack once again those who write off the heroic history of the Soviet people, and to condemn insufficiently party-minded approaches to history and individuals. He closed by stating that the sensational instances when direct ideological saboteurs penetrate the ranks of the workers of art can be explained only by political carelessness. Yegorychev's attack seemed to include a large portion of the intelligentsia in its scope. The liberals had demonstrated their apprehension about this sort of approach in a January Noviy Mir article which criticized Stalin's statement at the 18th party congress that the main bulk of the intelligentsia had opposed the revolution, and therefore had to be broken and dispersed.

Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul, a Brezhnev man, called for stricter literary controls. He urged that a decisive rebuff be given to the falsifiers of history and to those who slander the Soviet people. He described the nature of freedom in the Soviet Union, stating that artists are free to create but

> in the same degree the party and state organs enjoy the right of free choice of what to print . . . . In our opinion, the weak side of leadership of this sector of ideological work is insufficient party demandingness toward selection and publication of works of literature, art, and cinema.

Moscow Oblast' First Secretary Konotop was more explicit and more harsh in his recommendation than Bodyul had been:

> Each person is free to write and to speak everything which pleases him, without the slightest restrictions. But every free union (including the party) is also free to dismiss those members who use the party for preaching anti-party opinions.

Thus the threat had been raised of expulsion from party and creative unions; expulsion from the latter would mean the end of the right to publish. Other hard-line speeches

were given on this occasion by Masherov, Mzhavanadze, Pelshe, and Rostov party chief, M. Solomentsev.

On the other side of the fence, the more moderate Podgornyy stated that the party had done much to strengthen law and order and to eliminate harmful elements connected with the cult of personality. He said that economic and cultural issues present new questions, requiring legislation. In his speech Podgornyy also appealed for greater democracy in the party. In general those leaders who support a moderate approach have been silent on the Stalin issue and related subjects such as cultural freedom. In this particular speech Podgornyy dealt only briefly with the topic but his treatment was clearly moderate, as he implied that these issues should be dealt with through legislation--not administrative fiat.

At the congress Mikoyan and Shvernik were dropped from the Politburo and Pelshe was added; formerly First Secretary of Latvia, Pelshe is reportedly close to Suslov. Pelshe also took over Shvernik's function as chairman of the party's Control Commission. These actions marked another setback for the moderates on the Politburo.* Kunayev, a Brezhnev follower, and the Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, an apparent Shelepin supporter and probably Mazurov's protege, became candidate members of the Politburo.

*Before the congress, in February, the moderates had suffered another setback when A. Kochinyan replaced Ya. Zarobyan as First Secretary in Armenia. A subsequent speech by Kochinyan revealed that Zarobyan had been demoted for opening party membership to the masses and recruiting technicians rather than political workers, as well as for poor ideological leadership. Zarobyan had come from Khar'kov Oblast', Podgornyy's bailiwick, as had N. Sobol, dismissed in March from his position as Ukrainian Second Secretary. Both of these actions therefore represented a defeat for Podgornyy, and the Armenian shake-up may also have marked a defeat for Mikoyan, an Armenian who probably had had considerable influence in personnel appointments in that republic over the years.

In other personnel actions during this period, Shelepin's associate Khaldeyev was shifted from his position as RSFSR Agitprop Chief to become the new editor of Partiynaya Zhizn and G. Yenyutin, a long-time Brezhnev associate was named Chairman of the RSFSR People's Control Commissions. After the congress, there were a number of indications that Shelepin had been assigned responsibility for light industry matters, and from a meeting he attended the following September, it appeared that Demichev had assumed Shelepin's responsibility for supervising the Soviet security apparatus. From these actions it would appear that the moderates had received a further setback as had Shelepin, but Shelepin still had considerable strength juding from his ability to keep his supporters in high-level posts.

Post-Congress Orthodoxy

Following the congress a number of speeches given by party leaders indicated that the orthodox re-Stalinizing line continued to prevail. At a Leningrad Oblast' meeting early in April, Tolstikov delivered an only thinly veiled warning:

> The congress devoted attention also toethe negative phenomena in the development of literature and art. We also have been having cases of lowered demandingness toward the results of creative work here in Leningrad. Such lack of demandingness appears especially often in evaluating the creative work of the young writers and this has a negative effect on their creative growth. Our creative organs should think seriously about these facts.

And Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev, who had previously been quite moderate, gave a dogmatic speech in May at a congress of Kazakh writers. He called on writers to be in the forefront of the ideological struggle and to combat the challenge of bourgeois propaganda, and he affirmed party leadership of the arts. He did make several concessions to the

moderate view, stating that writers could depict negative aspects of life--but from a Communist position--and that demands should not be made on writers to write on specific subjects.

Demichev, in his May election speech, condemned ideologically harmful works and linked them to foreign propaganda which seeks to subvert Soviet society. This line by now had become almost standard and is reminiscent of the Stalinist concept of a sharpening class struggle. There can be no dissent within the structure as envisioned; therefore, any dissonance must be attributed to an aggressive, alien ideology. In the logical continuum of this line, Demichev condemned brige building between East and West. Subsequent extension of the line would lead to the charge that dissident writers were in fact agents of the West and should be tried for treasonous activity.

On 16 May Yepishev, head of the armed forces' political administration, gave a dogmatic speech at a conference on the indoctrination of youth. He reportedly called on writers to show the greatness of the times instead of questioning herioc legends. He praised the literature of the Stalin era, and said that Stalin's reasons for sending people to death or prison camps should be understood. He then criticized both Noviy Mir and Yunost' for publishing articles describing setbacks during the war and for paying tribute to abstract humanism and pacifism.

Differences within the leadership on the Stalin issue were reflected in the publication of contradictory articles by the two highest-ranking military figures in the Soviet Union in June 1966. Defense Minister Malinovskiy wrote an article in Izvestiya on 23 June in which he mentioned neither the purge of military leaders before the war nor mistakes on the part of Stalin. He attributed the initial defeats to the enormous size of the attacking forces which he said had been built up with the help of Western imperialists. He emphasized the pre-war buildup by the Soviet regime which, he said, saw the danger long before the war, and he praised the party for strengthening

SECRET

SECRET

the moral-political unity of the country.*

In an article in the June issue of the Military Historical Journal Marshal Andrey Grechko, First Deputy Minister of Defense, bucked the prevailing line and returned to the historiography of the Khrushchev era. He criticized Stalin and charged ineptitude by "the highest military and political leadership" on the eve of the war. He accused the regime of underestimating the immediacy of the Nazi threats, and stated that Stalin and his closest advisors--men at the head of the Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff (Timoshenko and Zhukov) "grossly miscalculated" the strategic situation. He further asserted that decisions on major defense problems were made by one man while responsible military leaders "often enough supported and encouraged these erroneous views." The use of this issue by Grechko may have demonstrated his dissatisfaction with what he considered the lack of consideration being given strategic military problems, and the willingness of some military men, for example Malinovskiy, to go along with it. Grechko was to change his emphasis on the Stalin issue considerably before being named Defense Minister the following year.

A Shift In Positions

A debate on the subject of collectivity of leadership versus individual responsiblity was carried on in the press during the summer and fall of 1966. On 20 July a Pravda article by F. Petrenko reaffirmed the principle of collective leadership and warned against the imposition of individual power. On 8 August a Pravda editorial appeared to respond to this by citing the need both to strengthen party democracy and at the same time to develop a sense

*A Rude Pravo version of this article had apparently been tailored to take into account bloc sensitivities. In this version, Malinovskiy referred to a series of grave mistakes committed during the early stages of the war, asserted that the USSR had a very limited time in which to prepare, and cited shortages of planes, tanks, and artillery at the start of the war.

SECRET

of responsibility and discipline. The editorial quoted Lenin to the effect that "irresponsibility taking shelter under references to collectiveness of work, is a most dangerous evil."

An article by Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev in Partiynaya Zhizn' on 1 October supported the Pravda editorial. Kunayev stressed the primacy of individual leadership, and he too used the Lenin quotation. However, Georgian Second Secretary P. Rodionov, in a Voprosy Istorii KPSS article reasserted Petrenko's view and emphasized that individual leaders must subordinate themselves to the collective. In this debate the neo-Stalinists, represented by Petrenko and Rodionov, demonstrated their fear that Brezhnev was acquiring too much power. They resorted to the same argument used previously by the moderates--that there are dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule and that the collectivity of leadership must be preserved. The neo-Stalinists were answered by the Brezhnev forces in the Pravda editorial and Kunayev's article. The argument used by them was that while collectivity is fine, it must not be used to cover up irresponsibility, and that there must be individual responsibility and discipline.

In August and September Izvestiya published two articles which strongly attacked Stalin and the personality cult. The first article stated that Stalin had departed from the norms of party life and had destroyed collectivity of leadership. The second was even stronger in its denunciation of Stalin; it accused him of overestimating his own services and crudely violating collectivity. It charged that his thesis that the class struggle was growing more and more aggravated had led to crude violations of socialist legality. These articles seem to have come from the moderate side as they condemn the Stalinist theory of intensifying class struggle, a term which was being resurrected by the neo-Stalinists. The Izvestiya articles do, however, agree with the neo-Stalinist defenses of collective leadership mentioned above, and for good reason. The moderates had been on the defensive for a long time and they, too, feared Brezhnev's increasing strength. Thus, the neo-Stalinists and the liberals had a common interest in stopping Brezhnev.

An indication that Shelepin's faction had cause to be concerned about the strength of its position was the identification of Shelepin in August as secretary in charge of consumer goods, a real come-down for him. In September Shelepin lost another foothold in the security forces. A new Ministry for the Protection of Public Order was established with N. Shchelokov, a long-time Brezhnev associate, appointed to head it. The logical appointee had been V. Tikunov, a Shelepin associate, who had been serving as chief of the RSFSR militia. On the eve of the August plenum of the central committee there were a number of reports that there would be numerous personnel changes--particularly that Kosygin would be fired. This did not occur.

In November Brezhnev indicated his support for a general rehabilitation of Stalin; in a speech in Tbilisi, he again mentioned Stalin's name, this time including him among a group of "ardent revolutionaries" who had led the struggle for the revolution in Georgia. Thus, while the neo-Stalinists were siding with the moderates on the question of collective leadership, Brezhnev took the Stalin issue an additional step. By further restoring Stalin he could also restore the concept of one-man rule to respectability and thereby legitimize his own drive for increased power.

INTELLECTUALS

Pre-Congress Clamp-Down

The general shift to an increasingly hard-line policy was reflected in a clamp-down on the intellectuals in the first few months of 1966. In addition to the trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and their sentencing to five and seven years at hard labor respectively for the publication of "anti-Soviet" works in the West, there were a number of other arrests and trials. In early January, diplomatic sources reported that a Soviet student had been sentenced to seven years in prison as the alleged leader of

approximately 250 Leningrad students who had secretly published the magazine Kolokol (The Bell), the magazine of "free thought." Eight others reportedly received sentences ranging from two to five years. The group reportedly claimed that it was not anti-Communist, but was opposed to Communism as practiced in the Soviet Union, and was against what they considered the remnants of Stalinism. Once again Leningrad was acting as the leader in implementing a hard-line policy. In February the young poet Vladimir Batshev was sentenced to five years exile in Siberia. Accused of being a parasite, he was condemned for participation in the 5 December demonstration protesting the arrests of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and for carrying on literary activities without being a member of the Union of Writers. Also in February the writer Valeriy Tarsis was deprived of his Soviet citizenship while traveling abroad.

The Soviet intellectuals reacted to the increasing pressure with fear and courage. Just before the 23rd congress convened on 29 March, 60 members of the USSR Union of Writers sent a letter to the presidiums of the congress, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.* They asked permission to stand surety for Daniel and Sinyavskiy. While criticizing the publication of works abroad without authorization, the signers stated that the trial of the two writers had set a dangerous precedent and threatened the progress of Soviet culture. They called for more freedom, not its condemnation.

Also on the eve of the congress, a group of 25 intellectuals sent a signed letter to Brezhnev, arguing against any rehabilitation of Stalin at the congress.** They mentioned tendencies in speeches and articles directed at such a rehabilitation and stated that this caused them deep apprehension. They said they had seen nothing which would warrant thinking the original condemnation of the personality cult was wrong; on the contrary, they maintained

*See Appendix Item B.

**See Appendix Item A.

SECRET

SECRET

that many of the most horrifying facts about Stalin's crimes had not yet been made public. They said that there were many dangers involved in any rehabilitation of Stalin, including serious dissensions in Soviet society.

> . . . Stalin is responsible not only for the destruction of countless innocent people, for our unpreparedness for the war, for a departure from the Leninist norms of party and state life. His crimes and unjust deeds also distorted the idea of Communism to such an extent that our people will never forgive him for this. Our people will not understand and will not accept even a partial departure from the decisions on the personality cult. No one will be able to obliterate these decisions from its consciousness and memory. Any attempt to do so will lead only to confusion and disarray in the broadest circles . . . . No explanations or articles will make people believe in Stalin again; on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger. To undertake anything like this is dangerous, taking into account the complex economic and political situation of our country.

The letter went on to describe another danger--that a rehabilitation would pose a threat of a new split in the world communist movement--between the Soviet Union and the Communists in the West who would see this as a surrender to the Chinese. The letter closed by saying that such a decision by the Central Committee could not be regarded as routine--that it would have historic importance for the destiny of the county.

In its March editorial Noviy Mir again defended truth in literature and used Pravda's 26 February article on the coming 23rd Congress to support its position. It said that Pravda, which had in fact given limited attention to the 20th Congress, had praised that congress for overcoming the personality cult and for restoring Leninist norms of party and state life, the observance of collectivity

SECRET

of leadership and intra-party democracy. Noviy Mir asserted, optimistically, that the party was constantly strengthening these things and was doing everything to avoid a repetition of the violations of legality connected with the cult. In obvious disfavor, Noviy Mir's editor-in-chief, Tvardovskiy was the only candidate or full member of the central committee not elected a delegate to the congress.

The Congress and After

As noted above, the 23rd Congress did not formally rehabilitate Stalin and, in fact, skirted the issue almost entirely. However, most of the speeches which dealt with culture were hard-line. This was true not only of the leaders who spoke, but also of those members of the intelligentsia itself who spoke. Mikhail Sholokhov gave one of the most vicious speeches of all, stating that if Daniel and Sinyavskiy had been caught in the 1920's they would have received harsher judgment and that if anything the sentences they received were too mild. One exception to the general trend was a speech given by USSR Cultural Minister Yekaterina Furtseva. While admitting that there were shortcomings in the arts, she named no names and called for friendly guidance. She said that the October 1964 plenum had gotten rid of the last vestiges of administrativeness in the arts and that in the new atmosphere intellectuals could work calmly and assuredly.

The sycophants and hacks immediately picked up the basically tough line projected at the congress. Both Pravda, in an article by Literaturnaya Gazeta editor Chakovskiy, and Literaturnaya Rossiya, in an editorial, attacked foreign propagandists for trying to frighten the creative intelligentsia with the "spectre of Stalinism." According to the latter paper

> Our ideological opponents are trying again to put an equal sign between the basic principles of Soviet literature of socialist realism and its party spirit and closeness to the people, and the shortcomings connected with the cult of personality . . . .

The editorial also described as slanderous, claims that Sholokhov's views on Daniel and Sinyavskiy were not shared by other writers.

In April the literary journal Yunost' (Youth) published a very self-critical editorial. According to one report the Komsomol was trying to take over the journal and the editorial represented the attempt to forestall this. Yunost' had been sharply criticized at the congress. The editorial recited conservative views on such topics as positive heroes and the ideological content of writing, but closed with a defiant statement:

> Nobody and nothing hinders or can hinder all the young and truly talented in the Soviet Union from growing and developing. It is not for nothing that the young in Soviet literature blossomed particularly well in recent years.

Thus the editorial closed by implying that there had been an upsurge in Soviet literature during the Khrushchev years and that the writers were aware of this and would not tolerate repressive measures aimed at cutting off this growth.

In April, at a plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers Union, a secretary of the union, M. Alekseyev, defended the literature of the Stalin years and condemned the "devastating term 'cult literature.'" He stated that some people had gone too far in condemning the cult:

> . . . Because of certain reasons, a good little bit of confusion was brought into the understanding of history and the present day during the last 10-12 years. The word 'great' related not to the whole history of the Soviet state but only to the decade which began approximately in 1953. It was suggested that this period should define the concept of the present day while events which happened earlier were not history. . . . Since in a certain part of this history there developed an ugly phenomenon, which was unnatural for our society and which at the 20th Party Congress was named the 'cult of personality', our ideological opponents did not fail to use this to blacken our revolution

and to cast aspersions on Soviet real life as a whole. As regards Soviet literature, despite the obvious facts which we cited above, it was simply declared non-existent.

Alekseyev praised several of Konstantin Simonov's war novels, but stated that he could not accept everything in them, specifically the idea that some heroes operated during the war with doubts which they could not possibly have had until after the 20th Party Congress. In other words Alekseyev was claiming that nobody knew of Stalin's crimes until they were revealed by Khrushchev in 1956.

Various articles published in the spring demonstrated the prevalence of a conservative trend. For example, in its lead editorial in May, Voprosy Istorii KPSS criticized false portrayals of the cult period, and cited the influence of subjectivism and voluntaristic mistakes. It said that there were still instances where "under the guise of criticism of the cult of personality, the work of our party and people in the construction of socialism was belittled." On 7 May a Pravda article conceded that the period of the cult of personality had been linked with serious perversions and mistakes in the work of state security, but claimed that this did not change the socialist nature of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence.

Pressure also continued to be exerted on the intellectuals. In May the writer Igor Galamchok was given a suspended sentence for having refused to testify at the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trial. In July 1965, 40 Ukrainian intellectuals had reportedly been arrested for nationalistic activities. Open trials for some of these were held in January and February 1966, but because of protest demonstrations open trials were discontinued. In April a closed trial was held, but three intellectuals managed to attend. Two of them, Ivan Dzyuba and Ivan Drach, later started a campaign to obtain signatures for a petition, pleading for the release of those tried. This was the beginning of a series of arrests and trials in the Ukraine which would increase in number and intensity in the next few years.

SECRET

SECRET

A Frightened Response

Clearly frightened by the prevailing trend, and possibly encouraged by what they may have considered to be the success of their previous letter pleading that Stalin not be rehabilitated, liberal intellectuals continued to protest. Lidiya Chukovskaya addressed a letter to Mikhail Sholokhov, which was subsequently smuggled to the West, condemning him for his congress speech. A number of other letters protesting the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trial were also written during this period and smuggled out. In one of these, written by A. Yakobson, the statement appears that the works of the two men were not anti-Soviet, but were "against Stalinism, its survivals and all attempts to revive it in our society."

Several articles appeared during the summer which revealed continued intransigeance on the part of even published writers. In the Armenian paper Kommunist, Bagish Ovsepyan wrote an article in which he reported glowingly on the 23rd congress, saying it had guaranteed once again that there would be no return to lawlessness and that it was a worthy successor to the 20th and 22nd congresses. His description bore little resemblance to the real thing. In an Izvestiya article on 21 July, Konstantin Simonov stated that it was worth repeating that had it not been for the purges, the USSR would have faced Hitler with many more commanders. On 22 July Literaturnaya Rossiya carried another Simonov article which contained implicit criticism of Zhdanov. On 30 July Tvardovskiy wrote a letter to Literaturnaya Gazeta in which he rejected criticism of the staging of his play "Terkin in the Other World" at the Satire Theater which had been closed at the end of June. The editors of the paper accompanied Tvardovskiy's letter with the statement that his evaluation was one-sided. The play was performed once more--in mid-August, but thereafter disappeared from the theater's repertoire.

In August Noviy Mir published an article which was to cause considerable controversy in the months ahead. The article was by V. Lakshin, an editor of the journal, and

SECRET

was entitled, "Writer, Reader, Critic." In it Lakshin praised works by Solzhenitsyn and Semin which had previously been criticized, and again presented Noviy Mir's case for truth in literature. This article was subsequently attacked by both Literaturnaya Gazeta and Literaturnaya Rossiya; both Lakshin and the journal itself were criticized. This was the start of an intense campaign against Noviy Mir which would continue into the following year.

STALIN THEMES

Re-Stalinizing Is Pushed

The prevalence of an orthodox line during and after the December 1965 plenum was reflected in the appearance in early 1966 of numerous articles glossing over Stalin's errors and crimes. The focus of attention had shifted, however, from Stalin's wartime role to more general policies and achievements of the Stalin years, with the policy of collectivization receiving the most attention. This indicated that Trapeznikov's October 1965 instructions were being followed.

Sel'skaya Zhizn', in a 29 December 1965 article attacked those who assert that conditions were not right for collectivization in the 1930's and who concentrate on the negative features of collectivization, ignoring all that was progressive. The article admitted that errors had been committed early in the process of collectivization, but minimized their seriousness; it spread the responsibility among local, oblast, and central organs, and failed to criticize Stalin at all. In fact, the article praised as "courageous fighters for the triumph of Lenin's cause" those who stood "at the source of the construction of the kolkhozes;" this can certainly be read as indirect praise of Stalin.

This theme was further advanced by F. Vaganov in a February Kommunist article, and by S. Kaplan in Pravda

SECRET

SECRET

Ukrainy on 14 February. Kaplan even used a Stalinist argument to explain early difficulties in collectivization. He said that the policy had been accompanied by a sharpening of the class struggle in a country encircled by capitalist states. He did mildly criticize Stalin's "inclination" to be hasty and "overly decretory" but clearly minimized the importance of this factor.

Evidence that the January article in Pravda, in which the three historians urged that the term "period of the personality cult" be renounced, was being taken seriously can be seen in two articles which appeared in early 1966. In late February Sel'skaya Zhizn stated that criticism of collectivization could not be justified by references to the subjectivist term "period of the personality cult." Similarly, a 12 March Pravda Ukrainy article criticized the use of this term, stating that its use had led to the detraction of Soviet achievements.

Another indication of the prevalence of a conservative line was the halt in the rehabilitation program. From January through April Voprosy Istorii KPSS again suspended its rehabilitations and on the eve of the congress the section of the journal which had included such articles was eliminated. In December the U.S. Embassy in Moscow reported a trend in Soviet writing to concede that the Stalin cult had been regrettable, but had been an aberration unrelated to the system's basic structure. The embassy cited several poems emphasizing the need to stress the positive, including one stating that youths who have heard about special camps, the Kirov murder, and so forth, should balance such a "momentary bit of offal" against the stride of the century.

A somewhat ominous indicator of the trend was Oktyabr's publication in March of an article referring to Boris Kedrov as a son and brother of "enemies of the people." Kedrov's father had been one of the first rehabilitations after Stalin's death, and Stalin's term "enemies of the people" had been specifically condemned by Khrushchev in his secret speech.

SECRET

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Exceptions to Rule; Nekrich Book Debate

There were exceptions to the generally hard-line emphasis in early 1966, but for the most part these came from the most intransigeant and liberal journals. Noviy Mir, for example, continued to publish anti-Stalinist items. In January it carried a review of A. Nekrich's book 22 June 1941, which had been published in 1965 and by now was very controversial. The book had been highly critical of Stalin for his handling of the prewar situation, and the review also charged Stalin with grave errors, and stated that those who arrested and persecuted Marshal Tukhachevskiy and his comrades must have known that they were innocent.

In February 1966 a meeting was held to discuss the Nekrich book and to determine the propriety of the book's condemnation of Stalin.* Participants in the conference included people from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, the foreign ministry and the armed forces. G. Deborin, later identified as head of the editorial board at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, opened the meeting by criticizing the book for what he considered a number of incorrect evaluations and facts. He argued that Soviet unpreparedness at the start of the war was not primarily due to Stalin's stubbornness, but was the result of various factors including misinformation. He attacked Nekrich's implication that Stalin, Voroshilov, Budennyy, Blyukher, and others had known of the innocence of the Tukhachevskiy-Yakir group, but had condemned them nonetheless. Throughout this talk, there were numerous shouts from the floor, and when Deborin attempted to pay tribute to the honor and conscience of Budennyy and Voroshilov, he was shouted off the rostrum.

A number of people then spoke and disputed Deborin's statements, putting the blame for military unpreparedness

*This account is based on a similar transcript was published by Posev.

SECRET

SECRET

on Stalin:

> Stalin bears the main responsibility for the tragedy. He created the situation in the country. Stalin's biggest crime was usurpation of power and destruction of our best military and Party cadres . . . . Now there are still people who say that Stalin must not be spoken of badly. They say he was not alone . . . . Stalin assumed the boldness of independently leading the country and his guilt is tremendous. It is necessary to speak of this so that it not be repeated.

This speaker then went on to discuss the trial of the Tukhachevskiy-Yakir group, stating that the "fraud was prepared by the Gestapo, but the idea came from Stalin."

Another speaker provided an example of the kind of statement probably most feared by the hierarchy; he criticized those around Stalin, who had not stopped him.

> Each is guilty, but the degree of guilt varies. One is guilty in that he decided not to say what he was thinking. The further and the higher, the greater the responsibility. At each level rejection of truth for the sake of personal well-being is a crime, and the higher the level, the more serious the crime. The main culprit is Stalin.

At the end of this meeting there was an exchange betwen Deborin and a man named Snegov, who said that Stalin should have been shot, not exonerated. Snegov charged that Stalin had helped Hitler in every way, especially in the invasion of Poland, because he had shot all the Polish Communists in the Soviet Union and had declared the Polish Communist Party illegal; he then stated that Stalin had betrayed all communists in all countries. At that point Deborin accused Snegov of saying things that "come from a

SECRET

camp hostile to us," and he asked Snegov to what camp he belonged. Snegov's reply was, "I am from Kolyma."* Snegov closed by stating that

> you can't frighten us with camps. We will not be intimidated. The time is different, and the past will not return . . . .

Snegov's optimism was not supported by subsequent events. In July 1967, Nekrich, the author of the book under discussion, was to be expelled from the party as an example to those who do not conform with the party line.

There were several other instances of intransigeance on the part of the liberals in early 1966. In February Noviy Mir carried an article by V. Kardin which was to have repercussions for months to come. Kardin stated that since the 20th congress there had been a strong desire to "drink from the river named fact," but that historians and memoirealists faced numerous obstacles--including the opposition of those who disagree with the restoration of historical truth. The other major liberal journal Yunost', in January, published for the first time in the Soviet Union, the text of a letter of Lenin's which was written in March 1923 and in which he upbraided Stalin for the latter's rude treatment of Nadezhda Krupskaya, and demanded either an apology from Stalin or the "severance of relations between us." The existence and contents of this letter as well as the quarrel itself had been described in an article in Pravda in 1964, but the text itself had never been published before.

There were several other anti-Stalinist articles before the congress. In March, for example, Voprosy Istorii KPSS published an article by A. Solov'yev which was very critical of Stalin's 1922 position on the nationalities issue (which had amounted to forced incorporation). Solov'yev stated that this concept had "conflicted with the ideas of equality and independence of fraternal Soviet republics."

*One of the forced labor camps under Stalin.

He described Lenin's oppostion to this proposal, and stated that Lenin had favored strengthening both the union of republics and the sovereignty of each republic, and had warned of the dangers of extreme centralism.

Post-Congress: Pro-Stalin Line Dominates

The conservative impression given by the congress was picked up and reinforced in various articles and speeches in the spring of 1966. At the Writers Union Congress in April, union secretary Alekseyev scoffed at those who refer to the battle of Stalingrad as the battle of Volgograd, stating that there was no such battle. Similarly, he scoffed at those who try to ignore the fact that Stalin was the supreme commander during the whole war. And Kalashnik, deputy to Yepishev at the armed forces political administration, criticized those who sometimes place the blame for the failures and difficulties at the start of the war on one figure--Stalin. While he admitted that the lawlessness and some errors played a certain negative role, he emphasized other factors such as the military and economic superiority of fascism which at that time had the benefit of the resources of almost the entire continent, and the fact that many Soviet troops had to be maintained in the East in case Japan entered the war.

On 9 May an article by Deborin, who had participated in the attack on Nekrich's book in February, appeared in Pravda. In this review of a history of Soviet foreign policy from 1917-1945, Deborin stated that despite the desire of the Soviet Union to conclude a collective security pact with Britain and France in 1939, the Soviet Union "was forced to accept the German proposal for signing a non-aggression pact." He blamed this situation on the British and Americans who, he said, preferred to make a deal with the fascists.

In addition to articles glossing over wartime difficulties, articles restoring Stalin's image in other areas also appeared. In May Oktyabr' attacked Zalygin's Na Irtyshe for portraying collectivization one-sidedly and for exaggerating the influence of the cult of personality on this

great historical event. In June Izvestiya included Stalin on a list of those who played a major role in speeding up industrialization. In July an article in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' presented a favorable picture of Stalin at the Potsdam negotiations in July 1945.

In July Oktyabr' carried several very hard-line articles. In one of these Strokov, in typical fashion, launched an attack on that great Khrushchevian sin--subjectivism--and described how that insidious quality manifests itself:

> . . . . Subjectivism may appear in the modernization of history and then a man, let us say from the 1940's, begins to think like a 'prophet', anticipating the party in condemning the cult of personality . . . . Subjectivism can incidentally 'reappraise' crucial historical events--and then it turns out that kolkhoz construction from the very beginning even to this day was a 'fatal mistake.' Yielding to the widespread fashion--to portray mainly our failures in the first stages of the Great Patriotic War--subjectivism will dismally concentrate on the 'horrors' of our 'defeats,' even when a gradiose attack by the Soviet armies is under way, and ardently will expose the commanders as 'fools' and the sinister 'osobisty' (KGB).

In the same issue, A. Dymshits attacked the concept of abstract humanism,* stating that it is impossible to approach in terms of abstract humanism such policies as war communism and collectivization, because it must not be forgotten that despite hard times progress was always being made.

*Also a favorite target of the Chinese.

On 21 July Kazakhstanskaya Pravda attempted to shift blame for the excesses in collectivization to local officials, stating that the central committee had cautioned local organization against artificially forcing the rate of collectivization. This article, coming from the republic headed by Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev suggested that he probably sanctioned this approach and, therefore, felt that Brezhnev approved. A 17 August Pravda article also criticized those who argue that collectivization had to be imposed from above. It said that while the party did not wait for the development of a material-technical base, this base had been developed simultaneously.

Liberals Fight Back

Coincident with a brief upsurge in other areas of the cultural community, probably a combination of fear at the prevailing hard-line and relief because Stalin had not been formally rehabilitated, a number of anti-Stalin articles were published in the spring and summer of 1966. First of all there was a sharp upsurge in the rehabilitation program in May. Most interesting were two articles in Izvestiya, which had not carried rehabilitation articles since May 1965.* One article stated that the historian V. Nevskiy was arrested in February 1935 on false charges and two years later was dead; the other was about the Uzbek leader, F. Khodzhayev** and mentioned only his "tragic" death in 1938. Other articles appeared in Literaturnaya Rossiya and Kommunist Estonii on purge victims, and the Military History Journal carried an article which stated that the personality cult had harmed strategic theory because of the unjust reprisals against many who were best trained in military theory, including Tukhachevskiy.

*Pravda had halted its rehabilitation articles after Rumyantsev was replaced in September 1965.

**Khodzhayev was executed in 1938 after his confession at the last of the big show trials. Only two other people who were involved in any of the three big trials, A. Ikramov and N. Krestinskiy, have been rehabilitated.

For the first time since December 1965 Voprosy Istorii KPSS carried items on purge victims, although it now used a very conservative format. It mentioned Nevskiy and Kirov, but mentioned neither the purge of the former nor the assassination of the latter. Furthermore, the May issue carried an article which indirectly provided justification for the purges, by stating that the struggle with the "enemies of Leninism" had been instrumental in preventing differences within the party during the war. The article also criticized subjective errors which led to the deprecation of the party and people under the guise of criticizing the cult of personality.

After May the rehabilitations again dropped off, although the provincial press continued to be stubborn.* Those articles which did appear carefully skirted any mention of the purges. For example, an article noting the death of R. Katanyan and signed by Anastas Mikoyan gave Katanyan's career until 1938 with no further elaboration. On 24 August Izvestiya discussed the events of 1935 and 1936, and mentioned Stalin only once--when he was held responsible for "violations of socialist legality" which did not alter the nature of the system. On 21 July Izvestiya had carried an article by Konstantin Simonov in which he cited the grave harm done the military by the purges. Throughout this period Izvestiya was consistently more moderate on the Stalin and cultural issues than was Pravda, perhaps a reflection of the government-party rivalry--i.e., Kosygin's relative moderation compared to Brezhnev's orthodox views.

*Bakinskiy Rabochiy on 7 June carried an article on a former First Secretary of Azerbaydzhan, stating that his life was "tragically cut short" in 1938. A 14 July article in Kommunist Tadzhikistan carried the same wording on Rakhinbayev. In August Kommunist Armenia published an article on Marshal Gay, calling him one of the outstanding Armenian officers "ruined by slander during the years of the personality cult." The same issue published an item on the poet Vartanyan, closing with

> . . . in 1937 the storm cloud, which was hanging over many persons also touched even the Communist poet Azasi Vartanyan.

SECRET

SECRET

In July 1966 the Outline History of the Moscow Party Organization was signed to the press. While the history placed the blame for excesses in collectivization on local officials and praised Stalin's 1930 article "Dizzy With Success" for having stressed the impermissibility of using force to carry out collectivization it came down surprisingly hard on the crimes of Stalin. It criticized the

> crude violations of Leninist norms and principles of party life and socialist legality, the willfulness and misuse of power, and the mass repressions against completely innocent Soviet people, engendered by the cult of Stalin's personality.

According to the history, Stalin deserved authority, but after the 17th congress he had begun to violate Leninist norms, and at the February-March 1937 plenum advanced the mistaken thesis that as socialism strengthens the class struggle intensifies:

> This was said at a time when the exploiting classes were already liquidated . . . . This assertion served as a theoretical basis for illegal repressions against honest Soviet people. Enormous harm was caused to the party and the whole people by the political adventurists Yezhov and Beria, who subjected many honest officials to unjustified repressions.

This particular history also treated Khrushchev fairly kindly, quoting from a 1963 speech by him in which he stated that there would have been even worse repressions if everyone had agreed--implying that he and others had stood up to Stalin. The history stated that in general party organs were improved in Moscow after a December 1949 plenum; it was at that plenum that Khrushchev became first secretary of the oblast. It is not at all clear who was responsible for the publication of this history. Moscow city and oblast' leaders Yegorychev and Konotop were at this time pushing a much harder line than that suggested in the history. For example, while presenting a "balanced"

SECRET

view in some respects, the history cited shortcomings in the party in the 1940's, stating that there was not the proper struggle against dogmatism.

Noviy Mir continued to resist the re-Stalinizing pressure, as did several other journals. In August, for example, Noviy Mir published an article criticizing the 1938 decision of Stalin and Vyshinskiy to declare subsidiary activities of kolhkozes illegal. This particular issue is still very much alive in the Soviet Union now, with the pragmatists supporting such activities. Several articles critical of Stalin's handling of collectivization were published in the spring and summer. The Ukrainian Historical Journal published two on the subject, one in April and one in July. The articles denied that Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success" had ended excesses in the countryside, attributing this instead to the work of Ukrainian party organizations. One of the articles stated that excessive haste and violations of the principle of voluntariness were among the biggest errors in the beginning of collectivization.

Revolt Of The Old Bolsheviks

In the summer of 1966 a meeting was held at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism to discuss the third volume of the History of the CPSU, which covered the period from March 1917-March 1918. The meeting was chaired by Pospelov, chairman of the institute and chief editor of the volume, and was attended by a group of Old Bolsheviks. Pospelov, in opening the meeting, described the difficulties in compiling the volume, stating that it had been necessary to overcome the "subjective layers which had been written in the previous ten years."

Following Pospelov's remarks a number of Old Bolsheviks rose to criticize the history and denounce Stalin. Several speakers attacked the praise given Stalin's official history, The Short Course, in the volume. One speaker claimed that he had spoken with Brezhnev protege Trapeznikov, head of the scientific and educational institution about this in April 1966, and that Trapeznikov had

said he did not agree with the editorial board on this and that he would give corresponding instructions. The speaker stated that he would like to know why this had not been done.

Several speakers then rose to challenge Stalin's performance as a revolutionary. Numerous specific charges were made, including the statement that Stalin had been no better than Trotskiy. One speaker stated that Stalin and Voroshilov had wiped out many loyal military specialists, and another said that Stalin had fabricated charges against Lenin's closest workers. A man named Snegov, possibly the same man who had participated in the debate on the Nekrich book,* launched perhaps the strongest attack:

> It is said that one man cannot change as much as an entire army. Stalin proved that more could be destroyed by one man than by a whole army. He destroyed millions of people . . . . Affectionate mothers are defending the child Stalin is every way possible . . . . The thing boils down to the fact that some counted on having the 23rd Congress rehabilitate Stalin. That didn't happen and it won't happen! . . . . The 23rd Congress confirmed once again the lines of the 20th and 22nd Congresses. There is no return to the times of Stalin.

An old Bolshevik named Zorin attacked the methods of the meeting, charging that the previous day some young historians had not been permitted in the room. He charged that documents were hidden, and said that it must be revealed how Leninist norms had been perverted by Stalin:

> Your conception is the conception of the Chinese leaders. You stand together with the bourgeois falsifiers. The history of the Party must not justify the perversions. You wrote that Trotskiy tried to replace Leninism with Trotskiyism, but you remain quiet about Stalin's having replaced Leninism with Stalinism. Now will the young people believe you; can they believe lies?

*See page 58 for further discussion.

At the end of the meeting there were various comments from those who had helped frame the history. Bugayev, the head of the commission, said that in writing the history it was necessary to be guided by the decisions of the central committee on 30 June 1956. At this there were shouts that the 22nd Congress had declared Stalin a criminal and that this congress had not been abrogated. When Pospelov spoke and tried to maintain that Stalin's role had been mostly positive during this period, he was interrupted by shouts that he stop falsifying history.* Publication of this volume of the history was very slow; it finally appeared in October 1967 and its publication was accompanied by a Pravda article, whose re-Stalinizing tone indicated that the efforts of the Old Bolsheviks had failed.

Leadership Shift Reflected in Stalin Issue

In September and October, Pravda Ukrainy, which for several years had published neo-Stalinist articles, carried a two-part article by G. Kikalov which evaluated the Stalin cult more critically than it had in the past. While he made the usual calls for emphasis on positive achievements and ignored the question of excesses in collectivization and the purges, Kikalov said that sometimes "arbitrary administrativeness was condoned," principles of free exchange of opinion were violated, and objective truth suffered as a result. He said that while it was only natural that people respected Stalin, who had properly fought the Trotskiyites and rightists, Stalin had begun to manifest some negative traits; he began to think of himself as infallible, made theoretical errors, and ignored collective leadership. It would appear that publication of this article in this neo-Stalinist journal was part of the campaign being started at this time by the Shelepin

*The original account of this meeting was carried in the underground journal Feniks 66, whose publisher Yuriy Galanskov was sentenced to 5 years in a labor camp in January 1968. The shortened version of the meeting was carried in the April issue of Survey, a London-based quarterly journal of Soviet and East European studies.

faction. Their target was Brezhnev, who they feared was gaining too much strength and their weapon was the Stalin issue--pointing out the consequences that can flow from the concentration of power in the hands of one man. In general, neo-Stalinist attacks on Stalin concentrate on the abuses of collective leadership through the accumulation of power in the hands of a single man, whereas moderate anti-Stalin attacks include charges of repression and criticism of the purges.

On 1 November Brezhnev made his adoption of the re-Stalinizing policy complete when he referred to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary. This line was echoed rapidly by various publications. On 6 November an Izvestiya chronicle of Lenin's activities in November 1917 listed Stalin among those consulted by Lenin during the critical days of armed uprising in Moscow. The November issue of Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta credited Stalin as well as Lenin with authoring the regime's November 1917 declaration of the rights of nationalities. And Komsomolskaya Pravda on 6 November, published exerpts from Theodore Dreiser's 1928 book Dreiser Looks at Russia, in which he treated Stalin as a dedicated national leader and as a revolutionary figure concerned with the fate of humanity and the individual.

SUMMARY

Indications that a further step toward the neo-Stalinist position had been taken at the December 1965 plenum were substantiated in early 1966. A January Pravda article instructed historians to stop referring to the term period of the cult of personality and to take a positive view of the Stalin era. A similar article appeared shortly thereafter in a Moldavian paper, instructing propagandists of the correct view to take on the cult. The trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy in February, as well as the arrests of several other young intellectuals, indicated the start of an actively repressive policy toward dissident intellectuals.

The decision to proceed with the trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and to impose harsh sentences must have been made by the Presidium, as the implications of this decision were important enough to warrant high-level consideration. Of the twelve members of the Presidium, at least seven must have supported the measure. Kosygin reportedly opposed it, Mikoyan presumably opposed it, and Podgornyy, in this subsequent statement at the congress that cultural matters should be dealt with through legislation, indicated that he would have opposed it. Suslov, Shelepin, Mazurov, and Shelest almost certainly supported the decision. Brezhnev must therefore have given his support and have taken with him the votes of at least two of the following--Kirilenko, Polyanskiy, Voronov, and Shvernik.

