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

SOVIET POLICY AND THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS

The course of events before, during, and after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 provides a case study of the dilemmas and dangers which arise when the Soviet Union seeks to implement its basic Middle East strategy of support for the Arab nationalist movements. Moscow's policy record in the Middle East is mixed, and events unforeseen by the Soviet leaders have forced significant and awkward shifts in Soviet policy emphasis.

In the period before the six-day war in 1967, Soviet policy shifted from support of moderate Arab policy to espousal of the radical Arab line, thereby encouraging a sequence of events that Moscow could not control. After the defeat of the Arabs, Soviet policy shifted back again to support of moderate Arab policies. But current trends in Soviet policy are again toward support of Arab radicalism, despite the seeming likelihood of a new war in the Middle East and the possibility of another Arab defeat. These policy shifts reveal how resistant Moscow is to any fundamental departure from its instinctive tendency to support militant Arab nationalism in hopes of Soviet political gains and/or Western political losses in the Middle East.

This research study has been reviewed in the appropiate Soviet and Middle Eastern branches of the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Office of National Estimates. Although not in agreement with every statement or judgment, they are in general accord with the major thrust and conclusions of the study.

The research analyst in charge was Mrs. Carolyn Ekedahl, with assistance from Mr. Carl Linden.

John Kerry King
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

CONTENTS

Abstract of Summary and Conclusions

The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 was both a humiliating defeat for the Arabs and a major setback for Soviet prestige. The Soviets had committed substantial quantities of aid and political support to the Arabs, and the activist policy which they adopted in mid-1966 contributed significantly to pre-war tensions. In the hope of ensuring the support and survival of a new Syrian regime, the Soviets at that time began to voice a more militant, anti-Israel line and, more importantly, to encourage unity between their ally Nasir and the Syrians. While both Nasir and the Soviets might have hoped thereby to gain increased control over the fanatical Syrians, the net result of the policy was to push Nasir toward greater militancy against Israel. The Soviets failed to foresee the results of this policy. When they lost control of the situation, they were reluctant to spend their influence trying to restrain Nasir.

The embarrassing results of their pre-war policy led the Soviets to make some changes in their Middle East approach. Before the war they gave vocal support to the more extreme anti-Israel positions of the more militant Arab regimes. Afterward, they retreated to a more moderate, though still anti-Israel, line. Their willingness to take considerable risks in a situation they could not control, in order to achieve short-term goals, gave way in the war's aftermath to a somewhat more cautious, gradual approach. The dangers inherent in becoming overly committed to a radical leftist regime had become obvious. Before the war they undertook only perfunctory efforts to prevent Syrian provocations; now they began to urge restraint in earnest. In place of the demagogic ambivalence which had marked their pre-war statements, with pledges of support left purposely vague and undefined, the Soviets now clarified the limits of their support for the Arabs. And, as a result of the Arab military debacle, the USSR now asked that in exchange for aid, Soviet military instructors and advisers be given authority to train and organize at all levels of the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces.

While the Soviets had shifted their tactics, they remained wedded to the strategy which had helped produce the Arab fiasco in the six-day war. They continue to believe that the maintenance of Arab-Israeli tension at a high pitch augments Soviet influence in the area. However, they evidently hope to succeed where they failed in June 1967, i.e., to make their control over the Arabs efficacious and thus avoid a repetition of the June disaster. The result has been to give Soviet Middle East policy a schizophrenic appearance.

For example, the Soviets have made clear to the Arabs that they do not intend to become involved militarily in a future conflict. On the other hand, Moscow has increased substantially the size of its Mediterranean fleet and has striven to restore Arab confidence in the firmness of its support through the prolonged visits of Soviet naval vessels to Syrian and Egyptian ports. The presence of large numbers of Soviet advisers and military personnel in the area, although possibly designed to ensure that the situation does not again get out of hand, has increased the dangers of the Soviet involvement in the event of war. Sufficient materiel to rebuild the Arab armed forces (and possibly confidence) continues to move into the area. Despite the increasing threat to peace in the Middle East that the growth of the Arab terrorist and guerrilla organizations poses, the Soviet Union has avoided any moves which might endanger its standing with these groups. It has funneled military aid to several guerrilla organizations through the UAR and Iraq, using its East European allies as arms agents. While the Soviets may hope thereby to gain some control over the guerrilla leadership, they seem to have forgotten the failure of a similar policy toward the Syrian militants prior to the June war.

Whatever may be the case, there has been a shift in emphasis in the last year away from the notable sobriety and caution shown by the Soviets after the June war, and toward renewed and overt support of Arab militancy. Recently the latter trend was highlighted by Kosygin's remarks asserting a line of active aid to the Arab anti-Israeli struggle (10 December) and by increasing reportage in Soviet propaganda of the activities and exploits of the guerrilla movement.

The post-war Soviet receptivity to a negotiated political settlement in the Middle East at the same time has not completely evaporated. However, Moscow's first consideration appears—just as it was before the June war—once more to be consolidation of its position as champion of the Arab "national liberation" and "anti-imperialist" movement. It thus has patronized the growing guerrilla movement. The Soviets see, it seems, in such a policy prospects for long-range gains for Soviet influence in the region which outweigh the chronic danger of events getting out of control again as they did in June 1967. Hence the Soviets have acceded to the Arab preconditions for a Middle East settlement, though they would not be unreceptive to U.S. proposals which they thought the Arabs could be persuaded to accept. While the Soviets seek to avoid a confrontation in the area, they may judge that the renewed support of Nasir and guerrilla militancy involves little chance of such a confrontation. Moreover, the Soviets once again seem confident that

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they can control Nasir and avoid another full-scale Arab-Israeli war. The dangers of the policy may be greater than the Soviet leadership assumes, given Nasir's tendency, amply illustrated in May 1967, to act in an unpredictable, erratic, often bellicose, and sometimes politically suicidal manner.

Figure 1



SOVIET POLICY AND THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

BEFORE THE WAR

SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY UP TO THE CRISIS

Soviet Commitment to Political Support of Syria: Spring 1966

In the mid-1950s the Soviets began to cultivate the newly emerging nationalist Arab regimes, taking advantage of growing anti-Western sentiment common among them. Nasir, the most impressive of the new breed of Arab leader and head of the strongest Arab state, was the Soviets' primary target. The USSR invested heavily in the UAR, and by 1965 Cairo was almost completely dependent on Moscow for military aid. Arab fears that Soviet aid to the Middle East might be curtailed as a result of Khrushchev's ouster were not borne out.

After the 1954 overthrow of Colonel Shishakli in Syria, the Soviets had an on-again, off-again relationship with that nation. The February 1966 coup by the extremist wing of the ultra-nationalist Baath Party resulted in a rapid rapprochement in Soviet-Syrian relations, and the inclusion of a Communist in the new Syrian cabinet was particularly gratifying to the Soviets. Thereafter, the USSR increased greatly its military and economic aid to Syria, and concern for the survival of the radical Baathists became a major consideration in Soviet Middle East policy.

In an effort to capitalize on the situation in Syria, the Soviets began publicly to endorse an increasingly militant anti-Israel line, and to issue warnings against any interference in the internal affairs of her new client. Apparently concerned that Syria's neighbor Jordan might take some action against the new Syrian regime, the Soviets privately warned the Jordanians not to do so. On 28 May the Soviet Ambassador to Jordan, Slyusarenke, reportedly delivered such a message to King Husayn, stating that Soviet intelligence reports indicated such an intervention was in the wind. Publicly, on 7 May 1966, an *Izvestiya* article attacked Israel for "armed provocations" against Syria aimed at overthrowing the new regime and warned Israel not to intervene.

A 27 May TASS item implied increased Soviet political support for the Syrian regime. According to this statement, the Soviet Union would not

"remain indifferent to attempts at violating peace in the region in immediate proximity to the frontiers of the USSR." This statement specifically attacked "extremist" forces in Israel and charged that "reactionary" quarters in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, backed by the United States and United Kingdom, were plotting against Syria. The effect of the Soviet statement—despite the diplomatic impression of the language—was to encourage a still more activist Syrian policy against Israel. During this period the Syrians were backing guerrilla raids into Israel from Jordanian territory. While the number of these raids was not comparable to the postwar level of guerrilla attacks, it marked a significant increase over what had gone before.

The Soviets Urge Syrian-Egyptian Unity: Late 1966–Early 1967

In addition to issuing warnings against intervention, the Soviets sought to secure the new Syrian regime by urging reconciliation between the Syrians and the Egyptians; the two nations had been estranged since the 1961 secession of Syria from its union with Egypt. Kosygin, in a speech to the UAR's National Assembly in mid-May 1966, appealed for unity among the "progressive" Arab states. The Soviets may have hoped that in exchange for protection through an alliance with the UAR, the Syrians would adopt a less provocative stance. Yet, the eventual result seems to have been to encourage Nasir to adopt a more militant line.

During the fall of 1966 and continuing into 1967, Arab terrorist raids into Israel from Syria and Jordan intensified. Israel reciprocated with reprisal raids. Syrian Prime Minister Zuayyin, in October, announced that Syria would never take measures to curb the fedayeen. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met several times between 14 October and 4 November at the request of Israel, but the USSR veto prevented passage of a resolution condemning the terrorist raids.

Soviet behavior in the fall of 1966 set the pattern for the subsequent performance in the spring of 1967. On 12 October Israel received a note from the Soviet Union charging that a concentration of Israeli troops had formed along the Syrian border and that the Israelis were preparing for an air attack which would be followed by the penetration of Israeli troops deep into Syria. Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko repeated the charge two days later at the UN. A UN investigation failed to support the Soviet charges. Meanwhile, on 14 and 15 October, Moscow sought to disabuse the Arabs of any thought of responding in an adventurist manner. Thus, Moscow simultaneously urged the Syrian and Egyptian governments to stay calm and avoid giving Israel a pretext for aggression.

On 8 November 1966, some three weeks after the Soviets pressed their allegation of an imminent Israeli invasion of Syria, the UAR signed a mutual defense pact with Syria. The timing suggests that the Soviet-sponsored report of a threatened Israeli attack may have encouraged the two Arab regimes to sign the pact. Certainly the Soviet report must have given the Syrian government added incentive to seek the protection of an alliance with Nasir, and Nasir may have hoped to acquire some control over the Syrians in exchange. The Soviet objective of Egyptian-Syrian rapprochement had been well served by the false report of Israeli mobilization. A similar false report, disseminated in May 1967, backfired and helped to precipitate the chain of events that led to war.

The USSR apparently hoped that the UAR-Syrian alliance would provide greater security for the radical regime in Syria and dampen the Syrian regime's tendency to undertake adventures on its own. However, Nasir did not succeed in moderating the provocative Syrian policy toward Israel. On the contrary, Nasir, tied to the far more militant Syrians, became more vulnerable in the face of demagogic Syrian appeals to anti-Israel passions among the Arab nations.*

In early 1967 the tension along the Israeli-Syrian border was high as artillery exchanges increased. Syria (clearly not strong enough to handle Israel alone) put considerable pressure on Nasir to demonstrate his leadership of the Arab world and to prove the worth of the November defense pact. During this period the Soviets warned the Syrians on at least two occasions that they did not want the situation to get out of hand. But the Soviet desire to capitalize on the prevailing tension in order to increase their influence at the expense of the United States prevented them from taking any strong position with the Syrians and led to somewhat contradictory actions. For example, on 3 February, a few weeks after the Soviets privately cautioned the Syrians against precipitating a war, *Izvestiya* published an article charging Israel with concentrating large forces on the Syrian border, calling up reservists, and putting the military forces on alert.

On 7 April 1967, following a border exchange of fire, Israel launched the deepest air strikes into Syria up to that time. This may have marked a

**Nasir was vulnerable to charges of inaction from both left and right. An Israeli raid on the Jordanian border town of As-Samu on 13 November 1966 caused Jordan's Husayn to start taunting Nasir.*

major change in Israel's retaliatory policy, as its pilots were authorized to penetrate deep into Syria. The Syrians were humiliated and the Soviets, who had supplied Syria with aircraft, were embarrassed by Israel's success. Five days later there was another fierce gun battle across the Israeli-Syrian border. The Arab states criticized the UAR for remaining relatively silent and passive during the period. Moscow Radio, on the other hand, was shrill in charges of U.S. fleet moves and "conspiracies" and warnings of Israeli plans to invade Syria. The 7 April battle revealed to the Soviets and the Syrians the vulnerability of Syria to Israeli attacks, and the Soviets may have concluded that in order to deter Israel, Egypt must make a firmer commitment to Syria.

In mid-April the Soviets sent Israel a warning note, stating that Israel must bear full responsibility for her actions and "hoping" that Israel would not permit herself to be used by those who would make her the puppet of foreign enemy forces. Soviet propaganda continued to link Israel and the United States as plotters against Syria. On 24 April, Brezhnev called for the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean.

PRELUDE TO WAR–May 1967

Rumor Feeds Tension

In a speech on 2 May, Nasir, perhaps responding to Arab criticism and Soviet nudges, attacked "imperialism" and the United States in unusually violent terms. On 12 May Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol, in a sharply worded statement, warned Syria that it faced severe conteraction if it did not halt terrorist incursions into Israel. Shortly thereafter, word spread through the area that Israel was concentrating forces on the Syrian border and was poised to launch an attack on Syria. The report was untrue. In fact Israel did not reinforce its frontiers and mobilize its reserves until *after* the UAR began its military build-up.

The origin of the report is not clear; it apparently did not originate with either the Syrians or Egyptians, both of whom were given the information by the Soviets. It is possible that the Israelis themselves floated the rumor hoping to induce the Soviets to persuade the Syrians to stop their provocative actions. In any event, the Soviets did not appear particularly concerned about establishing the validity of the report. They had made similar unfounded claims in October 1966 and February 1967 and were the main disseminators of this report. In a speech on 22 May Nasir said that

on 13 May we received accurate information that Israel was concentrating on the

Syrian border huge armed forces... The decision made by Israel at this time was to carry out an aggression against Syria as of May 17.

In speeches on 9 June and 23 July, Nasir cited the Soviets as the source of this "accurate information" and claimed that the information had been passed to an Egyptian parliamentary delegation which visited Moscow in May.

On 13 May a message was sent through Egyptian channels to Cairo from Moscow. It stated that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov had told the Egyptians that Israel was preparing a ground and air attack on Syria—to be carried out between 17 and 21 May. It stated that the Soviets had advised the UAR to be prepared, to stay calm, and not to be drawn into fighting with Israel, and that they had advised the Syrians to remain calm and not give Israel the opportunity for military operations. The message also said that the USSR favored informing the Security Council before Israel took military action against Syria. According to the message, Anwar al-Sadat, head of the Egyptian delegation then in Moscow, had been given this information. This intercept confirms Nasir's statement that the Soviets had passed the information to the UAR and adds the fact that the Soviets at the same time urged caution. The Arabs were to take the information but not the advice.

According to [redacted] from 15 through 19 May Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko informed each Arab ambassador accredited to Moscow of an impending Israeli attack on Syria and offered every assistance, including military. Another [redacted] confirmed that such assurances had been given in Moscow by a very high Soviet political officer. It is highly unlikely, however, that such a blanket assurance was ever given. The report of alleged Israeli plans for an attack was subsequently repeated at the UNSC meeting on 29 May by UAR Ambassador al-Quni and was echoed by Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko, who said that the Arabs had precise information of Israeli troop concentrations and an Israeli intention to attack on 17 May.

Soviet motivation for spreading a flimsy and unsubstantiated report as explosive as this one is not clear. Even if they knew the facts of the story to be untrue, the Soviets might in fact have feared that, as a result of Eshkol's speech, an Israeli reprisal attack of some sort against Syria was likely to occur shortly. If so, they may have hoped to push the UAR toward a firm and open commitment to come to Syria's aid, reasoning that such a commitment might deter Israel from further raids. It is also possible that the Soviets hoped to frighten the Syrians into modifying their policies by convincing

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them that they faced an Israeli attack otherwise.* In either case, they were proved wrong. If they did believe the report, they had made an intelligence blunder; if, as seems more likely, they did not believe the story or had fabricated it and were using it to prod either Nasir or the Syrians, they misjudged the effect it would have. The story did not restrain the Syrians, and it provoked a far more aggressive reaction from Nasir than Moscow expected or desired.

Build-up of UAR Forces

Nasir apparently believed the reports given him by the Soviet Union,** and the mobilization of UAR forces deployed against Israel followed. Nasir may have had reasons of his own for proceeding as he did, but the report spread by the Russians gave him justification. According to the Egyptian press, an emergency had been declared in the UAR in order "to put teeth into the mutual defense pact with Syria." In public statements Nasir repeatedly stressed that UAR military preparations were in response to the threat of an Israeli attack on Syria. This apparently was designed to direct Israeli attention to the Egyptian border, and at the same time help bolster Nasir's image as the leader of the Arab world.

On 17 May Nasir requested the withdrawal of UNEF from Sinai and the Gaza Strip; he subsequently demanded that these forces be withdrawn from the UAR entirely. On 18 May UAR forces began to occupy UN observation posts in Sinai. UN forces were not equipped to respond and the following day Secretary General U Thant agreed to complete withdrawal.*** By 22 May, Egyptian soldiers had completely replaced the UN forces.

**This supports the view that Israel itself might have started the rumor.*

***Nasir's willingness to believe the reports at this time may have been influenced by the Israeli air attacks on Syria in April as well as by Eshkol's sharp warning in May.*

****The UN forces had been stationed in the UAR after the 1956 war; units stationed in Sharm ash-Shaykh, a point southwest of the Strait of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, had been a token of assurance of safe passage for Israeli ships through the strait. The control of the Strait of Tiran had been a source of friction between the Arabs and Israelis since 1949; in that year, following the armistice, Egypt installed guns near Sharm ash-Shaykh, overlooking the strait. In the 1956 campaign, Israel captured the post commanding the strait. In the face of U.S. and Soviet pressure it subsequently withdrew its forces.*

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Nasir's demand that the UN forces be withdrawn and U Thant's compliance served several purposes. With the UNEF buffer removed, Egyptian forces could respond more quickly in case of an Israeli attack on Syria. Nasir's demand also undercut Jordanian charges that the UAR had been hiding behind a UN shield. And, getting UN forces out of the UAR, particularly out of the symbolic and strategic post at Sharm ash-Shaykh, bolstered Nasir's prestige and Arab pride.

Soviets Appear Sanguine

While Soviet press support for the UAR build-up conveyed an impression of Soviet approval of developments, there were some indications of Soviet apprehension. Soviet UN Ambassador Fedorenko expressed some concern at the speed of UNEF withdrawal, and on the same day Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin told Ambassador Thompson that he thought the Soviets could "match" the United States in urging restraint on its allies. The Soviets did make some gestures toward restraint, indicating Soviet unwillingness to become directly involved in a Syrian-Israeli war.

On 18 May a Moscow Domestic Service broadcast charged that Israeli troops were being concentrated on the Syrian frontier and that some observers were comparing the situation with that on the eve of the Suez operation. According to the broadcast, the Syrians had had no choice but to put their army on alert in view of the threats from Israel. The broadcast also stated that the provisions of the Syrian-Egyptian mutual aid treaty had been applied, that UAR forces were on stand-by alert, and that Cairo had stated that it would intervene in the event of Israeli aggression against Syria.

On 19 May the Novosti Press Agency went further. The dispatch, distributed in Arab countries but not carried in the Soviet press, stated that the USSR would not stand idly by if Israel attacked Syria.

The net effect of such statements must have been to reassure some Arabs of Soviet support.

Nasir Closes the Gulf of Aqaba

By 22 May 1967, the day the small UNEF force was withdrawn from Sharm ash-Shaykh, Nasir announced that the UAR had closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and to ships of all other countries bringing strategic cargoes to Israel. The next day, Eshkol repeated the Israel position that Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping in the Gulf would be considered an act of aggression. On 26 May Israel warned that it would not wait indefinitely for an end to the Egyptian blockade and the withdrawal of Arab troop concentrations on its borders. By then, the Israeli armed forces were near peak mobilization.

Nasir's actions during the month of May probably were influenced by bad information concerning Arab military strength and the extent of Soviet backing. But the false report of Israel's plans to attack Syria, by triggering Nasir's decision to mobilize, played a major role in Nasir's actions. If he believed that Israel planned an attack on Syria and that the UAR would have to respond, his mobilization and his demand for a withdrawal of UNEF forces might have been intended as deterrents.

However, Nasir's decision to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba raised the pitch of the crisis to new and dangerous levels. His speeches indicated that he believed Israel would respond to the blockade and that the UAR was equipped to handle an Israeli attack. On 26 May he stated

> *....Recently we have felt strong enough that if we were to enter a battle with Israel, with God's help, we could triumph. On this basis we decided to take actual steps.... Taking over Sharm ash-Shaykh...meant that we were ready to enter a general war with Israel.*

Though he indicated that the UAR would not initiate an attack, he declared that if Israel attacked either Syria or the UAR.

> *....The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.*

While Nasir was publicly stating that Israel would have to respond and that the UAR could then handle Israel militarily, it seems likely that Nasir in fact believed that Israel would not attack and that he would make major political gains for only a modest risk.

The USSR and Closure of the Gulf

The Soviets, the evidence suggests, were taken by surprise when Nasir closed the Gulf. Not only was their disapproval indicated by the absence of

explicit expressions of support, but the reaction of the Soviet press was muted and delayed. This was a sign of either a lack of advance notice, or absence of a prepared official position, or both. On 23 May TASS reported Nasir's statement on the closing of the Suez canal and several hours later issued a Soviet government statement repeating much of the previous Soviet propaganda line, but failed to mention the closure of the gulf.*

The first semi-official comment on the closure of the gulf came three days later in a *Pravda* article. The article recalled that Israel had not used the gulf before 1956, thereby intimating she had no right to use it. However, the Soviets were at this point evidently reluctant to support Nasir's act.

The Soviet attitude toward the Middle East situation seemed to be summed up in a rhetorical question posed on 1 June by a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister [redacted] he asked if there was any reason why the USSR should work with the United States in the Middle East. That the Soviets had not yet seen any reason to do so was demonstrated by their position at the United Nations, where efforts to resolve the situation were lukewarm, ineffective, and slow. The USSR had rejected requests for four-power talks. On 24 May Soviet UN Ambassador Fedorenko temporarily barred the way to Security Council discussion of the developing crisis by refusing to participate. On 29 May, when a Security Council meeting was at last held on the crisis, Fedorenko added nothing constructive.

ON THE BRINK

Nature of Soviet Support for the Arabs

Reports on specific Soviet commitments to the Arabs are confusing; it appears that Soviet assurances were always kept vague and thus were open to misinterpretation by the Arabs. The only fairly clear commitment the Soviets made was to support the Arabs if the United States intervened on behalf of Israel—and even here the extent and type of assistance were not

**The Soviet government of 23 May accused Israel of preparing to attack Syria and stated that Western "imperialist circles" were responsible for inciting Israel. The statement concluded by warning that the aggressors would meet not only united Arab strength but also "strong opposition" from the Soviet Union and all peace-loving states.*

clear. According to one report, in mid-May Nasir asked what the Soviet Union would do if the United States came to Israel's aid in the event of war. Kosygin reportedly replied that the Soviets in turn would aid the Arabs.*

Confusion in the Arab world about the extent of Soviet support for the Arab cause is demonstrated by the varying official reports made to the Syrian and Egyptian governments in mid-May. On 15 May the Syrian Ambassador in Moscow reported generalized Soviet assurances of support and said that he felt this was meant to include even military intervention. On the following day the Egyptian Ambassador in Damascus also reported to Cairo that Moscow would support Syria "to the extent of military intervention." Subsequent clarification from the Syrian Ambassador in Moscow contained the information that "Soviet assistance will not, repeat not, reach the point of military intervention." It is not clear from the reporting whether or not this clarification was conveyed to the Egyptians; the Syrians might have preferred to keep it to themselves so that the Egyptians would not back off. In short, as far as we know, the Soviets tried to avoid making a clear-cut statement concerning the nature and extent of their assistance in the event of war.

From 25 to 28 May the Egyptian Minister of War, Shams Badran, was in Moscow where he met with Kosygin, Gromyko, and Grechko.** In his 29 May speech Nasir said that Kosygin had sent a message back with Badran stating that the Soviet Union

> *stands with us in this battle and will not allow any country to intervene, so that the state of affairs prevailing before 1956 may be restored.*

This statement, together with Nasir's claims regarding Egyptian strength vis-a-vis Israel, suggests that Nasir's expectations of Soviet support in the

**According to a Soviet official, in late May the Soviets had told Nasir that they were committed only to "neutralizing" the US—that they would respond to any escalation Washington might undertake but would not go beyond that.*

***UAR Ambassador to Moscow Ghaleb stated after the war that the Soviets had never promised military aid to the Arabs, but that a young and inexperienced Minister of Defense (Badran) who visited Moscow shortly before the war had misunderstood and reported that he was sure Moscow would help the Arabs in the event of war. Badran was one of the first to be dismissed after the war; it is probable that he had overstated the Soviet commitment.*

event of war included only materiel and the necessary Soviet actions to deter U.S. intervention in Israel's behalf. Nasir surely did not anticipate what in fact occurred—a disastrous five-day war. He more likely foresaw a prolonged conflict in which Soviet aid—in the form of military equipment, not actual physical support—might well play an important part.

Whatever his interpretation of the actual Soviet commitment, Nasir apparently felt that it was sufficient. He seems to have believed that Soviet support would only be needed to prevent a recurrence of 1956—when Western forces assisted Israel. He apparently felt that the United States could restrain Israel and also seemed confident that the Arabs could cope with Israel militarily if necessary. Nasir's confidence in Egypt's military capability seems to have been at least partially shared by the Soviets.

However, the most important Soviet error at this point would appear to have been their failure to foresee an Israeli attack.

Soviets Urge Restraint—Too Little Too Late

During the period between the announcement of the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the outbreak of war, Soviet policy apparently was based on the asumption that Israel would not attack if the situation remained static. On the one hand, the Soviets gave encouragement to the Arabs and left open the possibility that they would support the Arabs in the event of war; on the other hand, they sought gently to restrain the Arabs from further provocative actions. There is no indication that they ever attempted to persuade Nasir to lift the blockade. Anxious to avoid war and at the same

time retain the atmosphere of tension from which they felt they could benefit, the Soviets urged upon the Arabs only that degree of restraint they felt necessary to keep the situation from boiling over into war.

The Soviets, in their post-war accounts, have claimed that before the war they urged the Arabs to refrain from actions which could be used by Israeli ruling circles as a pretext to launch hostilities. Nasir has supported this claim, stating that on 26 May the U.S. Government had given the Soviet Ambassador in Washington a message asking that the Soviets urge the UAR to use restraint and not be the first to open fire.

Soviet attempts to restrain the Arabs were limited, however, and suggest that they were concerned not so much about a possible Israeli retaliation for closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, as they were about further Arab actions which in turn might lead to war. Their late May attempts to convince the Arabs that Israel was not going to attack** apparently referred back to the original untrue report of a planned Israeli attack on Syria, rather than to the possibility of a retaliatory attack for closure of the gulf.

Positions Harden

In the last days of May, Nasir began to settle his differences with the more conservative Arab nations, a situation most feared by Israel and, by the beginning of June, the Egyptian and Israeli positions were completely intransigent. On 1 June Israeli Labor Minister Yigal Alon insisted that some protection of Israel's borders from terrorist attacks, the withdrawal of Egyptian troop concentrations along the border, and the lifting of the

blockade were necessary conditions to avoid an "inevitable" military clash. On 2 June UAR Foreign Minister Riyad announced that the Suez Canal would be closed to anyone who tried to break the blockade.

Most available information indicates that the Israeli attack at dawn on 5 June came as a complete surprise to the Soviets. The timing of the attack certainly surprised the Arabs. After the war Nasir blamed his unpreparedness on the fact that the United States had indicated it would try to restrain Israel. And Nasir, as well as the Soviets, apparently was convinced Israel would not attack without U.S. approval.

THE SIX-DAY WAR AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Israel Attacks; the USSR Reacts

Israel's attack on the UAR came in the morning on 5 June 1967. Surprise enabled the Israeli air force to virtually eliminate the Egyptian air force on the ground, and Israeli forces advanced with little trouble into Sinai and the Gaza Strip. By 6 June Israeli forces were well on their way to the Suez; on 7 June they captured Sharm ash-Shaykh; and on 8 June Israel claimed complete control of Sinai. The war with Jordan began later in the day of 5 June. After Jordanian forces seized UN headquarters in Jerusalem, Israel launched air and ground attacks along the armistice line and Israeli forces swept toward the Jordan River. Israel had virtually destroyed the Syrian air force on 5 June, but did not begin her ground attack against Syria until 9 June; by the time of cease-fire with the Syrians, Israeli forces had penetrated about 10 miles into Syria and occupied the Golan Heights.

Soviet press organs, also taken by surprise, continued their pre-war propaganda themes. On 5 June *Izvestiya* and TASS both charged that Johnson and Wilson, at their recent Washington conference,* had worked out an anti-UAR strategy and that they had spurred Israel on. That afternoon a Moscow broadcast in Arabic said that Israel would not have attacked without U.S. instigation, that the Arabs were ready to reply to the imperialists, and that the Arabs were not alone in their just struggle. Some hours later, in a French-language version of the same commentary beamed to the Maghreb states, the following line was added:

> *As the Soviet government stressed recently, the organizers will have to face not only the united strength of the Arab countries, but also the firm response to this aggression by the USSR and all other peace-loving states.*

The commentary did not elaborate, leaving the threat of Soviet intervention vague.

**The Johnson-Wilson meeting had ended on 3 June.*

A Soviet government statement, issued late on 5 June was even more imprecise. It demanded that Israel halt military actions immediately and withdraw behind the truce line, stating that the Soviet government reserved the right to take all necessary steps. It called on the UN to condemn Israel's actions and to try to restore peace in the Middle East.

These statements revealed the Soviet fear of becoming militarily involved. There were several reports that they considered a military response,* but their actions suggest that this was not a serious alternative at this point. Within hours of the outbreak of war, according to a State Department report, Moscow made use of the "hot-line" teletype to Washington, probably for two reasons—to make sure no accidental confrontation with the United States occurred and to try to stop the war, which they quickly realized the Arabs could not win.

Charges of US-UK Involvement

Soviet restraint was also demonstrated in Moscow's reaction to the Arab charge that the United States and Great Britain had actually participated in the air strikes against the UAR. The original source of the report is not clear. According to an Egyptian source, Cairo's charge was based on the belief that more aircraft took part in the attack than Israel possessed; it seems likely that the Arabs misread the origins of the aircraft, which the Israelis had sent in at low altitudes from the Mediterranean to escape radar

detection. Nasir, for one, seems to have believed the report.* On 7 June he sent a message to Jordan, Syria, and Algeria, in which he claimed that the UAR high command had "confirmed beyond any doubt the collusion of the US and England with Israel."

The implications of this charge for the Soviets could have been serious, if they in fact had made a commitment to assist in the event of an actual US intervention. The Soviets never officially accepted the accusation of US participation as valid, although the Soviet press did, in several instances, repeat the charges.**

during Boumediene's visit to Moscow from 12 to 14 June, the Soviets reportedly emphasized that US aircraft had not participated in the Arab-Israeli war and asked him to pass this information to Nasir. Furthermore, no authoritative Soviet source gave public credence to the Arab charge. The Soviets were clearly unwilling to fall for what they may have felt was an Arab effort to drag them into the war.

Soviets Urge Acceptance of Cease Fire

Agitated conversations were reportedly held between the Soviets and Egyptians after the outbreak of war—in Cairo between Nasir and Pozhidayev, and in Moscow between Ghaleb and top Soviet leaders. The Egyptians demanded that the Soviets immediately replace their demolished air force but were told that there was no place to land planes as the airfields too had been destroyed. In response to the Egyptian accusation that the Soviets were

**This charge was consistent with Soviet prewar press charges that US and British naval forces were being built up in the Mediterranean and with prewar Soviet charges that the US and Britain planned to support Israel militarily.*

***A 6 June domestic broadcast repeated the Arab Command statement that it had proof of Western participation. As late as 11 June a Soviet domestic commentator said that while the US was trying to repudiate reports of participation, the fact remained that on the eve of the war, US and British carriers passed through the Suez and stationed themselves in the Red Sea, from where their planes "covered Israel's air space."*

deserting them in their hour of need, the Soviets said that they were committed only to supporting the Arabs against the United States—not against Israel.

The Soviets decided shortly after the Israeli offensive that an immediate cease-fire should be accepted, as the Arab position was not yet catastrophic. They felt that the Egyptians could not respond successfully as they had no planes; however, Nasir did not accept this line of reasoning and launched a counter-offensive which failed.

The Soviets for a brief time refused to accept the simple cease-fire resolution put forth at the UN and instead urged adoption of a resolution combining a cease-fire with the call for withdrawal of troops to prewar positions. Israel refused to accept this condition and the UAR refused to accept a cease-fire without it. On 6 June Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov ordered Soviet UN representative Fedorenko to accept the simple cease-fire in spite of the Arab position. However, the UAR was not yet prepared to accept and without Egyptian approval the Security Council unanimously passed a simple cease-fire resolution.

For the next two days the Soviets apparently attempted to persuade the UAR to accept a simple cease-fire, although they were also pushing a cease-fire with conditions.

On 7 June a UAR Embassy spokesman in Paris said that Egypt rejected the UN resolution calling for a simple cease-fire. The Soviets requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council that afternoon and tabled a second cease-fire resolution, simply calling on the governments concerned to cease firing at 2000 GMT that night. It was unanimously adopted. Jordan and Israel agreed, but the UAR still rejected it.*

**On this date Radio Moscow broadcast the text of a Soviet government statement to Israel charging that the failure of Israel to comply with the UN call for a cease-fire was further proof of Israel's aggressive policy and threatening to break diplomatic relations with Israel.*

The reasons for this sudden shift in Egyptian policy are not clear. Soviet pressure to accept a cease-fire had been consistent and perhaps effective, but it is more likely that Nasir saw the hopelessness of Egypt's military position and finally decided to accept.

