

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IN THE HISTORY OF THE USSR

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VOLUME 1:
documents issued in 1953-1954 years

Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

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Contents

In continuation there will be issued more books in this series of documents

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CAESAR - 1

15 July 1953

Copy No. 45

"THE DOCTORS' PLOT"

[redacted]

HR70-14
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CAESAR

Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
14 July 1953

MEMORANDUM

The attached article, "The Doctors' Plot, is the first in a series of working papers prepared by the staff of Project CAESAR. Project CAESAR was established by the Director of Central Intelligence to study all available information on the members of the Soviet hierarchy, the middle ranks as well as the higher.

On the whole, the biographic information under scrutiny, like most categories of information on the Soviet Union, is inconclusive and frequently contradictory. The work of Project CAESAR has served, however, to stimulate reconstruction of developments and events affecting the Kremlin hierarchy, of which the first to be issued is "The Doctors' Plot". It will be followed by articles dealing with both the subsequent and preceding periods.

All parts of CIA are contributing to the Project as are certain elements of other agencies, notably the National Security Agency and the Biographic Register of the Department of State.

The articles in this series will be identified by the word CAESAR in the upper left hand corner of the cover page of each. The articles are subject to revision, and suggestions and criticisms will be welcomed. They should be addressed to Mr. James P. Hanrahan, Indications Staff, Office of Current Intelligence

The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors and do not represent official views of the Agency.

It is suggested that recipients retain their copies of the various chapters as issued, for later binding in chronological order into a loose-leaf book.

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THE DOCTORS' PLOT

The 13 January Pravda article disclosing the doctors' plot must have had a shattering effect on the citizens of the USSR. It set the stage for what was probably anticipated in many quarters as a repeat performance of the devastating purge that shook the Soviet Union from 1934-1938.

The announcement singled out nine doctors -- most of them Jewish -- as part of a ring of spies working for a "Jewish-bourgeois nationalist group," which in turn was sponsored by the American and British intelligence organizations. They were accused of murdering by mistreatment two former Soviet leaders -- A. S. Shcherbakov, who died in May 1945, and A. A. Zhdanov, who died in August 1948. In addition to other leaders, the doctors were further specifically accused of attempting to murder five military figures: Marshals Vasilevski, Konev and Govorov, General Shtemenko and Admiral Levchenko.

The "plot" had clearly anti-Semitic overtones. The observation was made at the time that since no Jews had attended Zhdanov and Shcherbakov, it was necessary to include among the participants the names of three non-Jews who had. In addition, it represented a new stage in the fierce propaganda war, the "hate-America" campaign, which Ambassador Kennan had found so virulent upon his arrival in Moscow. Inter alia, it brought proof of US hostility directly to the Soviet people by proving that this country had many agents inside the USSR.

The leaders of the US and UK were in effect accused of having assassinated two prominent Soviet government officials and of conspiring to assassinate more, in particular, these five military leaders of the USSR. Shcherbakov's "murder" was committed at a time when the US and UK were allied with the USSR in a war against Germany and were awaiting Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Shcherbakov, a Colonel General, at the time of his death was Chief of the Army's Political Administration, Deputy Commissar of Defense, Secretary of the Moscow City and Oblast Committees, and alternate member of the Politburo.

The wording of the announcement carried the clear suggestion that the doctors might have succeeded either in murdering others not specified in the announcement or at least in reducing their life span. Yegorov, one of the accused, had actually been Chief of the Kremlin's medical directorate, and hence had probably treated at one time or another all of the Politburo members, including Stalin

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himself. It is known, for example, that Yegorov treated Kalinin, Dimitrov, and Choibalsan. The French Communist press had reported that Vinogradov and another of the accused doctors, Grinstein, had treated Thorez.

Singled out as the doctors' intermediaries were A. B. Shimelevich, last identified as head doctor at the Botkin Hospital in Moscow in 1947, and Solomon Mikhoels, Chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee during World War II. Mikhoels had died in Byelorussia in 1948 under somewhat mysterious circumstances.

This particular part of the announcement appeared purposefully open-ended. Few people in the USSR would be ready to accept the fact that only these two relatively minor figures were to be accused of handling the purported plot inside the country. The last time doctors had been accused of medical murder in the USSR, the head of the secret police (Yagoda) had allegedly prompted them and he in turn allegedly had been directed by a Politburo member -- Abel Yenukidze; both had paid with their lives. The stage was set, therefore, for more arrests and more disclosures and by directly censuring the MGB the Pravda article had suggested that history might repeat itself.

Abakumov, the MGB Chief in 1948 when Zhdanov died, had already been ousted as Minister (August 1951) although his removal had never been publicly announced. The plot could serve as a good reason for justifying this earlier removal if one were needed. His link-up with US "espionage" could have been well documented. To take one example, Ambassador Kennan was visited in July 1952, almost a year after Abakumov's replacement, by a provocateur claiming to be Abakumov's son.

Abakumov, however, was not the only MGB chief involved. V. N. Merkulov had been head of the Commissariat of State Security in 1945 when Shcherbakov died. At the time of the plot's announcement he was serving as USSR Minister of State Control. Merkulov had suffered a setback at the October Party Congress when he was dropped from a full to alternate status on the Central Committee. He is listed [redacted] as having been a close associate of Beria. One [redacted] reports that he was among those who accompanied Beria to Moscow when he was called by Stalin to take over Yezhov's job and end the purge. Abakumov also had been associated with Beria and he, of course, did not figure at the Party Congress at all.

The implication that both Abakumov and Merkulov were involved cast a shadow on one of the big luminaries in the Kremlin itself, L. P. Beria. There are other suggestions with regard to Beria and the purge: Beria had been universally regarded as retaining Politburo

level responsibility for security affairs. [redacted]

[redacted]

There were a few straws in the wind in the fall of 1952 indicating that Beria had slipped among the ranks of Stalin's favorites. He was listed as the sixth Politburo member to enter the Hall of Columns at the opening of the Party Congress, when previously he had ranked as number four. This lower ranking was later repeated in the order in which the pictures of the Politburo members were hung on 7 November, the anniversary of the October revolution. (Beria later regained his number four spot on 21 January.)

[redacted]

Beria had been in charge of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs from 1937 to 1947. In 1943 the Commissariat of State Security had

been formed out of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs and Merkulov had been given charge of it. All the Commissariats were renamed Ministries in March 1946, and Merkulov continued to head the Ministry of State Security (MGB) until some time in the middle of that year, when he was replaced by Abakumov. The indirect implication of Beria was modified by the fact that on 12 January, the evening before the announcement, Stalin and five of his biggest lieutenants -- Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov and Kaganovich -- attended a concert at the Bolshoi theatre. There is little doubt that this appearance was intended to avert the panic which was expected with the announcement of the doctors' plot the following day.

Beria was probably not the only Soviet leader concerned about the outcome of the doctors' plot. Certainly the anti-Semitic nature of the affair caused concern among those of Jewish background. L. M. Kaganovich is Jewish and so, too, is the wife of V. M. Molotov.[1] In addition, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, N. M. Shvernik, has been reported to be Jewish.[2]

The question which immediately arose with regard to the startling announcement was who had started it and why. Something big had been brewing since Suslov's 24 December attack on Fedoseyev for daring

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1/ The status of Kaganovich at the time of the plot was unclear. He had been identified [redacted] as Chief of Gossnab (Committee for the State Supplies to the National Economy) as late as May 1952. However, when the election lists for the Supreme Soviet were made public at the end of January 1953, I. G. Kabanov was listed as Chairman of Gossnab. One Soviet [redacted] has reported that in Kiev Kaganovich was referred to as "our father" by the Jewish residents there. Several Jews in Kiev were arrested in the wake of the vigilance campaign. The American Jewish Yearbook for the year 1948-49 quotes a Jewish writer from Wilno as stating that the poet I. Fefer and the theatre director S. Mikhoels interceded in 1945 with Kaganovich who in turn interceded with Zhdanov to license a Yiddish daily paper in the USSR. The license was refused (Fefer, incidentally, had toured the US with Mikhoels in 1943.) Fefer was arrested in 1948 but Soviet authorities never gave any reason for this action.

[redacted]

to write about Stalin's opus without previously confessing to the sins of Voznesenskyism. This in turn had been followed by the mass recantation of economists on 8 January. Yet the timing of the decision as well as its perpetrators were difficult to fix.[1] It was necessary to go back to the October Party Congress to find anything concrete and even then the evidence was slight. What evidence there was pointed to Malenkov, Khrushchev, Suslov, and Poskrebychev.[2]

Malenkov in a paragraph of his report to the 19th Party Congress had referred to "the enemies of the Soviet State who are working persistently to smuggle their agents into our country" and had warned against "the remnants of bourgeois ideology and relics of private property, mentality and morality" still prevalent in the Party's ranks. Suslov had said a little more along this line. Soviet domestic propaganda following the Congress, however, had echoed Soviet strength and was characterized by a tone of confidence and assurance as was exemplified, for example, in Pervukhin's speech on 7 November. Thus, there had been no real effort after the Congress to prepare the people for the doctors' plot or the heightened vigilance campaign set off by its announcement.

One of the few harbingers was seen in the December 1952 Agitators Notebook, which attacked Zionism as a "reactionary nationalist current of the Jewish bourgeoisie." This was in contrast to the line of Moscow radio which during the Slansky trial in November had

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1/ Some of the principals in the plot were apparently still free men as late as October 1952, even though the 13 January announcement had indicated that the plot had been uncovered "some time ago". On 23 October an institute of the Academy of Science in the Georgian SSR congratulated Vinogradov, one of the nine doctors involved, on his 70th birthday, indicating that he had probably not been arrested by that date. On 3 November a laudatory article on Vinogradov appeared in Evening Moscow.

2/ Most of the principal lines which were utilized by Soviet propaganda media during the vigilance campaign were mentioned in Party Congress speeches by Malenkov, Khrushchev, Moskatov, Suslov, Fadeyev, and Poskrebychev. Curiously, Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and Kaganovich did not mention any of these lines. For example, while Malenkov, Khrushchev, Suslov, and Poskrebychev spoke of the dangers of "capitalist encirclement" and admitted the existence of "hostile elements" within the USSR, neither of the points was mentioned by Stalin, Molotov, Beria, or Kaganovich.

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played down the Zionism issue. Something may have happened in the period between October and January to cause the "doctors' plot" decision or affect its timing, but whatever it was it remained under the surface.

One probable clue was the curiously belated announcement on 30 October that Marshal Govorov had been elected an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Party at the Congress, but had been erroneously left off the lists. Obviously something very strange was going on and great pressure must have been exerted to get Govorov on the Central Committee. It has been speculated that Malenkov, who apparently dominated the October Congress, had for one reason or another begun to have trouble with the Central Committee and that some elements in it were rebelling against him.

Govorov was one of the military men allegedly marked for death by the doctors. This was of some interest because Govorov had links with Zhdanov. He had served with him in Leningrad and had delivered one of the eulogies at his funeral. In a Pravda article on 27 January 1949, Govorov had praised Zhdanov for his role in the defense of Leningrad. Here again the reasons why precisely these five -- Vasilevsky, Konev, Govorov, Shtemenko, and Levchenko -- were singled out for notoriety and other military leaders, such as Zhukov, Sokolovsky, and Timoshenko were not, is unknown. Another curious note regarding the selection of the five military leaders was that they did not include an Air Force representative. With regard to Zhukov, [redacted] in the obituary notices recently published, Zhukov's name had appeared eighth, outranked only by those marshals who were members of the Politburo and government, the Chief of Staff and Marshal Konev.

In addition, amid the mass of speculation regarding the purpose of the doctors' plot no clear reason for the inclusion of the five military figures stood out. Speculation at the time ranged from (a) an effort to bolster morale of the military by putting them on the side of the vigilantes, to (b) a warning to precisely these five and others of their ilk to remain passive in the events which were to transpire. It seems hard to visualize the military, with the experience of the 30's still in their minds, as looking with favor on any purge. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the announcement was intended as a warning -- a warning against individuals or a group of individuals unknown to the West, who were contesting the status quo. This opposition may have been real or it may have been imagined. The Govorov appointment to the Central Committee suggested that it was real.

THE INTENSIFIED VIGILANCE CAMPAIGN

At any rate, once the original announcement of the plot was made there was little time lost in building on the symbolism of the purges of the 30's. An article in the 14 January issue of Kommunist linked the "Kostovs, Rajks, and Slanskys" with the "Trotskyites and Bukharinites" of the 30's and the timing suggested that all would be linked to the doctors' plot. The magazine also charged that many Party cards had been acquired by "alien enemy elements" in Leningrad. This effort to re-create a situation allegedly existent at the time of the Kirov assassination in 1934 appeared to be an obvious attempt to connect that earlier situation with the present.

In addition, the Pravda editorial which accompanied the announcement had referred to "right wing opportunists who held an anti-Marxist position regarding the extinguishing of the class struggle," thereby adopting a line which had run through the previous trials in the Satellites and which had been levied against Pauker in Rumania and Gomulka in Poland. The fact that representatives of the accused Jewish agency "Joint" were still present in Hungary indicated that the Satellites were not to be spared further purging.

In connection with his statements regarding "capitalist encirclement" and the existence of "hostile elements" in the USSR, Malenkov in his speech at the Congress had also mentioned the purges of the 30's. The purge of "all kinds of enemies of Marxism-Leninism, Trotsky-Bukharinite degenerates, against capitulators and traitors who endeavored to lead the Party off the correct path and to split the unity of its ranks" said Malenkov made it possible for the USSR to be sure there were no internal traitors when the Germans attacked it. In this connection, some observers have inferred that one of the purposes of the vigilance campaign was to root out all potential forms of opposition within the USSR in expectation of a war with the United States.

On 15 January Izvestia ran a lead article entitled, "Increase Political Vigilance," which did not mention the plot but appeared to associate Malenkov with the general idea of it. The American Embassy in Moscow noted at the time that the article presented an unusual example of quoting from Malenkov in as great a length as from Stalin. This pattern was to be followed throughout the remainder of the vigilance campaign. Malenkov was to be the only Soviet leader other than Stalin cited in the vigilance literature, although these citations were usually with reference to his speech at the Party Congress.

As mentioned previously, a survey of major themes in Soviet broadcasts between the 19th Party Congress and the subsequent reversal

of the doctors' plot indicated that there was no effort to prepare the Soviet people for the doctors' plot and the vigilance campaign. The broadcasts during this period did not appear to be based on the directives set forth by Malenkov in his report to the Congress. However, the survey noted that the announcement of the doctors' plot set off an extremely intense "vigilance campaign," with the main emphasis on eliminating "the remnants of bourgeois ideology, relics of private-property mentality and morality" which Malenkov had warned the Party against in his speech to the 19th Party Congress.

Later material in the "vigilance campaign" stressed the need to "end the self-satisfaction, infatuation with achievements, smug complacency, and inattentiveness" in the ranks of the Party. Again, the elimination of these "evils" had been cited by Malenkov, in his report to the 19th Party Congress, as one of the basic tasks of the Party.

Other second flight Soviet leaders took an active part in the campaign. On 3 February Vyshinsky excoriated leaders of Soviet law for their "serious mistakes." In his speech at the Congress Poskrebyshev had specifically singled out the jurists as needing some self-criticism and he had done so in roughly the same language now employed by Vyshinsky. He called on Soviet jurists to direct their attention to exploding "bourgeois principles" of international law that served the American and English "war mongers." Bagirov, Melnikov, Mikhailov, Patolichev, Yudin, and Alexandrov were all publicly associated with the campaign. Malenkov was also quoted with reference to the "capitalist encirclement" idea which was to accompany the vigilance campaign, a theme which had not been dominant in Soviet propaganda for some time but one which had been stressed by Malenkov, Khrushchev, Suslov, and Poskrebyshev at the Congress.

Since both Stalin and Malenkov were employed as oracles of the "vigilance campaign" in the days following the "doctors plot" announcement, and since Malenkov had been linked in Soviet propaganda with the hard line on "class-warfare" (he had been quoted by Ulbricht to this effect in a December speech), it is most probable that both were closely connected with its origins. In retrospect the theme would seem particularly adapted to the picture of an aged Stalin verging on senility, mistrustful of his doctors and darkly suspicious of a new administration in Washington. His lieutenants of the earlier days of purging --- Malenkov, Poskrebyshev and Shkiryatov were still with him and perhaps it was one of them who had planted the seed. Vyshinsky too was still in the foregound. In this connection, certain items are worthy of note:

1. Ambassador Kennan has stated his view that Malenkov during 1951 had succeeded in securing predominant influence over Stalin, had misinformed Stalin about Western intentions, and was in fact largely responsible for preventing Kennan from seeing Stalin during his Moscow tour. Mr. Kennan also identifies Malenkov with the hate-America line.

2. The view that Poskrebyshev and Stalin ran the whole show seems most unlikely. We believe that Poskrebyshev was probably intimately involved, but that so too was Malenkov.

3.

4. There was later to be one rather curious statement by a foreign Communist explicitly associating Stalin with the doctors' plot. The Indian Communist Party's parliamentary leader, A. K. Gopalan, held a press conference in New Delhi on 19 May after returning from Moscow and declared that Stalin, as Premier at the time, must have shared in the responsibility for the arrest of the accused doctors. This statement brought immediate protests from other top Indian Communists at the Conference. It is the only known statement of this sort by a Communist source.

The doctors' plot announcement was shortly followed by a major campaign for the intensification of security measures. On 16 January, Pravda demanded increased vigilance from Soviet scientists and members of the intelligensia. Yuri Zhdanov, Chief of the Science Section of the Party Central Committee and son of the late Andrei Zhdanov, named a number of scientists who were guilty of subjectivistic distortions. This, of course, reminded observers of his recantation in 1948 after his father's decline and shortly before his father's death, when Yuri had to grovel before Lysenko.

At the same time certain leading Soviet historians, including Maisky, the former Ambassador to Great Britain, were criticized for their "bourgeois" thinking, while Kiev radio attacked individuals in the Ukraine who had not been sufficiently vigilant, particularly in light industry and the meat and dairy, food and timber industries. The next day Trud reached new heights of invective in an attack on "American and British war-mongers and their weapon -- Zionism." On 20 January a newspaper in the Lithuanian USSR admitted that some organizations there had been penetrated by "bourgeois nationalists" and Jewish Zionists, while Red Fleet charged that Western powers were utilizing diplomatic representatives and newspaper correspondents for "undermining" the USSR. Papers in the Ukrainian and Latvian SSR's accused specific individuals, mostly Jews, of criminal activities.

On the eve of the 21st, the Lenin day address was given by N. A. Mikhailov, the ex-Komsomol chief, who had been made a secretary of the Central Committee at the Party Congress. He stressed Party vigilance in the class struggle and denounced complacency in Party ranks as "counter-revolutionary". Stalin was quoted as holding that "such people...are turncoats or hypocrites who should be chased out of our Party." Curiously enough, this quote as well as most of the others attributed to Stalin during the campaign were taken from his writings of an earlier period. He had said nothing at the Congress usable for these purposes.

On 21 January New Times appeared with a strong attack on Zionism and on Israeli government officials who were called the executors of a US State Department spy ring in the USSR. Israel was attacked for racial bigotry. As was the case in the doctors' plot, most of the individuals cited after 13 January in the vigilance campaign as being harmful to Soviet security bore Jewish names.

The vigilance drive was also vigorously pushed in the European Satellites. In Hungary, Jews were arrested for their association with "Joint." In Rumania the party press warned that the deviation exemplified by former Finance Minister Luca had not been eliminated and that it would be "dangerous opportunism" to say that it had. In Bulgaria, ten members of an "espionage and plotting" organization guided by the "American intelligence in Turkey" were arrested, tried, and convicted between 18 and 20 January. In East Germany Georg Dertinger, the CDU Foreign Minister, was arrested on charges of treason and the anti-Zionist campaign which developed there resulted in the flight of numerous Jews to West Berlin, who were apparently under no illusion as to what the future would hold for them. In Poland the government continued its campaign against alleged US espionage and on 16 January delivered a note to the US protesting such activities.

In Austria, the Communist Party conducted a purge related to the Slansky trial. It was in Austria, also, that a Soviet-sponsored broadcast suggested that the principal reason for the Satellite trials was to be found in the policy of Secretary of State Dulles, who sought separation of the Satellites from the Soviet Union.

Elsewhere throughout the world, the various Communist parties were attempting with some difficulty to hew to the new line, particularly in France and in Italy where the damaging effect was noticeable. One [redacted] report at the time said that the Italian Communist Party had lost financial support as a result.

Within the USSR, the campaign continued in full swing. On 6 February Pravda announced the arrest of four persons on espionage charges. On 8 February Izvestia stated that Soviet security agents had liquidated a nest of American spies established in 1947 by a former US assistant naval attache in Vladivostok. The American Embassy in Moscow observed at that time that the Pravda article of 6 February had gone beyond previous press statements in its revelations of disputes over theory and in its citation of names and details of alleged espionage. The article had stated that "certain rotten theories" were still in existence among which were the beliefs that capitalist encirclement no longer existed and that the capitalist world would renounce its attempts to harm the increasingly stable Soviet Union. The class struggle was said to remain one between capitalism and socialism, and hence the capitalists would continue their attempts to overthrow the USSR.

In the face of this threat, Soviet foreign policy was described as "firm" and one which "admits of no concessions or little concessions to the imperialist aggressors." Stalin had not touched on capitalist encirclement in either his Bolshevik article or his short speech at the close of the Congress. His point in Economic Problems of Socialism that wars between the capitalist states were more likely than wars against the Soviet Union was not in keeping with the propaganda line. Louis Fisher, viewing this part of Stalin's article as a tension-relaxing device, has pointed out that the Soviet people may have taken it too seriously and hence provided another contributory cause for the vigilance campaign. Pravda's admission that "hostile elements" existed in the USSR indicated that the purge would definitely continue.