In the months before the congress there were numerous reports that Stalin would be rehabilitated, as well as various indications that this might well be true. At several pre-congress regional party meetings, high-level spokesmen indicated their support of a hard-line. Among those who expressed neo-Stalinist viewpoints were Masherov of Belorussia, Shelest of the Ukraine, and the First Secretary of Moldavia, Bodyul, who at one time may have served under Brezhnev in Moldavia. Leningrad chief Tolstikov urged that party influence on the creative intellectuals be strengthened. The most strident tones came from Georgia, where party secretary Sturua used the term cosmopolitanism, which under Stalin had been an anti-Semitic charge used to justify repression of the intellectuals; Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze also gave a hard-line speech.

In addition, many articles which were written during this period, particularly on the subject of collectivization, reflected a coordinated policy of rehabilitating Stalin and his policies. Particularly ominous were the Stalinist terms which were resurrected. In addition to Sturua's use of the term cosmopolitanism, a February article on collectivization referred favorably to Stalin's long-discredited theory of the sharpening

of the class struggle in the 1930's. And in February, the neo-Stalinist journal Oktyabr' referred to two rehabilitated purge victims as enemies of the people. This term had been condemned by Khrushchev in his secret speech.

When it opened in late March 1966, the 23rd Congress proved to be somewhat anticlimactic. Stalin was not rehabilitated and the only remaining vestige of a rehabilitation plan was the symbolic restoration of the terms Politburo and General Secretary. It seems likely that the decision not to proceed with public and formal rehabilitation was based on the violent reactions to the proposal, both at home and abroad. Various communist parties had indicated disagreement and the rumors had brought a frightened response from Soviet intellectuals, a group of whom bravely sent a letter of protest to Brezhnev urging that Stalin not be rehabilitated.

Brezhnev emerged from the 23rd congress as clearly the first among equals; his acquisition of the title General Secretary had clearly strengthened his position. Although this was primarily a symbolic victory, it nonetheless served to set him apart from his colleagues and establish him as Stalin's legitimate heir. The fact that Brezhnev was the beneficiary of the policy of re-Stalinizing supports the view that he had supported the policy. However, a number of speakers at the congress, including Yegorychev and Moscow Oblast' First Secretary Konotop, gave much tougher speeches than that given by Brezhnev. Thus it would seem that in spite of Brezhnev's support of much of the neo-Stalinist position, pressure for even more repressive measures was being exerted by members of the neo-Stalinist faction.

Personnel changes made at the congress indicated that the moderates were continuing to lose ground. Mikoyan and Shvernik were dropped from the Politburo and Suslov associate Pelshe, the First Secretary of Latvia, was added. In addition Brezhnev-protege Kunayev, the First Secretary of Kazakhstan, and neo-Stalinist Masherov,

the First Secretary of Belorussia, became candidate members of the Politburo. However, Shelepin was apparently assigned responsibility for light industry at the congress--a clear set-back for him also. Thus, the net gainer was Brezhnev.

In the months immediately after the congress, a conservative line prevailed, but the more extreme neo-Stalinist statements virtually ceased. Furthermore, while the intellectuals continued to write letters protesting the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trials and the generally orthodox line, they must have felt a certain amount of relief at the failure of the congress to rehabilitate Stalin. In addition, they might have felt that the Pet retreat by the leadership on this issue had been brought about by their protests, a belief which might have encouraged them to draft further protests. Thus, still frightened by the prevailing conservative line, but hopeful that things might change, the liberals apparently decided to press ahead. In May there was a resurgence of rehabilitations and during the spring and summer a number of articles were published criticizing Stalin for his role in collectivization.

This liberal push was soon halted, however; the rehabilitations ended by summer and articles critical of Stalin were quickly outnumbered by articles exonerating him. As the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow approached, Stalin's military image was further improved, and prewar miscalculations and errors were increasingly rationalized. One exception to this was a June article by Marshal Grechko, reportedly a Brezhnev man, in which he attacked Stalin and charged the prewar leadership, both political and military, with ineptitude. The purpose of this article may have been to stress the need formore emphasis on contemporary military defenses; he may well have been annoyed by the adoption at the May plenum of an emormous agricultural program. Grechko's point may have been that the military should not be slighted and his method was to show the disastrous

results of ignoring military needs.

Friction in the leadership continued throughout the summer. This was most interestingly demonstrated in a debate which took place in the press during the summer and fall. Several articles were written by neo-Stalinists, stressing the importance of collective leadership and warning against the dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule. An article in the neo-Stalinist journal Pravda Ukrainy criticized Stalin's tendency to think of himself as infallible and to ignore collective leadership. These articles revealed the concern felt by the Shelepin faction over their leader's decline and Brezhnev's growing strength.

The apprehension of the neo-Stalinists was shared by the liberals who also had a vested interest in preventing Brezhnev from acquiring further power. During the summer two articles in Izvestiya also defended collective leadership strongly. Izvestiya, the government paper, had been consistently moderate during the period, possibly reflecting Kosygin's views. These articles defending collective leadership, which used the Stalin issue, suggested that Kosygin and the moderates were also very uneasy about Brezhnev's growing strength.

These attacks by both moderates and neo-Stalinists on Brezhnev's position, were answered fairly quickly. A Pravda editorial and an article by Brezhnev protege Kunayev both emphasized the need for responsibility and discipline, and quoted Lenin to the effect that irresponsibility must not be allowed to hide under references to collectivity; Kunayev also stressed the primacy of individual leadership. Furthermore, on 1 November, Brezhnev pushed even further the issue of Stalin. By referring to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary", he reinforced his own claim to be Stalin's heir and by implication defended the concept of one-man rule.

DECEMBER 1965	APRIL 1966
CPSU PRESIDIUM	**CPSU POLITBURO**
Full Members	**Full Members**
BREZHNEV	BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO	KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN	KOSYGIN
MAZUROV	MAZUROV
MIKOYAN[1]	PELSHE[4]
PODGORNYY	PODGORNYY
POLYANSKIY	POLYANSKIY
SHELEPIN	SHELEPIN
SHELEST	SHELEST
SHVERNIK[1]	SUSLOV
SUSLOV	VORONOV
VORONOV	
Candidate Members	**Candidate Members**
DEMICHEV	DEMICHEV
GRISHIN	GRISHIN
MZHAVANADZE	KUNAYEV[4]
RASHIDOV	MASHEROV[4]
SHCHERBITSKIY[2]	MZHAVANADZE
USTINOV	RASHIDOV
YEFREMOV[1]	SHCHERBITSKIY
	USTINOV
CPSU SECRETARIAT	**CPSU SECRETARIAT**
ANDROPOV	ANDROPOV
BREZHNEV	BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV	DEMICHEV
KAPITONOV[2]	KAPITONOV
KULAKOV[3]	KULAKOV
PODGORNYY[1]	PONOMAREV
PONOMAREV	RUDAKOV[5]
RUDAKOV	SHELEPIN
SHELEPIN	SUSLOV
SUSLOV	USTINOV
USTINOV	

1. Dropped in April 1966.
2. Elected in December 1965.
3. Elected September 1965.
4. Elected in April 1966.
5. Died in July 1966.

NEO-STALINIST LINE ADOPTED

The 50th Anniversary Year

November 1966-December 1967

LEADERSHIP

Hard Line Dominates; Dissension Continues

Following Brezhnev's indication in early November that he favored further restoration of Stalin's name, a number of leaders rushed to follow suit. Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Akhundov, Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan, and, of course, Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze all mentioned Stalin favorably in February 1967. In the last two months of 1966 both Shelest and Yegorychev once again expressed their typically neo-Stalinist views, indicating that this neo-Stalinist faction continued to push. In a speech at the Fifth Ukrainian Writers Congress, Shelest called for more vigilance and militance toward the enemy. He stated that if the enemy praised you, you must have made a political mistake. According to Pravda Ukrainy, Shelest recalled the 1965 central committee decree criticizing Khar'kov Oblast' (Podgornyy's old domain) and indicated that there were still shortcomings there, a clear slap at Podgornyy. On 6 December Yegorychev spoke on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow; he had only praise for Stalin's role.

In early 1967 there were a number of reports concerning continued friction in the Soviet leadership. In April [redacted] stated that there was a group within the leadership which included Shelepin, Suslov, and Ponomarev, and which wished to return to Stalinism. He stated that a struggle for power was going on and that numerous compromises were being reached, such as those at the 23rd congress, but that there was no firm cohesion within the leadership.

Reports of tension between Brezhnev and Kosygin were also received early in 1967. According to one, Kosygin had lost some ground following a disagreement. In February four Soviet musicians who were visiting the United States reported that Kosygin was an emphatic supporter of the creative intelligentsia--that he had a deep appreciation of culture and was sympathetic to the problems of the intellectuals, demonstrating this both vocally and through policy influence. They said that Brezhnev was just the opposite. In June there was a report that Brezhnev wanted Kosygin's job and that Kosygin was trying to subordinate political issues to economic ones.

During this period there continued to be articles on the subject of collective leadership and criticism within the party. The most significant of these was a March article by Petrenko in Voprosy Istorii KPSS. Petrenko argued that collective leadership and a scientific approach help prevent but cannot exclude serious mistakes and that Lenin had considered honest acknowledgement and correction of mistakes as a sign of the seriousness of the party, its moral strength, and its ability to implement revolutionary reorganizations. For example:

> The frank, bold statement on the serious mistakes and distortions, committed as a result of the personality cult of Stalin, which was made by our party at its own initiative can serve as an example of resolute criticism and self-criticism. The 20th Party Congress resolutely subjected these mistakes to fundamental criticism. The party began step by step to correct them . . . .

Petrenko stated that every party member has the right to criticize any other Communist no matter what position he holds, and that persons guilty of suppressing criticism should be punished--even expelled from the party. Petrenko seemed clearly to be indicating his strong support for current criticism of party members, at any level, implying that this was directed at high-ranking people--possibly Brezhnev.

However, Petrenko's concept of criticism was limited. He quoted Lenin to the effect that "if freedom of criticism means freedom to defend capitalism, then we will crush it." And he stated that it was necessary to take a critical look at the past, but that this look should not be negative:

> . . . For instance, many historians and writers are now striving to interpret in a critical manner the time during which the harmful consequences of the personality cult of Stalin had a negative influence on the development of Soviet society. This is a necessary step in the further development of historical science and artistic creativity. The task is not easy, but is of the highest degree of importance. Incompatible with its implementation, however, are the attempts to distort our past in a one-sided manner, in a distorted mirror, as just a solid chain of mistakes and shortcomings.

Thus Petrenko's article, while using the Stalin issue to illustrate the need for criticism, was conservative in emphasis, suggesting that it came from the neo-Stalinist faction which must have considered itself on the defensive at this time.

Leaders Speak

On 23 February First Deputy Defense Minister Grechko, in an Izvestiya article, completely exonerated the party leadership of blame for failing to prepare for World War II. Less than a year before, in June 1966, he had been quite critical of prewar preparations. Now he stated that

> In connection with the growing threat of an armed attack the party and government adopted the necessary measures to further strengthen the Soviet Army. In the period between 1 January 1939 and 1 June 1941 the numerical strength of the armed forces increased almost 2.5 times. The formation of mechanized corps, aviation divisions, and new artillery and anti-tank units began in 1940-1941, but unfortunately by the outbreak of the war they had not yet been fully supplied with new material equipment.

In April Grechko became USSR Minister of Defense, reportedly with Brezhnev's backing, and in a 9 May article in Pravda he completely explained away the initial setbacks of the war:

> . . . Encouraged by the reactionary circles of the Western powers, Hitler at the time of the attack on the Soviet Union had enslaved most European countries and had forced their manpower and industrial resources to serve his predatory plans. As a result, fascist Germany invaded the territory of our country with an emormous already mobilized and powerful army. Not a single state could have resisted such pressure. Only a state born by the Great October and only a people who had liberated themselves from the fetters of capitalism were strong enough to engage in a singlehanded struggle against such a formidable enemy and achieve a brilliant victory.

In the spring several members of the hierarchy referred in speeches to the state of culture in the Soviet Union. In his March election speech, Brezhnev cited shortcomings in creative work and stated that criticism of these shortcomings was directed solely at the fruitful development of culture and that this was a concern which the party manifests unfailingly and constantly. While still more moderate than statements by neo-Stalinists such as Shelest and Yegorychev, this was Brezhnev's strongest statement up to this time on the subject of party control of the arts.

In late April two somewhat different attitudes toward cultural matters were expressed by Kirilenko and Yegorychev. Kirilenko in the past had expressed both moderate and pro-Brezhnev sentiments. In November 1966 he had given a speech in which he strongly praised Brezhnev for his wartime activities. Now, on 22 April, he stated simply that Soviet literature and art were flowering. Two days later, in Pravda, Yeogrychev warned against negative attitudes and called for the strengthening of ideological work. He stated that one cannot for a minute forget that

communism is being built in circumstances of a sharp struggle of two ideologies, and that malicious attacks on the revolution and falsification of historical events had intensified. He stated that Soviet history must be evaluated correctly and he casually dismissed the crimes of the Stalin era:

> Of course, now everything is clear, as they say, looking back. Apparently some things could have been done better perhaps and with less expenditure of forces . . . . At one time in our country so much was said about errors and mistakes that some people . . . could get the impression that all we have done is make mistakes . . . . We must have a more exacting attitude than ever before toward everything that is put out in publications, that is presented in exhibits, that is put out on screens and on stages of theaters and is secured in concert halls. The role of Communist creative organs grows especially in this.

Thus, whereas Kirilenko had indicated that all was well, Yegorychev was full of accusations and warnings that the party would exert even more pressure upon the intellectuals. This difference between these two speeches suggests that while Brezhnev and his followers supported re-Stalinizing and a generally orthodox position, they were being pushed to proceed still more rapidly toward more repressive measures. This pressure still being exerted by the neo-Stalinists was apparently part of their ongoing effort to gain the initiative in their struggle for the leadership.

The Fourth All-Union Writers Congress finally opened in May, having been postponed several times previously. The party's message to the congress demanded of literature well-developed ideological criteria, emphasized party control of the arts, and warned against western influence. Podgornyy was the highest-ranking speaker at the congress and the tone of his speech was orthodox, although he did not call for further party control of the arts or do any threatening. He discussed the fierce

struggle taking place between the two social systems and said that ideological enemies try to disarm the Soviet people. He said that loyalty to the truth of life and the indelible principles of party-mindedness enable writers to write vivid history of the great deeds of the Soviet people. On the other hand, he had only praise for Soviet writers, and said that there was every reason to expect that the writers union would continue to champion party-mindedness and people-mindedness. Thus, he seemed to be saying that any control necessary should be exercized by the writers union, a clear difference from Yegorychev's threat that the party should do more.

In a speech on 12 June Mzhavanadze called for the purification of party ranks and used a Stalin quotation to support his point. Whether or not he was calling for a purge of impure party members is not certain, but such a call is implied, making this a very threatening speech:

> First, I would like to draw your attention to the need for a most decisive struggle for the purity of party ranks . . . . The penetration of the party by unworthy members has not yet been overcome . . . . I will cite in this connection the words of I.V. Stalin, who said that there was nothing higher than the title of a member of the party, the founder and leader of which was Comrade Lenin. He also said, "It is not given to everyone to be a party member . . ." This means that the door of the party must not be open to all but only to worthy people, entirely dedicated to the cause of the party.

In June 1967 the theses of the central committee for the 50th anniversary were published. They contained some criticism of the cult of Stalin, although they presented the 50 years of Soviet rule as a period of unbroken progress. To the extent that they reintroduced some criticism of the cult, however, they differed from the January central committee decree on preparations for the anniversary. That decree had projected an overwhelmingly favorable image of the entire course of Soviet history.

There was no mention of Stalin or criticism of his reign--not even a reference to difficulties at the start of the war. Thus the return of some criticism was a definite shift.*

Shelepin's Defeat and Reaction To It

In the spring and early summer of 1967 Shelepin suffered a series of defeats in the form of personnel shifts. Goryunov, the head of TASS and a Shelepin man, was replaced in April. In the same month Grechko became Minister of Defense, replacing Malinovskiy, who had died two weeks earlier. In the intervening two weeks a number of reports had circulated to the effect that Shelepin was backing Ustinov, party secretary in charge of the defense industry, while Brezhnev favored Grechko. In May Shelepin's protege Semichastnyy was replaced as KGB chief by Andropov.** While the KGB had had several failures right before this shift--including the defection of Stalin's daughter--it seems clear that the firing of Semichastnyy was primarily a blow at Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction. Also in May, Pospelov was relieved as Chairman of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, a position he had held since 1949. While Pospelov's allegiances are not clear, the timing of his removal and the fact that his journal had published Petrenko's March article which was apparently anti-Brezhnev, suggests that he was considered sympathetic to Shelepin.

A crisis in the leadership occurred following the Middle East debacle in early June. At the end of that month a party plenum was held and Brezhnev apparently reported on the situation. A number of regional leaders (all republic first secretaries except Masherov who had previously indicated his neo-Stalinist tendencies) rose

*See page 98 for further discussion.

**In June Andropov was taken off the Secretariat, but became a candidate member of the Politburo, the highest position held by a KGB chief since Beriya's death.

to support Brezhnev. However, Yegorychev, in his speech, reportedly attacked the regime's handling of the situation, possibly arguing that the Soviet Union should have taken a stronger position. Yegorychev's apparent support of a harder foreign policy provides an example of the correlation between these policies and the Stalin issue. Yegorychev, one of the most outspoken members of the neo-Stalinist faction, was also supporting a very hard foreign policy.

Several days after his attack, the Moscow city committee relieved Yegorychev of his positions and appointed Viktor Grishin, who had previously headed the Soviet trade union organization. The following month Shelepin replaced Grishin as head of Soviet trade unions, indicating a further decline in his fortunes and strongly suggesting that he was being punished along with Yegorychev* for the latter's move at the congress. At the September plenum Shelepin was released from his position on the secretariat; however, he retained his position on the Politburo.

Following Yegorychev's removal and Shelepin's demotion, a group of articles appeared defending collective leadership and the right of party members to criticize. These seemed clearly to be reactions to the firing of Yegorychev and indicated the degree of support for Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction within the party apparatus. They may also have represented the fear of various second-level officials that they might meet Yegorychev's fate. For example, the first article was by Georgiy Popov, Yegorychev's counterpart in Leningrad City. The Leningrad party organization had long been hard-line; now it was clearly siding with Yegorychev and, by implication, Shelepin. Popov emphasized the right to criticize and the dangers inherent in the tendency of some leaders to suppress criticism from below and to attempt one-man leadership.

The second article was by Petrenko, who had previously written several articles defending collective leadership and the right to criticize. The article was published in Partiynaya Zhizn' in September and was particularly interesting as Petrenko again raised the personality cult spectre, even though he seemed to be defending Yegorychev, a neo-Stalinist. Petrenko stated

*Yegorychev was subsequently named Deputy Minister of Tractor-Agricultural Machine Building.

that the party theses issued in June had resolutely condemned the cult of Stalin's personality which had expressed itself in the raising up of the role of one person which, he said, is alien to Marxism-Leninism and a deviation from the principle of collective leadership. He went on to defend collective leadership, and to say that the party secretary must not misuse his position. In praising criticism he stated that "cases where certain officials /Brezhnev?/ incorrectly take criticism from below /Yegorychev?/ are far from having been eliminated."

The third article in this series also appeared in Partiynaya Zhizn' in the same month; this too is significant as Khaldeyev, a close Shelepin associate, had been appointed chief editor of that journal in the spring of 1966. In this article Masherov, the Belorussian First Secretary and apparently a member of Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction, quoted from Brezhnev's speech at the 23rd Congress in support of criticism and self-criticism. According to Masherov, each party member should have an opportunity to express his judgments, expose shortcomings, and work to eliminate these shortcomings. He said that an important place in the development of criticism is occupied by central committee plenums /such as the June plenum at which Yegorychev expressed his criticism?/ and that a correct response to criticism is necessary. Critics must be listened to and their criticism must be followed by the correction of errors. Masherov went on to say that critics too have a responsibility and should not be impatient, and should not engage in criticism for the sake of criticism or in order to achieve some personal egotistical goals. However, Masherov left little doubt of where his allegiance lay. He stated that the desire of a leader to guard himself from criticism could lead to violations of Leninist norms and he closed with a case study. He cited a bureau head /Brezhnev?/ who was justifiably criticized for shortcomings. But the bureau head was offended and took revenge by accusing the critic /Yegorychev?/ of irresponsibility and having him transferred to a lower paying job.

A fourth article dealing with this subject appeared on 19 September in Sovetskaya Rossiya; this was written by Gorkiy First Secretary Katushev, who has been close to

Brezhnev,* and its tone was quite different from that of the other three. Katushev did not emphasize collective leadership nor did he stress the right to criticize; rather he concentrated on the need to convince through argumentation and reasonable plemics. He stated that sometimes opponents act without restraint and hurl accusations at each other, a situation which results in even greater divergence of viewpoints. He stated that in order to convince someone it is neceesary to use logic and reason--that no organizational measures or administrative threats can force him to change his mind. While these words might have been directed at Brezhnev, Katushev's closing statements supported the view that the main target was Yegorychev and the neo-Stalinists. Katushev stated that freedom of discussion is permitted only until a decision is adopted, and that then that decision must be carried out. He stated that sometimes a complication arises when a man who agreed to a decision and voted for it, subsequently does not implement it--a possible reference to Yegorychev's criticism of Middle East policy after the fact. Katushev closed by stating that conviction and exactingness must be joined, and he quoted Lenin to the effect that after the attempt to convince fails, then force may be used.

It is ironic that in the first three of these articles, written in defense of Yegorychev (and by implication Shelepin as well) by his neo-Stalinist allies, liberal arguments were used. Support of a Stalinist position carries with it implied approval of the right of the leader to get rid of his opponents, and the need of the Shelepin group was the opposite--to emphasize the rights of those not in control to attack with impunity. As a result, a somewhat bizarre situation arose in which supporters of Yegorychev, one of the most fanatic re-Stalinizers, were forced to resort to arguments for collective leadership, the right of criticism, and even outright condemnation of the cult of personality, in an effort to safeguard their

*Katushev's appointment as Gorkiy First Secretary had been personally supervised by Brezhnev in December 1965; Katushev had indicated strong support for Brezhnev at the 23rd Congress and Brezhnev personally defended Gorkiy Oblast' in January 1967 after it had been criticized in Pravda in 1966.

own survival. In defense of Brezhnev, Katushev responded with an article stating in effect that the right to argue is limited to the period before a decision is made, but that then there must be unity and compliance.

Year End Atmosphere Repressive

An insight into the atmosphere prevailing at high levels of the Soviet hierarchy was provided in a private speech given by Pravda editor Zimyanin in October. Zimyanin first attacked Solzhenitsyn, calling him a schizophrenic who was obsessed with his years in a concentration camp and the fact that he had been "justly or unjustly" repressed. He stated that Solzhenitsyn's works were anti-Soviet and that in the old days he would have been imprisoned for them--that certainly they could not have been published.* He then turned on Voznesenskiy, condemning him for his behavior in June. Voznesenskiy had complained bitterly about the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States in a letter to Pravda which found its way to the West.** Zimyanin stated that he had met with Voznesenskiy, who had denied having sent the letter to the West himself. Zimyanin reported that he had told the poet that while he might get off with a reprimand this time if it ever happened again

> . . . I told him . . . that he would be crushed . . . that I myself would see to it that he did not even leave a wet spot . . . .

The 50th anniversary of Soviet rule was celebrated in November and was unsensational. As suggested by the January decree on preparations for the anniversary and the

*The December issue of Noviy Mir had reportedly planned to carry Solzhenitsyn's novel The Cancer Ward; when this issue finally appeared in February 1968, the novel was not included. According to several Soviet sources, this decision had been made in high political circles and had involved a bitter struggle before Christmas.

**See page 91 for further discussion.

theses issued in June, the entire period of Soviet history was treated overwhelmingly favorably. Even the cult, which had been condemned in the theses, was not mentioned. Brezhnev gave the major speech on this occasion. He did not mention Stalin by name, but was favorable by implication. He praised the 18th Congress of 1939 and stated that the party had foreseen the possibility of a military clash with the forces of imperialism at this time and had prepared the country and the people for defense. He admitted that there had been miscalculations, but explained these away on the basis of the pioneering role of the Soviet regime.

During December there were various rumors that more members of the Shelepin group would lose their positions. The reports involved the chairmen of the committees on broadcasting and television (Mesyatsev), publishing (Mikhaylov), and cultural relations with foreign countries (Romanovskiy), and indicated that these committees would either be abolished or absorbed by the council of ministers. These reports were partially vindicated by a 23 December Izvestiya announcement that Romanovskiy's committee had been abolished. Thus, at this time, Shelepin still appeared to be very much on the defensive.

INTELLECTUALS

Pressure Increases; Protests Continue

Following Brezhnev's favorable mention of Stalin in November 1966, pressure on intellectuals to conform was to increase. However, liberal intellectuals continued to make their feelings and apprehensions known. On 27 December Literaturnaya Gazeta published a fascinating article by A. Yanov, which contained a strong liberal appeal for a truthful examination of the past. Yanov called for a clear interpretation of past and present, and stated that problems need investigation--not indignation. He argued that an examination of the past is a prerequisite to obtaining freedom from the consequences of those mistakes:

> 'A nation which has forgotten its past runs the risk of experiencing it again,' said some philosopher.

Yanov then attacked an Oktyabr' article by K. Bukovskiy.

> K. Bukovskiy writes: 'Regardless of what we were--blind or "hypnotized"--and regardless of the origin of the "hypnosis"--in those years we not only did not lie, but we had no doubts about anything.' And that is all! Black on white. But wait a minute, esteemed Konstantin Ivanovich, how about the investigation of the mechanism of that gigantic illusion, that unprecedented historical mystification, and that "hypnosis" which you yourself were talking about,--has it been completed, exhausted, signed and filed away in the archives? So what gives you the right to offer your personal opinion and your personal experiences as the final result of the investigation as a categorical imperative? How do you know that 'we' did not doubt?

In December Soviet intellectuals again expressed their apprehension at orthodox trends, this time in a letter which warned against confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of a decree published in September 1966, extending Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code to cover literary protests.* The letter was signed by nine academicians, various members of the intellectual community, and a number of Old Bolsheviks. It stated that the signers considered the adoption of the decree unjustified and that the decree raised the danger of "violations of socialist legality" and the "creation of an atmosphere of suspicion and denunciation" (i.e., a return to Stalinist methods).

The concern expressed both by Yanov, who was in effect stating that the refusal to continue to probe the crimes of the Stalin era could well foreshadow a return to Stalinist methods, and of the intellectuals, who were protesting what they considered to be the sign of such

*See Appendix Items C for text of decree and D for text of protest.

a return, was valid. The year 1967 opened with a harsh clamp-down on the dissident intellectuals. In mid-January Yuriy Galanskov, editor of Feniks (Phoenix) 1966, a secret typewritten literary-publicist journal,* was arrested, as were three of his co-workers. On 22 January a demonstration held to protest these arrests resulted in the arrests of more people, including art critic Igor Golomshtok, who had defended Sinyavskiy at his trial, and Viktor Khaustov, who was subsequently sentenced to four years in a labor camp. Khaustov was the first person convicted and sentenced under the new section of Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Others arrested at this time were tried in August 1967.**

On 24 January it was reported from Moscow that Aleksandr Ginsburg had been arrested for compiling the Belaya Kniga (White Book), a collection of documents on the Daniel Sinyavskiy case. Ginsburg had sent a copy to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in October 1966. Ginsburg and Galanskov were tried in January 1968.*** In March, according to Posev,**** a number of young people were arrested in Leningrad on charges of having organized a circle connected with emigre groups under the cover of a philosophical circle. Posev reported that a trial was being prepared for some of these people, and that as a result of preliminary investigations, 11 of the 25 had been sent to psychiatric hospitals or released under surveillance.

The general tightening of policy was also revealed in the closing down of two art exhibits in January. One

*Among the items published in Feniks was the previously mentioned "Discussion of the Third Volume of the History of the CPSU."

**See page 93 for further discussion of the trial.

***See page 94 for further discussion of this trial.

****An anti-Soviet emigre publishing organization in West Germany.

was an unofficial, unsanctioned exhibit of unorthodox art and the second was a display of Chagal paintings.* On 23 January the Fifth Plenum of the USSR Union of Artists was held and dogmatic speeches were given by the union's acting head, F. Belashova, and by USSR Minister of Culture, Yekaterina Furtseva. Furtseva had been quite moderate in previous speeches and stood out for her moderate statement at the 23rd congress. Her shift at this time suggests that she had been given clear instructions about prevailing policy.

Campaign Against Noviy Mir

During the first few months of 1967 there was considerable evidence that the liberal journal Noviy Mir was in trouble. The first indication came in a 27 January Pravda editorial--its first major editorical on culture in over a year. In a personnel change in January Kunitsyn, a consistent hard-liner and formerly deputy chief of the central committee's cultural section, became editor of Pravda's Department of Art and Literature; he may have been responsible for this editorial which criticized both Noviy Mir and Oktyabr', but was much more harsh in its comments on the former.

On 1 February Literaturnaya Gazeta published an article which followed the line of Pravda's editorial. This journal had reportedly been taken over by a dogmatic group in December, although Chakovskiy remained as chief editor; in January the paper began a new format. In this article Noviy Mir was sharply criticized. The journal was also attacked at a session of the Board of the Union of Writers during this period. At the meeting various speakers pointed out the "substantial ideological and artistic errors, over-simplification, and shortcomings in the journal's activities."

An 8 March article by Tvardovskiy in Literaturnaya Gazeta revealed, however, that he would not give in easily.

*In February three of the artists who had participated in the exhibit were called to a meeting of their combine and "condemned."

He stated that "We are attentive and will be attentive in the future to criticism," but only if this criticism

> proceeds from the lofty concepts of the literature of a socialist society, worthy of the great traditions of Russian realism bequeathed by the classics.

His omission of the adjective "socialist" modifying "realism" indicated his continued opposition to the official line. In March, while in Italy attending a writers meeting, Tvardovskiy stated that the concept of realism did not need to be explained by adjectives.

Publication of Noviy Mir was held up during the early part of 1967. During January there were reports that the central committee was trying to force changes in the editorial board by removing A. Dementyev and B. Zaks, two assistant editors upon whom Tvardovskiy reportedly relied heavily. The party central apparatus was said to be reluctant to have a scandal but determined to weaken Tvardovskiy. In March, when the first issue of the journal finally appeared, Dementyev and Zaks had been removed from the board and three new members had been added. The two removed were definitely liberals; the leanings of the new three was less clear.

In May Yunost' published two poems by Tvardovskiy, both applicable to freedom and the attacks made against him. The first read

> I myself inquire and find
> All my own mistakes.
> I shall remember them
> Without a given libretto.
> There is no sense--I am a grown man--
> In laughable self-defense.
> But please, don't hang on my soul.
> Don't breath down my neck.

In the second, more allegorical poem, Tvardovskiy described his birth--under the fir trees in the forest--saying it is

Dnipro was quickly rebuffed for publishing such an article. On 25 February Molodoy Ukrainy attacked the journal and said that it had been criticized by the Ukrainian Komsomol central committee.

Another example of a republic journal being censured is that of Zvezda Vostoka, the organ of the Uzbek Union of Writers. In its first four issues of 1967 the journal published a number of works by semi-controversial authors. In one of these Konstantin Simonov reviewed For Whom the Bell Tolls, and alluded to the purges. The fifth and sixth issues of the journal did not carry any such works in spite of promises that it would do so, and in August, the editor V. Kostyria, was reportedly dismissed.

In April and May, in the weeks preceding the Fourth Writers Congress, the efforts by the liberals to stage a comeback were overshadowed by the orthodox articles being published. On 19 April an editorial in Literaturnaya Gazeta made a strong demand for unity and central control over the arts. It used as its reference the 35th anniversary of the party resolution which banned all independent literary organizations and forced writers into a single, tightly-controlled writers union. Similarly, Pravda published two threatening articles on the eve of the congress. One implied that those who did not respond properly to criticism might well lose their jobs, and the other, one of whose authors was Kunitsyn, called for more aggressive criticism of incorrect concepts. This article proposed the establishment of an institution of "readers' opinions" to help those involved in publishing works to deepen the educational influence of literature and art; in other words they proposed the establishment of still another control organization to weed out "incorrect concepts."

Originally scheduled for the spring of 1966, the Fourth Writers Congress had been postponed twice before it finally opened in late May 1967. According to several reports the congress had been put off because of dissidence and "hundreds" of writers had been arrested in Leningrad and Kiev in the weeks before the congress. An orthodox line dominated at the congress and the most interesting

episode occurred behind the scenes. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn circulated a letter to the delegates strongly condemning censorship in the Soviet Union and describing his own persecution at the hands of the authorities.* In addition, 79 intellectuals circulated a petition calling for discussion of Solzhenitsyn's letter. According to [redacted] Solzhenitsyn was severely reprimanded after the congress and threatened with expulsion from the union if he did not mend his ways. In June 1967 Grani** published a letter sent by an anonymous person in Moscow, stating that even Solzhenitsyn himself had given up hope of being published.

Solzhenitsyn's letter was followed in the early summer of 1967 by a number of protests, concerning censorship. The intellectuals had undoubtedly been frightened by increasing threats of tightened control as well as by the actual clamp-down on liberal journals and dissident intellectuals. It seems likely that they were encouraged to mount their attack when they did because of the defeat of Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction in the spring and early summer.

On 19 June a scheduled trip to New York by the poet Andrey Voznesenskiy was suddenly cancelled. Voznesenskiy, obviously angry, sent a letter to Pravda in which he described the "atmosphere of blackmail, confusion, and provocation" in which he had been living. A copy of this letter was sent to the West and printed in the New York Times.*** On 2 July Voznesenskiy appeared at the Taganka Theater and read a poem attacking censorship; two days later he was reportedly called before a special meeting of the Board of the Union of Writers and put under pressure to withdraw the comments in his letter and poem. He refused to do so even though he was censured and threatened with expulsion from the union.****

*See Appendix Item E.

**The quarterly journal of Posev.

***See Appendix Item F.

****See also page 83 for Voznesenskiy's reported conversation with Zimyanin, who reportedly threatened him if he did not conform.

SECRET

SECRET

On 30 June Komsomolskaya Pravda carried an article by Pravda correspondent Burlatskiy and a former secretary of the Komsomol Karpinskiy. These two men attacked censorship in the theater and strongly implied their support of freedom to criticize. They attacked those who avoid discussing certain phenomena because it might put the system in an unfavorable light, stating that these people sacrifice real political interests--the improvement of Soviet society--for the sake of improperly understood propaganda interests. They argued that art is obligated to intrude into life and touch all its aspects. They said that Lenin's formula for guiding creative work

> definitely excludes a secret and narrow departmental approach which is never guaranteed against a subjective bias . . . .

Publication of this liberal article in the organ of the Komsomol, an organization headed by Shelepin protege Sergey Pavlov indicates that the neo-Stalinist faction had allied itself with the liberals on the issue of censorship, as well as on the subject of the right to criticize. The publication of this article coincided with the publication of three articles defending collective leadership and freedom to criticize which were published following Yegorychev's dismissal and Shelepin's setback.

This particular article was decisively rebuffed only a week after its publication. On 8 July Komsomolskaya Pravda itself, in an editorial, rejected the article, calling it erroneous and stating that it contradicted party principles.

> The Komsomol Central Committee having examined the article . . . has found that the publication of the article was a crude ideological mistake on the part of the Komsomolskaya Pravda editorial board.

The editorial then quoted Brezhnev's comments on party guidance of the arts, made at the 23rd Congress. Thus, this attempt to challenge Brezhnev, made in the form of

SECRET

a liberal article but apparently sanctioned by the neo-Stalinists, was rejected immediately, undoubtedly at the bidding of high-level officials.

Year Ends With Harsh Policy

In the fall of 1967 the ominous tendencies continued. On 30 August Vladimir Bukovskiy and two others arrested in January for protesting the arrests of Galanskov and his co-workers went on trial. Bukovskiy, who said he had organized the demonstration was sentenced to three years and the two others to one year each. Bukovskiy did not plead guilty at his trial, although the Soviet press indicated that he had; on the contrary he made a spirited plea in his own behalf and attacked the manner in which the whole trial had been conducted. The text of his plea was attached to a letter sent by Pavel Litvinov to four Soviet newspapers, as well as to the French and Italian party papers. In his letter Litvinov, the grandson of Maxim Litvinov and a physicist, described a warning he had received from the KGB not to become involved in any reporting on the Bukovskiy trial.* Litvinov defied this order and has subsequently participated in the drafting of several protests.

Evidence of further pressure being exerted on the intellectuals came from several sources. On 22 September the head of Moscow City party's cultural section, Solovyeva, called for more control by theater party organizations over theater repertories:

> There are cases when it is necessary for all the members of the party bureau to convince one director or another that he must review his selection of plays or his outline and at times even replace a performer.

In October a joint plenum of the boards of cultural unions and organizations of the USSR and RSFSR was held, and a very dogmatic line dominated. Ye. Belashova stated that the artist must take a side in the struggle for ideologies and that "even silence can be treason."

*See Appendix Item G.

The 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution came and went in November and there was no indication that the prevailing repressive line would lift. In fact, if there was any shift in policy line in the months after the anniversary, it was toward a still more orthodox line. In October and November Oktyabr' published a novel by Kochetov in which Stalin was viewed as a very positive, though fairly minor, figure and the use of terror received implied approval.

Even more threatening than orthodox articles, however, were the continuing arrests and trials of intellectuals. In mid-December there was a report that four people were being tried in Leningrad on the serious charge of having participated in an armed terrorist network trying to overthrow the Soviet state. This trial had reportedly grown out of the arrest in early 1967 of 25 intellectuals connected with the philosophy department at the University of Leningrad. Many rumors circulated in Moscow, including the report that similar groups had been discovered in the Ukraine and another that the case was so serious that the central committee had met to consider it. Other reported trials included one involving six youths in Moscow charged with distributing anti-Soviet leaflets and one involving a student charged with writing an allegedly anti-Soviet film script. A report smuggled to the West in early 1968 contained charges made by a Ukrainian journalist, Vyacheslav Chornovil, that harsh repressions were taking place in the Ukraine. Chornovil, who was sentenced to 18 months in a labor camp in November 1967, had addressed his letter to Shelest. In it he described the KGB techniques of harrassment and extracting confessions; he also described a number of arrests and trials of intellectuals in the Ukraine during 1966 and 1967.

In January 1968 the four individuals arrested the previous January--Ginsburg, Galanskov, Dobrovolskiy, and Lashkova, went on trial. In connection with this particular case, several petitions were reportedly circulated. The first was said to be signed by about 100 members of the intellectual community and was sent to the Procurator General; it requested assurances that the trial would be

public. The second petition was reportedly signed by 44 intellectuals and charged that the long imprisonment of the four persons without trial was in violation of the criminal code of the Soviet Union. In addition, Litvinov and the wife of the imprisoned author, Yuriy Daniel denounced the trial in a letter which was published in the West.* In what they termed an appeal to world opinion, they condemned the manner in which the trial had been held and demanded a new trial. Litvinov was subsequently fired from his position as a physics instructor. Two other petitions were reportedly circulated with respect to this trial; one was an appeal by 30 intellectuals and the other a petition of 12 who wished to appear as defense witnesses. In December there were reports of another petition, this one signed by 180 Moscow intellectuals who urged that a law be adopted which would implement the constitution's pledge of freedom of the press. All of these pleas were to no avail; the trial of the four was not public and heavy sentences were imposed. Ginzburg and Galanskov received seven and five year sentences respectively; Dobrovolskiy, who turned state's evidence, received a two-year sentence, and Lashkova, who had merely typed for the group, received a one-year sentence.

Thus, during the early part of 1968 there was considerable evidence that a very harsh policy prevailed--the harshest policy since the death of Stalin--and that repression of intellectuals who dared to voice opinions which deviated from the party line would continue. Official sanction was put on this policy with the central committee resolution passed at the April 1968 plenum; this resolution called for a further tightening of ideological pressure.

STALIN THEMES

Stalin Era Whitewashed

The continued shift toward more and more orthodox views, revealed in the arrests of dissident intellectuals in early 1967, was also reflected in the new extremes reached in extolling the Stalin era. In November and December, on the eve of the anniversary of the Battle of Moscow, numerous articles and speeches were published

praising Stalin for his leadership at this time of crisis. In a January article in Molodaya Gvardiya, N. Mikhaylov, possibly the chairman of the State Committee for Publishing and a Shelepin protege, described Komsomol unity during the war and attributed this to Stalin's inspiring leadership. Mikhaylov stated that Stalin must have known of Hitler's designs, for with his experience and hatred of fascism he would not have treated reports of the planned attack carelessly. But he also knew what Hitler's strength was, so he tried up until the last minute to ward off the approaching war and buy time for preparations. He stated that Stalin withstood all pressures because he had great ideological conviction, implicit faith in the party, and recognition of the party's authority.