On 8 June, at the same Security Council meeting at which U Thant announced that the UAR would abide by a cease-fire if Israel would do the same, the Soviets tabled a draft resolution calling for a condemnation of Israel and the withdrawal of troops behind the truce line. This resolution was never passed but was to become the basis of Soviet demands in the months ahead. On 9 June a resolution was unanimously passed, demanding fulfillment of the previous resolutions (of 6 and 7 June) calling for a cease-fire. Two hours after passage of the resolution, Syria and Israel had accepted it.

Threat of Soviet Intervention and the Moscow Conference

In spite of the formal agreement to cease fire, Israeli troops continued to advance into Syria on 9 and 10 June. At this point, the Soviets began to threaten some (undefined) action if Israel did not stop. Reports indicate that on 9 June several Soviet diplomats warned that if Israel did not observe the cease-fire in Syria, the Soviets might intervene. A CPSU document prepared in October 1967 stated that on the morning of 10 June the Soviets sent an urgent message to President Johnson, warning that if Israel did not stop the USSR would be compelled to take unspecified "necessary" action. This is probably a reference to the use of the "hot-line" between Moscow and

There were indications that the Soviets were in fact making preparations for limited intervention. On 11 June there were several reports of Soviet military preparations—one involving the possible landing of 400 Soviet sailors near Latakia, Syria, and the other involving the possible landing of paratroops in Syria to halt the Israeli advance toward Damascus. These reports reveal the extent of Soviet concern for Syria and its regime, but the amount of support being considered was token only. It is not impossible that these reports were circulated by the Soviets in an attempt to scare the Israelis into stopping their advance in Syria.

After the war the Soviets were to claim that the Israeli halt was a direct result of the USSR's determined stand. While it is possible that the Soviet threats played a role in Israel's decision to stop, the fact that Israel had agreed to a cease-fire *before* the USSR began to make threats suggests that the Soviet threats were not so important; furthermore, there is little to indicate that Israel had planned to take Damascus in any event.

Two or three days after the start of the war, the Soviets summoned their East European allies to Moscow to discuss the situation. The leaders met on 9 June and the following day released a statement warning that if the UNSC did not take proper measures and if Israel did not withdraw to the armistice lines, the signers would do "everything necessary to help the peoples of the Arab countries administer a resolute rebuff to the aggressor." This belated and again vague verbal threat indicated that the Soviets and their allies had no intention of becoming militarily involved. On 10 June the Soviet Union did, however, break diplomatic relations with Israel, and in the days that followed the other Moscow signatories followed suit.*

Various other agreements not included in the public statement were made at the Moscow Conference. [redacted] it was agreed

that the Soviets would be the spokesmen for all and that they would present a united front on the Middle East problem.* [redacted] said the meeting recognized the need to repair the war damage in the Arab countries and to supply the Egyptian armed forces with replacements for lost tanks, aircraft, and other materiel.** But limits to this aid were also discussed. In light of the weaknesses in the UAR military structure revealed by the war [redacted] reported, the Soviets decided they must exercise control of Egyptian use of Soviet-supplied military equipment. It was agreed that all of Nasir's requests for military aid would be met, but that the Soviets would demand that they participate in any future UAR decision concerning major military actions to be launched with Soviet-supplied arms. While the Soviets may have requested that they be involved in such decision making, it is not likely that Nasir would have agreed to weaken his own prerogatives. The Soviets did, however, acquire a greater role in Egyptian military training and organization.

SOVIETS REACT TO DEFEAT

Attempts to Reassure Arabs

The Soviets, shocked by the magnitude of the Arab defeat, reacted instinctively. First, they tried to salvage what they could from a bad situation. They were particularly vulnerable to charges that they had failed the Arabs; they also were sensitive to rumors that the Chinese were going to move into the area with offers of aid and even more sensitive to the prospects of a Chinese propaganda heyday at their expense. Their immediate aims were to restore their damaged prestige in the eyes of the world and to re-establish their credibility as friends of the Arabs. The emergency airlift of

**The Soviets agreed to contact Cairo immediately in behalf of the Eastern European countries; this was the first time the Soviets had thus represented the Eastern European countries in negotiations with the UAR.*

aid begun by the Soviets on 6 June* (the largest such operation Moscow has ever conducted) and the 10 June statement of the Moscow conference were the first steps in this direction. Subsequent high-level visits and assurances of continuing military aid were a vital element in their efforts to restore their influence with the Arabs.

The Arabs were stunned by defeat and were at once gripped by shock, humiliation, and anger. They looked for scapegoats and found a number; the United States and Great Britain whom they said had aided Israel, some of their own leaders—particularly military—whom they felt had failed them,** and the Soviet Union which they felt had let them down. Their frustration and anger with the Soviets was openly expressed in the press as well as privately. Among the most vehement was Algerian President Boumediene, who at one point apparently considered ordering all Algerian students in the USSR to return home. On 12 June Boumediene flew to Moscow where he reportedly attacked the Soviets for their failure to assist. He was reminded of the dangers of nuclear war and was somewhat mollified by promises of continued aid. Syrian President Al-Atasi visited Moscow shortly after the war and charged that on the second day of the war the Soviet Ambassador to Damascus had promised "technical military assistance" which was then not provided. The Soviets reportedly responded that the military situation had developed so swiftly that the Soviet aid program had been thrown off balance.

Probably because they realized their need for Soviet aid and support, the Arabs' anti-Soviet line of the first few days faded fairly quickly. Press articles lost their anti-Soviet tones and,

**Although the Soviets had begun to airlift replacement equipment to the Arabs while the war was still in progress, aid alone was far from enough to reverse the tide of the war. In the war the UAR lost about two-thirds of its fighters, four-fifths of its bombers, and one-half of its tanks; the Syrians lost most of their fighters and one-fourth of their tanks. The Iraqis and Algerians lost only small amounts of materiel.*

***On 9 June Nasir issued his official resignation. At the same time Commander-in-Chief Amir and War Minister Badran also submitted their resignations as did 11 other high-ranking military commanders. Nasir later retracted his resignation, but the others held.*

On the same day Pozhidayev had handed Nasir an "important message" from the Soviet government. Possibly this contained promises of further Soviet support.*

A major move in the Soviet effort to assuage the Arabs was the tour of Soviet President Podgornyy to Arab capitals in late June. Podgornyy himself described the trip as a "calming mission." He undoubtedly gave reassurances of continued support, both military and economic, but the exact amount promised and the *quid pro quo* (if any) were not so clear. It seems likely that at this time the Soviets committed themselves at least to the replacement of all Egyptian equipment lost in the war. The Podgornyy-Nasir talks apparently were not completely smooth and final agreement on all issues was postponed.

Podgornyy did return to Moscow before visiting Syria, and his visit to Syria may have been particularly unsatisfactory. The communiqué issued after this visit was somewhat chillier than those following his trips to Cairo and Baghdad,** and the Syrians were very upset by the extent of Soviet caution and stinginess. Podgornyy urged a calm approach and advised the Syrians not to consider an immediate resumption of hostilities. His promise of aid to support an eventual resumption of war was said to be offset by a

**In fact, Arab resentment was to continue for a long period; open criticism stopped, however, because of the need for Soviet aid.*

***The former said simply that "official talks" were held and that Podgornyy expressed "heartfelt gratitude" for the hospitality shown him. The others stressed the spirit of friendship and understanding which prevailed at the meetings.*

request for a naval base in Syria and for Soviet direction of Syrian "technical commands." that the Soviets were demanding bases in the Middle East. If they did demand bases they did so unsuccessfully, for although they have been given increased access to Arab ports, they have not acquired control of any port facilities. Soviet technicians and advisors were subsequently stationed in Syria, but, again, it is highly unlikely that these advisors have been given command authority.

Efforts to Regain International Prestige: Propaganda in the UN

Restoration of their international status was the second immediate goal of the Soviets in the wake of their June setback. On 13 June in a letter to the Secretary General of the UN, Gromyko requested an emergency session of the General Assembly to consider the Middle East situation and the question of "liquidating the consequences of Israeli aggression against the Arab states and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice lines." This was a reversal of the USSR's traditional emphasis on the Security Council and was probably based on the expectation that the assembly would prove a more sympathetic vehicle for propaganda purposes.*

A number of UAR UN officials, were dismayed by the Soviet move and saw it as a gesture to regain prestige rather than an attempt to help the Arabs. This interpretation was apparently quite valid. the USSR considered mid-June as "essentially a propaganda phase" in the UN. As the peak of the immediate Soviet post-war drive to regain Arab trust had been reached with Podgornyy's trips to the Middle East, so the drive to regain prestige in the world reached a high point with the arrival at the UN of Soviet Premier Kosygin on 17 June. On the 19th Kosygin addressed the UN General Assembly. He repeated Soviet charges of Israel's mid-May plot to attack Syria and of imperialist support for Israel, charging that military maneuvers by the U.S. and British fleets on the eve of the war could have been interpreted by Israel as encouragement for aggression. He also attacked the United States for blocking the Security Council resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops. But he steered clear of any implication of direct U.S. and British involvement in the

On 14 June the Security Council failed to adopt a Soviet draft resolution condemning Israel and demanding that she withdraw her troops behind the armistice line.

war. He stressed the dangers of a world war which he said would be nuclear and, in a statement not included in a later Moscow Domestic Service version, said that every state should refrain from further complicating the situation.

Kosygin then presented the Soviet Union's draft resolution which contained four provisions:

(1) Condemnation of the aggressive actions of Israel and the continuing occupation by Israel of part of the territory of the UAR, Syria, and Jordan;

(2) Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the occupied territory to positions behind the armistice lines;

(3) Restitution in full by Israel of the damages inflicted by its aggression;

(4) Immediate effective measures by the UN Security Council to eliminate all consequences of Israel's aggression.

Kosygin met with President Johnson at Glassboro on 23 and again on 25 June, then held a press conference to discuss the meetings. He hinted at Soviet flexibility in his statement that after Israeli withdrawal the Security Council could consider all other questions arising in the Middle East. The TASS version of the press conference omitted this statement but said simply that all other solutions (other than withdrawal) to the crisis were unrealistic.* Kosygin's formula was to be the basis of the July 1967 Soviet proposal which never came to a vote.**

SHIFT IN SOVIET TACTICS–TOWARD MODERATION

Soviets Urge Restraint on Arabs

While the desire to restore their reputation with the Arabs and to ensure against Chinese inroads in the area was stimulating the Soviets to continue active support of the radical Arabs, they also had seen the

See pps. 31-37 for discussion of leadership differences on the Middle East.

**See page 30.

disastrous results that policy had helped cause in June. The Soviets, however, tried to straddle both sides of the problem. They continued to supply large quantities of aid—both military and economic—but they also tried to establish greater control over its use. In addition, they would moderate their support of the radical Arab line.

Soviet political restraint reflected an urgent desire to avoid a repetition of the June War. The Soviets at the time made it very clear to the Arabs that they would *not* come to their assistance in the event of renewed hostilities. This shift from a somewhat vague to a clear-cut position emerged in early July. From 10-12 July East European leaders with the exception of Romania's leaders met in Budapest; their communiqué promised continued aid as well as "steps aimed at strengthening the Arabs' defense potential." It contained no implied threat of action by the socialist states in the event of renewed hostilities.*

During this same period the Arab leaders were meeting in Cairo in a futile effort to plot a common course.** The Soviets reportedly sent word to this "little summit" that the Arabs should expect no Soviet armed intervention if hostilities were resumed, although aid and diplomatic support would continue. Only if "clear-cut" intervention by the United States occurred (and this would be determined by the Soviets) would the USSR become directly involved. [redacted] the

**In addition, according to a CPSU document prepared in October 1967 for distribution to delegates to the November anniversary celebrations in Moscow (see page 51), the conference also decided that a more realistic stand was needed on the part of the Arabs and that an immediate step should be to combine demands for immediate Israeli withdrawal with a formula for terminating the state of war.*

***On 11 July Boumediene, Nasir, and Husayn met in Cairo but were reportedly unable to reach agreement on a common approach. The next day Boumediene met in Damascus with Syrian leaders, and they issued a statement promising resistance to compromise. At this time Husayn was trying to promote an Arab summit—which would be moderate in approach. The Syrians and Algerians were opposed, and the UAR was fluctuating. On 23 July Nasir indicated that the UAR would attend an Arab summit.*

TOP SECRET

Soviets also proposed a compromise plan—if the Arabs would accept implicitly the existence of Israel as a state and end the state of belligerence, the USSR would intervene with the United States to pressure Israel to give up "most" of the territory occupied during the war.

In addition to top-level consultations and communications, numerous military delegations were traveling back and forth in an effort to work out priorities and conditions for aid.* Syrian dissatisfaction with Soviet aid offers had been indicated after Podgornyy's visit to that country early in July. Toward the end of that month Egyptian disappointment began to show. When Egyptian Chief of Staff Riyad visited Moscow in late July, the Soviets reportedly presented a counterproposal to his, offering less than the Egyptians had expected. Riyad reportedly indicated that the Soviets were not prepared to do more than replace what had been lost. He said that the Soviets supported the expulsion of Israel from Sinai but would not support a war to destroy Israel. Another source reported that the Soviets promised only enough to enable the UAR to defend itself.

Reports of conditions demanded by the Soviets in return for aid have varied. Some sources have stated that the Soviets agreed to replace lost material with "no strings." But it is clear that they were pressing for some things in exchange for aid.

The most obvious condition demanded and agreed upon was the stationing of Soviet advisors in the Arab armed forces. Soviet advisors began arriving almost immediately in the UAR. They arrived somewhat later in Syria and Algeria, possibly reflecting earlier unhappy Syrian reaction to Podgornyy's visit. [redacted] has stated that by late

**Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister Zakharov was in Cairo from 20 June to 1 July. Late in June the Algerian Defense Minister met with Brezhnev and Grechko, and in early July Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Pavlovskiy spent several weeks in Algeria. Soviet military delegations also arrived in Syria shortly after the war. On 14 July Grechko met with a UAR military delegation led by Chief of Staff Riyad and late in July Soviet Politburo member Mazurov met with Iraqi and Sudanese military delegations.*

TOP SECRET

June about 100 Soviet officers had already been attached to the UAR army at brigade level and had already caused dissension in the UAR military.* In late June Nasir told [redacted] that:

> *For the first time Soviet advisors have been integrated into the organic structure of the UAR Army at the lowest level. I am sorry about this but I had to do it.*

The second Soviet condition most frequently reported was the acquisition of naval facilities in the Mediterranean. Such facilities are essential to the maintenance by the Soviets of a sizable fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Soviets demonstrated in 1967 their firm intention of becoming and remaining a Mediterranean power.** At the same time Soviet condemnation of Western bases in the area made their own acquisition of bases an embarrassing proposition. Hence, their demands may have centered on the *use* of facilities rather than their acquisition. Nasir, in talks with Husayn in early July, said that he was prepared to sign a defense pact with the Soviets giving them whatever bases in the UAR they needed. This statement is somewhat suspect, however, as it smacks of a Nasir effort to push the West (which he may well have assumed would receive this information) into

**On 29 June about 20 majors and colonels were reportedly pensioned off after they voiced disapproval of the arrival of Soviet officers. This action was reportedly reversed by Nasir in early July and about 50 pensioned officers were reinstated.*

***The Soviets began building up their Mediterranean fleet shortly after the war. In late June they sent their first landing ships through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean, and in mid-July Moscow took over direct communications with its warships there. During the year the size of the Soviet fleet continued to grow.*

making concessions in an effort to stave off such a Soviet presence.

[redacted] reports that Nasir had rejected requests by Podgornyy and Zakharov for Soviet acquisition of naval facilities but had approved the idea of the Soviets expanding available facilities. On 10 and 11 July Soviet ships put into Alexandria and Port Said for a week's visit--probably to demonstrate Soviet support for the Arabs and possibly to make use of their new access to port facilities there. On 12 July the Egyptian paper *Al Jumhuriyah* stated that the UAR would extend an open invitation to the Soviet fleet to stay in Port Said and Alexandria as long as it wished. Since that time vessels of the Soviet fleet have continually visited these ports, as well as Latakia in Syria.

More Flexible UN Posture

In addition to modifying their policy of supporting the Arabs by urging restraint and imposing conditions on aid, the Soviets, in July, began moving toward a more flexible stance at the UN. Their position, as reflected by the 10-12 July Budapest Conference, was that a more realistic Arab position was needed and that demands for immediate Israeli withdrawal should be supplemented with a formula for terminating the state of war.

Having made their propaganda points with the Arabs, the Soviets dropped the hard-line resolution proposed by Kosygin on 19 June and gave their support to a nonaligned nations resolution sponsored by Yugoslavia; this draft was somewhat more moderate than that of the Soviets. While it called for the immediate withdrawal of all troops behind the armistice line with UN supervision, it did *not* demand condemnation of Israel, did *not* call for reparations, and *did* suggest that after withdrawal had occurred the Security Council might consider "all aspects of the situation in the area." In addition, it requested that the Secretary General designate a personal

**Nasir's deviousness is reflected in various other reports. He used Chinese offers of assistance, for example, to try to obtain further commitments from the Soviets. The fact that China had made offers was, according to one source, supposed to leak to the Soviets, as was the fact that Nasir had rejected the offer--at least for the time being. [redacted] has reported that fears of Chinese movement into the area had added impetus to the Soviet postwar aid program.*

representative to work for compliance. On 3 July Gromyko praised the resolution and condemned any other approach. However, the draft failed to pass in a vote on 4 July 1967.*

In mid-July the Soviets indicated their willingness to compromise still more on a UN resolution.

Other reports indicate that, while for the first time the Soviets did include a promise of some reciprocal action for Israeli withdrawal, they did not put withdrawal and ending the state of belligerency on the same level. Rather they called for Israeli withdrawal under UN supervision and for referral of the Arab-Israeli question to the Security Council, which would be enjoined to decide on issues concerning termination of the state of belligerency, free passage through international waterways, and the refugee problem.

that the Egyptians and Iraqis had agreed to the Soviet draft proposal. However, Boumediene and the Syrians issued a statement on 12 July promising to resist any compromise. The Soviets were unable to change Boumediene's mind when he visited Moscow in mid-July, and the radical Arabs prevailed. The USSR never presented its draft and on 21 July the General Assembly's emergency session was adjourned.

Thus the Soviets had cornered themselves by restricting their freedom to maneuver in the UN. Their initial call for a General Assembly session reflected their desire for a public propaganda forum. In July, when they had

**The emergency UNSC session considered seven draft resolutions and adopted two—all others failing to gain the required two-thirds majority. The US draft, which along with the Soviet draft failed to pass, called for negotiated arrangements with third party assistance based on five principles: mutual recognition of the political independence and territorial integrity of all countries in the area; recognized boundaries to accompany disengagement and withdrawal; freedom of innocent maritime passage; a just solution of the refugee problem; recognition of the right of all sovereign nations to exist in peace and security. The two resolutions which were passed called for adoption of humanitarian principles and for Israel to take no action to alter the status of Jerusalem.*

become more serious in their efforts to work out a compromise UN resolution, they were trapped by the fact that in the General Assembly, where each Arab nation had a vote, in order to push their resolution through they would have had to actively and publicly oppose the radical Arabs.

They were still unwilling to do this. Their exasperation was voiced by several high-level Soviet figures in late July.

Also in late July, in his meeting with Italian Communists, Ponomarev criticized the Arabs ferociously, calling them fanatical and irrational.

CROSS CURRENTS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP DURING THE CRISIS

While the war had produced severe, if momentary, strains in the Soviet-Arab alliance, it also produced pressures in Soviet internal politics. At one point even the performance of the top leaders in crisis came under an apparent attack. That attack appears to have echoed the views of an element which was critical of the cautiousness of official policy moves in the crisis. Both during and after the crisis, such a view remained outside the consensus in the leadership—in fact was firmly rejected by it. However, within the consensus which opposed direct involvement in the crisis but favored continued support of the Arabs, differences over the extent of such aid in the future as well as more or less flexible positions concerning a diplomatic settlement of the conflict were discernible. Not only the difficult Arabs but the lack of complete unanimity within the top Soviet echelons was a complicating factor in Soviet policy-making.

The Yegorychev Affair

The activist viewpoint, which was in fact considered by some leaders but was discarded, called for taking a limited military risk and cautiously challenging the United States in the crisis. Whether or not such a view was advanced in the Politburo during the heat of the crisis when that body met in frequent session, it may have been raised by Moscow party chief Yegorychev when he spoke to the Central Committee plenum convoked after the June War to endorse the Politburo's actions in the crisis. According to some reports, he criticized the leadership for a lack of forcefulness in the crisis, and though he subsequently suffered for his temerity by

losing his post, it seems unlikely that he would have raised his voice if there had been no support for his views at the highest levels. In any case, a policy of calculated risk was shunned by the consensus that emerged in the Politburo during the crisis.

While a more aggressive view may have had some supporters within the Politburo itself, the evidence contains little direct indication as to who they might have been. Shelepin, of course, is one suspect since Yegorychev, who voiced the criticism of leadership's crisis actions at the June plenum,can be counted a member of the coterie around this leader. However, there were signs that the militant view had supporters among elements on the periphery of the inner-leadership, especially among the military. For example, *Red Star* was one of the few Soviet organs which openly defended the UAR's closure of the Straits of Tiran (28 June) and was particularly insistent in its calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories. Further, it was close to a month after the war before any Soviet military leader explicitly endorsed Soviet handling of the crisis. Only on 5 July did Defense Minister Grechko do so—the day Brezhnev also presented a vigorous public defense of Politburo policy in the crisis.

Brezhnev's speech on 5 July bore all the earmarks of a general apologia for Soviet Middle East policy, past, present, and future. This was his first post-war speech and probably was designed to counter both foreign—particularly Arab—and internal criticism. He first tried to counter arguments that a more assertive policy should have been followed in the crisis. He insisted on the "correctness" of Moscow's "energetic" moves to stop Israel and protect Arab interests. He then moved on to defend the continuing strong Soviet support for the Arabs; while careful to say—in line with Politburo policy—that the struggle in the present phase was "political," he emphasized the demand for Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands and pointed to the material aid the USSR was rendering the Arabs. While alluding to efforts at resolving the crisis in the UN, he dwelt on the purpose of Podgornyy's missions to the UAR, Syria and Iraq; namely, strengthening ties and coordinating common action in the defense of Arab interests. The speech contained little hint of any interest in promoting a compromise settlement in the area. In general the speech seemed to be a defense of Moscow's pro-Arab policy. From the perspective of Soviet internal politics it appeared to reflect Brezhnev's awareness of the danger of an alliance of military* and party elements joining together in opposition to official policy in the mid-East.

**The speech was delivered to a graduating military class.*

The danger was already implicit in the Yegorychev affair. Yegorychev, the Moscow party chief and thus a pre-eminent figure among the party's middle-level executives, launched his criticism of official policy when two of its prime promoters and agents, Podgornyy and Kosygin, were away from home implementing that policy, the first in Cairo and the second in New York at the UN. This left Brezhnev, the third of the triumvirate in charge of executing the adopted policy in Moscow, to bear the brunt of this evidently unexpected attack.

The precise content of the Yegorychev criticism remains unclear.

**A similar criticism—but from figures linked with reform rather than hard-line positions—was discernible in a 17 June Pravda article by Rumyantsev, Burlatskiy and Bestuzhev. This article while devoted to the need for more intensive study of broad social and political trends contained a pointed call for better political predictions "especially" with regard to "prospects of developing international relations." The glaring case in point—the lead up to and outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war—could scarcely fail to come to mind in an informed reader.*

equipment and that "further improvement" of military preparedness depended "to a great extent" on the practical activity of the military itself. Further, the introduction of a Soviet naval force into the Mediterranean in the wake of the crisis served, among other things however belatedly, to cover the leaders' flank against charges of passivity in crisis situations.

In any case, Brezhnev administered a severe rebuff to Yegorychev by relegating him to a lesser post—presumably as an object lesson to any who assumed his policy or leadership was easily challengeable—and obtained an express stamp of approval from the Central Committee and the Moscow party organization among others for the Politburo's actions during the crisis. Indeed, the display of his organizational power was essential to Brezhnev's immediate prestige and authority. Brezhnev's elaborate defense of policy in the crisis in the 5 July speech also mirrored his awareness of the danger of an erosion of his authority resulting from publicity within the regime of the view that the leadership was not sufficiently forceful in foreign affairs. Further, it is possible that the main motive behind the Yegorychev foray was to undermine confidence in the leadership; Brezhnev's rapid response succeeded in rebuffing this attempt.

The Politburo Consensus and Differences Within It

The quick disposal of Yegorychev underlined the agreement among the top figures in the Politburo on the need for caution and strict avoidance of any direct Soviet involvement in the military side of the conflict. The evidence contains strong indications that the latter view was unanimously held by the four ranking members of the Politburo: Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Suslov, and Kosygin.

For example, both Brezhnev and Suslov during the war's early stage were critical of Nasir in remarks to visiting delegations. Brezhnev stressed that the USSR's first aim was to avoid world war and if it had only the smallest alternative to war it would choose it. Further, [redacted], he was quite undisturbed and uncritical regarding the American role during the Middle East crisis and took Nasir to task for complaining that the Soviets were not supplying him enough weapons. Suslov said that Nasir had pursued shortsighted and provocative policies prior to the crisis, that the USSR bore no responsibility for the military defeat of the Arabs, and that the only course open to the Arabs was to secure an immediate peace. He stated that the USSR could only assist them to the latter goal and that the USSR would not interfere or intervene directly in the region in opposition to the United Nations.

Both Kosygin and Podgornyy indicated their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Further, the tenor of Kosygin's statements and activities at the UN and Glassboro and Brezhnev's treatment of Podgornyy as a confidant regarding the Yegorychev affair deepens the impression that these figures were working in close concert to minimize the effects of the Arab setback.

Yet within this area of agreement at least two diverging positions were visible as well as differing nuances in the views expressed by individual figures. The differences suggest that policy in the crisis was formulated by a coalition rather than by a coterie of like-minded men. For, on the one hand, Kosygin seemed to represent a more flexible position than his colleagues with regard to seeking a major political settlement in the Middle East, while Brezhnev, and even more distinctly Podgornyy, assumed less flexible postures on a postwar settlement. The latter seemed more intent on refurbishing the Soviet image as the Arabs' champion and restoring them to their prewar positions than on altering the basic conditions that had helped produce the war. It should be noted, however, that these views reflected the different forums to which these men were speaking—Kosygin to an international audience, Podgornyy to the Arabs, and Brezhnev to party and military groups. However, their views were compatible with the differing outlooks each had displayed earlier.

[redacted] reported that Kosygin even threatened to resign at one point as a result of his disagreement with other Politburo members. That he may have represented a position of greater flexibility than the other leaders was suggested by the conciliatory shadings of his statements during his UN trip in contrast to the uniformly harsh-toned, anti-Israeli, anti-Western propaganda in Soviet media. Indeed, passages in Kosygin's statements which could be interpreted as conciliatory were excised from Soviet press accounts. Editorial trimming of such passages was evident, for example, in Kosygin's 25 June statement that after an Israeli withdrawal all other questions arising in the Middle East could be considered by the Security Council.

Any hints of a softening of Soviet demands regarding a Middle East settlement or of the possibility of compromise were absent from Brezhnev's major speech on 5 July. He also did not reiterate Kosygin's support at the UN of Israel's right to exist as an element of Soviet policy, nor the Premier's reference to the responsibility of the great powers to contribute to peace in

the Middle East.* Similarly, the Central Committee resolution which, in effect, approved Brezhnev's unpublished report to the plenum also omitted these points. In other respects, however, the resolution paralleled the main lines of Kosygin's UN speech—though, as might be expected, defining Soviet policy positions in a more thoroughgoing ideological form. Similarly, Podgornyy in a conversation assumed an intransigent tone. He indicated that he was not sure a compromise was possible, though he said a peaceful solution was necessary. He emphasized that aggression could not be rewarded and that Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab territories was the precondition of any negotiations. That this position may have been a diplomatic stance rather than ironclad policy was at least suggested when not to take what the Arabs and the Soviets said publicly too literally and that compromises were necessary. Yet, in a conversation in late July, Kosygin again took a softer line, saying that a second round militarily in the Middle East was out of the question from the Soviet viewpoint and that a peaceful solution, preferably in the UN, must be found. Thus, the relatively consistent difference in emphasis between Kosygin and his two colleagues emerges in the available evidence and suggests that he was an advocate of a more flexible policy designed to increase chances for a political settlement in the Middle East.

While detailed evidence on the views of other Politburo-level figures on Middle East policy during the crisis period is scanty, one notable moderate-sounding voice emerged in the Central Committee Secretariat. The audience to which it was addressed probably in part accounts for its tenor. In late July, in his meeting with Italian Communists, party secretary Ponomarev expressed sharp criticisms of the Arabs for refusing Moscow's counsels of restraint before the war and for taking such unilateral actions as closing the gulf. He charged that the Arab governments were fanatic and irrational, and that Moscow was forced to give aid to Nasir as he was the most reasonable of the Arab leaders; he was particularly critical of Boumediene, a view apparently not previously held by Brezhnev, who in early June had stated that

**Kosygin's assertion of Israel's right to exist was implicit in the statement that every people had the right "to establish an independent state of its own." Like Brezhnev, other leaders did not mention this right with reference to the Middle East, though presumably recognition of Israel's right to statehood has remained a promise of Soviet policy.*

Boumediene was the most reasonable of the Arab leaders. Ponomarev complained that the Arabs were bleeding the socialist states and criticized the Egyptians for keeping the Suez closed. He was quite pessimistic, stating that the cease-fire had left the crisis unresolved and the Soviets did not know how it could be resolved; he expressed alarm that the situation might lead to a direct confrontation among the great powers.

In sum, it would appear that during the crisis a perhaps uneasy consensus existed, based on the desire to keep losses to a minimum and avoid any direct involvement in the conflict. While some leaders may have urged stronger action than was in fact taken, support for such a course seems to have been slight. However, once the actual crisis had passed the differences on Middle East policy surfaced—most explosively in the Yegorychev attack. A consensus approach again prevailed, aimed at preserving with minimal loss the Soviet role as champion of Arab interests. However, on one side of the consensus may have been a hard-line, activist position, and on the other a more moderate one. Differences over the extent of commitment to be made to the Arabs most probably have persisted. These countertrends within the leadership probably have been partly responsible for the schizophrenic course of Soviet conduct since the war; they also suggest a potential for change in Soviet Middle East policy.

SOVIETS SHIFT SUPPORT FROM SYRIANS TO EGYPTIANS

Moscow Endorses Nasir's Postwar Moves

Soviet policy underwent a gradual, hesitant shift away from the radical Arab position toward the Egyptians in the months immediately following the June war. During this process Soviet policy makers experienced repeated frustration both because of the imperviousness of the Syrian radicals and their Arab abettors to any notion of compromise politics in the UN and because of their own self-imposed inhibition against pressuring the radicals to the point where they might turn in anger against Moscow's sponsorship. Despite the part Nasir had played in precipitating the June war, he was by way of contrast less fanatical than the Syrians and the more amenable to Soviet counsel and admonition. In fact, after the shock of the Arab defeat had lessened and Nasir had survived the crisis of his own leadership, Moscow did not hesitate to aim public criticism at the Egyptian failures and by indirection at Nasir himself in press articles in late June. The Soviets were even more explicit in their criticisms with showing impatience with Arab hotheadedness and referring to Nasir's prewar actions

as case in point. Evidence that Nasir had been chastened—at least temporarily—by his experience and saw the need for political flexibility was first reflected in his decision in mid-July to attend an Arab summit meeting. Since the meeting was endorsed by the conservative Arabs and boycotted by the radicals, the decision marked a shift away from his prewar alliance with the Syrians. Nasir's decision to side with the conservative Arabs was undoubtedly tied to an effort to find sources of relief for the UAR's critical economic situation. Loss of revenue from the closing of Suez as well as the general dislocation caused by the war had created a monetary crisis and Nasir needed money. At the conference, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya jointly agreed to provide the UAR and Jordan with quarterly aid payments, in exchange for which these three nations were to resume oil shipments to the United States. The conference rejected the "continue-to-fight" policy recommended by Syria (which refused to attend the conference), Algeria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and gave Nasir and Husayn a mandate to seek a political settlement; it termed a Yugoslav compromise proposal "reasonable."*

**In mid-August Tito had visited the UAR, Syria, and Iraq in an effort to win Arab support for his proposal. This five-point plan did not include a nonbelligerency clause as Nasir had said, indicating that Nasir was prepared to go further in compromise than the Tito plan. As published in Tanyug on 16 September its provisions were:*

1. *The pullback of all troops from territories occupied since 4 June, with UN observers on hand.*
2. *A UN Security Council or big-four power guarantee of the security and frontiers of all countries in the area until a final solution was found.*
3. *Free passage through the Strait of Tiran pending a ruling by the International Court of Justice.*
4. *Restoration of all forces in Suez on the eve of 5 June.*
5. *As soon as the above was done, the UNSC would take steps to resolve other issues.*

In the first week of September Moscow somewhat belatedly voiced its approval of the Khartoum conference. At the same time Soviet propaganda changed its tune on Middle East issues. As late as 31 August Soviet propaganda continued to echo the hard line taken in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* early in the month. *Radio Peace and Progress* carried a report urging continued embargo of US oil, withdrawal of Arab currency from Western banks,and a general boycott of the West. Also Moscow had been critical of the idea of an Arab summit prior to Nasir's announcement of his decision to support the Khartoum summit on 23 July.

Now *Pravda* endorsed the Khartoum conference on 5 September as a step forward in Arab unity; it said that the view held by various Arabs that the resumption of war was the only way out had been replaced by a more sober approach. *Radio Peace and Progress*, on the same day, noted the absence of the Syrian leaders "who consider military operations the main method" but said that the Syrians had agreed to support "all positive measures" drafted in Khartoum. *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* now praised the resumption of oil shipments to the United States as a necessary source of Arab revenue. *Novoye Vremya* in September called the Syrian and Algerian advocacy of continuous struggle unrealistic, and praised the Egyptian public for reacting favorably to suggestions that the slogan of destruction of Israel be dropped. The article held out hope for settlement by saying that the Khartoum conference had rejected direct negotiations "at the present stage," thereby leaving open the possibility that this might change.