A new height in invective was reached on 8 February when an Izvestia book review attempted to rewrite history to put the United States on the German rather than the Soviet side during World War II. The article accused the United States and American espionage of trying "to facilitate military actions of the Hitlerite Army against the

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Soviet Union." The vigilance theme remained the most dominant topic in broadcasts to the Russian people, and while the US and UK were cited as the chief external enemies, much emphasis was given to internal enemies as well. Two types of crimes were emphasized: political and economic. Specific accusations were made against the managerial class and petty Party and government officials. Most of the managers charged with security violations were in charge of consumer goods enterprises. The charges against Party officials emphasized malfeasance in the selection of cadres.

Yet the world was never to learn just who had been marked for purging, if indeed the Soviet leaders themselves knew. Most of the actual cases cited were small ones; most of the crimes were petty. The biggest official implicated was one S. M. Petrov, a Deputy Minister of Non-ferrous Metallurgy, who was said to have lost a number of secret documents through negligence and laxness. The provincial areas seemed to be waiting for the final word from Moscow. Yet possibly in the scramble to predetermine the party line, hackneyed cases, some of which had been aired before, were once more dragged into the open. This same pattern seemed to be aired by the Moscow propaganda media also. All the old standard cases against the West were reproduced, but few new ones were created. This dearth of major culprits also appeared to enhance the theory that the initial announcement had been intended as a warning rather than a direct accusation.

FURTHER INDICATIONS OF TENSION

Meanwhile, another event had transpired which proved to be of more than marginal interest. On 27 January the candidate lists for the approaching elections to the local Moscow Soviets were published in the Moscow Pravda. Several members of the Council of Ministers were given no place on this list, which is actually a Who's Who for the City of Moscow, numbering as it does more than fifteen hundred leaders.

Among those not listed were I. A. Benediktov, Minister of Agriculture; U.Yu. Yusupov, Minister of Cotton Growing; D. G. Zhimerin, Minister of Electric Power Stations; I. K. Sivolap, Minister of Food Industry; I. A. Bovin, Minister of Forest Economy; P. A. Zakharov, Minister of Geology; Ye. I. Smirnov, Minister of Health; N. S. Kazakov, Minister of Heavy Machine Building Industry; P. I. Parshin, Minister of Machine and Instrument Industry; N. V. Novikov, Minister of Maritime Fleet; P. F. Lomako, Minister of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy; I. Ye. Voronov, Minister of Paper and Wood Processing Industry; N. A. Skvortsov, Minister of State Farms; V. S. Abakumov, Minister of State Security; S. A. Stepanov, Minister of Agricultural Machine Building.

The fate of these men was later to be reflected in the March decrees consolidating the Soviet Government, indicating that at least some of the changes wrought by the decrees had been under active consideration during the period between the October Congress and Stalin's death. Another interesting development was the nomination of S. D. Ignatiev by a group of Moscow workers of the MGB. This was the first time that he had been publicly identified with the MGB. Evidently, now that the doctors' plot had broken, the time was considered ripe to reveal Abakumov's replacement and explain why Ignatiev had been accorded high honors at the October Party Congress, where he had been made a member of the Party's Presidium.

Also significant was the fact that the name of A. A. Andreev appeared. He was listed as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. This was the first indication since October that Andreev, who had been left off the Party's Presidium, was still relatively prominent. Smirnov, the Minister of Health, who had been directly censored in the original announcement of the doctors' plot, failed to make an appearance on the list. It had been rumored in Moscow that he disappeared about six weeks before the announcement. Smirnov's fall, however, had been presaged at the October Party Congress, where he was not listed as a member of the Central Committee in spite of the fact that the Minister of Health in the RSFSR was named. This suggested that the doctors' plot was under consultation at that time.

A further significant fact noted in the lists was the position of P. N. Pospelov, who was listed as deputy editor of Pravda. He had been removed on 19 January from his position as Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute and had failed for the first time in five years to give the annual Lenin anniversary address on 21 January, which was delivered by Mikhailov. This indicated that Pospelov was not completely in disfavor, although he had definitely suffered a loss of prestige. It was thought significant at the time of the October Congress that Pospelov had not been named to one of the leading Party organs in spite of the fact that other Party theoreticians, such as Mitin, Yudin, and Chesnokov, had been. Interest in Pospelov's case was heightened by the fact that he had been reliably reported to be Jewish.

The vigilance campaign tapered off somewhat near the end of February, which was marked by very few significant events. Nevertheless, there were certain noteworthy events during the month. Three foreigners had interviews with Stalin -- on the 7th, the Argentine Ambassador, and on the 17th, both the Indian Ambassador and a representative of the Indian peace movement, Kitchlew, who had won a Stalin prize. In his interview with the Argentine Ambassador, Stalin discussed trade in political terms. This was in keeping with the remarks

in his Economic Problems of Socialism, where he had indicated that the Soviet Union would sooner or later move into an offensive economic policy of competing with the West for markets in underdeveloped areas. This was in contrast to the defensive policy of the post-war period which was directed primarily at the acquisition of critically needed goods from Western countries. 1/

Two other events suggested that all was not well within the Soviet Union. On 14 February the death of L. Z. Mekhlis once more gave evidence of the tension that was in the Moscow air. Mekhlis was a leading Soviet official who had retired from Soviet life in 1950, when V. N. Merkulov replaced him as Minister of State Control. [redacted] this retirement was due to ill health. Mekhlis was elected to the Central Committee of the Party in October 1952 and had appeared on the lists of candidates to the Moscow Soviets published on 27 January. He was also a Jew. Soviet propaganda treatment of his death strongly suggested that it was necessary to taper the anti-Semitic aspects of the internal security drive, lest the death of Mekhlis be taken as another example of murder perpetrated by a new group of "doctor-wreckers."

Although Mekhlis had been an important Soviet official in earlier years, his death announcement was made in a form usually reserved for only the very highest Soviet leaders; condolences were received from the various top Soviet organizations as well as Party and State leaders.

[redacted]

A relatively detailed medical report on Mekhlis attributed his death to heart failure, due to general arteriosclerosis affecting primarily the heart and brain. The fact that Soviet authorities took such pains to describe precisely how Mekhlis died was an indication of their fear that the Soviet people as well as the rest of the world would assume that this prominent Jew had been murdered. The signatures of the medical report identified I. I. Kuperin as the new Chief of the Kremlin medical directorate. [redacted] He apparently had replaced Egorov, who had been one of the accused doctors, as Chief of the Kremlin medical staff.

On 17 February, Izvestia carried another curious death announcement -- that of General Kosynkin of the Kremlin guard. It noted that the death had occurred two days earlier and had been "sudden". This unusual announcement, coming at the time that it did, was another indicator that something was amiss. [redacted]

The only other occasion of note in February was the annual Red Army day ceremonies on the 23rd, when the usual line that the Soviet Army was defensive in nature was replaced by one stressing its role as one of liberation.

TOP SECRET

CAESAR - 2

16 July 1953

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DEATH OF STALIN

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TOP SECRET

DEATH OF STALIN

LAST DAYS OF STALIN

This then was the situation in the Soviet Union on 4 March, when Radio Moscow announced that Stalin was in critical condition as a result of a stroke on the night of 1-2 March. The continuing medical bulletins were couched in pessimistic terms. They carefully outlined the nature of Stalin's illness and meticulously described the measures being taken by the doctors who were treating him. These play-by-play accounts revealed concern lest listeners interpret this news as meaning that either the old "doctor wreckers," or a group of new ones, had succeeded in shortening Stalin's life. The eight doctors in attendance were under the supervision of a new Minister of Health, Tretyakov.

Stalin had been last seen by a non-Communist on 17 February when he had given an audience to the Indian Ambassador (who had, however, never met him previously). While it is possible that Stalin's illness had been carefully concealed, and that a double was used for this interview, this is unlikely; it is considered highly doubtful that a double would have been used for Stalin's last interview. Stalin's collapse actually followed several months of what for him was unusual activity. Work on the Party Congress had evidently kept him in Moscow throughout the fall; in addition to this, he had granted at least four interviews to foreigners, had attended the anniversary ceremonies on 7 November and had appeared in the Bolshoi theatre on 12 January. (It is true, however, that Stalin's movements had been somewhat restricted. He delivered only a short speech at the Party Congress, yielding the main address to Malenkov. The 7 November ceremonies had been much shorter than usual, probably out of deference to him.)

The nature of the reporting on Stalin's illness suggested that his final stroke caught the Politburo off guard. There had been no advance warning. An examination of all Soviet radio propaganda from 1 to 4 March yielded no indication prior to the public announcement of Stalin's actual condition. There were no significant differences either in the nature or in the number of references to Stalin, who continued to be presented during this period as the focus of power in the Soviet Union. Similarly, an examination of all the Satellite radio propaganda material from the time of the October Party Congress to Stalin's death revealed no attempt to build up any of his lieutenants in possible anticipation of his voluntary or involuntary relinquishment of power.

This information is of course far from conclusive. Many hypotheses concerning the circumstances of Stalin's death could be advanced to explain this lack of preparation. Furthermore, the West was completely dependent on the Soviet radio and press for all news on this development. It is impossible therefore to determine whether Stalin had been dead for some time, whether he was murdered, or whether he died in the way the medical bulletins said he did.

THE QUESTION OF STALIN'S SUCCESSOR

The announcements regarding Stalin's condition, indicating as they did that the Soviet Union would soon be without its leader and revealing that Stalin's disciples had waited four days before informing the people of their impending loss, immediately focused attention on Malenkov as the most likely successor. His career had moved steadily forward since Zhdanov's death in August 1948. He was the senior member of the Party Secretariat, the position from which Stalin originally consolidated his power. He was the only man other than Stalin who was a member of all three of the highest bodies of the Party and Government--the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Collegium of the Council of Ministers (Deputy Chairmen).

Ignatiev's appointment in 1951 as MGB Minister was also thought to have had the blessing and approval of Malenkov. The nature of Ignatiev's Party career indicated that he had prospered under, and had possibly been brought along by, Malenkov. Moreover, one curious bit of biographic information suggested that their association may have been of long standing. In 1920 Ignatiev, 16 years old and a Komsomol member, was directed to the political section of the Bukhara Oblast and in the following year he was transferred to the military section of the All-Bukhara Extraordinary Commission. Malenkov was serving as a "political worker" in the military-political administration in the Bukhara region at about this time.

Malenkov had delivered the key address at the Party Congress, and subsequently, as might have been expected, it had been accorded much publicity throughout the Communist world. The replacement of the Politburo by a Presidium, the composition of which apparently favored Malenkov if it favored any of the old Politburo members, also seemed to contribute to his leading position. This was even more true of the enlarged Secretariat.

Thus it was commonly expected that Malenkov would attempt to fill the void left by Stalin. The official announcement regarding Stalin's illness, however, threw no light on the subject of his successor. It merely placed responsibility in the Central Committee of the Party and in the Council of Ministers, claiming that these two bodies would "take into account all circumstances connected with the temporary withdrawal of Stalin from leading the State's and Party's activity."

The announcement of Stalin's death came on 5 March. It linked his name with that of Lenin in an eulogy of the Party as leader of the people. It underscored the "steel-like, monolithic unity" of Party ranks and defined its task as the "guarding of unity", as the "apple of our eye." Reuters at the time recalled that Malenkov used this phrase in his October Party Congress speech and suggested that he was the author of the document. The same phrase, however, had appeared in connection with Lenin's death. Neither Malenkov nor any other associate of Stalin was mentioned in the announcement. Malenkov had come before the public eye, however, in a 4 March Pravda editorial which quotes from the section of his Congress speech dealing with Party unity.

The announcement affirmed the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions and desire for "business-like" relations. It named the "great Chinese people" first on the list of those people with whom the Soviet Union intended to develop friendship.

Khrushchev was listed as chairman of the Committee for organizing Stalin's funeral. On it were Kaganovich, Shvernik, Vasilevsky, Pegov, Artemev, the Commandant of the Moscow Military District, and Yasnov, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet. The funeral rites were set for 9 March.

THE FIRST GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION

On 7 March, Moscow radio announced that in order to prevent "panic and disarray," a major reorganization of the Party and Government had been made at a joint meeting of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This almost unprecedented method of handling business was in keeping with the gravity of the situation and reminiscent of the days of the German attack, when the Soviet leaders had met in a similar joint session and formed the State Defense Council. It strongly suggested that the leaders in this moment of crisis had moved swiftly to show their unity and to gird themselves for any battle that might be coming from either inside or out.

In a complete reversal of the organizational decisions taken by the October Congress, this new decree clearly outlined the spheres of interest and power of Stalin's closest collaborators -- the members of the old Politburo. Malenkov became Premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers); Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich became first Deputy Premiers. In addition, Beria returned to direct control of the security forces by becoming Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD), with which was combined the Ministry of State Security (MGB); Molotov returned to direct leadership in Foreign Affairs; Bulganin took over as Minister of War; Kaganovich received no ministerial assignment, but presumably was to be the economic czar. The Party's Presidium was reduced to ten men, eight of whom had been members of Stalin's Politburo. Here, too, Malenkov's name came first, indicating his ascendancy. He was followed by Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khruschev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin, in that order. Saburov and Pervukhin were the only newcomers to the group as it had existed before October.

Voroshilov was given the honor of titular head of state. He was "recommended" to become Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Khrushchev was "to concentrate on his work in the Central Committee." Mikoyan took over as head of the new Ministry of Internal and External Trade. Saburov was relieved of his job as head of Gosplan and became the new Minister of Machine Building. Pervukhin became the chief of the new Ministry of Electric Power Stations and the Electrical Equipment Industry.

Thus Party and Government continued to be welded together at the top. Even at this early date, however, there was at least one visible flaw in this attempt at "monolithic unity": the peculiar shuffling of the Secretariat on 7 March suggested that the transition was experiencing difficulty.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

In the 20's, Stalin had been accorded the title of General Secretary of the Party, and from this position he had manipulated its apparatus to the point where it was completely under his control. He had then proceeded to eliminate his enemies, step by step, culminating in the dread purges of the 30's. It is perhaps small wonder that the Soviet leaders were sensitive over the Secretariat and who should lead and control it. The Orgburo had been dissolved and the day-to-day control of Party affairs, as well as the control of Party (and Government) personnel appointments, were recognized as the function of the Secretariat. Most observers had expected that Malenkov would be accorded Stalin's title as "General Secretary" but this was not the case. The new decree did not even mention Malenkov's name in connection with the Secretariat, nor did it mention the names of two other members -- Suslov and Aristov. The Secretariat was reshuffled as follows:

1. Pegov was removed from the Secretariat and appointed Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, where he replaced Gorkin, who became Deputy Secretary. This appeared to be a demotion for Pegov, an old apparatus functionary who had been chief of the Central Committee's light industry section. In June 1952, he had been identified [redacted] by his appointment to the secretariat at the 19th Party Congress. [redacted] have taken the view that, like Voroshilov, Pegov was moved over as Secretary to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to help smooth the ratification of the reorganization decrees. Gorkin, whom Pegov replaced, was noted on the downgrade in October when he lost his membership on the Central Committee; he was, however, appointed a member of the Party's Auditing Commission.)

2. Ignatiev, Pospelov and Shatalin were elected Secretaries. This was very unusual: (a) Shatalin was not made a full member of the Central Committee in October, but was listed as an alternate. He had been elected to the Orgburo in March 1946, and had presumably been elevated, at that time, from alternate to full membership on the Central Committee. At any rate he was named only an alternate in October 1952. He had been identified [redacted] as Chief of the Planning, Financial and Trade Organs Department of the Central Committee. [redacted] he was a protege of Malenkov and had been personally chosen by him for service in the apparatus. Shatalin had served as

Malenkov's deputy in the Cadres Department. Yet the record of the October Congress indicates that he was not regarded as too important at that time. (b) Pospelov, as mentioned previously, had been overlooked in the selection for the Party's Presidium in October, despite his seniority, ability and Party record. He suffered another setback in January when he was replaced as head of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. [redacted] reports that Pospelov was closely linked with Molotov. There is circumstantial evidence to support this. Pospelov and Molotov were the only two to survive on the editorial staff of Bolshevik in 1934 when it was purged of Bukharin and all his supporters. (c) Ignatiev, as mentioned previously, had been MGB Minister prior to October. The new decree did not spell out Beria's deputy ministers, as it did in the case of most of the other ministers. It nevertheless appeared most probable that Ignatiev had left the MGB.

3. Khrushchev was relieved of his duties as First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the Party, in order to "concentrate on his work in the Central Committee."

4. Ponomarenko and Ignatov were relieved of their duties as Secretaries and transferred "to leading work in the Council of Ministers."

5. Party "Secretary" Mikhailov was confirmed as First Secretary of the Moscow Committee, replacing Khrushchev in this post.

6. Brezhnev was relieved as Secretary and transferred to the post of head of the Political Department of the Navy.

Thus, of the nine Party Secretaries incumbent when Stalin died, the status of three -- Malenkov 1/, Suslov and Aristov -- was undetermined; Khrushchev had apparently been upgraded, judging from the phraseology of the decree (quoted above); Pegov, Ponomarenko, Ignatov and Brezhnev were transferred to other duties; Mikhailov was still listed as a Secretary. In addition, three newcomers -- Ignatiev, Pospelov, and Shatalin -- had been added. Clearly the joint meeting which drew up the reorganization decree of 6 March had run into trouble when it came to the Secretariat and had been unable to make up its mind.

1/ Malenkov, however, was listed by Pravda as a secretary on 11 March.

The Central Committee meeting on 14 March was to reduce the Secretariat still further, and eventually it was to become a four-man group. For the moment, however, there was uncertainty. The only things clear were that four of the Secretariat members had been transferred, three had been added and no successor for Stalin's position as First Secretary had been selected.

Returning to the decree itself, there were several other points worthy of note:

1. Top control of the Government was centered, at least formally, in Malenkov, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and his four deputies. No other deputy chairmen were listed. The decree, however, indicated that two organs had existed in the former Council of Ministers -- a "Buro" and a "Presidium". Presumably the new Presidium was composed of most of the members of the old "Buro", while the old Presidium probably numbered among its ranks the remaining former deputy chairmen who were not in the old "Buro". How long these groups had existed is unknown. It was also revealed that an identical setup had existed in the Party's Presidium, i.e., that it had been composed of a "Buro", presumably including most of the members of the old Politburo, and a Presidium, probably composed of the new blood taken on in October. In effect, therefore, a previous centralization was publicly displayed for the first time.

2. Shvernik, whose replacement by Voroshilov as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was "recommended", was in turn "recommended" as chairman of the Council of Trade Unions, a position he had held in the past.[1] V. V. Kuznetsov, the incumbent chief of the Trade Unions, was relieved and made a Deputy Foreign Minister, while Vyshinsky and Malik were named First Deputy Foreign Ministers under Molotov. Vyshinsky, in addition, was appointed permanent USSR delegate to the UN.

3. Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov were named as Bulganin's deputies in the War Ministry. Vasilevsky had been War Minister prior to Bulganin, while Zhukov had been in semi-obscurity since 1946, serving as a military district commandant. His return to this position had been ascribed to (a) a desire to restore this key general to an authoritative position in time of stress, (b) a plan on Malenkov's part to secure the support or at least the

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1/ This play on words was necessary on legalistic grounds; the Supreme Soviet is supposed to choose the chairman of its own Presidium

neutrality of the professional military, (c) the need for a counter to Bulganin,[1] and (d) a desire to reduce the panic of the people.

4. I. G. Kabanov was appointed Mikoyan's First Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade, and Kumykin and Zbavoronkov, Deputies. The latter two had been the ministerial incumbents of the merged trade ministries. Kabanov had been identified as Chairman of Gossnab in January. His new job suggested that Mikoyan's ministry would take over some of Gossnab's functions.

5. No deputies were listed for Beria's Ministry of Interior, Saburov's Ministry of Machine Building, Malyshev's Ministry of Transport and Machine Building, or Pervukhin's Ministry of Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry.

6. Kosyachenko became the new chief of Gosplan. A controversial figure, as recently as February 1952 he had recanted in Planned Economy for his support of Voznesensky's economic views. He had become a Deputy Chairman of Gosplan in November 1940 and was raised to First Deputy Chairman in May 1941 shortly after the Chairmanship passed to Saburov. He remained in this position when Voznesensky returned in 1943. He edited Planned Economy from at least March of 1945 until June of 1951.

7. With regard to Party affairs, the decree also named four alternates to the Party Presidium -- Shvernik, Ponomarenko, Melnikov and Bagirov.

(a) Shvernik had been a perennial alternate before his elevation to the enlarged Presidium in October.

1/ Zhukov's relations with Bulganin are a matter of some interest but there is no firm evidence on this point. At one stage during World War II, Bulganin served as political commissar to Zhukov. This may have engendered some friction and there are several reports indicating that this was the case. Bulganin, of course, is strictly a political administrator.

(b) Ponomarenko was at the same time relieved of his position on the Secretariat. Along with his running mate, Suslov, he had long been thought to rank just below the Politburo level. (Most observers associate Ponomarenko with Malenkov because of the fact that he became Minister of Procurement in 1950.

(c) Melnikov, First Party Secretary in the Ukraine, had also been elevated to the Presidium in October. His retention as an alternate was viewed as a move to keep some regional Party representation on this body. He had served as Second Secretary to Khrushchev in the Ukraine from 1947 to 1949 and succeeded Khrushchev when the latter moved to his Secretariat assignment in Moscow in December 1949.

(d) Bagirov's appointment was unusual. A senior Party regional leader, he had been overlooked in the October promotions for some unknown reason. He now superseded twenty-two members of the October Presidium. He had worked with Beria in Transcaucasus security affairs and at one point had been Beria's superior. Yet his writings on Party affairs in the Transcaucasus had paid little lip service to Beria. While both Melnikov's and Bagirov's appointments were interpreted as a maneuver to retain some regional figures on the top Party organs, it soon became evident that both these men were to continue in their regional jobs and hence would not be physically present in Moscow most of the time.