A 16 January broadcast over Moscow Domestic Service on the years from 1933 to 1941 ignored any errors or problems of the period, and concentrated on praising industrial and agricultural growth. It paid tribute to the 1936 constitution as well as to the 1937 elections which saw a "remarkable victory" for the block of party and non-party candidates. It praised the 18th party congress of 1939 for its approval of the war prevention policy of the party--and it totally ignored the purges.

In March Kommunist Moldaviya urged that the positive achievements of collectivization be stressed and attacked a West German author (a euphemism for Soviet writers who make the same point) who

> attempts to impose on the reader the current but absolutely groundless thesis prevalent in bourgeois historiography concerning the forcible nature of collectivization . . . .

And on 7 May Pravda published an article which glossed over the disagreement between Stalin and Lenin on the subject of nationalities in 1917:

> . . . On the basis of the report by I.V. Stalin, the conference adopted a resolution signed by V. I. Lenin, on the nationalities

question. The Bolshevik Party came forth decisively in favor of meeting the demands of the working people of all oppressed nations, recognizing their right to self-determination, including separation and formation of an independent state.

On 30 May Krasnaya Zvezda criticized various World War II memoirs, and charged that personal memoirs should not contradict the "truth of history." It attacked those who criticize General Headquarters for its conduct of the war, stating that

> The best evidence of the fact that the General Headquarters and its working organ, the General Staff, skillfully directed the operations of the Soviet troops is the victorious outcome of the war. The General Headquarters included prominent commanders and party and state leaders. The Supreme Commander, I.V. Stalin, displayed great firmness; his leadership of the military operations was on the whole correct, and his merits in this field were numerous.

In this early part of 1967, there was a virtual suspension of any references to the purges and rehabilitations of purge victims. Even the provincial papers halted publication of such articles with very few exceptions. Interestingly, those references which did appear seemed to involve the military. For example, in February the Armenian paper Kommunist published a series of articles on Marshal Gay and there was also apparently a commemorative meeting held for Gay in which Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan participated. On 26 March Krasnaya Zvezda carried an article by Marshal Vasilyevskiy in which he referred to Tukhachevskiy as an outstanding theorist and leader. Both Tukhachevskiy and Gay had been proponents of modernization of Soviet forces before their purges, and it is possible that these particular rehabilitations were being pushed by those who wished more emphasis to be put on modernization of Soviet armed forces.

In June 1967 the central committee issued its theses on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the revolution. On the subject of war preparations, the theses gave official sanction to the complete ignoring of prewar miscalculations and errors. The theses stated that the Soviet Union had done all it could to establish a system of collective security in Europe, but that these efforts were rebuffed by the men of Munich who preferred an alliance with Hitler. In this very complex situation the Soviet Union had been forced to sign a nonaggression pact with Hitler, thereby gaining time to prepare. Even though the party and government took steps to strengthen defenses it was impossible to prevent war. The theses also praised the 20th party congress resolution which it said had condemned the Stalin personality cult; the cult, according to the theses, had expressed itself in the glorification of the role of one man, departures from the Leninist principle of collective leadership, unwarranted repression, and other violations of socialist legality. This reference is very low key, as the resolution passed by the 20th Congress was relatively mild; the strong anti-Stalin element at the congress was Khrushchev's "secret speech."

Wartime Errors Erased

On 21 July the new First Deputy Minister of Defense, Yakubovskiy, wrote an article for Krasnaya Zvezda which successfully passed over whatever errors there might have been in prewar preparations. He praised measures taken to train military personnel and did not even make an oblique reference to the purges. He then explained why the Soviet Union had suffered some defeats in the early stages of the war:

> It was not possible, however, to fully implement the planned program of preparing the armed forces for the war. Specifically, the rearmament of the ground forces with new military technical equipment and the formation of mechanized groups of units remained unfinished. This explains the

difficulties encountered by our troops in the first period of the Great Fatherland War . . . .

In mid-July it was reported that Nekrich, author of the controversial book 22 June 1941, which had been published in 1965 and discussed at a stormy meeting early in 1966, had been expelled from the party. Thus, Nekrich became the scapegoat for past "errors" in analysis of prewar preparedness and Stalin's wartime role, and an example to those who might wish to write in a similar vein. It was also reported that the editor who had approved the publication of Nekrich's book had been fired. In September Voprosy Istorii KPSS followed this with an attack on Nekrich by Deborin, who had also participated in the February 1966 meeting held to criticize Nekrich's book.* Deborin claimed that the book had been written in the spirit of bourgeois historiography. He then proceeded to defend war preparations and the leadership of the party during the war; he asserted that the Soviet Union had signed the Ribbentrop Pact only when it was clear that an anti-Nazi alliance was impossible. Deborin denied that preparations for an attack had not been made and that the Soviet leadership had underestimated the danger of war.

On 24 August a Krasnaya Zvezda article by Major General Zhilin called for a new official wartime history to correct the "subjective" view of Stalin's leadership. He stated that bourgeois falsifiers must be refuted--that they try to discredit the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the prewar years and conceal the fact that this policy was directed at providing collective security in Europe and restraining aggressive forces. He called for criticism of subjective statements made by some memoirists who mistakenly evaluate the readiness of the Soviet Union to repulse aggression in the late 1930's and wrongly evaluate events at the start of the war.

An 8 December article in Krasnaya Zvezda completed the transition to a positive view of Stalin as prewar and wartime leader:

*See pages 57-59.

Historical experience obviously confirms the correctness of the military policy of the party at all stages of socialist construction and the decisive significance of the prewar five-year plans for the defense potential of the country. This experience rejects the formerly existing anti-historic views on alleged miscalculations of the Communist Party and Soviet government in the creation of military-economic potential. In any case, in such a short time the military-industrial base of the USSR simply could not reach the volume of the military-industrial base of fascist Germany, which as early as 1933 began to actively reorganize its economy for war purposes and later completed its military-economic potential by making use of the heavy industry of the European states it had occupied.

The treacherous attack on the Soviet Union by fascist Germany, which had previously mobilized its first-class equipped war machinery, as well as a certain incompleteness in the measures taken by our country to prepare itself to repel an aggression, allowed the Hitlerite army, despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, to rapidly penetrate into the USSR . . . . .

Thus all that remains of previous criticisms of the handling of the prewar situation, is the statement that there was a certain incompleteness in the measures taken to repel aggression.

Collectivization Smoothed Over

In August several articles were published on the period of collectivization. The first was by Brezhnev-protege Trapeznikov and appeared in Pravda on 4 August.

Trapeznikov acknowledged that there were complications and difficulties in collectivization, which were the result of the fact that this policy was carried out among a culturally backward and widely dispersed peasant population. He stated that this had been one of the "most brilliant periods" in Soviet history and that collectivization had been an historical necessity. However, he said that there had been no way of knowing exactly what stages had to be gone through, how fast to go, and exactly what economic forms the new type of enterprise would take.

> It must be said that a considerable mess and confusions prevailed in this respect. There were elements in the party which, engaging in hare-brained schemes for the selection of forms of collective economy, tried at first to create various types of gigantic units--agro-industrial combines--in order to propagate communes, or to design agro-cities without consideration for the objective conditions and the practical experience of the masses.

The agro-gorod concept described by Trapeznikov had been supported by Khrushchev; thus Trapeznikov had absolved Stalin and the party of any guilt and had shifted blame for confusion in agriculture to Khrushchev, implicating at the same time those who also had supported such policies--Podgornyy, Polyanskiy in 1959 and, more recently the Belorussians.

A 26 August article in Pravda Ukrainy by A. Yevdokimov continued the line found in Trapeznikov's article, and criticized the ideologists of anti-communism for treating collectivization as though it had been implemented contrary to Leninist principles. He then discussed the complexity of the development of socialist agriculture and some of the problems encountered. In particular, he stated that the defense of the country during the war had placed demands on heavy industry, thus retarding the strength of the material-technical base of agriculture. There was no mention of Stalin, and no indication that incorrect orders from the center had created difficulties in collectivization.

Stalin's Revolutionary Role Praised

On 8 August several articles were published commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Sixth Party Congress. A Pravda article by first deputy editor Zarodov stated that the report to the central committee, delivered by Stalin and Sverdlov, had presented a bright, vigorous picture of the development of the revolution. An article published in Belorussia also mentioned Stalin's report and noted that he was elected a member of the central committee. The article listed several delegates who had wavered on the subject of Lenin's court appearance, but Stalin was not included on the list. According to this article, Stalin did make one error, but the error is minimized. At a time when Lenin was saying that the situation was fully defined and power was in the hands of the counter-revolutionary military, Stalin stated that "it was still not clear in whose hands the power is." The article makes it clear that the situation had, in fact, only been defined for about a month. An October article in Pravda discussed the October 1917 adoption of a resolution on armed uprising, and listed Stalin among those who had supported Lenin.

In October the third volume of the History of the CPSU, which had caused such a furor in the summer of 1966, was finally published. It was accompanied on 26 October by a Pravda editorial which blasted previous one-sidedness and serious errors which had been made in the characterization of the early struggle of the party; these errors had involved viewing these struggles in terms of the blunders made by people involved in them. While the editorial did not mention Stalin by name he was obviously the person now being exonerated.

On 22 October the Georgian paper Zarya Vostoka published an article on the uprisings in Georgia in the early 1920's. In discussing Ordzhonikidze's handling of the uprising, the article referred constantly to telegrams sent to Lenin and Stalin; the two names are always mentioned together. Then, according to the article, in September 1920 Stalin was sent to study and clean up the situation in Georgia. After establishing Communist power

in that state, the article stated, the party's Orgburo adopted a decree at Stalin's suggestion calling for the immediate dispatch of cadres to Georgia.

Liberal Efforts--Feeble and Hopeless

Several feeble efforts were made by the moderates to combat the steadily increasing orthodox pressure, but these efforts were doomed to failure. The rehabilitation program was virtually ended, but there were several commemorative meetings held. In August such a meeting was held for Yan Rudzutak, who had died in the purges in 1938; Mikoyan spoke at this meeting as did various Latvian veterans of the revolution.* In September a similar meeting was held for another of Statlin's victims, Postyshev; press coverage of both these meetings was, however, minimal.

In October a war film based on a scenario by Konstantin Simonov opened in Moscow. Among the subjects discussed in the movie were the lack of preparedness for the war, Stalin's refusal to believe that the Germans would attack, and the catastrophic effect of the purges on the Soviet high command. According to one report this film had encountered fierce opposition before it was finally released; however, the fact that it was released indicated that there was still some support for a moderate position in high places.

Another interesting deviation from the general trend was the passage in September of a decree exonerating the Tatars of the charge of collaborating with the fascists. The decree stated that the accusation made in 1944 had been without foundation and had groundlessly attributed this crime to the whole Tatar population. This decree

*In December Mikoyan again demonstrated his sympathy for the liberals when he attended a performance of the controversail play "Bolsheviki" at the Sovremennik Theater and made a demonstrative show of approval. This play delivered the message that the start of Red Terror during the Civil War had been a dangerous step.

was passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of which Podgornyy is chairman. However, in spite of this rehabilitation there was apparently little change in the situation of the Tatars. A petition sent to the West in early 1968 included the charge that although the Tatars had been officially rehabilitated, they still could not return to their homeland.

On 30 December one of the most interesting turn arounds of this period occurred. Pravda Ukrainy, which had been one of the most outspoken of the neo-Stalinist journals, published a rehabilitation. On the 70th birthday of V. Primakov, a former member of the Military Council in Leningrad, the paper stated that he had been slandered in 1935, removed from his job, and a year later was dead. The use by this paper of a rehabilitation might be a further indication of the fear of the neo-Stalinists in the wake of the Yegorychev purge, that they were now in danger of being repressed by Brezhnev.

SUMMARY

A rigid, orthodox line dominated the first six months of 1967, in spite of reports of dissension within the leadership. While there may well have been dissension, a conservative-orthodox faction, led by Brezhnev and perhaps strongly influenced by Suslov, was strong enough to enforce its line. This line was demonstrated in the arrests of a number of intellectuals early in January and by large-scale arrests in the Ukraine and Leningrad on the eve of the Fourth Writers Congress. The leaders in these two areas, Shelest and Tolstikov, had been among the most outspoken proponents of the neo-Stalinist line; the suppression of intellectuals in their regions demonstrates the direct relationship between an expressed orthodox viewpoint and direct administrative action.

The few liberal articles which were published during this period were met with fairly swift punishment, reflecting the orthodox solution of dealing with non-conformists through administrative action. The most

notable example of this was the harrassment of Noviy Mir which culminated in the replacement of two key members of that journal's editorial board. Another instance was the expulsion of Nekrich from the party for having written a book in 1965 critical of the handling of prewar preparations. His expulsion was a clear warning to others who might be tempted to indulge in historical objectivity.

The orthodox line was also reflected in the continued halt in the rehabilitation program; the only exception was the publication of several articles on purged military leaders Gay and Tukhachevskiy. Both of these men had been supporters of modernization of the Soviet armed forces in the 1930's, and these articles might have been backed by contemporary supporters of increased emphasis on a modernized military establishment. Articles which appeared during this period concerning Stalin's wartime role and his actions as a revolutionary and leader seemed to exonerate him completely of any mistakes.

Signs of dissension within the leadership continued. Several more articles were published defending the need for collective leadership. One of these, by Petrenko, defended collective leadership and also called for the right of criticism and self-criticism within the party. The tone of Petrenko's article was quite hard-line, however, suggesting that he was speaking for the neo-Stalinists rather than the liberals. He used the cult of personality to illustrate the evils of one-man leadership--the first time the neo-Stalinists had resorted to this device.

Having effectively beaten down the moderates, Brezhnev was now ready to launch a major campaign against Shelepin, and during the spring and summer of 1967, the latter's strength was gradually whittled away. In April his protege Goryunov was relieved as head of TASS, and in May Semichastnyy was replaced as KGB chief. Following the Middle East crisis and his apparent challenge to the leadership on its handling of that situation, Yegorychev, the most outspoken member of the neo-Stalinist faction, was fired as Moscow City boss. As a final blow, Shelepin

was appointed head of the Soviet trade union organization and removed from the party secretariat.

In the wake of these major setbacks for the neo-Stalinist faction, several articles appeared defending collective leadership and the right of party members (i.e., Yegorychev) to express criticism of their superiors (i.e., Brezhnev) even at the highest party levels. These articles seemed clearly aimed at Brezhnev, and came in at least two instances from members of the neo-Stalinist camp. The adoption by this faction of an anti-Stalin line suggested real desperation on their part; their use of this line was clearly defensive--an attempt to stave off further setbacks. Another apparent shift was the publication of a rehabilitation by the neo-Stalinist journal Pravda Ukrainy in late December. Having previously backed the halt in the rehabilitation program as part of a general re-Stalinizing, they now apparently feared that they themselves were in danger of being purged and therefore were now identifying with the purge victims rather than with Stalin.

That Shelepin's defeat and that of various of his neo-Stalinist backers did not signify a corresponding defeat for their point of view was revealed almost immediately. Encouraged by Shelepin's defeat, the liberal intellectuals published several articles at the end of June in which they criticized censorship and seemed to urge its abolition. These articles were quickly suppressed. The continuation of a harsh policy was also reflected in the continuation of the arrests and trials of dissident intellectuals and in the favorable treatment Stalin and his policies continued to receive. Thus, it was clear that an orthodox line, favored by Brezhnev, still dominated.

APPENDIX A: TEXT OF APPEAL AGAINST STALIN'S REHABILITATION
March 1966

Respected Leonid Ilich!

Tendencies have appeared lately in some public speeches and articles in our press which are in fact directed at a partial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin. We do not know how firmly these tendencies are grounded, but they manifest themselves ever more frequently as the XXIII Party Congress draws nearer. However, even if it is only a matter of a partial revision of the decisions of the XX and XXII Party Congresses, this causes deep apprehension. We think it our duty to inform you about our opinion in this matter.

Until now we have not been aware of a single fact, of a single argument which would permit us to think that a condemnation of the personality cult was wrong in any of its respects. On the contrary, it is difficult to doubt that a large part of striking, of truly horrifying facts about Stalin's crimes has not yet been made public. These facts would confirm the absolute correctness of the decisions of both Party Congresses.

There is something else as well. We believe that any attempt to whitewash Stalin conceals a danger of serious dissensions within Soviet society. Stalin is responsible not only for the destruction of countless innocent people, for our unpreparedness for the war, for a departure from the Leninist norms of party and state life. His crimes and unjust deeds also distorted the idea of Communism to such an extent that our people will never forgive him for this. Our people will not understand and will not accept even a partial departure from the decisions on the personality cult. No one will be able to obliterate these decisions from its consciousness and memory. Any attempt to do so will lead only to confusion and disarray in the broadest circles. We are convinced, for instance, that this would cause great unrest among the intelligentsia and would seriously complicate the moods of our youth. Like the whole of the Soviet

public we are worried about the young people. No explanations or articles will make people believe in Stalin again; on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger. To undertake anything like this is dangerous, taking into account the complex economic and political situation of our country.

We also see another danger as equally serious. The question of Stalin's rehabilitation concerns not only home, but also international politics. Any step towards his rehabilitation would undoubtedly pose a threat of a new split in the ranks of the world Communist movement, this time between ourselves and the Communists of the West. They would assess this step as a surrender to the Chinese, to which they would never agree. This is a factor of exceptional importance which we cannot write off. In the time when we are threatened, on the one hand, by ever more active American imperialists and West German revanchists and, on the other, by the leaders of the Communist Party of China, it would be extremely unwise to risk a rift or even complications with the fraternal parties in the West.

So as not to claim your attention for too long we limit ourselves to mentioning only the most substantial arguments against any rehabilitation of Stalin, first and foremost concerning the danger of the two-way split. We do not even speak about the great complications which any departure from the decisions of the XX Party Congress would bring upon the international contacts of our cultural community--among other things upon its struggle for peace and international cooperation. All that has been achieved so far would be endangered.

We could not but write you about our thoughts. It is quite clear that a decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on this question cannot be regarded as a routine one, taken in the general course of work. In either case it will have historic importance for the destinies of our country. We hope that this will be taken into account.

APPENDIX B: TEXT OF SOVIET WRITERS' PETITION TO KREMLIN
November 1966

To the Presidium of the 23d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Comrades:

We, the undersigned group of Moscow writers, request you to grant us permission to stand surety for the recently sentenced writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. We believe that this would be an act of both wisdom and humanity.

Although we do not approve the means by which these writers published their work abroad, we cannot accept the view that their motives were in any way anti-Soviet, which alone could have justified the severity of the sentence. The prosecution failed to prove the existence of such a motive.

At the same time, the condemnation of writers for the writing of satirical works creates an extremely dangerous precedent and threatens to hold up the progress of Soviet culture. Neither learning nor art can exist if neither paradoxical ideas can be expressed nor hyperbolic images be used as an artistic device. In our complex situation today, we need more freedom for artistic experiment and certainly not its condemnation. From this standpoint, the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel has already caused us more harm than did any of their mistakes

Sinyavsky and Daniel are gifted men who should be given the chance to make up for their lack of political prudence and tact. If they were released on our surety and remained in touch with Soviet society, they would soon

realize their mistakes and redeem them by the artistic and ideological value of the new literary works they would create.

We beg you, therefore, to release Andrei Sinyavasky and Yuli Daniel on our surety.

This would be an act dictated by the interests of our country, the interests of the world and those of the world Communist movement.

APPENDIX C: TEXT OF A DECREE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE RSFSR [RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC] ON 16 SEPTEMBER, ENTITLED "ON THE ENTRY OF A SUPPLEMENT TO THE PENAL CODE OF THE RSFSR",16 September 1966

Chapter IX "Crimes Against the Administrative Order" in the Penal Code of the RSFSR is hereby supplemented by Articles 190 [sub-section 1], 190 [sub-section 2], and 190 [sub-section 3] which contain the following provisions:

Article 190--1. Spreading scientifically slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet system of government and social order: systematic dissemination, in verbal form, of scientifically slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet system of government and the Soviet social order, as well as preparation of writings or printed products of the same content and their dissemination in any form shall be punished with deprivation of freedom up to 3 years or with corrective labor terms up to one year or with a fine up to 100 rubles.

Article 190--2. Defamation of the coat of arms of the state or of the national flag: defamation of the government coat of arms or the flag of the USSR, the RSFSR, or any of the other Union Republics shall be punished by imprisonment of up to 2 years, corrective labor service up to one year, or a fine of up to 50 rubles.

Article 190--3. Staging group actions which violate public order or active participation in such actions: the staging of group actions or active participation in such actions, which violate public order in a serious manner or which are accompanied by open failure to comply with the legal requests of agents [representatives] of the government, or which interfere with the activities of the transportation system, of government and community [social] agencies or enterprises, shall be punished with imprisonment of up to 3 years or corrective labor service up to one year or a fine of up to 100 rubles.

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX D: PETITION AGAINST EXTENSION OF ARTICLE 190 January 1967

Copies to the Political Bureau of the CPSU;

to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR;

to the Attorney General of the USSR.

Comrade Deputies:

We, a group of Soviet citizens, consider it to be our duty to express our attitude toward the 16 September 1966 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR "On the Entry of a Supplement to the Penal Code of the RSFSR."

In our opinion, the additions to Articles 190--1 and 190--3, of the Penal Code of the RSFSR, have no foundation in the political reality of our land. The passage of such laws, at this time, seems to us to be an unjustified act which conjures up the danger of false judicial verdicts, the violation of socialist justice, and the creation of an atmosphere of suspicions and denunciations. Article 190--1 facilitates subjective evaluations and arbitrary interpretations of statements as scientific slander against the Soviet system of government and social order.

We are convinced that Article 190--1 and 190--3 are in conflict with the Leninist principles of socialist democracy. If the Plenum of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR should confirm these Articles, they might become an obstacle on the road to the implementation of the freedoms guaranteed in the USSR constitution.

The signers include the following: Academician Asturov, biologists; academician Zeldovich, physicist; academician Knunyants, chemist; academician Leontovich, physicist, Lenin Prize winner; academician Sakharov, physicist; academician Skazkin, historian; academician Tamm, physicist; academician Engelgardt, biochemist; author

SECRET

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Kaverin; author Nekrasov; author Dombrovskiy; author Voynovich; composer Shostakovich; movie director Romm.

This letter was also signed by a group of old Bolsheviks and others, giving us a total of 21 signatures, some of the signatures being illegible. The document was received by the Supreme Soviet between 1 and 10 January 1967.

APPENDIX E: TEXT OF SOLZHENITSYN LETTER PROTESTING CENSORSHIP, May 16, 1967

To the presidium and the delegates of the congress, to members of the Union of Soviet Writers, to the editors of literary newspapers and magazines:

I.

The oppression, no longer tolerable, that our literature has been enduring from censorship for decades and that the Union of Writers cannot accept any further.

This censorship under the obscuring label of Glavlit [Soviet censorship agency], not provided for by the Constitution and therefore illegal and nowhere publicly labeled as such, is imposing a yoke on our literature and gives people who are unversed in literature arbitrary control over writers.

A survival of the Middle Ages, censorship manages in Methuselah-like fashion to drag out its existence almost to the 21st century. Of fleeting significance, it attempts to appropriate unto itself the role of unfleeting time of separating the good books from the bad.

Our writers are not supposed to have the right, they are not endowed with the right, to express their anticipatory judgments about the moral life of man and society, or to explain in their own way the social problems or the historical experience that has been so deeply felt in our country.

Works that might have expressed the mature thinking of the people, that might have timely and salutary influence on the realm of the spirit or on the development of a social conscience are prohibited or distorted by censorship on the basis of considerations that are petty, egotistic and, from the national point of view, shortsighted.

Outstanding manuscripts by young authors, as yet entirely unknown, are nowadays rejected by editors solely on the ground that they "will not pass."

Many union members and even delegates at this congress know how they themselves bowed to the pressure of censorship and made concessions in the structure and concept of their books, changing chapters, pages, paragraphs, sentences, giving them innocuous titles, only to see them finally in print, even if it meant distorting them irremediably.

We have one decisive factor here, the death of a troublesome writer, after which, sooner or later, he is returned to us, with an annotation "explaining his errors." For a long time, the name of Pasternak could not be pronounced out loud, but then he died, and his books appeared and his verses are even quoted at ceremonies.

Pushkin's words are really coming true: "They are capable of loving only the dead."

But tardy publication of books and "authorization" of names do not make up for either the social or the artistic losses suffered by our people from these monstrous delays, from the oppression of artistic conscience. (In fact there were writers in the 1920s, Pilnyak, Platonov and Mandelshtam, who called attention at a very early stage to the beginnings of the cult and the particular traits of Stalin's character; however, they were destroyed and silenced instead of being listened to.)

Literature cannot develop between the categories "permitted" and "not permitted"--"this you can and this you can't." Literature that is not the air of its contemporary society, that dares not pass on to society its pains and fears, that does not warn in time against the threatening moral and social dangers, such literature does not deserve the name of literature; it is only a facade. Such literature loses the confidence of its own people, and its published works are used as waste paper instead of being read.

SECRET

SECRET

Our literature has lost the leading role it played at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, and the brillance of experimentation that distinguished it in the 1920s. To the entire world the literary life of our country now appears as something infinitely poorer, flatter and lower than it actually is, then it would appear if it were not restricted, hemmed in.

The losers are both our country, in world public opinion, and world literature itself. If the world had access to all the uninhibited fruits of our literature, if it were enriched by our own spiritual experience, the whole artistic evolution of the world would move along in a different way, acquiring a new stability and attaining even a new artistic threshold.

I propose that the congress adopt a resolution that would demand and insure the abolition of all censorship, overt or hidden, of all fictional writing and release publishing houses from the obligation of obtaining authorization for the publication of every printed page.

II.

The duties of the union toward its members:

These duties are not clearly formulated in the statutes of the Union of Soviet Writers (under "Protection of copyright" and "Measures for the protection of other rights of writers"), and it is sad to find that for a third of a century the union has defended neither the "other rights nor even the copyright of persecuted writers.

Many writers were subjected during their lifetime to abuse and slander in the press and from rostrums without being given the physical possibility of replying. Moreover they have been exposed to violence and personal persecution (Bulgakov, Akhmatova, Tsvetayeva, Pasternak, Zoshchenko, Platonov, Aleksandr Grin, Vasily Grossman).

SECRET

The Union of Writers not only did not make available its own publications for reply and justification, not only did not come out in defense of these writers, but through its leadership was always first among the persecutors.

Names that adorned our poetry of the 20th century found themselves on lists of those excluded from the union or not even admitted to the union in the first place.

The leadership of the union cowardly abandoned to their distress those for whom persecution ended in exile, camps and death (Pavel, Vasilyev, Mandelshtam, Artem Vesely, Pilnyak, Babel, Tabidze, Zapolotsky and others).

The list must be cut off at "and others." We learned after the 20th congress of the party [on de-Stalinization in 1956] that there were more than 600 writers whom the union had obediently handed over to their fate in prisons and camps.

However, the roll is even longer, and its curled-up end cannot be read and will never be read by our eyes. It contains the names of young prose writers and poets whom we may have known only accidentally through personal meetings, whose talents were crushed in camps before being able to blossom, whose writings never got further than the offices of the state security service in the days of Yagoda, Yezhov, Beria and Abakumov [heads of the secret police under Stalin].

There is no historical necessity for the newly elected leadership of the union to share with preceding leaderships responsibility for the past.

I propose that paragraph 22 of the union statutes clearly formulate all the guarantees for the defense of union members who are subjected to slander and unjust persecutions so that past illegalities will not be repeated.

III.

If the congress will not remain indifferent to what I have said, I also ask that it consider the interdictions and persecutions to which I myself have been subjected.

1. My novel "In the First Circle" was taken away from me by the state security people, and this has prevented it from being submitted to publishers. Instead, in my lifetime, against my will and even without my knowledge, this novel has been "published" in an unnatural "closed" edition for reading by a selected unidentified circle. My novel has become available to literary officials, but is being concealed from most writers. I have been unable to insure open discussion of the novel within writers associations and to prevent misuse and plagiarism.

2. Together with the novel, my literary archives dating back 15 and 20 years, things that were not intended for publication, were taken away from me. Now tendentious excerpts from these files have also been covertly "published" and are being circulated within the same circles. The play "Feast of the Victors," which I wrote down from memory in camp, where I figured under four serial numbers (at a time when, condemned to die by starvation, we were forgotten by society and no one outside the camps came out against repressions), this play, now left far behind, is being ascribed to me as my very latest work.

3. For three years now an irresponsible campaign of slander is being conducted against me, who fought all through the war as a battery commander and received military decorations. It is being said that I served time as a criminal, or surrendered to the enemy (I was never a prisoner of war), that I "betrayed" my country, "served the Germans". That is the interpretation now being put on the 11 years I spent in camps and exile for having criticized Stalin. This slander is being spread in secret instructions and meetings by people holding official positions. I vainly tried to stop the slander by appealing to the board of the Writers Union of the R.S.F.R. [Russian Republic], and to the press. The board did not even

react, and not a single paper printed my reply to the slanderers. On the contrary, slander against me from rostrums has intensified and become more vicious within the last year, making use of distorted material from my confiscated files, and I have no way of replying.

4. My story "The Cancer Ward," the first part of which was approved for publication by the prose department of the Moscow writers organization, cannot be published either by chapters, rejected by five magazines, or in its entirety, rejected by Novy Mir, Zvezda and Prostor [literary journals].

5. The play "The Reindeer and the Little Hut," accepted in 1962 by the Theater Sovremennik [in Moscow], has thus far not received permission to be performed.

6. The screen play, "The Tanks Know the Truth," the stage play "The Light That Is in You," short stories, "The Right Hand," the series "Small Bits," cannot find either a producer or a publisher.

7. My stories published in Novy Mir have never been reprinted in book form, having been rejected everywhere--by the Soviet Writer Publishers, the State Literature Publishing House, the Ogonyok Library. They thus remain inaccessible to the general reading public.

8. I have also been prevented from having any other contacts with readers, public readings of my works --in November, 1966, 9 out of 11 scheduled meetings were canceled at the last moment--or readings over the radio. Even the simple act of giving a manuscript away for "reading and copying" has now become a criminal act, and the ancient Russian scribes were permitted to do.

My work has thus been finally smothered, gagged and slandered.

In view of such a gross infringement on my copyright and "other" rights, will the fourth congress defend me, yes or no? It seems to me that the choice is also not without importance for the literary future of several delegates.

I am, of course, confident that I will fulfill my duty as a writer under all circumstances, from the grave even more successfully and more unchallenged than in my lifetime. No one can bar the road to the truth, and to advance its cause I an prepared to accept even death. But, maybe, many lessons will finally teach us not to stop the writer's pen during his lifetime. At no time has this ennobled our history.

A.I. Solzhenitsyn
May 16, 1967.

APPENDIX F: TEXT OF VOZNESENSKIY LETTER, TO PRAVDA, 22 June 1966

For nearly a week now I have been living in an atmosphere of blackmail, confusion and provocation.

On June 16 I received an official notification from the Union of Writers that my trip to New York to give a reading at the Arts Festival there June 21 (this was the only poetry reading at the festival and it had been allotted to a Soviet poet) was "inadvisable."

I warned the leadership of the Union of Writers of the consequences of cancellation: the evening had been advertised for six months ahead, posters had been put up and tickets sold, and it would have been too late to arrange an alternative program. Despite my conviction that the union's decision was extremely unwise, I immediately, after talking with them, sent a cable to the United States saying I could not come.

But what does a poetry evening matter? That's not the main point. Let's also forget that at first (until June 16) everybody was in favor of it, but that then they suddenly changed their minds. What is intolerable is the lying and total lack of scruples that went with all this.

Here I have been working, taking part in functions organized by the Union of Writers, going to the theater, receiving foreign writers at the request of the Novosti agency, only to learn that for three days now the Union of Writers has been telling journalists that I am seriously ill. Of course, the leaders of the Union of Writers must know what they are talking about, but why haven't they at least informed me that I am sick? It's difficult to imagine anything more idiotic. It's an insult to elementary human dignity.

I am a Soviet writer, a human being made of flesh and blood, not a puppet to be pulled on string.

Why is it that I suddenly have to learn from foreign broadcasts that "the government of the U.S.S.R. has

allowed Voznesenskiy to go to the festival. The ban has been lifted and he has received his visas. It now is only a matter of his getting a ticket . . ."

But at this very same moment the union tells me: "Your trip is off. In reply to questions we are saying you are ill." In other words they tell one lie to me and another to the world at large. What sort of position does that put me in? What am I supposed to tell people? Why, during all this, has nobody in the leadership of the Union of Writers bothered to call me and explain what was going on, or at least, tell me what the official reasons for my non-departure were? Why do they pull the wool over everybody's eyes by saying (variously) that I'm ill, that I've left it too late to get a ticket, or (now that everybody knows that it's too late for me to get to the poetry reading) that I am just about to leave? Why compromise a Soviet poet in the eyes of thousands of lovers of Soviet poetry? Why lead people to think that the reading might take place after all? Why involve the organizers of the evening in further expense? And why, in general, create all this fuss about my trip at such a crucial time as this in world affairs!

It is not a question of me personally, but of the fate of Soviet literature, its honor and prestige in the outside world. How much longer will we go on dragging ourselves through the mud? How much longer will the Union of Writers go on using methods like these?

Clearly the leadership of the union does not regard writers as human beings. This lying, prevarication and knocking people's heads together, is standard practice. This is what they do to many of my comrades. Letters to us often do not reach us, and sometimes replies are sent in our name. What boors, what chameleons they are! We are surrounded by lies, lies, lies, bad manners and lies.

I am ashamed to be a member of the same union as these people.

That is why I am writing to your newspaper, which is called "Truth" (Pravda).

SECRET

APPENDIX G: EXCERPTS FROM LITVINOV LETTER TO VARIOUS PAPERS

I regard it as my duty to make public the following:

On September 26, 1967, I was summoned by the Committee of State Security (K.G.B.) to appear before Gostev, an official of the K.G.B. Another officer of the K.G.B., who did not give his name, was present during our conversation.

After this talk was over, I wrote it down immediately and as fully as I could remember. I vouch for the accuracy of the substance of what was said between the representative of the K.G.B. and me.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, [we] have knowledge that you together with a group of other people intend to reproduce and distribute the minutes of the recent criminal trial of Bukovsky and others. We warn you that if you do that, you will be held criminally responsible.

I: Irrespective of my intentions, I cannot understand what the criminal responsibility for such an action might be.

Gostev: The court will decide that, and we wish only to warn you that if such a record should be spread through Moscow or other cities or appears abroad, you will be held responsible for this.

I: I know the laws well and I cannot imagine what particular law would be transgressed by the composition of such a document.

Gostev: There is such an article, 190-1. Take the criminal code and read it.

I: I know this article very well and can recite it from memory. It deals with slanderous fabrications which would discredit the Soviet social system and regime. What

SECRET

SECRET

kind of slander could there be in recording the hearing of a case before a Soviet court?

Gostev; Well, your notes will be a biased distortion of facts and a slander of the court's actions, and that would be proved by the agency competent to handle such cases.

I: How can you possibly know this? Instead of starting a new case, you yourself should publish the record of this criminal trial and in this way kill the rumors circulating in Moscow.

Gostev: And why do we need to publish it? It is an ordinary criminal case of disturbance of the peace.

I: If so, it is all the more important to give information about it, to let all the people see that it is really an ordinary case.

Gostev: Vechernyaya Moskva (a Moscow newspaper) of September 4, 1967, gives all the information about the case. All that has to be known about that trial is in there.

I: In the first place, there is too little information: The reader who had heard nothing previously about this case simply would not understand what it is all about. In the second place, it is false and slanderous. Rather, the editor of Vechernyaya Moskva or the person who gave such information should be charged with slander.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, the news report is absolutely correct. Remember that.

I: It says there that Bukovsky pleaded guilty. Yet I who was interested in this case, know perfectly well that he did not plead guilty.

Gostev: What does it matter whether he pleaded guilty or not? The court found him guilty. Consequently, he is guilty.

SECRET

I am not talking now about the court's decision; nor did the newspaper have it in mind. And confession of guilt by the defendant represents a completely independent judicial concept. In general, it would be a good idea to tell more about Bukovsky; for example, how he was arrested while reciting poetry on Mayakovsky Square, brought to the police station and beaten up.

Gostev: This is not true. It could not be.

I: His mother said so.

Gostev: Who cares what she said?

I; She did not tell it to me--I do not know her--but to the court, and nobody interrupted her or accused her of slander.

Gostev: She should rather have told you how she was summoned and warned about the conduct of her son. We can summon your parents, too. And in general, Pavel Mikhailovich, have in mind: Vechernyaya Moskva has printed all that the Soviet people should know about this case and this information is completely true and we warn you that if not only you, but your friends or anybody makes this record, you specifically will be held responsible for it. You understand very well that such a record can be used by our ideological enemies, especially on the eve of the 50th anniversary of Soviet power.

I: But I do not know of any law that would prohibit the dissemination of a non-secret document only because it might be misused by somebody. Much critical material from Soviet newspapers might also be misused by somebody.

Gostev: It should be clear to you what we are talking about. We are only warning you, and the court will prove the guilt.

I: It will prove it, I have no doubt. The trial of Bukovsky makes that clear. And how about my friend Aleksandr Ginzburg? Is he imprisoned for the same kind of actions that you are warning me about?

Gostev: Well, you will learn what he did when he is put on trial. He will be acquitted if he is innocent. Could you possibly think that now, in the 50th year of Soviet power, a Soviet court would make a wrong decision?

I: Then why was Bukovsky's trial closed to the public?

Gostev: It was not.

I: Yet it was impossible to get in.

Gostev: Those who had to get in got in. There were representatives of the public and all seats in the hall were taken. We did not intend to rent a club (auditorium) because of this case.

I: In other words, the public nature of legal proceedings was violated.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, we have no intention of arguing with you. We simply warn you. Just imagine if people would learn that the grandson of the great diplomat Litvinov (Maxim M. Litvinov, former Foreign Minister) is busy with such doings, this would be a blot on his memory.

I: Well, I do not think he would blame me. Can I go?

Gostev: Please, The best thing for you to do now would be to go home and destroy all that you've collected.

I know that a similar kind of conversation was conducted with Alexsandr Ginzburg two months before his arrest.

I am asking you to publish this letter so that in case of my arrest the public would be informed about the circumstances which preceded it.

P. M. LITVINOV.
Assistant in the Faculty of Physics in Moscow, Institute of Precision Chemical Technology

October 3, 1967
Moscow, 8 Alexei Tolstoy Street, Apartment 78.

APPENDIX H: TEXT OF LITVINOV-DANIEL APPEAL, 12 January 1967

To World Public Opinion:

The judicial trial of [Yuri] Galanskov, [Aleksandr] Ginzburg, [Aleksei] Dobrovolsky and [Vera] Lashkova, which is taking place at present in the Moscow City Court, is being carried out in violation of the most important principles of Soviet law. The judge and the prosecutor, with the participation of a special kind of audience have turned the trial into a wild mockery of three of the accused --Galanskov, Ginzburg and Lashkova--and of the witnesses-- unthinkable in the 20th century.

The case took on the character of the well-known "witch trials" on its second day, when Galanskov and Ginzburg--despite a year of preliminary incarceration, in spite of pressure from the court--refused to accept the groundless accusations made against them by Dobrovolsky and sought to prove their own innocence. Evidence by witnesses in favor of Galanskov and Ginzburg infuriated the court even more.

The judge and the prosecutor throughout the trial have been helping Dobrovolsky to introduce false evidence against Galanskov and Ginzburg. The defense lawyers are constantly forbidden to ask questions, and the witnesses are not being allowed to give evidence that unmasks the provocative role of Dobrovolsky in this case.

Judge [Lev M.] Mironov has not once stopped the prosecutor. But he is allowing people who represent the defense to say only that which fits in with the program already prepared by the K.G.B. (state secret police) investigation. Whenever any participant in the trial departs from the rehearsed spectacle, the judge cries, "Your question is out of order," "This has no relation to the case," "I will not allow you to speak." These exclamations have been directed at the accused (apart from Dobrovolsky), to their lawyers and to the witnesses.

The witnesses leave the court after their examination, or rather they are pushed out of the court, in a depressed state almost in hysterics.

Witness Yelena Basilova was not allowed to make a statement to the court--she wanted to record how the K.G.B. had prosecuted her mentally sick husband, whose evidence given during the investigation when he was in a certifiable state, plays an important role in the prosecution case. Basilova was driven out of the court while the judge shouted and the audience howled, drowning her words.

P. Grigorenko (former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko of the Soviet Army) submitted a request asking that he be examined as a witness because he could explain the origin of the money found on Dobrovolsky. Galanskov gave him this money. Grigorenko's request was turned down on the pretext that he is allegedly mentally ill. This is not true.

Witnesses Aida Topeshkina was not allowed to make a statement to the court in which she wanted to give facts showing the falsity of Dobrovolsky's evidence. Topeshkina, an expectant mother, was physically ejected from the courtroom, while the audience howled at her.