The Soviet decision to change the propaganda line evidently came after Nasir's own switch to support of Khartoum and somewhat tardily. Despite the delays, the Soviets had taken a major step in their policy of supporting the less militant Arab line. Each step in this direction cost the Soviets influence in the more radical Arab camp, and each step was made reluctantly. A public Soviet position on the summit conference was necessary, and, as the radical Arabs vigorously opposed the conference while Nasir supported it, a Soviet position was bound to alienate one or the other. The fear of a renewed war and another setback was consistently pushing the Soviets toward the moderate Arab line and away from their previous support for the radicals.

Soviets Urge Restraint on Syria

Pravda's endorsement of the Khartoum summit registered Moscow's readiness to support the relatively moderate position now assumed by Nasir and to criticize the more radical Arabs in public. The Soviet policy of urging

Egyptian-Syrian unity before the war had helped to push Nasir toward greater militancy with disastrous results. Now the Soviets were prepared to make clear their support for a more rational Arab line and to risk alienating the Syrians as a result. Their efforts to pull the Syrians in that direction met with no success.





The arguments used by the Soviets clearly indicated their apprehension about the possibility of a renewal of the war and their particular fear that Syrian provocations would cause an Israeli reaction which might prove disastrous. And they were now willing to let the Syrians know that they did not support any policy which might impel the Israelis to resume the fighting.

In early August a Syrian delegation led by Minister of Defense Hafiz Asad spent a week in Moscow; reports on the results of this visit suggest a less than satisfactory result from the Syrian point of view. Although one source said that Asad was pleased with the visit, most reporting indicates Syrian disappointment. According to the Damascus press, the Soviets agreed to give the Syrian Army free military equipment equal to that lost in the war, but insisted that the Syrians pay for equipment received in excess of the June 1967 levels. A [redacted] stated in mid-August that the Syrians were angry because the Soviets were supplying them with old and used equipment and were making them pay 50% rather than the previous 25% of the cost of aircraft.

A Syrian military mission to the USSR in October is also said to have come back dissatisfied. Although by the end of the year most of the Syrian war losses had reportedly been replaced, as of November Soviet deliveries of military equipment largely represented fulfillment of prewar contracts. The October delegation reportedly returned with no new promises of aid.

In any event, the Syrians were dependent on the Soviets for their equipment and, while the message may never have been relayed directly, the

implication might well have been conveyed that until the Syrians moderated their position, Soviet support would be less than complete. In addition, the Soviets might well have reasoned that the dangers inherent in supplying the radical and aggressive Syrians with a larger military capability were too great to be risked.

The Lever Of Military Aid

While Soviet arm-twisting never reached the point where the Syrians or Egyptians openly complained, Soviet military aid policy was unmistakably aimed at measurably increasing the USSR's presence, influence and—to whatever degree possible—control over Arab policy in the war-making sphere.

The Soviets had considerable room in which to maneuver and apply pressure in their military aid program. For, although they had immediately promised after the war to resupply equipment lost in the war, the Soviets could decide how much and what type of additional equipment would be forthcoming. The stationing of Soviet military advisors in the Arab forces was clearly one of Moscow's conditions for aid. The number of Soviet personnel in Arab countries jumped rapidly to about four times its prewar level and continued to be maintained there.

This influx has been accompanied by signs of considerable friction within the Arab armed forces between the Soviet and Arab military. [redacted] the Soviets demanded that Soviet personnel serve as instructors at all levels of the Syrian army command and that they control any firing along Syria's frontiers; this source stated that this degree of Soviet control was unacceptable to the Syrian government, had stirred controversy, and, in fact, had helped bring down the Syrian Government on 28 September 1967.

The authority actually given these advisors is not clear. Although various reports have indicated a high degree of Soviet authority in training and operational exercises, there is no proof of direct Soviet command and control authority. While it seems unlikely that Soviet personnel have any final say in policy and command decisions, the extent of their involvement in both the Syrian and UAR armed forces is certainly greater than it was before the war. The Soviets must in this way expect to exercise some restraint on Arab forces and to make sure that Soviet-supplied equipment was not again squandered; at the same time they obviously hoped to raise the standards and capabilities of the Arab armed forces.

The Soviets also succeeded in gaining increased access to naval facilities in the Mediterranean. The Soviets greatly increased the size of their Mediterranean fleet during 1967, and access to refueling and repair facilities had become very desirable. Secondly, a Soviet naval presence in Arab ports provided a greater deterrent factor against future Israeli attacks and, more importantly, US intervention in the area.

However, a distinction must be drawn between the establishment of Soviet *bases* in the Middle East and the use by the Soviets of existing port facilities. According to a political observer in Cairo, Foreign Minister Riyad said that Nasir refused the Soviets permission to open a naval base in the UAR, although Soviet ships at Alexandria and Port Said could "stay as long as they want." In other words, Soviet requests for *control* of port facilities had been rejected, but Soviet *use* of such facilities would be permitted.*

In fact, the Soviet fleet has made only minimal use of these ports and has relied primarily on its own auxiliary ships for supplies and repairs. However, Soviet fleet vessels have made prolonged visits to various ports, particularly Port Said and Alexandria in the UAR and Latakia in Syria. The increased Soviet naval presence provides an added counter for Soviet tactics in future crisis situations.

SOVIET MANEUVERS ON ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT

Position on Withdrawal Ambiguous

The Soviet shift in August and September 1967 to support of Nasir and a less militant propaganda line** and the growing Soviet criticism of the radical Arabs were accompanied by a corresponding inclination by the Soviets to follow Nasir's lead in the diplomatic realm without undertaking any initiatives of their own. As their shift on various themes (the summit, an oil boycott of the West, and so forth) had been accomplished in stages, so

**In fact the Soviets themselves probably would not wish to acquire bases formally as they have long been outspoken critics of US bases. Furthermore, their acquisition of bases could render them still more vulnerable to possible involvement in a future war.*

***See pages 37-39*

their position on a political settlement during this period was ambiguous and even contradictory. For example, UN Ambassador Fedorenko told [redacted] on 3 August that Soviet policy in the future would link Israeli withdrawal to the end of the state of belligerency in the Middle East, but in September Moscow injected a new adjective--unconditional--into propaganda demanding Israeli withdrawal.

The public statements of top Soviet spokesmen were also vague. Both Kosygin and Gromyko in mid-September publicly stressed the dangers of tensions in the area "in direct proximity" to the USSR's frontiers. Gromyko, in his 22 September speech to the General Assembly* warned of the dangers of a new armed conflict, called for Israeli compensation to the Arabs, and said that if Israel did not observe the UN resolutions, the Security Council must determine sanctions. [redacted] He did not elaborate, but the implication that compromises were possible was clear.

By the end of September, however, the Soviets seemed to have no specific goal in the diplomatic realm, and their statements seemed to lack direction. They still had not taken any public position on the Tito proposals of August** which the moderate Arabs, including Nasir, had indicated were acceptable. Taking no initiatives of their own, Soviet policy seemed to be in a state of suspense and seemed content to let Nasir take the lead, as he had on the Khartoum summit, and follow his initiative in again supporting a compromise UN resolution.

Soviets Support Arab Initiative

[redacted]

**The special emergency session of the UNGA, convened on 17 June and adjourned temporarily on 21 July, concluded on 18 September with a resolution asking that the regular General Assembly session give the Middle East situation high priority. Gromyko was addressing the regular session.*

***See page 38*



During the next week US Ambassador Goldberg told Ambassador Dobrynin that the United States did not want a UN meeting on the issue without Moscow's prior agreement on future guarantees of Israeli security--presumably including passage through the Suez. According to one report Moscow would not commit itself on this matter without Arab agreement, a



negative posture since Nasir was adamant that free passage be combined with the refugee question. However, Soviet Ambassador to Cairo Vinogradov reportedly told Western diplomats that Moscow believed an end to the state of belligerency would include Israeli passage through the Suez, but felt that Israel should not assert this right until the final stages of settlement. Thus, the Soviet view, as stated by Vinogradov, was more conciliatory in this respect than was Nasir's position.

Increased Tension and Nasir's Ambivalence

Numerous border incidents along the cease-fire lines in the Middle East have raised Arab-Israeli tension to a high pitch since the end of the war and the danger of a major outbreak of war has returned. Arab terrorist raids into Israel increased steadily and by October 1967 Israel was warning that it might have to strike at the "centers of terrorism"—a clear threat to Syria and possibly to Jordan. The threat particularly alarmed the Syrians, who were expecting an "imminent attack."

In October there were indications that Nasir was in a troubled state of mind. Nasir's confidant Haykal expressed anxiety about the leader's mental condition, saying that he was subject to sudden fits of temper and severe depression and was obsessed with the ambition of restoring Egypt's prestige through a successful strike at Israel. The sinking of the Israel destroyer *Eilat* on 21 October might have reflected this attitude on Nasir's part. If so, he must have been further infuriated by Israel's retaliation—the bombing of Egyptian oil refineries—and the announcement that the United States would supply fighter bombers to Israel.

There were various reports at this time that the Egyptian position was hardening and doubt was growing in Cairo about the possibility of a peaceful settlement. On 10 November Haykal, writing in *Al Ahram*, termed the continuation of the war "inevitable"; he hedged a bit, however, by adding that this did not necessarily mean that fighting would resume tomorrow.

Toward a UN Resolution

In spite of their reportedly hardening position, the Egyptians during this period, nonetheless, supported a draft resolution, submitted by the Indians,* which embodied with a few changes the earlier Jordan/UAR/Soviet

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understanding of early October. Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied during the war was tied to the end of the state of belligerency, as it had been in the Arab plan, but instead of referring the questions of refugees and free passage through international waterways to future deliberation, this draft implied that settlement of these issues would occur in the same time frame as the other provisions. In addition, it called for the dispatch of a special representative to the Middle East to coordinate efforts to resolve the situation.

At this time, however, the UAR and Jordan appeared to be losing touch with each other. Cairo, which had called for a Security Council session* apparently without consulting Jordan, was supporting the Indian draft. Husayn, on the other hand, felt that the Arabs must accept a proposal which had US approval, as the United States was the only nation which could exert a practical influence. A US draft resolution had also been presented to the Security Council; it called for an end to the state of belligerency and recognition of the right of all states to exist within recognized boundaries; it called for Israeli withdrawal, but did not specify withdrawal from *all* occupied territories.

**The Security Council met in urgent session on 9 November at the request of the UAR.*

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Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Soviets Play a Double Role

During the fall Soviet diplomats began to speak again of a mounting war danger in the Middle East.* Several indicated that, without a political settlement (which seemed far away), terrorism might increase and open hostilities recur.

This threat may well have been intended for Western consumption with the goal of pushing the West toward a more flexible diplomatic position.

The degree of pressure, if any, the Soviets exerted on the UAR to accept the UK draft is not known, but they evidently did want some sort of political accommodation to reduce the danger of renewed hostilities. Fedorenko was annoyed over the sinking of the *Eilat* as this complicated reaching agreement at the UN. Probably the Soviets also feared that incidents of this sort might result in renewed war.

In October Muhyi ad-Din stated that the Soviets were not providing the UAR with arms in the quantity or quality requested; he said that they were holding back on certain weapons and counseling that the UAR make a final agreement on permanent guaranteed boundaries. In a CPSU document probably written in October, which was circulated to delegations visiting the USSR in November,** the Soviets stated that it was necessary for the Arabs to adopt a more realistic approach and that an immediate step should be to combine demands for immediate Israeli withdrawal with a formula on terminating the state of war. Thus both the desire and the willingness to push for a resolution seemed to be present on the Soviet side.

**See page 51 for further discussion of this document.

At the same time Soviet actions betrayed ambivalence.

The draft specified that Israel withdraw to pre-5 June borders and postponed consideration of the refugee problem and passage through international waterways for future consideration by the council. Thus,it returned to the July 1967 Soviet proposal; this emphasis on total withdrawal and postponement of the other issues made the Soviet proposal more palatable for the Arabs than was the British plan but also ensured its rejection by Israel and the United States. In addition, the Soviet draft omitted any provision for a special representative to be sent to the area.

The Soviet action delayed Security Council proceedings for two days and mystified everyone. Their sudden action came as a surprise since they were expected to support the UK draft. The action may have been a last-minute effort to appease the radical Arabs by playing the part of partial obstructionists and by going through the motions of submitting a more pro-Arab resolution which they expected to withdraw.

On 22 November the Soviets withdrew their resolution and supported the British draft which then passed unanimously.

The Syrians predictably reacted violently to the Security Council resolution. On 23 and 25 November Atasi and other Syrian leaders issued inflammatory statements calling for armed struggle. And, on 23 November, Zuayyin complained to the Soviet Ambassador in Damascus that the USSR wanted to impose Nasir's political line on the Syrians. The Soviets did not remain silent. A *Pravda* article on 27 November praised the self-control of the moderate Arabs and criticized Arab "hotheads":

> *We cannot help noting that in some Arab capitals there are hotheads and hasty statements in the press which,under present conditions, act like a boomerang, give pretexts for anti-Arab Western propaganda, and are taken advantage of by extremists in Tel Aviv.*

Soviet efforts to urge the Syrians into moderation had failed. The Soviet decision to endorse the compromise UN resolution further antagonized the Syrians. In spite of their efforts to walk a middle line, the Soviets had again been forced to choose and, in so doing, had alienated the Syrian extremists.

THE SOVIET POSITION–NOVEMBER 1967

In November 1967 the Soviet leadership issued a CPSU document on Soviet policy in the Middle East giving an authoritative defense and explanation of Soviet actions in the Middle East. Circulated among delegates to the 50th anniversary observances in Moscow, it reflected Soviet sensitivity to criticism of the USSR after the war, both by critics domestic (Yegorychev) and foreign (particularly of course the Arabs). The document pictures the Arab leaders as supporters of Soviet policies who did not seek Soviet involvement in the armed conflict. It only gives an intimation of Arab dissatisfaction with Soviet policy in raising accusations against the Chinese and "imperialists" who allegedly sought to drive a wedge between the USSR and the Arabs. The document zigzags between attacks on the "imperialist West" and "its tool" Israel, attributing Israel's aggression to the "imperialist" goal of destroying the progressive Arab states, and criticism of the Arabs for their military failure in the war.

Soviet contempt for the Arab military is visible in passages on military aid which explains how deliveries of basic arms had already made up for UAR and Syrian losses in the war.* Citing Podgornyy's trip in late June, the sending of military delegations to the Middle East, and the visits of Soviet naval vessels to Port Said and Alexandria as measures of the Soviet effort to strengthen Arab defenses, it suggests that the successful use of the aid rests with the Arabs in stressing the importance of the efficient mastering of equipment and the need to improve the Arab armed forces.

The document tends to exaggerate Soviet efforts to prevent war in late May 1967 and Soviet support for the Arabs when war broke out. According to its account the USSR urged restraint on the Arabs during the late May visits of Badran and Atasi, but when the war started, sent military aid to the Arabs and Soviet warships into the Mediterranean as a counterpoise to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. And, finally, according to the document, the Soviets issued a series of warnings, culminating in the 10 June message to President Johnson containing a threat of unspecified Soviet counteractions if Israel did

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not cease military operations.

At the same time, the document reaffirmed the Soviet interest in a "political settlement" and Israel's continued existence as a state, while calling for an immediate and unconditidnal withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory. In this connection, the document cited the admonition of the July Budapest conference that the Arabs must be more realistic and that the first step should combine a demand for immediate Israeli withdrawal with an arrangement for terminating the state of war between the Arabs and Israel.

The Soviet advocacy of this policy nonetheless left a number of questions of interpretation and implementation unanswered. The less extreme Arab leaders had already indicated that they wanted Israeli withdrawal from *all* territories occupied after 5 June, a condition unacceptable to Israel. Further, the Arabs and Israelis were at odds on the question of *when* Israeli withdrawal would occur–before, during, or after some reciprocal Arab action. In this period the Soviet position vacillated. It shifted from demanding withdrawal *before* any reciprocating Arab move to a more flexible stance and back again. The argument over the foregoing issues was further exacerbated by questions of passage through international waterways, settlement of the refugee problem, supervision of an agreement, direct talks, and so forth. Thus, passage of a UN resolution, seen as a major goal for so long, was simply a first step, and a hesitant one at that, toward a solution.

CONCLUSION

While the resolution was not a panacea, its passage punctuated the change in Soviet tactics which had evolved since the June war. Before the war Moscow lent support to the fanatic Syrian regime which it saw as a springboard for extending Soviet influence in the Middle East. To this end Moscow pursued conflicting tactics which soon proved counter-productive. On the one hand, Moscow made no effective effort to curb the mounting Syrian propaganda and guerrilla campaign against Israel and at one point helped abet that campaign by disseminating a false report of an imminent Israeli military move against Syria. On the other hand, Moscow sought to revive Egyptian-Syrian rapprochement evidently expecting that such a development would at once serve to curb Syrian initiative and deter Israel. However, the unintended result of the Soviet policy was not to improve control over the Syrians but to radicalize Nasir and to accelerate the movement of events toward war.

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Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

During and after the war, the Soviets improvised policy staying away from direct involvement behind a smokescreen of pro-Arab propaganda and diplomatic gestures. Moscow issued some vague threats and initiated an airlift to the Arab nations while making clear to the Arabs that the USSR would not be drawn then or in the future to such a war.

As the war crisis receded Soviet policy shifted toward stronger support of Nasir who evidently was at least temporarily chastened by defeat. Moscow followed Nasir's lead and gave its support to the Khartoum summit conference. The conference was endorsed by the conservative (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan) and moderate (UAR) Arabs and boycotted by the radical Syrians. The Soviets urged the Syrians both to attend the conference and modify their line. In the face of Syrian refusal, Moscow put pressure on the Syrians by giving them less military aid than was requested—but to no avail. The new Soviet line was underscored by the USSR's endorsement of the UN compromise resolution in November despite Syrian opposition. Earlier in July 1967 Syrian opposition had led the Soviets to back down from their proposed resolution. In November they refused to back down again and on the 22nd a compromise resolution was passed in the Security Council with Soviet backing. While it might have been supposed at the end of 1967 that Soviet policy on the Middle East had finally evolved into a more or less firm course, Soviet policy since then has once again displayed a schizoid tendency.

Despite a determination in the aftermath of the June disaster to prevent a repetition of that episode, the Soviet leadership has continued to ride on the back of an unpredictable and untamed Arab nationalist movement. Indeed, Soviet diplomats became more vocal in urging restraint on the Arabs in late 1967 and warned them not to expect direct Soviet participation in any second installment of the June war. Nonetheless, Moscow at the same time resumed and even augmented the policies that had produced Arab overconfidence in the first place: it re-equipped Arab armies, stepped up training of the Arab military through an expanded corps of Soviet advisors, and began to funnel aid to the Arab guerrillas—the most fanatical vanguard of the Arab movement against Israel.

The renewed Soviet preference for the presumably more malleable Egyptians over the Syrian zealots scarcely offset the chronic danger inherent in Soviet policy. Any pressure Moscow put on Nasir in favor of a political settlement with Israel was restricted by its own desire not to alienate the Arab leader. Acting under this inhibition the Soviet moderate line of late 1967 has eroded as Nasir's anti-Israeli militancy has mounted to a point

where he rivals the Syrians in stridency. The moderate trend in Soviet policy has been increasingly submerged by a trend toward more open support of Arab militancy. Recently, the latter trend was underscored by Shelepin's speech (19 October 1969) at a WFTU meeting endorsing a strong line of active aid to Arab guerrillas, Kosygin's remarks in a similar vein (10 December 1969) in welcoming an Egyptian delegation, and increasing favorable reportage in Soviet media of the activities and reputed exploits of the Arab guerrilla movement. The shift suggests that Moscow once more seems intent on keeping pace with Arab radicalization. Moreover, with its increased military and naval presence in the area along with greater confidence in its strategic posture toward the United States, Moscow may now see itself in a better position than it was in 1967 to tolerate the risk inherent in its policy and be ready for a more active role in any future crisis in the Middle East. While such a judgment does not necessarily imply that the present Soviet leadership has developed a penchant for sudden or risky initiatives in crisis situations, it has unmistakably striven to put itself in a position to play a more active part in future crises and incidentally reduce its vulnerability to charges of unpreparedness from internal critics that arose in June 1967. In sum, the Soviets currently estimate that the long-range gains for Soviet influence in the Middle East outweigh the chronic danger of having events get out of control as they did in June 1967.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The prelude to the Arab-Israeli war contains the recurring theme of Soviet attempts to manipulate and take advantage of a highly explosive situation over which, in the final analysis,the Soviets had no control. Prior to the radical Baathist coup in Syria in February 1966, Soviet policy-makers focused on wooing Nasir. After the coup, they saw Syria as another promising candidate for advancing Soviet influence in the Middle East and turned their attentions to that more fanatical, more anti-Israeli nation. In the spring of 1966 they began to support a radical anti-Israel line more in harmony with the inclinations of the fanatical Syrians than with the relatively moderate views of Nasir.

The decision to support the Syrians involved the commitment of prestige as well as additional quantities of economic and military equipment. Thus the Soviet Union assumed a major interest in insuring the survival of a shaky regime, beset by internal problems and vulnerable to outside pressures. Syria's hostility toward her conservative, pro-West Arab neighbor Jordan created fear of subversion from that quarter, and her aggressive policy towards Israel—including both verbal and terrorist attacks—created the constant possibility of reprisals from that nation.

In addition to supporting a generally harder (more pro-Arab, anti-Israel) propaganda line in the Middle East, the USSR began to issue vague warnings against any outside interference in Syria's affairs. In the beginning these warnings were directed primarily at Jordan, but soon the focus of apprehension shifted to Israel, which was portrayed as the tool of the United States. Although this anti-U.S. line was consistent with the Soviet policy of undermining U.S. influence in the area and, therefore, might have been used in any case, it is also possible that memories of the 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon contributed to a fear of U.S. interference in Syria.

Hoping to ward off any retaliatory attacks against Damascus, the Soviets sought to bring Syria and the UAR closer together; this was not an easy task as the two had been very hostile since the break-up of their union in 1961. In seeking a Syrian-UAR rapprochement, the Soviets may have hoped to gain several things; first,they might have felt Nasir could persuade the Syrians to take a less provocative attitude toward Israel, and, secondly, they apparently wanted Nasir to pledge his support to Syria and thereby deter any planned intervention against Syria. A Soviet disseminated report in October 1966 that Israeli troops were concentrating along the Syrian border

in preparation for an attack may have helped prompt the signing of a UAR-Syrian mutual defense pact directed against Israel in November 1966. The terms of the pact made the UAR the senior partner with the option of determining when and how it would respond to any hostilities between Israel and Syria. The Soviets and Egyptians may have hoped this would increase their influence over Syria; the most important effect of the treaty, however, was to render Nasir more vulnerable to demagogic pressures brought by the extremist Syrians.

During the early months of 1967 the conflict on the Israeli-Syrian border mounted as guerrilla attacks from Syrian territory intensified. An Israeli reprisal attack and a major air battle on 7 April between Syrians and Israelis resulted in an overwhelming victory for the latter and pointed up Syria's military vulnerability. Nasir's passivity during and after this battle led to new efforts by the Soviets to persuade Nasir to make a credible commitment to Syria, probably in the hope that this would deter Israel.

Another Soviet-spread rumor in mid-May 1967 that Israel had mobilized its forces on the Syrian border in preparation for a major attack triggered the chain of events which led to war. The rumor was without basis in fact, and while some analysts feel that the Soviets did believe the report, it seems likely that they did not.* If they did believe it, they were remiss in their failure to investigate it. A similar Soviet-disseminated false accusation in October 1966 had been followed by the November defense pact between Syria and the UAR. It is thus quite possible the Soviets were again consciously using a false report in an effort to manipulate Nasir. They may have hoped to convince Nasir that an Israeli attack on Syria was imminent and that he should convincingly show his support for Syria and thereby deter the Israelis from undertaking any major hostile action.

The Soviets' willingness to pass along an uncorroborated report as dramatic as this one illustrated their readiness before the war to take risks for the sake of their immediate goals. Of course, the full extent of the danger was not yet understood. In their drive to gain Nasir's support for the Syrians they added fuel to an already explosive situation. Their concern about a

**The Soviets may well have feared, however, that the Israelis were contemplating an eventual attack. On 12 May Israeli Premier Eshkol had issued a sharp warning to Syria, stating that that nation faced severe counteraction if it did not halt terrorist raids into Israel.*

possible Syrian-Israeli conflict and their desire to increase their own influence and power in the area at the expense of the United States caused the Soviets to underestimate the risks involved in their policy. The USSR was trying to play the role of manipulator, but it did not have direct control over the primary actors.

Nasir, the led, now topk the lead into his own hands. The Soviets initially looked on approvingly as he mobilized Egyptian forces and moved them toward the Israeli borders. (Some analysts feel the Soviets were upset by the Egyptian mobilization, but if that was the case, they gave no indication of disapproval.) His demand that UN emergency forces be withdrawn from Sinai and the Gaza Strip was described by him and accepted by the Soviets as an attempt to deter Israel by convincing the latter of Egyptian readiness to come to Syria's defense. However, the Soviets were not quite so sanguine or approving of Nasir's 22 May announcement that he was blockading the Gulf of Aqaba. For this was not a move to *deter* Israel but was itself a provocation which the Israelis interpreted as an act of war.

At this important stage the Soviets made little effort to retrieve the situation for which they had so carefully laid the groundwork. Although they were *not* informed in advance of the blockade and did not approve of it, they were clearly unwilling to squander any of their influence by trying to convince Nasir that he must pull back. They seem to have minimized the possible dangers, being persuaded that the United States could and would restrain Israel, fairly sure that the UAR could deter Israel from any attack (Nasir himself seemed convinced the Arabs could handle Israel militarily), and secure in the belief that regardless of what happened the USSR could only gain politically at the expense of the United States.

Instead of trying to convince Nasir that he must retreat, the Soviets continued with their demagogic but ambivalent support of the Arabs. They issued strong statements of support for the Arab cause, implying Soviet assistance in the event of imperialist aggression. They left deliberately vague, however, the forms such assistance would take and under what circumstances it would be forthcoming. Nasir was convinced that the USSR would at least prevent any U.S. interference in Israel's behalf, his major anxiety at the time. There is no evidence that the Soviets ever made it clear to him, however, that they would not become directly involved* and they never

**On one occasion in mid-May, they did finally indicate this to the Syrians, but there is reason to doubt that this one clear statement in a welter of Soviet ambiguity ever reached the UAR.*

tried to persuade Nasir to retreat from the suicidal steps he had already taken. The closest they came to the latter was to suggest that he not take *further* provocative actions.

Surprised by the Israeli attack on 5 June and shocked by the ease and magnitude of the Israeli victory, the Soviets first of all made sure that they would not be pulled into the conflict. They made immediate use of the "hot-line" to Washington both to try to put a stop to the Israeli attack and to insure against a U.S./USSR confrontation. They rejected the Arab charge of U.S./UK participation in Israeli air attacks—a charge they probably felt was calculated to draw them into the war. The Soviets then turned to the task of salvaging what they could from the debacle. They supported a simple cease-fire resolution in the United Nations in an attempt to cut Arab losses, and they initiated an emergency airlift of equipment to their Arab allies.

The only indications of possible direct Soviet involvement came after Israel began its march into Syria on 9 June. On that date the Soviets began to issue vague warnings of possible Soviet action if Israel did not stop its advance toward Damascus, and on 11 June there were several reports indicating that the Soviets in fact were making plans for token landings of sailors and/or paratroops in Syria. After the war the Soviets attributed the cessation of hostilities by Israel to the effect of its warnings. While it is possible that Israel stopped its advance rather than risk possible Soviet intervention, it is more likely that it stopped because it had achieved its objective of capturing the strategic Golan Heights; there is little to suggest that Israel planned to advance to any of the Arab capitals. In any event, the Soviet threats were kept vague and the reported actions being considered by the USSR were belated and only token in nature.

The initial reactions of the Soviets during the war seemed almost instinctive in character—first, self-preservation and then the attempt to salvage what they could. Immediately after the war they continued with essentially the same approach; they tried to redeem themselves in the eyes of their Arab allies by sending high-level delegations to reassure the Arabs of continued Soviet support, and they tried to regain some of their international prestige by championing the Arab cause with strong words in the United Nations.

However, interwoven from the beginning of the post-war period were the strands of a somewhat more cautious Soviet approach to the Middle East, based on the desire to prevent a recurrence of the June disaster. Soviet fear of another runaway situation was demonstrated by their demands for

some control over future arms shipments, by an unwillingness to make unlimited commitments of military aid, particularly to the Syrians, and by the Soviet decision to make it clear to the Arabs that they would *not* come to their assistance in the event of renewed hostilities with Israel.* Furthermore, in July 1967 the Soviets seemed to be working toward a compromise UN resolution which would combine demands for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories with termination of the state of belligerency in the Middle East.

However, in many important ways Soviet policy retained ambiguities. While fearful of a new military disaster and therefore anxious to restrain Arab militancy, the Soviets quickly demonstrated their support for their Arab clients by shipping large quantities of arms to them. While anxious to get some sort of UN resolution passed, in order to put pressure on Israel to withdraw, the Soviets withdrew their support of such a proposal in July in the face of radical Arab opposition. These apparent contradictions point up the USSR's consistent dilemma—the desire to continue to profit politically from Middle East tension without permitting the situation to explode again.

Soviet policy during the post-war period of June and July was in transition. The leadership was struggling to justify its actions in the Middle East which were under attack from both foreign and domestic sources. Its foreign critics included the Arabs, who had been disillusioned by Soviet inaction during the war. Within the Soviet Union, Moscow City boss Yegorychev attacked these policies at the late June CPSU plenum. Although Yegorychev was removed from his post, the fact that he dared express strong criticism suggests that he felt his views had support from influential elements in the hierarchy.

In spite of internal disagreements, Soviet policy began to take clearer shape in the summer of 1967 and by November of that year the second shift in Soviet policy was virtually complete. The first shift, that of mid-1966, had followed the radical Baathist coup in Syria; it had reflected the Soviet

**The Soviets did, however, manage to retain an element of ambiguity regarding their response in the event of U.S. intervention in a Middle East war. While stating explicitly that no Soviet armed intervention would occur in the event of Arab-Israeli hostilities, they indicated that the USSR might become directly involved in the event of "clear-cut" U.S. intervention—to be determined by the Soviets.*

decision to support and defend this regime and to try to achieve a Syrian-Egyptian rapprochement. It had involved the adoption by the Soviets of a more activist line and had helped push Nasir to a more militant stance. The second shift followed Nasir's own post-war decision to reject the bellicose "continue-to-fight" line of the Syrians, and involved the Soviet decision to support Nasir at the cost of alienating the Syrians.

In late July and August the UAR began to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward the West and a more friendly attitude toward the conservative Arab nations. The latter change in line was probably prompted in large part by the economic plight of the UAR, for soon afterward Arab conservatives came forth with promises of substantial quantities of aid to Nasir. Nasir shifted from opposition to support of a proposed Arab summit which was being endorsed by the conservatives (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan) and boycotted by the radical Syrians. The conference, held in Khartoum at the end of August, gave Nasir and Husayn a mandate to seek a political settlement and termed "reasonable" a compromise Yugoslav proposal. The Soviets, forced to make a public choice between Nasir and the Syrians on this issue, chose Nasir. Critical of the conference until Nasir endorsed it, the Soviets switched to supporting it and at the last moment even tried (unsuccessfully) to persuade the Syrians to attend.

Soviet backing for Nasir's policies was further revealed by the USSR decision in October 1967 to support Nasir's and Husayn's efforts to get a resolution passed in the United Nations. The terms agreed to by the two Arab leaders in September were similar to those included in the Soviet-backed plan of July; the Soviets had withdrawn this plan when the radical Arabs rejected it. This time the Soviets indicated they would support a resolution regardless of Syria's opposition.

The compromise (UK) draft resolution which was finally passed by the UN Security Council contained less favorable terms than those desired by the UAR (for example, it did not specify that Israel withdraw from *all* territories occupied after 4 June, nor did it call for *immediate* Israeli withdrawal. Nonetheless, after considerable haggling Nasir had apparently agreed to accept it. Before its adoption, however, the Soviets made one final attempt to avoid alienating the radical Arabs. On the eve of the Security Council vote, they submitted their own substitute draft calling for *immediate* Israeli withdrawal from *all* territories occupied during the war. However, this was a gesture only, and the day after submitting it the Soviets withdrew the draft and voted for the UK resolution.

The Soviet gesture served to give the radical Arabs some assurance of a Soviet commitment to their cause. The substitute draft restated the Soviets' pro-Arab position and placed the USSR in the role of temporary obstructionist. If the mollifying of the Syrians was its objective, it had little success, for they reacted violently to the passage of the resolution, and attacked the Soviets bitterly for voting for it.

A Soviet-Syrian estrangement had been in the offing throughout the summer and early fall of 1967. Having made their choice for Nasir and the more moderate line, the Soviets had turned to the task of trying to move the Syrians in that direction—to no avail. There was considerable evidence that the Syrians were furious at the lack of Soviet support during the war and dissatisfied at the Soviet subsequent failure to give them everything they wanted in terms of military aid. The rift between the two was further exacerbated by the increased Soviet influence that accompanied the continued aid. The USSR insisted upon, and the Egyptians and the Syrians acquiesced to, the stationing of Soviet instructors and advisors at all levels of both the UAR and Syrian armed forces. Although they probably recognized the need for Soviet personnel to instruct in the use of equipment, both the Syrians and Egyptians undoubtedly had to swallow considerable pride in order to accept the presence of large numbers of foreign military advisors.