STALIN'S FUNERAL - REACTION TO DEATH

Following publication of the 6 March decree, attention was once more centered on Stalin's funeral, which was scheduled for the 9th of March. Presumably fear of disorder had been reflected in the swift moves of the Soviet leaders to set their house in order. Some part of this atmosphere had crept into the language of the decree itself which talked of "panic and disarray." 1/

1/ On 1 April the US Naval Attache in Helsinki stating that when a Finnish Border Guard officer attempted to offer condolences on Stalin's death to a counterpart in the Porkkola Guard, the latter broke into tears and said they were all worried about their future and feared military purges in a struggle for power. Yet reports from Moscow indicated that in general the militia handled itself with normal effectiveness.

Western press reporting from the Soviet capital drew attention to the vast wave of mourners who came to view Stalin. In contrast to this, the US Embassy in Moscow found little evidence of extreme grief in the capital over the death of Stalin. On 8 March it noted that the atmosphere in Moscow was calm, that markets were open and business was conducted as usual. The Embassy in fact reported that an American who had been in Moscow in 1945 recalled more evidence of grief over Roosevelt's death than there was over Stalin's.

The official reaction of the European Satellites to Stalin's death was expressed in propaganda reaffirming unity and gratitude toward the USSR, and in increased internal security precautions. Reports of unusual security measures came from various sources -- in Czechoslovakia and Rumania from US officials; in Bulgaria and Albania, Belgrade radio broadcasts concerning them. Such a tightening of security is fairly standard practice on occasions which might elicit unexpected reactions from the public. In this case, non-Communist response to the news was generally a mixture of hope and despair, with optimism reportedly more prevalent in Poland.

It seems to be the consensus of most Western students of Soviet affairs and propaganda that the deification of Stalin was so all-pervasive in scope, so penetrating, as to have had a profound effect on the Russian people, particularly on the uneducated. Stalin was portrayed as a god, who of course could do no wrong. His goodness was unbounded. The bureaucratic level between Stalin and the people was blamed for anything reflecting negatively on Stalin's divinity. Between the lowly peasant and the great god Stalin, there was a vast middle ground wherein lay responsibility for all ills affecting the Soviet Union. Stalin prevented those ills from becoming worse and was responsible for all good in the USSR. No other Soviet leader had ever been allowed to achieve independent stature.1/

When Stalin died, therefore, it was necessary to fill the tremendous void with secondary figures. All of the important ones were apparently employed to fill the breach, at least as a holding operation, to calm the people and keep them under control until a more permanent setup could be worked out.

The Soviet leaders also began what in retrospect appears to have been a very clever and intelligently-conceived de-emphasis of Stalin, imperceptible at first but one which was eventually to make itself apparent to the entire world. A Western survey of Soviet propaganda

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1/ In World War II, the pattern had been interrupted, but only briefly, by the attention given such men as Zhukov and Zhdanov.

in the period following Stalin's death revealed that a two-week period of idolizing Stalin had been followed by an apparently deliberate de-emphasis, and concluded that the "progressively but still only partially eclipsed god-head is being replaced only by the impersonal concept of government and Party."

This change took the following forms: (a) avoiding or minimizing the use of Stalin's name in connection with his hitherto heavily publicized contributions to communism, such as the Soviet nationalities policy and the 1936 constitution; (b) utilizing quotations from Stalin without attributing them to him; (c) avoiding or minimizing the use of his name in connection with several measures apparently intended to woo Soviet public opinion -- the price reduction, the amnesty, the release of the accused doctor plotters, the Pravda answer to Eisenhower; (d) paying tribute to the Communist Party leadership rather than to Stalin as being responsible for victory in World War II (Bulganin's speech of 1 May); and (e) failing to award the annual Stalin prizes for literature and science.

The de-emphasis apparently moved from the Moscow center out to the provinces gradually. A Department of State survey was to conclude in May that Soviet propaganda media had achieved a basic uniformity in the treatment of Stalin. Both the central and provincial press continued to refer to him regularly, but not nearly as frequently as during his lifetime. References were always made with respect and admiration, however, and nothing suggestive of criticism of Stalin appeared. In many cases, Stalin was referred to jointly with Lenin.

Stalin lay in state for four days, the key Soviet leaders serving as honor guards. On the day of Stalin's funeral, the US Embassy commented that, considering the facilities available, the rites for Stalin were unspectacular. The embassy found particularly incongruous the fact that Stalin's body was placed in a narrow aisle on the side of Lenin's bier, and that it was poorly lighted. commented that the decision to hold the burial only four days after Stalin's death, "contrary to conjecture and without allowing the public sufficient time to view the bier, is interpreted as meaning that the present high ranking officials do not eye favorably the continual demonstrations of affection accorded the former dictator by the people."

Of the three funeral speeches delivered by Malenkov, Beria and Molotov, only Molotov's was regarded as a real funeral oration by the American Embassy. The embassy noted that while Molotov's voice was shaken in delivery, Malenkov and Beria remained in complete con-

trol of themselves. Malenkov and Beria devoted most of their attention to the future. Malenkov's speech was non-belligerent in tone, and in general indicated that the same policies would be carried on.

Beria's speech was in a similar vein, with the curious exception that it did not refer once to Stalin as Comrade Stalin, and that it rarely mentioned Stalin except in conjunction with Lenin's name. In addition Beria emphasized that the Party's policy would brook no interference, that the Party's organs had decided to continue national policy without interruption, and that one of the decisions taken in this connection was the appointment of Stalin's comrade-in-arms, Malenkov, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.1/

All three speeches paid special deference to the Chinese,2/ and in every reference to the Satellites, China came first. None of the speakers specifically mentioned the US, UK or the Western nations.

A close re-reading of all three speeches was to provide Western observers with much food for speculation, perhaps more valid than usual, since the speeches were delivered in a rather unique situation. For example, Malenkov, who had been placed at the top of the list of the new Party Presidium, did not once refer to the Central Committee; Beria, on the other hand, referred to it five times, suggesting that perhaps, in contrast to Malenkov, he was making a bid for its support. Beria, in a curious message, alluded to the Government's regard for the rights of its citizens. This was later to take on added significance.

THE ABORTIVE MALENKOV BUILD-UP

The funeral ceremony presented the Soviet leadership to the world as a triumvirate: Malenkov, evidently the primus inter pares; Beria, close behind and giving Malenkov a sort of half-hearted blessing; and Molotov, running a relatively poor third. A survey of

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1/ Various observers differed in interpreting this passage in Beria's speech. Some thought it to be laudatory of Malenkov; others thought the praise extremely reserved, since Beria had said Malenkov's appointment was one of the most important decisions and that responsibility had now fallen on "leaders" trained by Stalin.

2/ Chou En-lai was granted the unusual honor of marching third in Stalin's funeral procession.

official comment in the Western world on the personal power relationships within the Soviet Union shortly after Stalin's death found general agreement that no single leader of sufficient stature was available to assume the position and role of Stalin. Most of the individual estimates concluded that political power would be distributed among several of the top Soviet leaders. There was some difference of opinion as to whether a harmonious relationship would prevail, and predictions varied as to the strength of the individual power positions.

Many Communist and non-Communist observers had predicted that Molotov would return to his old job as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and that Malenkov would become Party Chief and possibly inherit Stalin's title of General Secretary of the Party. There are, in addition, [redacted] reports indicating that various Communist leaders in Western Europe thought Molotov would become Stalin's successor.

Malenkov had already begun to capitalize on his position as apparent head of the triumvirate. On 5 March, the day after Stalin's death, Pravda singled out Malenkov for special attention by quoting from his speech to the Party Congress. This was the first reference to any individual leader, except to Stalin, since the Soviet Premier's illness had been announced. On 7, 8 and 9 March, Pravda again featured quotations from Malenkov's report to the Congress, beginning at this time to use the heavy black type previously reserved for quotations from Stalin. The 8 March issue also contained a picture of Malenkov delivering the Party Congress report in which Stalin was the only other person visible. On 9 March Pravda again gave Malenkov a heavy play and Izvestia printed a picture of Malenkov and Stalin taken on May Day 1952. On 10 March, Pravda and Izvestia both reported that Khrushchev had called on "Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, G. M. Malenkov", to speak, the first indication that he had remained on the Secretariat following the 6 March reorganization.

On 10 March Pravda printed the much-publicized picture of Stalin, Mao and Malenkov at the 1950 signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty. The picture had been retouched to place Malenkov next to Mao by eliminating three persons who had been standing between them. The picture also eliminated Molotov, who had been at Stalin's right hand, and Vyshinsky, who had been seated in front of Mao. The newspaper also published an article by Mao Tse-tung referring to the Central Committee and the Soviet Government headed by Comrade Malenkov.

Stalin had waited five years after the death of Lenin to usher in his own deification campaign in 1929; Malenkov made his bid even

before Stalin's funeral. In the days immediately after the funeral, Malenkov's funeral speech was rebroadcast almost more times than Beria's and Molotov's together, and began to be referred to in editorials in the provincial press. This effort to build up Malenkov was also evident in Radio Kiev broadcasts on 11 and 12 March stating that the local city and oblast Soviets had enthusiastically dispatched letters of greeting to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Comrade Malenkov. An effort to model Malenkov after Stalin was also apparent in another Radio Kiev broadcast, which quoted the chief Ukrainian-language newspaper to the effect that "Comrade Malenkov made an oath on behalf of the Party over the coffin of Comrade Stalin to serve the people faithfully." Stalin had made a similar oath at Lenin's funeral.

The Malenkov buildup was short-lived, and in the ensuing days of March his prominence was sharply cut back. An outside observer, Solomon Schwartz, was to note that the buildup had cost Malenkov a great deal. Upon checking the Soviet press, he found that from the 11th of March to the end of the month, Pravda did not once quote Malenkov in its editorial articles and only infrequently (on the 11th, 12th, 18th, and 24th) made any reference to the funeral speeches of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov. He noted that "only in its editorial of 17 March, devoted to the Supreme Soviet session did Pravda refer to the speech of the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, but in this case the editor hastened to underscore the confidence of the Soviet peoples in the 'Government headed by the faithful pupils and comrades-in-arms of great Stalin,' not by a pupil and a comrade-in-arms but by 'pupils and comrades'."

A Bulgarian Communist travelling in the West is alleged to have stated that following Stalin's death, the Bulgarian Government ordered substitution of Malenkov's portraits for Stalin's. Later the Soviet Embassy in Sofia ordered Malenkov's picture removed and replaced by Stalin's.

This initial buildup of Malenkov threw some Satellite and Communist publications off the track. Bertram Wolfe has pointed out that the April issue of the American Communist journal Political Affairs, which was prepared in early March, published Malenkov's funeral speech and not those of Beria and Molotov, and a lead article by William Z. Foster entitled "Malenkov at the Helm." However, in the May issue which was prepared in early April, Foster dealt with Stalin and coexistence, not even referring to Malenkov's remarks on this subject in his funeral oration.

On 12 March an article by Alexeyev in Izvestia, entitled "The Great Stalin is the Creator of our Five Year Plans," contained a

substantial quotation from Beria and ended on the note that Party and State leadership was in the reliable hands of the Great Stalin's faithful "companions-in-arms."

During the period from 14 to 16 March, articles by regional Party leaders Patolichev (Byelorussia) and Kalnberzin (Latvia), as well as by Party theoretician Chesnokov, made no mention of Malenkov, but stressed the leading role of the Central Committee. On 16 March Pravda referred to the leading role of the Central Committee. The same issue described the Big-Three -- Malenkov, Beria and Molotov -- as "faithful comrades-in-arms of Stalin."

There were some indications in the immediate period following Stalin's death that the Satellites were not clear on the leadership in the USSR, but leaned a little toward Malenkov. A survey of Satellite propaganda up to 15 May found that Malenkov, as well as other Soviet leaders, was mentioned only sparingly after Stalin's death. On the few occasions that Malenkov was mentioned, it was in connection either with his speech at Stalin's funeral or with his speech at the 19th Party Congress. Malenkov, however, was mentioned more than Beria and/or Molotov, and these latter two were not mentioned independently of Malenkov.

This braking of the Malenkov buildup was to be paralleled in the action taken by the Central Committee meeting of 14 March, an action that was not publicly revealed until six days later.

THE SECOND GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION

Meanwhile the Supreme Soviet meeting scheduled for the 14th was postponed one day, obviously to allow the Central Committee meeting to take place. When it met, the Supreme Soviet approved with its customary unanimity the appointments of Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Voroshilov as Chairman of its own Presidium. In addition, it ratified a sweeping reorganization of the Government which went far beyond the changes proposed at the joint session on 6 March. By 15 March, it looked as though the earlier changes had lacked unity and had been hastily put together in a disorderly compromise arrived at under considerable pressure and tension during the days of Stalin's illness.

At the 15 March meeting, Khrushchev gave the nominating speech for Voroshilov as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Beria gave the nominating speech for Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of

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Ministers.

Mr. Beam, the Counsellor of the American Embassy in Moscow at the time, observed that of all the Soviet leaders, Molotov received the warmest applause.

Malenkov presented the composition of the new Government, stating that the measures for amalgamating the ministries were worked out over a long time during Stalin's lifetime and that their adoption had been "merely hastened." Some of the highlights of the additional reorganization measures follow:

1. The decree represented a sweeping reversal of the administrative policies followed since 1948. It reduced the number of Soviet ministries or organs of ministerial level from 57 to 27, placing control of this simplified structure in the hands of men who were for the most part experienced.

2. The Ministry of the Navy was merged with the War Ministry and became the Ministry of Defense, under Bulganin. (On 6 March Bulganin had received control of the Ministry of War only).

3. A. I. Kozlov received control of the newly-merged Ministry of Agriculture and Procurement, formed out of five related ministries. Kozlov's appointment was quite a surprise. He was a relatively young Party functionary who had been chief of the agricultural section of the Central Committee, and had been identified there as late as 14 March Yet at the October Congress he had been made an alternate member of the Central Committee. In getting this position he moved ahead of two full members of the Central Committee, whose ministries were merged under his control. the Council of Collective Farm Affairs under Andreev was later abolished, giving Kozlov complete control of agriculture.

4. P. K. Ponomarenko received control of the new Ministry of Culture. Ponomarenko, in addition to being a member of the Secretariat, had been Minister of Procurement since 1950. The 6 March decree had slated Ponomarenko for "leading work in the Council of Ministers," and Western observers thought that he might

become a Deputy Chairman of that body or receive control of agriculture. His new Ministry of Culture was formed out of the Ministries of Higher Education, Cinematography and Labor Reserves, the Committee on Affairs of the Arts, the Radio Broadcasting Committee, and the Chief Administration of Printing, Publishing and Bookselling.

5. The State Committee of Material and Technical Supply of the National Economy (Gossnab) and the State Committee on Supply of Food and Industrial Goods (Gosprodsnab) were merged with the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). This gave Gosplan the supervision over allocations of materials, food and industrial products, thereby greatly increasing its importance. Kosyachenko, the new Gosplan chief appointed on 6 March, was not even a member of the Central Committee. At that time it was thought that Mikoyan's Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade would receive at least some of Gossnab's functions since its Chief, Kabanov, had become First Deputy Minister under Mikoyan.

6. Mikoyan, who on 6 March had been named Minister of Internal and External Trade, was appointed on 15 March a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. His stature was thus increased in a curious way. Since Mikoyan was now the only Deputy Chairman, he occupied a niche by himself, presumably below the Presidium of the Council of Ministers composed of the five First Deputy Chairmen yet above the ordinary ministers comprising the full Council of Ministers.

7. N. G. Ignatov who, like Ponomarenko, had been marked for "leading work" in the Council of Ministers on 6 March, did not receive a ministerial assignment. His status was not determined until 2 April when Leningrad Pravda announced his selection as a Party Secretary in Leningrad.

8. The Supreme Soviet failed to ratify either the Fifth Five-Year Plan or the 1953 State Budget, both of which were already in effect, suggesting that a review of existing plans by the reorganized Government was underway.

9. Malenkov, in submitting the nominations of the government appointments, referred to the principle of collective leadership. He stated that "the strength of our leadership rests in its collective, cohesive and moral-ethical nature. We regard strictist observance of this supreme principle as a guarantee of correct leadership of the country and a most important condition of our further successful progress along the path of building communism in our country." He said that the USSR would follow

the policy elaborated by the Party, and that this policy had been stated by himself, Beria and Molotov at Stalin's funeral on 9 March. He elaborated further to say that there was no question that could not be "settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries. This applies to our relations with all states, including the United States of America."

10. V. V. Kuznetsov was released from his duties as a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with his appointment as USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 10 March Kuznetsov had been assigned as Ambassador to Peiping. In contrast to previous Soviet practice, he evidently did not relinquish his title as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs upon receiving a diplomatic post in a foreign country. Malik, for example, who replaced Gromyko in London, was relieved of his title of First Deputy Foreign Minister upon receiving this assignment. (An exception to this is the USSR permanent ambassadorial post at the UN, which in recent years has been held by men of Deputy Foreign Minister rank. Vyshinsky, the present incumbent, is a First Deputy Minister).

11. A. A. Andreyev, the ex-Politburo member and ex-Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was elected a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. (This automatically excluded him from any ministerial position; as mentioned above, the Council of Collective Farm Affairs, which he headed, has been abolished). N. M. Shvernik, deposed as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was nevertheless elected a member of that body.

The complete reorganization was presented to the Supreme Soviet in about an hour's time. It was revolutionary and hence bound to cause much confusion in the country as a whole.

In addition, revealed at least one major reorganization not spelled out in the official decrees, which basically altered the structure of an important sector of Soviet society, the economic organs of the MVD. The foundation on which that structure had been built, the Chief Directorate of Camps of the MVD,

was transferred to the Ministry of Justice, which thereby inherited control of the USSR's vast forced labor supply. Furthermore, the special Chief Directorates of Camps for Mining and Metallurgy of the Far Northern Construction (Dalstroy), and possibly the Chief Directorate of Special Non-Ferrous Metals, were shifted to the Ministry of Metallurgy. The Hydrological Projecting and Exploring Directorate was moved to the Ministry of Electrical Power Stations and Electrical Industry, and the Chief Directorate of Railroad Construction Camps of the MVD was transferred to the Ministry of Land Transportation.

In some cases the chiefs of these directorates as well as the personnel moved with them.

Curiously, this breakup of the self-sufficient MVD empire has not yet been revealed by Soviet sources, although it was later reflected in the ramifications of the amnesty decree. Since the separations of the MGB from the MVD in 1943, the police functions of the MVD had all gradually been absorbed by the MGB, and the MVD's interest had become primarily an economic one. Now that the MVD was merged again with the MGB it was losing its economic role completely.

Interest in this development was heightened because of Beria's accession to control of the reorganized MVD. He had held sway over the economic functions of the MVD through his old deputy, Kruglov. These functions, incidentally, included a great deal of the construction work for the Soviet atomic energy program, which Beria administered. It seemed at first glance hard to believe that Beria would preside over the liquidation of his empire; possibly Beria had to sacrifice these economic functions in the give-and-take atmosphere preceding 6 March in order to regain control of the police, which had previously slipped from his grasp.

This atmosphere must have also affected another rival for power -- G. M. Malenkov.

As mentioned previously, a meeting of the Central Committee had been held on 14 March, resulting in a day's postponement of the Supreme Soviet meeting. Undoubtedly, it was called to work out the reorganization which Malenkov was to present to the Supreme Soviet. The results of this plenary session of the Central Committee, unlike those of the 15 March Supreme Soviet meeting, were not made public until 20 March,

six days after the Central Committee meeting. The Soviet press then published a list of three decisions taken:

(a) To accede to the request of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, G. M. Malenkov, for his release from the duties of Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

(b) To elect a Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU to consist of the following: Comrades N. S. Khrushchev, N. A. Suslov, P. N. Pospelov, N. N. Shatalin, S. D. Ignatiev.

(c) In accordance with paragraph 32 of the Communist Party Statute, to transfer Comrade N. N. Shatalin from candidate to member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Thus a five-man Secretariat was named with Khrushchev listed first. Among other things, Suslov, who was not mentioned in the 6 March decree, was retained; Aristov, also unmentioned on 6 March, was dropped; Mikhailov, identified as being in the Secretariat on 6 March, was also dropped. The ranking of the three newcomers was reversed: on 6 March Ignatiev was listed first, then Pospelov, and Shatalin; on the 20th, Shatalin was listed first among the newcomers, followed by Pospelov and Ignatiev.

SIGNIFICANCE OF REORGANIZATION OF PARTY SECRETARIAT

Malenkov thus abandoned direct control of the Party Secretariat -- something which Stalin in his lifetime had never done. Stalin had used the office of General Secretary to achieve absolute dictatorship. In later years he had delegated considerable authority to the ranking secretary, a position held by Malenkov at the time of Stalin's death.

The presumption of the authors of this paper has been that Stalin had allowed Malenkov's influence to grow, that Malenkov had achieved predominance by capably handling the intricate affairs of the apparatus in the name of Stalin, and that Malenkov's influence had become quite strong in the last two years of Stalin's life. Stalin, despite whatever infirmity may have gripped him, must have been aware of and allowed this personal rise to take place, a rise which culminated in Malenkov's leading role at the Party Congress. Stalin therefore appeared to approve of this Malenkov preeminence and had done nothing to stop it.

It is the author's contention that Stalin was unable to contemplate anyone succeeding him. Perhaps in the doctors' plot the evil genius of Stalin, as has been speculated earlier, was moving against

all his enemies, and perhaps he had planned to use Malenkov for this purpose and then discard him. If this supposition is valid, it would appear to have been only a question of time before Stalin, realizing Malenkov's independent power position would have set about to destroy him.