The "commandant of the court," K.G.B. Colonel Tsirkunenko, did not allow witness L. Katz back into the court after a recess, and told her, "if you have given other evidence, you could have stayed."

None of the witnesses have been allowed to stay in the court after giving evidence, although they are obliged to stay under Soviet law. Appeals by the witnesses on the basis of Article 283 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [the relevant article] went unheeded, and the judge said sharply to witness V. Vinogradova, "You can just leave the court under Article 283."

The courtroom is filled with specially-selected people--officials of the K.G.B. and volunteer militia-- who give the appearance of an open public trial. These

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

people make a noise, laugh, and insult the accused and the witnesses. Judge Mironov had made no attempt to prevent these violations of order. Not one of the blatant offenders has been ejected from the hall.

In this tense atmosphere there can be no pretense that the trial is objective, that there is any justice or legality about it. The sentence was decided from the very start.

We appeal to world public opinion, and in the first place to the Soviet public opinion. We appeal to everyone in whom conscience is alive and who has sufficient courage:

Demand public condemnation of this shameful trial and the punishment of those guilty of perpetrating it!

Demand the release of the accused from arrest!

Demand a new trial with the observance of all legal norms and with the presence of international observers!

Citizens of our country! This trial is a stain on the honor of our state and on the conscience of everyone of us. You yourselves elected this court and these judges--demand that they be deprived of the posts which they have abused. Today it is not only the fate of the three accused which is in danger--their trial is no better than the celebrated trials of the nineteen-thirties, which involved us in so much shame and so much blood that we have still not recovered from them.

We pass this appeal to the Western progressive press, and ask for it to be published and broadcast by radio as soon as possible. We are not sending this request to Soviet newspapers because that is hopeless.

(signed)
LARISA BOGORAZ-DANIEL
Moscow, V-261,
Leninsky Prospect 85,
Flat 3
PAVEL LITVINOV
Moscow, K-1, Ulitsa Alexei,
Tolstoy 8, Flat 78.

ERRATA

The attached pictures are part of an Intelligence Report previously disseminated--the Stalin Issue and the Soviet Leadership Struggle, reference title CAESAR XXXII, RSS No. 0030A/68, 17 July 1968.

STALIN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

JUNE 1967	SEPTEMBER 1967
CPSU POLITBURO	CPSU POLITBURO
Full Members	Full Members
BREZHNEV	BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO	KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN	KOSYGIN
MAZUROV	MAZUROV
PELSHE	PELSHE
PODGORNYY	PODGORNYY
POLYANSKIY	POLYANSKIY
SHELEPIN	SHELEPIN
SHELEST	SHELEST
SUSLOV	SUSLOV
VORONOV	VORONOV
Candidate Members	Candidate Members
ANDROPOV[1]	ANDROPOV
DEMICHEV	DEMICHEV
GRISHIN	GRISHIN
KUNAYEV	KUNAYEV
MASHEROV	MASHEROV
MZHAVANADZE	MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV	RASHIDOV
SHCHERBITSKIY	SHCHERBITSKIY
USTINOV	USTINOV
CPSU SECRETARIAT	CPSU SECRETARIAT
BREZHNEV	BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV	DEMICHEV
KAPITONOV	KAPITONOV
KULAKOV	KULAKOV
PONOMAREV	PONOMAREV
SHELEPIN[2]	SOLOMENTSEV
SOLOMENTSEV[3]	SUSLOV
SUSLOV	USTINOV
USTINOV	

1. Elected in June 1967 and dropped from Secretariat.
2. Dropped in September 1967.
3. Elected in December 1966.

SECRET

NATURE OF THE LEADERSHIP



COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

FIRST AMONG EQUALS

CONFIDENTIAL

MAJOR PROTAGONISTS

BREZHNEV

SHELEPIN

PODGORNYY

SUSLOV

KOSYGIN

MIKOYAN

CONFIDENTIAL

SHELEPIN SUPPORTERS

SEMICHASTNYY

YEGORYCHEV

PAVLOV

BELORUSSIAN CLIQUE

MAZUROV

MASHEROV



ZIMYANIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KEY FIGURES IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

MALINOVSKIY

GRECHKO

YEPISHEV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIBERAL SPOKESMEN

RUMYANTSEV

TVARDOVSKIY

VOZNESENSKIY

YEVTUSHENKO

ERENBURG

CONFIDENTIAL

DISSENTING WRITERS

SINYAVSKIY

DANIEL

SOLZHENITSYN

GINSBURG

GALANSKOV

CONFIDENTIAL

REGIONAL LEADERS

MZHAVANADZE

KUNAYEV

SHELEST

TOLSTIKOV

PELSHE

BODYUL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE CHANGING SCENE

September 1965

FRONT ROW: R. TO L.
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, MIKOYAN, PODGORNYY, SUSLOV

BACK ROW: R. TO L.
POLYANSKIY, KIRILENKO, VORONOV, SHELEPIN, GRISHIN



November 1965

L. TO R.
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, MIKOYAN, SUSLOV
PODGORNYY

August 1966

FRONT ROW: R. TO L.
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, PODGORNYY, SUSLOV, VORONOV

BACK ROW: R. TO L.
POLYANSKIY, KIRILENKO, MAZUROV, SHELEPIN, PELSHE



April 1966

L. TO R.
PODGORNYY, KOSYGIN, BREZHNEV, SUSLOV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

(14)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

POLITICS IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO
AND THE CZECH CRISIS

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXXIII)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28 October 1968

RSS No. 0032/68



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POLICY DIFFERENCES IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO
AND THE CZECH CRISIS

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS

This is a speculative essay on differences over policies and priorities in the Soviet Politburo as they emerged prior to and during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The essay focuses primarily on the conflicting policy tendencies within the Soviet leadership as symbolized by Kosygin and by Brezhnev. Other personalities, of course, are involved and in the long run may prove equally or more important. However, in recent and current policy debates in the Soviet Union the tendency toward orthodoxy, dogmatism, and conservatism as represented by Brezhnev and the more moderate stance in foreign and domestic policy as represented by Kosygin appear to be the main lines along which differences and disputes among the Soviet leaders take shape. The somewhat controversial thesis of this essay is that the Czech crisis did not precipitate differences among the Soviet leaders but rather that the crisis was part of a continuing dispute among Soviet leaders over the "soft" versus the "hard" line issue in domestic, bloc and international affairs.

The essay was written by Carl Linden, an SRS consultant, and reflects information available through mid-September.

John Kerry King
Chief, DDI Special Research Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POLICY DIFFERENCES IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO
AND THE CZECH CRISIS

The post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership reached a turning point when it launched the invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20th. By all normal expectations it should by now have irrevocably passed that point. Yet in the immediate aftermath of the invasion the Soviet "collective leadership" tarried, hesitating to carry the military action to its logical conclusion, namely, the total destruction of the Dubcek liberal Communist regime. In the face of the unity of the initial Czechoslovak resistance the Kremlin backtracked for the time being. The Dubcek regime won a reprieve and the Soviets at least temporarily eschewed the imposition of direct military rule. In effect, the Kremlin returned to the pre-invasion strategy of trying to bend the Czechoslovak leadership to its will with the massive added advantage of the leverage provided by the occupation army.

The seesawing in Soviet tactics has almost certainly been tied to shifts in Politburo alignments as well as to the Czechoslovak resistance. The failure of the effort at Cierna to curb the Czechoslovak liberalization evidently was exploited by the promoters of direct intervention to demand a go-ahead with invasion plans. Yet the embarrassing failure of the venture to produce immediate results in the form of a compliant collaborationist government in Prague gave some breathing space to counsels of restraint in the Politburo. After the invasion, the Soviet toleration, for the moment, of the reelection by the Czechoslovak party of an overwhelmingly liberal leadership headed by Dubcek with only a thin sprinkling of conservatives clearly suggested that a moderating, temporizing influence was still at work within the Soviet leadership. In the ensuing weeks, the clash of alternately menacing and conciliatory notes in the Soviet press and in Soviet dealings with the Czechs seemed more like telltales of disarray within the Soviet ruling group than the

masterful execution of a carrot and stick policy. It was not until early October that Brezhnev was able to bring to bear upon Dubcek sufficiently harsh pressures to bring major Czechoslovak concessions in the direction desired by the invasion's sponsors.

The stop-and-go pattern of Soviet policy, the evidence suggests, has been a mirror of the unstable balance of forces that has existed in the Politburo "collective" since Khrushchev's fall. From this standpoint the invasion came as a culminating move in a growing conflict among those forces.

The Czech crisis brought to a head an underlying conflict in the Soviet "collective leadership" between moderates who wanted to follow broadly the path of reform at home and accommodation abroad and conservatives bent on erasing the legacy of Khrushchevism and restoring ideological and political orthodoxy to Soviet policy. Before the invasion a senior Yugoslav editor dramatized but did not exaggerate the stakes in the Czech crisis when he said: "We feel strongly about Czechoslovakia because theirs is our fight, too. If they lose, then we and other Communist parties could also lose our struggle against our own dogmatic forces and we would all go back to a kind of Stalinism." The comment is by no means irrelevant to the Soviet leadership although the factional balance in the Soviet party over the past several years had tended to favor the conservatives, which is the reverse of what the situation has been in Yugoslavia and recently in Czechoslovakia.

The Kremlin decision to invade Czechoslovakia must be counted a severe, if not culminating, defeat for the more moderate Soviet leaders. All those projects in Soviet policy holding out the prospect of limited detente with the United States and the Western powers have now fallen under a cloud. President Johnson's postponement of talks with Kosygin on nuclear arms limitation underscored the downturn in the fortunes of the moderates. Ironically, Kosygin had completed arrangements with Washington on the talks the day before Soviet troops crossed the Czechoslovak borders. Yet the unexpected results of the invasion for Soviet policy-makers and their subsequent hesitation to

crush the Dubcek regime outright after the failure of the first attempt to do so leaves room for doubt as to the ultimate outcome of the invasion on the internal politics of the Soviet leadership. Of course, the very momentum of the resort to main force in Czechoslovakia weighs heavily against a reversal in policy and places the more moderate wing of the Soviet top echelon at a disadvantage in the internal political struggle.

In the period since Khrushchev's fall, conservative forces in the Soviet party have held the edge in inner-party politics and a turn toward ideological and political orthodoxy increasingly showed in the cards. The pressure from such forces gained in strength and despite vigorous and steady resistance the moderate wing of the leading group has been forced into a slow but steady retreat on a whole spectrum of issues ranging from the Stalin question to defense spending. However, the sudden and total downfall of the orthodox Novotny regime and the unexpectedly rapid liberalization under Dubcek posed a threat to what had been a gradual restoration of orthodoxy in Soviet politics. The danger that the Czech liberalization, if permitted to survive, would in time infect Soviet politics was undoubtedly considered acute by Soviet conservatives. They saw in it a deep menace to the gains they had made in political struggle within the Soviet leadership since Khrushchev's fall. As a result the issues that had already been producing divisions within the "collective leadership" were aggravated.

Two developments, in particular, since early spring this year registered the aggravation of the conflict in the leading group. In February and March there were signs of a sharpening of the clash between Brezhnev and Kosygin whose positions over time have mirrored respectively the divisions between the conservative and moderate wings of the leading group. Secondly, the confrontation between Brezhnev and Kosygin was followed by an increasingly noticeable divergence in the lines of movement in Soviet policy. As summer came, Soviet policy alternately turned its face in opposing directions.

On the one side, there were the series of moves which culminated at the end of June in the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the Politburo decision to enter high-level talks with the United States on nuclear arms limitation. These initiatives and the justifications offered on their behalf by Soviet spokesmen were in close accord with positions Kosygin had previously taken. On the other hand, there was the steady expansion, under Brezhnev's evident personal guidance, of the drive against the Czechoslovak liberalization and the associated propaganda campaign playing on the theme of an intensifying ideological and class struggle between the Soviet and Western camps. As the crisis with the Czechoslovaks grew the counter-pulls within the Soviet leadership between conflict and accommodation abroad with the United States and the West, between rigidity and relaxation inside the Soviet and East European orbit became more manifest. All the major issues dividing the dogmatic-orthodox from the moderate-reformist wings of the leadership in the post-Khrushchev period tended to converge.

The altercation between Brezhnev and Kosygin--revealed in their respective speeches to local party organizations in February and March--touched on a secondary issue but nonetheless an issue clearly tied to the deeper difference of outlook that has been manifested between the two Soviet executives since early in their incumbency. In his speech on March 28, Brezhnev took a cut at Kosygin for the latter's praise the month before of Western science and technology, in general, and of American achievements in production organization, in particular. Kosygin had warned that it would be "shortsighted" not to utilize foreign accomplishments in these spheres. In a riposte, Brezhnev berated "some workers" for overrating capitalist and depreciating Soviet achievements. Brezhnev complained that Soviet spokesmen should be "paying more attention" to showing the flaws of capitalism and the "upheaval" it is undergoing--a theme which the party leader has increasingly played upon as the basis for Soviet leadership of the class struggle against imperialism.

The exchange pointed to the more fundamental issue of how the Western world should be viewed and, by implication, the broad policy line that should be pursued toward that world. The difference over Western achievements was also in tune with other specific differences between the two men. For example, where Brezhnev has stressed the prospect of protracted struggle with the West, Kosygin has stressed the possibilities of developing good economic relations with the West; where Brezhnev has promoted a high rate of military spending, Kosygin has argued for holding the line in favor of the civilian economy. In brief, Brezhnev's specific policy positions have been generally consistent with his over-all conservative viewpoint which, while eschewing Chinese-style militancy, stresses the need to maintain a sharp line of demarcation between the Communist and "imperialist" camps. Kosygin's have accorded with his generally moderate stance opening the prospect of accommodations with the West over the long term and profitable relations with it for the sake of Soviet internal growth and development.

The same Brezhnev speech in March also contained signs of strain in the relationship between the party apparatchiki on the one hand and the economic managers under Kosygin on the other. Brezhnev aimed a thrust at the latter, warning of punishments if executives abused the greater autonomy they were enjoying. Brezhnev's stress on control from the center and an unusually emphatic reassertion of party supremacy in all spheres of national development obviously constricted any notion of a special or quasi-independent preserve of policy for Kosygin and his managers. Brezhnev's focus on the theme of party supremacy was also to become a dominant element in the subsequent development of the Soviet attack on Czechoslovak internal reforms. In the March speech Brezhnev stressed the principle of party supremacy by repeating the refrain, "Only the party can..." He said:

> Only the party, armed with frontline theory, with Marxism-Leninism, can find the correct solution to these problems [i.e., building communism at home and promoting socialism abroad] and can determine the principal, most

> urgent directions of the country's economic and social development. Only the party.... can impart to all work in the construction of communism a purposeful, scientifically based, and planned character. Only the party can unite the forces of the people --the working class, the peasants and the intelligentsia--for the successful solution of both economic and political problems.

One of the points hidden in Brezhnev's emphasis on party primacy was bared in a Kommunist article in early May. It charged that "some economic leaders" took a narrow "administrative-managerial" view of their activity without regard for political considerations and disdained general interests. The article was alluding to disregard among managers of the prerogatives of party organs at various levels and was touching the same sore point Brezhnev exposed in his warning against indiscipline and disregard of state interests. The article's complaints about the ideological failings of the managers harmonized with Brezhnev's argument at a party conference in February that the "ruble"--a reference to the emphasis on the "profit" motive in Kosygin's economic reform--was not the only incentive, but that it needed to be combined with ideological stimuli and Communist consciousness.

In any case, the intensity of the clash between the two top leaders was indicated by the relative openness of Brezhnev's criticism of Kosygin on the score of underrating Soviet accomplishments. While the differences between the two had been apparent before in differing emphases and divergent formulations in their speeches, as well as recurring signs of personal friction behind the scenes, rarely had either pointed a finger at the other so unmistakably in a public utterance.

In March President Johnson's limitation of the bombing of North Vietnam opening the way to the Paris talks, on the one side, and the rapidly widening scope of the Czechoslovak liberalization on the other evidently produced discordant movements in the Politburo. President Johnson's actions apparently gave Kosygin a handle for

moving debate on the question of negotiating with the United States on nuclear arms limitation toward a resolution. At the same time, the pace of the Czech developments evidently prompted Brezhnev to accelerate efforts --undoubtedly urged on by alarms sounded by conservative elements in the leading group--to develop a strategy of counter-action against the Czechoslovak liberalization. At the April plenum of the Central Committee he unveiled plans for an "offensive" against "imperialist" ideological and political subversion at home and abroad. As events have turned out the Czech liberal communist regime was the ultimate target of the offensive. In brief, the nuclear arms and the Czechoslovak issues became counterpoints in a broader leadership conflict.

The Politburo's decision--announced in late June--to enter talks with the United States on nuclear arms limitation including the ABM issue came against a background bearing all the signs of long and involved controversy within the leading group. The eighteen-month Soviet delay in accepting the idea of talks indicate that the decision was hard to come by. There had been immediate and specific evidence of controversy after the initial U.S. proposal to discuss missile limitation in January 1967. For example, in February a Pravda article (inaccurately paraphrasing a Kosygin statement) indicated that the Soviet Union was willing to discuss the question, but the article was subsequently discredited by a Soviet spokesman. In March 1967 the President revealed that he had received a letter from Kosygin affirming Soviet willingness to discuss the issue, but the letter was never confirmed by the Soviets.

The advocates of entering talks must have advanced hard-headed and persuasive arguments in order to tip the balance in the Politburo in their favor. While the prospect of a settlement of the Vietnam war undoubtedly affected the debate, the U.S. decision in June to go ahead with the Sentinel ABM probably helped clinch arguments in favor of talks. The argument probably played on the fear the USSR might prove the loser in a full-scale nuclear race and on the hope that a tactical advantage might be won if the U.S. were to delay ABM development

during talks. Perhaps very important was the spectre of severe disruption of the Soviet economy such a race could produce. However, the decision to enter talks as well as the concurrent decisions to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, continue cultural exchanges and open air links with New York were not so important in themselves but rather in the broader implications they raised for general policy.

Brezhnev for one made it clear that he placed a restrictive interpretation on the scope and purposes of the decisions on the treaty and nuclear talks. At the April plenum Brezhnev had already tied Soviet agreement to the non-proliferation treaty strictly to the military-strategic benefits it secured for the USSR without suggesting that it enhanced coexistence with the West. A Pravda commentator echoed this attitude in a 6 July interview with a Japanese newsman, rejecting the idea of any connection between "U.S.-Soviet coexistence" and the non-proliferation treaty or nuclear disarmament talks. Further, in his 8 July speech to the military graduates, Brezhnev implied that the non-proliferation treaty was a concession wrung unwillingly from the imperialist powers by the militant struggle of "peace-loving" forces.

In comparison, Gromyko's report at the Supreme Soviet announcing Soviet readiness to enter nuclear arms limitation talks placed the decision in a broad and optimistic political perspective. That perspective, in short, stood in contrast to the darker prospect of danger and conflict set out in the conservative line that had been dominant in other major regime statements. Gromyko, a dutiful and deferential official, was undoubtedly the mouthpiece for views emanating from the highest level. On major points his Supreme Soviet report accorded with positions Kosygin had previously taken but almost necessarily must have represented more than the latter's views alone. The most likely assumption is that the report was not given without prior consultation in the Politburo and reflected the view of at least a temporary majority of that body.

The Gromyko report was keyed to a characterization of the present "stage" of international developments that contrasted with the pessimistic view Brezhnev had consistently asserted. Despite the "motley character" and "complexity" of contemporary events, the "main" conclusion to be drawn regarding the present "stage," Gromyko stated, was that the rate of collapse of the system of imperialism--with its attendant phenomena of aggressive wars and "unbridled" arms races, etc.--was developing rapidly. The Brezhnev formulation--which has been a standard line in most party documents--offers a less reassuring prospect. The present "stage", in this view, involves a protracted, dangerous conflict with imperialism characterized by sharpened international tensions and "complications." The underlying cause of the condition, according to this analysis, is the development of the "general crisis of capitalism" which produces increasing "imperialist" aggressiveness in world affairs. The Gromyko formulation suggested a long-term trend of declining danger of serious conflict in international affairs.

Similar cleavage between Brezhnev and Kosygin on world prospects had emerged as far back as mid-1966. Brezhnev had warned in a speech that despite the gradual change of the balance of forces in favor of socialism, "this general tendency in world development must not hide from us the danger with which the present international situation is fraught." Shortly thereafter, Kosygin had challenged the Brezhnev view by simply turning the coin around. He warned, in turn, against "shutting oneself up in present-day events" when making policy. Rather, present tensions, he aruged, must be kept in the perspective of the broad trend favoring the forces of peace and security.

In support of the brighter view of affairs, the Gromyko report pictured a steady decline in the influence of traditional military strength in world politics--a trend which, he said, was the "essence" of the "new" phenomena of the present stage. Ironically Gromyko cited Brezhnev's report last November on the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution to support the latter point. Nonetheless, Gromyko's argument hardly squared with Brezhnev's resounding reaffirmation soon after in an 8 July

speech of the central importance of military power. "As long as imperialism exists and threatens the use of force," Brezhnev argued, the imperative to face "great material expenditures" in increasing military strength remains. Though the Soviet Union would, he added, continue to support limitation of the arms race, it must keep its powder dry in readiness for "any serious turn in events." The tone and thrust of Brezhnev's argument ran counter to Gromyko's, and his warning of a serious turn was confirmed by the subsequent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Gromyko had declared that the military power of imperialism is already successfully "contained" by Soviet might. This assertion was a complement of a Kosygin statement earlier in the year that the imperialists are "convinced" that the USSR was not vulnerable to military pressure as part of an explanation of why imperialism is allegedly stepping up "ideological" sabotage in the Soviet world.

In connection with the theme of the lessing of the influence of military power in world politics, Gromyko depreciated the importance of large U.S. military budgets. To measure a nation's strength in world affairs by the "quantitative" yardstick was faulty, Gromyko asserted, since by its measure American influence should have increased rather than declined. Brezhnev on 8 July, however, reasserted the importance of the yardstick. He voiced extreme alarm at the size of the upcoming U.S. military budget--which he exaggerated by citing a preliminary estimate--and professed to see a design in high Washington circles to work for strategic superiority over the USSR and to pursue a more aggressive policy. Brezhnev's expression of concern contrasted with Gromyko's reassuring assessment that Soviet might "is by no means lesser than" that of imperialism (read United States). Kosygin was also visibly upset by the size of the U.S. arms budget in his talk with British labor leader Crosland on 6 June, but his main concern, as in previous years, evidently was the impact of an arms race on the Soviet economy and on the Soviet allocation of resources, not the danger of the U.S. gaining strategic superiority. Further, Brezhnev's warning against "shutting our eyes" to the fact that the "hawks" maintain their positions in Washington (despite public opposition to U.S. war policies)

was a counterpoint to statements in the Gromyko report. Gromyko said that top American political figures like Rockefeller and George Ball were recognizing the limits of the influence of American military power in world affairs. Similarly, Kosygin had in the past pointed to the presence of moderate political forces in Washington.

The general theses of the Gromyko report were closely tied to its justifications for the pursuit of a disarmament policy, and, specifically, the decision to engage in talks on nuclear arms limitation with the United States. The report was cast in distinctly argumentative terms and answered specific objections against following a pro-disarmament policy--another indication that the report was drafted against a background of sharp debate. The report contained an attack on unidentified "bourgeois leaders" who saw a "tragic contradiction in the epoch" and who concluded that the arms race is a "fatal inevitability." Such a view describes the orthodox Communist thesis equally well and Gromyko confirmed this by denouncing Communist "theoreticians" who call the idea of disarmament an "illusion." While such attacks obviously apply, but are not necessarily limited, to the Chinese and others outside the USSR, Gromyko at this point phrased his case on the value of talks in a manner which suggested that he was mirroring an argument addressed to doubters in the Soviet leadership itself. On the one hand, he agreed, "experience" shows the "impossibility" of counting on capitalist powers agreeing to solutions of pressing international problems, especially disarmament, without constant exposure of militarist policies. On the other, he added, "experience also shows" that consistent and persistent pursuit of a disarmament policy made it possible to achieve "certain results" even if it did not lead "all at once to concrete agreements." The latter point fits in well with Kosygin's theme of steady progress in the disarmament field step-by-step at the signing of the non-proliferation treaty.

Kosygin's brief remarks at the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty shortly after the Supreme Soviet session reinforced the Gromyko report's defense of an active disarmament policy. Kosygin pictured a

steady step-by-step progress in the disarmament field reaching back to the Khrushchev era. He cited the test-ban treaty, the culmination of Khrushchev's detente efforts after the Cuban crisis, as the starting point of the record of progress. He spoke optimistically of the prospects of reducing international tension and saw in the non-proliferation treaty a confirmation of the capacity of states to find "mutually acceptable solutions" to the "complicated" international problems of the day. Kosygin even continued to preserve his accent on the positive as the crisis over Czechoslovakia escalated in mid-July. In Sweden on 12 July he went well beyond the call of diplomatic duty in developing the idea that the world is becoming a single entity in the spheres of trade, economics, science and technology. While noting that the "imperialists" still engage in attempts to aggravate tensions--attempts which "naturally" will be rebuffed, Kosygin asserted that an "objective appraisal" of the world situation made it "impossible not to note the positive processes." The "positive" trend, according to the Soviet Premier, was that all states both East and West, were interdependent and could not develop individually without "extensive" economic, scientific and technological collaboration. Kosygin's "one-world" theme clashed with the rapid intensification at that juncture of Moscow's hard-line propaganda against the Czechoslovak liberalization and the insistence on Stalin's rigid "two-camp" depiction of the world. Kosygin's theme uneasily co-existed with Brezhnev's picture of a world riven by crises and class war.

Brezhnev's political maneuvers following on the heels of the signature of the non-proliferation treaty and the decision to enter nuclear talks bore all the markings of a concentrated effort to head off the alternative line of general policy that had broken the surface in the Gromyko and Kosygin statements. His speeches in early July--some of the specific points of which have already been cited--squelched any idea that the way was being opened toward a more peaceful relationship with the Western powers and the United States in particular. These speeches were distinguished by unusually harsh anti-Western vituperation and were replete with the coldest of cold-war themes. His leading role in escalating the

attack against the liberal Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia to at least the point of direct intervention in July and August had the obvious advantage of putting massive pressure on moderates in the leading group to acquiesce in the hardline he had pushed with increasing vigor since the early spring.

At the same time, aware of the dangers of failure in the Czech venture, Brezhnev engaged in a feverish effort to lessen his personal vulnerability. He not only obtained the formal and public sanction of the Central Committee but of the Politburo itself for his actions. If he fails, any failures of the policy could be treated as "collective" responsibility; any successes Brezhnev could claim for himself as an initiator and leader of the venture. Brezhnev's difficulty in gaining genuine unity behind his leadership in the very heat of the Czech crisis was indicated in a Pravda article a week and a half before the invasion. The article (9 August) by Rodionov--a figure with a history of involvement in high-level intrigues--stressed the inviolability of "democratic centralism" in party politics and warned of the dangers of factionalism. His general comments on the pernicious effects on the execution of the official party line if some "pull" in one direction and others in another seemed as immediately applicable to the Soviet leadership as to other parties in the Communist world in the recent period. Rodionov pointedly recommended Brezhnev's speech of 28 March as a sound directive on the principles of party solidarity. It was this speech--cited earlier--which contained a conspicuous thrust at Kosygin's views and set forth many of the basic lines Brezhnev has since relentlessly advanced.

On the whole, it seems unlikely that the Politburo majority that backed the decision on arms talks represented the same alignment of forces that pushed through the decision to invade Czechoslovakia. Both actions, the evidence suggests, were the products of shifts in the balance within the leading group: in the first, a moderate grouping winning an advantage; in the second, a hard-line faction gaining the upper hand. Obviously there must have been "swing votes" in both cases. Kosygin and Brezhnev have

mirrored in their statements and actions the clash of the opposing tendencies. It has been Kosygin who most consistently among the leaders kept alive an alternative to the creeping conservative tide in party politics since Khrushchev's fall. Brezhnev, on the other, has striven to weld a conservatively-oriented coalition as the base of support for his leadership. He has sought to avoid alienating party conservatives and strong elements in the Soviet military as Khrushchev had done.

Brezhnev, nonetheless, has had to fight on two fronts in the leadership struggle. Brezhnev has so far contained but has not been able to drive from the field powerful potential challengers from both the militant-conservative and moderate groupings. (The outcome of the Czechoslovak affair will most likely decide this matter in one way or another.)

On the one side he has treated Kosygin, a leader without a personal base of power in the party apparatus, as a serious rival evidently because the latter has actual or potential allies with bases in the party. To suggest one possibility, it is worth recalling in this connection that Brezhnev's first major battle was with Podgornyy who shared with him the status of co-heir apparent in the Secretariat in Khrushchev's last year. Shortly after Khrushchev's fall Podgornyy associated himself with a moderate political line seemingly in tandem with Kosygin who was sponsoring a military budget cut and a policy of "mutual example" with the United States. With support from conservatives, most likely including Suslov, Brezhnev defeated Podgornyy and in the process sent Mikoyan--a consistent supporter of reform under Khrushchev--into retirement. He nudged Podgornyy out of the Secretariat and into the prestigious but less politically potent Presidency of the Supreme Soviet, replacing Mikoyan. Brezhnev's success reduced but did not destroy the threat from Podgornyy. Despite the seemingly close relations between the two since 1966, Brezhnev cannot be sure of Podgornyy's unwavering support in a leadership showdown.

On the second front, Brezhnev has been menaced by a militant faction dissatisfied with his leadership which says, in effect, that a new leader is needed to carry through a hard-line with greater determination and less circumspection. In 1965 Shelepin sought to lead this grouping and mounted an abortive challenge to Brezhnev's position. And last year Brezhnev once more had to cope with another challenge from the militants which was initiated by the then Moscow party chief, Yegorychev, and was apparently based on a complaint against the party secretary's caution in handling the Middle East crisis. While there seems to be little reason to doubt that Brezhnev has been the main author of the broad aggressive strategy pursued against the Czechoslovak liberalization during the past summer, he is perhaps vulnerable once more to the charge of ineffective leadership in a crisis from party militants. Not only, their argument probably goes, did the decision to invade remain a cliff-hanger for month-after-month despite all the sound and fury and the build-up of political-military pressure, but the invasion when it did come was not carried through to its logical conclusion quickly and efficiently and exposed Soviet policy to greater difficulties and embarrassment than was necessary.

From the moderates, on the other hand, comes the alternative argument that the invasion of Czechoslovakia has damaged rather than aided Soviet interests and that restraint would have been the better policy and remains the better policy in handling the Czechoslovaks even after the invasion. Such opposing pressures probably explain in part Moscow's alternately conciliatory and menacing gestures since the invasion.

In sum, each wing of the Soviet ruling group so far had tended to inhibit the consistent implementation of the designs of the other. Brezhnev has sought to be the spokesman for the conservative trend in the party since Khrushchev's fall but, buffetted by the cross-currents, has so far been unable to win the day decisively for his own leadership. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and its aftermath--whether Brezhnev had been a direct advocate of that action, or, as one report has it, had resisted but then yielded to militant demands to invade--is inevitably aggravating the long-existing strains within the Soviet ruling group and is likely eventually to produce a change in the political complexion of the Politburo.

[redacted]

8 OCT 1969

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

HR70-14
(U)

INSTITUTE FOR THE USA:

THE KREMLIN'S NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA-WATCHING

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXXV)

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

7 October 1969

[redacted]

[redacted]



~~SECRET~~

INSTITUTE FOR THE USA:

THE KREMLIN'S NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA-WATCHING

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

American Kremlinologists viewing the Soviet scene through the cracks in the Kremlin wall sometimes have the feeling that someone is looking back at them.

They are correct. His name is Yuriy A. Arbatov, and he is the Chief of the newly-formed Institute for the USA created to provide the Politburo a better basis for understanding the United States in all its complexities.

Should we be reassured or alarmed by the knowledge that Moscow has the nation under scrutiny by professional analysts rather than party dogmatists? This Intelligence Report presents a basis for reaching a judgment on this question by analyzing the political and professional philosophies of the man and his Institute as revealed in his publications and statements.

This study was prepared solely by SRS. It has been reviewed in OSR and OCI, and it encountered no substantive disagreement. The research analyst in charge was Arthur Cohen.



John Kerry Kyng
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INSTITUTE FOR THE USA:

THE KREMLIN'S NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA-WATCHING

Contents

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Yuriy Arkadyevich Arbatov
Director, Institute for the USA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

INSTITUTE FOR THE USA:

THE KREMLIN'S NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA-WATCHING

Summary

America-watching during Stalin's lifetime distorted and oversimplified the complex process of policy-formulation in the U.S., and analyses of the American scene had to comply with Stalin's arbitrary decision of 1947 to adopt a harsh line toward the U.S. In the Khrushchev period, Stalinist distortion of the U.S. for the first time was subjected to official criticism, but Khrushchev permitted amateurism to dominate America-watching because he (and several of his close colleagues) acted as their own experts. It was not until December 1967, when the Institute for the USA was established, that a professional and systematic approach to understanding the complex forces influencing policy in America was initiated. The post-Khrushchev leaders recognized the absolute necessity for having objective ("scientific") analyses of these complex forces. They probably were convinced that the blunders resulting from Khrushchev's dilettante approach to policy toward the U.S. could be avoided only by nurturing a real professionalism.

The man they selected from the Central Committee apparatus in December 1967 to develop the new Institute, Yuriy A. Arbatov (b. 1923), is a well-informed expert on the U.S. whose judgments are relatively free from doctrinal distortion. In the 1950s, he made his mark as a new kind of party publicist who defended Moscow's policies on the basis of factual information and logic, avoiding such Stalinist crudities as trying to carry a point by branding an opponent as "fascist." By the mid-1960s, when he began to work as an America-expert on more serious matters of policy for the Central Committee apparatus, he became one of the leading advocates of liberalized research on the U.S. He championed the

concept of a multi-discipline ("complex") approach to America-watching--an approach which probed the social, political, economic, and ideological factors influencing Washington's policy decisions.

Arbatov is far better informed on American developments than the old experts. He rejects the Stalinist dogma, which apparently is still held by some Soviets, that policy is made by only a homogenous "miniscule handful" in Washington directly serving the interests of a homogenous group in Wall Street. He assigns real importance to disputes among diverse forces within the Administration and Congress, to pressures from non-official groups, and to economic problems. The Institute has a Section on The U.S. Foreign Policy Mechanism, and one of the topics under systematic scrutiny is how American foreign policy is made. Another Section probes Sovietology in the USA. At the same time, as an expert making interpretations for the politburo, he is an opponent of research work on the U.S. which is not directly related to policy problems.

In the course of establishing Arbatov's Institute, the Soviet leaders by-passed America-experts within another existing institute--apparently because they were displeased with the quality of the old product and the ability of the old men. [redacted] described one of these men, [redacted] as a party hack, pedestrian in outlook, and the possessor of a plodding, dull mind, dedicated to the dogmatic view that the U.S. is completely "imperialistic." By contrast, men who have talked with Arbatov depict him as highly intelligent and eager to expand his already considerable fund of knowledge on the U.S. His ideology (Marxism) does not prevent him from accurately appraising the diverse forces at work on American policy makers. Some of the specialists he has recruited are more informed and open-minded than the traditional dogmatic America-watcher, whom he has disparaged as wearers of ideological "blinders." Arbatov probably will have to wage a continuing struggle against competitors in other institutes and men in the party,

who might prefer a return to the more simplistic (and distorted) view of policy-making in the U.S.

Arbatov has stated that he is called upon to make interpretations of American policy "to the politburo." His Institute apparently produces estimative as well as analytical papers on U.S. policy. The Institute functions more as an adjunct of the Central Committee's International and Bloc departments than as a scholarly component of the Academy of Sciences--its formal role.

Arbatov reportedly has access, beyond the Central Committee departments, to specific men in the politburo--particularly to Kosygin and Suslov. Soviet sources indicate that Arbatov's high-level supporters facilitate the process of recruitment of high-quality personnel. But it is not clear that he has the support of all Soviet leaders, or, more precisely, that he has received equal encouragement from all.

In this connection, Arbatov has been a prominent spokesman for those Soviet leaders who are anxious to attain a disarmament agreement through negotiations. Privately and in Izvestiya, he has warned American policy makers against delaying disarmament talks. In his discussion with former Secretary of Defense McNamara on 31 January 1969, Arbatov argued by implication the need for influential Americans to strengthen the hand of moderates in the Soviet Union, stating that the Soviet decision to engage in arms talks was a controversial one, that deep divisions existed in the Soviet government on this issue, and that many who now supported the talks had only recently moved to that position. Subsequently, other members of his Institute insisted privately to [redacted] that arms talks must not be delayed or blocked. This line was self-serving, being intended to create a sense of urgency among American officials to start negotiations. Nevertheless, it probably also reflected the real view of those leaders with whom Arbatov had close contacts.

Thus Arbatov and his Institute experts are not only engaged in policy support, but also they appear to have committed themselves to the support of one side--or faction--on a major issue. This means that Arbatov's findings have been, and probably will continue to be, exploitable materials for some (rather than all) politburo members on various issues concerning policy toward the U.S. However, this does not mean that Arbatov deliberately has distorted, or will distort, his findings in order to compress them into a preconceived policy-support package.

The Institute for the USA has made it possible for the politburo to appraise Washington's various policy actions with increased rationality--i.e., with greater accuracy and comprehension. The requirement that simplistic interpretations of any American policy-move must be rejected should buttress any tendency among the Soviet leaders to examine American policy in a more open-minded way than in the past. At the very least, the work of Arbatov and his staff should reduce the degree of error in Soviet appraisals of U.S. intentions on specific issues.

What actions Moscow will take on the basis of this improved comprehension is another matter. The more open-minded Soviet leaders may not have the opportunity to use new insights to reduce frictions in Soviet-American relations. Their relatively increased open-mindedness would conflict with the doctrine-soaked policies of the post-Khrushchev period, influenced significantly by the conservative thinking of Brezhnev.

Brezhnev has demanded, in recent years, a closer watch in the USSR over the incursion of Western ideas. In this sense, Arbatov is working in a situation of conflicting leadership aims. On the one hand, the leadership demands an improved effort--including objective analysis--on interpreting foreign developments, resulting in the strengthening of the geographical institutes. On the other hand, there is an increased emphasis on combatting foreign influences, resulting in a demand for greater doctrinal orthodoxy in the institutes concerned

with history, Marxism-Leninism, and philosophy. These conflicting aims may be reflected in the journal soon to be published by Arbatov's Institute. Articles may contain a mixture of some distortion and some accurate depiction of American developments. However, there is less likelihood that the demand for greater orthodoxy will corrupt the classified papers produced by Arbatov and his researchers for the eyes of the policy-makers only.

INSTITUTE FOR THE USA:

THE KREMLIN'S NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA-WATCHING

Introduction

The effort to develop a realistic understanding of the American political scene was a gradual process after Stalin's death. One of his intellectual legacies--namely, a grossly distorted image of the U.S.--lived on among party workers and academicians in the Khrushchev period. More and more, however, the Soviet leaders recognized that diverse and complex political and social forces were influencing the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and that it was to their interest to make an accurate (objective) analysis of these forces.

I. Stalin's Later Years: Distorting the American Political Scene

The basis of America-watching during Stalin's later years (1947-1953) was hardly more than a prospering dogmatism. Stalin's doctrinal bias severely hampered research and analysis. Moreover, his conception of what the Soviet internal control system should be--that is, his view that police controls should be pervasive--kept Soviet researchers walled off from sources which would have revealed the increasing complexity of developments in the U.S. and the need for sophisticated analysis. He required acceptance of the simplistic myth of government control by "Wall Street" which depicted one group of capitalists alternating with another at the helm of government following national elections. This distortion suppressed knowledge of sharp differences on policy issues among Congressional Democrats and Republicans and within the Cabinet. It also suppressed any understanding of the new phenomena, namely, (1) the stratification among American "capitalists"--big, middle, and small, (2) the rise of influential

corporation managers and high-level technical personnel as a result of the managerial revolution, and (3) the big increase in the ranks of intellectuals who were becoming influential as opinion-makers of the new urban and suburban middle class. In short, the deep diversity of interests of different groups within the capitalist class should have been a major research target but was not studied, inasmuch as it conflicted with Stalin's doctrinal view of the basic American dichotomy--namely, homogenous "capitalist" interests competing with homogenous "proletarian" interests.

Stalin would not relax controls sufficiently to permit researchers to work out an accurate view of these diverse American interests. He apparently believed that he already knew all he had to know regarding how policy was made. He was dedicated to Lenin's view that it was made by "a miniscule handful" of capitalists who, as like-minded individuals, were obligated only to advance the economic interests of "Wall Street." Intelligence reporting on the U.S. apparently provided him with the factual information he needed whenever he had to determine what major policies had been made. He apparently did not want additional insights, such as might have been provided him by American specialists, regarding different policy views within the U.S. government and among influential figures on the outside. His "Wall Street" dogma was the substitute for insight, and he seems to have downgraded, or discounted, the implications for policy of internal government disputes and extra-government pressures.