The Soviets also, according to reports, exerted pressure for the acquisition or use of naval facilities in the Mediterranean. They have not acquired control of any Arab ports, and even their use of these facilities has been minimal, with Soviet vessels relying primarily on their own auxiliary ships for supplies and repairs. However, the Soviet fleet has been provided continual access to various Arab ports, and Soviet vessels have paid occasional visits to them with the apparent purpose of demonstrating Soviet support for the Arabs and deterring Israel from attacking these ports. Israel has in fact not attacked any of these ports, but it is a matter of conjecture whether or not this has had anything to do with the Soviet presence.

Soviet shipments of military equipment to the Arabs increased in intensity during and just after the war. The Soviets apparently promised almost immediately to replace all equipment lost in the war and this has been virtually accomplished. Since the summer of 1967 shipments have settled down to a fairly steady flow, and the resupply program has restored Arab capabilities to at least the pre-war level.

In a similar way the Soviet attitude toward the fedayeen has tended to increase rather than decrease tension. Despite the dangers of major Israeli

retaliation, the Soviets have been increasingly unwilling to alienate the fedayeen, and, as a result, have been providing them indirectly with some assistance—mostly small arms equipment. In the last half of 1969 Soviet media began to voice support of the fedayeen and to publicize reports on the guerrilla-terrorists actions. And by the end of 1969 statements by figures at the Politburo level indicated that a line favoring more active aid to the Arab guerrillas was emerging in the Soviet leadership. Soviet recognition of the fedayeen as a force to be reckoned with reflects the political reality of the situation; since the June war the fedayeen have become a significant factor in the Middle East.

The actual Soviet military presence in the Middle East has increased substantially since the war. The Soviet Mediterranean fleet was bolstered significantly during 1967 and then leveled off. After the war the Soviets stationed large numbers of technicians and advisors in all branches and at all levels of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces with the objective of raising the standards and capabilities of these organizations. The element of caution is also present in this policy, as these personnel have the additional purpose of exercising some control over the use to which Soviet-supplied arms are put. However, though Soviet advisors have apparently been given a high degree of authority, particularly in training operations, thus causing considerable friction with the Arabs, there is no evidence in either the UAR or Syria of direct Soviet command and control authority. It is doubtful that direct participation of Soviet personnel in combat would occur, or, if it did occur, that it would be acknowledged.*

Nonetheless, the added Soviet presence in the Middle East increases the possibility of Soviet involvement in a future conflict. Furthermore, in spite of the presence of Soviet advisors, the USSR has little more control over Arab actions than it had in May 1967. Nasir is as unpredictable as ever, and apparently determined to maintain military pressure against Israel along the Suez Canal. There is little to suggest that the Soviets have made any serious effort to restrain him. Thus, the Soviets are again in the position of being

**The presence of Soviet personnel in Syria may be partially responsible for Israel's restraint in launching reprisal attacks in Syria. However, this may be due more to the fact that the Syrians have been cautious about launching terrorist attacks from their own territory; the latter seems more likely as the Israelis have launched reprisal raids into the UAR in spite of the presence there of Soviet personnel.*

heavily committed in terms of money, arms, men and prestige to its Arab clients without having a proportionate share in the decision-making.

Soviet policy in the Middle East thus bears a resemblance to an attempt at pressure cookery without a reliable safety valve. With one hand Moscow has sought to hold the lid on pressures tending toward another major eruption in the Middle East and with the other feeds the fire causing those pressures. In fact, the moderating tendency in Soviet policy which emerged after the June war has suffered erosion recently. The Soviets' choice of Nasir over the Syrians as the less fanatical and irrational of the two has been undercut by the increasing anti-Israeli militancy of the Egyptians under Nasir's lead since the June war. Unwilling to lose the position they have beside the vanguard of the Arab movement, the Soviets are once again moving with the current of Arab extremism. The danger of the policy is certain, but what remains very uncertain is whether or not the Soviets have instituted effective means to guide or deflect the current whenever Soviet interest requires.

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

ANDREY KIRILENKO AND THE
SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION

HR70-14
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15 March 1971
RSS No. 0050/71



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 March 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

ANDREY KIRILENKO AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION

Andrey Kirilenko has many of the requisites to become the Soviet Union's next "number one," replacing Leonid Brezhnev in the post of Party General Secretary upon the latter's retirement, fall, or demise, should any of these occur. For one thing, as Brezhnev's senior cadres secretary, Kirilenko directly controls the appointment of Party personnel to the highest posts in the regime, and thus is better placed than his colleagues to build the necessary political support for such an advance. Perhaps more important is the steady increase in his real power and authority in the top Party leadership over the past several years. With Brezhnev's support, he appears to have gained an edge over the other senior secretary serving as the General Secretary's deputy, Mikhail Suslov. There may well be, therefore, some formalization of Kirilenko's de facto position as Brezhnev's second in command at the 24th Party Congress, which is scheduled to convene in late March.

The possibility of Kirilenko's actually succeeding Brezhnev in the top Party post sometime in the future depends to a decisive degree, of course, on his having developed and maintained sufficient support among the regime's leading oligarchs: the members of the Party Politburo who make all major policy decisions and who will settle the issue of the political succession. These leaders have tended since Khrushchev's ouster to fall roughly into three categories: 1) the "Ukrainian group," (those officials, not necessarily Ukrainian by nationality or birth, who served under Khrushchev in the Ukraine),

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Special Research Staff, Directorate of Intelligence, and was coordinated within the Directorate.

which is generally aligned with Brezhnev in terms of power interests; 2) the "outsiders" of the Politburo, who tend periodically to make trouble for Brezhnev, and whose leading example is trade union chief Aleksandr Shelepin; and 3) the two outstanding "independents," Kosygin and Suslov, who have sufficient seniority and prestige to avoid long-lived factional commitments in the Party's internal power struggles.

Kirilenko's relations with the central figure of the Ukrainian group, Brezhnev, are fairly good despite a few differences of emphasis in their policy views. Their apparent personal closeness is likely to have evolved from their long association in heavy-industrial supervision in the Party during their Ukrainian period and later, and is reinforced by the general similarity of their policy views. The General Secretary seems to have reached a comfortable understanding with his cadres secretary in Party-organizational questions. Brezhnev has proceeded with relative freedom in removing Shelepin's clients from key positions but has left most other personnel areas alone. Kirilenko may conceivably have favored more moderate treatment than Brezhnev would have preferred for some of Shelepin's deposed supporters, but in any event he apparently has avoided offending Brezhnev through excessive favoritism and personal patronage in his own filling of routine vacancies.

The strength of Kirilenko's political ties with other individuals in the Ukrainian group is as varied as their bureaucratic positions and interests are mixed. Soviet "President" Nikolay Podgornyy, once a strong rival to Brezhnev but now without much of a Party power base, seems close to Kirilenko in policy outlook. In fact, Podgornyy appears to have preserved many of his political connections with him and the rest of the Ukrainian group. Therefore, assuming him to be politically active when the succession is decided, Podgornyy probably would give Kirilenko his vote of confidence, at least over competitors from outside the Ukrainian group.

First Deputy Premier Dmitriy Polyanskiy, whose connections with the Ukrainian Party organization are real but less obvious than those of Brezhnev or Podgornyy, rose through the ranks roughly parallel with Kirilenko until

the late 1950s. The emergence of Frol Kozlov at that time as Khrushchev's heir-designate resulted in a temporary setback for Kirilenko (and Brezhnev), but did not adversely affect Polyanskiy's (or Podgornyy's) career. Despite his apparent political connections with Kozlov, Polyanskiy managed to hold his position when the Ukrainians regained the ascendancy in 1963. Inherent in the Polyanskiy-Kirilenko relationship, however, is the potential for disagreement arising from their differing bureaucratic interests. Indeed, Polyanskiy's vested interest in rapid agricultural development seems at times to have clashed with Kirilenko's strong commitment to a policy of increased labor productivity and efficiency and his apparent desire to channel some agricultural funds elsewhere.

Ukrainian Party boss Petr Shelest, who rose under the aegis of Podgornyy and has a history of rivalry with some of the Ukrainian associates of Brezhnev and Kirilenko, could play an important part in the political succession. Shelest, in addition to controlling the Ukrainian Party organization, may have assumed leadership of the forces which Podgornyy once marshaled on the national level. Shelest may in fact be trying to undermine Brezhnev's influence in the Ukrainian group, and this further complicates Kirilenko's position.

Kirilenko apparently has tried to keep open his lines to the regime's younger non-Ukrainian leaders, despite their critical attitudes toward Brezhnev. Shelepin, the leading "outsider" among Politburo members, and Kirilenko seem to have a common approach to many policy problems, for example, they both have an evident distrust of detente with the West, and particularly with the United States. Brezhnev's maneuverings in 1966 brought them into rivalry in the Secretariat, however, and the transfer of Shelepin to the trade union post in 1967 appeared eventually to separate him from Kirilenko, who was drawn closer to Brezhnev. But while Kirilenko has not visibly sought to hinder Brezhnev in his repeated efforts to downgrade Shelepin's supporters, the weight of the evidence suggests that Brezhnev has not yet succeeded fully in disrupting the relationship between the two.

First Deputy Premier Kirill Mazurov is another "outsider" with whom Kirilenko could become allied in the political succession. The two men have worked together since 1965 in the sphere of industrial management, Kirilenko on the Party side and Mazurov in the government. They appear to have similar views in this area, as well as in foreign policy. Differences with Brezhnev and rivalry with Polyanskiy complicate Mazurov's own future, but so far they do not seem to have significantly worsened his relations with Kirilenko.

A third "outsider," RSFSR Premier Gennadiy Voronov, has a long history of rivalry with Kirilenko in terms of both power interests and policy views. Several major gains which Kirilenko made in consolidating his hold on the Party cadres apparatus in the RSFSR since 1962 were at the expense of Voronov's influence in this sphere. In the Communist political spectrum Voronov has the reputation of a "moderate" who apparently favors concessions in economic policy that conflict with Kirilenko's more orthodox approach in most economic areas.

Premier Aleksey Kosygin, one of the two "independents" of the Politburo whose place in the top leadership is crucial to the succession issue, may have little direct contact with Kirilenko. The main rivalry between the Secretariat and Council of Ministers centers on Brezhnev and Kosygin, and Kirilenko's position in this competition seems to shift with the issues. More importantly, on a number of domestic and foreign policy questions Kirilenko and Kosygin appear to hold opposite views, although they have apparently arrived at a consensus of sorts in policy on industrial management and planning. Brezhnev's position has favored sometimes Kosygin, sometimes Kirilenko, and occasionally neither.

The presence of the other "independent," Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov, seriously complicates Kirilenko's chances in the succession. With more than 23 years' continuous service in the Secretariat, Suslov has enormous prestige and considerable power in spite of his having specialized almost exclusively in ideology, propaganda, and foreign Communist relations. The limited evidence suggests that Suslov and Kirilenko are in fact

engaged in a struggle for position and power, without necessarily being in opposition on matters of policy. In making personnel appointments, Kirilenko has shown his hand in the provinces, where a large number of technocrats have risen to the post of Party boss, but Suslov has apparently had a moderating influence on Kirilenko's placement of cadres in the central posts, where a majority of appointees have been apparent compromises.

Several men who are at present lesser lights, primarily at the level of alternate member of the Politburo and member of the Secretariat, could become important in the political succession. Arvid Pel'she, chairman of the Party Control Commission and a full member of the Politburo at age 72 appears destined for retirement soon; however, as long as he remains active he probably would side with Suslov (his patron and reported brother-in-law) rather than Kirilenko. Among the Politburo alternate members possible Kirilenko supporters in a crisis include Party Secretary Dmitriy Ustinov, a quasi-"independent" who oversees all Soviet defense-related industry; and KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, whose past political connections with Suslov and others have not prevented the development of ties to Kirilenko. Larger question marks among the other potentially important figures in the succession picture are Party secretaries Ivan Kapitonov and Petr Demichev, responsible for supervising respectively the cadres sector and the propaganda machine. Kapitonov has worked for Kirilenko in the cadres apparatus since 1965 but has not clearly revealed his political sympathies. Demichev seems most closely allied with Shelepin and apparently has had little contact with Kirilenko.

On the basis of the foregoing, Kirilenko's influence within the leadership can be summarized as generally quite strong when compared with that of his closest competitors. His firmest support comes from the Ukrainian group, but he apparently has some political contact with the younger "outsiders," and could well enter into an alliance with them in the succession. There are, however, any number of imponderables affecting Kirilenko's chances to become the "number one" man in the Party, the first being Brezhnev's health -- political and otherwise. The most likely prospect is for Brezhnev's receiving a mandate at the 24th Party Congress.

to continue as Party boss for another 4-5 year term. Therefore, Kirilenko's best opportunity for taking command himself would seem to be the General Secretary's physical incapacitation or early death. A second important consideration is Kirilenko's age. Brezhnev actually is a few months younger than Kirilenko (though apparently less healthy). Should Brezhnev seem likely to remain General Secretary for a few more years, Kirilenko could decide to bid instead for the premiership with the support of the Party boss.

What kind of successor might Kirilenko be? His policy views may be summarized as neo-Stalinist for the most part. His foreign policy views reveal the mind of a fairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist who is highly suspicious of the West. Kirilenko has thus far had relatively few dealings with Western statesmen, in contrast with Brezhnev for example, who had some such contacts under Khrushchev during a three-year term as Soviet "President." Kirilenko's cautious lip service to a policy of detente is infrequent and carries tough conditions which appear almost to rule out its application to the US, and he has been in the forefront of those leaders who champion the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of limited sovereignty and of defense of "socialist gains." In his public statements Kirilenko has come as close as any other top Soviet leader to explicit advocacy of a forward policy. He has termed the rendering of Soviet aid to the Vietnamese and Arabs not only a "revolutionary duty" but also a requirement of Soviet security. He also has been very critical, incidentally, of the Communist Chinese leadership and has defended the Soviet policy of attacking Peking's political and ideological positions and building up a "secure defense" against any (that is, Chinese) encroachments; he has, however, remained within the general framework of Brezhnev's policy of not shutting the door on hope for a reconciliation with China in the long run.

The militancy Kirilenko reveals in foreign policy statements has its corollary in domestic policies, especially in the cultural and social spheres. Although he apparently has accepted the rationale behind increased consumer-goods production in recent years, Kirilenko has argued against immediate aid to agriculture and housing in the allocation of resources. He long has favored the use

of exhortation and persuasion over the application of material incentives to production; in addition, he has failed to endorse the major wage gains of recent years which Brezhnev, for one, has defended.

Kirilenko has revealed something of an undogmatic, technocratic bias, however, in his views on economic management. His speeches on this theme over the years have consistently promoted pragmatic solutions to the long-standing managerial problems of the Soviet economy. Significantly, the (for him) rare mention of Stalin during the early 1960s -- Khrushchev, of course, had numerous public supporters of his de-Stalinization campaign then -- was in the context of criticism of the dictator's "dogmas," the stereotypes and rigid policies which, according to Kirilenko, prevented honest appraisals of the economy and hampered science and technology. In line with his economic pragmatism, Kirilenko has been one of the few Soviet leaders to associate himself publicly with the creation of a business management school along "bourgeois" lines.

As in the case with Soviet leaders in general, little is known about Kirilenko's real views on defense and strategic questions, although something of his general attitude can be inferred from the domestic and foreign policy positions described above. His only public statement on SALT to date was a strictly pro forma assertion in April 1970 that the talks can produce results "if the United States makes an honest attempt to solve the problem at hand and not try to achieve one-sided gains." This cautious remark is consistent with Kirilenko's generally cynical attitude toward the US, which has been to the effect that the US government is two-faced in wanting good relations with the Soviet Union while "waging war against another socialist country" (North Vietnam). These views no doubt underlie Kirilenko's repeatedly expressed opinion on the need to increase Soviet defense capabilities in view of a "dangerous" international situation.

It would appear that in most of these questions Kirilenko's hard-nosed views are fairly close to Brezhnev's

conservative position and indeed probably have had a stronger impact than those of most other Politburo members on the thinking of the basically cautious General Secretary. In relation to the other policy-makers, Kirilenko's militancy toward the US and the rest of the "imperialistic" West is not quite as strident as that of Suslov or Shelepin, but it appears in sharp relief against Premier Kosygin's more moderate position. If therefore, Suslov and Kosygin fairly represent the ends of the spectrum on the question of Soviet-US relations with Brezhnev somewhere near the middle, then Kirilenko evidently would fall close to Brezhnev, but on Suslov's side.

Against this background Kirilenko would appear to be little more imaginative in the post of General Secretary than Brezhnev has been. Kirilenko in the post of Premier probably would be perceptibly less open to foreign-policy negotiation than Kosygin has seemed to be. In either the Party or the government post Kirilenko might be inclined to sanction somewhat greater risks than the post-Khrushchev leadership has taken, especially in its dealings with the US in international problem areas, and to endorse an even more repressive policy at home. It is, of course, possible that the greater responsibilities of a higher office and increased contact with Western representatives might induce Kirilenko to moderate somewhat his present views. One factor arguing against any very serious such modification in Kirilenko's views, however, is his apparent disinclination to yield to opportunistic considerations, as reflected in his unusually consistent position on policy issues over the years.

A likely general feature of a Kirilenko regime, therefore, would doubtless be its continuation and intensification of the main policies of the present leadership. Kirilenko would probably be not at all inclined to slow the momentum of the present trend away from the relative laxity of the Khrushchev years but, on the contrary, would be likely to press even harder than he has pushed until now to tighten economic and social discipline. The task of countering such a strong trend could be undertaken only by someone less closely identified with the post-Khrushchev

neo-Stalinism, who might challenge Kirilenko's right to be "number one" much as Khrushchev himself proceeded successfully to wrest the top Party job away from Malenkov in 1953.

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

Portrait of A Neo-Stalinist

Annex To CAESAR XXXIX
(Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political Succession)

(Reference Title: CAESAR XL)

~~Top Secret~~

June 1971

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Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub



TOP SECRET

PORTRAIT OF A NEO-STALINIST

ANNEX TO CAESAR XXXIX
(ANDREY KIRILENKO AND THE SOVIET
POLITICAL SUCCESSION)

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

This Annex to CAESAR XXXIX (March 1971) traces the rise of a tough apparatchik, Andrey Kirilenko, to a top position within the Soviet system. Although the Annex is published especially for those interested in the Soviet leadership question in some depth, the general reader will find profit in the patterns -- of leadership style, policy, and proteges -- which continue to produce more Stalins than Khrushchevs.

The analysis and judgments of this Annex are consistent with those of CAESAR XXXIX, and have similarly met general agreement among Soviet specialists within the Central Intelligence Agency. Comments on this Annex are welcome, and should be addressed to its author, Mr. Albert L. Salter, of this Staff.

Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

TOP SECRET

PORTRAIT OF A NEO-STALINIST

Contents

A NOTE ON SOURCES

As in the case of CAESAR XXXIX (Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political Succession), there is very little clandestine data available; thus the analysis presented in this Annex is based almost entirely on information from open sources

the fragmentary evidence does not permit definitive conclusions in many areas. Significant patterns do evolve, however, in the behavior of individual leaders and groups of leaders, and occasional illuminate certain important facets nd life-style within the top Soviet leadership.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub



PORTRAIT OF A NEO-STALINIST

Preview

The attitudes, prejudices, and working style of senior Politburo and Secretariat member Andrey Kirilenko are fairly representative of the neo-Stalinism that has come to mark the Soviet leadership system since Khrushchev's ouster. This has its deepest roots in the ground of terror prepared by Stalin in the mid-1930s, when he sought to consolidate his dictatorship through the methodical elimination of real or imagined opponents. Those purges took an especially heavy toll among the Party elite, and in the Ukraine the sweep was clean. almost all of the leading officials serving in the Ukraine in 1937 had been replaced, by the end of 1938, by previously obscure persons. This was the "new generation" of loyal Communists, many of them previously technicians rather than politicians, whom Stalin and his lieutenants recruited to fill the many vacuums they were creating in the Party's elite corps.

In January 1938 Khrushchev arrived in the Ukraine as Stalin's viceroy to wind up the purge and to oversee the Party recruitment campaign. His political experience set him off sharply against the neo-Stalinist initiates whom he recruited that year. Khrushchev had joined the Communist Party in 1918, and although not technically an Old Bolshevik, he had much in common with the older generation of Party leaders who were directly associated with the October Revolution. He had observed and to some extent participated in the early Leninist regime, with its degree of tolerance for dissident political views and factions and its unifying spirit of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. Khrushchev was also familiar with

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

its more conspiratorial aspects, which were to loom especially large a decade later as Stalin tightened his grip on the Party.

By contrast, the new elite which Khrushchev formed in the Ukraine in 1938 comprised young Communists who, variously, were sincere in their devotion to Stalin, or intimidated by his terror, or at least aware of how to survive in the system. In any case, they applied themselves to advancing the Stalinist cause, Stalin's name having become synomynous with the ideal of world communism. Because of this awesome baptism into the Party's service, and of their relative inexperience of the greater political diversity Khrushchev and others had known in the 1920s, this "new generation" of leaders acquired many of the political characteristics of Stalin and, in fact, became neo-Stalinists.

This distinction between Khrushchev and his younger Ukrainian hirelings was to set the stage for conflict in the post-Stalin period, after Khrushchev as the new Party boss had brought many of these leaders to Moscow for political support. Although they aided him in his fight against ultraconservatives, especially in the 1950s, these neo-Stalinists were a major force in the coalition of leaders who dumped Khrushchev in 1964, opposing him in large part for his unorthodox, (that is, un-Stalinist) ideas and methods. There is some evidence to suggest that not all of them had endorsed Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization for his own political purposes, and some of them may even have been surprised and dismayed when he launched the famous attack on Stalin in the "Secret Speech" at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In any event, most of them deplored the erosion of political and social discipline under Khrushchev, and many probably hoped for and worked toward a revival of more orthodox Soviet rule.

In short, the neo-Stalinists of today -- and they include such men as Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Shelest, and Kirilenko, all of whom got their start in the Ukraine

during the last years of the great purges, as well as the slightly more "old-line" Stalinist Suslov -- tend as a group toward authoritarian methods of rule. In political and social spheres they promote orthodoxy and conformity, allowing little or no room for experiment and dissent. For neo-Stalinists discipline is the watchword, and liberalizing ideas are anathema. In economic affairs they generally favor strict centralization of management for purposes of control, although a certain pragmatism often is visible in attempts to achieve more with limited means. They call themselves Leninists, but they are almost totally committed to Stalinist methods, except for the general and outright use of terror as an instrument of rule -- and the abandonment of terror apparently has been replaced in recent years by an increasing reliance on the labor-camp system, which had been greatly reduced under Khrushchev.

Kirilenko's career makes a good subject for inquiry into the neo-Stalinism of the present Soviet leadership, in that it illuminates fairly typical salient characteristics of the generation of Party leaders who have become the Kremlin policymakers of today. His formative years in Stalin's political machine were marked, especially during the purge period of the 1930s, by an atmosphere of conspiracy in which political protection was a minimum requisite for survival and advance. His ups and downs during the Khrushchev years, when he aligned himself with the "Ukrainian clique," provide a measure of the infighting which waxed within the Party at that time and which continues, to a lesser degree, to impair the smooth functioning of the regime. And, Kirilenko's career of apprenticeship in the Ukraine, of national prominence in the Russian Federation (RSFSR), and finally at the pinnacle of Party service in the central Secretariat demonstrates the unique closeness of his association during all these years with the present regime's leading neo-Stalinist, General Secretary Brezhnev.

Kirilenko's activities also give glimpses into how decisions are made within the framework of the

oligarchic leadership in the Brezhnev era, his success in pursuit of political power offering a gauge of the extent of neo-Stalinist influence on present policies. In addition, Kirilenko's entire career -- his development as an apparatchik, his performance as a decision-maker and technocratic administrator, and his emergence as Brezhnev's possible successor -- reveals the style, personality, and political outlook of a man who is now playing a primary role in shaping the Soviet course and the Soviet leadership of the future.

I. CASE STUDY OF A NEO-STALINIST ON THE RISE

When he arrived at his first professional Party post in Khrushchev's Ukraine in 1938, Kirilenko had behind him relatively scant experience in political work. In fact, his history as revealed in official though incomplete Soviet biographies suggests that as a youth he was anything but political in outlook. A large factor in his enrollment into the ranks of Party administrators probably was his technical ability, combined with his availability at the right time -- the end of the great purge of the Party elite.

Kirilenko's official biographic data include the facts of his birth on 8 September 1906 in the family of an artisan in a village of present-day Voronezh Oblast. (Earlier it was territorially part of Belgorod Oblast, which borders on the eastern Ukraine.) Thus was he born a Russian, despite his Ukrainian sounding name and probable descent from Ukrainian stock, and his biographies list his nationality as Russian. After completing a professional-technical school in 1925, the 18-year-old Kirilenko began a four-year period of work as a machinist and electrician, part of the time in Voronezh enterprises, and part in a mine in the Donbass. He could conceivably have come in contact with Khrushchev in the Donbass, in that the latter had been active there several years prior to 1928, working first in the mines and then in the Donetsk Party apparatus.

Kirilenko appears to have decided or been encouraged by 1929 to enter political work and to prepare for higher education. He served the next two years in various Komsomol and government organizations while studying in his spare time. On completing his preparatory courses in 1930, he enrolled in the Rybinsk Aviation Institute in Yaroslavl' Oblast (in the RSFSR). His student years were, by all

appearances, distinguished only by his joining the Communist Party at the age of 24 in 1931; he graduated only in 1936.* Kirilenko then moved to the Ukraine to take up the profession of design engineer in a Zaporozh'ye aircraft plant. He held this job for two years -- the worst period of the Stalinist terror and purges -- until Khrushchev's arrival to rebuild the Ukrainian Party apparatus.

A. Learning the Ropes: In the Ukraine (1938-55)

The 32-year old Kirilenko began his professional Party service in 1938 as the second secretary of a rayon (district) committee in Zaporozh'ye Oblast. He advanced rapidly, in 1939 becoming a secretary and then second secretary of the Zaporozh'ye Oblast Party Committee. How much of Kirilenko's promotion was due to Khrushchev's direct influence is unknown; assisting the Ukrainian Party boss in cadres and organizational matters then was M.A. Burmistenko, who reportedly had worked in the secret police in the 1920s and later had been closely associated with Stalin's personal secretariat.** In any event, Kirilenko continued until 1941 to serve as second secretary, presumably overseeing organizational and personnel matters

*Coincidentally, another future leader was graduating in 1936 in Rybinsk, although from the Water Transport Technical School: Yuriy Andropov, presently KGB chief. It is not known if the two young engineers were acquainted at that time. Andropov went into Komsomol work in Yaroslavl' Oblast after graduation, and his path is not known to have crossed Kirilenko's again until much later.

**Robert Conquest, The Great Terror.

in the predominantly heavy-industrial and metallurgical area of Zaporozh'ye, while Stalin and the Kremlin planners began to accelerate their preparations for a possible conflict with Hitler's Germany.

Kirilenko had meanwhile the opportunity to make contact with a number of Party officials who would later assume powerful positions in the regime, especially after Stalin's death. Some of these leaders appear to have been instrumental in assisting Kirilenko's advance. The most important of these was another young engineer named Leonid Brezhnev, who had been promoted in 1938 from a secondary government post to the position of secretary of the neighboring Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee. In view of the geographic and economic closeness of Zaporozh'ye and Dnepropetrovsk, it would not have been unusual for Kirilenko and Brezhnev to have had some contact at that time. Both of them, in turn, presumably had some political association with Aleksey Kirichenko, who served as chief of the Ukrainian Central Committee's Transportation Department



BREZHNEV, L.I.

KIRICHENKO, A.I.

during 1938-40 and who became Khrushchev's Ukrainian Party Secretary for industry before the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Kirichenko was to play an even more important role after the war and after Stalin's death in both Ukrainian and national Party affairs. In fact, his influence may have been as great as Khrushchev's or Brezhnev's was in promoting Kirilenko in the 1950s.

At the start of the war in 1941, many of the leading Ukrainian Party cadres entered military service as political commissars. Khrushchev and Kirichenko functioned as such on the Southwestern Front, for example. Kirilenko became a member of the military council of the 18th Army of the Southern Front. Brezhnev, too, was with the Southern Front at that time, as deputy chief of the Political Administration. In fact, Brezhnev also served, presumably simultaneously, as chief of the 18th Army Political Department, and an article which Kirilenko authored in December 1966 suggested that he and Brezhnev had worked in the same area at the front during this period. However, Kirilenko soon left the military service -- probably in April 1942, although official Soviet sources confuse the date -- to begin work at a Moscow aircraft plant as a representative of the Soviet Defense Committee. He returned, reportedly in 1943, to his former Ukrainian post of second secretary for Zaporozh'ye Oblast.

CONFIDENTIAL

KHRUSHCHEV, N. S.

Kirilenko's postwar career was marked by unspectacular but regular advances, behind which were a number of Ukrainian Party leaders. The central figure, of course, was Khrushchev, who had returned to the Ukraine in 1944. For three years, until March 1947, Khrushchev ruled the Ukraine virtually single-handedly. During this immediate postwar period

Khrushchev combined the posts of Ukrainian first secretary, Ukrainian Premier, and Party boss of both the city and the oblast committees of Kiev. He was indefatigably active, and all important personnel actions during this period had to have his approval. His decisive influence in shaping the Ukrainian cadres corps in the postwar period of reconstruction was manifested later in the support his Ukrainian associates, including Kirilenko, gave him in his political struggles against such formidable rivals as Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Kozlov.

Several circumstances suggest, nevertheless, that Brezhnev and others in Khrushchev's Ukrainian cohort had a more direct interest and involvement in promoting Kirilenko to higher posts than had the Party boss himself. For example, Brezhnev's first assignment on returning to the Ukraine from his political work in the military in September 1946 was to the post of Party boss in Zaporozh'ye, replacing the first secretary for whom Kirilenko had worked since 1943 and even before the war. Brezhnev's installation as Party boss over the head of Kirilenko does not argue strongly that Khrushchev had yet acquired an interest in furthering the career of the second secretary. However, Brezhnev and Kirilenko did not work together very long, for the latter's fortunes soon improved: he was promoted in February 1947 to the post of Party boss in Nikolayev Oblast, a Black Sea port and machine-building area. It seems plausible, especially in view of Brezhnev's probable prewar and wartime association with Kirilenko, that this sudden change in Kirilenko's fortunes was in large part due to a Brezhnev recommendation.*

**The promotion was, however, only a small chapter in the story of high-level maneuvering for control over cadres in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia. In May 1946 Georgiy Malenkov, by then one of the most powerful Kremlin figures, apparently had suffered a setback at the hands of his rivals in the center and lost direct control over*

(footnote continued on page 12)

In Dnepropetrovsk

Brezhnev's involvement appeared likely again in the transfer of Kirilenko in July 1950 to the more important position of Dnepropetrovsk Party boss. Brezhnev had held the post from late 1947 until early 1950, when he followed Khrushchev from the Ukraine to Moscow.* Despite their physical absence from the Ukraine, both Khrushchev and Brezhnev undoubtedly continued to exert

(footnote continued from page 11)
the cadres sector. As one consequence, the handling of cadres affairs in the Ukraine was criticized in a Central Committee decree and, more importantly, Aleksey Yepishev was released from political work in the armed forces in July to become Khrushchev's "cadres secretary." The assignment of Yepishev, who had served Khrushchev before the war as Khar'kov Party boss, undercut the growing power of Second Secretary Dem'yan Korotchenko, a Kaganovich client who had succeeded in getting direct control over personnel assignments in July 1945 with the exile of the then cadres secretary, Kirichenko, to the post of first secretary of Odessa Oblast. Yepishev continued to serve as cadres secretary until 1949, when he went into a period of political decline. However, since 1962, under the aegis of first Khrushchev and then Brezhnev, Yepishev has held the important position of chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, which carries political rank and power equivalent to that of a Central Committee department chief.

**Khrushchev went to Moscow in December 1949 to join the central Secretariat. Brezhnev left Dnepropetrovsk the following April to work in the Central Committee apparatus and then, in July, was installed as Moldavian Party first secretary.*

their influence in the Ukraine. In particular, Brezhnev probably would have had a decisive say in the matter of selecting Kirilenko as his successor. Of course, Kirilenko's transfer would have had at least the formal approval of the new Ukrainian first and second secretaries, Leonid Mel'nikov and Aleksey Kirichenko.*

Kirilenko's Dnepropetrovsk assignment was to last five and a half years, until the end of 1955. He presumably gained further valuable experience from administering the large Party organization in this important industrial area, but he did not appear to be involved much in the political battles that were being fought in the last years of Stalin's reign. He was not elected to the Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission at the 19th Party

**Mel'nikov had been installed in the Ukrainian Secretariat during Kaganovich's 9-month stint as Party boss in 1947 -- that is, when Khrushchev had been temporarily removed from all posts but that of Ukrainian premier. When Khrushchev regained the post of Party first secretary in the Ukraine, his former second secretary and rival Korotchenko became premier, and Mel'nikov became second secretary. It is unclear whether Khrushchev himself arranged these transfers or the subsequent elevation of Mel'nikov to first secretary; he may more plausibly have proposed or sanctioned Kirichenko's return from his Odessa exile to replace Mel'nikov as second secretary. Mel'nikov was to be removed as Ukrainian Party boss soon after Stalin's death in 1953, and the evidence suggests that Khrushchev sacrificed him in collusion with Beriya in order to install Kirichenko in his place. Mel'nikov reappeared in a diplomatic post after Beriya's removal but never regained a position of power. Since 1966 he has been chairman of the State Committee for Supervision of Industrial and Mining Safety, presumably enjoying the patronage of Brezhnev and Kirilenko in this sinecure. Korotchenko was relegated in January 1954 to the honorific but relatively powerless post of Ukrainian "President," in which he remained until his death in 1969.*

Congress in October 1952, despite the fact that Khrushchev played a major role at the congress in organizational matters and Brezhnev was elected to the central Secretariat and made an alternate member of the enlarged Party Presidium, as the Politburo was called then and until 1966.* In fact, the period of 1950-53 was one of apparent retrenchment for most "older" Ukrainian Party officials as the turnover of personnel increased in the republic. The change in membership of the Ukrainian Central Committee between republic Party congresses in January 1949 and September 1952 registered a casualty rate of 50 percent among leading cadres. Kirilenko was one of those older leaders whose political connections (and, perhaps, administrative talents) held them in good stead.