At any rate Stalin's death prevented this, and left Malenkov with his power intact. This power evidently was not great enough, however, to withstand the pressure of the other Soviet leaders, who apparently moved at an early moment to restrict it. It appears reasonable to assume that Malenkov gave in to their pressure -- whether direct or indirect, spoken or unspoken -- and withdrew from the Secretariat. It is probably true that in so doing he immediately began to take steps to minimize the role of the Secretariat. There is some evidence that this has been the case. It is also probably true that the other Soviet leaders wholeheartedly approved of these attempts.

Malenkov's withdrawal, thus does appear to stand as a sign of weakness, a sign that he was not able at the outset to inherit all the trappings of Stalin's power. He appeared to have some supporters left in the Secretariat, and his influence and power would undoubtedly continue to be felt there. But this was not the same as being in it himself. Malenkov, the first ranking member of the Party Presidium, but not officially its Chairman, would still have to accede to the desires of others. Stalin also was never formally a "Chairman" of the Politburo, but he had certainly acted in this capacity and had done more than break tie votes. In Stalin's absence from the Politburo sessions before the war, reliable Soviet defectors have reported, Molotov chaired the meetings.

Krushchev's rise in the Secretariat, first indicated in the 6 March decree, was confirmed by this announcement. He was listed first in the rankings of the Secretariat, and hence took over the day-to-day control of party affairs previously performed by Malenkov.

Much speculation immediately centered on the political orientation of Khrushchev and the other members of the Secretariat, especially their relations with Malenkov. As has been previously noted, Khrushchev and Suslov figure prominently in the vigilance campaign. While this was not unusual in light of their positions and the Party's role in the campaign, it did seem to align them in this instance with Malenkov. In addition their careers were not such as

to indicate that they were anti-Malenkov. The biographical evidence on the men does not add much further in this respect.1/

Various biographic appraisals of Khrushchev lay stress on his ability to hew a center line, his opportunism and his blind obedience to Stalin; yet such appraisals are common to most Soviet leaders. Suslov's orientation had come in for a good deal of attention at the time he entered the Secretariat in 1947 when Zhdanov was in ascendancy. He remained prominent, however, after Zhdanov's death, suggesting that he had been able to overcome any stigma that may have been attached to him in this regard. His attack on Fedoseyev had also served to array him against Voznesensky, a Zhdanov adherent.

With regard to Ignatiev, the authors had previously assumed him to be a Malenkov man. The fact that he was listed after Shatalin and Pospelov, rather than before them as had been the case on 6 March, was perhaps an omen of his later downfall. Shatalin was only an alternate Central Committee member in October, possibly indicating a falling out with Malenkov. Pospelov, although an old time Bolshevik and Party theoretician, had declined in stature prior to Stalin's death. There is some indication that he is on close terms with Molotov.

The braking of the Malenkov propaganda buildup, and the withdrawal of Malenkov from the Secretariat, was to be followed in the ensuing months by stress on the collegial nature of the leadership; it is perhaps reasonable to assert that this concept received the Central Committee's formal support in its 14 March meeting. This stress on collegial leadership is best documented in Soviet and Satellite propaganda media of the period. The concept has also been used in several other contexts.

[redacted]

1/ As far as can be determined, the rumor that Khrushchev's sister or daughter was Malenkov's second wife is false.

CAESAR - 3

17 July 1953

[redacted]

Copy No. 45

THE REVERSAL OF THE DOCTORS' PLOT AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

[redacted]

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[redacted]

THE REVERSAL OF THE DOCTORS' PLOT
and
ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

IMPLICATIONS OF REVERSAL

On 4 April, the much publicized doctors' plot was repudiated in a startling public reversal. Pravda reported that an investigation committee especially set up for the purpose by the newly-merged USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) under L. P. Beria had found that officials of the ex-Ministry of State Security (MGB) had used "illegal methods" to extract false confessions from the accused doctors.

The announcement came at a time when the vigilance campaign, which the doctors' plot had touched off, had ground to a halt in the wake of the sweeping amnesty decree promulgated by the new regime on 27 March, and at a time when the Communist propaganda machine was engaged in an all-out peace offensive. The arrested doctors were said to have been incorrectly accused "without any legal bases whatsoever," and hence they had been released and completely exonerated. The guilty police officials of the investigations section of the former MGB had been arrested. A second brief announcement made by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the same day stated that the decree of 20 January awarding the Order of Lenin to Lydia Timashuk, the informer in the doctors' plot, had been repealed as incorrect.

The Pravda announcement contained several extremely interesting points. The number of accused doctors had been increased from the nine named in January to fifteen; and, of the six names added, none were Jewish, clearly implying that the original doctors' plot expose had carried anti-Semitic overtones. Furthermore, the announcement came so suddenly that an article in the March issue of Young Communist, which was distributed on the very day of the reversal, strongly attacked foreign espionage, especially American, and called for vigilance against foreign penetration in the same violent language that had been characteristic of the vigilance campaign; it praised Lydia Timashuk as an outstanding example of revolutionary vigilance. It is interesting to note that the listing of the released doctors did not include two of the original nine, M. B. Kogan and Y. G. Etinger. Kogan was believed to have died in 1951 and hence had probably never been arrested, while Etinger, according to the US Embassy in Moscow, was rumored to have died during incarceration.

The announcement, of course, centered attention on Beria. It was made under the auspices of the Ministry (MVD) he had so recently

inherited. Furthermore, Pravda's main editorial on the reversal, in an almost exact repetition of a statement contained in Beria's funeral speech, promised that the government would respect the constitutional rights of Soviet citizens. This statement in Beria's speech is the only known allusion in the recent past to the Government's regard for the constitutional rights of its citizens, a fact that is particularly interesting, since Soviet domestic propaganda generally avoids all reference to the individual and his rights and generally treats the constitution as a symbol of the power of the State or a guarantee of material benefits. Thus, the Pravda editorial appeared to indicate that Beria had been a prime motivating force in the release of the doctors, and to imply that he had been considering this move at the time of the funeral.1/ Beria's role in the reversal was further suggested by a UP dispatch cleared by the Moscow censors on 7 April attributing the release of the doctors "to the personal intervention of Deputy Premier L. P. Beria as soon as he took over the newly-combined Ministry of State Security and Internal Affairs."

The American Embassy in Moscow commented that the reversal provided concrete evidence of the new regime's break with the old, since Stalin had either fully approved of, or personally engineered, the "revelation" of the plot. The embassy added that this disclosure indicated that some high-level controversy existed or had recently been concluded in the Soviet Union, but suggested that recent events indicated Malenkov and Beria were operating harmoniously.

On 6 April Pravda levied a critical attack against S. D. Ignatiev, identifying him as being the responsible MGB minister at the time of the arrest of the doctors. On the following day the Central Committee met in plenary session and removed Ignatiev from his post as Party Secretary, in which he had been confirmed as recently as 20 March, when the results of the Central Committee meeting of 14 March (which had rearranged the Secretariat) were finally published. He was thus removed less than three weeks after he was publicly confirmed in the post.

1/ Malenkov, on the other hand, in his funeral speech mentioned the necessity of continuing the vigilance campaign maintaining that it was necessary to train the Soviet people in "a spirit of high political vigilance" to be directed against "internal and external enemies."

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The US Embassy in Moscow commented that the 7 April meeting removing Ignatiev may have afforded an opportunity to Central Committee members, possibly for the first time, to discuss the background of the plot affair. The embassy further observed that Beria, as a member of a minority race himself, might presumably be identified with the policy of racial equality which began with the reversal of the charges against the doctors. In the embassy's opinion, this new policy might have been a reflection on Malenkov, who was rumored to be personally anti-Semitic (Malenkov's alleged anti-Semitism, often rumored, remains unconfirmed).

On 10 April Izvestia promised its readers that persons found guilty of falsely accusing the fifteen Soviet doctors and attempting to foment racial prejudice in the Soviet Union would be justly punished. This had its conclusion on 22 May when N. N. Vasilev, Minister of State Control of the RSFSR, stated that the Soviet Government had punished such guilty officials as Ryumin, the former Deputy Minister of State Security, who was accused of helping to fabricate the doctors' plot. The nature of the punishment was not revealed. This announcement was extremely unusual, in that it was made not by the Security Ministry itself but by a Republican minister of the Ministry of State Control.

On the same day, the Soviet press criticized officials of the Georgian Republic and, in what appeared to be a veiled attack on Stalin, sharply criticized those who resort to "one-man rule" as opposed to "internal party democracy"; it added that no man possessed the knowledge and capabilities of collective leadership. On 8 May the leading editorial of the Georgian newspaper, Zarya Vostoka, linked Ryumin with Rukhadze, a former Georgian MGB Minister who was currently being accused of fabricating the charges in the 1951-52 purges in Georgia. The editorial charged that Ryumin, as well as Rukhadze, had fabricated the evidence against the Georgian leaders in this earlier purge, and accused Rukhadze of "trying to arouse discontent among the Soviet peoples" and of attempting to "stir up feelings of racial hatred."

The doctors' plot reversal also served, at least temporarily, to bring what was left of the vigilance campaign to a close: the [redacted] noted that, at the beginning of April, the campaign against Israel and Zionism carried on by the Soviet press before Stalin's death suddenly stopped. The doctors' plot reversal also suggested that Soviet relations with Israel might be improved, probably to the extent of again exchanging ambassadors. An indication that the Soviet Union would seek to extract whatever benefit

it could out of such an arrangement was [redacted] Soviet officials who indirectly approached Israeli representatives in Bulgaria on the question of resuming relations reportedly stipulated that Israel punish those responsible for the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv and pledge not to join any pact directed against the USSR.

Perhaps one of the most interesting footnotes to the whole doctors' plot affair was seen in a Soviet plain text message of 22 April when Egorov, one of the indicted doctors, was addressed at the Sanitation Directorate of the Kremlin. Prior to the doctors' plot announcement Egorov had been chief of this directorate. This rather unusual postscript also raised the unanswered question of how Stalin met his death. The return of a skilled surgeon to his post on the Kremlin medical staff suggested to some that the circumstances leading to his removal were deliberately staged.

In summary, then, the whole reversal procedure looked like a bid on the part of Beria and at least some of the other Soviet leaders to ingratiate themselves with the Soviet people. In addition, Beria was probably anxious to remove the dread stigma attached to his name throughout the Soviet Union by virtue of his connections with the police. The reversal may likewise have prefaced a complete housecleaning of any old MGB leaders who might have switched allegiance from Beria to Ignatiev when the latter moved into the MGB in August 1951 under the direction of Stalin and probably Malenkov as well.

GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN REGIONAL REPUBLICS

The exoneration of the Moscow doctors was followed shortly by a complete reorganization of the Georgian Party and Government apparatus, which reversed the purge that had occurred in that area during 1951 and 1952. When the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers in Georgia, V. M. Bakradze, presented the new government, he stated that all its members were from the Georgian Party organization, formerly led by "the best son of Georgia, the intelligent pupil of Lenin, the comrade of Stalin, the illustrious official of the Communist Party in the great Soviet Government -- Comrade Beria." He declared that three of the new members of the Georgian Council of Ministers had been falsely charged and arrested in the fall of 1951 in the case fabricated by the former MGB Chief in Georgia, Rukhadze. Two former First Secretaries of the Georgian Party, Charkviani and Mgeladze, had not only failed critically to examine Rukhadze's fabrications, but had even abetted them. Bakradze indicated that directives from "All-Union" organs had freed the three innocent officials as well as others who had been implicated and, as a

demonstration of their rehabilitation, Bakradze had included them in the new Council of Ministers.

One of the most notable aspects of this Georgian reorganization was the appointment of V. G. Dekanozov as Minister of the MVD. Dekanozov had been the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin at the time of Germany's attack on the USSR. He was at one time Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and after the war he served as Deputy Chief of the Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad. This Directorate, under V. N. Merkulov, had charge of Soviet assets in Germany and the European Satellites. Prior to entering the Foreign Ministry Dekanozov, a Georgian, had long been associated with Beria, particularly in the period from 1929 to 1935 in the Georgian security apparatus. [redacted] reported that Dekanozov was on close terms with Beria. His appointment again appeared to reflect the hand of Beria.

In 1951 and 1952 the Georgian political leadership had been publicly criticized for corruption and for encouraging local rather than national patriotism. Beria himself had attended the Georgian Party meeting on 1 April 1952, which had marked the high point of the purges and which had replaced among others the top Party Secretary. The changes made appeared to reflect on the position of Beria, who had long been considered to have, along with Stalin, a personal interest and responsibility for Georgian affairs.

The undoing of the earlier Georgian purge provided a further reason for questioning Malenkov's role: if he, under Stalin (as is thought probable), played a part in these earlier developments in Georgia, then the current exoneration of Beria's men was another indication of Malenkov's lack of control. The picture, however, was far from complete. Some top Georgian Party officials who, by virtue of their biographic profiles would appear to be long-time Beria associates, were still numbered among the ranks of those purged. Further, the Georgian Party Congress originally scheduled for 26 May had not been held as of early July. Its convocation had been announced on 14 April at the time of the Georgian Party and Government reorganization and presumably it was scheduled to confirm the changes which had taken place in the Party apparatus. In spite of these inconsistencies, however, it appeared certain that Beria had played a major role in the reversal, particularly since Bakradze had referred only to him in his discussion of the government reorganization and had not mentioned Malenkov once. This pattern, with one curious exception when Malenkov was singled out for attention, was to be followed in the Georgian press, which extolled Beria in extremely flowery terms.

The pattern of Beria worship in the Transcaucasus was far from complete, however. An opposite cult was noted in Azerbaijan where Bagirov, the newly-named Premier, told the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet that the people would rally around Malenkov, "the closest comrade of Stalin." Bagirov's procedure in assuming the Azerbaijan Premiership resembled that followed by Malenkov in the central government in that Bagirov also relinquished his position on the Party Secretariat upon assuming the office of Premier. This unusual procedure of two new regional premiers picking two different Soviet leaders as their patrons added to the mounting indications that the Soviet leadership was indeed collegial in form. It indicated that the regional participants were either choosing the leader they would like most to be identified with at that time or standing by their previous patrons on the grounds that it would be foolhardy to abandon them at this late date.

Bagirov, who had aligned himself with Malenkov, had had an earlier association with Beria and in fact at one time had been Beria's superior in police affairs in Azerbaijan. In his history of Transcaucasian Party affairs, however, he had failed to glorify Beria, suggesting that his relations with him were not too favorable. Bagirov had been accorded unusual recognition in the Party reorganization of 6 March when he was moved ahead of twenty-two members of the ex-Party Presidium to become an alternate member of the new Party Presidium. Bagirov had also long been a vocal advocate of Stalin's Russification policy, which at the time of his appointment as Azerbaijani Premier appeared to have been at least temporarily shelved.

INTERNAL MEASURES TO EASE TENSION

While the regional republics were setting their houses in order in reorganizations patterned after the All-Union model, the Central Government was enacting measures designed to ease internal tensions and to popularize itself with the Soviet people:

1. On 27 March the amnesty decree was issued.

2. On 1 April the annual decree on price cuts announced the largest reductions made in four years.

3. April and May messages provided indications that production of consumer goods was being increased.

4. The 1953 announcement of the annual State loan was delayed until late June and the loan itself was only half as large as those of 1951 and 1952.

5. On 18 May, wheat flour was placed on daily sale in Moscow State stores, ending the four-day-a-year sale system in practice since World War II. On the same day in an unprecedented step, the Government announced a bargain clearance sale with twenty-five percent price cuts for the remainder of May and June in State stores.

The American Embassy in Moscow noted that the local population showed a lively interest in the amnesty decree, which the Embassy assumed would affect directly more than two million people. It commented that the absence of any reference to Stalin in Soviet news coverage was apparently designed to give the new regime full credit for the amnesty. The wording of this decree, which had preceded the doctors' plot reversal by about seven days, contrasted sharply with previous emphasis on the need for internal security.

The consumer goods price reductions which went into effect on 1 April were the most extensive since those of 1 May 1950. The list of price cuts also included a number of manufactured items on which prices had not been reduced in recent years. The greatest cut however was the fifty percent reduction in the price of fresh fruits and vegetables.

EXTERNAL MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSION

The policy of reducing tension at home had its counterpart in the field of foreign affairs. After Stalin's death, the two plane incidents of the 12th and 15th of March had caused a considerable increase in international tension. On 21 March came the first indication that the propaganda line had switched. On this date, Soviet media resumed normal coverage of internal and external news, understandably lacking in the period following Stalin's death. When this occurred, it was noted that articles on foreign affairs resumed anti-US charges, but with considerable restraint. A 21 March commentary on the possibility of peaceful coexistence of capitalism and socialism recalled the "vigorous cooperation" of the US, UK and USSR during World War II and the "splendid results" of that cooperation in the common victory over the enemy. Previously Soviet propaganda had insisted that the Red Army had won the World War II victory singlehanded.

Another instance of what was to become a concerted Soviet drive to reduce international tension was seen on 25 March when the USSR granted visas to ten US newspaper and radio editors to visit Moscow for one week.

On 28 March the Chinese accepted General Clark's offer of 22 February to exchange sick and wounded POW's and suggested resumption of the truce talks. Two days later Chou En-lai proposed the repatriation of all prisoners desiring to be released, with the disposition of the remainder to be decided by neutral states. The same day the senior Soviet UN Secretariat member took the initiative to inform [redacted] that Chou's statement on repatriation was "the real thing." On 31 March Vyshinsky expressed hope in the Security Council that the current UN session would promote further useful results which could strengthen friendly relations with all nations.

These late March moves were followed by a series of Soviet efforts to get on friendlier terms with the West, which appeared to occur in discernible phases. From late March until late April, Soviet policy was characterized principally by an attempt to ease tensions with the West at the least possible cost to the USSR. This involved improved personal relations with Western diplomats, some relaxation of the previously vigorous internal Soviet security measures, moderation of language in Soviet speeches and official statements, and release of some Western civilians interned in Korea. These changes reflected primarily a relaxation in

to ambassadorial level and hoped that Yugoslavia would reciprocate. This overture on Molotov's part was subsequently realized. Another example of the new tactic was the 30 May Soviet note to Turkey, in which the USSR expressed optimism over the possibility of finding a mutually acceptable solution to the Dardanelles question and abandoned its "territorial claims against Turkey."

The record of such recent developments in Soviet foreign policy has been widely covered elsewhere and it is not thought advisable to record these events chronologically in this paper. The decision to reduce international tension was undoubtedly approved by the new Soviet leaders before being put into operation by Molotov in his role as custodian of Soviet foreign affairs. He had been publicly identified with this approach since 1 April, when he endorsed Chou En-lai's POW concession, although at that time Molotov insisted that the Communist stand on repatriation was still firm. While Stalin's Bolshevik article had contained the necessary theoretical justification for these maneuvers and while various foreign Communists attributed them to the article, their timing made it difficult to escape the conclusion that they had been brought about as a result of Stalin's death.

The USSR, up to Stalin's death and in the period immediately following, had lapsed into a rigid position, a sort of go-it-alone policy with regard to international relations in which the atmosphere of compromise, reconciliation and negotiation was completely absent. Thus, in addition to the conclusion that these preliminary moves were made to keep the international situation fluid and to promote a period of international relaxation while problems of Soviet leadership were thrashed out at home, they suggest that with Stalin's passing a more realistic and perhaps more effective Soviet foreign policy was to come into play. Such a policy may well have been in the minds of the majority of Soviet leaders, but ruled out by Stalin in the last years of his life.

Korea has been the only real concession to date. The compromise agreement at Panmunjom on 8 June represented a Communist retreat from a position which had been proclaimed domestically and internationally as final. The relevance of this compromise to the policy change in the USSR was, of course, obscured by Chinese involvement in the issue and the problem of Sino-Soviet relations in the period following Stalin's death.

In summary, there have been no outward signs that the new atmosphere of detente was unacceptable to a portion of the Soviet leadership, or that it had in fact entered into a struggle for leadership. The reduction of international tension would seem to be a policy attractive to all Soviet contenders in their bids for internal power.

In the background, of course, the possibility always remained that some leader would use the international arena to solidify his position with the Soviet masses. In this respect, Molotov would appear to have the advantage.

The foreign policy problem, however, was at a later date to become much more acute with respect to the delicate question of Germany. At this point, over-all Soviet foreign policy, policy toward the Satellites, jurisdictional control in Germany, and individual personalities exercising the control were to merge in the first big test of the new regime. Meanwhile, however, there were more internal developments affecting the general pattern of the Soviet leadership.

MAY DAY SLOGANS AS BAROMETER OF POLICY

The May Day slogans published on 21 April represented a considerable change from those issued for the 7 November 1952 anniversary. There was increased emphasis on "peaceful coexistence." In addition, Soviet workers were called on to strengthen the "fraternal friendship among peoples of our country" and "increasingly to strengthen the unity of the great Soviet many-peopled State," in what appeared to be an allusion to the doctors' plot reversal. One novel slogan affirmed that the "rights of Soviet citizens, guaranteed by our Constitution, are unshakable and are defended as sacred by the Soviet Government." This was another repetition of Beria's remarks on this subject at Stalin's funeral. Another slogan admonished employees of State institutions strictly to observe "socialist legality and take a sensitive attitude towards workers' inquiries." Finally, the de-emphasis of Stalin was continued. His name occurred only twice in the slogans.

The constitution was referred to as the Soviet Constitution rather than the Stalin Constitution and the Komsomol, instead of being the "Lenin-Stalin Komsomol," was now called the "All-Union Lenin Communist Union of Youth." This was in contrast to the pattern in Czechoslovakia, for example, where one slogan used the name of the recently-deceased Gottwald ten times, referring to the "Gottwald Five-Year Plan," and so on.

Malenkov, unlike Zapotocky in Czechoslovakia, was not mentioned in the slogans, nor for that matter were Beria and Molotov. However, quotations from both Beria and Malenkov were employed. The avoidance of names of both past and present leaders, together with the new emphasis on unity of the people, the Party and the Government, reinforced the current Soviet propaganda line that the USSR was experiencing rule of the Party by its leaders acting jointly rather than rule of an individual.