Ever since his campaign against "servility toward the West" which was launched in 1947 simultaneously with the Cold War, researchers analyzing the American "political economy" sought security in an arid, quotation-laden approach. Those who worked in the Institute of World Economy and World Politics, of the Academy of Sciences, had just witnessed the denunciation of its Director, Eugene Varga, for writing that Western capitalism would be temporarily free from crises, or "stabilized," for about 10 years. Previously, this had been similar to Stalin's own view. But when Stalin changed it in 1947,

preferring that researchers postulate an "imminent economic crisis," the Institute was abolished. Its researchers were transferred, becoming a mere section--the Section on Economics of Contemporary Capitalism, Institute of Economics, from 1947 to 1956. They were unable to acquire foreign publications and were impelled to distort the American scene, inasmuch as "Every Marxist work on the economics of capitalist countries must be a bill of indictment." (Pravda, 2 September 1950) While Stalin lived, accurate studies were derided as poisonous products of "bourgeois objectivism." As the son of Anastas Mikoyan, Sergo, later put it, researchers in Varga's institute had been "suppressed."

II. The Gradual Shift to Non-Distorting Research

Following Stalin's death in March 1953, particularly in the fall of 1955, the first signs of a liberalizing thaw began to appear in articles on the problem of objective analysis of capitalist countries. Scholars were told that a new era had begun and that they must stop distorting and oversimplifying:

> Many scientists take up a dogmatic and oversimplifying attitude toward the economic situation of present-day capitalism. This finds expression in an unexplained rejection or a suppression of the achievements attained in the capitalist countries in the development of production, science, and technology. (Problems of Economics, #10, February 1955)

Party personnel, too, were directed to avoid "oversimplifying ideas about the decay of capitalism which are now current in our propaganda." (Kommunist, #14, September 1955) A big step in the direction of objective research was made by Mikoyan in his speech of 16 February 1956 to the 20th CPSU Congress when he demanded accuracy in order to explain "the complexity and contradictory nature" of developments in capitalist countries. He complained that academicians had limited themselves to

selecting isolated facts to prove, "for purposes of agitation," the approaching crisis of capitalism and impoverishment of the workers, failing to provide "an all-sided, deep evaluation" of events in capitalist countries.

Varga's old institute was revived and expanded, following the Congress, to be the present-day Institute of World Economics and International Relations. But America-watching was still limited in scope, having been confined to one of six "sections"--the small Section for Problems of American Imperialism--in the Institute. Better working conditions for its researchers included access to American source materials, and one report suggests that on occasion Section members were drawn in to join task forces preparing papers to serve as background information for men in the Central Committee. It may be conjectured, however, that the Section chief did not have direct access to the top Soviet leadership and that the work of his Section usually was not oriented toward policy.

A. The Rise of America-Expert Yuriy A. Arbatov

Yuriy (or Georgiy) Arkadyevich Arbatov (b. 1923), by training a "Doctor of Philosophical Sciences" and a "Candidate of Law" who had graduated from the University of Moscow, made his mark in the 1950s as a party publicist on political developments in capitalist countries, particularly on intellectual currents in the U.S. By the mid-1960s he was working for the Central Committee apparatus. As a post-Stalin critic of American intellectual developments, he tried to make his critiques convincing and credible, which meant that he had to read extensively in U.S. books, journals, and research papers in addition to the American press. In 1956, following the 20th CPSU Congress, Arbatov apprently was encouraged to make available to researchers American materials, primarily with the intention of training them to write "convincing and well-grounded critiques"--Arbatov's phrase--of Western political ideas. He declared

that the "enormous quantity of factual information" accumulated by Western sociologists should be "used by us, critically."

> This is the more necessary because the empirical studies of bourgeois sociologists frequently contain material which cannot be found in other sources . . . even disregarding the idea of applying such studies to our country, and considering only the use of the factual material they contain for the study of capitalist society, we must recognize the volume of such material and not ignore it. The critical mastery and assimilation, on a Marxist basis, of such material will undoubtedly facilitate the study of contemporary capitalism. (Problems of Philosophy, October 1956)

For a credible critique of Western sociologists and for a new understanding of Western societies, academicians were encouraged to exploit the published writings of "bourgeois" scholars. They were to be informed critics, rather than ignorant critics, of the U.S.

Even before the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, Arbatov had had access to American scholarly publications for special propaganda use. He had been writing "convincing" critiques of American events. For example, access to foreign materials had been indicated in his critical analysis of USIA, which was published in Kommunist, May 1955. His analysis was unusual, inasmuch as it reflected careful and detailed research, drawing on many current American government, newspaper, and academic sources. Far from being the work of an ordinary party polemicist in the Stalin-Zhdanov tradition, Arbatov's article indicated a sophisticated understanding of the complexity of the American "psychological warfare apparatus," of the debate being waged at the time in Congress over the new USIA budget, and of the ideas of scholars specializing in psychological warfare operations, such as Professors Lasswell and Linebarger. Access to the

works of other American specialists on public opinion--e.g., Walter Lippmann and Robert Strausz-Hupe--was indicated by Arbatov's pamphlet published in March 1956 on the "role of the masses in international relations." The Khrushchevian tone of this pamphlet strongly suggests that immediately after the liberalizing 20th Congress, Arbatov committed himself to the relatively empirical policies of Khrushchev and Mikoyan. He was a sophisticated writer, and he must have felt that he could advance more rapidly within the party's propaganda apparatus than the conventional hack, particularly at a time when oversimplification was under attack.

Arbatov thereafter, in his special field as a "convincing" critic of American scholars, used his opportunities to support Khrushchevian policies. In the above-mentioned March 1956 pamphlet, for example, he defended the positions that there can be a "parliamentary road" to power for Communists in capitalist countries and that there is "no fatal inevitability of wars." In his review of Professor C. Wright Mills' book, The Power Elite (1956), published in Pravda on 21 December 1956, he implicitly rejected the Molotov view that negotiations with the U.S. were harmful to Soviet interests. Arbatov wrote favorably about the idea of negotiations and detente in his critique of Herman Wouk (New Times, #5, February 1957). In an attack on Strausz-Hupe, he praised the idea of "realistic . . . mutual consent" as against international "ultimatums" as the way to peace (New Times, #16, April 1957). Arbatov made a distinction between those influential American writers who favored detente and those who opposed it, and he displayed considerable skill in subjecting Strausz-Hupe's anti-detente arguments to a rational critique.

In this role, he was an early member of the new group of rational-minded party publicists who defended Moscow's policies on the basis of factual information, avoiding the old standard propaganda cliches in order to convey a sense of sobriety in their approach. Arbatov discarded such Stalinist crudities as trying to carry a point by branding an opponent as "Fascist" or "reactionary." For example, in criticizing a VOA broadcaster,

Arbatov made only one sarcastic remark about the man personally, and went on to dissect the broadcast's content, using logic as his major weapon. (New Times, #14, April 1957) This approach was not entirely objective, but it may have been effective with the 500,000 reader-audience of New Times.

As an ambitious party member, Arbatov used his academic training for political rather than scholarly articles. They were all distinguished by a basic orthodoxy of line, whatever that orthodoxy was at any particular time, and combined richly elaborated detail, including the appearance of a scholarly structure. He showed considerable knowledge in refuting six BBC broadcasts by the former British Vice-Consul in Moscow, Sir R.B. Lockart, making Lockart's historical analysis appear to be "ludicrous." (New Times, #50, December 1967) He was also comfortable in writing on doctrinal matters, but he proved to be a less able advocate in this field when confronted with the task of disparaging such serious students of Marxist ideology as Professor Isiah Berlin on Plekhanov (New Times, #6, February 1957) and Professor Maurice Cranston on the "non-scientific" nature of Marxist laws. (New Times, #13, April 1957)

Arbatov's ability to survive and prosper in the party is at least partly the result of his willingness to shift with changes of direction. The Hungarian revolt of October-November 1956 led to a temporary slowdown in liberalization. When the party attacked non-party historians for having misrepresented the "struggle against vulgarization" to mean "adopting a tolerant attitude toward the ideology of the bourgeoisie" (Party Life, #23, December 1956) and when the government issued a decree (7 March 1957) demanding that Problems of History dedicate itself to "partyness" in historical research, Arbatov applied the new strictures to Soviet sociologists. He warned that their sociology "cannot be non-party" or cut off from Marxist values and that, contrary to Freudian views in the West, Soviet scholars must see "class struggle" as the basis of psychological tensions in society. (Problems of Philosophy, #2, April 1957)

Following the June 1957 Central Committee Plenum where Khrushchev won a major victory over Stalinist opponents, Arbatov wrote in defense of Khrushchevian positions as the Soviet leader continued to advance against the "Anti-Party Group." Unlike the neo-Stalinists, who viewed Western leaderships as undifferentiated cabals of war planners, Arbatov depicted them along the lines developed by Khrushchev and Mikoyan:

> Lately, some people in the capitalist world see fit to urge 'looking facts in the face,' 'accepting the challenge' and laying emphasis not only on the arms race, but on the competition with Socialism in the economic and social spheres as well . . . The supporters of Socialism, and indeed all honest men, can only welcome the desire of some bourgeois leaders to take up the challenge and compete with Socialism in the economic and social spheres. (International Affairs, #1, January 1959)

And when, at the 21st CPSU Congress in January-February 1959, Khrushchev pursued his dispute with Mao over the importance of using material incentives when advancing toward full Communism--one of several points in dispute--Arbatov was one of the publicists in the party who defended Khrushchev's position. Writing shortly after the Congress, Arbatov attacked Mao indirectly for considering material incentives far less important in a man's attitude toward labor than "spiritual stimuli." (Kommunist, #3, 9 March 1959) That he was able to prepare this article for the party's theoretical journal on short notice suggests that he had become known among officials in the Central Committee as an articulate and quick-response propaganda publicist. At the same time, his university training as a student of philosophy qualified him for more basic doctrinal work, such as participation in 1959 as one of several authors contributing to Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism--a volume reflecting, in part, Khrushchev's relatively moderate view of Communism and relations with the West.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Arbatov later went beyond a defense of Khrushchev to open flattery in order to help bolster the Soviet leader's personal stature. In a joint article written with L. Sedin in April 1960, he participated in Khrushchev's effort to build up his own political position as against that of other presidium members; those junior party cadres who desired advancement had to engage in the sycophantic exercise. But it was a Khrushchevian, pragmatic cult--that is, it was non-Stalinist in its limited scope and passionless nature, and Khrushchev was not depicted as super-human in mentality or divine in personality.

> A great contribution to the further theoretical development of this problem (of coexistence) has been made by N.S. Khrushchev--the indefatigable propagandist and persistent advocate of the Leninist idea of the feasibility and historical necessity of peaceful coexistence of states with differing socio-political systems. Many speeches and talks by the head of the Soviet government and his well-known article "On Peaceful Coexistence" published in the American journal, Foreign Affairs, in October 1959 have thrown light on diverse aspects of the policy of coexistence. Moreover, he has contributed a particularly large amount of what is new to development of problems involving the peaceful competition of the two systems. (World Economics and International Relations, #5, 22 April 1960)

Arbatov and Sedin, writing to defend Khrushchev's version of coexistence, distorted the image of Lenin into that of a peace-loving Victorian radical. The main purpose of this distortion was to undercut Mao's militant ("Leninist") demand for a revolutionary strategy against the U.S., particularly in the underdeveloped countries.

Arbatov continued to defend Khrushchev's main formulations as the Sino-Soviet dispute developed. He reaffirmed Khrushchev's revisionist thesis set forth at the 21st Congress, namely, the idea that wars can be

abolished "even before capitalism disappears" in the world. (Kommunist, #9, June 1961) He attacked the Chinese by name for the first time in 1963 while defending the nuclear test ban treaty. (Pravda, 13 August 1963) Shortly afterward, he attacked Stalin by name, linking the Chinese with his view that imperialist wars can be an "indirect" reserve of Communist revolution. (Kommunist, #14, September 1963) But as an American specialist, Arbatov was not one of Moscow's main polemicists in the dispute; he merely paraphrased the definitive CPSU articles on war and peace, and his work seems to have been used as an additional weapon among the polemical batteries Khrushchev had ranged against Mao.

After Khrushchev was deposed in mid-October 1964, Arbatov's pieces reflected a combination of Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian political positions. For at least three weeks, he maintained an undiluted Khrushchevian position, attacking Mao's preference for "revolutionary war" over the CPSU Program's prescription for winning adherents to Communism "by the example and revolutionizing influence" of advances made in bloc countries. Beyond that, he again disparaged Stalinism openly by complaining that the force of example had been dealt "a damaging blow by those crude perversions of socialist democracy that were perpetuated in the 1930s and 1940s during the period of the Stalin personality cult." (World Economics and International Relations, #11, 31 October 1964) Within three months, however, Arbatov had shifted to comply with the modified, somewhat harder anti-U.S. positions of the new leadership.

This shift was reflected in Arbatov's important article (published in Pravda on 6 January 1965) which discussed President Johnson's State of the Union message. He stated that the policy of conducting the Cold War was "not yet a political fossil" and that the President's "bridge-building" line toward East Europe was political penetration "very close to the policy of madmen." But this new, qualified emphasis on anti-imperialism was not intended by the new Soviet leadership to be a complete

reversal of the policy of contacts and negotiations with Washington. It was a step back from Khrushchev's non-support of Hanoi--that is, it was intended to mollify Ho and undercut the Chinese accusations in the world Communist movement of USSR-U.S. cooperation. The new leadership also intended to warn the East European countries against moving away from the USSR and toward the U.S. at a time of apparent weakness and indecision during the succession-to-Khrushchev period.

Arbatov's Pravda article provided an anti-imperialist smokescreen for the new leadership, in effect sanctioning a continuation of negotiations with "moderates" in the Johnson Administration. He portrayed the Administration as being locked in a policy struggle which was reflected on the surface in "policy contradictions" he found in the State of the Union message. He went on to set forth several remaining Khrushchevian positions, namely, that the West was impelled to adopt a more "cautious, flexible, and deliberate strategy" because of Moscow's ability to influence international opinion by the "force of example," that the West had to accept "economic competition" and had to make "concessions and compromises" in foreign policy, and that bloc countries would not gain from a nuclear war "even if imperialism, which unleashed it, perished in its flames."

Arbatov carried out his new and important Pravda assignment skillfully, and he probably impressed the new leadership as being their best-informed and most astute expert on the U.S. The article's content indicated that, for the first time, Arbatov was discussing a major American political event of immediate concern to the politburo. And for the first time, he was given the assignment of enunciating a major shift--i.e., toward Hanoi. Thus he was elevated from the ranks of a mere propagandist (although a sophisticated one) to the status of a policy-support expert on key current matters regarding the U.S.

B. Arbatov's Commitment to Non-Dogmatic Research

Arbatov's university training provided him with the ability to separate his role as a party propagandist from his role as an America-watcher who had to analyze political trends in the U.S. in a serious-minded and objective way. In 1965, he joined the ranks of reformers who were championing the cause of liberalizing political research, and he openly supported Dr. F. M. Burlatsky of the Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences, who wrote on the need for "science" (i.e., empirical and objective study) in the analysis of political problems. (Pravda, 10 January 1965) The problems to be studied were primarily, but not exclusively, those appearing in Soviet society. Burlatsky emphasized the need to examine problems with a new tool, namely, the discipline known in the West as "political science," which was unique in its many-sided approach, analyzing complex questions by using a combination of "scientific communism, theory of state and law, and sociology, as well as economics." He proposed that special research institutions should be established for "political science," hoping to make it a new, separate field rather than a study subordinated to traditional juridical science. Since 1938, the official Soviet concept of the inseparable bond between the study of law and politics had led to the absorption and denigration of the study of politics by juridical science; it had resulted in a rigid, formal, and legalistic--i.e., useless--treatment of political problems.

Burlatsky was supported by Arbatov (among others) at the annual meeting of the relatively new Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences (SAPS) in February 1965. Arbatov, who was elected to the Executive Committee of the association, argued that development of "political science" as an independent discipline would make it possible to discover "scientific" answers to all current political questions. He suggested that political science research should be divided into two basic specialties, namely, "internal political, connected with the domestic

problems of socialist society, and external political, connected with international relations and the international communist movement." (Soviet State and Law, #7, July 1965) He supported Burlatsky's plea to the association for a separate political science dedicated to the comprehensive and predominantly empirical investigation of the "totality of political realtions (and) political activities in all their manifestations." But other discussants at the meeting, while accepting the need for more emphasis on the study of politics, rejected the idea of an independent discipline to be introduced as a new department in educational institutions. Strengthened by the speech of V. M. Chkhikvadze, Director of the Institute of State and Law (and the boss of Burlatsky), their view prevailed.

While Burlatsky's effort failed to lead to establishment of a separate discipline, a new emphasis was placed on political research. On 13 June 1965, Pravda published a follow-up editorial surveying favorable responses to Burlatsky's January article. Members of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, for example, were quoted as complaining that while there were scholars already working in some areas listed by Burlatsky (contemporary international relations, international workers' movement, the study of socialist and capitalist societies, etc.), the level and scope of their works were not satisfactory, largely because these areas of research were still officially slighted. Regarding contemporary foreign politics, they also complained that dissertations in this field were adversely affected because they had to be arbitrarily fitted into the framework of the old juridical, historical, or philosophical disciplines. The Pravda editorial seems to have reflected leadership impatience with the failure of these traditional disciplines to provide them with useful information, of a current nature, on the effectiveness of Soviet foreign

and domestic policy. Regarding Arbatov's American specialization, the editorial called for a "political" approach to the study of political power in capitalist countries (among other areas of new emphasis). It concluded by urging researchers, without waiting for the establishment of special institutions of political science, to "considerably broaden their study of political problems in the existing institutions" of higher learning and research. It may be conjectured that between January and June 1965, Arbatov helped to convince some members of the Central Committee that a broader, multi-discipline ("complex") attack on foreign policy problems would prove far more useful to the top policy-makers than the old rigid, formalistic and juridical approach. He probably indicated that the increasing complexity of American politics required a new, "complex" approach, undistorted by oversimplifications and dogma.

III. Origin of the Institute for the USA

A. America-Watching in Other Institutes

In support of party Central Committee workers, research on American foreign policy and economy was centered primarily in the USA Section, Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The Section was headed by Professor I.M. Lemin, who presided over 30 scholars in three sub-sections, namely, American "foreign policy," "economy," and "disarmament." In June 1964, the Institute's deputy director, D.M. Menshikov, son of the former Ambassador to the U.S., stated that research papers for the Central Committee included such subjects as "How will U.S. foreign policy change vis-a-vis the USSR if Goldwater were to be elected to the presidency?" In July 1964, he was completing a book, The Main Drives of U.S. Foreign Policy. But young Mikoyan (also an Institute scholar) stated privately that the older members--he may have meant Lemin (about 70 years old) among others--were "too inflexible and doctrinaire" in their attitudes toward current problems.

Arbatov in 1966 directly criticized the impractical content of books on international relations produced by Soviet scholars, and by implication the Institute was his chief target. In his review of The ABC of Diplomacy (1965) written by Professor A.M. Kovalev of Moscow State University, Arbatov praised the book as an exceptional work, primarily because of its treatment of political "practice."

> The book will be of interest because of the close links between theory and foreign political practices, because it reveals not only general principles, but also, so to say, the very 'kitchen' side of diplomatic work. This should be mentioned in particular since poor ties with political practice have so far been the weak spot of many even good works devoted to international relations. (Kommunist, #12, August 1966) (emphasis supplied)

It is significant that Kovalev, the author praised by Arbatov, was not a member of the Institute which was the major producer of books on "international relations." Institute deputy director Menshikov commented [redacted] in June 1966 that professionals working for him turned out "a book a year," that his job was to "crack the whip" to see that they "got their books out," and that he personally had written one based on materials accumulated during an earlier trip to the U.S.: Millionaires and Managers. It seems probable that when Arbatov wrote his Kommunist review he was well aware of the Institute's product in book form and that he considered the product useless for practical policy support.

The Soviet leadership's determination to shape research work into a policy-support operation was suggested by the appointment of N.N. Inozemtsev, in preference to a professional economist, to be the new director of the Institute. A former editor of Pravda, Inozemtsev was not respected among academicians as a scholar; he was brought in from the party's propaganda apparatus. Like Arbatov, he was in his middle years (45) and was reported in the fall of 1966 to be "very knowledgable" on American foreign policy, skillful in writing articles adapting doctrine to international developments, very intelligent, and "a good administrator." Arbatov's Kommunist review, in addition to its criticism of useless theoretical works on diplomacy in general, may also have been directed against Inozemtsev's thick book (759 pages), Foreign Policy of the U.S. in the Epoch of Imperialism (Moscow, 1960), and this may have been an early instance of competition between the two men.

Inozemtsev's Institute had traditional expertise in the economy of the U.S., and unlike Arbatov, Inozemtsev personally had some proficiency in economics. As a Corresponding Member, Department of Economics, Academy of Sciences, Inozemtsev apparently was viewed by men within the Central Committee apparatus as valuable because he was party-trained and not purely a scholar, because he was a good administrator, and because his training would help the effort to improve the Institute's policy-support work on complex economic developments in the U.S. In July 1966, about two months after Inozemtsev was selected as the new Director, one report indicated that the Insti-

tute might be reorganized by moving specialists out to take up research in individual institutes, separating economic research from foreign relations research. During his visit to the U.S. in November 1966, Inozemtsev stated privately that the Institute's main charter was to assess "foreign economics," particularly the economics of the U.S. Subsequently, the Institute's research on the U.S. was indeed concentrated on economic developments, with a secondary place being given to "socio-political problems." (Inozemtsev's Report on the Institute's Research in 1968: Economic Gazette, #10, 1969)

In addition to the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, several other institutes investigate aspects of American affairs as a secondary responsibility. The Institute of Africa (established in 1959) primarily provides support for Soviet political activity in the Dark Continent, but includes in its scope of responsibility the study of the "new colonialism"--i.e., American--appearing in Africa. The Institute of Latin America (established in 1961) centers its attention on Cuba and revolutionary activity in the area, but its supplementary task is to analyze American policy in individual countries. The Institute of the Far East (established in 1965) focuses its attention on China and secondarily on Washington-Peking relations. The evidence suggests, however, that these three area-oriented institutes carry far less of the research load on American policy than does Inozemtsev's institute.

These specialized institutes apparently were set up to support the Soviet foreign policy effort toward the countries of primary importance in each geographical area. The Soviet leaders seem to have wanted Central Committee workers to provide more direct, detailed, and timely analyses of developments in the Congo since 1959, in Cuba since 1961, and in China since 1965. This meant that the policy-support institutes were required to produce research papers of a new kind, namely, timely and realistic, rather than historical and academic; the reference-book nature of institute research was criticized. For example, the Director of the Institute for Africa, V.G. Solodovnikov,

stated that because of the appearance of many new African states, priority research had to be directed toward more detailed and timely work. (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald, May 1965.) The Director of the Institute of Latin America, V. V. Volskiy, complained that research still had "a reference-book or a cognitive-descriptive character," and T. T. Timofeyev stated that it was necessary to "realistically evaluate" new factors in the position of Latin America in the East-West struggle. Both men had spoken at a session of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences which discussed the "new and complex" problems facing Soviet Latin Americanists. (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald, December 1966) Regarding the need for current research on China, B. Zanegin, head of the Foreign Policy Section, Institute of the Far East, stated privately in April 1969 that the older Institute of Oriental Studies is still active but deals with the "antiquities" of China; the new (since 1965) institute concentrates on current issues in the politics and economics of China rather than on the traditional cultural and humanities aspects of China scholarship. Zanegin also stated that the institute had no direct influence on policy toward Peking; policy-support usually meant a process whereby copies of research papers were sent to the appropriate "government bodies"--almost certainly Central Committee departments. Later, the authors recognized sections of their papers incorporated into official articles, according to Zanegin.

Thus the general trend in institute research after the late 1950s was toward studies useful for current support of leadership policies. Greater stress on timeliness and practical usefulness of studies led to increased specialization on an area-country basis. This stress culminated in the issuance of a Central Committee decree (14 August 1967) which demanded an improvement in the organization, planning, and financing of institute research.

B. Establishment of the Institute for the USA

1. The Central Committee Demand for "Complex" (Multi-discipline) Research

In its decree of 14 August 1967, the Central Committee directed the Academy of Sciences to recommend (before 1 January 1968) methods for "the basic improvement of the organization, planning, and financing of scientific research in the field of the social sciences." Regarding research on capitalist countries in particular, the decree complained about the defects in the organization of research. It noted that "many aspects and problems of capitalist society and the national liberation movement still await thorough and complex research. The organization of these researches is not carried out purposefully enough." (Decree as published in Pravda on 22 August 1967.) A follow-up Pravda editorial on 23 August suggested that the demand for "complex" research meant a multi-discipline, multi-faceted approach rather than the old, oversimplified study which had failed to comprehend the importance for policy of assessing the social and political complexities of the American scene. It stated that investigations were required regarding the "socio-economic, political, and ideological tendencies of contemporary capitalism."

The attack on oversimplification and the demand for a "complex" approach in institute research had been stated clearly prior to issuance of the decree. In the spring of 1967, members of the Academy of Sciences Presidium criticized the procedures of G.M. Sorokin's Institute of Economics of the World Socialist Systems, stating that "the exceptionally complex tasks facing the Institute require an integrated approach to their solution and thus require the study of not only purely economic problems, but also social, political, and even ideological problems." (Emphasis added.) Some members suggested organizing special sections within the Institute for the study of "problems of a socio-political nature." Academician P.N. Fedoseyev attacked the Institute's "simplified and overstylized points of view," and then declared that an accurate view

of the real situation in bloc countries required a multi-discipline method of research:

> The world socialist economy represents an extremely dynamic system and much hinges on the actual situation in the various countries, on the level of their development, on the actually attained labor productivity, etc; it must be considered that a solution is needed not only for purely economic problems but also for socio-political problems, and that these problems must be considered integrally when analyzing all the possible results and all the existing tasks. (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald, April 1967) (emphasis supplied)

Fedoseyev went on to recommend a strengthened effort by saying that the Institute should be supplied with additional personnel, material sources, and premises; moreover, more researchers should be dispatched for trips abroad. The Academy of Sciences Presidium adopted a resolution calling for (among other things) prompt preparation by the Institute of "objective and complete" information on the economic processes taking place in bloc countries.

This "complex" approach reflected implicit Soviet acceptance of the multi-discipline aspect--one of the few practical aspects--of American social and political science procedures. It was an indirect acknowledgment that Mikoyan had been right when, in his speech at the 20th CPSU Congress, he had disparaged Stalin's dictum on the shrinkage of capitalist production as inadequate for explaining "the complexity and the contradictory nature of events in contemporary capitalism." Moreover, it was an apparent reflection of the Soviet leaders' view that the complex aspects of modern domestic and foreign policy required a liberation of research institutions from the old, unrealistic, text-book images of the U.S. in order to fashion them into useful policy-support units.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

2. By-passing the Competition

Reorganization within the existing institutes was one of the consequences of the decree's directives. By December 1967, the USA Section in the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (which previously had three sub-sections) was revamped, made into a Department, and assigned to working on policy-support analyses of special projects concerning the U.S. economy. This directed the Institute's work increasingly toward economic topics--such as the U.S. agricultural economy and the U.S. balance of payments problem--taking it almost completely out of the larger field of analysis of American political developments. The USA Department chief, Yu. M. Melnikov, reportedly was a specialist on U.S. aid to underdeveloped countries. His prior training had been confined to the field of pre-1940 American "economic penetration" in Latin America. He was described in early January 1969 [redacted] as a party hack, pedestrian in outlook, and the possessor of a plodding, dull mind, dedicated to the dogmatic view that the U.S. was completely "imperialistic." He apparently was not considered by the Soviet leadership as the man they needed to make a new start in improving the quality of analysis of the U.S.

Establishment of the Institute for the USA (five blocks from the U.S. embassy at Khlebnyi pereulok II/3) in December 1967 was a more important consequence of the 14 August 1967 decree's demand for improved social science research of a "complex" nature. Arbatov, its new director, was qualified for the upgraded effort on the U.S. because he was intelligent, informed on the American scene, and relatively pragmatic, willing to view American trends with a minimum of Marxist distortion. Moreover, he was reform-minded, having been active in the appeal of pragmatic men to break down the old formalistic disciplines in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences.

Arbatov stated privately that the main areas of research emphasis would be the U.S. economy, Soviet-American relations, U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. internal developments. U.S. military matters, he declared, would be analyzed by other institutes, but, regarding the political aspects of the arms race, he stated that he was recruiting a group to produce arms control and disarmament studies and to engage in non-government Soviet-American arms control talks.

In line with a suggestion made in September 1968 by Central Committee member A.M. Rumyantsev, Arbatov stated that the Institute would publish a monthly journal. According to one report, starting early in 1970, the Institute will indeed publish a monthly journal--USA: Politics, Economics, Ideology--with Valentin Berezhkov (formerly of New Times) as the prospective editor and Vitaly Petrusenko (formerly a TASS correspondent in Washington) as the deputy editor. Arbatov also indicated that studies would appear in book form including, for example, a monograph on American private corporations. He indicated his intention to arrange for exchanges of newspapers, journals, and other publications, and he is preparing for an exchange of researchers. He prefers to have his own Institute library rather than work out of the holdings of other institutes, and his Scientific Secretary for Foreign Relations, V.P. Filatov, has already contacted the U.S. embassy and private libraries in the U.S.--as well as the Library of Congress--for aid in building up a new collection. Although Arbatov intends to bring the Institute's personnel roster up to 500, by June 1969 he had recruited 140, of whom 60 were fulltime researchers. In addition, 15 post-graduate students were reported to be engaged in research at the Institute.

Institute researchers told [redacted] they have a subscription list of about 250 U.S. publications, including the Congressional Record, from which they glean useful source materials, especially from the "Extension of Remarks" section. They also stated that the New York Times and the Washington Post are used as the most important newspaper sources.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Arbatov's search for bright, young, reform-minded workers fluent in English opened a competition between the Institute and other institutes. In January 1969, Yu. M. Melnikov, the chief of the USA Department in the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, headed by Inozemtsev, stated privately that Arbatov's organization was a "rival." Another official in Inozemtsev's institute asserted that "We are afraid that he will steal our best American experts. He can pay top salaries. He has influence and prestige. The good people--the young, particularly--are lining up to work with him." (Interview in Business Week, 17 February 1968)

Arbatov himself privately disparaged the older institute. In January 1969 he was reported to have complained that the old approach failed to study theU.S. in all its "complex" aspects, concentrated on America's industrial and military development, and simplified the results of elections to mean a mere placement in national office of part of a single, homogenous "profiteering" elite which was no different from the part which lost the election. The symbol of this "dogmatic approach" was, according to Arbatov, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, where America-watching was left to a limited subdivision--presumably Yu. M. Melnikov's.

IV. The New Approach Underway

A. Arbatov As Interpreter of the U.S. for the Politburo

1. His Direct Access to the Soviet Leaders

Arbatov's rise from the status of party propagandist to that of a high-level policy-support worker was suggested by his 6 January 1965 Pravda article. Later, on 16 May 1967, Moscow Pravda identified him as a "responsible worker of the Central Committee." Subsequently, his new Institute assignment suggested that the Soviet leaders, who already had a department within another institute working on the U.S., were displeased with the old product and preferred to make a new start with a man whose

views they respected. According to [redacted] Arbatov was appointed from the Central Committee secretariat--that is, from the party's central apparatus--and he was selected specifically to make it possible for the Institute to bring its product directly to the attention of "the highest authorities." Arbatov later stated privately that he is called upon to make interpretations of U.S. policy "to the politburo." And when, in a tongue-in-cheek article, Herman Kahn played the role of hypothetical Soviet expert on the U.S. in a Newsweek article (16 June 1969), it was Arbatov as the leading expert on the U.S. who replied to him (Newsweek, 21 July 1969).

There is evidence of Arbatov's access to specific men in the politburo. He opened his private interview with former Secretary of Defense McNamara on 31 January 1969 with personal greetings from Kosygin. [redacted] reported that in February 1969 Arbatov had made comments to him which implied that he was "quite close" to Suslov. The same source asserted that Arbatov had direct access to the late politburo member Otto Kuusinen, and had later written Kuusinen's obituary. He almost certainly has direct access, having worked in the party apparatus, to such men as head of the Central Committee's International Department Ponomarev and former head of the Bloc Department Andropov, who is now head of the KGB. Soviet academicians who had discussed Arbatov [redacted] have stated that his various high-level contacts facilitate the process of recruitment for his institute.

Working directly for the party's central apparatus and the politburo, Arbatov was completely policy-oriented. He rejected, as standards for the new approach to America-watching, highly theoretical speculation of the kind conducted by certain American institutes (such as the Center for Advanced Behavioral Studies at Stanford and Herman Kahn's Hudson Institute). He informed a questioner, who had asked if his Institute would resemble American "think tanks," that "In political studies, I don't believe much in the sort of highly speculative and prophetic work your so-called think tanks specialize in." (Interview in Business Week, 17 February 1968)

Papers prepared by the Institute for policy-makers apparently are estimative in nature and hew close to matters of practical politics. According to A.M. Rumyantsev of the Central Committee, the Institute for the USA (among others) is required to keep its work in a "close relationship" with the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR. (Problems of History, #9, September 1968) During a discussion between Soviet academicians and Senators Gore and Pell in Moscow on 20 November 1968, Arbatov indicated his intimate knowledge of current Soviet policy on arms limitation talks; he apparently was assigned the task of urging the senators to intensify their appeals for a disarmament "initiative" from the U.S. Administration.

2. His Objective Approach to America-Watching

Shortly before his first visit to the U.S., Arbatov told [redacted] that the purpose of his trip was to advise his government on the prospects for the U.S. In the process of determining the relationship of U.S. domestic problems to foreign policy, his intention would be, he insisted, to take an "objective and scientific" approach to this study of the U.S., as opposed to propaganda. He had indicated in his Business Week interview in February 1968 that many Soviet specialists working on the U.S. still wore ideological "blinders" and that he would have to train many of his researchers virtually from scratch.

Arbatov's emphasis on the need for an objective approach was similar to the view expressed by the liberal-minded Vice President of the Academy of Sciences and Central Committee member, A.M. Rumyantsev. Defining the nature of institute research on Western countries, Rumyantsev stated that it was necessary to acquire "a profound and precise" knowledge of all processes--i.e., "economic, social, political, and spiritual"--of capitalist countries and that the product must be an "objective and valid assessment" of the overall productive potential of these countries. Making a polemical statement on the need for objective research, he declared that

> To an equal extent, it would be harmful both to implant illusions in respect to the potentialities of modern capitalism, or to underestimate its genuine forces. (Problems of History, #9, September 1968)

He went on to warn researchers against "oversimplification" and stereotype-thinking "in the approach to an analysis of modern capitalism." As a practical measure, Rumyantsev proposed the further development of "field research," inasmuch as "it is necessary to put an end to the physical isolation of Soviet experts on America" (among others) "from the countries which they are studying." Arbatov later stated privately that his first visit to the U.S. (January-February 1969) would not be the last, inasmuch as he planned to make the trip over "from time to time."

On 11 January 1969 Arbatov used an article to argue not only for objective analysis, but also for a higher degree of sophistication in trying to understand the complexities of American policy making. Writing in Izvestiya, he stated that the "most interesting" aspect of the Brookings Institute's book, Agenda for the Nation (1968), was reflected in

> the organic link between internal difficulties that have reached an unprecedented height and the foreign policy course that Washington pursues.

In an apparent criticism by implication of researchers still tied to the traditional, Stalinist approach to analyzing U.S. domestic problems, he warned that "many old and indeed 'traditional' problems have become entirely different from those 10 or 15 years ago." Arbatov's implication was that America's problems were so "complex" --and "complex problems" was the theme of his article-- that only the new experts could satisfactorily analyze their many facets.

Some of the specialists he had begun to recruit were indeed more sophisticated than the traditional kind of America-watcher. For example, when his new recruit for the study of American economic problems, V.I. Gromeka, expressed unusually objective views on a wide range of U.S. subjects [redacted] on 9 January 1969, he "shocked" the doctrinaire chief of the USA Department in the rival Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Yu. M. Melnikov. Arbatov's awareness of the complexity of the American policy-making process was indicated by his comment [redacted] just prior to his U.S. visit: he planned to meet with men who will be making "or influencing" policy over the next four years, and also those who might be influential for years in the future. This is a considerable departure from the view that professors and newspaper editors do not influence the foreign policy of the "miniscule handful" of capitalists who control Washington's foreign relations. Researchers he visited in early February 1969 were impressed by his "extremely sophisticated" understanding of American society and political trends, but they also received the impression that he is tough-minded--i.e., always concerned with the practical political rather than the purely intellectual aspect of a problem.

In addition to rejecting the methodology of purely speculative studies of the U.S. as conducted in the "think tanks," Arbatov also has tried, and found useless, the approach of the quantifiers of all data. He stated in early February 1969 that he had had some experience with the methods of physical scientists and mathematicians in the analysis of social problems and that he had found the approaches of these people too simplistic. He concluded that attempts to reduce "complex" issues of people and society into neat, quantified formulas simply "do not get very far"--i.e., these attempts can deal only with trivia.

In practice, Arbatov seems to start with a relatively open-minded approach in surveying the American scene. He seems aware that in the West Marxists are derided for their "tendentiousness and onesidedness." (Izvestiya, 11 January 1969) As a Marxist, Arbatov continues to be critical of the U.S. "capitalist" system, but his pragmatic approach and his new job has impelled him to become

better informed on precisely how that system operates and precisely what forces are at work in it. He is critical of the "weaknesses of the capitalist business cycle" and the "archaic" system of private ownership of industry, but he is dedicated to learning and applying technology --i.e., computer aids and systems analysis--and even "management techniques" of American firms to his new Institute. (Interview in Business Week, 17 February 1968) He is critical of American foreign policy, but he appears determined to accurately report what it is and how it is formulated.

He also appears to strive for full understanding. During a February 1969 round-table discussion [redacted] Arbatov appeared to be "shaken" by the gaps revealed in his knowledge of how strategic decisions are made in the U.S. He apparently had been concentrating his efforts on the works of American foreign affairs analysts, primarily in the political science area, but he had not given his attention to the new group of war-gaming and strategic-exchange specialists. But as a career-minded worker, he reportedly was extremely anxious to fill in this knowledge gap, and he was taking copious notes by the end of the discussion. He is known to have privately disparaged his rival in the field of "non-government" bilateral Soviet-American disarmament consultations, declaring in February 1969 that Academician M.D. Millionshchikov was "uninformed" on disarmament matters.

Arbatov also seems to be aware that objectivity does not (and cannot) result entirely from his own effort to be open-minded, but depends equally on the support of other men in his Institute. These men apparently are permitted to challenge analyses, testing and refuting them by the facts of developments in the U.S. They are permitted to hold minority views, implying that dogmatic certainty is consciously and constantly under attack. [redacted] Arbatov's Institute, with the open and informal atmosphere, and noted in particular that junior members were not afraid to speak up in the presence of

superiors (or foreign visitors)--an apparent change from the usual follow-the-line attitude of other institutes and ministries. Good questions were asked, and no one appeared to be an obvious party hack.

Arbatov apparently permits even his own analyses to be questioned. His interpretation of President Nixon as a man who would prove to be difficult for the Soviet leaders to deal with (and therefore not to be preferred to a president elected from the Democratic Party) apparently was challenged by the Institute Scientific Secretary for Foreign Relations, V.P. Filatov, who privately stated on 12 June 1969 that he had been the only Institute member preferring Nixon because the Soviets could more easily deal with this type of American leader than some "moderate" or "liberal." Thus even though Arbatov apparently finds it difficult to separate himself from his personal bias (in this case, his "pessimistic" view of the Nixon Administration), he permits alternative views to exist as one of several ways to dispel distortion and restrict the effects of bias.

In their research, Institute members almost certainly are provided with classified KGB reports. The Institute, in effect, functions more as an adjunct of the Central Committee's International and Bloc departments than as a scholarly component of the Academy of Sciences. It includes at least one researcher (I.V. Mikhaylov) who has worked in the party's International Department, several others who had held positions in the Washington embassy, and one who had worked as an economic correspondent in New York. These experienced men are able to keep topics under scrutiny at the Institute on a practical course.

3. His Position on a Policy Issue: Soviet-American Disarmament Negotiations

Arbatov has been a prominent spokesman for those Soviet leaders who are anxious to attain a disarmament agreement through negotiations. During his January-February 1969 visit to the U.S. he advocated--to various

scholars, editors, and businessmen--a scaling-down of the arms race in general, and of American military spending in particular. He privately expressed the hope that no drift "to the right" would take place in the U.S., implying that he preferred a moderate course for the new Administration on arms issues. He inquired about patterns of federal spending, and he suggested that the "military-industrial complex" in the U.S. would block a shift in public spending from armaments to a massive monetary attack on poverty and urban decay. In the context of another matter--i.e., the ABM controversy--Arbatov stated privately that more money "should" be going into the cities. His Izvestiya article of 11 January 1969 had strongly suggested that he was somehow involved in the Soviet debate (as well as the one in the U.S.) over allocation of resources, and that he was a spokesman for those Soviet leaders who were anxious to begin USSR-US talks on strategic arms limitations and for those leaders who preferred to see a reduction in Soviet military spending.