The death of Stalin and the consolidation of Khrushchev's position in 1953 brought increased political upheaval in the Ukraine as elsewhere, but Kirilenko did not get a career break for more than two years. Meanwhile, he had an opportunity to strengthen political ties that would prove useful in the future. His fast-rising associate Kirichenko moved up from Ukrainian second secretary to replace the demoted Mel'nikov as Ukrainian Party boss soon after Khrushchev took over the Party. Nikolay Podgornyy, who had served three years as Khar'kov Party first secretary and was therefore one of Kirilenko's peers

On the other hand, the Dnepropetrovsk post apparently did not rate a seat on either the Central Committee or the Central Auding Commission at that time. Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, the oblast first secretary after Kirilenko, was elected a member of the Central Auditing Commission at the next congress in 1956, but Kirilenko's advance had already made him eligible for full membership in the Central Committee.

in the Ukrainian hierarchy, became second secretary in Kirichenko's vacated place in August 1953.*

Within Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, where he had inherited Brezhnev's political base, Kirilenko developed additional contacts which probably did not significantly contribute to his subsequent advance but which may now, in 1971, redound to his political advantage. These include, above all, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Aleksey Vatchenko. Shcherbitskiy made regular advances in his career after Kirilenko's arrival in 1950: from his position of second secretary of Dneprodzerzhinsk City, he rose in late 1952 to city first secretary and moved up in early 1954 to become second secretary to Kirilenko in the oblast Party committee. Kirilenko may have collaborated with the top Ukrainian leadership -- the first and second secretaries were still Kirichenko and Podgornyy -- in the latter promotion, as well as in the selection of Shcherbitskiy to become Dnepropetrovsk Party boss when Kirilenko left the Ukraine in late 1955. Shcherbitskiy subsequently rose to the position of Ukrainian Premier and CPSU Presidium alternate member. Vatchenko also rose from the ranks in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast during Kirilenko's and Shcherbitskiy's reign: in 1954 he advanced

Khrushchev and Kirichenko may have preferred Podgornyy over Kirilenko and other possible contenders for the Ukrainian "second in command" because of his more extensive contacts. Podgornyy had the advantage of having served during 1946-50 as the Ukrainian "permanent representative" in Moscow, in effect as Khrushchev's liaison with the regime's central apparatus. Another possible factor in Podgornyy's selection was his earlier background in the food industry, which coincided with Khrushchev's special interest in agriculture and complemented Kirichenko's industrial experience. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that Khrushchev preferred more actively political types than Kirilenko appeared to be.

from the post of chief of an unidentified department to secretary of the oblast Party committee, probably simultaneously with Shcherbitskiy's arrival as second secretary. Vatchenko, who has been Dnepropetrovsk Party boss since late 1965, actually appears more closely associated with Shcherbitskiy than with Kirilenko, to judge by the circumstances of their later careers, but Kirilenko presumably can count on Vatchenko's support.*

The rather extended length of Kirilenko's tour in Dnepropetrovsk probably was connected with Brezhnev's temporary setback immediately after Stalin's death. In one of several high-level changes, Khrushchev's political opponents forced Brezhnev to leave his high Party posts in the Secretariat and Presidium and to serve as a political "commissar" in the armed forces. As Khrushchev made gains, however, so Brezhnev advanced again to higher posts in the Party, becoming Kazakh second secretary in 1954.** Soon thereafter he moved up to the post of Kazakh

Vatchenko's own second secretary V.M. Chebrikov, for example, transferred to Moscow in 1967 to a high post in the secret police: he was identified in October 1969 as KGB deputy chairman. The little that is known of Chebrikov's career suggests that he is also closely associated with Shcherbitskiy.

**At the same time, a number of important changes occurred both in the central apparatus and in the Ukraine, including in Kirilenko's Dnepropetrovsk secretariat. Probably the most important of the changes in the central apparatus was the reorganization of the Department of Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol Organs into a Department of Party Organs, with a branch for the RSFSR under the supervision of Viktor Churayev. This was clearly a Khrushchev move to break up the dynasty which Malenkov had built over the years and was a foreshadowing of the creation of the Bureau for the RSFSR two years later. Churayev had*
(footnote continued on page 17)

Party boss. By late 1955 Brezhnev had recouped his earlier political strength and was preparing to reenter the central Secretariat and Party Presidium at the 20th Party Congress.

In view of this, it appears probable that Brezhnev was largely responsible for the December 1955 transfer of Kirilenko from the Ukraine to the position of Sverdlovsk Party boss, which resulted not only in his election two months later at the 20th congress to full membership in the Central Committee, but also in his becoming ex officio a charter member of the newly formed Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR.

B. Joining the Fray: The Sverdlovsk Years (1956-62)

Kirilenko's assignment to the Sverdlovsk post was not a purely political move but followed logically upon his previous experience in heavy-industrial areas. The location of Sverdlovsk in the heart of the strategically important Urals industrial complex required someone like Kirilenko whose technical competence had been demonstrated. Several circumstances, however, in addition to the imminence of the 20th Party Congress, indicated that the assignment was far from routine. First, the plenum of the Sverdlovsk Party organization which installed Kirilenko as its chief was held in the presence of a top Kremlin leader: Averkiy Aristov, who just a few months earlier, after a

(footnote continued from page 16)
served in the Khar'kov Party organization both before and after the war, from 1944 through most of 1950 as oblast first secretary. Subsequently Churayev worked in the central cadres apparatus and presumably was instrumental in assisting Khrushchev's rise to power.

two-year period of political eclipse, had returned to the central Secretariat to oversee the cadres sector for Khrushchev. Second, the press account of the plenum indicated that the former Party first secretary, A.M. Kutyrev, and the incumbent executive committee chairman, K.K. Nikolayev, were "sharply" criticized for leadership failings. Against such a background, the arrival of a Ukrainian official to head the oblast Party organization probably fostered resentment and rivalry within it.*

The apparent political motive in Kirilenko's transfer to Sverdlovsk at this particular time was reinforced with the formation of the Bureau for the RSFSR -- the mini-secretariat which Khrushchev created at the 20th Party Congress to improve his control over the Central Committee apparatus. Bureau members included, in addition to representatives of the RSFSR apparatus, the Party first secretaries of Moscow, Leningrad, Gor'kiy, and Sverdlovsk oblasts -- all under the supervision of Khrushchev and one other member of the Central Secretariat. Thus Kirilenko was drawn more closely into the service of Khrushchev on the eve of the gathering storm of ultra-conservative opposition to the Party boss.

When the moment of truth arrived, Kirilenko apparently decided that his own political future was tied to

*For one thing, Nikolayev had chaired the Sverdlovsk executive committee since 1948 and thus had been in contention to accede to the top Party post. He did eventually attain this position, but only after Kirilenko left in 1962. That no love had been lost between the two leaders was suggested in April 1963 -- a time of intense political struggle between Khrushchev and Kozlov which involved, among other things, several indications of an attempt to undermine Kirilenko's position -- when Nikolayev published an article in Pravda which took a swipe at the handling of construction affairs in Sverdlovsk during Kirilenko's tenure as Party boss.

Khrushchev's fate, and so he took the offensive in defending the Party boss against the coalition that had formed to oust him.

at the June 1957 Central Committee plenum which Khrushchev had insisted his Presidium opponents convene to resolve the leadership issue, Kirilenko took the floor at the outset to demand that the Central Committee reject Molotov's request for a discussion of wavering among the Bloc countries. As Kirilenko undoubtedly understood, the request was merely a tactical device used to approach the real issue of Khrushchev's continuing in power, with Molotov and others intent on attacking Khrushchev for the ill effects of his de-Stalinization policies. Therefore, Kirilenko countered with the suggestion that the plenum discuss instead the wavering within the ranks of the Soviet Party. As a result, Khrushchev got the green light to proceed with the attack against his opposition on a charge of "anti-Party" activity. Clearly Khrushchev and Kirilenko had planned such a tactic in advance, and the risk that the ploy might fail was perhaps not very great.* Nevertheless, Kirilenko was repaid for his help by being made an alternate member of the Party Presidium at the plenum, even though his Sverdlovsk post did not rate such a high rank.

Kirilenko clearly was on his way up with this promotion, for the sake of which he gave up membership on the RSFSR Bureau. It seems likely that he was being groomed for eventual membership on the central Secretariat or for deputy chairmanship of the RSFSR Bureau. Meanwhile, Kirilenko continued to devote most of his attention to his Sverdlovsk duties. After August 1958 these included his membership on the military council of the Ural district

*The military, behind Marshal Zhukov, ensured that Khrushchev's supporters were flown to Moscow so as to outnumber his opponents in the quorum of the Central Committee which met in the plenary session.

(okrug) -- a Central Committee decision assigned such a role to the Party bosses in all the centers of the military okrugs -- but there is little evidence that this function was much more than nominal.

KOZLOV, F.R.

In 1959-60, however, for reasons which remain obscure, the fortunes of the "Ukrainian clique" took a turn for the worse, and Kirilenko's position suffered as a result. Frol Kozlov, the Leningrad-based first deputy premier, suddenly arose as Khrushchev's heir-designate. The ascendacy of Kozlov, himself a new-generation "neo-Stalinist," was facilitated by the departure of most of the old-line Stalinists like Molotov; it marked the beginning of a new stage of political struggle, pitting neo-Stalinists against each other. Aleksey Kirichenko, who since late 1957 had been a member of the central Secretariat and Khrushchev's heir apparent, was demoted in January 1960 to Rostov Party first secretary (and several months later was to lose even that remnant of his power). In May that year, Kozlov joined the Secretariat and gave up his first deputy premier position to another Leningrader, Aleksey Kosygin. With Kozlov's arrival in the Secretariat, a number of Khrushchev's allies were forced to depart: Brezhnev was kicked upstairs to the largely honorific post of Soviet "President," and Aristov was compelled to give up his secretarial position, otsensibly to concentrate on his duties as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau.

Although Kirilenko continued to perform routine functions during 1960, there were signs that Kozlov's drive for increased power began to affect Kirilenko's

position in 1961. Kozlov's attention may have been attracted when the Sverdlovsk first secretary headed a large official delegation to Warsaw in late September 1960, apparently on an industrial mission.* In any case, Kirilenko showed signs of slipping after Kozlov increased his influence in the RSFSR Bureau in January 1961 with the transfer of Aristov to the ambassadorial post in Warsaw and the appointment of Gennadiy Voronov as the bureau's deputy chairman. For example, the delegation to Hungary which Kirilenko headed in April was small and included no one of significance. In June, just a few months before the 22d Party Congress, Kirilenko was forced to publish in Pravda an admission of economic shortcomings in Sverdlovsk. Finally, at the congress in October, Kirilenko was dropped as an alternate member of the Presidium and reverted to his pre-1957 status as a mere member of the RSFSR Bureau.

Kirilenko's public prominence dropped sharply after that congress, reflecting his political downgrading. After appearing at a Sverdlovsk Party meeting in early November to discuss the outcome of the 22d congress, Kirilenko disappeared generally from public view. His name, together with that of Sverdlovsk executive committee chairman Nikolayev, appeared on a pro forma "letter" to Khrushchev in Pravda which announced fulfillment of the oblast's annual plan at the year's end, but he failed to appear in any meaningful political activity. This change undoubtedly reflected the great influence which allies of Kozlov had gained in the RSFSR Bureau. The bureau's two deputy chairmen at the close of the 22d congress were the holdover Voronov and the newcomer Petr Lomako -- the latter an

*A.P. Rudakov, chief of the Central Committee Department of Heavy Industry and a member of Khrushchev's "Ukrainian clique," was the leading functionary accompanying Kirilenko.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

industralist associated with the Leningraders Kosygin and Kozlov.* The degree to which the new leadership situation in the RSFSR Bureau undermined Kirilenko's position was illustrated in mid-December, when he conspicuously failed to appear at two conferences held in Sverdlovsk -- the first on agriculture which Voronov and the then RSFSR Premier Dmitriy Polyanskiy conducted, and the second on economic management at which Lomako presided. It appeared at that stage to be merely a matter of time before Kirilenko's complete political demise.

C. In Khrushchev's Service: The RSFSR Bureau (1962-64)

Kirilenko dramatically regained and added to his former political power in April 1962, after almost six months of obscurity. The circumstances surrounding his sudden recovery were extraordinary and suggested hanky-panky: he returned to the Party Presidium, not as before with the rank of alternate member but now as a full member with a vote on policy matters, and his installation occurred not at a regularly scheduled Central Committee plenum but "in the back room." Kirilenko's co-optation

**Lomako had been identified as deputy chairman on the eve of the congress. He probably already had been chosen to replace Viktor Churayev, a member of the "Ukrainian clique" who had been appointed deputy chairman just two weeks after Voronov's replacement of Aristov in January 1961. Kozlov's victory over the Ukrainians at the congress was registered in the demotion of Churayev to bureau member, the retention of Lomako as deputy chairman for industrial affairs, and the promotion of Voronov from alternate to full member of the Presidium and to the newly created position of bureau first deputy chairman, together with Kirilenko's downgrading from Presidium alternate membership to Churayev's level of bureau member.*

into the Party Presidium was revealed during a 23-25 April session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A communique announcing that a Central Committee plenum had been held "during the first session" of the Supreme Soviet and had confirmed Kirilenko's co-optation was not published until 26 April. This plenum apparently had had no other business than the elevation of Kirilenko and the downgrading of Kozlov's protege Spiridonov, discussed below. The irregularity of this procedure* and the presumed opposition to the action were such that the extraordinary plenum, which supposedly confirmed Kirilenko in the policy-making status he holds today, has not been recognized in official Party histories and handbooks.

Personnel actions which accompanied Kirilenko's irregular co-optation indicated that it was one move in Khrushchev's maneuvering against the forces led by Kozlov, whose power and ambition had grown so that they posed a serious threat to the First Secretary. Thus, Kirilenko was confirmed at the same time in the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau, thereby matching Voronov in rank and position. In addition, Kozlov's successor in Leningrad, Ivan Spirdonov, who had moved into the central Secretariat just six months earlier at the 22d Party Congress, now was demoted to chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union; his fall to the powerless post neatly balanced the sudden reversal of fortunes for Kirilenko, who had lost out at the congress. Spiridonov's transfer entailed his dismissal from the Secretariat and from the post of Leningrad Party boss, thus effectively removing

**Ivan Zhegalin, a Suslov associate and Ambassador to Romania at the time, commented [redacted] that he had been unable to attend the plenum because it had been called too precipitately to permit him to reach Moscow in time.*

him as a source of resistance to Kirilenko and of support for Kozlov in the Party's highest executive bodies.*

Kirilenko's elevation to the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau had the effect of preventing the Kozlov-led forces from monopolizing control over the appointment of cadres in the RSFSR. In March, one month prior to Kirilenko's comeback, a major reorganization of the Soviet farm sector -- actually a prelude to the Party's bifurcation a half year later -- had given Voronov control over a revised and expanded "nomenklatura" for agricultural cadres in the republic.** It seems likely that Lomako, the deputy chairman for industry, had been in line to control a similar nomenklatura for RSFSR industrial cadres and possibly to receive a promotion to first deputy chairman, but Kirilenko's sudden arrival blocked that opportunity. Lomako remained a deputy chairman after April but presumably had little say in appointments.

Kirilenko's activities during 1962 added to these indications that he was instrumental in supporting Khrushchev's struggle against Kozlov. For example, in August Kirilenko supervised the installation of Viktor Skryabin, his close associate from Zaporozh'ye, as Rostov Party

If, as seems likely, Kirilenko was being groomed during 1957-60 as Brezhnev's understudy and was in the position of rivaling Kozlov during the next two years, then Spiridonov apparently had replaced him at the 22d congress as the only provincial Party boss with some national responsibility in the sphere of industry, serving in effect as Kozlov's second. However, with his demotion the following April Spiridonov failed even to retain a place on the RSFSR Bureau.

**The nomenklatura is a list of designated Party and state posts over which a higher echelon of the Party apparatus has full jurisdiction in making appointments.*

first secretary in place of Aleksandr Basov, who had been given a diplomatic assignment. The action was a clear swipe at Kozlov's authority: Basov had gone to Rostov only weeks after Kozlov's arrival in the Secretariat in May 1960, to replace the already severely downgraded Aleksey Kirichenko. Also, Kozlov had been in Rostov in June -- that is, only two months before Skraybin's arrival -- to meet with the Party leadership after riots had broken out in nearby Novocherkassk, but he had taken no action against Basov; he may, in fact, have been attempting to protect him. The Skryabin appointment probably was also offensive to Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov, who has demonstrated a special interest in his former Rostov bailiwick and who presumably was instrumental in getting Basov a diplomatic post.*

Policy support which Kirilenko gave in 1962 to Vasiliy Tolstikov, Spiridonov's successor in Leningrad, appeared to reflect Khrushchev's intent to break up the Kozlov-Kosygin "dynasty" there. Tolstikov had risen through the ranks of the Leningrad Party organization but not clearly as a Kozlov protege: Khrushchev himself had taken the highly unusual step of presiding over his installation as Leningrad Party boss, apparently to underline his support of him (and possibly also to put down dissent among Kozlov allies who may have been opposed to the junior Tolstikov).

Against this background, Kirilenko's public support for a Leninigrad proposal on industrial management at a

Under the circumstances, however, Basov's diplomatic assignment was dangerous and thankless: he showed up as an "economic counsellor" at the Soviet Embassy in Havana on 10 August, just weeks before the Cuban missile crisis reached its peak. The posting had the political effect of removing him from Party politics and portending loss of membership on the Central Committee.

Central Committee conference in late July assumed political significance. In his otherwise routine report on Party management of industry, Kirilenko said that the Leningraders' proposal for merging affiliated enterprises into production complexes, or industrial "firms," was of great interest, and he instructed the leaders in other RSFSR provinces to draft similar proposals. He also referred favorably to Khrushchev's support for the "initiative" of the Leningrad Party organization in introducing a two-shift schedule in the machine-building industry.*

Kirilenko's general political position received another boost in November as a result of Khrushchev's controversial bifurcation of the Party into industrial and rural organizations. The reorganization involved additional changes in the leadership of the RSFSR Bureau which virtually eliminated Kozlov's influence in it. First, Voronov was appointed RSFSR Premier and, although remaining a full member of the Party Presidium, thereby was reduced to being only a member of the RSFSR Bureau; that is, he became nominally Kirilenko's subordinate in the RSFSR Party hierarchy. Second, Leonid Yefremov, an apparent Brezhnev ally who had been a bureau member by virtue of his position as Gor'kiy Party first secretary, replaced Voronov as first deputy chairman with agricultural responsibilities and became an alternate member of the Party Presidium. Finally, Lomako was dropped as deputy chairman and transferred out of the RSFSR Party apparatus altogether; apparently under the aegis of Kosygin and Kozlov,

It was also about this time, in September 1962, that Kirilenko was first noted in contact with Petr Anisimov, a young Leningrad Party official who rose rapidly under Tolstikov before transferring in early 1968 to his present position in the central Party apparatus as deputy chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department. The available information on Anisimov's activities strongly suggests that he is a Kirilenko client.

he went into a newly created central planning post. Kirilenko took up whatever slack resulted from Lomako's departure.*

Kirilenko's increased power after November 1962 brought increased opposition from the Kozlov faction, reflecting the heightened intensity of their general struggle against Khrushchev and the Ukrainians. Signs of sniping at Kirilenko picked up markedly in March and April 1962. His named appeared out of Cyrillic alphabetical order, following Kozlov's and Kosygin's, in a list of the top leadership in Pravda on both 12 and 13 March. The annual edition of Spravochnik Partiynogo Rabotnika (Party Official's Handbook), which was signed to the press on 30 March, conspicuously failed to publish the communique of the April 1962 plenum at which Kirilenko was "elected" a Presidium member. On 1 April, Pravda published the earlier discussed article by Sverdlovsk Party boss Nikolayev implicitly critical of Kirilenko's performance in construction work. Finally, on 22 and 23 April, Izvestiya and a few other newspapers (notably the Leningrad Party paper) again slighted Kirilenko by placing his name after Kosygin's in an otherwise alphabetical list of the Presidium members at an RSFSR Party conference -- and this was a major conference which heard and discussed a Kirilenko report on industrial management! Absent from the list was Kozlov, who had suffered a paralyzing stroke several days earlier and was never to return to active political life.

The division of responsibilities between Kirilenko and Yefremov was formalized with the creation of two smaller RSFSR bureaus -- for rural management and for industrial management -- within the older RSFSR Bureau. It is unclear how this arrangement affected Voronov, who remained a member of the older bureau but had no clearly defined responsibility for one or another economic sector. In any case, Kirilenko outranked Yefremov in the Party Presidium even though they held nominally equal positions in the RSFSR Bureau.

But with Kozlov sidelined, Kirilenko came into his own as Khrushchev's main spokesman for industrial affairs. The report which he delivered to the April conference revealed a strong pragmatic approach to economic administration and a greater willingness than he had shown in the past to touch on controversial questions. In a rare departure from his neo-Stalinist position, Kirilenko claimed that stereotypes and rigid policies were a thing of the past, thanks to the renunciation of Stalin's personality cult, and he lauded the November 1962 bifurcation of the Party as an outstanding contribution to improving Party leadership of the national economy. He complained, however, that quite a few Party and economic leaders still were held captive by the former "traditions and customs." While he said that the organizational experience which the Party had accumulated over many years should not be renounced, he warned of the "great danger" in transferring outworn methods to the new Party and economic organs.

Kirilenko's Economic Views

This forward-looking attitude probably was intended to provide a backdrop for Kirilenko's more practical suggestions for reorganizing production. In particular, he strongly reiterated the support he had given in July 1962 to the Leningrad proposal on merging enterprises into industrial firms, or production associations, as they were now being called. Several times in his report Kirilenko termed these associations a "progressive" form of production organization, and he asked for its bolder use in all branches of industry. Asserting that associations had proved their economic soundness, he nevertheless suggested the existence of some controversy over the scheme when claiming that associations were capable of carrying out a unified technical policy without infringing on the interests of sovnarkhozes (the national-economic councils, or regional government organs of planning and management). In fact, the regional sovnarkhozes had already lost some powers, precisely in control over technical policy, to

central state committees which were set up primarily for defense industries during the bifurcation of the Party along economic lines in November. Kirilenko thus seemed sensitive to objections which regional Party leaders presumably had raised that the production associations might further assist a trend toward state-administrative centralization harmful to their interests. Although his statement was equivocal, Kirilenko's pragmatic approach appeared to envision the organization of associations on a strictly regional basis.*

That Kirilenko held no brief for the central planners and administrators became more evident as time went on. His speech to another important industrial conference in May 1964 was especially hard-hitting in this respect, perhaps reflecting increased confidence as Kozlov's permanent removal from politics became manifest.** In his speech,

*The report also contained a couple of suggestions of Kirilenko's interest in somewhat orthodox directions. He mentioned favorably, for example, the need to introduce computer technology into management. At the same time, he said that a "production-technical association" was being set up within the RSFSR Sovnarkhoz that would produce computer equipment, evidently for managerial use in the sovnarkhoz. Kirilenko's main interest in all this seemed to be to strengthen the sovnarkhoz apparatus, rather than the centralized planning agencies. This would presumably allow greater Party control in management at the regional level. In addition, Kirilenko dwelt on ideological means of influencing production, such as "socialist competition," the "movement for Communist labor," and propaganda of "advanced experience" -- all of which revealed his preference for exhortation over the application of material incentives.

**Kirilenko presumably felt less fettered when working with the Ukrainians Brezhnev and Podgornyy, who had been brought into the central Secretariat as successors to Kozlov in June 1963.

Kirilenko repeated his call for a further "bold advance" in forming production associations. He coupled this, however, with a warning that their formation should not be an end in itself but promote better organization of production. This admonition reflected awareness of the resistance of the central planning agencies, because he went on to ridicule their indiscriminate issuance of general directives to industrial enterprises already functioning within associations:

> *General directives [from central agencies] often are addressed to those enterprises which joined associations long ago and are not independent economic units. This is what we call habit. People do not follow life, but it is changing, it does not remain static; small enterprises are merging, but they continue to receive instructions. We feel like telling the comrades who write [such instructions]: 'Do not make people laugh.'*

In addition, Kirilenko made a seemingly gratuitious statement on Stalinism in economic management which appeared aimed again at the resistance of conservative administrators:

> *Stalin's dogmas, divorced from life, did not make possible a sober assessment of the processes taking place in the economy. They drove economic thought into a blind alley and introduced a spirit of conservatism in technical policy. The bureaucratic approach to planning detracted from the role of plans themselves, resulted in major miscalculations, and hampered scientific and technical thought. The liquidation of the cult of personality... made it possible to put economic work on strictly scientific foundations.*

Except for the earlier mentioned remarks on the stereotypes and rigid policies which held sway under Stalin (p. 31), this unusual deviation from Kirilenko's standard line marked the only observed public reference he had made or was to make to the person of the late dictator.*

The speech was notable also for Kirilenko's first observed public reference to the use of material incentives, carefully labeled for the purpose of "technical progress." He appeared to blame the state planning apparatus for failing to come to grips with the "complicated" but unavoidable problems of applying "material rewards for good results, for increased efficiency and product longevity." The bulk of the speech, however, revealed an unchanged general attitude in favor of administrative and "moral" means of improving production efficiency.

Kirilenko's attitudes at that time on economic management, revealing a typical apparatchik interest in increasing Party control, such an interest in the chemical sector, the development of which had received unusual attention from Khrushchev as an alternative to expansion of the metallurgical branches of industry.

**In this connection, a significant measure of Kirilenko's reserve on the Stalin issue was his avoiding mention of the late dictator by name in his speech at the 22d Party Congress, where many other leaders were joining the chorus behind Khrushchev in attacking Stalin's person. Kirilenko restricted himself to affirming the correctness of the 20th Party Congress decisions, specifically for their condemning the "personality cult" (a phenomenon divorced, it would seem, from the person of Stalin), exposing its harmful effects and reestablishing collective leadership -- a relatively innocuous endorsement of de-Stalinization.*

he favored creating a special post within certain sovnarkhozes for a deputy chairman for chemistry.

It could be inferred that Kirilenko expected to achieve increased Party control by augmenting the staff of a newly created Central Committee department, which would achieve closer supervision of the chemical industry through Party cadres assigned as deputy chairmen for chemistry in the appropriate sovnarkhozes. It seems probable that this activity reflected the formation of the RSFSR Department of Chemical Industry, which was first publicly identified in September 1964.

Apparently convinced of the efficacy of his plans, Kirilenko in his speech laid out the organization of his Party-controlled campaign for developing "public" forms of economic work. According to Kirilenko, economic laboratories had been organized in 450 enterprises in the RSFSR, the post of chief economist (functioning as a deputy) director for economic matters) had been introduced in more than 1,000 major industrial enterprises, and economic laboratories and economic-analysis departments had been formed in the sovnarkhozes -- all of which appeared to be legitimate economic work. He also indicated, however, that 160,000 persons were engaged in the work of more than 16,000 "public" bureaus and groups of economic analysis in enterprises throughout the republic

technical economic councils had been formed to administer this activity in 30 oblast industrial Party committees and in 450 city and rayon Party committees throughout the RSFSR. He cited approvingly the experience of the Volgograd Oblast Industrial Party Committee, which used economic councils and "commissions for promoting technical

progress, within the committee's industrial departments, to find ways to cut production costs. Kirilenko lauded this new, Party-directed effort as a means of bringing large numbers of workers and engineering-technical personnel into economic administration.


KOSYGIN, A.N.

Although this activity apparently was restricted to the chemical industry in the RSFSR and did not affect a large part of the national economy, some professional government administrators and planners in the center -- Premier Kosygin for example -- undoubtedly had a much less sanguine attitude toward Kirilenko's campaign. The emphasis on the Party's involvement in economic work, which, according to Kirilenko, would mean improving economic training even in the Party education system,* probably also raised the hackles of Suslov and other more orthodox Party ideologues who were concerned that such training was detracting from theoretical studies and leading to the neglect of political work in the Party.** It was clear, therefore, that Kirilenko

Kirilenko said that economic departments had been formed in "Marxist-Leninist universities" within city Party committees, at which about 40,000 persons were studying, but he felt that the quality of this work left much to be desired.

**The ideologue's viewpoint probably was expressed most clearly in an article which V. Stepanov published in Pravda on 17 May 1965, attacking the practice under Khrushchev of the Party's immersion in economic management to the detriment of ideological and propaganda interests.*

had committed himself to supporting Khrushchev's schemes for broad chemicalization and Party management of the economy when the coalition of leaders, including Kosygin and Suslov, finally formed around Brezhnev to oust Khrushchev from political office in October 1964.

D. In Brezhnev's Service: The RSFSR Bureau (1964-66)

During the politically unsettled period immediately after Khrushchev's ouster and for most of 1965 Kirilenko maintained a low profile, engaging in few public activities while presumably concentrating on securing his organizational base. Actually Kirilenko was somewhat on the periphery of the main battlefield, which was the central Secretariat. Here Podgornyy, who was "second in command" to Brezhnev by virtue of his responsibility for supervising Party-organizational matters, seemed actually the near equal of the Party boss in the first several months of the new regime. A secondary arena was in the field of competition between the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers -- that is, between Brezhnev and Kosygin. Thus the RSFSR Bureau represented a minor area for skirmishes in the larger political maneuvers in this period.

The regime's first major change, reversing Khrushchev's Party bifurcation scheme, implied a slight setback for Kirilenko and others who had profited politically from bifurcation. At the November plenum which made the decision to return to the organizational structure of the Party that existed before bifurcation, Podgornyy delivered the report recommending this action, while Brezhnev played no visible role. In a sense, therefore, Podgornyy was identified with a decision which was not clearly in Kirilenko's interest.

The decision to reorganize the Party along old lines led to the reinstatement, for the most part, of all the Party bosses in the republics and lower levels who had given up some of their power in 1962. However, several

personnel changes in the RSFSR had some effect on Kirilenko's position, the overall result of which was in his favor. In December Leonid Yefremov was transferred from the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau to become Party boss in Stavropol' Kray. This manifest demotion, which portended the loss of Yefremov's position on the Party Presidium, left Kirilenko the sole deputy chairman of the bureau under Brezhnev's strictly nominal chairmanship. Voronov may have wanted to reclaim the vacated position of deputy chairman for agriculture, but he remained only a member of the bureau.* In effect, therefore, Kirilenko became de facto Party boss for the entire RSFSR.

At the same time, another change at the provinqial level indicated that Kirilenko was not immune from attack in his own area. On 3 December, Suslov presided over the installation of Mikhail Solomentsev in the post of Rostov Rural Party chief in place of Kirilenko's former Zaporozh'ye associate Viktor Skryabin, who was "placed at the disposal of the Central Committee." Three weeks later Solomentsev became Rostov Party first secretary of the reunified organization -- the position which Skryabin had held prior to the 1962 bifurcation; Skryabin disappeared from public view and was not relected to the Central Committee at the 23d Party Congress in April 1966. Thus Suslov

Possibly Brezhnev decided to monopolize control over the agricultural sphere on the Party side, sharing responsibility for this sector only with Deputy Premier Polyanskiy on the government side. Tending to confirm this possibility was the appointment of Fedor Kulakov sometime in November to the post of chief of the Central Committee's Agricultural Department but not to the position of secretary for agriculture, from which Vasiliy Polyakov was ousted at that time. Kulakov did not attain that position for almost a year; meanwhile, Brezhnev emerged as the regime's agricultural spokesman in March 1965 when he announced a major program for agricultural development.

struck back for Kirilenko's earlier intrusion in Rostov Party politics (see page 25). However, Suslov's sally came before Kirilenko had consolidated his position on the RSFSR Bureau, and similar incursions in the republic's Party organizations subsequently were not observed.

KAPITONOV, I.V.

Probably the most significant move involving a provincial Party official in December was the return of Ivan Kapitonov from political exile to the post of chief of the reunified Central Committee Department of RSFSR Party Organs. Kapitonov had been demoted in 1959 from Moscow City first secretary to the position of Party boss in Ivanovo Oblast. His return to the center in December 1964 probably had the backing of Brezhnev and Suslov as well as Kirilenko. Kapitonov's two deputies in the new department were the former chiefs of the bifurcated departments for RSFSR Party organs -- Nikolay Voronovskiy (industrial), and Mikhail Polekhin (rural). Both Kapitonov and Voronovskiy were to advance as Brezhnev and Kirilenko consolidated their own positions during 1965, as well as again in 1966.

One of the intermediate moves in the strengthening of Kirilenko's influence in the cadres sector, although all the effects were not immediately apparent, was the April 1965 demotion of Vitaliy Titov from the central Secretariat to Kazakhstan to fill the vacancy of republic second secretary which had resulted from Solomentsev's transfer to Rostov. Titov, a Ukrainian associate of Podgornyy, had been the junior secretary in charge of Party-organizational

matters and cadres appointments since 1962.* The demotion had a two-fold significance. First, it represented a serious blow to his patron Podgornyy, whose dominance in the cadres sector it weakened. Second, Titov's removal coincided with the conferring of new titles and, apparently, of changed roles upon the union-republic and RSFSR departments of Party organs. Public identifications in May revealed that the union-republic department carried the designation, Department of Party-Organizational Work; the RSFSR department underwent the same transformation, becoming the Department of Party-Organizational Work for the RSFSR. The full significance of these titular changes was unclear, but they suggested at least the abolition of Titov's Commission on Party-Organizational Work.