German and Czech slogans, which were issued before Soviet slogans, greeted Malenkov by name as did slogans in Albania, Viet Nam and North Korea. In Rumania, one of the slogans was a direct quotation from Malenkov's funeral speech. The Hungarian and Polish slogans, issued after the USSR's, failed to mention Malenkov and, in Poland, the slogan dealing with the constitution appeared to be modified in conformity with Beria's statement on the subject.

In the Satellites in general, and Poland and Hungary in particular, Malenkov received no unusual prominence. In Warsaw pictures of Prime Minister Bierut predominated, with those of Stalin in second place. In Budapest the usual triumvirate of Lenin, Stalin and Rakosi was played up and Malenkov's picture was actually seen on only three buildings.

In China, [redacted] the groups passing the reviewing stand were urged to cheer Mao Tse-tung and no one else, and that images of Mao were particularly prominent, whereas portraits of Malenkov were featured only in the company of other foreign Communist leaders and were generally given second rank behind the Chinese. The 55 slogans issued by Peiping for use on May Day did not mention the Soviet Premier, and Mao Tse-tung replaced Stalin in the place of honor in Chinese propaganda.

The key address in the Soviet Union on 1 May, which was made by Bulganin, was in the vein of the Pravda reply to President Eisenhower. While the language was far less bellicose than usual, Bulganin asked for Western "deeds" to match the "peaceful statements" of its leaders. In published listings of the Presidium, Malenkov was in first place, followed by Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin.

READJUSTMENTS REFLECTING PECULIAR NATURE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Meanwhile, a series of disconnected and in some cases inexplicable developments occurred, which were of interest because of their bearing on the Soviet leadership and the policy of that leadership. Cumulatively, they suggested that a delicate balance was being maintained as the triumvirate moved their human chess players across the board.

1. On 11 April, G. M. Orlov was awarded the Order of Lenin on his 50th anniversary. The practice of making this award to deserving Soviet leaders at this stage in their careers is not unusual. However, [redacted] the award to Orlov recalled the surprise which his retention in the new Soviet Gorvernment as Minister of the Timber and Paper Industry had caused. Orlov, [redacted] had been one of the most

earlier Pravda article of 27 April also had pointed out that the wider authority of the ministers was aimed at bringing a closer rapprochement between the State apparatus and the people.

8. On 17 May, a Soviet regional broadcast announced that the Kazak Republic Publishing House had issued in Kazakh the second edition of the brochure on Beria's address at the 19th Party Congress of the Communist Party and stated that 50,000 copies had already been published. This is the only known Soviet broadcast referring to this type of subject since Stalin's death.

[redacted]

10. On 2 June the British Ambassador to the USSR held a reception to mark the Queen's Coronation. All the leading Soviet leaders including Malenkov had been invited to attend. Molotov, however, was the only man of Presidium rank to put in an appearance. This was in keeping with the trend noted earlier at receptions given by the East Germans and Czechs, which only Molotov and Mikoyan attended.

11. On 4 June, the US Embassy in Moscow relayed a rumor that P. K. Ponomarenko had been appointed Central Committee Secretary to fill the vacancy created by Ignatiev's dismissal. The embassy source, a Western correspondent in Moscow, also believed that Kaftanov, the former USSR Minister of Higher Education, had taken Ponomarenko's place as Minister of Culture. The correspondent was unable to send the story through the Moscow censors. The rumor took on some credibility by virtue of the fact that Kaftanov, who had been in decline since his replacement as Minister of Higher Education in 1951, had been identified in communications intelligence as a Deputy Minister of Culture and hence might be a logical replacement. Ponomarenko, as mentioned previously, was thought to be in the Malenkov camp. If this were true and if Ponomarenko had not been bought off in the interim, his return to the Secretariat, which he had vacated on 6 March, would seem to reflect favorably on Malenkov. Curiously enough, the example of the USSR cabinet, where former Party Secretary Ponomarenko had taken over the Ministry of Culture, had been followed at least in the Ukrainian, Moldavian and Karelo-Finnish cabinets. In each of these, the new Minister of Culture was drawn directly from the Party Secretariat or had formerly been associated with it. This procedure was par-

ticularly noteworthy because it occurred despite the fact that both A. M. Lazarev and I. I. Tsvetkov, the Moldavian and Karelo-Finnish officials, had been criticized in September 1952, while the status of K. Z. Litvin, the new Ukrainian Minister of Culture, had apparently been declining since 1950.

12. On 4 June, the American Embassy was visited by what it took to be a Soviet provocateur who insisted on seeing Ambassador Bohlen. The incident suggested that in spite of overtures of friendship, Soviet leaders were attempting to take out insurance, as they had attempted to do with Ambassador Kennan, should the necessity arise to demand Bohlen's recall.

13. On 23 May, the Soviet press published a curious article by the controversial economist, Varga, which appeared on the surface to be, like the Stalin Bolshevik article, purely propagandistic in tone. In effect, it represented another recantation on Varga's part of his 1947 position that in times of crisis the State could and would act contrary to the desires of the monopolies for maximum profits and in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Varga revised this stand and accepted Stalin's view that the monopolies had taken control of the State. Varga, however, was able to maintain at least by inference his 1947 theory that the expected (1948) post-war crisis would be a temporary one and that the serious cyclical crisis of capitalism would come perhaps ten years after the war. He did this in his statement regarding the coming market crisis, particularly as accentuated by the re-entry of Japan and Germany into world markets. This view, of course, was in complete conformity with Stalin's position. Western observers had been waiting for some clue as to the possibility of change in Soviet economic policy. Yet Varga's article restated the general estimate set forth by Stalin. It made a bid for the relaxation of COCOM controls, but this was certainly not unusual.

CAESAR - 4

16 July 1953

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Outside the Soviet Union, the situation in Germany was to provide the clearest indication of the problems faced by the new Soviet leadership and the difficulty which it had in handling them. Difficulty in larger policy questions is perhaps inherent in the nature of the collegial leadership, where differing opinions must be resolved and where mistaken policy can react disastrously on its chief proponent.

In East Germany, US officials were quick to notice in the days following Stalin's death that Walter Ulbricht was taking special pains to straighten out his record. His 8 March policy statement, published in the East German press prior to Malenkov's funeral oration, attributed to Stalin's guidance policies that Ulbricht had long espoused. At the same time, there were fairly reliable reports that at a late March meeting of the Soviet Control Commission Grotewohl had criticized the SED Central Committee and, indirectly, Ulbricht for failure to meet successfully the problems of reparations, refugees and consumer goods shortages. The relative mildness of East German reaction to West German Bundestag ratification of the EDC and the contractual agreements was taken at the time as a possible indication that Ulbricht's strong policies were less acceptable than they had been previously.

In mid-April [redacted] reported that relations between the Soviet occupation authorities and East German Communist leaders had deteriorated, due to the low esteem in which the Russians were held by the East Germans and the political and economic blunders for which the Germans were blamed. At the same time, the USSR put out feelers regarding new Soviet proposals on Germany. These feelers were evasive on the problem of free elections in East Germany, declaring that the essential problem was to ensure Germany's neutrality.

On 15 April Ulbricht disproved rumors of a Soviet policy shift in Germany and of his own shaky status by strongly reaffirming his "rapid socialization" program. Two days after this speech the Soviet Government announced that the Political Advisor to the Soviet Control Commission, V. S. Semenov, was being recalled and would be replaced by P. F. Yudin. This appointment was especially interesting in view of the importance of this job and the fact that Yudin, like Kuznetsov and Benediktov, had also had no foreign office experience. He was a Party theoretician of long standing, who had been the first editor of the Cominform Journal and who was elevated to the Party's Presidium at the October Congress. [redacted] claimed that Yudin while in Yugoslavia had been an agent of the MVD. On the surface it looked as though this Party leader was being sent into a ticklish post to keep the situation under control

and possibly to implement a new policy. Icarus had reported that in political matters Semenov had the deciding voice, and that if Chuikov failed to agree, Semenov merely called Moscow to talk to Molotov, Vyshinski or Malik, or the Central Committee. Semenov had also reportedly served Soviet intelligence from his post in Sweden during World War II. Semenov, who was not a member of the Central Committee, did not appear to be of equal Party rank with Yudin.

On 5 May Ulbricht continued his hard line when he bitterly denounced the West German Socialists as traitors to the working class despite their opposition to the Bonn and Paris treaties. Ulbricht's propaganda tactic of basing the unity campaign on the implausible thesis that an increasingly communized East Germany would become more attractive to West Germans demonstrated an inflexibility inconsistent with the emphasis being given to the German unity campaign in statements emanating from Moscow.

On 5 May Ambassador Bohlen commented that the articles by Grotewohl and Ulbricht, published in the Moscow press on the anniversary of the German surrender, did not indicate a change in Soviet policy toward Germany and may have been an attempt to show that rumors of such a change were without foundation. On 15 May the SED expelled Franz Dahlem and several other members from its Central Committee. Dahlem's fall from favor had been attributed to his Western residence and his alleged association with the view that the transfer of "Soviet-style communism" to East Germany should be delayed. His purge again pointed to the dominant position of Ulbricht.

On 28 May Moscow completely revamped its representation in Germany by dissolving the Soviet Control Commission and naming Ambassador Semenov to the new post of Soviet High Commissioner in Germany. His return 37 days after his replacement as Political Adviser to the SCC by Yudin implied indecision in Moscow on policy in Germany and on the organizational and personnel setup necessary to implement it.

Semenov's replacement in April had left no prominent Soviet Foreign Ministry official in Germany during a period when the USSR was expressing interest in an improved international situation. On 1 May the Soviet press had carried Semenov's elevation to the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry. The announcement of his return to Germany was now made by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It indicated that the Foreign Ministry under Molotov was being allowed to assume formal responsibility for overall German policy determination at the expense of the Army representative, Chuikov. The status of both was left unclear in the original announcement.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Chuikov, whose functions were limited to command of the Soviet troops in Germany, was transferred on 7 June to an unnamed post in the Ministry of Defense and replaced by Col. General A. A. Grechko, who had been Commander of the Kiev Military District. Yudin was subsequently to be appointed Deputy to Semenov. At the same time I. I. Ilyichev, formerly Soviet Ambassador to East Germany and a professional diplomat, took over the duties of Soviet High Commissioner to Austria from General Sviridov and was also named Ambassador to Austria.

The extent of Yudin's actual control of East German policy cannot be ascertained; the brief Yudin period on the SCC was not marked by any change in the intensified communization process, which reached a crescendo during his tenure. Vituperative speeches were made by Premier Ulbricht in support of this program. Also during this period, the East German campaign against the Protestant Church reached its peak. The disparity between the uncompromising East German position and conciliatory Soviet gestures elsewhere was manifest.

Four days after the arrival of Semenov, the SED Politburo announced a spectacular reversal of its former program, clearly implying that Semenov had returned with a new policy. On 9 June it did inter alia the following things:

1. Composed major differences with the Protestant Church;

2. Called for amendment of the plan for heavy industry with a view to improving worker standards of living;

3. Halted the recently intensified campaign for socialization of agriculture;

4. Promised new policies regarding residence and interzonal transit permits;

5. Promised restitution of confiscated property and restoration of full civil rights to refugees who returned from the West;

6. Professed a willingness to encourage private business; and

7. Promised a general amnesty for persons charged with damaging state-owned property.

A week following the SED reversal, the East German Government encountered the greatest show of resistance ever experienced in any Soviet Satellite. Curiously, the riots on 16 and 17 June began as a demonstration which the Government, anxious to show its new-found liberality, probably inspired and encouraged, and certainly, in the beginning, winked at.

Protesting a late May increase in work norms, 100,000 East Berliners finally joined in unprecedented revolt against the regime. Strikes and rioting spread over much of the Soviet Zone, with the demonstrators calling for abolition of the regime and free all-German elections. Soviet authorities reacted swiftly and efficiently to quell the disturbances. On 19 June a total of 25,000 Soviet troops with at least 450 tanks and self-propelled guns were estimated to be in East Berlin. The seriousness with which the Soviet military authorities viewed the disorders was indicated by an apparent general alert of their forces throughout Germany. East German Garrisoned People's Police units were reportedly alerted and confined to their barracks on 17 June. They were not committed in Berlin until 18 June, after the situation had been brought under control by Soviet forces. It was later confirmed that strikes or riots had occurred in 28 cities in East Germany.

A 21 June editorial in the East German Communist newspaper, Neues Deutschland, stated that "the quelling of the fascist provocation was absolutely essential so that our Government might embark on its new course which . . . aims at a decisive improvement in the living standard of our population." On the same day the SED Central Committee proclaimed that enemies of the people would not be allowed to interrupt the new course of action, and announced further economic concessions. Despite renewed disturbances on 7 July, the East German Government reopened the sector border in Berlin two days later.

The Soviet Union, therefore, had withstood this first test in East Germany and rejected the alternative of cracking down on its restive Satellite in retaliation. Additional proof that a general conciliatory

policy was, at least for the moment, still in effect was seen in several developments in the Satellites. For example, on 22 June the Albanian Government cancelled debts accumulated by peasants from 1949 to 1952. On 24 June Hungary liberalized crop collection measures. On 4 July newly-appointed Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy promised economic and political reforms unprecedented in the Satellites. On 6 July Czechoslovakia revoked a harsh labor discipline decree announced only one week earlier.

Meanwhile, the USSR had reshuffled its diplomatic representation in Poland in another of the top-level personnel realignments which had been taking place since Stalin's death. G. M. Popov, another man new to the diplomatic scene, was appointed Ambassador to Poland. His appointment indicated some diminution of Malenkov's influence. During the 1940's Popov rose rapidly to the highest echelons of the Party hierarchy. Between 1941 and 1946 he had become successively a full member of the Central Committee, First Secretary of the important Moscow City and Oblast committees, and a member of the Secretariat and Orgburo of the Central Committee. In December 1949 he suffered a sharp set-back when he was replaced on the Central Committee Secretariat and as First Secretary of the Moscow Party organization by N. S. Khrushchev, and transferred "to responsible work in city construction." His loss of these important positions has been attributed to Malenkov's influence. He served as Minister of City Construction and later was Minister of Agricultural Machine Building until his removal in December 1951. His partial decline was evident at the 19th Party Congress when he was reduced from full to alternate membership on the Central Committee. According to Ambassador Bohlen, A. A. Sobolev, whom Popov had replaced, was reportedly unsympathetic to Molotov.

Ambassador Bohlen anticipated that the East German reforms would go forward, although the Soviet leadership had clearly been impressed with the dangers to a dictatorship inherent in a program of liberalization. In a cable of 19 June he suggested that the reforms were motivated primarily by the domestic situation in East Germany and stemmed from the realization by the new Soviet leaders that a continuation of intensive socialization would lead to either economic or political catastrophe which could be coped with only through measures of terror they were unwilling to employ. He pointed out that the Orbit press had printed the almost unprecedented admission that a working class could oppose a Communist regime. He added that the emphasis put on the need for greater consideration for the masses suggested that the reforms would continue.

CAESAR - 5

17 July 1953

MELNIKOV'S REMOVAL IN THE UKRAINE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TOP SECRET

MELNIKOV'S REMOVAL IN THE UKRAINE

Ukrainian personnel shifts following the death of Stalin culminated in the purge of L. G. Melnikov from his position as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party on 12 June. In view of his membership on the USSR Party Presidium and his close relations with other members of that body, he was the most important Soviet leader to have been removed since the death of Stalin.

There were few advance indications of Melnikov's ouster to be found in the Ukrainian governmental reorganization. On 10 April, the Ukrainian SSR began to reorganize its governmental structure in accordance with the USSR reorganization of 15 March; this process continued throughout the months of April and May. The 10 April reorganization included the consolidation of several ministries in line with the All-Union ministerial consolidation. Among others, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security were merged into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs under the direction of P. Y. Meshyk, a reported MIB associate of L. P. Beria. On 23 April, the Ukrainian Minister of State Control, A. P. Pirogov, was replaced by K. S. Karavaev. An important personnel change on 30 May provided what is perhaps the first indication of an impending high level personnel reversal in the Ukraine. On that date, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet appointed A. Y. Korneichuk First Deputy Chairman of the Republican Council of Ministers, and released Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Yeremenke from his position "in connection with his appointment as Chairman of the Ukrainian Industrial Council Administration."

The new Deputy Premier, Korneichuk, was an official and a writer who had previously been quite prominent in Party and State affairs, but who had been criticized on several occasions for having allowed "bourgeois nationalist" tendencies to appear in his writings. Both he and his wife, the Polish-born writer V. Vasilevskaya, had been criticized on this account by Melnikov himself at the 17th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in September, 1952. At that time, Melnikov had stated that Korneichuk and his wife were both guilty of "gross ideological defects and deviations from historical truth...in their libretto of the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitski'."

While generally adhering rather closely to the line laid down by the Moscow press, Ukrainian papers during this period reflected

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several interesting trends which help put Melnikov's removal in perspective. In one respect, the Ukrainian press did not follow the Moscow line; following the death of Stalin and until 13 March, the Soviet press generally, led by Pravda and Izvestia, began to give Malenkov a buildup similar to that used for Stalin. As mentioned above, the new Soviet Premier was liberally quoted in every issue, and quotations from his speeches were set in a boldface type previously reserved for similar quotations from Stalin. On 13 March, the central press, and particularly Pravda, abruptly stopped this practice in favor of the new, collective approach to the Soviet leadership. The Ukrainian press, however, continued to give exceptional treatment to Malenkov at least until the end of March. This may have been an indirect declaration of allegiance to him by the Ukrainian Party under Melnikov's leadership. The halting of this procedure by the Ukrainian press may have been due to pressure on the part of an anti-Malenkov faction in Moscow. On the other hand, it may have occurred at the personal request of Malenkov, assuming that he was in accord with the collective leadership line for the time being.

In early June, Ukrainian papers began to feature articles which foreshadowed the removal of Melnikov on the 12th of that month. On 5 June, the official Ukrainian newspaper apologized in a front page editorial for its own "smear" of the Ukrainian Ministry of Health on 20 February, during the height of the vigilance campaign. The February article had castigated the Health Ministry for tolerating unethical practices, employing professionally incompetent practitioners, and failing to eliminate nepotism, bureaucracy and corruption in certain hospitals. Most of the officials singled out in the article had Jewish names. The 5 June editorial stated that the previous article had "smeared a large group of honest health officials and reflected erroneous views incompatible with national policy, the Communist Party and Soviet ideology."

This was a clear repudiation of an anti-Jewish article; it was traceable to the reversal of the doctors' plot in early April. Additional criticism of "violators of the Soviet nationalities policy" arose in short order in connection with newspaper criticism of the training of Party propagandists. On 3 June, Party officials were scored for not having paid proper attention to the theoretical training of propagandists and for having delegated responsibility for the selection and training of propagandists to lower Party organization rather than maintaining centralized control in these matters.

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On 11 June, the official newspaper, in a more extensive criticism, charged that anti-Marxist viewpoints were creeping into propaganda material, and that propagandists were not speaking to the workers "in that language which is most comprehensible to them." This latter charge was to figure the next day as one of the chief reasons for the expulsion of Melnikov.

On 12 June it was announced that Melnikov had been discharged from his post as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party. Melnikov was accused inter alia of having allowed "distortions" of the Soviet nationalities policy in the western areas of the Ukraine. Among these distortions was the virtual replacement of the local by the Russian language in several schools, and the appointment of officials who were not drawn from the local population. The plenum of the Central Committee appointed A. I. Kirichenko to replace Melnikov as First Secretary, the first Ukrainian to occupy this position since 1938 with the exception of Kaganovich, who had been born in Kiev and who had held the post for a brief period in 1947. The Central Committee also appointed A. E. Korneichuk to the thirteen-man Bureau of the Ukrainian Central Committee.

Criticism was levelled at the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, headed by Premier D. S. Korotchenko, and on 13 June Ambassador Bohlen reported from Moscow that, "according to a reliable newspaper source," Korotchenko had been removed from office. Korotchenko's ouster has not been confirmed but there were other indications that the Ukrainian Council of Ministers was being reorganized. It was announced that V. G. Bondarchuk, Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, was released from his post "in connection with his transfer to a scientific post," and on 18 June another Deputy Chairman, Baranovsky, was released from his duties "in connection with his passing fully for work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR." Other changes in the Ukraine included the dismissal of officials in both the Kiev and Lvov Soviets.

The removal of Melnikov was of importance from several points of view. First of all, it seemed to reflect on the position of the USSR Presidium faction headed by G. M. Malenkov and N. S. Khrushchev. Melnikov had been Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Party directly responsible to Khrushchev when the latter served as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party from 1947 to 1949. He had also taken a prominent part at the 19th Party Congress, which was generally believed to have been a Malenkov affair, and he had

been elected to the top USSR Party Presidium following the Congress. He had also been a member of the Caucus of Representatives of Delegations, which proposed the composition of the governing bodies of the 19th Congress, and had been elected a member of the Congress Secretariat. This was interesting because many of the prominent members of the Caucus, and particularly of the Congress Secretariat, have either been purged or demoted or have disappeared from public prominence since the death of Stalin. Melnikov also had taken a rather prominent part in the Soviet vigilance campaign, which derived much of its ideological inspiration from Malenkov's speech at the Party Congress, and he had faithfully reflected Malenkov's views on party discipline, policy and procedures.

It was speculated at the time that Melnikov's ouster was instigated by L. P. Beria, since his removal was the third instance of a Party purge on charges of promoting excessive Russification directly related to changes in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The first such instance revolved around the Interior Ministry's reversal of the doctors' plot, which included the dismissal from the Party Secretariat of Former MGB Minister S. D. Ignatiev. The mid-April purge in the Georgian SSR included the installation of a new Interior Minister believed close to Beria, and included charges that the previous MGB Minister had framed loyal Georgians on charges of non-existent nationalism.1/ Finally, the governmental changes in the Ukraine had brought to the Interior Ministry of that Republic an official believed to be loyal to Beria. Subsequent Party criticism in the Soviet Republics of Latvia and Lithuania, which had been accompanied by transfers into the Interior Ministry of MGB officials believed to be loyal to Beria, also included charges that previous administrations in those republics had violated the correct nationalities policy.