His Izvestiya article of 15 April 1969 added some credibility to these conjectures. Regarding the matter of arms costs, he quoted MIT's G. M. Rathjens to the effect that the U.S. and the USSR could avoid another upward turn in the arms-race spiral, which might otherwise prove costly and dangerous for "both" countries. He tried to warn top U.S. policy makers against delaying and making unreasonable demands which would impede disarmament talks and prevent the conclusion of an agreement--a position he took earlier in almost every conversation he had with American scholars, editors, and businessmen.

In his talk with McNamara on 31 January 1969, Arbatov argued by implication the need for influential Americans to strengthen the hand of moderates in the Soviet Union. He told the former Secretary of Defense that the Soviet decision to engage in arms talks was a controversial one, that deep divisions existed in the Soviet government on this issue, and that many who now supported the talks had only recently (and rather reluctantly) moved to that position. In this way Arbatov informed the new Administration that a delay in the start of arms talks might impair the efforts of moderates in

the Soviet leadership. He took the same line with former UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg during the latter's visit to Moscow, stating privately on 18 July 1969 that positive responses from the U.S. were desirable because there was pulling and hauling in the highest Soviet circles about policy toward Washington. Other members of his Institute --namely, Anatoliy Gromyko, son of the Foreign Minister and head of the US Foreign Policy Doctrines section of the Institute, on 12 March, and E.S. Shershnev, deputy director of the Institute, on 4 July--insisted [redacted] that strategic arms limitation talks must not be delayed or blocked.

This line regarding internal Soviet resistance to arms talks was self-serving, inasmuch as it was intended to create a sense of urgency among American officials to start negotiations. Nevertheless, it probably also reflected the real view of those leaders with whom Arbatov had close contacts. As for his probable disagreement with opponents of arms talks among the military, [redacted] Arbatov made disparaging remarks about the conservative attitude of some of the Soviet military toward such talks.

B. The Probable Influence of the New Approach

The Soviet leadership's decision in December 1967 to establish an institute of America-experts has made it possible for Moscow to appraise Washington's various policy actions with increased rationality--i.e., with greater accuracy and comprehension. The requirement that simplistic interpretations of any American policy move must be rejected should buttress any tendency among the Soviet leaders to examine American policy in a more open-minded way than in the past. They may not choose to use such an improved comprehension for easing Soviet-American relations, preferring instead to make their overall political effort against Washington more subtle. At the very

least, however, the work of Arbatov and his staff should reduce the degree of error in Soviet appraisals of U.S. intentions on specific issues.

Arbatov has been encouraged to raise the status of America-watching to a professional art practiced by experts rather than by party amateurs and doctrinaire researchers.

It is important to emphasize that the Institute is not an organization of scholars, detached from politics and examining academic subjects, but rather a group of experts recruited to analyze political matters which relate directly to policy. Arbatov is not a tender-minded intellectual, but rather a tough, policy-oriented analyst.

Secret

Secret

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

HR70-14
(U)

LEONID BREZHNEV: THE MAN AND HIS POWER

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXXVII)

SECRET

5 December 1969

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub



~~SECRET~~

LEONID BREZHNEV: THE MAN AND HIS POWER

After the pyrotechnic Khrushchev, most anyone to become "number one" in the Soviet Union was likely to appear grey. Brezhnev, the careful, efficient and ruthless bureaucrat who succeeded him, is not completely lacking in imagination, color or style--but almost so.

This study seeks to understand Brezhnev's power, modus operandi, and prospects. It does so by viewing him from the perspectives of the power of the office he holds, of his methods of attaining and using that power, and of his personality.

The study concludes that Brezhnev does prevail among Soviet leaders and that he has made a strong impact on the direction and style of Soviet policy. Barring ill health, his position is not likely to be challenged, despite his general unpopularity and his lack of forceful leadership.

This study was prepared by the Special Research Staff and reviewed by analysts in the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates, who offered no significant disagreement. An Annex, published separately, lays out the evidence on Brezhnev's methods in greater detail. The research analyst in charge was

John Kerry King
Chief, OD/I Special Research Staff

~~SECRET~~

LEONID BREZHNEV: THE MAN AND HIS POWER

Contents

SUMMARY

The General Secretary of the Soviet party Central Committee is the hub and the motive force of the policy-making Politburo. He guides its activities and arbitrates between and among its members, nominally his peers. He convenes the Politburo, determines the agenda and the participation of other party officials in its meetings, and even controls the release or publication of its resolutions. The role of the General Secretary in Politburo meetings is to preside and summarize the views expressed, to provide a consensus "ruling." Apparently the General Secretary's rulings are accepted in most matters, and issues come to a vote at such meetings only in those cases when a consensus is unobtainable. This authority gives the General Secretary decided advantages over his fellow policymakers.

The General Secretary also administers the Central Committee's executive Secretariat, which checks on the implementation of Politburo policy in all areas of Soviet life. He is particularly well placed to benefit from the Secretariat's primary function, the assignment of party personnel to every post of significance in the party and state apparatus. Of course, he delegates much of his authority to his subordinates, some of whom are Politburo members with power in their own right. However, the General Secretary apparently has the ultimate responsibility for the work of the Secretariat and its operational departments.

In addition to his responsibilities in party administration, the General Secretary sits at the apex of the defense structure. He serves ex officio as chairman of the Defense Council, a civilian-military consultative body which makes recommendations to the Politburo on major military problems. In wartime the chairman of the Defense Council probably would direct the country's military effort as Supreme Commander in Chief; in peacetime he apparently has important influence on the direction of defense policy. Together with the premier and the president, who are members of the council, the General Secretary lends significant authority to the council's recommendations, and it is likely

that in most cases the Politburo would concur in them. Little is known of the chairman's role on the Defense Council, but the evidence suggests that the General Secretary, as chairman, guides its operation as fully as he does the activities of the Politburo and Secretariat.

Brezhnev has used the political advantages of the General Secretary's office to consolidate his power within the ruling oligarchy. Through judicious use of his right to rule on the assignment of party personnel, he has gradually placed proteges in key positions at the expense of his rivals, who have been mainly within the Secretariat. In the first months after Khrushchev's fall in late 1964, two senior secretaries--Politburo members Nikolay Podgornyy and Aleksandr Shelepin--had sufficient ambition and independent support to pose a threat to Brezhnev. Another senior secretary, Mikhail Suslov, had earned considerable prestige from his long service, since 1947, on the Secretariat, but he appeared to lack the ability and desire to become a contender for the top post. Podgornyy was especially well placed to challenge Brezhnev in the long run, supervising party organization in general and claiming the support of a junior secretary, Vitaliy Titov, in charge of the important Party Organs Department.

Brezhnev, whose political strength in the first few months of the new regime appeared somewhat weak, began maneuvering to consolidate his position. The transfer of Titov from the Party Organs Department in April 1965 to a secondary post in Kazakhstan was a major setback for Podgornyy and had all the marks of a Brezhnev-instigated ploy. In line with his demotion, Titov lost his post on the Secretariat at the subsequent Central Committee meeting in September. The weakened Podgornyy was transferred in December to the largely ceremonial post of president. At the same time, Shelepin lost his position as head of the party-state control apparatus but took up Podgornyy's secretarial responsibilities for party organization. Shelepin therefore remained in a good position to challenge Brezhnev. However, Ivan Kapitonov, an official with past ties to Brezhnev and Suslov, filled the vacancies created by Titov's removal and thus served as a counterweight to Shelepin.

In April 1966, Brezhnev's associate Andrey Kirilenko became a member of the Secretariat, while Podgornyy's removal from it was confirmed and Shelepin was reassigned from party organizational affairs to the less sensitive field of consumer goods and light industry. The final blow to Shelepin's aspirations was his transfer about one year later from the Secretariat to head the trade unions, which already had been preceded by the removal of several of his closest supporters from key posts. Throughout the two years of maneuvering, Brezhnev revealed a preference for the gradual and indirect approach rather than for the confrontation tactic which Khrushchev generally had favored.

The changes in the Secretariat in the 1964-67 period thus resulted in a net gain for Brezhnev. Instead of having to contend with four other full members of the Politburo in that body, there were subsequently only two. Of course, he has no guarantee that either of the two--Kirilenko and Suslov--will not sometime try to oppose or even oust him. Perhaps recognizing this, Brezhnev in effect has encouraged a rivalry between the two by allowing each to deputize for him on a par. In general, however, he has leaned in favor of Kirilenko, who has begun to emerge as a "second in command" with responsibility for party organization. The only change on the Secretariat in the past two years has been the addition in April 1968 of Konstantin Katushev, a Kirilenko protege with Brezhnev's backing; a young party technocrat with virtually no experience in foreign affairs, Katushev assumed responsibility for supervising relations with ruling Communist parties--a job which could bring him in conflict with Suslov. There is evidence that Katushev's appointment did not sit well with some of the party leadership, and Brezhnev has seemed concerned to avoid any other appointments which might further upset the balance in the Secretariat.

Concurrent with his moves to dominate the Secretariat, Brezhnev has given attention to upstaging Premier Kosygin. The virtually equal billing which the two leaders received during the first months of the new regime gave way to prominence for Brezhnev at ceremonial functions and in party protocol in the spring of 1965. Six months later,

at the September Central Committee plenum on economic reform measures, Brezhnev took part of the spotlight in what otherwise would have been Kosygin's show. Both leaders were scheduled to deliver reports to the 23d Party Congress in April 1966--Brezhnev the main account of the party's activities since the last congress, Kosygin a report on the 1966-70 economic plan. At the congress itself, Brezhnev's report received greater attention by the delegates and greater press treatment, and protocol honors consistently gave Brezhnev the edge over Kosygin, as well as other leaders. In the fall of 1966, relations between the two men appeared to worsen, and Brezhnev began to receive much greater prominence in the press. By December, small signs of a Brezhnev "cult" dramatized his preeminence over Kosygin and set the tone for the political imbalance that has prevailed between them since then.

Simultaneously, Brezhnev has angled for the support of the armed forces and security organizations. From the start he courted the military by defending their interests in investment policy and relying on professional advice on strategic-defense policy. This tactic has conflicted with a trend in the party leadership favoring relaxation of its defense-oriented posture and introduction of a cost-effectiveness approach to questions of force structure. As a result, Brezhnev has taken a middle course between the opposing pressures; he apparently has acquiesced in Premier Kosygin's proposal to open strategic arms talks with the US, but he also has approved courses of action-for example, the invasion of Czechoslovakia--which have had the effect of impeding Kosygin's initiative. Despite pressure from within the high command (presumably centering around the "missile generals" whose vested interest the initiative most threatens), Brezhnev has moved mostly with the current in the general direction of negotiation. He appeared to reach some kind of modus vivendi with the military in the spring of 1969, when the regime decided (after several years' debate) to abandon its traditional parade of armed might on May Day.

In contrast to his limited success in winning the military's full support, Brezhnev has steadily increased his already considerable influence in the security organizations. He has done so by granting them greater prestige

and material support than they had under Khrushchev, as well as by eliminating the significant influence that Politburo member Shelepin exerted in them and in the party and state apparatus controlling them. Brezhnev's personal supervision of the police agencies was evident in the appointment of his client, Nikolay Shchelokov, to head the militia organization (MOOP, later renamed MVD) in the fall of 1966. The May 1967 appointment of Yuriy Andropov, a party secretary who had helped promote Brezhnev's drive for the international Communist conference, to head the Committee of State Security (KGB) also appeared to reflect Brezhnev's will. In both instances, the officials who were removed were allies of Shelepin. Brezhnev's influence was reflected also in the assignment of past associates to high KGB posts, primarily in the counterintelligence components which have flourished under Andropov's guidance.

In brief, the record shows Brezhnev to be a cautious but ambitious bureaucrat with generally conservative instincts. Undoubtedly mindful of the opposition Khrushchev aroused by his dynamism and aggressiveness, Brezhnev has presided over rather than tried to dominate the party oligarchy. He has come to stand for the generally status quo policies which the majority of the party leadership have supported. His "safe" behaviour has made him a poor target for any political rivals. It has also reinforced his reputation with the conservative party functionaries and military leaders whose interests had suffered under Khrushchev.

Prospects for Brezhnev's continued rule, despite his failure to provide forceful leadership, are thus good. The possibility that a rival might capitalize on a crisis situation or policy failure and attempt to upset the status quo always exists, but a more serious and immediate threat to Brezhnev's political future is his health. With a history of heart attacks, Brezhnev could find his career cut short at any time. Such an occurrence might set in motion a succession struggle with unforeseeable consequences in policy. However, the oligarchy might see its best interest in continuing the present policy lines by settling on one of Brezhnev's allies, such as Kirilenko. In any case, Brezhnev has succeeded in making a strong and perhaps lasting impact on the direction of Soviet policy.

INTRODUCTION

The power of any individual Soviet leader, and specifically the Communist Party boss, must be defined primarily in terms of his relation to the ruling Politburo oligarchy. The dynamics of Soviet politics have had their source in the ebb and flow of power between the party boss and the Politburo. Lenin was the main motive force of the early Soviet regime, which took the form not of an oligarchy so much as a thinly disguised dictatorship of one man. Nevertheless, Lenin made a conscious effort to share his decision-making power with his closest colleagues, and the present regime points to the Leninist rule as a model of "collective leadership." In contrast to the concept of shared power, the mature Stalinist regime in practice denied the existence of any source of power outside the Leader. Stalin had reigned autocratically above the party itself and was not identified as the party's highest executive during most of his rule. Since Stalin's death, however, the oligarchic or "collective" leadership--the party Politburo--has held or shared all political power in tandem with the party boss.

The history of Khrushchev's rule, from 1953 to 1964, was one of a constant fluctuation of political power between him and the party Presidium, as the Politburo was known then. In essence, two opposing political forces or tendencies regulated the power flow. It was in the oligarchy's interest, on the one hand, to give the party leader sufficient authority to guard against a drifting or rigidifying policy and, on the other hand, to prevent the individual from acquiring too much power and becoming a danger to the group. On two major occasions, in 1957 and 1964, a majority of the oligarchy decided that Khrushchev had acquired too much power and was usurping their role as decision-makers. Khrushchev had the support of only a minority in the party Presidium for the political showdown in 1957 but defeated his opposition by appealing to the Central Committee, where his superior forces could legally overrule the oligarchy. After 1957, Khrushchev's power vis-a-vis the Presidium was generally greater than before but suffered from periodic overloading and short-circuiting, until in October 1964 the majority of the Presidium again had accumulated sufficient power to restrain him, this time permanently.

With Khrushchev's ouster, the oligarchy succeeded in overcoming what it regarded as a dangerous buildup of political power under the control of one man. In fact, by specifically stipulating a separation of the posts of party boss and governmental premier, which Khrushchev had held jointly since 1957, the new collective leadership made it more difficult for any individual leader to acquire the power of a dictator. As a consequence, it has had to accept a certain amount of drift and rigidity in policy in place of the kind of forward movement that a potential or actual dictator could supply. In these circumstances, Brezhnev's position as party boss has inherent limitations, but he still has advantages over any other individual in the leadership in terms of potential for the accumulation of power.

THE REACHES OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Leonid Brezhnev undoubtedly holds the most powerful posts in the Soviet collective leadership. As General Secretary of the party Central Committee, he holds supreme prerogatives in three vital areas of responsibility. First, he directs the operation of the Politburo, which is the party's supreme policy and decision-making body. Second, he heads the Central Committee Secretariat, which through the staff of party functionaries known as the apparatus, supervises the execution of the Politburo's policy decisions. And third, the General Secretary is ex officio the chairman of the Defense Council, the supreme military-civilian body with responsibility for defense policy--the closest Soviet equivalent to the U.S. National Security Council. In addition, Brezhnev's position carries with it a number of lesser rights and responsibilities such as membership on the largely prestigious Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Parliament). No other Soviet leader has so many levers of power in his grasp.

It is often difficult in actual practice to determine when Brezhnev is acting as Politburo leader and when he is functioning as chief of the Secretariat. The line between the two functions is exceedingly thin when

the Politburo or Secretariat is not in formal session. Indeed, the distinction is often meaningless; the General Secretary's decisions today in implementing Politburo policy, taken together with numerous similar "administrative" actions, can perceptibly influence the formulation of policy tomorrow. In other words, Brezhnev controls the machinery for action and thus has the capability to act, directly or subtly, against a colleague or a policy.

The General Secretary must, nevertheless, serve as a leader and arbiter, not a dictator. Otherwise, he becomes vulnerable to criticism from political rivals. The primary source of potential opposition to the General Secretary is first of all the Secretariat itself. In fact, Brezhnev seems to have seen the gravest threat to his power so far in the person of a "senior secretary"--one of the members of the Secretariat who are also Politburo members and who deputize for the General Secretary in his absence. The Council of Ministers--Premier Kosygin's government bureaucracy in which Brezhnev holds no post--poses no direct threat to the power position of the General Secretary. Nevertheless, it represents an institutional obstacle to his ambitions, and Brezhnev has tried to make inroads there while blocking Kosygin's bids to enhance the premier's authority. He also has had to guard against the formation of alliances between the Premier and Brezhnev's fellow secretaries which could weaken or threaten his own authority as General Secretary. More serious potential instruments of power outside the party bureaucracy--which generally are under the control of the General Secretary but could be used against him by party rivals--are the security organs and the armed forces. All these institutional factors complicate the political equation and affect Brezhnev's power position.

Presiding Over the Policymaking Politburo

The mechanics of decision-making in the Soviet Union, and especially the workings of the Politburo, are veiled from public view. Nevertheless, certain aspects of

its "collective" procedures have become known over the years. Ambassador Dobrynin has explained that the general practice in the Politburo is to seek a consensus or, failing that, to take votes on disputed issues. The role of the General Secretary, he said, is to preside and to summarize the views expressed. He added that the General Secretary's "rulings" usually are accepted.

Dobrynin's account is in line with the standard explanation of Politburo decision-making given Westerners since the late 1950s. The Soviet press, in a rare departure from its usual secrecy on such matters, had quoted Khrushchev in a May 1957 interview to the effect that at meetings of the Politburo (then called Presidium) its members try to arrive at a "single viewpoint" or, failing that, to resolve the question by a "simple majority vote."

The [redacted] defector [redacted] has provided more specific information on the institutional advantages which the General Secretary has over his Politburo "peers."* The General Secretary, according [redacted] presides over the Politburo, with the assistance of one or two secretaries (clearly a reference to the "senior secretaries") who act in the General Secretary's absence. The General Secretary dominates the work of the Politburo, convening and chairing meetings and submitting the agenda for discussion. The General Secretary further has administrative

*Some of [redacted] information must be treated with caution, for he appears to extrapolate from the [redacted] model of the Soviet system whenever his actual knowledge is limited. However, much of what he says--particularly in a military context--coincides with what is known or suspected of Soviet practice from more solid intelligence.

control over the operation of the Politburo primarily through the Central Committee's General Department, which functions mainly as a secretariat of the General Secretary and supervises the printing and distribution of Politburo documents. The General Secretary reportedly is the arbiter of all conflicts within the Politburo and, indeed, all other organs of which he is nominal or de facto chairman.

Brezhnev has not always abided by the strict interpretation of his position as a first among equals. Sometimes he has been observed protecting or building on the authority of the General Secretary as the highest leader of the entire party. His efforts to enhance the standing of the General Secretary tend, of course, to detract from the authority of other Politburo members. Recurrent warnings in the Soviet press against violations of collective procedures suggest that these efforts have not sat well with some of the other leaders. For example, a Pravda article on 20 July 1966 seemed to have Brezhnev specifically in mind in citing the fallibility of any individual "regardless of the party post he might be assigned to" and asserting that "the secretary of a party committee is no chief, he does not have the right to command--he is only the senior person in an organ of collective leadership, elected by the Communists." An article of such a sensitive political nature could only appear with the backing of one or more top-level leaders, whom the dictates of party etiquette if not political wisdom prevent from speaking out personally.*

*The article's importance was indicated by the fact that its author, F. Petrenko, was identified as a Central Committee functionary when he travelled to Bulgaria in May 1965 on a delegation led by Politburo member Suslov; his precise position and other connections with policymakers have not been revealed.

Steering the Party Machine

Most of Brezhnev's political strength derives from his position as administrator of the party. All administrative functions in the party hierarchy ultimately are located in the post of the General Secretary. The General Secretary relies, of course, on his subordinates to supervise various aspects of party administration. This delegation of authority, however, does not appear to detract from his ultimate responsibility for all aspects of party life. In his capacity as party chief, the General Secretary directs the activities of the other secretaries and, through them or directly himself, supervises the Central Committee apparatus (which in turn provides close everyday guidance to all Soviet organizations in and out of the party).

Brezhnev's role as chief of the Secretariat gives him two important advantages over his colleagues in non-secretarial positions, as well as other secretaries. First, he is better placed to benefit from the Secretariat's right to control party organizational policy and, specifically, to propose candidates for assignment to virtually all important positions. His right (probably including a veto power) to approve each appointment, while other leaders consent to or propose candidates only within their area of competence, allows him to create a stronger core of support at all levels. Second, because the party pervades all aspects of Soviet life, Brezhnev can interfere in the administration of every other organization in the USSR--including the governmental (ministerial) bureaucracy, the state apparatus of councils and executive committees, the military and security forces, etc. When the Secretariat's interference in these organizations implies incompetence on their part, it tends to discredit their leading officials and the performance of the ultimately responsible individuals in the Politburo.

Just how forcefully and effectively Brezhnev can use his authority in the Secretariat to shape its composition and, in general, to assert his will is not entirely clear from the available evidence. His acquisition at the

23d Congress of the title of General Secretary--created in Lenin's time but held only by Stalin--represented a gain in prestige, whatever the other purposes of the title's restoration. (The traditional term "Politburo" replaced "Presidium" for the party's policy-making body at the same time, reflecting the party leadership's stress on continuity with the policies of the Lenin and Stalin regimes.) In contrast to the previous title of First Secretary, the concept of General Secretary implies that the party boss is on a plane above the Secretariat, rather than the first in a line of its members. His actual authority with senior figures like Suslov and Kirilenko is, of course, of a different order than with junior members like Kulakov and Solomentsev. The latter hold the least status within the Secretariat, while the former, being Politburo members, come close to being Brezhnev's peers in executive as well as policy-making activities. Because the Politburo presumably must approve appointments at the Secretariat level, it would seem impolitic if not perilous for Brezhnev to attempt to install his own appointee without prior consultation and, if necessary, political compromise with his colleagues. Whatever the limitations on the General Secretary's jurisdiction within the Secretariat, however, the changes which have occurred in its composition since Khrushchev's ouster (see Annex) suggest that Brezhnev's wishes in staffing that body have prevailed.

Certain high-level personnel changes since the 23d Congress appear to have altered subtly the institutional weight of the Secretariat to the advantage of the Politburo but not clearly to the detriment of the General Secretary. Thus, three moves in 1967 involving setbacks for Shelepin (and an implied boost to Brezhnev's power) had the effect of cutting into the Secretariat's area of responsibility. In May, Party Secretary Andropov replaced Central Committee member Semichastnyy as KGB chief. Accordingly, at the June plenum Andropov was dropped from the Secretariat; at the same time, however, he became a Politburo candidate member. In late June, Politburo candidate member Grishin replaced the Moscow party boss, Central Committee member Yegorychev. As a result of these two actions, the KGB and the Moscow party organization in theory became accountable directly to the Politburo rather

than to the Secretariat. Then, when Grishin was released as head of the Soviet trade unions in July, Politburo member Shelepin himself left the Secretariat to take the vacated post. This had the effect of a significant upgrading of the trade unions, giving them a say in formulating policy. Aside from power considerations, that is, the fact that by these moves Brezhnev succeeded in neutralizing the immediate threat Shelepin represented within the Secretariat, the impact of this shift in the Secretariat's authority on the position of the General Secretary would seem to be minimal in view of his preeminent position in the Politburo.

Directing the Defense Establishment

In the Soviet hierarchical set-up, the General Secretary traditionally has carried the function of leadership over the defense effort. In contrast to the collective procedures which prevail elsewhere, the need for ultimately concentrating all military authority in one man--the party boss--still is recognized in practice. In wartime this means his assuming responsibility for the total direction of the country and its armed forces as Supreme Commander in Chief. In peacetime it means his chairing the Defense Council--the supreme military-civilian consultative body attached to the Politburo.* The Defense Council is comprised of several Politburo members and high military officers, and its recommendations on defense policy presumably carry great weight with the Politburo, which has the responsibility for all final decisions in this as in every other area.

*Some confusion over the exact name, composition, and operation of the council, and even its very existence, has arisen as a result of the secrecy shrouding all things military in the Soviet Union. The Defense Council should not be confused, for example, with the military council that functions within the Ministry of Defense at the apex of a hierarchy of regional and service-oriented military councils.

The accumulated evidence indicates that the General Secretary controls the Defense Council as fully as the Secretariat. Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy once reported that Khrushchev, as chairman, completely dominated the Supreme (or Main) Military Council, as the body sometimes has been known.* According to this report, Khrushchev even bypassed the Defense Minister in the consultative process, putting questions directly to council members (that is, those members, like the chief of staff, who were subordinate to the Defense Minister in the military hierarchy). Under the chairmanship of Khrushchev, the council reportedly was an operational and very flexible group "attached to" (but apparently higher than) the Ministry of Defense; in actuality it was entirely under Khrushchev. Meetings were both regular and ad hoc, sometimes without a quorum of the council's membership. A meeting of Khrushchev with the Defense Minister, his chief of staff, a couple of Politburo members, and several commanders of appropriate combat arms might, according to Penkovskiy, be considered a meeting of the council. In April 1962, the council reportedly heard Khrushchev speak about the major role that artillery and missile forces would play in the future and made several high-level personnel changes in the armed forces in line with the new emphasis in strategic doctrine. Penkovskiy's report implied (and other evidence confirmed) that Khrushchev used the authority of the chairman of the military council to push his personal views on defense policy, overriding the opinions of the professional military advisers.

Brezhnev generally has the same authority in defense matters that Khrushchev once exercised, although he (unlike his predecessor) has not acquired the title

*Several sources, both before and after Khrushchev's ouster, have referred to it by this name, although a Soviet dictionary of abbreviations which appeared in 1963 listed the body under this title (under its Russian letters VVS) as defunct at the time of publication, and a secret Soviet party and government decree, dated July 1961 mentioned a Defense Council in the context of recommendations to be made on the most important questions of civil defense.

of peacetime Supreme Commander in Chief.* However, the collective procedures of the post-Khrushchev regime have impinged on the chairmanship of the Defense Council, complicating the definition of its leadership. The October 1964 Central Committee plenum adopted a decision which "considered inexpedient in the future the combining of the duties of the First Secretary of the Central Committee and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in one person." This decision, separating the top party and government posts, contradicted the classic formulation of military leadership functions that appeared in Khrushchev's time in Marshal Sokolovskiy's book, Military Strategy (first and second editions):

> The entire leadership of the country and of the Armed Forces in time of war will be implemented by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the possible organization of a supreme organ of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. This supreme organ of leadership can be given the same powers as the GKO (State Committee of Defense) in the period of the Great Patriotic War, and is headed by the First Secretary of the CC CPSU and the head of the government on whom the functions of the Supreme Commander in Chief of All Armed Forces can be placed. (Emphasis added.)

The Russian language, which gave the "whom" of the final clause in singular form, had left no doubt that the top functions of the party and government were united. As

*Khrushchev allowed himself identified with this title, despite the fact that his colleagues apparently opposed his public identification in that position and despite the fact that it was customary for the title to take effect only in wartime. Brezhnev evidently has not chosen to take the same political risk.

a consequence of the October plenum ruling, however, the third (1967) edition of Sokolovskiy's book dropped the underlined clause entirely, without giving a substitute definition of the Supreme Commander in Chief.*

Collegiality notwithstanding, Brezhnev is chairman of the Defense Council, as he himself told [redacted] 1965, and this gives him an edge over Premier Kosygin and other Politburo members who sit on the council. As in the Secretariat, Brezhnev must take into consideration the fact that some members of the Defense Council are his theoretical equals on the Politburo. The council's exact composition is unknown, but by all accounts it includes Premier Kosygin, [redacted] other permanent members are Defense Minister Grechko, Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovskiy, Chief of General Staff Zakharov, the chiefs of the General Staff's Main Operations and Intelligence directorates (Colonel Generals Povalyy and Ivashutin, respectively), and General Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. The [redacted] whose list conflicted somewhat with the above, gave the following as the council's members: Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, Grechko, Zakharov, Politburo candidate member Andropov (as KGB chief), and Deputy Premier Baybakov (as chairman of the State Planning Commission). [redacted] specialists like Ivashutin might provide outside expertise but do not participate in discussions beyond their competence.

[redacted] the Central Committee decree stipulates that return to one-man rule is justified in a national emergency or crisis, but only then. Despite Sokolovskiy's bow to collective leadership, therefore, Brezhnev would seek to utilize this ruling to justify his taking on both party and government functions in wartime and the position of Supreme Commander in Chief of a unified command structure along the lines of the GKO.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Brezhnev nevertheless appears in complete charge of the Defense Council, as in the Secretariat. [redacted] the General Secretary convenes the council and determines the topics to be discussed. Council meetings usually are held in a conference room next to the offices of the General Secretary in the Central Committee building. (The council would use the War Room at General Staff headquarters to discuss the War Plan, which is invalid unless signed by the General Secretary.) In a fast-moving military emergency, Brezhnev would call the council into session for consultation, time permitting. Although [redacted] has not said so, the Politburo might then discuss the council's recommendations--again, time permitting. But the General Secretary is empowered to act on his own in surprise attack situations where the time factor is all-important. In other words, he has his finger on the nuclear trigger at least for the purpose of retaliation. The Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs serves as a secretariat of the Defense Council.

Brezhnev's ultimate authority in defense matters is reflected in several other ways. For example, he supervises the Defense Ministry's Main Political Administration, which functions as a Central Committee department rather than a component of the military forces whose political reliability it ensures. Brezhnev probably is responsible also for approving senior military appointments. He has, of course, been publicly identified with military affairs, delivering a speech annually to the graduates of the military academy each July--at least until 1969, when no civilian leader spoke at the ceremony.

Other Prerogatives

The supreme position of the General Secretary has brought Brezhnev several other, primarily prestigious, titles and rights. These merely reflect rather than add to his position of authority and do not fall neatly into such categories as the functions of policy-maker, party administrator, and supreme commander. It certainly was by virtue of his position as party chief, for example,

[redacted]

that Brezhnev was elected in December 1964 to replace Khrushchev as chairman of the Constitution Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Brezhnev at the time was only a Supreme Soviet delegate and was not elected to the Supreme Soviet Presidium until October 1965.*

Brezhnev also is chairman of a Central Committee commission for drafting new kolkhoz statutes and calling for a congress of kolkhoz workers, which was formed apparently in late 1965 or early 1966 in accordance with the March 1965 Central Committee Plenum decisions on agricultural questions. Although Brezhnev emerged at the plenum as the regime's spokesman for agricultural policy, Politburo member Polyanskiy actually appears to have the primary responsibility in questions of agricultural organization and administration. In this light, Brezhnev's role on the commission may be strictly nominal. Meetings of the commission have been very infrequent, most recently on 25 March 1969 to hear and approve a report by Polyanskiy on the completed draft statutes. Brezhnev merely summed up the discussions at the meeting.

Brezhnev also has the right as party boss to interfere in the activities of any "public" organization--the trade unions, the Komsomol, the People's Control Committee, for example. In the Soviet system these organizations do not exist independently and serve to assist the party in implementing its policies. Brezhnev exercised his prerogative, for example, in intervening personally in Komsomol affairs after replacing the chief of the organization in June 1968.

*The commission to draft a new constitution has yet to make any perceptible progress, despite Brezhnev's promise to have it ready for the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in late 1967. His election to the Presidium ostensibly was for the purpose of legitimizing travel abroad on state matters and meetings with non-Communist statesmen.

THE EXERCISE OF POWER: BREZHNEV'S STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE*

Brezhnev has been the model of an "organization man" in his first five years of rule. He has been able, through very careful and gradual maneuvering, to rise from a precarious position in October 1964 to dominance by April 1966. He directed his first efforts to improving his situation within the Secretariat, where he had rivals in the persons of Podgornyy and Shelepin. The latter had their own power bases and had been influential in party personnel assignments since the late 1950s. Brezhnev also moved to improve his status vis-a-vis Premier Kosygin, his counterpart in the government bureaucracy who appeared to rank fairly equally with the party boss in prestige and authority for the first few months. At the same time, he sought to ensure a firm grip on the security forces and the military. He pushed successfully for more direct control of the police, where he already had had significant influence. His efforts to gain the full support of the armed forces, on the other hand, yielded variable results. The military seemed solidly behind Brezhnev in the first period of the new regime, but a part of the high command later began to oppose or pressure him as the leadership took steps toward opening negotiations on strategic arms. Until early 1969 Brezhnev vacillated between the opposing civilian and military pressures but appeared generally to defend the interests of the military. With a party congress due sometime next year, however, he now seems anxious to play safe with the civilian majority of the party Central Committee who will be called on to reelect him General Secretary for another four years.

Consolidating His Power in the Secretariat

When Brezhnev inherited the top party administrative position in mid-October 1964 he acquired no more--in fact, less--power than Khrushchev himself wielded as party boss in the last months of his rule. The Party Secretariat under

*A fuller exposition of this section is published separately as an Annex.

Brezhnev included several full members of the Politburo: Podgornyy (who had become "second in command" in charge of personnel assignments), the ideologist and foreign affairs specialist Suslov, and the industrial manager Kirilenko.* In addition, the young and ambitious Secretary and Deputy Premier Shelepin advanced to full membership on the Politburo at the first Central Committee plenum held after Khrushchev's ouster, in November. All of these strongmen on the Secretariat represented, to a greater or lesser degree, a potential threat to Brezhnev's power. However, Brezhnev probably felt that Kirilenko would give him support since they had worked closely together in the past, and Suslov had specialized in foreign Communist relations and appeared to be uninterested in engaging the party chief in extensive organizational jockeying. Thus, at the start, Brezhnev faced two serious rivals among the senior administrators within the party apparatus -- Podgornyy and Shelepin -- whose political weight made up for their disadvantage as formal subordinates of the General Secretary.

Brezhnev's uncertain position in the Secretariat was evident in the low level of his activity during the first six months of the new regime. The November 1964 Central Committee plenum approved several actions which served to increase the authority of "Second" Secretary Podgornyy; none clearly redounded to the benefit of Brezhnev, who played a minor role at the plenum. On trips abroad and at domestic functions Brezhnev shared the spotlight with Premier Kosygin. A few second-level personnel actions in late 1964 appeared to reflect Brezhnev's influence but were far from a show of strength.

At the March 1965 Central Committee plenum, however, Brezhnev began to show signs of assertiveness. He announced the regime's first major policy program -- a realistic

*Kirilenko was equivalent to a party secretary by virtue of his post as first deputy chairman of the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR, which prior to its abolition in April 1966 functioned within the Secretariat.

approach to solving the critical agricultural problem through solid, guaranteed investments and greater reliance on material incentives. However, Brezhnev did not dominate the plenum completely; Podgornyy presided at its sessions, and the several organizational moves which it approved failed to add significantly, if at all, to the support Brezhnev could muster at the highest levels of the leadership.

After the March plenum Brezhnev began to work quietly behind the scenes at improving his position. He made use of his right to appoint party functionaries to the staff of the Secretariat, assuring a more responsive execution of his rule. The most important change Brezhnev made was the removal of Vitaliy Titov, a protege of Secretary Podgornyy, from the key post of head of the Central Committee department responsible for personnel assignments. Titov's transfer to the provinces as a secretary of the Kazakh party organization, which meant his eventual release also as a junior member of the central Secretariat, bore the signs of an "end run" by Brezhnev, who had apparently lacked the required Central Committee support for such a move at the March plenum. In any case, Titov's demotion was a major blow to Podgornyy and brought into question his authority as the senior secretary responsible for party organizational matters. A number of similar, although less important, changes in the Central Committee apparatus appeared detrimental to the positions of secretaries Podgornyy and Shelepin during the summer of 1965. These indications contradicted numerous reports which claimed that Shelepin was about to take over from a passive Brezhnev.

Brezhnev had considerably strengthened his primacy among the senior secretaries by September 1965. Changes announced at a Central Committee plenum that month were more definitely in his favor than those of six months earlier. He delivered a speech which served to undercut the impact of the report Premier Kosygin had given on a reorganization of industrial planning and management. A further gain in Brezhnev's drive to control the Secretariat was the December transfer of Secretary Podgornyy to the post of President, removing him from direct influence in personnel appointments. At the same time, Shelepin was released as a deputy premier and assigned to full-time work in the Secretariat. It appeared that Shelepin had taken over

from Podgornyy as second in command of the Secretariat, and he thus continued to represent an important counterforce to Brezhnev. However, Shelepin lost out four months later in a reshuffle of secretarial responsibilities at the 23d Party Congress in April 1966, yielding his control of party organizational matters and concentrating on supervision of the consumer sector and light industry.

Brezhnev had run the show at the 23d Congress and apparently received a mandate for the next four years. Suslov had appeared to function during the congress as Brezhnev's second in command but his subsequent activities did not indicate a primary responsibility in party organizational matters. Kirilenko was the obvious candidate to pick up the cadres supervision Shelepin had relinquished, but his activities also were unrevealing in this regard. In fact, for a while it appeared that there was no recognized second in command. Later, however, Kirilenko began to emerge as the probable "second" secretary.

Brezhnev's attention, meanwhile, turned to the police and security forces, which were in the hands of men loyal to Shelepin. One of these men, militia chief Vadim Tikunov, had been instrumental in promoting an anti-crime campaign that led to the augmentation and centralization of his forces in August 1966. Tikunov was, therefore, the logical candidate to take over the militia under the new setup. However, after a two month delay which suggested high-level disagreement, a close associate of Brezhnev got the job, and Tikunov disappeared from public view. In May 1967, one of Shelepin's closest supporters, Vladimir Semichastnyy, was removed from the powerful post of KGB chairman. His replacement by a more independent party official from the Secretariat, Yuriy Andropov, was to Brezhnev's political advantage.

Brezhnev probably did not foresee that this gradual erosion of Shelepin's power would erupt soon in a challenge to his own position. Nevertheless, when the attack on Brezhnev's leadership came at the June 1967 Central Committee plenum, he availed himself of his full authority and turned the occasion into another victory over Shelepin and his

dwindling supporters. At the plenum, the young Moscow City party boss, Nikolay Yegorychev, criticized the diplomatic approach which Brezhnev had used in the course of the Arab-Israeli clash earlier that month. Several reports suggested that he felt the Soviet Union should have adopted a tougher stance in the crisis. The majority of speakers at the plenum, however, apparently supported the Brezhnev line, and within days Yegorychev was dismissed to a minor ministerial post. His important Moscow party position went to a senior official, trade union chief Viktor Grishin. Finally, at the end of the chain of reassignments, Shelepin himself filled Grishin's relatively powerless trade union slot, leaving the Secretariat the following September.* Since then, Brezhnev has given every indication of satisfaction with Kirilenko as second in command. The only addition to the Secretariat has been Konstantin Katushev, a young Kirilenko protege who has supervised relations with ruling Communist parties. Katushev's addition to the Secretariat appeared to impinge primarily on Suslov's authority, and there have been indications in the press that some of the party leadership have resented the appointment.

Dealing with Premier Kosygin

Brezhnev has seen the need, after the first priority task of controlling the Secretariat, to set himself a notch above his theoretical coequal on the government side, Premier Kosygin. He made his first move in this direction in March 1965. This was indicated when the Soviet press gave his Central Committee plenum report great play while practically ignoring Kosygin's important speech to the central planning agency--a speech which revised guidelines for the

*Barring an unlikely change in Shelepin's fortunes in the next few months, he could conceivably be demoted even further to candidate member of the Politburo -- the traditional rank of the trade union boss -- at the next party congress.

5-year economic plan originally drawn up with Khrushchevian priorities. Brezhnev took a lead in protocol standing at the same time, listed for the first time as head of a delegation which included Kosygin as a member.

Brezhnev became even more assertive in September 1965, after making inroads in the territory of secretaries Podgornyy and Shelepin. At a Central Committee plenum that month, Kosygin delivered the main report on important decisions to reform industrial planning and management, but Brezhnev shared the spotlight with a speech that staked out the party's claim in economic-administrative control.

The delicate balance between the party boss and the premier, with Brezhnev carrying slightly more weight, was maintained up to and during the 23d Party Congress in March-April 1966. Each leader delivered a major report to the congress, although Brezhnev's was discussed longer. While Kosygin received greater applause from the delegates at the beginning of the congress, Brezhnev received the highest protocol honors in the official record. At the conclusion of the congress, Brezhnev continued to have an edge over Kosygin in authority and prestige.