Kirilenko continued to maintain his low public profile during the spring and summer of 1965, while Brezhnev became increasingly involved in maneuvering against Podgornyy and senior Party Secretary Aleksandr Shelepin. By late September, Brezhnev had seriously weakened Podgornyy's influence in the cadres sector and apparently had put down a challenge from Shelepin for control of the top Party post. Brezhnev also had asserted himself strongly in competition with Kosygin at a Central Committee plenum which launched a reform of industrial planning and management.

As Brezhnev grew in stature, so Kirilenko began to be more politically active. On 14 September, the lead editorial of Sovetskaya Rossiya carried the gist of an

*Titov had been chief of the Department of Party Organs for Union Republics since early 1961; he became additionally a member of the Secretariat and chairman of the Commission on Party-Organizational Questions in November 1962. Almost nothing is known of the function of his commission, but conceivably it was created in part to arbitrate jurisdictional disputes and other conflicts arising between the newly bifurcated Party organizations.

RSFSR Bureau decree which criticized the Rostov Party leadership for allowing an overemphasis on the production of heavy-industrial goods to the detriment of the food sector and light industry -- an obvious swipe at Rostov Party boss Solomentsev. The following month Kirilenko headed a Soviet Party delegation to the Chilean Party Congress, which was his first travel in such capacity to a foreign Communist Party congress. The assignment may not have pleased or had the whole-hearted approval of Suslov, the senior secretary responsible for relations within the Communist movement, if only because of Kirilenko's strictly provincial position in the RSFSR.

This increased political activity and strength for Brezhnev and Kirilenko in the fall of 1965 was followed by a significant shift in the power balance in December. Podgornyy was transferred to the less powerful position of Soviet "President" in place of Anastas Mikoyan, who "retired," and Shelepin gained the key responsibility for Party-organizational matters. The gain for Shelepin entailed, however, some losses as well: he was forced to give up his USSR deputy premiership with the abolition of the Party-State Control Committee, of which he was chairman. In addition, Brezhnev and Kirilenko presumably together succeeded in putting a check on Shelepin's secretarial powers in the person of Kapitonov, who became a member of the Secretariat and took charge of the union-republic Party-Organizational Work Department. In filling the vacancies which Titov's departure in April had created, Kapitonov apparently ceased to head the RSFSR department. However, the entire question of the existence of the RSFSR Bureau may have become moot by that time, for it was to be abolished several months later at the 23d Party Congress.*

*An additional indication of the strength of Brezhnev and Kirilenko in December was the reinstatement of their former associate Shcherbitskiy as an alternate member of the Party Presidium. For slightly more than two years Shcherbitskiy had been reduced in rank and placed in

(footnote continued on page 40)

The Fight Over the Goryachev Proposal

The decision to abolish the RSFSR Bureau under the circumstances implied a consolidation of Kirilenko's position and paved the way for a reassignment of responsibilities within the Secretariat at the 23d Party Congress. The cadres apparatus was the subject of a highly controversial though muted debate which arose at the beginning of the congress when these responsibilities were in flux. The evidence does not permit firm conclusions, but the debate appeared to reflect maneuvering by Brezhnev and Kirilenko to prevent Shelepin from consolidating his hold over the cadres sector. In any case, by the end of the congress Shelepin was to yield the cadres portfolio to Kirilenko, who had meanwhile become a full-fledged member of the Secretariat.

The debate, which revolved around the question of the concentration of functions within the central Party apparatus, suggested important differences in principle between Shelepin and Kirilenko on Party-organizational matters, but it also touched indirectly on a number of important issues affecting the position of other leaders. It began on the second day of the congress, 30 March, when Novosibirsk Party chief Goryachev raised the sensitive question of Party-organizational work in the central apparatus. Goryachev's proposal, which he introduced in the context of criticism of young leaders of oblast, city, and rayon Party committees who were "specialists of various branches of the economy but who do not have sufficient Marxist-Leninist education," was for a return to a Stalinist

(footnote continued from page 39)
political limbo in Dnepropetrovsk, where he had served under Kirilenko as second secretary. Now, however, he regained his former position of Ukrainian Premier and the Presidium rank of alternate member which normally goes with that post.

organizational form -- the Cadres Directorate. In place of the arrangement which had existed since 1948, whereby a central department (or departments) of Party organs coordinated the diverse aspects of cadres work with all the economic and other functional departments of the Central Committee concerned, Goryachev argued the need to "create cadres directorates and departments in local Party organs and the Party Central Committee, concentrating in one place the recruitment, assignment, and training of cadres." Such a proposal, if accepted, meant in effect a radical diminution of the powers, or even the complete elimination, of the Central Committee's functional departments and a concentration of enormous power in the person controlling the Cadres Directorate.

Shelepin was senior cadres secretary at the start of the congress, and it thus seems plausible that Goryachev was speaking on his behalf. This inference is strengthened by two facts. First, Goryachev's implication that the new directorate would place greater emphasis on "Marxist-Leninist" indoctrination in the training of economic cadres appeared in consonance with the ideological bias Shelepin had acquired during long years in the Komsomol and as a watchdog over the secret police.*

SHELEPIN, A.N.

**A soviet professor [redacted] has described Shelepin, with whom he was personally acquainted, as a champion of "firm" leadership and ideological continuity. Shelepin, he said, believed that the economy should be subject to*
(footnote continued on page 42)



(footnote continued from page 41)
strict Party control and directed by an elite of ideologically reliable and highly trained specialists, who would ensure among other things the purification and renewal of ideology in order to "make it the program of the masses again" and to repress material egoism in all social strata and groups. This program would aim at a Party that was to the highest degree idealistic, egalitarian, informed, and organized. [redacted] contrasted Shelepin's program, incidentally, to its opposite "extreme" in Soviet economic thinking -- Kosygin's platform of reliance on economic methods such as material incentives and expansion of the market mechanism, with a certain devolution of decision-making on the enterprise, within a system of industrial agencies freed from Party control. It should be noted that the economic views which Kirilenko expressed in 1962-64 closely resembled the Shelepin program.



The development of controversy over Goryachev's proposal was suggested by the fact that although the idea received applause at the time [redacted] no subsequent speaker explicitly endorsed it. Speaking on the day after Goryachev, Primorskiy Kray Party boss Chernyshev implied his general support with a statement on the need to "improve work in the recruitment, assignment, and training of cadres." His lukewarm but favorable attitude may have reflected his divided allegiance, with a bias toward the more ideologically motivated forces. Like Kirilenko, Chernyshev had trained as an aviation engineer and even had served under Kirilenko's supervision in the RSFSR industrial sector in Primorskiy Kray during 1962-64, but his main political allegiance and ideological bent probably were formed during the years of his affiliation with the wartime partisan movement and the Party organization in Belorussia, where he worked directly with Mazurov. In sum, his statement favoring some change in the cadres policy appeared to place him with the presumed supporters of Shelepin.

Opposition to the idea of a single Cadres Directorate was revealed finally on 2 April in the speech of Estonian Party boss Kebin, a notoriously independent and outspoken leader with a background suggesting Suslov's patronage. Kebin rejected Goryachev's proposal in a strong defense of the style of cadres work which was predominant in the post-Stalin period. In his opinion, "leading cadres should be recruited and trained first of all by that department and that organ which is responsible for a given sector of work, and not by a special cadres department" (emphasis added). In other words, he advocated continuing the practice whereby a number of functional departments of the Central Committee -- which are accountable to several secretaries in a general diffusion of power -- have a major

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Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

say in deciding who among the officials of lower Party committees should be best qualified for recruitment and training.*

Two days after Kebin's speech, during the windup of discussion on Brezhnev's report, two speakers from the RSFSR spoke as if the issue had been tilted, but the outcome apparently remained undecided. The speakers, Perm' Party chief Galanshin and Kemerovo Party boss Yeshtokin, may have taken their cue from Kirilenko.

Galanshin, who had worked in Perm' in the Urals for many years as a neighbor to Kirilenko, expressed the view that it would be "expedient" to create a strong system for improving the production skills of managerial cadres. His statement thus changed the direction of the debate away from the ideological slant of the Goryachev proposal toward a more pragmatic approach to the training of economic cadres.*** On the other hand, a failure to reach a consensus

*There were several hints in Kebin's remarks on Party-organizational questions that he was allied with Kosygin and/or Suslov in rejecting Goryachev's proposal. Most tellingly, he was highly critical of the past "passion for creating various contrived and often duplicative non-staff Party commissions and councils without consideration of their expediency" -- a fairly clear allusion to the economic councils for economy, technical progress, etc., which Kirilenko had promoted and which Kosygin and Suslov probably opposed in 1964.

***Galanshin, incidentally, made reference to the abolition of the RSFSR Bureau, which virtually all other speakers

(footnote continued on page 45)

on the question was registered very late during the discussion of Brezhnev's report, in the remarks of Yeshtokin, who had served for four years as Kirilenko's second secretary in Sverdlovsk. Yeshtokin indicated that "subjectivist arbitrariness and contrived forms" still existed in Party-organizational and ideological work, but he failed to suggest a remedy. Instead he suggested that these problems should be aired on a broad scale within the Party, "perhaps" even in a discussion at a Central Committee plenum.*

Thus, the proposal for a revival of the Cadres Directorate and other Stalinist forms of organizing Party work died a quiet death at the congress, and Shelepin, the presumed inspirer of the idea, relinquished his control over the cadres sector to Kirilenko.

(footnote continued from page 44)
had ignored. His remark suggested that he favored greater centralized Party control than Kebin would have approved. Thus, Galanshin said he presumed that the bureau's elimination would lead to a strengthening rather than a weakening of ties between the center and the provinces. His proposal for a system of managerial training, therefore, probably envisioned a large role for the central Party apparatus despite its apparent link with Kosygin's economic reform program.

*In the event, however, no such broad Party discussion or plenum has been noted.

II. KIRILENKO'S CAREER AS DEPUTY GENERAL SECRETARY

Examination of the general lines of authority in the Secretariat during 1966-71 provides a framework for analyzing Kirilenko's further career in greater detail. The activities of the top Party leadership during this period indicate that each senior secretary has served roughly on a par as a deputy to the General Secretary, at least until mid-1970, when Kirilenko's stock seemed to rise. The over-all evidence suggests that any of them can deputize fully for Brezhnev during the Party chief's absence, although they mostly have restricted their deputizing activities to their own assigned areas of responsibility.

The new assignments within the Secretariat as a result of the RSFSR Bureau's abolition at the 23d congress were primarily to Brezhnev's advantage, of course, but they were greatly to the political benefit of Kirilenko as well. In addition to his gaining full control over the cadres sector, Kirilenko continued to supervise the important industrial and construction sectors of the economy -- his bailiwick now extended beyond the RSFSR and embraced the entire country -- while Brezhnev gave up whatever formal secretarial responsibility he may have had in this sphere prior to the congress. Shelepin lost not only the cadres sector but also his control over the Administrative Organs Department, which fell under Brezhnev's personal purview. Shelepin was left to supervise the work of Party organs in light industry and the consumer sector. Suslov's long-standing formal responsibility for Communist theory and propaganda remained intact, his position apparently being the only one unaffected by the changes during the congress.*

**Suslov apparently took up the responsibility for light industry and consumer goods when Shelepin left the Secretariat in mid-1967, and Kirilenko's duties remained unchanged.*

The lines of secretarial authority in the field of foreign Communist relations were not clearly drawn, however. Brezhnev as Party boss obviously took a direct personal interest in these relations and involved himself in the most important problems. In time a pattern seemed to take shape. Brezhnev appeared to have a greater interest in liaison with ruling parties and to be more active in overseeing the work of the Bloc Department. Kirilenko also played a large role in this business, especially on matters pertaining to economic relations within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Meanwhile, Suslov dealt most often with non-ruling parties and supervised the daily work of the Central Committee's International Department. The International Department's role, however, goes beyond liaison with non-ruling Parties and encompasses general responsibility for the coordination of most aspects of foreign policy, so that Suslov has an important say in all foreign questions.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUSLOV, M.A.

The none too precise arrangements among the General Secretary's deputies were clearly manifest in several cases of overlapping in Kirilenko's and Suslov's public activities. During 1966-70, approximately two thirds of Kirilenko's significant official contacts with foreign Communists (receiving ambassadors and official delegations in Moscow, attending foreign embassy receptions, heading Soviet Party delegations abroad, and other activities not involving another senior secretary) were within the Bloc of ruling Parties; a full third of his contacts, therefore, were with non-ruling Parties. Similarly, almost half of Suslov's public contacts during the same period were with Bloc Party officials. In fact, their share of the responsibility in trips abroad was just about equal: Suslov led a CPSU

delegation to Finland in November 1966 and went (with Premier Kosygin) to Romania in July 1970; Kirilenko led a Party delegation to Italy in July 1968 and officially represented the CPSU at the French Party Congress in February 1970.

Some of the crossing over in relations with foreign Communist Parties may have been due to Suslov's inability to attend certain functions because of chronic ill health, although he appeared to carry a normal work load until 1970. Also, responsibility for certain parties seemed to reflect a special connection or knowledge, such as has been evident in the case of Kirilenko's continued dealings since 1965 with the Chilean Communist Party. However, in many if not most cases the choice of either Kirilenko or Suslov as the leading Soviet representative appeared to depend on the nature of the business to be conducted in the given instance, Kirilenko being involved most often in economic discussions (and therefore logically more often with the Eastern Europeans in the CEMA framework) and Suslov playing the major role in theoretical matters and general guidance.

The apparent confusion of senior secretarial responsibilities was even greater in the sphere of Party-organizational questions, where the overt association of any Politburo member with personnel placement was very rare and usually misleading. For example, the Soviet press revealed that Suslov alone among the other Politburo members was present at the July 1967 installation of Shelepin as trade union chief. According to one report reaching the US Embassy in Moscow, Suslov also had attended the meeting of the Moscow City Party Committee which two weeks earlier "decided" to elect the then trade union chief, Viktor Grishin, as its first secretary in place of Nikolay Yegorychev, the "Young Turk" critic of Brezhnev's handling of the Arab-Israeli problem. Suslov also presided over the installation of Grigoriy Romanov as Party boss in Leningrad in place of the transferred Vasiliy Tolstikov in September 1970. The reason for Suslov's public involvement in the cadres sector on these occasions is unclear

but seems to have had a connection with the power politics behind the moves. It is quite likely that Brezhnev assigned Suslov the task of presiding over the above changes so as to avoid too blatant a demonstration of his own personal involvement in a power struggle against Shelepin, who was the loser in each case.

[redacted] whatever their public roles, it is Kirilenko and not Suslov who since 1966 has had formal jurisdiction over Party-organizational work, including appointments. [redacted] There is no clear evidence of a similar place for Suslov in the cadres hierarchy.

A. Sharing Power with Brezhnev's Rivals

For several weeks after the 23d Party Congress, Kirilenko was preoccupied with the business of merging the RSFSR Bureau staff with the union-republic components of the Central Committee apparatus and was, therefore, not yet involved in significant administrative or political matters. Presumably he decided to tread easily in his relations with Suslov and Shelepin, who had built strong followings in the apparatus, for most of the chiefs of former RSFSR departments became merely deputy chiefs of the consolidated departments. The fact that there was no wholesale takeover by the former RSFSR apparatchiks,

even in the industrial departments which were fully under Kirilenko's control in the new setup, suggested some self-restraint. However, Voronovskiy and Petrovichev of the RSFSR cadres apparatus were identified after the congress as deputies to Kapitonov in the consolidated Party-Organizational Work Department, indicating a virtual takeover in this sphere.* Neither was identified at first in the post of first deputy chief of the department, but they appeared to outrank Aleksey Skvortsov, the only remaining deputy from the former union-republic department. In addition, Mikhail Khaldeyev transferred during the congress from the RSFSR Agitprop Department (where he had worked in the bifurcation years in Kirilenko's industrial sector as department chief) to the post of editor-in-chief of the important Central Committee journal Partiynaya Zhizn'. This move, although a manifest gain for Kirilenko, undoubtedly was also quite acceptable to Shelepin, who had raised Khaldeyev to a position of prominence in the Komsomol organization during the mid-1950s.



*See foldout opposite p. 56.





There was evidence of significant maneuvering in the Secretariat throughout the second half of 1966, mostly



between Brezhnev and Shelepin but also involving Kirilenko. The confirmation, probably in early August, of Voronovskiy as first deputy chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department clearly marked a gain for Kirilenko. Then in September, Nikolay Shchelokov, whose main ties were to Brezhnev but who also had been associated to some degree with Kirilenko and Podgornyy in the Ukrainian Party organization, became chief of the uniformed police (militia, now known as MVD) which had been headed by a Shelepin ally, Vadim Tikunov.* At the same time, Shelepin seemed to benefit most among the senior secretaries from the September appointment of Boris Moralev to the vacancy of deputy chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department which Voronovskiy's promotion created. Jockeying by Suslov was clearly demonstrated in November when Mikhail Solomentsev left Rostov to become chief of the Central Committee Department of Heavy Industry -- an appointment which led to his joining the Secretariat the next month. Against the background of Kirilenko's apparent opposition to Solomentsev (see pp. 36-37 and 39), his appointment, together with Moralev's, created the impression that Brezhnev's rivals had the intent and ability to circumscribe the power of the cadres secretary.

In view of these indications of sharpening conflict in the leadership, it is perhaps not surprising that Kirilenko took the opportunity during a public speech in December 1966 to demonstrate his loyalty to Brezhnev. Speaking in Novorossiysk on a commemorative occasion, Kirilenko recalled Brezhnev's wartime service in a manner which exceeded the bounds of collegiality: referring to Brezhnev's political work with the 18th Army in Novorossiysk, Kirilenko cited the "indefatigable activity of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, his personal bravery and steadfastness, and his profound ideological conviction, which served as models of Party spirit and military valor." Such fulsome praise, which

Kirilenko was caught in the middle here, having worked several years himself with Tikunov.

was reminiscent of the public adulation of Khrushchev in the early 1960s (and Kirilenko was among the most vocal public supporters of the Party boss then as well), may have been intended to remind Brezhnev that he had cause to protect Kirilenko and to give him preference over Suslov and Shelepin as a more reliable deputy.

The following spring there were signs of increased activity on Kirilenko's part that registered Brezhnev's trust and possibly reflected a delegation of greater authority to the cadres secretary.

Kirilenko, although undoubtedly not playing the decisive role, must have been involved in Brezhnev's swinging the appointment of Marshal Grechko as Minister of Defense, also in April, against evident opposition from some quarters. Clearly, he and other leaders of the "Ukrainian group" had greater influence over


Apr 66
Oct 66
Dec 67 - Jan 68
Nov 68
Present
PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL WORK DEPARTMENT
Chief: I. V. Kapitonov
1st Deputy: N. A. Voronovskiy
(to Chuvash 1st Secretary)
Deputy: N. A. Petrovichev
(1st Deputy):
Deputy: A. G. Skvortsov
(Retired)
(Deputy): B. N. Moralev
(Deputy): Ye. Z. Razumov
(Deputy): P. P. Anisimov
Deputy: N. S. Perun


CPS
Nov 62
Dec 64
COMMISSION ON PARTY-ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS
Chief: V. N. Titov
PARTY ORGANS DEPARTMENT FOR UNION REPUBLICS
Chief: V. N. Titov
1st Deputy: P. F. Pigalev
Deputy: N. A. Belukha
(to Latvian 2nd Secretary)
(Deputy): I. Ye. Ryazanov
(Deputy): A. G. Skvortsov
PARTY ORGANS DEPARTMENT FOR RSFSR
Chief: M. A. Polekhin
Deputy: N. A. Voronovskiy
Deputy: N. A. Petrovichev
PARTY ORGANS FOR RSFSR INDUSTRY
Chief: N. A. Voronovskiy
Deputy: Ye. K. Ligachev
PARTY ORGANS DEPARTMENT FOR RSFSR AGRICULTURE
Chief: M. A. Polekhin
Deputy: N. A. Petrovichev
PARTY ORGANS DEPARTMENT FOR RSFSR
Chief: I. V. Kapitonov
Deputy: M. A. Polekhin
Deputy: N. A. Voronovskiy
Central Cadres Staff
RSFSR Cadres Staff
Central Cadres Staff, incorporating RSFSR Cadres Staff in April 66

THE CADRES APPARATUS
CPSU Central Committee, 1961-1970

Apr 65 | Dec 65 | Apr 66 | Oct 66 | Dec 67 - Jan

(to Kazakh 2nd Secretary)

PARTY-ORGANIZATIONAL WORK DEPARTMENT

(Chief): None — Chief: I. V. Kapitonov

(to Krasnodar Kray, Chairman)

PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL WORK DEPARTMENT

Chief: I. V. Kapitonov
1st Deputy: N. A. Voronovskiy
Deputy: N. A. Petrovichev
Deputy: A. G. Skvortsov

(Deputy): B. N. Moralev

ıENT — PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL WORK DEPARTMENT FOR RSFSR

(Chief) None

ıkiy

was identified in December 1967 as a deputy chief of the department. Possibly Kirilenko intended him as a replacement for Voronovskiy, who vacated the post of first deputy chief and became Party first secretary in Chuvash Oblast at about that time. The person who eventually was identified in June 1968 as Voronovskiy's successor, however, was his close associate from the RSFSR cadres apparatus, Petrovichev, whose experience was broader than Razumov's and whose contacts extended beyond Kirilenko to include, in particular, Voronov and Demichev as well as Shelepin. If, therefore, Kirilenko had planned on making Razumov Kapitonov's first deputy, the opposition to such a move was sufficient to prevent his doing so despite his unquestioned authority in the cadres sector. In any case, the net gain was in Kirilenko's favor.

Meanwhile, in February 1968, Kirilenko's hand was again visible in the appearance of another new deputy chief of Kapitonov's department in the person of Pavel Anisimov. Rising from the ranks of the Leningrad Party organization, Anisimov had established public ties with Kirilenko exclusively among the top leadership since 1962. He apparently replaced the one holdover from the union-republic department of the Podgornyy-Shelepin era, Aleksey Skvortsov, who retired in the same month. In addition, in the wake of Petrovichev's move upward, Nikolay Perun was released from his post of secretary of the Donetsk Party organization in the Ukraine to become deputy chief of the department. Although Perun appears most beholden to Ukrainian Party chief Shelest, biographic information on him is too thin to allow a firm judgment on his political connections within the "Ukrainian group." He could, for example, be allied with Shelest's rival, Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy, whose influence appears to have increased since 1966 -- the same year that Perun emerged from a long period of political oblivion to take up his duties in Donetsk.

Kirilenko's increased power and authority in the Secretariat was reflected also in heightened public prominence, giving rise to speculation in some quarters that he

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Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

had "replaced" Suslov as the "number two man" in the Party. For example, Kirilenko rather than Suslov accompanied Brezhnev and others to Dresden in late March for a meeting of Party and Government leaders from the Eastern European countries, where political upheaval in Czechoslovakia was the main subject of discussion.* A few days later Kirilenko was named chairman of a commission for the funeral of Soviet cosmonaut Gagarin -- the same function Suslov had performed the preceding year on the death of cosmonaut Komarov. The speculation increased in June, when Kirilenko and Ustinov held a reception for participants in a Central Committee conference of officials involved in the work of "administrative" (security-related) organs: Suslov had had an analogous role with regard to a similar conference in April 1967.

While it seems improbable that Kirilenko had assumed a formally designated "number two" position at this time, he did become more active in the field of international Communist relations, in which Suslov always had been prominent. Kirilenko appeared to be especially active during 1967-69 in pushing for the early convening of the International Communist Conference, which was from the start a pet project of Brezhnev, as well as of Suslov. Reports of his talks with foreign Communists in this period presented a picture of Kirilenko's insisting on holding the conference in order to "restore unity" and on recognizing the leading role of the Soviet Party so as to prevent further fragmentation of the Communist "movement". Kirilenko reportedly complained that positions of "non-alignment" -- he was especially upset over the Romanian position -- made progress toward the conference difficult. Although his attitude in talks with foreign Communists was one of sweet reasonableness, Kirilenko reputedly was among the

However, Kirilenko's presence might be explained as relating to economic questions, as the inclusion of Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov in the Soviet delegation suggests.

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Left to Right (front row only): D. S. Polyanskiy, A. P. Kirilenko, L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin, N. V. Podgornyy

Left to Right: A. N. Kosygin, A. P. Kirilenko, L. I. Brezhnev, N. V. Podgornyy

Funeral Procession for Cosmonaut Yu. Gagarin, March 1968

most dogmatic advocates of a military solution to the growing problem of Czechoslovak democratization in 1968. Suslov, on the other hand, was widely reported to have been in the minority which urged a political solution to the Czechoslovak heresy; if so, it was possibly because he placed a higher priority than Brezhnev and Kirilenko on convening the often postponed international conference according to schedule in November 1968. In any case, reporting consistently placed Kirilenko among those leaders whose pressure finally brought Brezhnev around to the decision to go ahead in August with the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

KATUSHEV, K. F.

Kirilenko's greater involvement in foreign Communist relations naturally intensified his rivalry with Suslov. Indications of this competition appeared in the appointment of Party officials to work with the Bloc Department. The most important of these was the unexpected promotion in April 1968 of Konstantin Katushev, previously Party boss in Gork'iy and a professional auto designer with almost no experience in foreign affairs, to the central Secretariat with the primary responsibility of supervising the Bloc Department. This advancement of an official who had risen through the ranks in Gor'kiy under Kirilenko's aegis and who had received personal attention from Brezhnev since 1965 had all the appearances of a power play to prevent the assignment of the Secretariat post to Konstantin Rusakov, an associate of Kosygin and Suslov whose public identification as chief of the Bloc Department just two weeks earlier had suggested that he would enter the Secretariat.*

**Rusakov's predecessor in the department, Andropov, had combined the jobs of department chief and member of the Secretariat.*

Further possible indications of Suslov's displeasure with the Kirilenko-Brezhnev push in Bloc liaison matters occurred after the intervention in Czechoslovakia, during the period of "normalization" and renewed preparation for the International Communist Conference (now scheduled for mid-1969). One sign of sniping was a 19 December Pravda identification of Katushev as a secretary "attached to" ("pri") the Central Committee, a highly unusual formulation which implied a lower status than the full-fledged and proper "secretary of the Central Committee." Then, in April 1969, a mix-up in identifying the Soviet participants in a CEMA summit conference, initially omitting Kirilenko's name and then misrepresenting his status on the delegation, appeared to reflect an attempt to downgrade his role in it.*

Left to Right: K. V. Rusakov, K. F. Katushev, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, and L. I. Brezhnev
International Communist Conference, June 1969

**On 21 April an official announcement, based on a Central Committee and government decision, listed only Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Katushev among the top leaders on the delegation.*
(footnote continued on page 64)



C. Outlining the Five-Year Plan***

In July 1969, with the International Communist Conference out of the way, Kirilenko turned his main attention

(footnote continued from page 63)
A TASS bulletin, reporting on the opening session on 23 April, revealed that Kirilenko was "also present" with the delegation. Finally, on 24 April, the central press listed Kirilenko as a full-fledged member of the delegation.

**See pp. 56-57 of CAESAR XXXIX.*



away from relations with foreign Communist parties and began to work intensively on the 1971-75 national-economic plan. As senior secretary responsible for industrial production, Kirilenko obviously has a direct interest in long-term plans. It is even possible that he has the formal responsibility for overseeing the work of the Central Committee Department of Planning and Finance Organs, although the evidence is too sparse to allow a firm judgment on this.



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

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

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

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

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

The absence of significant activity involving Kirilenko's staff in economic affairs between November 1969 and February 1970 suggests that the basic directives of the long-range plan, at least for industry, had taken shape in the late October Politburo discussions. A Central Committee plenum in mid-December -- the annual occasion for approval of the next year's plan and budget -- became a forum for airing, in addition, the basic features of the new five-year plan.

Subsequent propaganda on the December plenum also held hints that Kirilenko had been a major force behind the important speech which Brezhnev delivered to it. The press accounts indicated that the unpublished speech had focused on "fundamental" questions of economic development. A Pravda editorial on 13 January 1970 elaborated that the plenum had considered "major problems which arise in compiling plans for the future, and in particular the new 5-year plan." The main theme of the post-plenum propaganda -- labor productivity and economic efficiency, rather than increased rates of growth in capital investment, as the foremost criteria -- appeared consistent with the thrust of Kirilenko's critique. One additional question which could

created a major problem in drawing up the plan was whether to adopt production associations as the basic economic unit and, if so, how a network of associations would fit into the ministerial structure. The December plenum apparently addressed itself to this problem, for a Central Committee decree on associations (still unpublished) was adopted in February, and a conference was held especially to discuss the future of them.*

It is unclear what additional work on the 1971-75 plan the December plenum decisions may have caused for Kirilenko and the plan commission. The "major problems" which were said to have arisen in compiling the 5-year plan could have included delays in defining the basic directions of agricultural development.

Whatever the reason, Kirilenko's plan commission seems to have presented its final recommendations tardily

*For Kirilenko's attitudes on associations, see pp. 28-30. The associations were to feature prominently in the published directives of the 5-year plan -- see ahead p. 84.

in February 1970 -- that is, somewhat exceeding its January deadline.* In fact, some of the delay may have been due to routine tidying up of loose ends.

There were signs in April that a detailed outline of the 5-year plan, presumably based on the commission's recommendations, was near completion in draft form. Kirilenko revealed in a mid-April speech in Yerevan that Gosplan had been working on such a draft with other government ministries and departments and with republic governments and that it would be debated "soon" in the Politburo and the government (Council of Ministers).

The Reversal on Agriculture

At the same time, decisions on the agricultural sector were in the offing which apparently would require modification of some of Kirilenko's work on plan priorities. The day before Kirilenko gave his speech in Yerevan, Brezhnev had spoken in Khar'kov in some detail on economic questions.

Saying that the December plenum had also discussed agricultural problems, Brezhnev had implied that investment in this sector would be increased only gradually. Similar statements from the Party boss on 21 April suggested that other perenially neglected areas of the economy, such as consumer-goods production and housing, might also be slighted in the next 5-year plan. In both cases, he stressed that the necessary development of these sectors would take time, implying that resources were needed more urgently elsewhere.

Brezhnev soon was to turn these statements on their head, however. The apparent vehicle for this turnabout was the memorandum "On the Agricultural Situation," which Brezhnev presented for the Politburo's attention and approval on 21 May 1970.* The main lines of Brezhnev's memo were made public only on 2 July in his report to a Central Committee plenum, but its impact on the new 5-year plan was immediate. At the end of May, Brezhnev spoke to a session of the USSR Council of Ministers, which had heard Kosygin report on the basic directions of the national economy for 1971-75. According to the press account, the council instructed Gosplan to do "additional work" in finding resources -- a blatant suggestion that Brezhnev's intrusion in this government affair signified a rejection of Gosplan's draft plan, and, implicitly, of Kirilenko's guidelines. Brezhnev immediately repeated his performance at a session of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on 1 June.** Brezhnev

**The press account, which indicated that the 1971-75 plan for the RSFSR was discussed, failed to list RSFSR Premier Voronov or anyone else as having given a report. The inference from Brezhnev's unprecedented forays in these two government bodies -- with which, technically, he has no association -- is that the changes in projected investment which his agricultural memorandum necessitated were so extensive as to upset the carefully weighed priorities of the draft plan and to require appropriate explanation and justification.*

hinted at the shift in projected investment priorities in his 12 June speech to his Moscow election district, saying now that time was the main factor in developing agriculture. He opted for a "considerable acceleration" of the program of material assistance to agriculture, rather than allowing it to drag on for 25 years, which suggested that certain "comrades" had such a timetable in mind.

Brezhnev used similar language in justifying the program of increased investment in agriculture, including in machine building for agriculture, which he finally unveiled in his 2 July report to the Central Committee. Again, he seemed to imply the existence of opposition by admitting that "Of course, a certain period of time is needed to resolve fully the task of technically reequipping agriculture." He went on to argue, however, the need to ensure that this period not be prolonged. In line with this, Brezhnev indicated that "as a rule" all branches of industry would be required to assist the agricultural sector with production of machinery and equipment; not a single plant, said Brezhnev, should remain outside "this great and noble cause." He named a number of defense-related ministries which had supplied estimates of what each could contribute without reducing its basic output. In effect, Brezhnev seemed to be saying that for the immediate future -- that is, for 1971-75 -- industrial growth should remain roughly at its present rate, while excess capital should be used for manufacturing agricultural equipment.

How drastically the decisions on agricultural development may have affected Kirilenko's original proposals on economic priorities and the timetable for approval of the 1971-75 plan outline is unclear. According to one report, Gosplan officials in mid-April had expected to be busy through June putting the draft plan directives in order, one official even declaring it essential that it be ready in July. However, in June Soviet officials' activity and remarks indicated their recognition that the plan would be delayed, possibly until as late as the end of the year. (In fact, preparation of the plan directives would take until February 1971.) The failure of the 2-3 July Central

Committee plenum to schedule the 24th Party Congress, which would be required inter alia to approve formally the 5-year plan directives, and the eventual decision to delay the congress until March 1971, which was announced at another plenum convened unexpectedly several days later, reinforced these indications of disarray and confusion in planning. In later explaining the delay in finishing the drafting of the plan, a Gosplan deputy chairman told a Western official that the draft plan had been rejected and returned to the planners -- to be reworked "from A to Z" -- in April (presumably after Brezhnev's speeches in the Ukraine). In sum, it would appear that the shift in projected agricultural priorities which Brezhnev revealed at the early July plenum was a source of delay in the completion of the draft plan outline and in the convocation of the congress.

These changes in the draft plan in any case seemed to imply a partial rejection of Kirilenko's earlier formulations on industrial goals. At the same time, Kirilenko presumably would have agreed to a program of massive investment in machine building for agriculture, such as Brezhnev indicated in his July plenum report was planned.