There were suggestions that the removal of Melnikov might be followed by further difficulties within the Soviet Party hierarchy. M. D. A. Bagirov, Premier of Azerbaijan, was another proponent of a strict Russification policy. He had received unusual prominence in the 6 March reorganization, when he had by-passed twenty-two

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1/ An indication that these two reversals were instigated by the same source was found in an 8 May editorial in the official Georgian newspaper which linked Ryumin, the MGB official charged with primary responsibility for the doctors' plot, and Rukhadze, the Georgian Security Minister, on a common charge of attempting to foment racial hatred among the Soviet peoples.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

members of the October Party Presidium and was made one of the four alternate members of the new group. Following his installation as Premier of Azerbaijan, he had paid fulsome personal tribute to Malenkov. This was in contrast to the Georgian reorganization when Bakradze, the new Georgian Premier, had singled out Beria for praise. It was also in contrast to the current line on "collegial" leadership then in vogue.

In addition to the above, it was also believed that Melnikov would be relieved of his membership in the Party Presidium. In order for this to be accomplished legally, another meeting of the USSR Party Central Committee would be required, as in the case of the dismissal of Ignatiev from the Party Secretariat. It is not known whether this has taken place, although on 27 June Melnikov, along with Beria and M. D. A. Bagirov, failed to attend the opera with the Party Presidium at the Bolshoi theater. The fact that V. A. Malyshev, the new Minister of Transport and Heavy Machine Building appeared with the group suggested that he had replaced Melnikov.

29 July 1953

THE ZHDANOV - MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP

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THE ZHDANOV-MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP

The hypothesis is frequently advanced that Zhdanov and Malenkov engaged in a bitter political conflict for Stalin's favor and for control over the Soviet Communist Party. This is a matter of some importance, since many observers profess to see in this conflict and its outcome an explanation for many of the problems of Soviet policy in the post-war years. The hypothesis set forth below is a composite of various versions of the alleged Zhdanov-Malenkov controversy.1/

Under this hypothesis, a rise in the influence of one was accompanied by a partial eclipse of the other. Zhdanov, who was pre-eminent in the Party and generally accorded to be Stalin's favorite prior to the war, was sent to Leningrad at the time of the Nazi attack. Malenkov, a rising young man who had become prominent only in February 1941, was made a member of the Supreme Defense Council, a five-man streamlined Politburo for the conduct of the war.2/ In the Supreme Defense Council Malenkov was Stalin's immediate subordinate for Party affairs, with additional responsibility for aircraft production and for the relocation of Soviet industry from western USSR to the east.

After the tide of the war turned and the Soviet armies began to retake occupied areas, Malenkov was made Chairman of a new State Committee for the Rehabilitation of Devastated Territories. This committee, with Beria, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Andreev as members, was responsible for industrial, agricultural and political reconstruction in the Soviet territories recovered from the Germans. Since the German-occupied areas had held a large portion of Soviet industry, agriculture and population, the magnitude of the responsibilities of this committee was great.

1/ Proponents of this hypothesis, such as Ruth Fischer, Franz Borkenau and Boris Nicolaevsky, have their own variants, and each has drawn attention to facts overlooked by others. Nicolaevsky, for example, was the only outside observer to discover that Malenkov appeared in Soviet agricultural affairs in 1947.

2/ The original five members of the Supreme Defense Council were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria. Later additions were Kaganovich, Voznesensky and Mikoyan. Voroshilov was later replaced by Bulganin.

Zhdanov, meanwhile, whatever the reason for his original assignment to Leningrad in 1941, may have been in some sort of disfavor in January 1945. After the successful defense of Leningrad, he was relieved of his duties as First Secretary of the Leningrad City and Province Committees. In January 1945, when the city of Leningrad was presented with the Order of Lenin, Zhdanov's name was mentioned, but only as one of the Politburo members. Zhdanov moved to Helsinki as Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland and remained there until December 1945, at which time he returned to Moscow.

Thereafter, Zhdanov again managed to secure Stalin's favor and to eclipse Malenkov. Zhdanov sold Stalin on the necessity for an ideological cleansing of the Communist Party and for a tightening up of Soviet society generally. Zhdanov himself spearheaded the ideological purge. He then began undercutting Malenkov: he successfully unseated him from several key positions, and then attacked such associates of his as Varga and Aleksandrov. As for Malenkov, he appeared to be concerned, from late 1946 on, with agricultural problems and suffered a great loss of prominence.

Zhdanov is said to have been a fanatic Communist, and to have believed that it was possible to make striking advances internationally through foreign Communist Parties, particularly in France and Italy. Specifically, he is said to have been responsible for the organization of the Cominform in September 1947, a foreign policy move which at the minimum was intended to sabotage the Marshall Plan but which was also intended to launch the French and Italian Parties into revolutionary action to seize power.

The French Communist Party undertook violent action in November of 1947 and, until broken by the French army, almost succeeded in paralyzing the government and the economy. The Italian Party undertook similar action, but with much less seccess. In February 1948, the Czechoslovak Communist Party succeeded in seizing power; the impetus for this was attributed to Zhdanov.

At the founding conference of the Cominform in September 1947, Zhdanov supported the Yugoslav delegates in their criticism of the backward policies of other Communist Parties, especially the French and Italian, and in general indicated his approval of the policies of the Yugoslav Communists. Tito, however, was proving to be less than completely obedient, and in 1948 Stalin decided that it was necessary to take disciplinary action. After negotiations lasting four months, characterized by efforts of Stalin and Molotov to intimidate and split the Yugoslav Politburo, it became necessary to apply the extreme sanction against Tito: excommunication from the Communist fold.

During this period, the turn of events in Western Europe had led the United States to take the initiative in attempting unilateral solution of the West German economic situation. The British and the French joined in this effort in the winter of 1947-48. Russian reaction entailed an attempt to capitalize on the most exposed position of the West, the Allied sectors of Berlin, an effort that culminated in the full blockade of Berlin in June 1948.

According to the hypothesis being set forth, Stalin held Zhdanov responsible for the various reverses in Soviet policy, in particular the Yugoslav defection.1/ Zhdanov's death on 31 August 1948 signalled the end of the so-called Zhdanov period.2/ After his Death, Malenkov rapidly achieved a high position in official listings of the Politburo, which was generally taken to indicate that he had returned to grace. Malenkov then allegedly initiated a purge of various persons who owed their positions to Zhdanov's influence. Meanwhile, the Berlin blockade was liquidated and the Greek Civil War was permitted to come to an end, and the emphasis in Soviet foreign policy visibly began to shift to the Far East, where the Chinese Communists were rapidly gaining complete control of mainland China.

* * * * *

What now can be said with regard to this hypothesis? There are several very critical questions involved in it. These questions are: Was there in fact political enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov? Did Malenkov truly lose out in the period from, say, August 1946 up to some time early in 1948? For example, did Malenkov find himself in

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1/ At the time, many observers attributed the Yugoslav break to Zhdanov's purportedly hard line toward the Yugoslavs, i.e., to an attempt on his part to set the same standards of ideological and political conformity for the Satellite countries as had been applied in the USSR. Others believed, on the contrary, that Tito was Zhdanov's principal ally in the international Communist sphere, and that Tito's defection was not so much a result of Zhdanov's effort to bully the Yugoslavs as it was the cause of his being irrevocably discredited.

2/ There were numerous rumors and much speculation that Zhdanov was murdered. This speculation was revived and given added impetus by the so-called Doctors' Plot of January 1953.

agriculture as a top-ranking trouble shooter or was he relegated to this field in disgrace? Was Zhdanov in fact responsible for the international communist expansionism of this period? Was there in fact a purge conducted by Malenkov after Zhdanov's death and after Malenkov was back in Stalin's good graces? Was there in fact a shift in emphasis in Soviet policy to the Far East following Zhdanov's death and during the period of Malenkov's rise?

THE POLITICAL ECLIPSE OF MALENKOV

The question of whether Zhdanov and Malenkov were political enemies depends a great deal on the answer to the question whether Malenkov really lost both responsibilities and prestige in the fall of 1946. The evidence for Malenkov's political eclipse is as follows:

1. In early October 1946, a source of the US Military Attache in Moscow reported that Malenkov had suffered some measure of disgrace, although he was unable to give the reasons for the alleged trouble. Although on 18 October it was announced that Malenkov had been "confirmed" as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, there was a rumor in Moscow that this constituted a demotion. This was given added credence on 24 October when the AP correspondent in Moscow received from the Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau an official biography of Malenkov. This biography omitted reference to Malenkov's "responsible work in the Central Committee," which is believed to have been done in his position on Stalin's personal secretariat; it omitted reference to the fact that Malenkov had been a Secretary of the Party for many years; and finally, it omitted reference to the fact that Malenkov had been an alternate member of the Politburo since 1939 and a full member since only the preceding March. The reporting officer noted that the biography had been initialed by a superior of the Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau, and he commented that such initialing was usually an indication that the item had been cleared with higher authority.

2. Apparently, Malenkov was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee and lost control over Party personnel matters during this period. He was given these responsibilities in 1939 and he retained them through the war; he was last identified in the Party Secretariat in the spring of 1946. Thereafter he was not listed among the Party Secretaries, nor was the designation "Secretary" given after his name on Soviet calendars, election listings, and so forth, until 20 July 1948.

On this date he signed a telegram of condolence to the leader of the Japanese Communist Party, Tokuda, as a Secretary of the Central Committee.

In 1947 and 1948, Zhdanov was clearly the leading Secretary of the Party; he signed decrees on behalf of the Central Committee, and he was identified as filling the leading role in the Secretariat. The only indication that Malenkov was still a figure of some power and still concerned with Party organizational questions was his appearance with Zhdanov at the founding conference of the Cominform in September 1947. At this conference, Malenkov gave the report on behalf of the Soviet Communist Party. It was a recital of the program of the Party since the war, the problems it faced, its educational, ideological and economic tasks, its problems of reconstruction, and so forth. It may be noted, however, that Malenkov very definitely was the junior partner at the Cominform Conference: Zhdanov gave a far-reaching analysis of the entire international situation and of Soviet policy as well, whereas Malenkov served simply as rapporteur for the Soviet Party.

As noted above, there is no evidence associating Malenkov with the Central Committee apparatus, nor with Party personnel matters, during this period. The supposition that Malenkov lost these responsibilities would be strengthened if some other person could be reliably identified as responsible for them. Tentative evidence suggests that A. A. Kuznetsov may have received these responsibilities. A. A. Kuznetsov was a former deputy to Zhdanov in the Leningrad Party organization, and became a member of the Secretariat and Orgburo in March 1946. A report of early 1949 stated that the Central Committee "had created a commission headed by Central Committee Secretary Kuznetsov, which adopted very stern measures in approving prospective Soviet Military Administration (in Germany) officials and workers."1/

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3. Malenkov, following his apparent eclipse, was subsequently identified by the Soviet press as "directly" engaged in agricultural work.

This requires a certain explanation of the agriculture problem existing at that time. During the war the Communist Party had relaxed a number of its harsher measures with regard to the peasantry and, as a result, the peasants had concentrated their efforts on private holdings at the expense of communal land and had disposed of the produce from these private holdings on the free market at high prices. Due to the destruction resulting from the war, the disruption of the kolkhoz system, and a severe drought and a poor harvest in 1946, the Government and Party found it necessary to restrict severely bread rations and the release of grains. However, because an unduly large proportion of agricultural produce was grown on private holdings and disposed of by the peasantry on the free market, the Government found it difficult to control the flow of grains and to effect a cut in bread rations. Due to the same factors, furthermore, there had been a disproportionate flow of money from the city to the countryside, and peasant savings had risen sharply. This served to strengthen the bargaining position of the peasantry vis-a-vis the Soviet Government and Party. (It may be noted that it was this situation which led to the extreme devaluation of the ruble in December 1947, which practically wiped out peasant savings.) Agriculture was thus the most critical problem facing the Soviet Government in the fall and winter of 1946-47. The possibility exists that Malenkov was moved into agriculture as a top-flight trouble shooter.

This possibility, however, does not appear to be supported by available evidence. Beginning in September 1946, the Government and Party began to issue a series of joint decrees designed to correct abuses of the kolkhoz charter and to meet the agriculture crisis. These decrees were signed by Stalin on behalf of the Government and by Zhdanov on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party. On 8 October 1946 a Council for Collective Farms Affairs of almost forty members was established. A. A. Andreev, a Politburo member, was designated Chairman of this council. Malenkov was not a member. In March 1947, a plenary session of the Central Committee was held to discuss the agricultural crisis and it was Andreev who presented the report. Finally, a plain-text message of November 1947, reporting on an agricultural problem, was jointly addressed to Malenkov at the Council of Ministers and to Zhdanov at the

Central Committee. Thus, although agriculture was indeed the key problem in late 1946 and 1947, it does not appear that Malenkov became the dominant policy-making figure, but rather he seems to have occupied an anomalous position.

4. There is, finally, the question of Malenkov's prestige throughout this period. In March 1946, the US Embassy reported that Malenkov "was acknowledged to be Stalin's principal adviser on internal political problems." Yet, by 7 November 1946, Malenkov's position had dropped in the Politburo listing and Zhdanov appeared to have taken his place in Stalin's favor. It is important to note that Malenkov was the only Politburo member whose status dropped significantly in the period from 1946 to 1948 and whose position rose measurably after Zhdanov's death. In the 1947 elections, Malenkov was not widely propagandized, and he was not one of the five principal "candidates". This relative obscurity prevailed through 1947 and the first half of 1948.

The evidence adduced above almost conclusively establishes that Malenkov's career suffered a very sharp set-back in 1946, involving a severe reduction in the scope of his duties and responsibilities and, therefore, in his power. What his personal relations with Stalin were cannot be said; it must be remembered that Malenkov did survive this critical period, and we can be sure that if Stalin had developed real dislike or distrust of Malenkov, the latter would have disappeared completely.

FURTHER INFORMATION RELATING TO MALENKOV'S POSITION IN THE HIERARCHY

In 1945 Malenkov was involved in many activities other than those relating to the Communist Party. These activities undoubtedly brought him into conflict with other Soviet leaders. There is attempted below a summary of information relating to these activities, in an effort to throw some light on Malenkov's fortunes during this period.

Soviet Intelligence Activities. In 1940 and 1941, Malenkov was the Politburo member responsible for personnel questions, including those of Soviet intelligence. He was also said to have been responsible for resolving jurisdictional disputes between the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, and the Military Intelligence apparatus. In connection with intelligence questions, the Chief of the GRU (Military Intelligence Directorate) at that time, F. I. Golikov, was said to have a direct telephone line to Malenkov's office. A similar

association is revealed in the information made available in the Gouzenko case. According to Gouzenko, Malenkov had been Chief of the Foreign Sector of the Central Committee apparatus, which was apparently responsible for the selection and supervision of Soviet personnel sent abroad.

It may be that Malenkov's political eclipse in the summer of 1946 was in some way associated with this responsibility. the then Minister of State Security Merkulov had been dismissed because of a breakdown in Soviet intelligence operations in North America towards the end of the war. The coincidence in time of Merkulov's dismissal and Malenkov's fall is striking; they occurred roughly within a two-month period in middle of 1946. Malenkov may have been compromised, both because of his responsibility for the loyalty of Soviet citizens abroad and also in connection with foreign intelligence. There was indeed a series of important incidents in this field in 1944 and 1945. Kravchenko, a high level Soviet official who had come to the US with the Soviet Purchasing Commission, defected; a Soviet Naval Lieutenant in Seattle was tried and acquitted of espionage by US courts; lastly, in September 1945 Gouzenko defected in Ottawa.

It was not until April and May of 1946 that, in the course of public disclosures and testimony, the full ramifications of the Gouzenko defection became known. This would correspond very closely with the replacement of Merkulov, which, according to available evidence, probably took place in late June or early July of 1946. The reverses listed above may have contributed to Malenkov's difficulties.

Soviet Policy on Germany. Malenkov became involved in foreign policy in connection with his chairmanship of the State Committee for Rehabilitation of Devastated Areas, to which he was appointed in August 1943. This body, called the Special Committee, later became the authority responsible for the policy of industrial dismantling in Soviet-occupied areas in Eastern Europe and possibly in the Far East.

The Special Committee was represented in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany by M. Z. Saburov, who had also been one of the Soviet economic advisors at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. There does indeed seem to have been some sort of policy difference in Moscow on the

problem of Germany, and it seems probable that this was in some way associated with the dismantling program.

The whole dismantling operation was very badly handled and a great deal of valuable property was destroyed or lost. The program also created hostility toward the Soviet Government among the people of Eastern Europe and Germany. In a 10 July 1946 foreign policy speech, Molotov announced that dismantling was to be discontinued and that Soviet policy in the future would support German industrialization. The actual dismantling of German industry appears to have dropped off in 1946. In 1946 and early 1947, a new form of economic control was developed, which involved Soviet ownership of controlling shares in industrial and commercial firms in Germany and in other non-Soviet areas. This new program appears first to have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade under Mikoyan. In mid-1947 the program was identified under a newly established Chief Administration for Soviet Properties Abroad (GUSIMZ), which is believed to have belonged nominally to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This administration was under the direction of Merkulov, who had been replaced in June 1946 as Minister of State Security.1/

It is noteworthy that Evgenii Varga, the ranking economic analyst for the Communist Party and Director of the Institute of World Politics and World Economics, had written a series of articles, beginning in 1943, regarding the necessity of rebuilding Soviet industry and economy with equipment and plants expropriated from the enemy powers. Varga himself was not on the Special Committee which handled dismantling; yet it seems likely that he had been, if not the moving spirit, at least the man who was providing theoretical propaganda justification for this policy. This series of articles is one of the indications that Varga was in some way closely associated with Malenkov in this period. The dismantling policy was terminated some time in 1946; it was in the summer of 1946 that Malenkov lost influence; and it was in May 1947 that Varga was brought up for criticism because of his theoretical analyses of the impact of the war on the capitalistic economic system.

1/ It is interesting to note, in this connection, that many of the Soviet-owned plants in Austria, Germany and Manchuria were turned back to the respective Satellite Governments in 1951 and 1952, which suggests not the dissolution but at least the reduction in scope of activities and influence of this Chief Administration. Merkulov himself moved from this administration to the Ministry of State Control in 1950, replacing the incumbent minister, Mekhlis.

there was conflict between the various Politburo figures over Soviet economic policy in Germany. the dismantling and removal of German industrial plants was intended both to prevent future German resurgence and to assist in Soviet reconstruction. This initial post-war policy was said to have been predicated on the estimate that the Soviet forces would not remain in occupation for a long period of time. Malenkov had been the leading proponent of this policy, but that he had met opposition from Mikoyan and the Soviet Military Administration, under Marshal Zhukov until early 1946.1/ Mikoyan allegedly favored the retention of German plant capacity in

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1/ It is not implied that the purported conflict between Malenkov and the SMA was at that time a factor in Zhukov's career. Zhukov's difficulties apparently originated in another quarter. Zhukov clashed with Vasili Stalin and Col. Gen. I. A. Serov. it was "well known" that Zhukov was "well known" that Zhukov was "a very difficult character" and "held a rather dim view of the MVD and MGB." Serov was Zhukov's deputy in the SMA, in overall charge of NKVD and NKGB activities. Zhukov reportedly "could not stand Serov." Serov, however, was a close friend of Vasili Stalin and Beria, and also was on very good terms with Malenkov and Stalin. Vasili Stalin "behaved very badly" when he was in Germany, and when adverse reports on him were sent back, Serov frequently defended him. When Vasili Stalin was sent back to Moscow, Serov allegedly again helped by writing a favorable report on him and an unfavorable one on Zhukov.

Zhukov, after his recall from Germany, was summoned before the Central Committee and disciplined for a number of delinquencies and acts of malfeasance. He was reassigned as Commander of the Odessa Military District and later as Commander of the Sverdlovsk Military District. Zhukov's assignment from March to June 1946 as Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces.)

Serov subsequently became First Deputy Minister of the MVD under S. N. Kruglov, and presumably remained in that position until Stalin's death. He was named a candidate member of the Central Committee in October 1952. His assignment subsequent to 7 March 1953 is not known.

Germany, in the interests of efficient production and a balanced East Germany economy capable of supporting the Soviet economy. Zhdanov became involved in the controversy, seeing it as a useful political weapon against Malenkov. Voznesensky then sided with Mikoyan and Zhdanov, in the interests of rational planning and accounting. alleged that Malenkov clashed with the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, which was aware of the profound antagonism the removal program was creating among the German populace and believed it was prejudicing Soviet occupation and political objectives in Germany.

The evidence already set forth partially supports the above report. We have already noted Varga's role in espousing the dismantling policy, the apparent association between Varga and Malenkov, In addition, there is the fact of the presence of M. Z. Saburov as plenipotentiary of the Special Committee in the Soviet Military Administration.2/ There is, further, the actual shift in Soviet economic policy in 1946 and early 1947, and the establishment of the nominal jurisdiction of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, under Mikoyan, over this economic policy.

It seems reasonable to suppose that Malenkov may also have met opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, i.e., Molotov. This supposition cannot be supported by available evidence.

The Varga Case. Under instructions from the Central Committee, in 1944 and 1945 Varga's institute produced an analysis of the impact of the war on the Western capitalist economy. The book was completed

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2/ Saburov was reported to be a strong supporter of Malenkov. He succeeded Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan in 1949, presented the Fifth Five Year Plan of the Party Congress in October 1952, and became a full member of the Party Presidium in March 1953.

about December 1945 and received fairly wide circulation, as indicated by several remarks made during the debate on the book to the effect that a number of Communist and progressive public figures of both the USSR and the Satellites had been "disoriented" by Varga's position. Sometime in very late 1946 or early 1947, it was decided to convoke a conference of economists to discuss the book. The debate was held in May 1947.