The apparent calm prevailing at the 23d Party Congress gave way to a series of squalls in the Brezhnev-Kosygin relationship, but the duumvirate remained generally on an even keel until November 1966. At that time, the press gave short shrift to Kosygin's activities in the Ukraine and no publicity at all to his speech in Donetsk on 1 November; however, it gave prominent coverage of Brezhnev's speech on the same day in Georgia. The same slighting treatment of Kosygin prevailed throughout November and December, while Brezhnev enjoyed greater publicity and even some personal adulation for his wartime services -- a revival of the proscribed "personality cult" on a minor scale. The incipient Brezhnev cult stopped after he received high state honors on his 60th birthday in mid-December, but from that point on he has had little trouble in maintaining his primacy over Kosygin.

Controlling the Armed Forces and Security Agencies

An important factor in Brezhnev's coming to power and a necessary condition of his continued rule has been the support of the armed forces and security organizations. This support has been variable, especially from the military, due to the strong influence that Party Secretary Shelepin (and to a lesser extent Secretary Podgornyy) exerted in them for a while after the Khrushchev ouster. Brezhnev has tried, with some success, to improve his organizational footing in these organizations, meanwhile defending their interests on most issues within the Politburo. Some tension has existed between the party leadership and the military as a whole, but the elite of the armed forces -- the generally over-aged marshals and generals who nevertheless have Central Committee status -- probably feel safe with the conservative Brezhnev. It would seem unlikely, moreover, that any pretender to the top party post could turn the security forces against Brezhnev in the near future, so successful has he been in strengthening his grip on them.

The Restive Military

Brezhnev's relations with the military have been marked by ups and downs. At the start, Brezhnev appeared to make some gains by advocating a continued high priority for defense in budgetary debates and encouraging the acceptance of military expertise in strategic doctrinal matters. He scrapped Khrushchev's heavy emphasis on strategic rocket forces in favor of a more balanced policy that gave greater weight to conventional forces and a flexible response strategy. This reemphasis probably had the support of a majority of the military (and civilian) leadership.

Relations between Brezhnev and some of the military took a turn for the worse, however, after the death of Defense Minister Malinovskiy in late March 1967. Several reports suggested that at least some Politburo members backed the long-time armaments administrator, Secretary Dmitriy Ustinov, for the vacant post in order to bring a cost-conscious approach to questions of force structure.

It is conceivable that Premier Kosygin, who just one month earlier had revealed an interest in opening negotiations with the US on strategic arms limitations, had persuaded Brezhnev to nominate Ustinov. After an awkward delay which suggested the appointment was contentious, First Deputy Minister of Defense Grechko was given the post. Grechko, a proponent of conventional warfare and weaponry, has close connections with the "Ukrainian clique" which Khrushchev had patronized -- primarily Podgornyy, Polyanskiy, and Kirilenko -- and for this reason was probably acceptable to Brezhnev. Despite an outcome favorable to the majority of the military, the aborted nomination of a civilian Defense Minister probably created some ill will between the party leadership and the high command.

Opposition from a part of the high command appeared to be the basis of the attack on Brezhnev's handling of the Arab-Israeli war which Moscow Party boss Yegorychev spearheaded at the June 1967 Central Committee plenum.* Conceivably, the reported nomination of a civilian Minister of Defense and Semichastnyy's removal as KGB chairman brought some military leaders together with young party militants, supported by junior members of the Politburo, against the "seniors" of the leadership -- Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy -- and their status quo policies. In any case, Yegorychev's charges of unpreparedness would have appealed to some of the high command (presumably the minority group of "missile generals," who favor a stronger rocket force) since they suggested the inadequacy of measures taken by the civilian-dominated Defense Council.

Brezhnev continued his general support of the defense establishment during late 1967 and 1968, when the Czechoslovak democratization was the main concern of the political

*Yegorychev's speech reportedly contained statistics to prove that Moscow was inadequately defended against a missile attack.

leadership. By August 1968, Premier Kosygin appeared almost alone among the Politburo members insisting on a political solution to the problem (only Suslov and Shelepin sided with Kosygin, by most accounts). Apparently Brezhnev, in his capacity as Defense Council chairman, had set the military wheels in motion early in the year. During the summer he did nothing to slow those wheels, and by August the invasion was virtually the only alternative to a Soviet political defeat.

Brezhnev's reliance on the military to achieve a foreign policy goal increased their prestige, at least as an instrument of power, and may have had the effect of pacifying somewhat the more clamorous of his high command critics. In late June Brezhnev apparently had agreed to support Kosygin's initiative -- aborted once in early 1967 -- on opening strategic arms talks. The regime's intention to participate in such talks was made public in an official government declaration in July, doubtless not without Brezhnev's acquiescence. Brezhnev's sanctioning of the invasion in August had the effect, of course, of impeding the initiative. Nevertheless, official reaffirmations of this intent paralleled the spring 1969 "normalization" of the political situation in Prague (achieved by Dubcek's downgrading after Grechko delivered the Politburo's ultimatum). A subsequent delay in arriving at a decision on the time and place for the talks probably has reflected opposition on the part of the Soviet "missile generals" and their political allies in decision-making circles, since any savings realized from cutbacks in stragegic weaponry could be allotted to the conventional arms forces which Brezhnev and Grechko have favored.*

that "the missile generals" tended to side with Brezhnev's political rivals in the hope of improving their own position with a change of the party leadership. They added that the high command -- but particularly the "missile generals" -- were pushing for the formation of a "Council of Marshals" which would have the power to make military decisions in an emergency without prior consent from the Politburo. All Politburo members were said to oppose such a council, which presumably would supplant Brezhnev's Defense Council.

Brezhnev and the military reached some kind of modus vivendi in early 1969, although it might not have been to the liking of the high command. The party leadership, clearly in connection with the renewed interest in arms talks, adopted a decision to relax the strong defense posture of the Soviet Union by abandoning the tradition of parading its military might on May Day. The decision reportedly came after several years' delay and was in keeping with the repeated statements by Brezhnev that the Soviet regime has no need to rattle sabres. It may have been the subject of intensified debate in the spring of 1967, when the regime was hinting its interest in the arms talks and in a civilian Minister of Defense. The same purpose seemed to be behind Brezhnev's failure to address the graduating class of young officers in July, which made the annual ceremony a more strictly military affair. At the same time, there has been no reduction in Brezhnev's control of the armed forces through the Central Committee's Department of Administrative Organs, the KGB's military counterintelligence directorate, and the Defense Ministry's (actually Central Committee's) Main Political Administration.

The Obedient Police

In contrast to his fluctuating fortunes with the military, Brezhnev has succeeded in getting a firm grip on the two important police organizations -- the security and intelligence giant known as the KGB, and the uniformed police, or militia, of the MVD. He has carefully avoided any actions that would antagonize the professional corps of these "administrative organs," as the security and related agencies are known in Soviet usage. On the contrary, they have received greater prestige and material support than they had under Khrushchev. More importantly, shifts in the leading personnel have been to Brezhnev's political advantage and to the detriment of his chief rival for their support, Politburo member Shelepin.

Brezhnev's influence over the administrative organs waxed and Shelepin's waned when Deputy Premier Polyanskiy filled the vacancy of first deputy premier in September 1965.

Polyanskiy, a political ally of Brezhnev whose responsibility on the Council of Ministers had been almost exclusively the administration of agricultural affairs, may have taken on an additional responsibility for overseeing governmental administration of security-related areas (transport, power sources, and the like) -- areas which Shelepin had administered as a deputy premier. In any case, Polyanskiy's influence was obvious in the December 1965 promotion of his political ally, Mikhail Yefremov, to deputy premier in place of Shelepin, who transferred to full-time work in the Party Secretariat. The circumstantial evidence strongly suggests a collusion between Polyanskiy, who benefitted from Shelepin's transfer, and Brezhnev, who "required" Shelepin's full-time presence on the Secretariat. Brezhnev's hand was more directly visible when in April 1966 Shelepin became responsible in the Secretariat for supervising consumer-good production and light industry alone, yielding any authority he may have had in the security field. The campaign against Shelepin's influence in this area culminated in the removal of Vadim Tikunov and Vladimir Semichastnyy, both close associates of Shelepin, from their leading posts in the militia and KGB respectively in August 1966 and May 1967.

Brezhnev probably has given his full backing to the increased emphasis on counterintelligence which has characterized the KGB's activities under its new chief, Politburo candidate member Yuriy Andropov. An indication of this new direction was the appointment, apparently in June 1967 -- that is, only one month after Andropov's takeover -- of experienced counterintelligence professional Semen Tsvigun as a second first deputy to Andropov.* Brezhnev's influence

*Tenuous evidence of a past working relationship with Brezhnev suggests that Tsvigun is another of his proteges. The other first deputy chairman, Nikolay Zakharov, remains active despite past association with former KGB boss Semichastnyy. Zakharov's political allegiances are unclear.

was evident in the appointment, also in 1967, of Georgiy Tsinev to a leading KGB post, probably as chief of the Second Chief Directorate (for counterintelligence and counterespionage). According [redacted], Brezhnev's close personal ties with Tsinev date back at least as early as the mid-1950s, when Tsinev served in military counterintelligence. Viktor Chebrikov, another presumed Brezhnev protege up from the party organization in Dnepropetrovsk, recently has been identified as deputy chairman of the KGB.*

Brezhnev's influence today in the Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs appears as strong as it was when his Ukrainian associate, Nikolay Mironov, was its chief. Mironov's first deputy, Nikolay Savinkin, became acting chief after Mironov's death in October 1964; his confirmation as chief in early 1968 seemed to indicate that Brezhnev was satisfied with Savinkin's performance. In addition, some very tenuous evidence suggests a connection between Brezhnev and Savinkin's replacement as first deputy chief, Nikolay Mal'shakov.

ASPECTS OF BREZHNEV'S PERSONALITY AND STYLE

Personality and political style have an important influence on the overall shape of Soviet policies as well as on the shifts in day-to-day tactics. Brezhnev has defended the interests of the Stalinist party functionaries and conventional military; Khrushchev did not, although he had the same options. Brezhnev has thus far avoided brinksmanship in international affairs; Khrushchev did not, although the same high risks were involved. Because an analysis of Brezhnev's influence on specific Soviet policies since 1964 is beyond the scope of this paper, the following considerations are intended merely to suggest the most distinctive characteristics of his personality and outlook.

*First identified as such in Izvestiya, 11 October 1969.

His Conservative Instincts

Brezhnev may have reached the top under Khrushchev's patronage, but the two men could not be much less alike. Khrushchev was naturally quick-witted, imaginative, bold, and ebullient, and these traits determined much of his behavior as a leader. He rose to prominence largely due to his abilities as a party trouble-shooter and an agitator for Stalin's policies, and after the dictator's death his passion for political argument and exhortation won him dividends in the ongoing power struggle. His willingness to tackle long-standing domestic problems attracted political support which may have been decisive in the defeat of his conservative opposition in the mid-1950s--the so-called antiparty group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and other contemporaries from the Stalinist bureaucracy. Khrushchev's dynamism and growing self-importance later became a "tragic flaw," however, and his constant reorganizations of the state and party apparatus alienated important vested interests, particularly among the more conservative segments of the society.

Brezhnev, a model organization man with a conservative bent, in these circumstances was the most logical successor to Khrushchev. No other leader had Brezhnev's general array of power and prestige. Suslov, with quiet and conservative bureaucratic manner, would have been suited to succeed Khrushchev but lacked the desire and perhaps the power base. Podgornyy, the other senior secretary in Khrushchev's Secretariat, had built a sufficient base to assume the top job, had he not acquired the reputation of a champion of Khrushchev's more liberal programs. Thus, just as Khrushchev seemed suited to correct the failings of Stalin's policies, so Brezhnev appeared to be the right man to restore some order to the party and government bureaucracies and to Soviet policies in general after Khrushchev's "hare-brained schemes" had created a state of constant turmoil.

Brezhnev's early experience as a party official probably contributed, at least in part, to his basic conservatism. Brezhnev was appointed to his first executive positions in the government and party in 1937-38, when he was 30 years

old. Hence, he benefited directly from the massive purge of those years, which probably coincided with the most formative period of his political development. Such an experience must have taught him to keep his powder dry--an attitude he has held ever since, judging from the circumstances of later comebacks. Brezhnev gradually climbed the ladder of the party hierarchy, not as Stalin's protege but as Khrushchev's client, attaining national prominence only in 1950.

Setbacks which Brezhnev suffered at the national level may have reinforced the "safe" behavior which the circumstances of his early career suggest was the predominant trait of the rising Stalinist apparatchik. A first humiliation was his removal in 1953, on the occasion of Stalin's death, from the Central Committee Secretariat and the "enlarged" Politburo after only six months' tenure. An apparent factor was Khrushchev's inability to protect him in the face of opposition from the majority of older members of the Politburo, whom Stalin probably had intended to replace with the younger officials added to the body in 1952. Brezhnev's second major setback, probably more damaging to his prestige and confidence, was his "kick upstairs" to the presidency in 1960. He had already made his earlier comeback to the Secretariat and Politburo in 1956, so his transfer had all the appearances of a move to semi-retirement. His careful execution of duties and avoidance of strong commitments on policy matters may have eased the way for his return to the Secretariat when Frol Kozlov's incapacitating stroke opened the question of Khrushchev's succession in 1963.*

*Illustrative of Brezhnev's unwillingness to commit himself on specific issues -- and probably to avoid a direct show of opposition to Khrushchev's policies and programs -- is the fact that he is not known to have spoken at any Central Committee plenum between the 20th Party Congress--that is, from the time of his election to the Secretariat and Politburo in 1956--and his return from the presidency in June 1963. He did, however, speak at the party congresses.

Despite its adverse effect on his power position at that time, Brezhnev's appointment as president did give him andopportunity to travel widely abroad and to deal with non-communist foreign statesmen--an opportunity often denied to leading party officials. Although this has not altered his basically conservative outlook, it appears to have broadened his understanding of things non-Soviet. Perhaps, also, it has contributed to an appreciation of the responsibilities inherent in the great-power status of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev told [redacted] for example, that there could be no forgiving mistakes which led to a new war. Continuing in a philosophical and apparently non-argumentative vein, he added that it was not a matter of any great importance to the Soviet Union what political and social systems other countries had, but the important thing was what foreign policies they pursued. While the purpose of these remarks is open to question, Brezhnev's personal inclination in foreign policy has been to use all possible political and diplomatic means to resolve conflicts, and, above all, to avoid military actions which might entail a direct confrontation with the US. On the other hand, when political means have been exhausted he might not shy from a military solution, expecially if there were little or no risk of a US counter move.

His Non-Intellectual Method

Brezhnev has displayed a rather Russian directness and emotionalism that add up to a projection of charm or boorishness, depending on the point of view of his audience. Especially in public, Brezhnev can appear deeply moved, even to tears, by the solemnity of the occasion, as when he personally gave his arm to support the widow of Yuriy Gagarin at the cosmonaut's funeral. The Soviet [redacted] who claimed to have worked as [redacted] in the Ukraine, has characterized Brezhnev as stupid, dull, and narrow-minded, apparently on the basis of a similar emotional display in 1945. [redacted] described a meeting of party officials at that time which was to discuss "serious problems" of rebuilding the ruins of postwar Ukraine and at which Brezhnev allegedly attached utmost importance to the "minor problem" of what to do with the illegitimate children whose mothers were Soviet citizens and whose fathers were German soldiers.

Brezhnev's "human side," genuine or not, apparently can be a political asset. For example, Brezhnev brusquely received after the latter had had rough talks with Kosygin and Podgornyy. Without making a friendly gesture, Brezhnev launched into conversation with a demand to know what had to say about allegedly replied that he would not account to anyone, including Brezhnev, and appealed for a "man-to-man" talk. At that point Brezhnev changed his manner completely, and in the best Russian tradition he embraced and began a relaxed and friendly talk.

Brezhnev can be much more abrasive when dealing with politically independent and sophisticated foreigners, especially from "imperialist" countries. who has had an opportunity to judge the behavior of Soviet leaders on more than one occasion, complained in late August 1968 that Brezhnev was choleric and less easy-going than Kosygin. , pointing to Khrushchev's flamboyant outbursts which quickly subsided, felt that if Brezhnev were to flare up it would be for a long time, and the damage to relations might be permanent. British Prime Minister Wilson, during his February 1966 visit to Moscow, evidently found Brezhnev bombastic and callow. Reportedly, Brezhnev boasted of the size and strength of the Soviet economy and somewhat grandly allowed that the Soviet Union could afford to make a few trade concessions to a relatively small country like the United Kingdom. This sort of behavior may have been behind the impression of an unthinking man and a boor which Brezhnev made on members of French President de Gaulle's delegation in Moscow in mid-1966.

With foreign Communists, Brezhnev drops virtually all pretense of dialogue. In addition, he spins out his "ideas" in no apparent logical sequence. His advice to a visiting for example, was punctuated by non sequiturs and sudden shifts in thought. In these discussions, Brezhnev gives the impression of relying primarily on the force of his authority, achieving his purposes indirectly through suggestion, rather than directly by persuasion. The fundamental weakness in this reliance on authority of position rather than the force of ideas is revealed especially sharply in crisis situations. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, when it had become clear that the Soviets in Prague had failed to install a new government, Brezhnev gave the impression of folding under the tension that had been building since before the military action. He apparently lacked the political skill to achieve his purposes in the "negotiations" with Dubcek and other Czechoslovak leaders held captive in Moscow after the invasion.

insisting that the Czechoslovak leaders sign the final communique, Brezhnev reportedly said "I have had enough of this. Sign the document, I am hungry."

Brezhnev has displayed a high opinion of his handling of difficult political situations. This was shown, for example, in the account of a foreign communist delegation which in July 1967 heard Brezhnev's own version of the important role he played during the height of the Arab-Israeli fighting. Boasting rather than complaining, Brezhnev said he was exhausted by the crisis, during which he did not sleep for three days. Brezhnev seemed especially taken by the close attention of President Johnson, mentioning several times the close contact that Washington had maintained with Moscow. (It is not clear who in the collective leadership actually has the ultimate responsibility for receiving and responding to incoming and outgoing messages on the hot line, the terminal of which is located by Kosygin's office. Brezhnev may have exaggerated his role on this score,

by implying that he himself had been on the receiving end of "calls" from the President.) He also claimed to have performed the almost impossible job of explaining Moscow's position to all the Arab state leaders and outlining Soviet policy personally to the Soviet ambassadors in the Arab states, who had overreached their authority and promised more than they should have. Brezhnev added, apparently not without pleasure, that handling all these details personally was enough to overcome any one man.

His Pursuit of Bureaucratic Conformity

Perhaps aware of his intellectual limitations, Brezhnev has carried out his responsibilities in a relatively cautious manner. Unlike the aggressive Khrushchev, he has given the impression--perhaps out of necessity--of working contentedly within the confines of collective leadership. He has willingly granted a hearing to the opinion of his colleagues and specialists when it does not conflict with his overall outlook. He has endorsed, for example, the limited application of sociological methods which progressives within the party have advocated in place of traditional ideological dogma as the basis of foreign and domestic propaganda. But he has not supported and presumably never would sanction its use as a tool of objective inquiry into the basic propositions underlying such holy concepts as party supremacy in politics, socialist realism in art, or proletarian internationalism in communist relations.

Brezhnev set out early in his regime to dampen dissent both within the party rank and file and among the Soviet populace in general. He has shown an abiding concern to eliminate disunity and establish "order" as defined by the functionaries in the party apparatus and the security police. "Democratic centralism"--in essence, rule from above, where all wisdom resides--became the watchword in Brezhnev's statements and in the practice of party officials. As a result, party policy became somewhat more consistent but less vital; sharp discrepancies and failings were fewer, but forward movement was nil.

Brezhnev became especially insistent on conformity after the 23d Party Congress. He reacted quickly, for example, to criticism from Moscow party chief Yegorychev at the June 1967 Central Committee plenum, and the immediate disciplinary action taken against the critic served to warn others that he could and would take stern action to protect his position. In his 29 March 1968 speech to the Moscow party organization, Brezhnev reiterated his demand for "iron discipline" in extremely strong terms. He went so far as to threaten a purge: "While the party trusts its cadres, it will, as always, hold everyone accountable . . . and sternly prosecute all cases of violation of party and state discipline, regardless of position held or past services." Brezhnev added that whoever believed that iron discipline lost its significance after the "period of direct revolutionary action" was mistaken. Perhaps because of this insistence on solidarity, Brezhnev has been careful not to stray too far from the consensus of his Politburo colleagues, as his gingerly approach to the Czechoslovak problem demonstrated.

PROGNOSIS

The accumulated evidence on Brezhnev's political advantages, successful maneuvering, and cautious behaviour suggests that prospects for his continued rule are good. In addition, the major foreign policy problems of the past year which could have affected Brezhnev adversely with an unfavorable outcome--"normalization" of the domestic situation in Czechoslovakia and the holding of the international Communist conference--have been resolved relatively favorably from the Soviet viewpoint. At home, public dislike of Brezhnev was dramatically evident in the late January 1969 apparent assassination attempt by a Soviet military man; nevertheless, the incident and the lack of popularity it symbolized should have no significant effect on Brezhnev's actual power position, since the majority of the Politburo have supported his status quo policies. Moreover, the very few personnel changes affecting Central Committee members since the last party congress in 1966 have favored Brezhnev's associates, primarily at the expense of officials with ties to Politburo member Shelepin; the chances are very good, therefore, that the new Central Committee to be elected at the 24th Party Congress, due sometime next year, will give Brezhnev approximately the same political support he now has.

Despite a lack of indications of widespread opposition to Brezhnev's leadership at the top levels of the party, there are a couple of factors to be taken into account in any projection of his career or the future shape of the Soviet leadership: Brezhnev's health, and a possible challenge from a minority faction within the Politburo.

the oligarchy might rather attempt to continue with a minimum of upset and settle on one of Brezhnev's allies--for example, "Second" Secretary Kirilenko--for the vacancy.

Growing dissatisfaction within the party over the leadership's essentially defensive or passive status quo policies could conceivably serve to spur factional struggle against Brezhnev, as was the case briefly in June 1967 regarding Soviet actions in the Middle East. Such a development might occur unexpectedly in connection with a dramatic failure in foreign policy or domestic happening that is seized as a pretext for a change in leadership toward a more forceful or active policy. Such a tactic could easily backfire, however, since Brezhnev could claim with some justification to have used restraint in pursuing a consensus policy. On balance, therefore, a bid to supplant Brezhnev on policy grounds does not appear likely.

[redacted]

(8)

~~SECRET~~
[redacted]

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

Brezhnev's Struggle for Dominance

Annex to
(Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His Power)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

5 December 1969
RSS No. ~~0042~~/69



SECRET

BREZHNEV'S STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE

ANNEX TO CAESAR XXXVII
(Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His Power)

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

This Annex lays out and analyzes in detail the evidence concerning Brezhnev's modus operandi in achieving and consolidating power in the Soviet hierarchy.

The Annex is published for those who might desire to pursue the subject in some depth. The analysis and conclusions found in this Annex are consistent with the basic study, but, unlike that study, the Annex has not been coordinated or reviewed in detail by other offices.

SECRET

BREZHNEV'S STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE

ANNEX TO
(Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His Power)

Conténts

INTRODUCTION

Brezhnev has decided advantages over other Soviet leaders by virtue of his supreme party position. As de facto chairman of the Politburo, the General Secretary can and does preside over its operation and exert a deciding influence on the direction of policy. As chief of the party Secretariat, he is in a better position than any other leader to manipulate the executive machinery for personal gain--primarily through appointments of clients to key posts in the party and state apparatus. Finally, as the man in control of the military hierarchy and police forces, the General Secretary can call on the organizations of coercion for self-protection in the name of regime security. Nevertheless, the lesson of Khrushchev's removal was that none of these powers can be taken for granted. To maintain his power, a General Secretary must strive for dominance over his colleagues and, at the same time, not appear to threaten the survival of the oligarchy; otherwise, he falls prey to his political rivals.

This study is concerned with how Brezhnev has perceived his position within the oligarchy and maneuvered to consolidate his personal power. It examines his efforts to this end in three arenas of political action: the party Secretariat, the party-government duumvirate, and the amorphous military-security complex. The most important arena--and Brezhnev has appeared to recognize it as such--as been the Secretariat, where senior secretaries Podgornyy and Shelepin seemed to wield more actual power in the first months after Khrushchev's fall than the General Secretary himself. The paper follows Brezhnev's struggle for dominance over his secretarial rivals, beginning with his first tenuous moves within the Central Committee apparatus in late 1964, continuing with his assertive thrust for recognition during most of 1965, and reaching the breakthrough in December that year with Podgornyy's transfer from the Secretariat. It examines Brezhnev's use of indirect methods to neutralize Shelepin as a threat

in that body. Finally, it traces Brezhnev's fostering of Kirilenko as "second in command," bringing relative stability to the Secretariat after 1967.

Another important area of potential danger to the General Secretary is his shared-power relationship with Premier Kosygin. Because this subject has been treated fairly exhaustively elsewhere, the study focuses on the essentials of this aspect of Brezhnev's struggle--primarily on his effort to gain and hold the preeminent position in the duumvirate.

Finally, this study investigates Brezhnev's method of dealing with the regime's two biggest instruments of power--the military and the security organizations. It covers the highlights of his variable fortunes with a military organization that is divided roughly into two groupings: the advocates of conventional armaments and a flexible-response strategy whom Brezhnev apparently has favored, and the proponents of an overwhelming missile-oriented deterrent force. The paper concludes with a discussion of Brezhnev's conspicuously successful drive to consolidate an already strong influence within the security organizations--the KGB and MVD--and among their party watchdogs.

THE MAIN ARENA: THE PARTY SECRETARIAT

Brezhnev, like Khrushchev before him, was bound to show a healthy respect for the political threat which his senior secretarial colleagues, particularly his "second in command," could pose. At the time of Khrushchev's ouster, the Secretariat included three full members of the Politburo in addition to Brezhnev: Podgornyy ("second in command" by virtue of his responsibility for party organization), Suslov, and Kirilenko. From the outset, Podgornyy must have figured in Brezhnev's thinking as the one to watch. A favored member of Khrushchev's leadership, Podgornyy had had an opportunity to build a strong power base within the party, and his past political views were somewhat at odds with Brezhnev's. Thus, the potential for rivalry between the two leaders was already high. Suslov, despite continuous membership on the Secretariat since 1947 and consequent prestige and influence among party functionaries, had specialized in foreign Communist policy--his views being quite close to Brezhnev's, judging by the public record--and seemed to lack the ambition to bid for the top party post. Kirilenko, the industrial watchdog with whom Brezhnev had worked closely throughout most of their careers, appeared to present the least immediate cause for concern, since much of his political base was also Brezhnev's. The balance within the Secretariat was, therefore, inherently unstable, and maneuvering for political power in that body would occur in its most concentrated form.

Early Adversity for Brezhnev

Podgornyy showed his hand early, just one month after Khrushchev's ouster, in monopolizing the first Central Committee plenum without the deposed leader. The plenum, on 16 November, heard Podgornyy deliver the only report --on reunification of the party as it existed before Khrushchev split it into industrial and agricultural organizations in 1962. Brezhnev did not speak at the plenum at all. Thus, as spokesman for the new regime, Podgornyy

garnered the credit for overturning one of the most unpopular actions of the old regime.

Podgornyy's influence at the plenum also was indicated in the personnel actions which it approved. By far the most important of these was the promotion of Party Secretary Shelepin to full membership in the Politburo, thus increasing the number of senior secretaries under Brezhnev to four. Shelepin's addition to the elite group of party administrators complicated Brezhnev's position considerably. Brezhnev was not extremely popular within the party at the lower levels, and Shelepin had the reputation of a brilliant young "comer."* Moreover Shelepin's responsibility in the Secretariat for supervision of the "administrative organs"--including the security forces, the legal apparatus, and the military--already had made him a figure to reckon with, and his promotion had the effect of seriously impinging on Brezhnev's authority in these areas in the Politburo. Taken together, Podgornyy and Shelepin represented a real threat to Brezhnev's position.**

*Several reports during the first months of the regime took the line that Brezhnev and Kosygin were caretakers and would soon be replaced. One [redacted] even claimed that Brezhnev had agreed to serve as party chief only one year. While unconfirmed, this report would tend to explain the organizational stalemate of Brezhnev until the late summer of 1965.

**A coalition between Podgornyy and Shelepin was more than a theoretical possibility, considering the circumstances of Shelepin's rise. His spectacular leaps up the party ladder in the early 1960s were due, no doubt, to Khrushchev's boosting, but they coincided with similar support from Khrushchev for Podgornyy and with a period of adversity for Brezhnev. Two close associates of Podgornyy--V.M. Churayev and V.N. Titov--had dominated party personnel matters during this period, when Khrushchev was looking for new blood to replace the old in the body politic. Thus, "Young Turks" like Shelepin and Demichev

(footnote continued on page 5)

In fact, the common denominator in the careers of officials whom the November plenum promoted was an apparent association with Podgornyy or Shelepin--more than with any other top leader. Thus Podgornyy's close Ukrainian associate, Petr Shelest, advanced from candidate to full member of the Politburo. Party Secretary Demichev received the rank of Politburo candidate member. Eight other officials at a lower level formed something of a mixed bag but included such known or presumed associates of Podgornyy and Shelepin as V. Ye. Semichastnyy, A.A. Yepishev, I.K. Lutak, and P.M. Masherov.* In any case, Brezhnev's influence in the personnel actions of the plenum was slight.

An important action which the November plenum confirmed, the appointment of A.M. Rumyantsev as editor-in-chief of Pravda, also traced to the influence of Podgornyy. Rumyantsev had been associated with Podgornyy in the Ukrainian party organization, and during his 10-month stint as editor of Pravda the newspaper's editorial line most closely reflected the views of Podgornyy. It should be noted, however, that Rumyantsev also worked for several

(footnote continued from page 4)
joined Podgornyy in giving Khrushchev his strongest support against political opposition, while more senior, orthodox leaders like Brezhnev and Suslov withheld support or equivocated on a number of controversial issues. (However, during 1965 Shelepin took a more conservative position and, as this study shows, did not hesitate to sacrifice some of Podgornyy's political supporters.)

*Two others, V.F. Zhigalin and V.I. Konotop, have had no known direct ties with Podgornyy or Shelepin, but each has a connection--however small--with Podgornyy's bailiwick of Khar'kov: Zhigalin is a Supreme Soviet deputy with a Khar'kov constituency, and Konotop graduated from an institute there. The political associations of the other two, G.I. Popov and G.F. Sizov, are unclear.

years with Suslov as a party theoretician, specializing in foreign Communist relations during the latter part of Khrushchev's rule.*

The November plenum approved the dismissal of Khrushchev's protege, V.I. Polyakov, as party secretary and chief of the Central Committee Department of Agriculture, thus creating two openings in the apparatus. Brezhnev apparently made use of his prerogative as party boss to appoint Fedor Kulakov to head the Agriculture Department. The circumstances surrounding the posting of Kulakov, who worked closely with Politburo member Polyanskiy during the 1950s,and probably owed his rise to him, are not clear.** Conceivably, Polyanskiy recommended that Brezhnev appoint Kulakov before the November plenum in order to smooth the way for the release of Polyakov from the Secretariat. On the other hand, they could have tried and failed at the plenum to win Kulakov's acceptance in both the departmental and the secretariat posts; the plenum might have approved the first position for Kulakov but reserved judgment on the second. Or Brezhnev may simply have waited until after the plenum had approved the party reunification before making any appointments. In any case, Kulakov failed to win election to the Secretariat at the next opportunity--the March 1965 plenum--and, like his patron, Deputy Premier Polyanskiy, he marked time politically until the following September, when Brezhnev stook on firmer ground.

In another high-level personnel action, Brezhnev's first deputy for agriculture on the RSFSR Bureau, Politburo

*The fact that Rumyantsev was one of Brezhnev's first victims in the fall of 1965, when the latter had consolidated his position, indicated that no love was lost between the two.

**Soviet biographic sources indicate only that it became effective sometime in November.

candidate member Leonid Yefremov, went to Stavropol' in early December to take over as party chief in place of the transferred Kulakov.* It was unclear who among the top leaders had the closest ties to Yefremov and therefore suffered most directly from this manifest demotion. Yefremov's promotion to deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau in December 1962, after a particularly zealous defense of Khrushchev's policies in November, may have been due to the influence of V.N. Titov and ultimately to Podgornyy (the Podgornyy-Titov relationship is discussed below). In any case, Brezhnev's attitude toward the ardent Khrushchev supporter could well have been unfavorable. Yefremov had come under attack just after the November 1964 plenum in Sel'skaya Zhizn', a Central Committee newspaper which has usually reflected the views of Polyanskiy. It is conceivable that Brezhnev connived with Polyanskiy to get rid of Yefremov. In any case, Brezhnev did not appoint a replacement for him as deputy chairman of the bureau. Politburo member Voronov, who was also a member of the RSFSR Bureau, may have blocked such an appointment, being denied it himself.**

Responding to the Challengers

In contrast to his inconspicuous role at the November 1964 plenum, Brezhnev was prominent at the agricultural

*This was one of several personnel changes in December which were to figure in later maneuvering as Brezhnev consolidated his position. See ahead, pp

**In one respect, the entire issue of the RSFSR Bureau was tangential to the power equation, since of the top leaders only Kirilenko functioned full-time on it after Yefremov departed. Brezhnev never appeared in public activities of the bureau and was not even identified as chairman until July 1965--again, only after he began vigorously to assert himself against Podgornyy and Shelepin.

plenum in March 1965. He opened the plenum, delivered the report, and gave a closing speech after discussion by Central Committee members. On three occasions he interrupted speakers (as Khrushchev used to do in a display of authority) with his personal judgments, and he was elected to chair the commission for drawing up the plenum's formal decree. At the same time, however, Podgornyy's position of "second in command" was reflected in his presiding at each session of the plenum.* It is also noteworthy that the fact of Brezhnev's dominance at the plenum was only revealed in the stenographic record, which was signed to the press on 7 August and did not appear until September.

Despite his prominent role at the plenum, Brezhnev made few if any organizational gains from its decisions. The transfer of Ustinov and the entire defense-industry complex from the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers to the Secretariat seemed to have the effect of making him accountable to Brezhnev rather than Kosygin. However, this move did not perceptibly improve Brezhnev's position vis-a-vis the senior secretaries. The plenum's approval of the dismissal of Party Secretary Il'ichev served the interest primarily of Suslov, whom Khrushchev had tried to undercut through Il'ichev. It became apparent soon after the March plenum that Demichev had assumed Il'ichev's secretarial responsibilities for ideological matters, and although Brezhnev probably viewed Demichev as a trustworthy subordinate, the move did not detract from the considerable influence Shelepin had in the propaganda apparatus.**

*In the past, the number two man usually had presided for the first session only, and the honor of presiding over subsequent sessions was shared by other Politburo members.

**Il'ichev's propaganda apparatus had been staffed with a number of Shelepin's former associates, especially from the Komsomol. In early 1965, these included the heads of TASS, Novosti Press Agency, Trud, and the government committees for Radio and Television, the Press, and Cultural

(footnote continued on page 9)

Moreover, the other major personnel action which the March plenum approved, while outside the Secretariat, also appeared to the political advantage of Shelepin: this was the promotion of Kirill Mazurov to full membership on the Politburo and his advancement, over the head of the senior deputy premier Polyanskiy, to first deputy premier.*

It was, nevertheless, clear that by March the balance of power had shifted somehow in Brezhnev's favor. The power relationships which had been taking shape in the Secretariat in early 1965 were manifested in a sharpening of policy lines in open debates on a variety of issues, but notably economic policy and Stalin's place in history. In general terms, the debates revealed a split among policymakers between "moderates" who favored a continuation of Khrushchevian policies and "neo-Stalinists" who advocated a return to more orthodoxy in party policy. In Khrushchev's time and through most of 1965, Podgornyy was a leading spokesman for the moderate line, while Shelepin and Suslov adopted a more orthodox position. Brezhnev apparently determined early that the balance within the leadership, in the reaction against Khrushchev's policies, would tend toward a consolidation of the more

(footnote continued from page 8)
Relations With Foreign Countries. Within the Central Committee apparatus they dominated the RSFSR Agitprop Department; in addition, one was RSFSR deputy premier for ideological questions, and two others held the positions of Minister and Deputy Minister of Culture RSFSR. Although Demichev replaced the heads of a large percentage of the propaganda positions by late 1965, most of these Shelepin associates remained. Thus, despite some additions of Brezhnev and Suslov proteges to these posts during 1965, Demichev's restaffing did not perceptibly reduce Shelepin's strong influence in the public media.

*Mazurov had worked closely with Shelepin for a number of years in the Komsomol, and the relationship between them could date even to the 1940s, when they were involved in wartime partisan activities.

orthodox forces, and although he took a cautious position on most issues, his statements reflected a basically neo-Stalinist approach.

The first strong indication that Podgornyy's political position might be or come in question had appeared in an obscure argument in the Central Committee economic weekly, Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, involving Podgornyy's former bailiwick Khar'kov. The lead editorial of the weekly for 24 February 1965 criticized the party leadership in Khar'kov for poor economic work, and a major article by Brezhnev's political ally, V.V. Shcherbitskiy, in the same issue praised the economic record in Dneprodzerzhinsk, which was Brezhnev's birthplace and political stronghold. The implication of the articles was that priority would be given to the heavy-industrial sector, which the Dneprodzerzhinsk area represented and Brezhnev had favored, at the expense of light industry and consumer goods, which Podgornyy had championed and Khar'kov symbolized.*

*Other signs of Podgornyy's growing political isolation surfaced soon thereafter, notably when Suslov and even Mikoyan in public speeches in May rejected the economic priorities advocated by Podgornyy a few days earlier. Further, a Central Committee decree in July singled out Khar'kov in a criticism of Khrushchev's open door policy in party admissions. The criticism applied especially to V.M. Churayev and V.N. Titov, who used the policy to undermine the older and more orthodox members of the party leadership, including Brezhnev and Suslov. The decree was additionally adverse to Podgornyy since he was the party secretary responsible in 1965 for organizational matters. The decree symbolized Brezhnev's break from his past association with the Khar'kovite Churayev, who in the 1950s had been an apparent supporter of Brezhnev and the then Politburo member Aristov. It also was an implied slap at Shelepin and other newcomers whom Churayev and Titov had promoted in the early 1960s when Khrushchev was looking for more loyal political support.

The most serious political setback for Podgornyy, however, came with the April transfer of his fellow secretary and protege, V.N. Titov, to the post of Kazakh Central Committee second secretary. This was a clear demotion for Titov, who would consequently lose his position on the Secretariat and, equally important, his post as chief of the Party Organs Department. Podgornyy remained nominally "second in command" but lacked Titov's support in the Secretariat and apparatus, which became an arena for maneuvering between Brezhnev and Shelepin. Although one of Titov's deputies, Ivan Ryazanov, soon departed for "the periphery" to a relatively minor state post, Podgornyy maintained a foothold in the department through Titov's first deputy, Petr Pigalev.*

The circumstances surrounding Titov's shift suggest that it was a power play by Brezhnev which, as in the compromise appointment of Kulakov in November, was intended to bypass the normal decisionmaking machinery for such high-level moves--the Central Committee plenum. The groundwork had been laid in December for Titov's eventual replacement, although there was no direct evidence of a design on Brezhnev's part to present a fait accompli to the March plenum. Thus, Ivan Kapitonov was brought to Moscow from the provinces to head the Central Committee's Department for RSFSR Party Organs, one of the first moves,

*Titov's positions remained vacant until Ivan Kapitonov was officially confirmed in them in December 1965 at the same plenum which abolished Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee and transferred Shelepin to full-time work in the Secretariat. Pigalev himself remained in the department until the 23d Party Congress, when he became chief of a department of Podgornyy's Supreme Soviet Presidium --a good example of a Soviet leader looking after his own. The removal of Titov, Pigalev, and Ryazanov from the Party Organs Department signaled an end to the era of its control by Shelepin and Podgornyy.

incidentally, to foreshadowna return to favor of officials who had suffered political setbacks under Khrushchev.* Also in December, V.V. Skryabin was removed as Rostov party chief and placed "at the disposal of the Central Committee," his position being assumed by the second secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee, Mikhail Solomentsev.** Against this background, the belated transfer of Titov to Kazakhstan, less than two weeks after the March plenum, bore the signs of an administrative decision on the part of the Politburo or the General Secretary himself. Nevertheless, Kapitonov was not officially confirmed in Titov's secretariat and departmental positions until Podgornyy's "election" to the presidency in December 1965.

Since Titov's removal did not immediately resolve the deadlock in the Secretariat, uneasy maneuvering continued. Il'ichev's and Titov's secretarial responsibilities for ideological matters and party organization were reassigned, respectively, to Demichev and (probably) Rudakov. This indicated that Brezhnev intended to continue, for

*Former Moscow Oblast First Secretary Kapitonov had been exiled to Ivanovo in 1959, a time when the then "second in command," Aleksey Kirichenko, as well as Brezhnev and others, were losing ground to such rivals as Kozlov and Podgornyy. Kapitonov's return probably was due to the patronage of Brezhnev, Suslov, and possibly Kirilenko.