[redacted]

Brezhnev stressed, for example, the imperative need to create "within a short time" a branch of machine building for the production of equipment for the dairy and fodder industries, as well as to develop machine building for land melioration and agricultural transport. Brezhnev argued that "naturally, a certain time is needed to do all this work, but the countryside needs machinery now." Although Polyanskiy would not oppose investment in agricultural machine-building in principle, he might feel, as he did in 1969, that the money

*See p. 28 of CAESAR XXXIX.

could be put to better use toward other programs for agriculture, given the actual low level of agronomics in the countryside. Thus Brezhnev appeared to recognize Kirilenko's view on the immediate channeling of agricultural funds into a machine base. At the same time, Brezhnev's report recognized the justification of continued high rates of investment in the agricultural sector and revealed a consensus, in particular, on the "expediency" of increasing material incentives in the dairy industry -- an apparent bow to the Polyanskiy view.

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

probably served as the basis of a decree of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers on improving the use of technology in agriculture, a gist of which appeared in the 7 August issue of Sovetskaya Rossiya -- the newspaper most closely associated with Kirilenko. The decree listed a number of ministries slated to assist in the production of machinery and equipment for the agricultural sector in the forthcoming 5-year period. Notably, however, the list did not include several which



Brezhnev had named at the July plenum as potential participants in the voluntary program: the ministries of aviation, machine-building industry, shipbuilding, and defense industry.

On the day of the decree's publication, Kirilenko and Kulakov conducted a conference in the Central Committee with officials of the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, evidently to assign them tasks in carrying out the decree. They conducted a similar meeting a month later, on 7 September, on the manufacture of harvesters and spare parts, with officials of the same ministry. Thus, Kirilenko publicly identified himself with at least a part of the program for technical assistance to agriculture which Brezhnev presented at the July Central Committee plenum.

D. Toward the 24th Party Congress

The decision to convene the congress in March 1971, which was made sometime between the Central Committee plenums of 2-3 and 13 July 1970, was accompanied by an apparent extension of the scope of Kirilenko's administrative functions in the Secretariat, which suggested that Brezhnev had delegated some of his powers to him.* It is not clear if the

**See CAESAR XXXIX, pp. 3-7. An especially suggestive episode was the early December 1970 Pravda photograph which showed Kirilenko and Polyanskiy in the second rank behind Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin at an airport ceremony, notably omitting to show Suslov and other ranking leaders who were present. Only Sovetskaya Rossiya and Sel'skaya Zhizn', which are considered politically responsive respectively to Kirilenko and Polyanskiy on most issues, among the other central press dailies also printed the TASS photo. This seemed to underscore the political sensitivity of their editorial boards to Brezhnev's personal interests and to indicate that Kirilenko and Polyanskiy were then the General Secretary's preferences for succeeding eventually to the top Party and government posts.*

purpose was to free Brezhnev to devote his main attention to preparing for the congress or if, as seems more likely, the arrangement was intended to suggest that Kirilenko was the General Secretary's personal choice for a "second in command," a status to be formalized in some way at the 24th congress.



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

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

Kirilenko's work could well have been the basis of the published draft directives of the 5-year plan which appeared in the Soviet press in mid-February



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with Brezhnev's approving signature. The published directives, in fact, contained for the first time in Soviet practice a section on "improving management and planning," which gave a green light to the formation of production associations on a systematic basis, thus tending to confirm that Kirilenko had a decisive say in drafting them. Until Brezhnev signed his name to the directives, he himself had not mentioned the associations or in any other way been publicly connected with them.





III. POSTSCRIPT ON THE 24th CONGRESS

The proceedings and protocol of the congress registered a slight improvement in Kirilenko's position in the leadership but failed to reflect the heightened authority he apparently held in the Secretariat after last July. Suslov retained exactly the same positions he had held at the 23d Congress in Brezhnev's listing of the Politburo and Secretariat, and his prominence in presiding over several sessions of the congress suggests that he will continue to be an obstacle to Kirilenko's further advance. Kirilenko's improved position in protocal rankings at the congress was due to the downgrading of Voronov in the Politburo and the removal of Shelepin from the Secretariat: Kirilenko moved up to the fifth place on the Politburo (after Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, and Suslov) and the third place on the Secretariat (after Brezhnev and Suslov). If indeed it is Brezhnev's plan to achieve public recognition of Kirilenko as "second in command," Suslov's continued presence in the leadership appears to be a major obstacle to its fulfillment.

The election of four additional full members of the Politburo probably was intended to provide for the eventual replacement of some of the aging members of that body, including Suslov. The over-all effect of the additions was a consolidation of Brezhnev's power, but Kirilenko also made appreciable gains in his position. Two of the new members, Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy and Moscow City Party boss Grishin, appear to be more closely associated with Kirilenko than with Brezhnev. Kazakh Party first secretary Kunayev has been the most vocal of Brezhnev's public supporters and probably owes his present position entirely to the General Secretary's patronage, but his views on economic matters seem quite close to those of Kirilenko.* The fourth addition, Party Secretary

*See especially Kunayev's report to the Kazakh Central Committee plenum in December 1969.

Kulakov, has worked closely with Brezhnev and Polyanskiy on agricultural questions since 1965 and has no obvious political connections with Kirilenko (although he was associated with Kirilenko after the July 1970 plenum in the area of agricultural machine building). Kulakov's promotion to the level of senior secretary, where he joins Kirilenko and Suslov as a deputy to Brezhnev, may entail some slight changes in secretarial assignments -- he may, for example, continue to supervise agricultural matters while taking on the responsibility for overseeing the consumer sector and light industry -- but probably will not essentially alter the existing division of labor in the Secretariat, at least for the immediate future.

These and other personnel changes at the congress, as well as the inclusion of a number of Kirilenko's managerial ideas in Brezhnev's report, suggest that the two leaders are now closer than ever before. This situation would seem to improve Kirilenko's chances as a potential successor to the General Secretary in most circumstances. It might also make for heightened conflict with Suslov, Kosygin, and other top leaders who are relatively independent of the Party boss. The outlook, therefore, is for a continuation and perhaps intensification of the main lines of rivalry which have have been observed since 1966.

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

The Politburo and Soviet Decision-Making

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

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THE POLITBURO AND SOVIET DECISION-MAKING

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS

This study, the first in depth on the Politburo's organization and modus operandi, seeks to dispel some of the aura of mystery which has traditionally shrouded Kremlin decision-making. [redacted] this study examines the processes of the Politburo: the function of its internal parts, the cycle of its operations, and the support of its auxiliary agencies.

The picture which emerges is of decision-makers who are neither infallible giants nor glorified clerks, but hard-driving, able politicians whose ambitions and diverse responsibilities tend to create cross purposes: in short, human actors within a high-tensioned, but strong and flexible, political system. The study also concludes that General Secretary Brezhnev, as the focal point of the decision-making machinery, wields sufficient authority to play the central role in deciding and expediting important Politburo business, but not to override his fellow oligarchs on policy issues; that the Politburo's structure and procedures actually encourage its members to lobby on behalf of their own institutional vested interests and private ambitions; and that even though there continues to be a strong tendency to refer even secondary matters to the Politburo for resolution, specialists from subordinate agencies are now playing a growing role in support of Politburo decision-making, especially in the spheres of military policy and defense production.

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This study has met general agreement among Soviet specialists within the Central Intelligence Agency. Comments on the study are welcome and should be addressed to its author, Mr. Albert L. Salter, of this Staff.

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Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

THE POLITBURO AND SOVIET DECISION-MAKING

Contents

THE POLITBURO AND SOVIET DECISION-MAKING

THE POLITBURO AND SOVIET DECISION-MAKING

PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS

The Soviet decision-making process reflects both significant continuity and change in the system and style of rule created by Lenin a half-century ago. Supreme decisions over Party, government, and society still reside in the Communist Party (CPSU) -- and, within this supposed leading element of the proletariat, in that small elite known as the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee.

At the same time, policy decision-making is now much more complex and, in certain important details, much more diffuse. Moreover, the salient feature of Politburo evolution since Stalin has been a trend, albeit with zigs and zags, toward an increasingly stable political balance. During the upheavals of Stalin's era the Politburo was in the main an enforcer of the dictator's will, rather than a genuine policy-making body. After Stalin's death, the members of this elite body began to make significant contributions to decisions, but after Khrushchev's consolidation of power, and especially during his last few years in office, leadership stability and orderly processes suffered from his heavy-handed dominance. By contrast, the present regime has sought to maintain the dominance of the Politburo oligarchs as a collective, with the result that power has become somewhat more deeply and evenly balanced within the leadership.

Even so, and despite outward obeisance to "collective" leadership, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev actually presides over the Politburo's operation and

directs the activities of its members. Available evidence clearly indicates that the Party boss has the right, as de facto chairman, to decide when the Politburo shall meet, which if any outsiders shall attend its sessions, and what questions shall be discussed. Through the Central Committee's General Department, he also circulates the proposals and draft decisions which he and his colleagues have initiated, and at the Politburo sessions which review and approve them he sums up discussion, expresses the consensus, and rules on policy issues.

While the General Secretary provides focus and direction to the Politburo's decision-making operations, the allocation of responsibilities to other Politburo members often results in a situation where they serve, in effect, as representatives of the various vested interests in Soviet society. One vivid example is First Deputy Premier Dmitriy Polyanskiy, who supervises Soviet agriculture for the Politburo and who consistently has fought for the interests of the agricultural bureaucracy in his political activity; another, trade union boss Aleksandr Shelepin, has fairly consistently championed the cause of the Soviet consumer. But, compared with somewhat similar practice in the bureaucracies of other great powers, the opposing interests of institutional pluralism are markedly sharpened, in the Politburo case, by intense and continuing personal rivalry. We know that in some instances -- Shelepin and others -- this often results in the pushing of vested institutional interests as alternatives to policies which Brezhnev has endorsed since ousting Khrushchev.

The actual process of decision-making in the Politburo suggests systematic and rather efficient procedures. The central event in this process is the weekly Politburo session. Evidence indicates that in simplified outline, a typical week might begin with Brezhnev's receiving and

reviewing various memoranda and proposals on Monday for possible inclusion in that week's agenda; on Tuesday Brezhnev and the rest of the central Party Secretariat would meet to agree on the agenda; on Wednesday Premier Aleksey Kosygin would convene the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, and this government body would discuss and prepare possible contributions to the Politburo agenda items, coordinating within the Council and with the Party Secretariat; finally, after last-minute preparation of their positions, the Politburo leaders would meet on Thursday at 3 p.m., or at some other time at Brezhnev's discretion, to hear presentations and adopt decisions on the agenda topics. From Friday to Sunday the individual leaders would go about implementing these decisions and drawing up proposals for the next Politburo session.

Adherence to certain customs and rules of order at Politburo sessions evidently prevents debate from developing into a free-for-all. In contrast to the practice in Khrushchev's time, when the First Secretary apparently tried to reduce his colleagues' constraints on him by overloading the Politburo meetings with a multitude of trivial items, the custom in recent years has been to consider only a few items at each session. Accordingly, if a member expresses viewpoints which raise new aspects of a problem, he is generally asked to submit them in writing for detailed consideration at a later session. Brezhnev has privately claimed that most Politburo members listen to the presentation of most agenda items without speaking, and this may be true, although there is evidence that senior Politburo members, at least, feel little constraint in raising objections to important presentations or rulings with which they disagree. A significant degree of initiative appears to rest with Brezhnev in presenting an issue and expressing a consensus, and we know that colleagues occasionally pass him private notes during Politburo meetings to try

to influence his rulings. Most of the time, those rulings apparently are accepted; occasionally there are significant disagreements, and votes are then taken. The net effect of these procedures appears to be that enough authority is concentrated in the presiding officer's hands to move most Politburo business fairly expeditiously, though not enough to allow Brezhnev to override the wishes of a Politburo majority on an important matter.

While Politburo sessions probably are reserved for the most important issues of broad policy, much of the time of the policy-makers between sessions is devoted to coordination of secondary or lesser questions which demand resolution. The tendency in the Soviet decision-making system to refer many matters to the top which might logically be decided at a lower level places severe demands, in fact, on the Politburo leaders' time. This tradition of coordination of secondary issues at the highest level can be considered a weakness of the system. Nevertheless, definite procedures for expediting the process have been developed. The responsibility for coordinating the opinions of Politburo members on the larger issues lies with the member of the Party Secretariat who supervises the policy area involved in the decision. Together with the appropriate Central Committee department, the Party secretary reaches agreement with the Politburo member or members who are directly responsible for the field in question, and when substantive disagreements have been reconciled he forwards the coordinated version to the General Secretary, whose signature validates the decision. Delays in this process sometimes occur when a Politburo member decides to withhold his assent on an issue; Premier Kosygin, in particular, has occasionally insisted on his prerogative to delay coordination pending extended consideration of a proposal. Although from a practical political standpoint Brezhnev may not deliberately override the opinion of an important Politburo grouping on an issue, as Party boss he has the authority and responsibility to resolve the majority of contentious issues.

To facilitate their task of policy- and decision-making, the Politburo members explore specific tasks and problem areas in committee, forming various councils and commissions on permanent or ad hoc bases. The secret Soviet Defense Council is by far the most important of the permanent Politburo subcommittees: it includes three Politburo members, Brezhnev (as council chairman), "President" Nikolay Podgornyy, and Premier Kosygin; other members include Politburo alternate Dmitriy Ustinov (who oversees defense-industrial production and the space program from the Party Secretariat), Minister of Defense Andrey Grechko, and possibly chief of the General Staff Viktor Kulikov. The Defense Council prepares and forwards recommendations on the most important issues of military policy for approval by the Politburo. This council probably exerts an especially strong influence in the sphere of military technology, where many Politburo members probably are not well equipped to judge highly technical issues. It also seems to be involved in the appointment of high-level military officers, as was the case with the nomination of Kulikov to the top General Staff post last year. But however great its influence, the Defense Council is clearly subordinate to the Politburo on the most important policy questions.

Other Politburo subcommittees have included commissions on industry, agriculture, the national-economic plan, and domestic trade. Each commission, whether permanent or ad hoc, appears to function with full Politburo authority in its assigned area. A Politburo member conducts the commission at his own convenience in matters of participation, agenda, and so on. First deputy premiers Kirill Mazurov and Dmitriy Polyanskiy have chaired commissions on industry and agriculture, respectively, while senior Party secretary Andrey Kirilenko has chaired commissions on the economic plan and on domestic trade. Such commissions, in contrast to the Defense Council,

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Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

the Defense Council.

But the most important and direct supporting role in the Politburo decision-making system probably belongs to the Central Committee apparatus. This executive staff of the Party Secretariat not only formulates recommendations on policy issues within the competence of its approximately 20 departments, but also coordinates and channels much of the input of other agencies such as the Foreign Ministry and the KGB. The apparatus does not always function smoothly, for we know that departments compete among themselves for Politburo attention or are caught up in the rivalries between Politburo leaders.

The Central Committee apparatus also serves Politburo leaders as a primary source of the staff aides who assist each leader in formulating policy statements, memoranda, information briefs, and the like. In addition, Central Committee consultants provide specific expertise, and draft contributions on request for the use of the policy-makers. Several Central Committee departments also make use of consultants, many of whom hold full-time positions in academic research institutes. Such groups of consultants apparently serve, therefore, as a link between the Politburo and outside institutions such as the KGB and the academic institutes.

The most influential of the policy-supporting research institutes of the Academy of Sciences are the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (WEIR) and the Institute for the USA. These and other

academic institutes offer classified position papers or research studies and oral briefings to individual Politburo members on specified topics of interest to the policy-makers, and apparently compete vigorously for the ear of Politburo leaders. WEIR reportedly has prepared studies on such subjects as the implications of entering into SALT, the Czechoslovak situation prior to the Warsaw Pact intervention of 1968, and the strategic threat from China; whereas the Institute for the USA was asked to brief Premier Kosygin in 1969 on conflict between "guns and butter factions" in the US, and on the assessment by US experts of the same conflict in the Soviet Union.

While there is no firm evidence by which to measure the impact of institute findings on actual Politburo decisions, it appears to be true that the academic institutes provide the decision-makers with policy alternatives based on differing methodologies and perspectives. Together with the input of other auxiliary agencies, their contributions to the Politburo's formulation of policies reflect the increasing participation of an ever broader base of experts in the decision-making process in the past decade. It seems likely that this trend will continue during the next decade as well.

THE POLITBURO AND SOVIET DECISION-MAKING

I. POLITBURO STRUCTURE

In theory the CPSU Politburo is a collegial body without a chairman and without any organizational structure. This is an obviously unworkable setup, and in practice this central Soviet decision-making body is organized into three basic parts: a de facto chairman; its members; and a small executive staff. Clearly, the effectiveness of the Politburo as a policy-making body depends, in considerable part, on the inherent flexibility of this structure and its personalities.

A. The General Secretary's Role

1. The Embarrassing Need for a Chairman

An agreement to maintain an oligarchic sharing of power has been a fact of political life in the Politburo since Khrushchev's overthrow in 1964, so that the oligarchs have been continually embarrassed by the practical necessity to have someone take charge and steer the decision-making process, in order to get anything done. As a compromise,

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev has been allowed to run the Politburo's policy-making machinery but denied the corresponding titles.

It is, therefore, considered bad form in Soviet Party etiquette to identify the General Secretary as chairman of the Politburo. To do so could enhance his prestige and power at the expense of his nominal peers in the collective leadership. Sensitivity to such personal power ramifications probably also explains the infrequency of public references to the Politburo's being "headed by" Brezhnev. These very rare violations of the collectivity taboo generally have been committed by Brezhnev's known political clients, such as Kazakh Party boss Dinmukhamed Kunayev, who is a Politburo member. Other Politburo members probably have resented such statements as indirect Brezhnev attempts at self-aggrandizement. Registering the general sensitivity on this issue, a Party historical journal in August 1969 cited Lenin's writing that "there is no such" person as a Politburo chairman.

Nevertheless, Brezhnev as General Secretary is de facto chairman of the Politburo. His decisive role in presiding over the policy-making body is indicated in a partial listing of the General Secretary's prerogatives, including his right:

1) to convene and chair Politburo sessions,

2) to draw up the agenda of Politburo meetings,

3) to sum up and rule on issues under Politburo consideration,

4) to circulate, and by implication to withhold, various documents, proposals, etc., that are within Politburo purview, and

5) to decide the extent of participation at Politburo sessions, enlarging or restricting the discussion, even to the exclusion of Politburo alternates.*

Brezhnev himself gave additional details on his Politburo role during talks in 1970. According to Brezhnev, members must forward to him in writing three days in advance any problems they wish to have discussed, and Brezhnev selects topics from the written submissions; no subject may be raised in the meeting that has not been submitted in writing.

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1971

General Secretary
Leonid BREZHNEV

2. The Right to Deputize

suggest that any of the three senior Central Committee secretaries -- that is, Mikhail Suslov, Andrey Kirilenko, or Fedor Kulakov, who are members of both the Politburo and the

Central Committee Secretariat -- can be deputized to direct the Politburo's work during the General Secretary's absence from Moscow.*

Kirilenko convened the Politburo during the absence from Moscow of both Brezhnev and Suslov; in fact, about half of the Politburo members were on vacation at the time. It was apparently at this meeting that the Politburo either decided or finally ratified the transfer of RSFSR Premier Gennadiy Voronov, a Politburo member, to the much less important post of chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee. If the basic decision was actually made at this meeting, it raises the possibility that the Politburo can decide delicate matters, affecting even the power relationship within the Politburo itself, in the absence of the General Secretary or a number of its voting members. It seems more likely, however, that the vote of the other members was taken in absentia by long-distance telephone or that the action had been predetermined; Brezhnev himself might earlier have placed the question of Voronov's transfer on the agenda.

In addition, it appears that besides the senior Central Committee secretaries, two other senior Politburo members -- the Premier and the "President" -- may also have the right to conduct Politburo meetings when circumstances necessitate.

3. The General Department: Secret Politburo Secretariat

At any given time, whether it is Brezhnev himself or some deputizing colleague who is operating the Politburo's decision-making machinery, the man in charge relies on the Central Committee's General Department for executive support. Reporting formally to the General Secretary, the Department serves as a private secretariat to the Politburo in such matters as handling correspondence and other paper work. A kind of clearinghouse for proposals and decisions, it receives, registers, coordinates, amends, publishes, releases for dissemination, and stores Politburo documents.*

Between Politburo meetings, it is thus the General Department that conducts informal telephone votes by Politburo members on innumerable secondary matters and shepherds

memoranda on subjects large and small from one Politburo member's office to another. At the same time, this department has charge of all the mechanics of preparing and holding Politburo meetings; its responsibilities include circulating the agenda of planned Politburo sessions and alerting leaders to their required presence at these and other official functions. Politburo leaders acknowledge such requests from General Department officials as directives from the Party boss. In sum, the General Department moves the policy-making assembly line.

B. The Division of Functions

1. The Sources of Politburo Conflicts of Interest

The realities of the Politburo power structure ensure that certain Politburo leaders who hold particularly important posts in the Party or state apparatus are "more equal" than others who are their nominal peers. Some positions -- for example, the posts of Party General Secretary, senior Party secretary for organizational matters, government Premier, and first deputy premier -- are so important that they virtually guarantee a place among the voting members of the Politburo. Because they are vital to the administration of the Party and the state, these positions and their incumbents represent an irreducible core of the decision-making machinery. Persons who have gained these key posts, therefore, have a greater measure of influence and authority than their fellow Politburo members in less important posts.

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

Soviet leaders return applause of delegates to 24th Party Congress, which opened in March 1971. Front row, l. to r., key Politburo members PODGORNYY, BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, SUSLOV. Behind Brezhnev, SHCHERBITSKIY whispers in ear of KULAKOV; both junior leaders became Politburo members at the congress.

As these disparities in power would suggest, the agreement of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership to maintain "collectivity" by no means signifies an absence of political rivalries and conflicts. An individual leader obviously will take advantage of each opportunity that arises to advance his bureaucratic power and sometimes will go out of his way to defend his position against encroachments. At the same time, [redacted] suggest the existence of a general commitment to keep bureaucratic conflict to a minimum, and of alarm when this understanding appears to be violated.

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

1970

Nikolay PODGORNYY, Soviet "President" (titular chief of state).

1969

Premier Aleksey KOSYGIN.

[redacted] Brezhnev and President Podgornyy thus displayed their pique over Kosygin's having traveled to the Ukraine and having spoken [redacted] at meetings of Party activists about Party tasks. [redacted]

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1968

Ukrainian Premier
Vladimir SHCHERBITSKIY.

The potential for bureaucratic conflict between Party and state officials exists, of course, at several levels within the Politburo. The fact that the Party official's job is to check on and correct the performance of the government administrator makes likely a certain amount of recrimination and conflict along functional lines -- for example, between Ukrainian Party boss Petr Shelest and Ukrainian Premier Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, who are both Politburo members. Frictions are also observed between Party and government officials in competing areas, such as between the Party secretary who

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1971

Petr SHELEST Ukrainian
Party First Secretary.

oversees heavy-industrial production and the first deputy premier who administers the agricultural sector.*

Similar conflicts can occur within the Party or state hierarchies, creating an alliance between opposite numbers on some issues. Among the senior secretaries, for example, Kirilenko's responsibility for supervising heavy industry and construction brought him last year into conflict with Kulakov, who oversees agriculture from the

Kirilenko was categorically opposed to diverting trucks from industrial sectors to assist in the harvest.

**For an example of this type of competition, see CAESAR XXXIX, "Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political Succession," March 1971, p. 28.*

CONFIDENTIAL

1970

Party Secretary
Andrey KIRILENKO.

CONFIDENTIAL

1965

Party Secretary
Fedor KULAKOV.

2. Politburo Spokesmen for Domestic Lobbies

Against this background of conflict inherent in the structure of the Politburo, it is perhaps not surprising that have shown certain groups lobbying through "representatives" in the Politburo. Such "representation" on the part of a Politburo leader usually conforms to his assigned responsibilities; that is, he becomes biased from association with particular vested interests.

Polyanskiy and Agriculture

First Deputy Premier Polyanskiy, for example, is an active and ambitious promoter of the interests of the agricultural bureaucracy.

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

1970

First Deputy Premier
Dmitriy POLYANSKIY.

It is apparent that the opposition which Polyanskiy was fighting came from vested interests opposed to the ministerial agricultural bureaucracy. No doubt such "representation" has gained Polyanskiy valuable support within the Central Committee from the so-called agricultural lobby.

Shelepin and Consumer Goods

By contrast, trade union boss Aleksandr Shelepin apparently has advocated the consumer's cause from time to time during his tenure as a Politburo member, without hope for support from any comparable separate bureaucratic group in the Central Committee.

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1970

Aleksandr SHELEPIN, Chairman of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Shelepin's advocacy of the consumer's cause appears to have brought him into conflict on occasion with the heavy-industrial lobby.

Shelepin's speech was notable for its emphasis on the theme that heavy-industrialists had a responsibility to increase the production of consumer goods -- a theme which Brezhnev picked up in July 1970 in requesting support for his own program for agriculture.

it seems clear that Shelepin's "representation" of the consumer's interests in the Politburo

PARTY POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT
April 1972*

	NAME	AGE	TOTAL YEARS TENURE (Approx.) As Member	As Alternate	PRESENT POSITION (Date of Appointment)	GENERAL POLICY RESPONSIBILITIES † DOMESTIC	FOREIGN
						Secondary duties shown in grey	
POLITBURO MEMBERS	1. L. I. Brezhnev	65	14	2	General Secretary (Oct 64)	General Supervision, Defense, Security	General Supervision, Communist Party Liaison, US, Europe
	2. N. V. Podgornyy	69	12	2	Chmn, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (Dec 64)	Legislative Agencies, Local Economy, Defense	General State Relations, Southeast Asia
	3. A. N. Kosygin	68	16	5	USSR Premier (Oct 64)	Economic Administration & Finance, Defense	General Foreign Relations and Trade, Near East, Scandinavia, Canada
	4. M. A. Suslov	69	17	0	Party Secretary (Mar 47)	Ideology, Light Industry	International Communism (Including China)
	5. A. P. Kirilenko	65	10	4	Party Secretary (Apr 66)	Party Organization, Industrial Management	Communist Bloc Economy, Latin America
	6. A. Ya. Pel'she	73	6	0	Chmn, Party Control Committee (Apr 66)	Party Discipline	European Communist Relations
	7. K. T. Mazurov	58	7	8	USSR First Deputy Premier (Mar 65)	Industrial Administration, Science, Education	Economic Aid Programs
	8. D. S. Polyanskiy	54	12	2	USSR First Deputy Premier (Oct 65)	Agricultural Administration	(Unknown)
	9. P. Ye. Shelest	64	7	1	Ukrainian First Secretary (Jul 63)	Ukrainian Party Supervision	Eastern Europe
	10. G. I. Voronov	61	10	1	Chmn, USSR People's Control Committee (Jul 71)	Economic Discipline	(Unknown)
	11. A. N. Shelepin	53	7	0	Chmn, Central Council of Trade Unions (Jul 67)	Labor and Consumer Affairs	[illegible]
	12. V. V. Grishin	57	1	10	Moscow First Secretary (Jun 67)	Moscow Party Supervision	(Unknown)
	13. D. A. Kunayev	60	1	5	Kazakh First Secretary (Dec 64)**	Kazakh Party Supervision	(Unknown)
	14. V. V. Shcherbitskiy	54	1	7	Ukrainian Premier (Oct 65)**	Ukrainian Economic Administration	[illegible]
	15. F. D. Kulakov	54	1	0	Party Secretary (Sep 65)	Agriculture	(Unknown)
POLITBURO ALTERNATES	1. Yu. V. Andropov	57	—	5	Chmn, KGB (May 67)	Security, Intelligence	
	2. D. F. Ustinov	63	—	8	Party Secretary (Mar 65)	Defense Industry and Space	Military Aid
	3. P. N. Demichev	54	—	8	Party Secretary (Oct 61)	Propaganda, Culture, Party Indoctrination	—
	4. Sh. R. Rashidov	54	—	10	Uzbek First Secretary (Mar 59)	Uzbek Party Supervision	—
	5. P. M. Masherov	54	—	6	Belorussian First Secretary (Mar 65)	Belorussian Party Supervision	
	6. V. P. Mzhavanadze	69	—	14	Georgian First Secretary (Jun 57)	Georgian Party Supervision	—
	7. M. S. Solomentsev	58	—	½	RSFSR Premier (Nov 71)	RSFSR Economic Administration & Finance	—
SEC'T MEMBERS (NON-POLITBURO)	1. I. V. Kapitonov	57	—	—	Party Secretary (Dec 65)	Party Staffing	—
	2. K. F. Katushev	44	—	—	Party Secretary (Apr 68)	—	Communist Bloc Liaison
	3. B. N. Ponomarev	67	—	—	Party Secretary (Oct 61)	—	Relations With Non-Ruling Communist Parties

*Ranked in order as read by Brezhnev to 24th Party Congress in April 1971 except for Solomentsev added later
**Excludes a previous stint in this position

† Only approximate—does not show overlapping of duties among several leaders

differs in kind from Polyanskiy's patently bureaucratic lobbying for a clearly marked and powerful elite interest group. Some of Shelepin's positions can be traced to his functions and responsibilities, which have involved supervision or actual administration in the consumer sector for a number of years. It appears likely, in any case, that his main motive in adopting such a position was to appeal to a broad audience not identified with any one wing of the bureaucracy, so as to undercut the clear stand which Brezhnev took from the start of his rule in defense of heavy-industrial and military interests.

3. Foreign-Policy Responsibilities

There are clearly many Politburo differences of opinion over foreign affairs, although it is characteristic of the present Politburo system that in the foreign-policy area, in contrast to the domestic-policy field, opposing Soviet vested interests find less of a toehold for clear-cut "representation" by individual Politburo members. This appears to be so because the Politburo allocation of responsibilities in this area does not itself automatically create the kind of general, unceasing bureaucratic conflict and lobbying that has been observed throughout the Politburo on the domestic side. Thus, while all Politburo members have important full-time domestic assignments, only a few have primary responsibilities in the foreign field. Generally speaking, therefore, for most Politburo members policy-making in foreign affairs appears to involve relatively more collective decision-making in the forum of Politburo sessions, and less functional sparring in routine coordination between meetings.

Certain features of the assignment of Party and state functions may nevertheless give rise to divergencies in approaching foreign issues. Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and

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

1970

Party Secretary
Mikhail SUSLOV.

Suslov, for example, all have had responsibilities for conducting liaison with foreign Communist parties, but the particular attention which the first two leaders have given to the ruling parties has sometimes put them in opposition to their colleague, whose primary responsibility is to supervise relations with non-ruling parties. In 1968, for instance, Suslov's concern for the adverse consequences which a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia would have on the international Communist movement as a whole was apparently a factor that led him to oppose the invasion decision which Brezhnev and Kirilenko supported. For his part, Premier Kosygin's overall responsibility for administering the economy evidently has made him especially sensitive to the potential economic advantages of East-West detente for the Soviet Union, despite the occasional resistance of certain of his colleagues who have less direct concern for economic performance but greater responsibility for ideological purity and vigilance.

Given the press of business on such a small body as the Politburo, it must be presumed that on many issues, particularly with respect to foreign problems unfamiliar to them, its members accede to much of the policy advice and opinions of those among them who have experience with particular Communist parties or areas and countries of the world. Premier Kosygin, for example, has had especially close dealings with India, Pakistan, and other South Asian countries; Kirilenko has had a special concern for Chile and other Latin American countries; Polyanskiy has developed

special knowledge of certain African countries; and so forth. The total evidence nonetheless does not reveal a pattern of clearly defined responsibilities for individual countries throughout the Politburo; there appears to be considerable interchange among the leaders in contacts with specific foreign countries.

During the past year, General Secretary Brezhnev has meanwhile assumed a more prominent role in the conduct of state relations, which traditionally has been the concern of the Soviet "President" and Premier rather than of the Party boss. At the same time, the regime's "troika"

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Politburo Members BREZHNEV, PODGORNYY, and KOSYGIN, with Party Secretary Boris Ponomarev, meet in Kremlin conference room with Egyptian delegation, July 1970.

of Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin seems to have been slightly upgraded in the foreign field with respect to the other Politburo members. Thus, according to the obviously incomplete account of a "recent" change in the division of labor among the three rulers

Brezhnev now claims to have primary responsibility for foreign relations with Western Europe and the United States; Podgornyy is particularly concerned with Southeast Asia; and Kosygin with the Near East, Scanadanavia, and Canada. Although this alleged new arrangement gives Brezhnev greater prestige and indicates a heightened emphasis on diplomacy, it does not appear to reflect any basic changes in the process of decision-making.

II. POLITBURO MODUS OPERANDI

Despite Soviet secrecy, the inner workings of the Politburo are not entirely impenetrable to all-source examination of its operating procedures. materials provide insight into the scheduling of Politburo meetings, policy coordination between Politburo sessions, the way proposals and memoranda are originated and considered, and the range of domestic and foreign policy decisions which the Politburo covers. As a result, it is possible to draw some conclusions on the sources of policy initiative and influence, and on Politburo effectiveness in operations.

A. The Cycle of Decision-Making Meetings

The regular scheduling of meetings and other activities of the top Party and government agencies is geared, as much as practicable, to total support of weekly Politburo sessions. The schedule routinely calls for the Secretariat to meet every Tuesday, for the Council of Ministers (its Presidium, that is) to meet every Wednesday, and for the Politburo to meet every Thursday. (The average length of regular Thursday Politburo sessions is about four hours, but in some instances -- particularly during crisis periods -- the meetings last much longer.) The preparation of the agenda for Politburo sessions apparently also fits into this general pattern of scheduling. As

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General Secretary BREZHNEV with several members of the Politburo and Secretariat. Clockwise from left foreground are Politburo members SHELEPIN and GRISHIN; Party Secretaries KATUSHEV, KAPITONOV, and PONOMAREV; and Politburo members KULAKOV, PEL'SHE, KIRILENKO, and VORONOV.

mentioned elsewhere [redacted], Politburo members reportedly must submit proposed items for the agenda to Brezhnev three days in advance -- which means, normally, on Mondays.