One of Varga's statements during this debate seems to present almost positive evidence that it was Zhdanov who inspired the debate and the criticism of Varga's position. Varga's statement is worth quoting in full: "The difference between the author and the critic among us in the scientific field is different than in the field of art. In the field of art a division of labor is to be observed; the artist paints a picture, the sculptor creates a statue, but the critic writes a criticism. We cannot have such a situation, in which one works and another only criticizes---I deny such a 'division' between those writing books and those criticizing them--but if such a 'division of labor' exists, then, although I am no longer a young person, and not very healthy, I want to remain, to the end of my life, in the camp of those who work and not in the camps of those who merely criticize." This statement, made barely ten months after Zhdanov's furious criticism of Soviet literary figures, and during the Party's new attack against "Art for Art sake" cannot but be considered to have been a very courageous statement. It also clearly indicates the quarters from which the criticism of Varga's book was emanating. Elsewhere during the debate, Varga's statements imply that the attack originated from doctrinaire members of the Party hierarchy.

Subsequent to this debate, Varga has had a career of ups and downs. Suffice it to say that he was not completely disgraced, and, while his Institute was subsequently broken up, he seemed to remain an important economist in the USSR. The Party decision on Varga and assessment of his position was revealed in Pravda in January 1948; it is interesting to review the conclusions: Firstly, Varga was adjudged to have ascribed too much independent power to the bourgeois states in economic planning, whether in war or in peace, and in particular to have misunderstood the nature of the Labor Government in the United Kingdom. (The debates of May 1947 indicated that this was apparently causing considerable controversy among Soviet economists and political analysts.) Secondly, he was accused of having separated political from economic problems; he had taken up only economic problems in his first book, and it was adjudged that this was not only erroneous but also harmful, since the two are inseparable. Thirdly, Varga was condemned for failing to permit the Party to point out the errors in his thinking, that is, for refusing to recant. It may be noted in passing that only one of these three criticisms was a substantive question which would have

a bearing on Soviet estimates of the situation in the Western world and on forecasts of future trends.

More interesting is the fact that there was a wide variety of views expressed by the various professional economists during the debate on the various theses that Varga had propounded. This may be taken to indicate that there was considerable uncertainty in the Soviet Union at that time regarding these questions. Moreover, since these questions were so intimately associated with policy, it may be inferred that there was, correspondingly, some degree of uncertainty in policy formulation. It is further interesting to note that several of the points discussed in the Varga debates were treated in Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism, published in 1952, and some of the formulations in Stalin's Economic Problems would appear to have been taken almost verbatim from several of the speeches made in these early debates.

The Varga debates were interpreted in the Western world as indications and, so to speak, as indices of the Soviet estimate regarding future economic trends in the West and the prospects of the Western powers. This is probably correct. However, the information given herein leads to the supposition that Varga's fate was also something of an index of the degree of predominance which Zhdanov had managed to obtain. It should again be noted in this connection that Zhdanov never did succeed in completely submerging Malenkov, and that, as is indicated by Varga's career, Zhdanov's influence was probably not so great that he could effect the complete disgrace of this man associated with Malenkov.

ZHDANOV AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Zhdanov's role in the formulation of Soviet policy during this period, with regard to the outside world in general and international Communism in particular, is a very complex and controversial problem. We are on unsure grounds because, since the 30's, international Communism has been closely intertwined with the foreign intelligence apparatus of the USSR, and this apparatus is of course largely shrouded in secrecy. Available data, however -- primarily that contained in published books and articles including, for example, Dedijer's biography of Tito, - permits some tentative suppositions and conclusions regarding this problem.

reported that control of the Czechoslovak Communist Party had been exercised by men working out of Malenkov's

1. After the dissolution of the Comintern, Zhdanov advocated the establishment of a new international Communist organization. In 1946, there was, reportedly, a divergence of views in the Politburo regarding the character of the new organization. Zhdanov advocated an organizational concept that would allow for specific differences in the methods to be applied in different foreign countries.

Comment: Dedijer, in the biography of Tito, noted that Tito advanced the proposal of a new international Communist organization in 1945, and that Tito and Stalin discussed the question in June 1946.

2. Zhdanov illustrated his position by the Yugoslav example. He publialy labelled Yugoslavia as the most advanced People's Democracy. Dimitrov, the world-known Comintern functionary, supported Zhdanov's views.

Comment: Zhdanov publicly supported the Yugoslav criticism of the other Communist Parties at the Cominform meeting in September 1947. With regard to Dimitrov, circumstantial evidence supports the contention that he supported Tito's position during Yugoslavia's conflict with Moscow.

3. disclosed in 1948 that Zhdanov disagreed with the tone of the resolution condemning Yugoslavia, and insisted that an "escape" clause giving the Yugoslavs an opportunity to recant be included. The "other wing" was for an immediate and complete break with Yugoslavia.

Comment: In Tito's biography it is claimed that Stalin and Molotov signed the original letter denouncing Yugoslavia. According to the Yugoslav-Soviet letters, Molotov had levelled at least one accusation against the Yugoslavs. Beria was responsible for at least some decisions regarding the provision of equipment and materials for Yugoslavia. It is possible that Beria was antagonistic to Yugoslavia because of Yugoslav charges regarding Soviet intelligence activities.

On the other hand, [redacted] Zhdanov wrote an article in January 1948 denouncing a speech of Dimitrov's favoring Balkan federation. Balkan federation was a project especially favored by Tito, and Tito and Dimitrov had had several discussions on the subject. [redacted] Zhdanov forced the break with Yugoslavia. [redacted]

Comment: None

5. Zhdanov was considered an "aristocrat of the Party" and one of the best brains in the Soviet hierarchy. However, he was said to be reckless.

Comment: [redacted] agree that Zhdanov was brilliant, arrogant and dynamic. [redacted] have reported rumors in Soviet circles that Zhdanov had attempted to pursue "an independent line."

6. Yugoslavia played the chief role in support of the Greek Civil War. [redacted] Greek General Markos had been "greatly influenced by the Yugoslav role and support."

Comment: Yugoslav support of the Greek Civil War is well known. Circumstantial evidence strongly supports the contention that Markos was associated with Tito.

The evidence clearly demonstrates that Zhdanov was responsible for international Communist affairs. This conclusion, taken in conjunction with reports [redacted] regarding Zhdanov's character and with the reported rumors regarding Zhdanov's "independent line," strongly supports the hypothesis that the militant international Communist policy of 1947 was indeed an "individual" policy advocated by Zhdanov.

Circumstantial evidence of another nature tends to give further weight to this hypothesis. Stalin, it is known, had little or no

respect for foreign Communists and foreign Communist Parties. He had long been mistrustful and suspicious of foreign Communists. Thus, if a broad, militant Communist policy was adopted, then the presumption must be that Stalin's mistrust and skepticism had been overcome by some advocate of such a policy. Zhdanov evidently was this advocate.

A militant and aggressive policy was in fact adopted. The Western Communist Parties were given the task of sabotaging the Marshall Plan: Zhdanov bluntly stated this in his September 1947 speech. In 1947 the Finnish Communist Party, for no apparent reason, adopted a disruptive strike program. The Greek Communists, given the challenge of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, revolted in the summer and fall of 1947 and proclaimed a Government in December of that year. The Czech Communists seized the Government in February 1948. It is easy to believe that Zhdanov's political fortunes depended upon the success of the militant policy. It succeeded only in Czechoslovakia, and this was a minor victory when compared with the reverses suffered.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of this analysis can be summarized as follows:

1. The broad hypothesis set forth is not refuted by available information. Certain sub-hypotheses are strongly supported by the weight of evidence. These specific points are:

2. It appears well established that Malenkov lost important positions and suffered a reduction in status from mid-1946 to early 1948.

3. Available evidence supports the contention that Malenkov's eclipse was directly related to Zhdanov's return to Moscow. Malenkov's most important position was lost to a longtime associate of Zhdanov. The hypothesis that Zhdanov and Malenkov clashed over control of the Soviet Communist Party appears plausible. Available evidence indicates that Malenkov probably clashed with other Politburo members also, and that he probably received little if any support from them in his difficulties.

4. It is highly probable that Zhdanov was responsible for the policy line of the foreign Communist Parties in this period, and that he was an advocate of a militant revolutionary policy. It is probable that Zhdanov's career was compromised by the failure of the French and Italian Communist Parties in 1947 and 1948, and by the intransigence and defection of Yugoslavia.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

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5 August 1953

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THE BALANCE OF POWER

August 1948 to October 1950

HR70-14
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TOP SECRET

THE BALANCE OF POWER: AUGUST 1948 TO OCTOBER 1950

Following the death of Andrei Zhdanov, Malenkov rapidly re-occupied a prominent position in the Soviet hierarchy and apparently was allowed to re-establish control over the Party apparatus by carrying out a purge of important Zhdanov adherents. In this process Nikolai Voznesensky, Chairman of Gosplan and a member of the Politburo since only February 1947, disappeared. There was no subsequent reference to him until December 1952, when an article published by M. A. Suslov attacked the so-called Voznesensky deviation.

Concurrently with the Party purge in February and March 1949, several changes were made in governmental appointments. Voznesensky's case has already been mentioned. In March 1949, Molotov, Bulganin and Mikoyan all surrendered their respective ministerial portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, and Foreign Trade.

Through this period - August 1948 to October 1950 - there were two significant changes in the order of listing of the Politburo members. First, Malenkov moved up to fourth position in Politburo listings in mid-1948 (after Molotov and Beria) and then moved to thrid position (after Molotov) in mid-1949. Second, Bulganin rose markedly in Politburo listings in late 1949, and A. A. Andreev dropped markedly at the same time. However, neither Andreev nor Bulganin were at that time - 1948 to 1950 - among the Big Five.

Despite the Party purge and the ministerial changes, however, the basic balance in the distribution of power among the top five members of the Politburo probably remained substantially unchanged.

Molotov, even though he experienced some reduction in prominence, held his post as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and presumably remained largely responsible for foreign affairs.

Malenkov, while resuming control over personnel matters and widening his interests to include a wide variety of problems, maintained his previous interest in agriculture.

Beria remained in charge of the security function, forced labor, atomic energy, and transport. A minor change in Beria's responsibilities occurred in February 1950 when timber industry matters were transferred to Pervukhin.

Kaganovich remained responsible for building materials, and also was Chief of the State Committee for Material-Technical Supply (Gossnab). This committee was responsible for the planning and allocation of material for the Soviet economy.

Mikoyan was in charge of the fish, meat, dairy and food industries, and presumably also retained responsibility for internal and foreign trade. He was identified in foreign trade matters in February 1950.

On the second level of the Politburo, however, a number of changes took place in the distribution of power:

Andreev retained his interest in agriculture and his post as Chairman of the Council for Collective Farm Affairs, but was publicly rebuked in a Pravda article of 19 February 1950 for pursuing an incorrect line on agricultural labor questions.

Voznesensky disappeared in March 1949, and was replaced as Chairman of Gosplan by M. Z. Saburov, a reported Malenkov adherent.

Khrushchev was transferred from the Ukrainian Party organization to replace G. M. Popov as All-Union Secretary and as Secretary of the important Moscow Oblast Committee. Khrushchev also became the Politburo spokesman on agricultural policy, following Andreev's humiliation.

Bulganin and Kosygin both apparently retained their responsibilities for national defense and light industry respectively; Suslov, not a Politburo member, became the leading Soviet functionary who most often represented the USSR at Satellite political ceremonies. Other newcomers to sub-Politburo level were Ponomarenko and Shkiryatov.

Aside from the political events mentioned in the above paragraphs, the chief events and developments of the period under review were the following:

1. The adoption by the USSR, sometime in late 1948, of a rearmaments program. This program was apparently scheduled for completion by 1952.

2. The withdrawal of the USSR from its exposed position in Europe, i.e., the liquidation of the Berlin blockade and the Greek Civil War.

3. The internal consolidation of the East European Satellites, and the initiation of programs calculated to integrate their economies with that of the USSR.

4. The triumph of the Chinese Communists on the mainland, and the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China in October 1949.

5. The attack on South Korea by the North Korean Government on 25 June 1950, the subsequent intervention of the UN, and the commitment of the Chinese Communist armies in October 1950.

MALENKOV'S RISE

The clearest indication of Malenkov's rise to prominence is found in the official listings of the Politburo members published from time to time. Prior to Zhdanov's death, Malenkov had usually occupied a position in the Politburo varying from fifth to ninth. In late 1948, however, he moved to the number four position, following Molotov (number two) and Beria (number three). Malenkov then changed places with Beria in early 1949, but shortly thereafter dropped again to number four position. He moved back to third position in mid-1949 and held it until the time of Stalin's death.

During this period, Malenkov's name again began to appear [redacted] Malenkov had reappeared as a Party Secretary in July 1948 and, from the time of Zhdanov's death on, joint decrees issued by the Government and the Central Committee were signed by Stalin for the Council of Ministers, and by Malenkov for the Central Committee of the Party.

On 7 November 1949, Malenkov delivered the speech on the anniversary of the Revolution, which in previous years had been given by Molotov. In December 1949, in a series of articles written by the various Politburo members on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday, Malenkov's article preceded all others, including even Molotov's, in both the Pravda and Bolshevik versions.

The same trend was also evident in the propaganda treatment accorded Malenkov. On the occasion of Malenkov's 50th birthday in January 1952, for example, a propaganda statement was made that Malenkov had been "a faithful pupil of Lenin," an outright fabrication, of course. All this culminated in the selection of Malenkov as the person to give the keynote speech on behalf of the Central Committee at the long overdue Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952.

COMMUNIST PARTY CHANGES OF 1949

A summary review of key Communist Party appointments between 1944 and 1952 demonstrates conclusively that a shift of some magnitude in the control of the Party took place in 1949. This apparently involved the removal of the so-called Zhdanov clique. Important changes took place in the All-Union Secretariat, the secretarial appointments in the Moscow and Leningrad City and Oblast organizations and in the Ukrainian organization, and in the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army.

Prior to 1949 there was a certain pattern of continuity in the appointments of First Secretaries in the Moscow and Leningrad Party organizations. In each case when a First Secretary was promoted to a position of greater influence (or, as in the case of Shcherbakov, who died in 1945)[1/] the second ranking man in the organization took over. When these shifts took place, there were no known significant upsets in the staffing of these Party organs. This clearly indicates continuity and stability in the political power structure through these changes.

In 1949, however, there was an abrupt change in this pattern and an abrupt end to the careers of A. A. Kuznetsov, All-Union Secretary, G. M. Popov, All-Union Secretary and Secretary of the Moscow City and Oblast organizations, and P. S. Popkov, Leningrad

1/ Shcherbakov had held, at the time of his death, the Moscow City and Oblast Secretaryship. He was also the Chief of the Army Political Administration, a Secretary of the Central Committee and an alternate member of the Politburo. Shcherbakov was Zhdanov's son-in law.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Oblast Secretary. Both A. A. Kuznetsov and P. S. Popkov utterly disappeared in early 1949.1/ Beginning in December 1949, G. M. Popov was demoted to a succession of third-order positions; he disappeared in 1951.2/ N. S. Khrushchev moved up from the Ukraine to replace G. M. Popov as Secretary of the Moscow Oblast organization and as a member of the All-Union Secretariat.3/ The pattern which had previously applied to Moscow and Leningrad held true in the Ukraine following Khrushchev's departure: the Second Secretary in the Ukraine, L. G. Melnikov, stepped into Khrushchev's former position, and thus continuity of political leadership was maintained there.

In Leningrad, the City and Oblast First Secretary positions were taken by a newcomer to Leningrad, V. N. Andrianov. Andrianov held both positions until June 1950, when he surrendered the City Secretaryship to F. R. Kozlov, following the precedent established in Moscow when Khrushchev was moved in there. Both the Moscow and Leningrad Party organizations were completely shaken up following the displacement of the incumbent Secretaries and the introduction of the "outsiders" to directing positions.

The Chief Political Administration of the Army had been held during the war by Shcherbakov. Upon his death in May 1945, the position was taken by Colonel General Shikin, who held it until early 1949. In 1949, Colonel General F. F. Kuznetsov, who had been the Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate since 1945, took over this position and held it, so far as is known, through 1952.

1/ [redacted] Party and other figures were arrested in early 1949. [redacted] January and February 1949 appeared to be months of unusual police activity.

2/ G. M. Popov reappeared in June 1953, upon his appointment as Ambassador to Poland.

3/ This constituted another departure from the previous pattern. Khrushchev did not assume both the Moscow City and Oblast Secretaryships, but rather, a Rumyantsov was appointed to Moscow City position some months later. This point does not affect the argument.

He was last identified in this position in September 1952.1/

The coincidence of all these changes occurring in 1949 arouses interest in the political careers and connections of the persons affected. Of the persons concerned --- A. A. Kuznetsov, P. S. Popkov, Col. Gen. Shikin and G. M. Popov --- all have direct or secondary connections with Andrei Zhdanov:

A. A. Kuznetsov succeeded Zhdanov as Secretary in the Leningrad Oblast organization, having held positions in Leningrad since at least 1940. (For example, he was Secretary of the City Committee in 1940 and 1943.)

P. S. Popkov succeeded Kuznetsov in both the City and Oblast positions, after having been Chairman of the Leningrad Executive Committee since 1941.

Colonel General Shikin had been Political Officer on the Leningrad Front during the war and succeeded Shcherbakov in the Army Political Administration.

G. M. Popov, who succeeded Shcherbakov in the Moscow Party positions, was, along with Molotov, A. A. Kuznetsov and Marshal Govorov, a speaker at Zhdanov's funeral in September 1948.

G. M. Popov and A. A. Kuznetsov both became members of the Orgburo and All-Union Secretariat in March of 1946, and remained there throughout Zhdanov's tenure as First Secretary.

N. A. Voznesensky, who disappeared in March 1949, was also associated with Zhdanov. He first attained a prominent position in 1935 as Chairman of the Leningrad City Planning Commission, and later moved up to become the Chief of Gosplan. He was made a member of the Politburo in February 1947, at the height of Zhdanov's eminence. Further aspects of the Voznesensky case will be discussed in connection with the governmental changes of March 1949.

1/ On 16 July 1953, Colonel General A. S. Zheltov was identified as Chief of the Political Administration of the newly organized Ministry of Defense. F. F. Kuznetsov appeared in an obituary on 22 July 1953, and probably has remained as Chief of the Army Political Administration.

GOVERNMENT CHANGES IN 1949

In March, Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov, Minister of Foreign Trade Mikoyan and Minister of War Bulganin relinquished their direct control of ministries. They remained as Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, which still left them in the governmental picture, and, of course, they retained their Politburo positions. Voznesensky, however, was relieved of his positions as Chairman of Gosplan and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers at this time. Subsequently, he was not present at the various appearances of the Politburo, and he was not thereafter listed among the Politburo members. Of the various changes that took place in 1949, those affecting Molotov and Voznesensky are the most important and interesting.

Molotov had been Stalin's chief lieutenant in the Soviet governmental apparatus since the late twenties. He had been Prime Minister, i.e., Chairman of the Council of People's Commissariats, in the 1930's. In 1939, Stalin took over leadership of the Government as Prime Minister, and Molotov became Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position he held through and after the war.

Molotov may have been involved in a conflict concerning Soviet policy toward the Marshall Plan. There is information indicating disparate views in Moscow regarding the Marshall Plan and suggesting that Molotov may have been instrumental in the Soviet decision to oppose the plan.

It is worth noting that both Poland and Czechoslovakia initially accepted invitations to attend the July conference on the Marshall Plan, and later suddenly withdrew their acceptances. According to the published transcript of the Moscow discussions which culminated in order to Czechoslovakia to withdraw from the July conference, Stalin stated that it had become evident, upon receipt of information from Paris, that the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to aid the formation of a Western bloc and to isolate the Soviet Union. Stalin then told the Czechs that their country's participation in the Marshall Plan would be an unfriendly act against the USSR. Molotov had been the Soviet representative at the preliminary discussion on the Marshall Plan, held in Paris in June 1947.

Molotov's failure to deliver the annual 7 November anniversary speech in 1949 may be one indication that he had lost some degree of influence. At the end of the war, Molotov took over from Stalin the honor of delivering this speech; he gave it in 1945, 1947 and 1948.1/ Thereafter the honor was rotated among younger Politburo members, Malenkov giving it in 1949.2/ It is quite possible, of course, that Molotov -- aging and, ill -- was no longer capable of handling this speech.3/ Nevertheless, his withdrawal from public prominence was evident and was commented upon by a number of sources, including Russian defectors.

However, in spite of having relinquished direct control of Foreign Affairs, Molotov remained as First Deputy Chairman to Stalin on the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, he also appeared to have suffered no change in formal political status, since he was listed first after Stalin in all Politburo listings up until Stalin's death. A possible explanation of this is suggested by speculation current in 1949 to the effect that Molotov was being relieved of the day-to-day administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that he could concentrate on broad policy-planning functions -- in particular, relations with the Chinese Communists, who at that time were beginning to show signs that they would take over the mainland that year.

This speculation is supported by information put out through an informal Soviet channel. In April 1949, Madame Kollontai, who had been former Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm and who had occasionally been used by the Soviet Government to contact foreign embassies, called in the Swedish Ambassador in an obvious effort to comment on the various governmental changes that had taken place the month before. Among other things, she said that Molotov had been relieved of responsibility for day-to-day problems in order to concentrate on

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1/ Zhdanov delivered the speech in 1946.

2/ At the 7 November 1949 parade, Molotov was present on the reviewing stand, but departed some two-and-a-half hours before the demonstrations were over. Malenkov stood next to Molotov, but, according to the US Military Attache, noticeably shunned and turned his back on him.