**Skryabin had been a close associate of both Brezhnev and Kirilenko in the Ukrainian party organization and was well placed for advancement; however, he has not reappeared in any prominent position and failed of Central Committee reelection at the 23d Party Congress in April 1966. Like Kapitonov, Solomentsev appeared to owe his allegiance primarily to Brezhnev and Suslov.

the time being at any rate, to cultivate the support of certain of the younger generation of secretaries most closely associated with the rise of Shelepin.*

In addition, Brezhnev began in the summer of 1965 to make extensive changes in the Central Committee apparatus, especially where Podgornyy or Shelepin had had supervisory responsibilities. Not all the changes resulted in the displacement of their proteges, but several close associates of Brezhnev took command of important departments. Brezhnev's influence in the moves was particularly clear regarding the two departments most directly involved in administering internal Central Committee affairs--the General Department and the Administration of Affairs. Konstantin Chernenko became chief of the General Department officially in July, having served since 1960 as chief of Brezhnev's secretariat on the Supreme Soviet Presidium and (probably) of Brezhnev's personal staff on the Central Committee Secretariat. In the Administration of Affairs, Georgiy Pavlov replaced K.P. Chernyayev as chief, perhaps in July when Chernyayev last appeared in this role. Pavlov had studied and worked with Brezhnev in Dneprodzerzhinsk in the 1930s and probably maintained political ties later; for example, he became party chief in an RSFSR oblast soon after Brezhnev's position on the Secretariat and Politburo improved in the showdown with the "anti-party group" in 1957. Brezhnev apparently was satisfied with the personnel in the Central Committee departments involved in defense-related and security work, since they were virtually untouched. Most

*Rudakov for years had supervised heavy industry, and the evidence that he took on Titov's duties in party organization is tenuous. In April, Rudakov received a Czech delegation which had been in the Soviet Union studying CPSU experience in party organizational matters. In July, he attended a Turkmen Central Committee plenum which discussed the recruitment, assignment, and training of leading party officials.

of their chiefs had been since the late 1950s in the same posts, where they may have been supervised or even nominated by Brezhnev.

During the summer of 1965, Brezhnev and Suslov apparently tried to prevent Shelepin from increasing his influence over the propaganda media. In late June, three of Shelepin's cronies from his Komsomol reign--S.K. Romanovskiy, N.A. Mikhaylov, and A.M. Subbotin--were rumored to be leading candidates to fill the vacancy of Izvestiya chief editor which Stepakov's transfer to the Agitprop Department created. By this account, the final decision was pending Demichev's return from vacation in mid-July, but as it turned out a decision was announced only at the end of September, when Lev Tolkunov was transferred to the Izvestiya post from the Bloc Department (in which he had risen to prominence under Suslov and Andropov). Less than two weeks earlier, Pravda's editor-in-chief Rumyantsev had been replaced in the wake of a controversial article espousing the moderate line. Rumyantsev's replacement, Mikhail Zimyanin, appeared to be a compromise candidate, having career ties with Shelepin, Mazurov, and Suslov among the Politburo members.

By the end of summer, numerous rumors circulating in Moscow suggested that the "talented" Shelepin was about to take over from a passive and incompetent Brezhnev in a major upheaval of the top leadership. The origin of these rumors was usually obscure, although some traced to dubious sources of the KGB or to elements hostile to the Soviet regime. Many may have been purely speculative opinions based on a projection of Shelepin's meteoric career. In any case, the only tangible indicator that he might, in fact, have been bidding for the supreme party post at that time was the publication of several articles in the specialized press favoring an upgrading of Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee. These articles implied a threat to the party control apparatus--already significantly atrophied from Khrushchev's time--by arguing that the party-state control apparatus should coordinate the efforts of all organizations involved in "control" activity, rather than serve in tandem with the party control organization as the regulations stipulated. Whatever the actual

circumstances surrounding the rumored Shelepin takeover --which remain unclear to this day--Brezhnev's placement of proteges in the Central Committee apparatus contradicted the characterization of him as a passive figurehead.

In this highly fluid situation, when Shelepin appeared to be pressing for advantage, Brezhnev became increasingly assertive in establishing the authority of the General Secretary. Early in September, Brezhnev went alone to Poland for his fourth round of talks with Gomulka since Khrushchev's ouster; Kosygin had chaperoned him the first three times. The stenographic account of the March Central Committee plenum, which showed Brezhnev in a very favorable light, appeared at the same time (it had been signed to the press on 7 August, after an apparent delay in passing the censor, since it had been set in type by 3 June). The 1965 Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, which contained the first identification of Brezhnev as chairman of the RSFSR Bureau, was available about two weeks later, on the eve of a Central Committee plenum at which Brezhnev would further consolidate his position.

The outcome of the September Central Committee plenum and the Supreme Soviet session which immediately followed the plenum indicated that Brezhnev was able finally to surmount the earlier observed obstacles to consolidation. The plenum approved the election of Agriculture Department Chief Kulakov to the Secretariat, filling the vacancy that had existed almost one year. It also formally dismissed Titov as party secretary for organizational questions, without, however, designating a replacement. It probably also confirmed the appointments of Zimyanin and Tolkunov as chief editors of Pravda and Izvestiya, although this was not offically announced, and approved the organizational changes which the Supreme Soviet session was to ratify. The most important of the session's appointments was the promotion of Polyanskiy to first deputy premier, presumably reflecting a shift in the leadership in Brezhnev's favor. One of Brezhnev's oldest and closest associates from the Ukraine, Nikolay Tikhonov, was among the three new deputy premiers whom the session appointed. Less important, but still significant as indicators of Brezhnev's

increased stature in the party leadership, were the plenum's confirmation of him as the main rapporteur to the 23d Party Congress six months later, and the session's election of him as a member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.*

One of the minor personnel changes at the session fit into a larger scheme of maneuvering between Brezhnev and Podgornyy. This was the naming of Ukrainian Premier Kazanets to the post of Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, which opened the door to the appointment of V.V. Shcherbitskiy to the Ukrainian premiership, the position he had lost to Kazanets in 1963. Although it was Khrushchev who had attacked Shcherbitskiy at that time and probably insisted on his transfer to the lesser position of oblast party boss in Dnepropetrovsk, Podgornyy had seemed to be the main beneficiary of the 1963 move among the members of the Politburo and Secretariat.** It seemed clear, at any rate, that Shcherbitskiy looked to Brezhnev for support. The fact that Shcherbitskiy found refuge in Brezhnev's bailiwick of Dnepropetrovsk may have been more than symbolic

*Brezhnev's position on the state Presidium, as well as the elevation of his adopted ally Polyanskiy to first deputy premier, may have increased Brezhnev's leverage on the government side sufficiently to allow setting up the shifts of Podgornyy and Shelepin, discussed below. The published decision to hold the 23d Congress in early 1966 marked the start of jockeying for Central Committee positions at both high and low levels.

**Kazanets, prior to displacing Shcherbitskiy, had been Podgornyy's second secretary. Another Ukrainian party leader who rose to prominence under Podgornyy and presumably gave him political support, Petr Shelest, became Ukrainian first secretary. Shelest did not achieve the status of full Politburo member that traditionally went with the top Ukrainian party post, perhaps because Ukrainians already held several votes on the body. Thus, the candidate membership slot which Shcherbitskiy had held went to Shelest rather than to Kazanets.

of their past career association. Shcherbitskiy, who has been an outspoken advocate of Brezhnev's policies, regained his candidate membership on the Politburo at the first opportunity after reappointment as Ukrainian premier--at the same December 1965 Central Committee plenum that eased Podgornyy into the relatively toothless presidency. By contrast, Kazanets had failed--presumably due to Brezhnev's opposition--to achieve Politburo status even after Shelest's advance in November 1964 had created a vacancy at the candidate level.

The December 1965 Breakthrough

The December 1965 Central Committee plenum signaled a major breakthrough for Brezhnev in his drive for total control of the Secretariat. It abolished Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee in circumstances suggesting a rubber-stamp approval of a fait accompli. Thus Brezhnev delivered an informational report ("soobshcheniye") rather than the normal report for discussion ("doklad"), and the plenum communique listed no one as having spoken on it. Regarding personnel matters, the plenum approved the appointment of Kapitonov as party secretary (and chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department) and reelected Shcherbitskiy a candidate member of the Politburo.

A Supreme Soviet session subsequently tidied up the organizational picture, of which the plenum's dissolution of the Party-State Control Committee had been only one part. Podgornyy's replacement of the semi-retiring Mikoyan, whose departure from the presidency a number of sources had predicted since late 1964, meant giving up his "second in command" position on the Secretariat.*

*Although not officially relieved of his secretarial duties until the 23d Party Congress the following April, Podgornyy had ceased to function in this capacity after becoming president.

Shelepin, having been deprived of the post of Party-State Control Committee chairman, was released as deputy premier to work full-time in the Secretariat, assuming Podgornyy's number two slot. The session also confirmed the earlier appointment, dating to 13 November, of Mikhail Yefremov as a deputy premier.* However, despite the overall gain for Brezhnev, Shelepin's assumption of the "second in command" secretarial duties placed him in an improved position to build a larger base of political support.

Dominating the 23d Party Congress

Brezhnev went into the 23d Party Congress from a position of relative strength, with Suslov and Shelepin the only senior secretaries serving in a full-time capacity. By the end of the congress, when Podgornyy had been officially released and Kirilenko added to the Secretariat, Brezhnev's position appeared even stronger. The Congress, like the March 1965 Central Committee plenum, was Brezhnev's show. He opened it, delivered the main report, and received the highest protocol honors at every opportunity. He received the title of General Secretary (which only Stalin before him had held) rather than the less prestigious "First Secretary." At the close of the congress, Brezhnev announced his own "unanimous" election as General Secretary and Politburo member by a plenum of the newly chosen Central Committee, as well as the composition of

*Yefremov's appointment, so soon after extensive additions at the deputy premier level in October, had suggested high-level maneuvering. His infrequent public appearances have indicated his involvement in administering certain sensitive areas of industry and transport, security, etc. Thus, he appears to have taken up some or all the government duties that Shelepin had; this would indicate that the December shifts in responsibilities in the Secretariat had been decided in late October or early November.

the rest of the Politburo and the Secretariat in hierarchical order.

Brezhnev's list of the top leaders was out of alphabetical order and presumably represented the pecking order. The stenographic record of the congress, which gave also the officially approved registration of applause (not necessarily accurately reflecting actual applause), showed that Brezhnev ranked Suslov higher than either Shelepin or Kirilenko in both the Secretariat and the Politburo:

General Secretary of the Central Committee, and member of the Politburo: Brezhnev (stormy, long unabating applause).

Members of the Politburo:

Kosygin (stormy, prolonged applause);
Podgornyy (stormy, prolonged applause);
Suslov (stormy, prolonged applause);
Voronov (applause);
Kirilenko (applause);
Shelepin (applause);
Mazurov (applause);
Polyanskiy (applause);
Shelest (applause); and
Pel'she (applause).

Candidate members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee:

Demichev (applause);
Grishin (applause);
Mzhavanadze (applause);
Rashidov (applause);
Ustinov (applause);
Shcherbitskiy (applause);
Kunayev (applause);
Masherov (applause).

Secretaries of the Central Committee:*

Brezhnev	Andropov
Suslov	Ponomarev
Shelepin	Kapitonov
Kirilenko	Kulakov
Demichev	Rudakov
Ustinov	

An early sign of Suslov's high rank in the Secretariat had appeared at the beginning of the congress, in his presiding at the first session--a function traditionally associated with the "second in command." His status thus received a further boost from the fact that in Brezhnev's list, Shelepin ranked higher than Kirilenko in the Secretariat but lower in the Politburo. This treatment of the long-time specialist in international Communist affairs vis-a-vis the two organizational strongmen on the Secretariat served to heighten Brezhnev's prominence by placing the General Secretary an extra step above the senior secretary (or secretaries) in line for control of personnel assignments.

Ferment Among the Senior Secretaries: Shelepin's Isolation

Kirilenko's addition to the Secretariat, which resulted from the abolition of the Bureau for the RSFSR and transfer of its functions and personnel to the central apparatus, required a reshuffling of portfolios within the Secretariat. In the immediate post-congress period, Shelepin devoted more and more time to supervising party work in light industry and consumer goods (duties which Podgornyy had had also but which were secondary to his party organizational assignment). The activities of Suslov and Kirilenko throughout most of 1966 betrayed nothing

*Individual applause for secretaries was not registered in the stenographic record.

very new about their responsibilities but seemed to indicate that the two continued their previous involvement in, respectively, foreign Communist relations and RSFSR industry. Conceivably, Brezhnev had not proposed or achieved Politburo agreement on a "second in command" at this time. Brezhnev apparently did not find a way out of the deadlock among the senior secretaries for some time, during which the rivals for undisputed second place jockeyed inconclusively for position.

Brezhnev and Kirilenko may have joined forces against Shelepin in late July 1966 to forestall the appointment of Vadim Tikunov as chief of the newly centralized militia. Tikunov, most closely associated with Shelepin, Mazurov, and Demichev in the past, had been a shoo-in for the post. As the top militia official before the centralization was announced on 26 July, Tikunov had led a major crime campaign during late 1965 and early 1966 and had won Kosygin's public support for increased anti-crime measures. Nevertheless, the 2-3 August session of the Supreme Soviet, in ratifying the establishment of the new militia ministry, failed to appoint Tikunov its head. After almost two months' delay, the position went to Nikolay Shchelokov, whose career in the Ukraine and Moldavia must have brought him to the attention of Brezhnev and Kirilenko. Tikunov discreetly faded into the woodwork.

The appointment of Mikhail Solomentsev in November 1966 as chief of the Central Committee's Heavy Industry Department in place of the deceased Secretary Rudakov was symbolic of the standstill in the Secretariat. Solomentsev had appeared closer to Suslov than to Brezhnev and Kirilenko. Brezhnev may have had doubts about Solomentsev's loyalties since 1962, when a purge of Brezhnev's protege Kunayev in Kazakhstan resulted in the promotion of Solomentsev in the new Kazakh regime. Also, Solomentsev replaced a close associate of Brezhnev and Kirilenko, V.V. Skryabin, as Rostov party chief in late 1964; Suslov presided over

the move.* Another indication that Brezhnev and Kirilenko may have been at odds with Solomentsev was the September 1965 publicity given to a decree of the RSFSR Bureau--led by Brezhnev and Kirilenko--which criticized the Rostov party leadership, and thus implicitly Solomentsev, for allowing an "overemphasis" on heavy industrial production.** Against this background, Solomentsev's election to the Secretariat in December 1966--one month after his appointment as chief of the Heavy Industry Department--seemed to indicate that Suslov and others had prevailed in the Secretariat, at least on this issue at this time.

Brezhnev gave every indication throughout most of 1966 and early 1967 of being relatively satisfied with his position of preeminence in the Secretariat. However, his success in placing his protege Shchelokov in the top militia post at Shelepin's expense may have encouraged him to strike a second blow at his main rival's power base in the security forces. It is even conceivable that Shchelokov, since taking over the militia, had uncovered damaging evidence against his counterpart in the KGB, Semichastnyy, and saw in it a way to help Brezhnev remove another of Shelepin's clients. Semichastnyy was removed without any forewarning on 18 May 1967.

Brezhnev could not have moved against Semichastnyy, of course, without cause. Several reports on the switch gave inefficiency or incompetence as the main cause of his removal. [redacted], for example, reported that Rumanian Party Secretary Dalea expressed the view to some colleagues that the primary reasons were Semichastnyy's lack of success in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; he cited the defection of Stalin's daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva, as one failure. [redacted]

*Skryabin was placed "at the disposal of the Central Committee;" however, he dropped out of sight and failed to be reelected to that body at the 23d Party Congress.

**Editorial of Sovetskaya Rossiya for 14 September.

[redacted] reportedly gave a similar explanation of the action, claiming that Semichastnyy bore the responsibility for Svetlana's defection and that he was closely associated with Yuriy Nosenko, a highly placed security official who also defected. These considerations, which Brezhnev could have ignored if his attitude toward Semichastnyy had been favorable, may have provided the excuse for Brezhnev's political move against him. The trend of Andropov's subsequent administration of the KGB, however, tends to support the hypothesis that these faults were viewed seriously by him. Nevertheless, political considerations played an important, perhaps the decisive, role. A [redacted] Soviet [redacted] told a foreign party leader that the move was the result of an investigation into the activities of a clique surrounding Shelepin. Semichastnyy and others, the Soviet had implied, were engaged in factional activity, and the KGB's efficiency "sank greatly" under Semichastnyy because "responsibility to the clique took precedence over other responsibilities."

The choice of Party Secretary Andropov, who had worked a full decade in the Central Committee's Bloc Department, to take over the KGB was a compromise. He had worked closely with Brezhnev in the Secretariat and especially since late 1966 had given his boss strong support in the renewed drive for an international communist conference. However, he had also worked many years with Suslov and may have owed his earlier entrance into the Secretariat in 1962 to him.* Andropov also had been personally close to Shelepin in the past. This past tie may have softened the blow for Shelepin but could not compensate fully for the loss of his own protege, Semichastnyy. The latter became first deputy premier in the Ukraine, not the worst possible fate, since it might permit

*Little is known of Andropov's relationship with Suslov, however, and it is possible that Khrushchev deliberately promoted Andropov in 1962 as a counterweight to Suslov.

retention of his Central Committee membership. A third first deputy premier thus was created in the Ukraine under Shcherbitskiy; at least two of them, Semichastnyy and Nikolay Sobol', have independent political support and the potential for causing trouble for Shcherbitskiy (and thus for his presumed patron, Brezhnev).

The June 1967 Central Committee plenum approved Andropov's release ex post facto from his secretarial position and promoted him to the Politburo as a candidate member. However, it named no successor to take up his duties in supervising relations with the ruling Communist parties. This inaction at first appeared to reflect a normal delay in filling the sudden vacancy rather than serious disagreement on a replacement. Two junior functionaries, however, finally succeeded him in the Central Committee posts after almost one year; this procrastination and the division of his responsibilities suggested political compromise.

The Semichastnyy affair apparently did not sit well with an important echelon of the party--the young supporters of Shelepin. A leading representative of this group, Moscow party chief Yegorychev, attacked Brezhnev's leadership at the June plenum, which had been called to put a stamp of approval on the regime's military and diplomatic effort during the Arab-Israeli conflict. The events and issues surrounding the plenum are relevant to Brezhnev's overall position and are treated elsewhere. The important point regarding power relations among the senior secretaries is that the disciplinary action taken against Brezhnev's critic, Yegorychev, began a chain of events ending in Shelepin's ouster from the Secretariat. Brezhnev began his power play with typical indirection, transferring Yegorychev to a ministerial post and engineering the "election" of Politburo candidate member Grishin as Moscow party boss in late June, a few days after the Central Committee plenum had ended. In July, Shelepin was installed in Grishin's place as chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, virtually the lowest post carrying Politburo membership. (In fact, Grishin was only a Politburo candidate, and Shelepin could conceivably be downgraded at the next party congress if he

stays in the post.) Shelepin's official dismissal from the Secretariat at the September 1967 Central Committee plenum was a foregone conclusion.

Kirilenko's Emergence as "Second" Secretary

After sidetracking Shelepin, Brezhnev had only two senior secretaries to contend with--Suslov and Kirilenko. Signs that Kirilenko supervised the Department of Party-Organizational Work suggested that, despite the fact that Suslov supervised Shelepin's installation as trade union chief,* Kirilenko may have become Brezhnev's "second in command" by that time. In fact, he may have had party-organizational responsibilities since just after the 23d Party Congress. At that time, his long-time subordinate from the Central Committee apparatus (responsible for appointments to RSFSR industrial posts), Voronovskiy, became deputy and then first deputy to Kapitonov.

The official who finally, in April 1968, picked up Andropov's secretariat portfolio for supervising the Bloc Department was Konstantin Katushev, a young auto designer turned party administrator from Gor'kiy. Katushev rose rapidly in the Gor'kiy party organization apparently due to Kirilenko's influence in the RSFSR Bureau. He probably also owed something of his career to the promoted M.T. Yefremov, whom he replaced as Gor'kiy party chief in late 1965. Brezhnev has registered approval of Katushev in several ways, notably in his unusual appearance at the provincial party plenum which ratified the Yefremov-Katushev shift. Despite Katushev's youthfulness, there is nothing in his background to suggest past political

*On that occasion, Suslov revealed how low Shelepin had fallen in the consensus of his Politburo colleagues, expressing their hope that he would prove to be a "worthy" leader of the trade unions.

association with Shelepin; much less did he have discernable ties with Suslov or Andropov, since he had virtually no experience in foreign affairs prior to becoming a member of the Brezhnev team. His assignment to this area bore all the signs of an attempt by Brezhnev and Kirilenko to place a trusted party administrator in a position to ensure the implementation of the General Secretary's daily decisions in Bloc affairs.*

Brezhnev's apparent success in easing Podgornyy and Shelepin from the Secretariat and placing Kirilenko in charge of cadres was reflected in the promotion of five Central Committee candidates with a military or RSFSR background to full membership at the April 1968 plenum. They replaced deceased leaders whose background, incidentally, suggested ties mainly with Shelepin, Podgornyy, and Mazurov. There have been few changes in leading positions with Central Committee status since Kirilenko has taken charge, but in most cases they have reinforced this trend.

*Andropov's other position as chief of the Bloc Department went to Konstantin Rusakov, one of Andropov's departmental deputies He first appeared in public as chief almost two weeks before the April plenum that elected Katushev a secretary. This would suggest that Rusakov was in line for both posts but lost out to Katushev in a last minute move at the plenum.

THE COMPETITION WITH PREMIER KOSYGIN

One of Brezhnev's main concerns, secondary to establishing organizational supremacy in the Secretariat, has been to achdeve and maintain his preeminence over Kosygin. The October 1964 Central Committee plenum decreed it "inexpedient" that the top party and government posts be held by one person in the future, and this separation of party and government functions has figured prominently in proofs of the regime's "collegiality."* The dual arrangement, granting ostensibly equal authority to the General Secretary and the government premier, was never very workable, however, and soon gave way to the traditional hierarchy with the party chief in the topmost place.

Staking a Claim to "Number One"

The first signs that Brezhnev might have serious thoughts about establishing preeminence over his government counterpart appeared in March 1965. In contrast to the full play the Soviet press gave to Brezhnev's plenum report on agricultural questions, Kosygin's speech to planning officials six days earlier was reported only after a delay of several weeks, receiving limited distribution in the specialized publications Planovoye Khozyaystvo and Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. Such treatment, needless to

*Soviet propaganda never mentions the other, more significant aspect of high-level arrangements--the interlocking of the two ruling bureaucracies through the mechanism of the Politburo, where Brezhnev is de facto chairman. Moreover, the precariousness of the duumvirate, which derives from a reluctance to define the position of the General Secretary, is suggested in the word "inexpedient," which in Soviet usage connotes a temporary or tactical measure rather than an immutable or imperative law.

say, did not support the image of collectivity which the regime had been attempting to foster. Another cut at Kosygin's "equal" status occurred in protocol arrangements when the two leaders went to Poland in early April to renew a friendship pact. Despite reports from Warsaw as early as 18 March that Kosygin was accompanying Brezhnev to the signing ceremony, the first TASS announcement on 27 March did not mention Kosygin; it did reveal, however, that Brezhnev would head the delegation. This prominence contrasted with earlier protocol, since the two leaders had gone to Poland in October 1964 and January 1965 as members of a team, with neither singled out as a delegation head.

The September 1965 Central Committee plenum, which met to discuss a reform of the system of planning and industrial management, should have been Kosygin's show. Instead, it was a "balanced" affair. It heard Kosygin describe his compromise version of economic reform in the main report and Brezhnev present the party's tasks in a separate speech. In the abridged official version of his speech, Brezhnev proposed several institutional checks on the government within the framework of generally intensified party control. He delivered a second speech on scheduling the 23d Party Congress for six months later. The plenum decree confirmed Brezhnev as the main rapporteur to the congress for the Central Committee, while Kosygin was named to deliver a report on the 1966-1970 economic plan.

Despite a number of ups and downs, relations between Brezhnev and Kosygin remained on a fairly even keel for about a year after the September 1965 plenum, during which time the press gave each roughly equal treatment. However, this changed in early November 1966 to the detriment of Kosygin. Especially noticeable was the prominent coverage given to a speech Brezhnev made at an award ceremony in Georgia on 1 November; by contrast, a few column inches were devoted to Kosygin's activities the same day in Donetsk, where he addressed a party-economic aktiv. Other speeches by Kosygin at that time--at a 2 November conference in Krivoy Rog and a 26 November all-union seminar of trade union leaders in Moscow, for example--have never

been published. Kosygin continued to stay in the background in December, failing even to speak at the Supreme Soviet session which approved the 1967 plan and budget. Brezhnev, on the other hand, received the country's highest military order on his 60th birthday at a special ceremony at the end of the session (which according to one report was delayed to provide a fitting occasion for the award). Earlier in the month, Kirilenko had broken a taboo of collectivity by praising Brezhnev's personal qualities as a wartime political leader.* Whatever the reasons for Kosygin's eclipse in late 1966, Brezhnev took advantage of his own ascendancy in their relationship to exert more vigorous leadership of the collective.

Keeping a Rein on Kosygin

Since 1967, Brezhnev has combined a watchful attitude toward Kosygin with a willingness to accommodate him on some policy issues. While he has remained the dominant of the two, Brezhnev has been careful to keep a rather taut rein on Kosygin in order to prevent a runaway in his prestige and authority. It was probably Brezhnev, for example, who in February 1967 was responsible for the contretemps in Pravda's handling of a statement Kosygin had made while in London on Moscow's willingness to consider negotiations on limiting strategic arms, including defensive weapons. The journalist whose article reiterated the sensitive statement (not previously aired in the domestic media) reportedly received a reprimand, and Pravda took the unusual step of denying the validity of the article. Such an action could only have reflected the interference of the Secretariat, and presumably of the General Secretary himself.

*This violation of the unwritten rule against individual glorification, at least in Brezhnev's case, has not been repeated in any significant way since then.

Despite numerous indications and reports of Brezhnev's attempts to restrain Kosygin, the two leaders can find common cause much of the time. Brezhnev probably has recognized the value of working with Kosygin as much as possible, taking advantage of the premier's prestige and intellectual abilities. In general, Brezhnev has seemed to want to build on his own authority without appearing to pose a threat to Kosygin's position--which would be a threat also to the other leaders of the oligarchy.

THE DRIVE FOR MILITARY AND POLICE SUPPORT

An important factor in Brezhnev's assumption of power and a necessary condition of his continued rule has been the support of two main instruments of power in the Soviet Union--the security police (KGB) and militia (MVD, formerly MOOP), and the military (Ministry of Defense). Through their benign influence, Brezhnev achieved Khrushchev's ouster with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of danger to the plotters. For a while after the coup, however, his hold over them was tenuous due to the strong influence Shelepin exerted.

Uneven Relations With a Divided Military

Brezhnev courted the military from the very beginning, redressing the abuses which the armed forces had suffered at Khrushchev's hands. He consistently advocated a high priority for defense in budgetary policy. Moreover, he stopped dictating doctrine to the military and encouraged military professionalism. As a result, Khrushchev's one-sided emphasis on strategic rocket forces gave way to a more balanced policy, with greater attention than before to conventional forces and a flexible response strategy. Such a policy probably had the support of a majority of the military and civilian leadership.

Relations between Brezhnev and the military took a turn for the worse, however, after the death of Defense Minister Malinovskiy in late March 1967. Malinovskiy's first deputy, Marshal Grechko, was associated with the Ukrainian "clique" which Khrushchev had brought into the Politburo--primarily Podgornyy, Polyanskiy, and Kirilenko--and was therefore on an inside track for the vacancy. Nevertheless, [redacted] indicated that at least some Politburo members backed the Secretariat's armaments administrator Dmitriy Ustinov for the post, presumably in order to bring a cost-conscious approach to questions of force structure. It is conceivable that Kosygin, who in February had revealed an interest in opening negotiations

with the U.S. on strategic arms limitations, persuaded Brezhnev to nominate Ustinov. In fact, a majority of the Politburo could have seen an advantage in appointing a civilian who could find "hidden reserves" in the military budget and thus free capital for other sectors of the economy. [redacted] reported that Brezhnev had proposed Ustinov on behalf of the entire Politburo, but the military high command ("the Soviet marshals") had insisted on a professional military man, and the Politburo ultimately had given in and appointed Grechko. [redacted] reported that Grechko's relations with Brezhnev were not good; the attempt to install Ustinov may have been permanently damaging in this regard.

Brezhnev appeared to be under strong pressure from the military at the June 1967 plenum, where Moscow party boss Yegorychev attacked Brezhnev's diplomatic approach to the Middle East crisis. Apparently, the actions Brezhnev undertook in April and May against the interest of the military (the attempt to install a civilian Minister of Defense) and the younger party militants (the removal of Semichastnyy as KGB chairman) caused the two groups to join forces in challenging the ruling group or a majority within it on the issue of slackness in its defense posture. Although Brezhnev's report at the June plenum was not published in the press, a secret Soviet document revealed that it contained a defense of the regime's diplomatic effort to settle the crisis by peaceful means. Thus, Brezhnev was quoted as saying that the regime avoided loud threats and sabre-rattling because "the aggressors and their allies well understood that the Soviet Union consistently comes out for a stable peace in the Near East and...if necessary will resolutely come to the defense of the victims of aggression." The quotation, which appeared several months after the fact, probably was selected to indicate the nature of Yegorychev's criticism and Brezhnev's answer.

All reports on the subject were in agreement that Yegorychev had demanded a tougher Soviet military posture. According to [redacted] Soviet officials who dealt with Middle East problems cited a CPSU report in asserting that Yegorychev had complained at the plenum of military unpreparedness and had claimed that the regime failed to react decisively because the Soviet Army was ill prepared. This line of argument would have appealed to at least some of the high command, since it suggested the inadequacy of measures taken by the civilian-dominated Defense Council. It may also have reflected some stock-taking occasioned by the efficiently planned and executed Israeli military operations.

An elaborate but garbled version of the Yegorychev incident that made the rounds in Moscow tended to confirm the essential points of the alleged CPSU report. According to this account, Yegorychev's speech contained statistics backing up his charge that Moscow was inadequately defended against a missile attack. Brezhnev reportedly interrupted Yegorychev to ask when he had last attended a session of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, to which Yegorychev replied "never." Brezhnev then requested an intermission and convened the Politburo; Shelepin is said to have defended Yegorychev there. Back at the general party meeting, Brezhnev accused Yegorychev of revealing state secrets.

Brezhnev's reaction to the criticism was to deny the charge while undertaking to correct the criticized situation. Several measures were taken in addition to Yegorychev's demotion on 27 June, including military exercises and changes in alert procedures. The Soviet military press reported that Grishin, who was identified as a member of the Military Council of the Moscow PVO (Air Defense) Military District, had spoken at a meeting of the PVO council on 21 November 1967, commending the fine work of the district's "rocket gunners, airmen, and personnel of signals units" but warning against complacency. It would appear, therefore, that Brezhnev decided to preempt the position which the young militants and, presumably, the missile-force advocates in the military had adopted.

An additional factor which may have raised the military's back and, for a time, complicated Brezhnev's position was the party's (that is, the Politburo majority's) attempt to relax the strong defense-oriented posture of the Soviet Union through cancellation of the traditional parade of military might on May Day. The decision to change this posture, although implemented only in May 1969, reportedly had been under discussion for several years, and may have been the subject of intensified debate in the spring of 1967, when the regime was hinting at its interest in arms limitations talks and in a civilian Minister of Defense. Final resolution of the debate suggests that there has been some improvement in army-party relations after the two-year period of strain, with perhaps a strengthening of Brezhnev's position.

Brezhnev still does not have the support of the entire military, however. The high command is divided according to the self-interest of the various arms components, with its backing of Brezhnev similarly split. Grechko, a long-time proponent of conventional warfare and weapons, represents those elements of the high command which the post-Khrushchev regime (that is, Brezhnev) has favored. On the other hand, two Soviet [redacted] whose access to factual information is unknown, reportedly told Czechoslovak counterparts in February 1969 that the "missile generals"--who tended to side with Brezhnev's political opposition in the belief that any change in the top leadership could only result in an improvement in their own position--were coming to the fore again.*

*The same report asserted that the high command (apparently united) has been pushing for greater independence from party leadership and has proposed the formation of a "Council of Marshals" which would have the power to make military decisions in an emergency without prior consent from the Politburo. All Politburo members were said to oppose such a council, which presumably would supplant Brezhnev's Defense Council.

Dominating the Security Forces

In contrast to his fluctuating fortunes in dealing with the military, Brezhnev has succeeded in establishing a relatively firm grip on the KGB and MVD. Just as Brezhnev's tenuous control over the military has reflected the continued strength of his opponents within the Politburo, his steady consolidation of influence with the security establishment has reflected the gradual reduction in Shelepin's real power since 1965. Another reason for Brezhnev's success in making organizational inroads in the KGB and MVD probably has been his good footing in the Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs, which supervises their activities. In addition, Brezhnev apparently has avoided taking any actions that would antagonize the professional corps of these organizations. On the contrary, under Brezhnev's aegis they have enjoyed greater prestige and material support. In any case, the key to the use of these organizations as instruments of power lies in the political administrators who supervise their work, and in this respect Brezhnev has ensured that the men in charge are as trustworthy as can be expected in the Soviet scheme of things.

The frontal attack on Shelepin's entrenched positions in the security forces and militia followed several minor skirmishes and rear guard actions. Prior to removing Tikunov from the top MVD post in late 1966 and Semichastnyy from the KGB in May 1967, Brezhnev had taken important steps to strengthen his hold on the party and government apparatus which supervised their work. However, he was forced at first to share influence in this apparatus with Shelepin, since the two of them together had controlled the security forces prior to Khrushchev's ouster. When N.R. Mironov, chief of the Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs, died in an air crash a few days after the ouster, Brezhnev and Shelepin both lost the services of a long-time associate. Mironov had risen from within the KGB after (or about simultaneously with) Shelepin's appointment as its chief, to the Central Committee department position, where he became Shelepin's nominal supervisor. His rise might have been due to the

influence of Brezhnev, with whom he had worked in the 1930s. Mironov continued in his Central Committee post when Shelepin became a party secretary in charge of the department; he is presumed to have played an important role in supporting Brezhnev, and Shelepin, during preparations of the coup against Khrushchev. As a measure of the standoff in this area after Khrushchev's removal, no successor to the deceased Mironov appeared during the period when Shelepin probably supervised it--that is, prior to the 23d Party Congress--or for two years afterward when Brezhnev apparently had direct responsibility for it.

Brezhnev nevertheless began to undercut Shelepin's influence in the "administrative" organs as early as September 1965. He probably was influential in bringing about Kosygin's choice of Polyanskiy over Shelepin to fill the vacancy of first deputy premier which had resulted from Ustinov's transfer to the Secretariat in March. Polyanskiy, who had concentrated almost exclusively on agricultural matters, may have assumed the additional responsibility for overseeing the administration of security affairs on the government side. This was suggested by the circumstances surrounding the subsequent promotion of Polyanskiy's client, M.T. Yefremov, to deputy premier and the transfer of Shelepin from his deputy premier post in the government to full time work in the Secretariat.

Brezhnev worked with Kirilenko in the Secretariat and with Polyanskiy in the government to strengthen his hold on the security forces after the 23d Party Congress in 1966. By that time, Shelepin already had lost his secretarial responsibility for security affairs and apparently was counting on Kosygin and Demichev to support Tikunov's candidacy for the head post in the reorganized militia. The appointment of Brezhnev's client, Nikolay Shchelokov, to the post in September 1966 revealed that Shelepin's forces had dwindled to a decided minority.

The assignment of Andropov as KGB chief in May 1967, was, of course, an essential move to strengthen Brezhnev's position. Prior to late 1966, when Brezhnev began the renewed drive to hold the international communist conference,

Andropov had appeared close to Shelepin. Whatever his political ties (including some to Suslov), Andropov apparently had supported the General Secretary from the start. Moreover, Shelepin's gradual political decline through Brezhnev's maneuverings presumably did little to enhance the Andropov-Shelepin relationship. At the time of Andropov's appointment to the KGB, [redacted] reported the opinion of Rumanian Party Secretary Da] (whose primary responsibility was for relations with foreign Communist parties) that Andropov was loyal to and trusted by Brezhnev. A [redacted] Soviet [redacted], when queried about relations between Andropov and Shelepin shortly after Semichastnyy's removal, confirmed that the two men once had been close but no longer were. In any case, Brezhnev's substitution of Andropov for Semichastnyy appeared calculated to guarantee a heightened rivalry between the former associates.

Andropov probably had Brezhnev's full backing for the organizational changes he introduced in the KGB soon after taking over. The main emphasis of the reorganization was an expansion of the counterintelligence effort. The changes began at the very top, with the addition of S.K. Tsvigun, an experienced CI professional with tenuous career ties to Brezhnev, as a second first deputy to Andropov. The other first deputy chairman, N.S. Zakharov, remains active despite the fact that he served as chief of the 9th (Guards) Directorate when Shelepin headed the KGB, and moved up to KGB deputy chairman under Semichastnyy.

Brezhnev's influence in the KGB personnel changes were especially clear in the case of G.K. Tsinev, who by at least March 1968 had taken on major responsibilities, almost certainly as chief, in the Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence and counterespionage).* Brezhnev's

*Tsinev probably had been directorate chief for some time. His press article in December 1967 on broad aspects of counterintelligence, together with his identification as a colonel general, suggested that he had such responsibilities then. It is even possible that he assumed the vacancy of KGB deputy chairman that was created when S.G. Bannikov became a deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court in October.

association with Tsinev dates back as early as the 1950s, when Tsinev served in military counterintelligence in Berlin, as a subordinate to N.R. Mironov, the then chief of the KGB 3d (Military Counterintelligence) Directorate who later served Brezhnev well in the coup against Khrushchev. According to [redacted] Brezhnev, who in February 1956 was leaving Kazakhstan to become a member of Khrushchev's Secretariat at the 20th Party Congress, planned to get together in Moscow with former associates from the Ukraine, including specifically Tsinev and Mironov. In March 1956, Tsinev learned that Brezhnev was "making every effort" to secure Tsinev's transfer back to Moscow. Other Brezhnev associates with whom Tsinev had personal contacts at the time included N.A. Shchelokov (now MVD chief), S.G. Lapin (now TASS chief), and a Tikhonov (presumed to be Nikolay Tikhonov, now USSR deputy premier). The careers of these officials are a good example of the importance of personal ties and political patronage in the Soviet system and of the kind of support Brezhnev has in high party and government places.*

Control over the security forces through the Central Committee apparatus apparently remains in Brezhnev's hands, despite conflicting indications since Andropov became KGB chief that Kirilenko, Suslov, or Ustinov might have some supervisory responsibilities. The occasional public appearances of Kirilenko and Suslov in this area would seem

*The recent identification of Viktor Chebrikov as KGB deputy chairman indicates the continuing influence which the Ukrainian "clique" around Brezhnev has in the security organizations. Chebrikov had been second secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk party organization until mid-1967, when the Ukrainian press announced his departure for a new post "outside the Ukraine." The absence of publicity for him until his identification as deputy chairman of the KGB in October 1969 suggests that he has been serving in a lesser capacity within that organization in the interim.

to be examples of their deputizing for Brezhnev. The frequent involvement of Ustinov in security affairs probably is due to the nature of his work, which is in the administration of the highly-sensitive defense and space industry. It is unlikely that as a candidate member of the Politburo he would oversee an area of activity, one part of which is headed by his peer on that body (that is, KGB Chairman Andropov). However, his known activities indicate he may have a special responsibility for supervising various aspects--perhaps technical--of military affairs.

Brezhnev's influence in the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee apparently remains as strong as when his Ukrainian associate, N.R. Mironov, ran it. The promotion of Mironov's long-time deputy, Nikolay Savinkin, to head the department in early 1968 apparently indicated he was being compensated for services rendered to Brezhnev in 1966-67. Furthermore, Savinkin's replacement as first deputy head of the department, Nikolay Petrovich Mal'shakov, could be an associate of Brezhnev; however, the evidence to this effect is tenuous, in part due to an almost complete lack of information of Mal'shakov.*

*Mal'shakov had been chairman of the Penza Oblast Executive Committee from late 1965 until his appointment as Savinkin's first deputy in mid-1968. Several high officials with known ties to Brezhnev--Secretary Kulakov and Central Committee department chiefs K.U. Chernenko and S.P. Trapeznikov--had served several years in Penza, although their careers did not overlap with Mal'shakov's. Also, a Nikolay Petrovich Mal'shakov was identified in a December 1945 list of military awards as a senior technical lieutenant of the naval forces; if this is the same Mal'shakov, then conceivably he had attained a leading position in that service by 1953, when Brezhnev became chief of the Political Directorate of the Ministry of the Navy.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~