In simplified outline, then, the typical weekly cycle begins on Monday, with Brezhnev receiving and reviewing various memoranda and drafts for possible inclusion in the agenda for the Politburo session. On Tuesday



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Brezhnev and the rest of the Party Secretariat discuss and adopt a Politburo agenda to be circulated to the Politburo leaders and other concerned officials through the General Department. By Wednesday the Presidium of the Council of Ministers is able to discuss those questions which are on the agenda for the scheduled Politburo session and to draw up contributions, coordinating within the Council of Ministers at lower levels and with the Secretariat. In addition, any subordinate commissions or councils with a say on any agenda item might meet on Wednesday, perhaps prior to and in preparation for the Presidium meeting. Finally, on Thursday morning the Politburo leaders prepare to present their proposals and contributions at the actual Politburo session, which would begin at 3 p.m. From Friday to Sunday the individual leaders apparently set wheels in motion on the adopted decisions, and plan further proposals for delivery to Brezhnev by Monday for the next week's session. Despite many exceptions and disruptions in this typical design (such as receptions, conferences, travel, etc., not to mention unexpected developments and crises), such a pattern reveals systematic and rather efficient decision-making procedures.

Of course, Brezhnev has the right to call the Politburo into session at any time, on the shortest notice, should an occasion warrant this. The Politburo has met much more frequently than once a week when a crisis has developed, as was the case, for example, in the months before the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. For these irregularly scheduled sessions, Brezhnev usually takes advantage of his pre-eminent position in summoning the other leaders to the Central Committee building, where his office is located, rather than convening the session in the Kremlin building where the regularly scheduled Thursday meetings are held. In addition, the Politburo occasionally moves as a group to the leadership rest area of Zavidovo to conduct meetings in relative isolation. Such moves usually reflect discussions

on particularly sensitive or important subjects. For example, most Politburo leaders spent two days, presumably in meetings, in Zavidovo in mid-December 1970, following a long Politburo session on 19 December. [redacted] the activity probably involved the upheaval in the Polish leadership, which came to a head at precisely that time and culminated in Gierek's replacement of Gomulka as Party boss.

Attendance at Politburo meetings apparently is mandatory for members who have no other pressing engagements that would excuse them from attending.* Of course, General Department Chief Konstantin Chernenko or one of his deputies would be present as Politburo secretary to record the proceedings. Politburo alternates and members of the Party Secretariat apparently are invited as a matter of course to attend regular sessions; however, Brezhnev can exclude them in special cases, and in any case they have no binding vote on decisions. Other participants may attend at the invitation of Brezhnev (or, in his absence, on the request of the senior secretary in charge) in order to provide their expertise. Such outsiders, who normally are the elite of the most important Party and government agencies, probably are present only for the discussion of topics in their immediate area of competence.

[redacted]

The scope of topics which the Politburo considers in session can be gauged only roughly on the basis of limited evidence, but apparently it covers a broad range of issues -- from crucial to fairly trivial. In this connection, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin remarked in 1965 that under the Soviet system of decision-making the pressure on the leadership was extreme because so many problems were referred to the top; by way of example he said that he had once seen the agenda of a Presidium (Politburo) meeting that contained approximately 50 items. Dobrynin's remark would seem to apply primarily to the situation which had prevailed under Khrushchev, who had apparently sought to reduce his colleagues' ability to restrain him by overloading Politburo sessions with consideration of a great number of lesser questions.

In any case [redacted] materials suggest that at least since the 23d Party Congress in April 1966, when the Party Presidium was renamed the Politburo, session agenda have been briefer and devoted to more significant problems.

[redacted]

Whatever the scope of the agenda at Politburo meetings, the reported statements of several Soviet officials, including Brezhnev himself, suggest that most sessions are now fairly strictly ordered and conducted so as to avoid digressions or disruptions. Brezhnev, of course, plays the leading role in Politburo sessions. Ambassador Dobrynin stated in February 1969, for example, that the General Secretary presides at Politburo meetings and has the function of summarizing the views expressed. The general practice, he added, is to seek a consensus on the issue under discussion, and the General Secretary's "rulings" usually are accepted, although formal votes are taken occasionally in sessions when there are disagreements. Brezhnev himself elaborated on these procedures [redacted] in [redacted] 1970, stating that most Politburo members do not speak but merely listen at

Politburo sessions; further, that if in the course of the session a new problem should arise, then if at all possible, discussion and decision are postponed to the next meeting, and the Politburo member who raised the problem is asked to present it in writing beforehand. This custom is apparently intended, again, to limit the number of agenda items considered at each Politburo meeting in order to ensure adequate preparation and consideration of each item.



Although examples tend to confirm the existence of a certain discipline and order in Politburo sessions, apparently with the aim of expediting the presentation of proposals and adoption of consensus decisions, these rules of procedure clearly are not intended to stifle debate in that forum. The more senior and powerful members, especially, probably feel little constraint in speaking out during sessions.





B. Coordination Outside Politburo Meetings

Politburo sessions may well be reserved for the most important issues of broad policy, but a large proportion of the time of Kremlin decision-makers is devoted to other questions which demand resolution between sessions. The main method used daily to register the opinions of Politburo members on urgent questions is the so-called "vote." The normal practice calls for the General Department to send draft decisions, decrees, proposals, etc., by courier to the Politburo members and to request their "vote" on them. On simpler matters the department may telephone the Politburo member's office and inform the leader or his staff verbally of the issue to be voted on. In any case, the policy-maker is expected to express himself either "for" or "against" the issue, making comments to explain a negative position or suggesting changes in the decision's text.

In Kremlin usage, the line between voting and coordinating is not clear.

1. The Range of Issues Coordinated

It is possible that when a decision does not involve broad policy considerations, a "vote" is taken among several Politburo members in line with their assigned areas of responsibility. An example in support of such a hypothesis would be the November 1971 decision on granting military aid to Somalia, which a General Staff officer said had been voted on by [redacted] the three Politburo members who are Defense Council members: Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin.*

On the other hand, sometimes a full vote has been taken on seemingly trivial questions. [redacted]

Issues which we know have been raised for resolution outside Politburo meetings include such diverse topics as Brezhnev's report to the June 1969 International Communist Conference, instructions to Soviet ambassadors and delegates abroad, a proposed stop by Kosygin in Kabul on returning from India, a proposal on "Arab trade," the composition of various Soviet delegations to foreign conferences and summit meetings, the protocol arrangements for meeting East German leader Honecker, a proposed Mazurov reception of a UAR foreign trade official, the official recall of Podgornyy as a Supreme Soviet delegate from his elected constituency after his appointment as President, publication of obituaries on high Soviet officials, the erection of a monument for deceased Romanian leader Georgiu-Dej, the awarding of Orders of Lenin to Soviet cities and oblasts, and aspects of economic administration -- specifically, decisions on milk, timber, livestock breeding, and harvesting.

In almost every one of these instances the Politburo member or members voted favorably [redacted] which would suggest that the majority of such between-sessions decisions, because they usually are of secondary importance, pass through the coordination process with a minimum of trouble. Nevertheless, the apparent felt need to secure Politburo approval for many matters which might logically be decided at a lower level can be considered a weakness in the Soviet decision-making system, because it places severe demands on the policy-makers' time. This tradition apparently reflects not only a general reluctance to delegate authority, but also mutual suspicions among the Politburo oligarchs, which impel them to insure against possible future recriminations from their colleagues by securing the widest possible assumption of responsibility for decisions large and small.

2. The Political Pressures to Reach Agreement

the leaders not only usually try where possible to avoid friction, but may sometimes reverse themselves when it becomes clear that they are in a minority on an issue. The avoidance of political isolation is apparently an important consideration in coordination.

In fact, on less than vital issues many Politburo members often seem primarily concerned to vote whichever way the majority of their colleagues are voting, and not to appear as one who makes superfluous difficulties on routine matters.

3. Sources of Coordination Problems

On the other hand, the evidence also has revealed occasional difficulties in the coordination process as a result of policy frictions or collisions of vested interests.

CONFIDENTIAL

1967

Gennadiy VORONOV, Chairman of People's Control Committee.

The inference is that the leaders who have their political base in various geographical areas often cause some delay in coordinating important proposals and other documents affecting that base, at least until they have given close attention to the matter.

4. Cases of Outright Obstruction

Still more rarely materials contain indications of more serious resistance or outright opposition of Politburo members to certain proposals which have been put forward for coordination.

5. Brezhnev's Role in Resolving Differences

Except for unusual cases, such as one in which Kosygin apparently had major reservations, the procedure for resolving differences which Politburo members have expressed in coordinating on issues between Politburo sessions seems to be fairly clear. Brezhnev, as General Secretary, has the authority and responsibility to make the final determination on most if not all decisions. comments which have been made on a draft proposal are collated and incorporated into the decision within the Secretariat, normally by the Party secretary who has jurisdiction in the area or by one of his subordinates. From there, the revised draft is submitted finally to Brezhnev for his signature.

C. The Flow of Memoranda and Proposals Within the Politburo

The total evidence points to a considerable and constant flow of information and proposals within and around the Politburo. It indicates that virtually any member of the Politburo or Secretariat can initiate a policy proposal. However, it also suggests a pattern of procedures that centers on Brezhnev -- not surprisingly, in view of his position as General Secretary and de facto chairman of the Politburo. Brezhnev usually receives a copy of Politburo memoranda, reports, etc., whatever the restrictions on distribution. Moreover, they indicate that standing procedures call for Brezhnev to release documents before they are voted on by Politburo leaders. Further, they reveal that a document which has been circulated and coordinated among Politburo members goes back to Brezhnev, who signs and thereby validates the decision.

1. A Sampling of Politburo Memoranda

several examples show top leaders initiating memoranda addressed to the Politburo or, what is essentially the same thing, to the Central Committee.

-- a Kosygin memorandum on economic matters was circulated on Brezhnev's instructions to Politburo members

--

Andropov in his new position as KGB chief revealed that a memorandum, which was written by his deputy Sergey Bannikov, had been read at the Politburo and had received high praise;

-- the Bannikov memorandum was discussed about a week after the Arab-Israeli conflict ended and a week before Brezhnev reported on the situation to a Central Committee plenum -- strongly suggest that the subject here was

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1971
Yuriy ANDROPOV,
Chairman of Committee
for State Security (K.G.B.)
a Politburo alternate.

Soviet involvement in the Middle East, conceivably focusing on intelligence gaps or failures.

In none of these examples does the memorandum appear to present a major program. Rather, they suggest the advancement of important but somewhat narrow parts of policy programs.

By contrast, however, a Brezhnev memorandum of May 1970 "On the Situation in Agriculture" set forth for Politburo consideration a major investment program which apparently upset previously approved guidelines for the 1971-1975 national-economic plan.

It might be speculated, moreover, that Brezhnev made an attempt to arrange matters in such a way that at least his agricultural critic Voronov would not have time to review the memorandum properly.

2. Brezhnev's Powers to Authorize and Validate Proposals

Brezhnev's permission usually is sought or required to circulate a leader's proposal for Politburo coordination.

3. Premier Kosygin's Independence

Despite extensive Brezhnev powers regarding Politburo proposals, there is some evidence that Premier Kosygin's authority gives him a certain measure of independence from the General Secretary, beyond the acknowledged substantive competence that all Politburo leaders have in their area of responsibility, and that this leads to occasionally crossed wires.

A more serious conflict apparently occurred when Brezhnev complained to Foreign Minister Gromyko about a failure to follow his suggestion in coordinating a document Kosygin had allowed the British delegation to release the first version of the communique without striking out a phrase objectionable to Brezhnev, although the phrase was being removed from the version to be published in the Soviet press.

III. POLICY-SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS

A number of high-level institutions, both within and just below the Politburo, are directly involved in the decision-making process. At the Politburo level, various permanent and ad hoc bodies operate under the direct chairmanship of a Politburo member in fulfilling policy tasks on behalf of the policy-makers. The Defense Council, which plays a key role in formulating decisions in the military sphere, is the most important of these Politburo "subcommittees" and serves as the main channel through which Defense Ministry views reach the Politburo. Below the Politburo and subordinate to either the Party Secretariat or the government Council of Ministers, several Party and government agencies offer policy support on a direct and regular basis. The most important of these Politburo auxiliary agencies are the secret governmental Military-Industrial Commission and the Party Central Committee apparatus, while the latter is supported in turn by the intelligence and policy input of the Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and various academic research institutes. The efficiency of Politburo operations and policies depends very largely on the kind and amount of support which these institutions provide.

A. Politburo Subcommittees

It is clear that individual members do much of the Politburo's preliminary work themselves, relying primarily on their own personal staffs. Occasionally, however, specific tasks or problem areas are explored more formally in committee, usually in ad hoc commissions which are formed for this purpose. The assignment of a Politburo member to direct such subcommittees usually is due to his having regular bureaucratic responsibilities

in the given area. In addition, there are certain permanent bodies which represent exceptions to this somewhat haphazard staffing procedure, and which function as de facto Politburo subcommittees whatever their formal position in the regime's setup. In addition to the Defense Council, these include a Commission on Industry, (probably) a Commission on Agriculture, and a few others

1. The Defense Council

The secret Defense Council (Sovet oborony) evidently exists as a state entity linking the Party and government hierarchies. The limits of its independent powers in the sphere of defense are not fully clear, but it appears to be ultimately subordinate to the entire Politburo on the most important military policy issues. Its top-heavy membership, including the leadership troika of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy, reinforces its de facto status as a Politburo subcommittee.

Probable Council Membership

Evidence indicates overwhelmingly that Brezhnev chairs the council. Other members of the Defense Council, besides the troika, are Politburo alternate Dmitriy Ustinov, Minister of Defense Andrey Grechko and possibly Chief of the General Staff Viktor Kulikov. Ustinov's responsibility in the Party Secretariat for overseeing the armaments industry and space program makes him, in effect, Brezhnev's deputy for defense

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1970

Dmitriy USTINOV, Party Secretary and Politburo alternate.

industry. The fact that Ustinov is only a Politburo alternate may, however, reduce his role in Defense Council deliberations to an advisory capacity. The same holds true, of course, for the two military representatives, who have no Politburo status at all. Thus, although formally all Defense Council members may participate on an equal basis in their deliberations and resolutions, in practice the greater political authority of the three Politburo members probably makes their views decisive, particularly in the case of Brezhnev as chairman. In addition to these contributing members, the chief of the Chief Operations Directorate of the General Staff appears to function as a secretary of the Defense Council, handling procedural matters such as arranging for the convening of the Council, keeping minutes of its sessions, etc., but probably not having a say in its deliberations.

Other important government officials take part from time to time in the work of the Defense Council, offering special expertise on particular issues when requested on an ad hoc basis. Those who have been reported or observed in a Defense Council supportive role, possibly as associate members of the council, include the Warsaw Pact commander, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the KGB Chairman (who since 1967 has been Yuriy Andropov, a Politburo alternate), and, on defense-industrial questions, the chairmen of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), both of whom are USSR deputy premiers but have no Politburo status. Any of these officials, of course, can draw on the assistance of specialists within their own bureaucracies in providing information to the Defense Council. The presence of non-members at Defense Council sessions is restricted to those items of the agenda which fall within their area of expertise, in keeping with the tight rein of security and compartmentation in this area.

The Defense Council does not appear to have its own staff as such, relying instead on expert inputs

from various government agencies and groups as required.

the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense has a central role in presenting position papers on military requirements to the council. The General Staff receives recommendations on questions of doctrine, strategy, and force requirements from military research groups or institutes within the Defense Ministry; the General Staff reportedly has some responsibility in this area for presenting position papers before the council. In regard to development and procurement of military hardware, the Defense Minister allegedly has authority to place requirements for weapons systems, new technology, and troops, giving his recommendations (apparently not binding) on quantities of troops and weapons needed and on performance characteristics desired. it is presumed that the recommendations on military hardware requirements are forwarded to what he labeled the council's "economic component" (an apparent reference to the Military-Industrial Commission for final coordination before formal council approval. The council reportedly consults also with senior officials within the USSR Academy of Sciences in formulating recommendations for Politburo review.

Support for the Politburo

The Defense Council's activities, suggest that it makes important contributions to the formulation of Politburo positions on military issues. just a few hours before a scheduled Politburo session, the council met It seems clear that in this case the

Defense Council was called on to forward advice and recommendations to the Politburo in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives in Eastern Europe, and specifically in Czechoslovakia. The Defense Council, of course, would not have rewritten the broad outlines of the Politburo's foreign policy, which Brezhnev had spelled out a month earlier at a closed Central Committee plenum. Nevertheless, those outlines probably were somewhat vague for a variety of reasons, including differences of opinion within the Politburo at the time as to how hard to pressure the Czechoslovaks. Conceivably, therefore, the rampant growth of "democratization" in Prague and concomitant deterioration of the Soviet political position created the need, as Brezhnev saw it, for more specific guidelines, including military plans.

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Defense Council members (l. to r.) PODGORNYY, Marshal GRECHKO, BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, at May Day parade, 1968.

Independent Council Decisions

In addition to such preparatory work for the Politburo, the Defense Council may also have the right to make certain military-political decisions independently of the Politburo, especially on questions that fall within well-defined Politburo policy guidelines. the council defines the general principles of military doctrine after discussion and consideration of political, economic, and military factors, including strategy, weapons development, and technology. The council's decisions on military doctrine are final and binding on all Party and government agencies. the council takes part in all major military-political decisions, particularly during crisis periods.

Other evidence, nevertheless, has indicated that on the most important policy questions, the Defense Council has a role more clearly subordinate to Politburo decision-making.





2. Politburo Commissions

Information on additional Politburo subcommittees permits certain tenuous conclusions on their scope and method of operation. None of them seems as important as the Defense Council, although each presumably functions with a similar mandate from the Politburo. The evidence indicates that the Politburo member who is tasked with a policy problem conducts the commission at his convenience and apparently with full authorization in matters of participation, agenda, etc.

Commissions have been observed in several major policy areas, including industry, agriculture, the national-economic plan, and domestic trade. The industrial and

agricultural commissions are quite possibly permanent and have been chaired, respectively, by Mazurov and Polyanskiy, who are Premier Kosygin's first deputies.

a. The Commission on Industry

An industrial commission was formed under Kosygin's aegis before the Premier presented a major program of reform in economic planning and industrial management for approval by a Central Committee plenum.

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

1970

First Deputy Premier Kirill MAZUROV.

b. The Agricultural Commission

Many of Polyanskiy's activities in support of agricultural policy- and decision-making over the years appear to be associated with a commission on agriculture.





B. Auxiliary Agencies

Several agencies are just one step below the Politburo commissions in providing direct support to the policy-makers. On the government side, perhaps the most important in the decision-making process is the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) under the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. Like the Ministry of Defense, the VPK operates essentially as an adjunct of the Defense Council but is not headed by a Politburo member. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Committee for State Security (KGB) are similarly important institutions which support the Politburo in policy-making, but they are excluded from detailed consideration here.* On the

Party side, the Central Committee apparatus plays a key role, giving support in its own right and coordinating the contributions of other policy-supporting institutions. Research institutes of the Academy of Sciences also contribute, although generally indirectly through the apparatus, to the decision-making process.

1. The Military-Industrial Commission

The Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), the very existence of which is a state secret, is a high-level coordinating staff attached to the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers.* The VPK, with USSR Deputy Premier Leonid Smirnov as its chairman, is nominally subordinate to Premier Kosygin. However, in practice Smirnov reports directly to the Party Secretariat, specifically to Politburo alternate Ustinov, and thus indirectly to General Secretary Brezhnev, on the most important matters of decision-making in the sphere of defense-related research, development, and production. In effect, it apparently functions more as a Defense Council adjunct than as a staff of the Council of Ministers, except in routine matters.

CONFIDENTIAL

1965

Leonid SMIRNOV, USSR Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission.

*This Presidium is the highest-level, regularly functioning deliberative body in the Soviet government. It
(footnote continued on page 60)

materials shed some light on its otherwise obscure organizational structure and activities. They reveal that the commission has a permanent staff of defense-production experts, under the leadership of Smirnov and his three deputies, Georgiy Titov (first deputy), Georgiy Pashkov, and Leonid Gorshkov. These officials work directly with defense plant directors and engineers, as well as with the leadership of the eight ministries which administer all defense-related production.

possibly the entire staff of the VPK are specialists on detached duty from these ministries, with the exception of Smirnov, his deputies, and their immediate office help.

(footnote continued from page 59)
consists of the Premier, his two first deputies and several deputies, plus reportedly a small number of other members of the Council, such as the Minister of Finance. The Chairmen of the most important Presidium commissions are deputy premiers and thus are involved in all questions of government administration. In addition to the secret VPK, the Presidium contains at least two publicly identified Council of Ministers Commissions chaired by deputy premiers: for Foreign Economic Questions (chairman Vladimir Novikov), and for CEMA Affairs (chairman Mikhail Lesechko).

Investment Decisions

Beyond its primary responsibility for the smooth functioning of the defense-production sector, the VPK evidently has a say in formulating decisions on investment in military and space programs, as well as on other technical matters which relate to defense policy.

The VPK may indeed have only limited authority to initiate and approve decisions itself; rather, the commission probably serves primarily as a coordinator of decisions for the various government agencies which are involved in matters of defense.



Requirements for Estimates

The VPK seems to levy requirements for intelligence estimates in apparent support of defense-production plans



or programs, possibly on its own initiative for the purpose of special pleading.



The VPK Relationship With Grechko

One aspect of the VPK's authority as a possible adjunct of the Soviet Defense Council is its apparent responsibility for implementing and controlling production requirements of the Ministry of Defense.





The VPK and Command and Control

The VPK, by virtue of its pre-eminent role in overseeing the production of military technology, is associated with military command and control systems.



***"Command and control" would include, notably, the communications equipment, computers for data processing, electronic display boards, etc., that serve as a basis for military operational decisions.*



2. The Central Committee Apparatus

The Central Committee apparatus is known to play an important role in channeling or coordinating inputs to Politburo policies from other support agencies. However, the reporting from informed sources on the specific

machinery for this is quite often confused or contradictory. For example, Yuriy Arbatov, director of the Institute for the USA, reported in 1969 that the three primary contributors to most foreign policy debates -- which he identified as "the scientists" (apparently meaning institute officials like himself), "the military," and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- often present their positions to the policy-makers directly and independently, without prior coordination. He complained that this led to poor argumentation and presentation at the highest levels. In seeming contradiction, Arbatov two years later explained (in the context of preparation of Soviet positions on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks -- SALT) that a number of different bureaucratic groups in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Sciences, and the Ministry of Defense contributed to SALT, and that a Central Committee staff coordinated these groups. The final positions, he said, were then decided by the Politburo.*

Departmental Functions

Without doubt, many of the approximately 20 departments of the Central Committee apparatus play a considerable role in coordinating the inputs of the auxiliary agencies on most high-level policy problems, although the existence of a single staff for this general purpose is dubious. Anatoliy Gromyko, a member of Arbatov's institute and son of the Foreign Minister, has stated that

**It is conceivable, however, that such a coordinating body in the Central Committee apparatus was later established specifically for the SALT problem.*

the functions of staff support and policy coordination are carried out either formally by ad hoc groups which the Politburo and Secretariat create, or informally as part of "ongoing coordinating activities" of the Central Committee headquarters staff. He explicitly denied, however, that there was a permanent coordinating staff that would enjoy the leverage and over-all prerogatives of the US National Security Council staff which Dr. Kissinger heads. Gromyko's reported statement fits closely the observed pattern of activity of the Politburo commissions as described earlier, but it appears to be a simplification of the actual role of the central Party apparatus.

The coordination process in which Central Committee departments become involved is a complicated one. [redacted] has stressed that it is standard practice for all "interested" apparatchiks from the Central Committee, and sometimes from related organizations, to take part in the most important Politburo-level decisions.* Alluding to the existence of a "fair number" of patterns for decision-making, [redacted] described a hypothetical case in which information from various sources might point to a need to formulate a change of attitude toward a Polish political figure. The "interested" components would then be the Polish Sector of the Central Committee's "Foreign" (that is, Bloc) Department, the Foreign Ministry's Fourth European Countries Division (for Poland and Czechoslovakia), and possibly some department of the state security apparatus (KGB). According to this source, the Soviet position would be prepared first within one of these components, then gradually more senior officials would be enlisted in drafting opinions, and the related

[redacted]

departments consulted as the need arose. A preliminary decision would then be made in the Polish Sector and submitted to the Bloc Department chief for examination. After review by the department chief and the appropriate junior Party secretary, the matter would reach the Politburo level; the responsible Politburo member, and sometimes the entire Politburo, would convene all "interested" persons, and a final decision would be made.

[redacted]

Staff Aides and Consultants

The Central Committee apparatus also serves as a source of specialists who work on the personal staff of individual Politburo leaders.* The staff aides carry the title of "Assistant" to the leader they serve. In addition, Politburo leaders can draw on the specialized knowledge of "Consultants" who are attached to various Central Committee departments. Both the assistants and the consultants exert a considerable influence in formulating policy positions for their busy and often less well-versed bosses.

All such specialists are considered here as a category of Central Committee functionaries, irrespective of their formal position in the Party or state apparatus, because they have identical functions in assisting their bosses.

Central Committee consultant groups, which exist in several departments, may provide the mechanism by which ostensibly non-official "academicians" offer information and advice to the Party policy-makers. How this mechanism might work in, say, the area of foreign policy which the Bloc Department supervises can be seen in the contacts and activities of Aleksandr Bovin, whom the Soviet press identified in late 1969 as leader of a Consultant Group of an unspecified Central Committee department. Although Bovin's departmental subordination has not been spelled out, all the evidence strongly suggests a Bloc Department affiliation. His link to the academic world is reflected in the fact that he is a member of the editorial board of the journal USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, which is published by the Institute for the USA.

In view of Bovin's presence on the editorial board of the Arbatov institute's journal, therefore, it can be speculated that the Bovin group in the Bloc Department provides a link which connects the Central Committee apparatus

Conflict Among Brezhnev's Aides

An unconfirmed but plausible report on the drafting of Brezhnev's Lenin Day speech in 1970 suggested that staff aides and consultants, by dint of their intellect and specialized knowledge, occasionally can exert an important influence on their bosses and modify the outlines of Soviet policies.

**Besides its relationship with Arbatov's Institute for the USA, the Bloc Department presumably would control, for example, the Institute of the Far East (on China) and the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System (on CEMA member countries). There is no ready explanation for the interest, if not responsibility, which Andropov and the Bloc Department have exhibited regarding Soviet relations with the US, unless perhaps it has to do with the similarity of approach to Bloc countries and to the US, which is based more on traditional geo-political and military-strategic factors than on the ideological considerations that play such an important role in the International Department's dealings with other foreign countries and Communist parties.*

***These would include notably the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and the institutes for Africa and Latin America.*

According to this account, this speech had been written by a "large group"

A few days before he delivered the speech on 21 April, Brezhnev reportedly received a critical comment on the draft from his assistants,

These apparatchiks -- who are known from other sources to be strongly conservative Brezhnev associates of long standing -- are said to have accused the speech writers of revisionism, apparently because of the draft's favorable attitude toward detente and its failure to justify Stalinist policies. In response to a Brezhnev request for a reply to the criticism, the drafters allegedly charged with attacks on the Party's general line, and in the event the speech remained basically unchanged.

This reported incident of disarray among the General Secretary's closest advisors would seem to indicate that his foreign-policy assistants are both more moderate in the Soviet context and more influential in general than his domestic-affairs counselors.

3. Academic Institutes

The number of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences which give policy support to the Politburo has steadily increased during the past 10-15 years. The most influential of these institutes today, at least in the sphere of foreign policy, are the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (WEIR), which Nikolay Inozemtsev directs, and Yuriy Arbatov's Institute for the USA. Like several similar policy-support institutes of the Academy, these two appear to have drawn on Central Committee personnel for the core of their staff. In effect, they appear to be fulfilling functions which earlier had been located within the Central Committee but which were broken out in order to take advantage of the relative freedom that scholars have to mingle with professionals in their fields outside the Soviet Union and to gain access to influential political circles in foreign countries. The institutes are in a position thus to organize and centralize the largely overt collection and evaluation of information from a number of open sources and to pass their analyses to the Politburo, either directly or through the central Party apparatus.

A large body of reporting indicates that institute officials regularly brief individual members of the Politburo -- usually Kosygin or Brezhnev are mentioned -- and offer position papers or research studies on specific topics of interest to the policy-makers. The total evidence

suggests that only a few institute officials, probably at the director level, serve as permanent consultants to the Politburo, while the majority of them are summoned only occasionally, if at all.

Institute studies focus, naturally enough, on major problems having a direct bearing on Soviet policy. Several examples of the subjects of such studies are available

include SALT, Czechoslovakia, and China. the SALT paper had outlined first the Soviet objectives, then understanding of the US objectives followed with a discussion of the probable effects of various Soviet alternatives, the first two being to enter and not to enter into the negotiations.

Yuriy Arbatov and his Institute for the USA seem to play a role similar to WEIR's, although Arbatov may try to place more emphasis on face-to-face briefings of individual top leaders. Arbatov himself reportedly stated that in early June 1969 he had been asked to brief Kosygin on two topics: first, on current and future conflict in the US between the "guns and butter factions" over resource allocations -- that is, pressures in the US for defense expenditures as opposed to civilian expenditures -- and second, on how US experts assess the same conflict in the Soviet Union.

Rivalry Between Institutes

A number of reports indicate a fairly serious rivalry between WEIR and the Institute for the USA on strategic and foreign-policy issues, specifically in regard to the US, and this is reflected in their differing approaches to analysis. Undoubtedly, the background and personalities of their present directors have given the two institutes their unique stamp. WEIR, under the influence of the economist and former Pravda editor Inozemtsev, places its major emphasis on a theoretical approach and on model building. The Institute for the USA, on the other hand, working under the close supervision of polemicist Arbatov, apparently bases its analyses on a more empirical approach. Members of Arbatov's institute have made numerous disparaging remarks about Western "think-tanks" and their use of game theory, cybernetics, etc., in political-strategic analysis and have indicated a pragmatic preference for "logic." Kulish himself reportedly affirmed the existence of competition between WEIR and Arbatov's institute for influence and attention, and at one point even asserted that the Institute for the USA and other regional institutes in the Academy of Sciences were "satellites" of WEIR. Indeed, in creating the Arbatov institute in late 1967, the Politburo could very well have intended it to be an alternative source of information to them, with the focus on short-term considerations, while expecting the Inozemtsev institute to provide a longer or broader perspective on policy issues.

Competition probably exists between a number of other institutes that the Politburo draws on for expertise. For example, the Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production, under the directorship of Abel Aganbegyan, would appear to be a competitor of WEIR in some areas. In 1970 Aganbegyan's institute recruited WEIR's deputy director Stanislav Men'shikov to head a new section dealing with econometric models of capitalist

countries and focusing on the US. At the same time, however, WEIR reportedly had become very active in economic forecasting through computer modeling on the US economy;

A similar proliferation of effort seems to have occurred in the sphere of CEMA relations, which were the responsibility of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System for a number of years. Former Central Committee Bloc Department official Oleg Bogomolov has been director of this institute since April 1969. In early 1971, however, a CEMA specialist reported the establishment of a new International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Socialist System.

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POSTSCRIPT

The Soviet regime has evolved more or less continuously towards participatory bureaucracy over the past two decades. True, today's Politburo may not be much different from its past and future counterparts in certain features -- for example, regarding the existence of a de facto chairman in the person of the Party boss, the assignment of Politburo members to specific policy-making areas and to councils and ad hoc commissions, and the subordination of all Party and state agencies to Politburo rule. However, several distinctive aspects of the Politburo's modus operandi have undergone significant change over the years, and its effectiveness has been affected as a result. The future should bring further evolution.

In the Stalin era, which was marked by continual political upheaval and uncertainty, Politburo members almost completely lacked policy initiative, serving mainly as enforcers of the dictates of one person: Stalin. A modern Soviet Party textbook, discussing the fact that Stalin convened the Central Committee only twice during 1947-1952, expressed the problem of the Politburo's role at that time in exquisite understatement: "The Politburo also did not function normally for a long time. Many important questions, including those which concerned the fate of several members of the Central Committee and even of the Politburo, were decided if not by one person, then by a narrow circle of persons."

The position of the ruling elite improved somewhat under Khrushchev, so that its members began to make significant contributions to the formulation of policy. However, leadership suffered from the heavy-handed intrusions of the Party boss in all areas of activity, from the dilution of his colleagues' effectiveness in a flood of trivia, and from bitter political infighting which

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

accompanied Khrushchev's constant demoting and shifting of personnel in the Party leadership.

By contrast, the present Politburo has become stable in both its composition and its operating procedures as a result of continuing evolution of the system. As we have seen, the Politburo in recent years has adhered to orderly decision-making processes, reserving sessions for serious consideration of the most important issues of broad policy. In addition to ensuring full coordination among Politburo members on issues between sessions, the regime increasingly has provided for the participation in decision-making of an ever widening circle of specialists from various support agencies. Perhaps just as importantly, no Politburo member has been removed from the ruling elite in the past six years -- a reflection of the growing difficulty in altering the balance of power in the leadership, should someone like Brezhnev have a mind to try this.

Thus a heightened degree of orderliness and expansion of the circle of advisors has been both facilitated and made necessary by the continued sharing of power. At the same time, much of this increase in the stability and effectiveness of the policy-making system can be attributed also to the regime's greater experience in coming to grips with complex problems. Finally, the present policy mechanism probably reflects, in part, the personalities of the top leaders themselves. Brezhnev and Kosygin, for example, seem temperamentally content with the relatively ordered bureaucratic procedures of "collective" leadership. Should the over-all power balance remain essentially unchanged and Brezhnev either continue in charge for another five-ten years or be succeeded by someone of a similar bent -- for example, by his heir-apparent Kirilenko -- the outlook would be for relatively minor refinements in the present system, as well as for a probable continuation of the present trend toward widening the circle of policy support. On

the other hand, should a sudden shift in the power balance result in the advent of a less conformist and more ambitious leader, such as Shelepin perhaps might be, some major changes -- as yet unpredictable -- could occur in both the composition of the Politburo and its present fairly stable pattern of operations.

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