3/ reported that Molotov has heart, stomach and liver trouble, and that he was ill in 1948 and 1949. He failed to appear with the Politburo on two occasions in mid-1949. He frequently has been reported resting at Karlovy Vary, in Czechoslovakia.

"essential and fundamental problems," in particular relations with Communist China. She added that both Molotov and Mikoyan were quite busy in connection with the forthcoming Party Congress (which, it may be noted, did not take place until October 1952).

Furthermore, Molotov was identified in matters related to foreign policy after his release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though no longer Foreign Minister of the USSR, he attended a conference of Foreign Ministers of the East European Satellites, held in Prague in late October 1950. The same "VIP" plane that carried the Soviet delegation to Prague had earlier been noted in the Soviet Far East (in the period from 2 to 9 October), suggesting that Molotov may have been in the Far East at that time.1/

THE VOZNESENSKY CASE

The problem of explaining Voznesensky's disappearance in 1949 has been complicated further by the appearance of his name in December 1952 and in January-February 1953 in connection with the so-called "Voznesensky deviation," i.e., his alleged deviation from Stalin's views on Marxism and the economic laws of socialism. Voznesensky, as we have already had occasion to note, first achieved prominence as Chairman of the City Planning Commission in Leningrad in 1935. Subsequently, he went to Moscow to head the State Planning Commission and during the war he served on the State Defense Committee, the all-powerful "war cabinet". He was not one of the original members of the committee, having joined it on 4 February 1943. In March 1949, he disappeared from sight and his name was not mentioned in the Soviet press until the December 1952 attack on his views by M. A. Suslov in Pravda.

Three principal hypotheses have been advanced to explain Voznesensky's political demise. The first hypothesis is that Voznesensky was associated with the so-called Zhdanov clique in Moscow, in opposition to Malenkov, and that following Zhdanov's death in 1948 and his apparent disgrace, Voznesensky was purged. The second hypothesis is that Voznesensky had made many mistakes in Gosplan and, according to some sources, had badly advised Stalin and the other leaders in regard to the Soviet economic situation and capabilities. The third hypothesis is that Voznesensky opposed Stalin either on ideological questions regarding the nature of the economic problems and the laws

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1/ [redacted]

and policies of a Socialist state or on practical policy matters affecting the Soviet economy and the planning function.

The first hypothesis, that Voznesensky was associated with the Zhdanov group, is supported by the circumstancial evidence of Voznesensky's career -- and particularly by the fact that his disappearance was concurrent with a series of other important political shifts of early 1949, which in turn clearly indicated the unseating of a powerful political group. During the war, [redacted] that Voznesensky was a supporter of Malenkov, later reports stated that he switched sides when Zhdanov returned to Moscow and took over control of the Soviet Communist Party.

[redacted] Saburov, it will be remembered, took part in the dismantling of German industry, as the Berlin representative of the Special Committee in Moscow headed by Malenkov. Saburov replaced Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan in March 1949 and held this position until Stalin's death. For many years he had been associated with Gosplan, moving in and out of it, as a Deputy Chairman, several times. Not all aspects of Saburov's history are clear and it is impossible to say just what his relations with Voznesensky were. At the most, his history tends to support this first hypothesis.

There is considerable evidence to support the second hypothesis that Voznesensky had made serious mistakes in Gosplan and had perhaps presented an incorrectly optimistic picture of the Soviet economy. [redacted] the Soviet Government had reformulated its economic plans and tightened its plan controls, and that there had been changes in the Soviet planning structure in late 1948 and early 1949. These changes affected the organizational aspects of the planning function; certain of them had actually begun in January 1948. In late 1948, the State Statistical Commission was removed from the jurisdiction of Gosplan and placed under the Council of Ministers. In the beginning of 1949, the wholesale price structure was reformed: the prices on producers goods were increased and a movement was begun to abolish subsidies for these industries. This economy drive was accompanied by the imposition of stricter controls over enterprises and their costs and inventories; the plan fulfillment report published in April 1949 stated that "new additional plant capacity has come to light," resulting in increased plan targets for the first quarter of 1949.

Madame Kollontai, in her talk with the Swedish Ambassador, said that Voznesensky had been removed because he was "no executive and Gosplan had made many mistakes under his administration." A Soviet engineer who defected from the USSR in 1949, reported hearing that

Voznesensky had been removed because he had attempted to deceive Stalin regarding the degree of the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan. Finally, in late 1948 and early 1949, just preceding Voznesensky's disappearance, Soviet propaganda media embarked on a very short-lived campaign for the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan in four years. The "five year plan in four years" theme was first voiced by Molotov in the 7 November 1948 anniversary speech. This was followed by intensive propaganda on this theme through November, December and up until the publication of a Gosplan report in mid-January 1949. In the 21 January 1949 speech on the anniversary of Lenin's death, however, the theme was not mentioned and, while there were occasional references to it in subsequent months, for all practical purposes it had disappeared from Soviet propaganda. The cessation of this propaganda in mid-January, taken with the above-mentioned indications of organizational and economic readjustment in 1948, tends to support the hypothesis that there had been serious mistakes in planning and perhaps a seriously distorted picture of the state of the economy at the top level of the Government.

The third hypothesis -- that Voznesensky was disgraced because he opposed Stalin either on theoretical questions or on practical policy decisions -- was given a great deal of additional weight by the December 1952 disclosures, which have already been noted. One version of this hypothesis is that Voznesensky opposed the inauguration of a limited rearmament program by the USSR in the latter half of 1948 and instead favored the further development of consumer goods industries. This hypothesis will be discussed in two parts, the first devoted to its theoretical and ideological aspects, and the second to the practical policy problem.

The so-called "Voznesensky deviation" is drawn from his book, The War Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, which was published in 1947 and which received a Stalin prize in May 1948. According to this book, planning is an economic law of socialism and one of the chief characteristics differentiating the socialist from the capitalist system. Capitalism, in Communist dogma, is unable to plan and is characterized by a veritable anarchy of competing monopolistic interests.[1] In a sense, the assertion that planning is an "economic law" of socialism is a natural one for economic planners to hold; Voznesensky appears to have been the chief exponent of this point of view. A series of articles by members of Gosplan, published

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1/ The question whether or not it is possible for a capitalist government to plan had been one of the major issues in the Varga dispute.

in journals, monographs and books, likewise explicitly stated that "planning is an economic law of Socialism."

This thesis was categorically denounced by Stalin in his Economic Problems of Socialism, written in February 1952 as commentary on a conference of economists held in November 1951, but not published until October 1952. Stalin also denounced a number of other views, including the view that "the proportional development of the economy" was an economic law of socialism and the view that the Socialist state was able "to do anything." Stalin ascribed this latter view to numerous young and inexperienced Communists who had been "dazzled" by the accomplishments of the USSR. In an article written in December 1952, Suslov attacked P. Fedoseev for writing articles on Stalin's Economic Problems without admitting that he, Fedoseev, had himself been one of the persons who had held the erroneous points of view. In his article, Suslov quoted the text of a Central Committee decree issued in July 1949 which removed several leading figures from the editorial board of Bolshevik, the theoretical Communist Party journal, for disseminating Voznesensky's views and for "praising his book to the skies."

The 1949 decree also mentioned D. T. Shepilov, who at that time was Chief of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee apparatus (Agitprop). Shepilov subsequently lost his job in Agitprop, probably as a result of this decree. He too had been criticized, among other things, for "praising Voznesensky's book to the skies" and recommending it to the Party apparatus for study.

The hypothesis that Voznesensky was removed for ideological deviation and heresy and for developing points of view contrary to Stalin's appears to be unfounded. It is true that Voznesensky had argued that planning is the economic law of socialism and that the principle of "the proportional development of the economy" is another economic law of socialism. There is no evidence, however, to support the contention that these views were critical theoretical issues in late 1948 or early 1949. These "heresies" were expounded, for example, in a book written in 1946 by A. Kursky, a prominent economic theorist of Gosplan. A revised version of Kursky's book published in 1949 was changed only to the extent that it was brought up to date by use of contemporary examples. Kursky's contention that planning is an economic law of socialism was not expurgated. As one study of the development of economic theory in the USSR has pointed out: "Voznesensky's personal fortunes do not appear to have affected the general climate of opinion." The study pointed out, for example, that on 8 October 1949, six months after Voznesensky's fall, Pravda carried an editorial eulogizing the power of planning and

minimizing the so-called "objective" factors in the development of the Soviet economy. The editorial went on to say that Soviet man had become master of his fate and that this was the greatest achievement of the revolution and Socialism.1/ The lines of thought which supposedly represent the Voznesensky deviation continued to appear in Soviet theoretical journals and in various propaganda articles through 1951 and into 1952. As late as issue No. 4 of Voprosi Ekonomiki (April 1952) the "erroneous" doctrine is expounded.

It is extremely difficult to believe that if Voznesensky had been removed for theoretical, ideological deviation in 1949, a directive would not have been issued at that time which would have proscribed these views.2/ In other words, it appears that the deviation of which Voznesensky was accused was something manufactured in 1952, or late 1951, rather than in 1949 or 1948. This itself is a fact of considerable significance and the problem will be taken up subsequently.

There is very little evidence to either support or refute the hypothesis that Voznesensky opposed Stalin or others on questions of practical policy regarding the Soviet economy and, in particular, regarding rearmament. It is perhaps unreasonable to suppose that Voznesensky would have opposed the necessity for rearmament. There is no reason to believe that he would have arrogated to himself the problem of evaluating the intentions of foreign governments, in particular of the US. Rearmament began in 1948, probably nine months before Voznesensky disappeared; it is possible that he became involved in controversy regarding the manner in which this program should be carried out. It is also possible to read into his book an heretical point of view on agriculture (e.g., praise of the war-time system), but there is no evidence that Voznesensky was involved in such a controversy. The agriculture controversy did not

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1/ Soviet Studies, April 1953, "A Political Economy in the Making", J. Miller.

2/ The decree of July 1949 reproving Bolshevik and Agitprop does not meet this test. In this decree, praise of Voznesensky's book was only one of the many "shortcomings" critized; the reason given was that this praise was unjustified. The book itself was not denounced. Suslov's article in December 1952, on the other hand, described Voznesensky's views as "un-Marxist", while discussions in January 1953 said that they were "anti-Marxist". Thus, the evolution of a "deviation".

the end of 1951 or early 1952. reported that the Russians intended to have their fighter units completely re-equipped with jet aircraft by 1951. An independent source commenting on Soviet military developments reported that he had heard important Russians speaking quite openly in 1948 of the prospects of another war and that the USSR was to be completely prepared by the end of 1951. A third reporting on a conference which Stalin had held with Satellite leaders in September 1948 at Sochi, said that one of the chief purposes of the conference was to plan for the consolidation and integration of the Satellite economies with the Soviet economy. In addition he reported that Stalin had assigned Czechoslovakia the task of completely transforming its economy to heavy industry in order to contribute to the military potential of the USSR, and that this program was to be completed in three and a half years. This would place the target date in the spring of 1952. This supposition on the target date of the program is supported by the completion of a number of projects and by the appearance of substantial amounts of new model equipment in 1951 and 1952.

There are a few other indications suggesting that, in 1948, Soviet leaders became more concerned over the possibility of war with the West. In October 1948 orders were given to develop a stay-behind network in Germany, in the event that the Soviet Army vacated Germany. a ministerial decree was issued in 1948, which criticized the operation of Ministry of State Security (MGB) personnel for shortcomings in security administration. This decree reportedly charged security officers with professional laxity and lack of discipline, and called for "reconstruction" of State Security operations "aimed at the imperialistic intelligence." According to this report, all foreigners in the USSR were to be placed under close observation.

On the other hand, available evidence does not indicate that the rearmament program was so great that all other aspects of economic development were subordinated to it. The major emphasis of the Soviet economy remained on heavy industrial development, which was long-range in nature. Thus the possibility exists that the rearmament program was little more than one for re-equipment of the Soviet armed forces with modern weapons. Bulganin, speaking on the thirtieth anniversary of the Red Army on 23 February 1948, said that

the army had completed its conversion to a peace-time basis, and was beginning to re-equip itself with the latest weapons.

At any rate, while the exact character and scope of the Soviet rearmament effort remains an unsolved problem, there is no reason to presume that it was a highly controversial issue within the Kremlin.

THE AGRICULTURAL CONTROVERSY

After Voznesensky's ouster, the only striking manifestation of possible dissension within the Politburo was the criticism levied against A. A. Andreev, on agricultural matters, by Pravda on 19 February 1950. It may be recalled that Andreev, Commissar for Agriculture during the war, was made Chairman of the Council for Collective Farm Affairs in October 1946. He apparently remained the Politburo spokesman on agricultural matters, even after Malenkov's entry into agricultural problems in 1947.

The Pravda article, entitled "Against Distortions in Collective Farm Labor Organization," was an attack on the so-called "link" or "team" system of collective farming, as opposed to the "brigade" system. The practice denounced was that of parcelling out parts of a collective farm to small teams, or sub-groups, of collective farmers. The team system had been endorsed by the Party since at least 1939, and had been reaffirmed in decrees of 1947 and 1948. The Pravda article took exception to the indiscriminate application of this system to grain farming and to areas where the Kolkhozes were supplied with adequate agricultural machinery. It was argued that the system precluded the effective utilization of agricultural machinery and made overall control of the farmers impossible.

The article went on to say that "the incorrect views expressed in this matter by Comrade A. A. Andreev cannot be overlooked." It then proceeded to document the history of Andreev's incorrect views from 1939 to 1949. The author of the article is unknown.1/

Following the attack on Andreev and his subsequent recantation, which appeared in Pravda on 25 February 1950, a movement was begun by N. S. Khrushchev, as Chairman of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee, to enlarge the collective farms in the Moscow Oblast by merging or

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1/ Stylistic characteristics of the article tentatively suggest authorship by Khrushchev.

amalgamating the small farms. Khrushchev outlined this new policy in Pravda on 25 April 1950. Although some observers suggested that this was an experimental program applied only in Moscow Oblast, Khrushchev revealed in a December 1950 speech that a Central Committee decree on kolkhoz amalgamation had been issued, and implied that the policy was being implemented throughout the USSR. [redacted] indicated that the program was already underway there.

The open censure of A. A. Andreev for his "incorrect" policy probably represented more than an effort to provide a scapegoat for a change in policy: such public censures of Politburo figures are quite rare, and there are numerous cases of dramatic reversals in Soviet policy with no effort made to provide a scapegoat; such changes are frequently justified on the grounds that "new conditions" require the change, while in many cases there will be complete denial that any change has been effected at all.

Andreev's humiliation would appear, therefore, to reflect fundamental political controversy, and presumably it signalized the temporary triumph of one political faction over an opposing one. Thus, after Andreev's censure, Khrushchev became the top-level spokesman for agriculture, even though Andreev remained Chairman of the Council for Collective Farms Affairs.1/

The further development of the agricultural controversy takes us beyond 1950. The problem will be considered further in the CAESAR Report covering the period from October 1950 to December 1952.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE KOREAN WAR

A distinct change in Soviet foreign policy took place in 1949, involving a shift in Soviet effort and attention from Western Europe to the Far East. This shift coincided with the victory of the Chinese Communists on the mainland. In Europe, the Berlin blockade and the Greek Civil War were brought to an end in 1949, and from then on, Soviet diplomatic activity in Europe was negligible, entailing only a few sporadic propagandistic gestures. In the East European

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1/ Agriculture was not a new field of activity for Khrushchev. He was assigned to the Ukraine in 1938; in 1939, according to available records, he began writing on agricultural problems and, subsequently, he became known as an agricultural specialist.

Satellites the degree of Soviet control was increased, opposition elements were severely repressed, and efforts were begun to integrate the Satellite economies with that of the USSR.

Some observers attribute this foreign policy shift to the disappearance of Zhdanov's influence and the rise of Malenkov. Malenkov, it is said, saw an opportunity for major international successes in the Far East, whereas Zhdanov and Molotov reportedly had ignored the Far East and concentrated their attention on Europe.

For example, Dedijer's biography of Tito alleges that Stalin admitted, at a February 1948 conference, that he and the other Soviet leaders had underestimated the future prospects of the Chinese Communist revolution. In the summer of 1948, Stalin signed a condolence telegram to Togliatti, whereas it was Malenkov who signed a similar telegram in July 1948 to the Secretary General of the Japanese Communist Party, Tokuda.

The existence of such a foreign policy controversy is substantiated only by fragmentary indications of this kind. There is no reliable intelligence on this question, and the shift in Soviet policy which did in fact occur was clearly as much a result of circumstances as of anything else: The Berlin blockade had not only been a failure, but had also been a strong irritant to the West and had created a possibly explosive situation. The conclusion of the Greek Civil War was simply a matter of time after Yugoslavia withdrew its support. The militant Communist policy in France and Italy had failed. In the Far East, however, new possibilities appeared as the Chinese Communists neared final success.

Soviet Politburo members who regularly appeared at Chinese Communist parties and receptions from 1949 on were Molotov, Mikoyan and Bulganin. It will be remembered that Madame Kollontai specifically mentioned Chinese Communist affairs in discussing Molotov; further, Molotov was tentatively identified in the Far East in early August and in early October 1950.

The Soviet Ambassador to China from February 1948 to June 1952 was N. V. Roshchin.1/ The Soviet Political Representative in Japan,

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1/ Roshchin was renamed Ambassador to the Chinese Peoples Republic after relations with the Nationalist Government were severed in October 1949. Roshchin was replaced as Ambassador to China in June 1952 by A. S. Panyushkin, who had formerly been Ambassador to the United States. Roshchin was identified on 7 October 1952 as Chief of the Southeast Asia Division of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Derevyanko, was assigned to this post in 1946 and remained there until May 1950. The Soviet representative in Pyongyang, Colonel General T. F. Shtykov, had been the Chief of the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission on Korea and Commander of Soviet Forces in Korea from 1946 until 1948, at which time he was designated Ambassador to the North Korean Government.1/ Shtykov presumably remained Soviet Ambassador to Korea until August 1951; at that time a new Ambassador, V. N. Razuvaev, was identified.

The above data would appear to establish that there was no change in the Kremlin in late 1948 or early 1949, in the persons responsible for Far Eastern affairs. This conclusion tends to discount the hypothesis that there had been important policy differences relating to the Far East and that the shift in Soviet attention to the Far East was a result of Malenkov's rise.

The new expansive policy in the Far East culminated in the North Korean invasion of South Korea. There is little reason to believe that the proposal for the invasion would have provoked violent controversy in the Kremlin. There were sound military reasons for the Soviet leaders to desire to control all of Korea. (The same military considerations apply equally well to the Chinese Communists.) Furthermore, there is convincing circumstantial evidence that the Soviet leaders did not expect UN intervention in Korea; all evidence would appear to suggest that they expected the Korean invasion to be a short, fast campaign which would result in the consolidation of the entire peninsula under Soviet control.

[redacted] Numerous press rumors and reports from [redacted] placed Molotov in Peiping in late July or early August 1950. Then in early October 1950, just before the Chinese

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1/ Shtykov may well have been a member of Zhdanov's so-called Leningrad clique. He had been a Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Committee in 1939; during the war he was a member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front and also a Political Officer there, presumably under Colonel General Shikin. In 1945 he was identified as a member of the Military Council of the First Far Eastern Front.

Communist intervention in Korea, he was again tentatively identified in the Soviet Far East.

Despite the evidence suggesting Molotov's presence at these presumed policy conferences in the Far East, there are no grounds for concluding that Molotov himself was the primary sponsor of the North Korean attack. No one person or group of persons can be so identified. Moreover, despite the obvious reverse suffered by the USSR in the Korean development, and despite the obvious possible ramifications of these developments, no readjustments or other changes were noted in the Soviet hierarchy. It thus appears that nobody on the Politburo level was held immediately responsible or made a scapegoat for the reverses.

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21 August 1953

INDECISION AND STRESS

1950-1952

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INDECISION AND STRESS: 1950-1952

Following the failure of the North Korean attack on South Korea and the failure of the Chinese Communists to drive UN forces from Korea, Soviet leaders grew increasingly concerned about US rearmament and US-inspired integration of Western defense efforts. They apparently became particularly concerned about the establishment of US bases in various peripheral areas of the USSR. In spite of this, Soviet policy remained sterile and provocative. No new policy formulas were developed to meet the new situation. There is reason to believe that, as the months passed, this problem became more and more critical and controversy developed over Stalin's continuing inflexible line in foreign affairs.

Concurrently, the critical international situation apparently complicated Soviet internal planning problems. Revisions in the draft Five Year Plan and subsequent efforts to re-draft the plan in 1950 and 1951 probably reflected top level indecision regarding overall Soviet policy in this new situation and possibly conflict among the top Soviet leaders.

Meanwhile, domestic controversy on Soviet agricultural policy broke into the open in March 1951. There is reason to believe that Politburo member Khrushchev attempted to inaugurate a drastic change in agricultural policy, and that this program was opposed by one or more Politburo members. Speculatively, it is suggested that Malenkov backed Khrushchev, but only to a point, while Beria was the leading figure in opposition.

In August 1951, the replacement of V. S. Abakumov by S. D. Ignatiev as Chief of the MGB probably removed the MGB from Beria's area of responsibility, representing the first major upset in the power balance that had existed among the Politburo members since Zhdanov's death. Judging from the secrecy cloaking this shift and from a statement published in September 1952, it is believed that the issue involved was that of Party control over the MGB.

Later, in Soviet Georgia, a series of purges began which eliminated men who had held positions of influence there for many years. It is believed that this shake-up reflected adversely on Beria, who had retained overlordship in Georgian affairs since his departure from Georgia in 1938. Opinions differ as to whether Malenkov, or Stalin himself, initiated these purges.

In February 1952, Stalin began the series of letters, published in October 1952 as The Economic Problems of Socialism, which constituted both ideological pronouncements and observations on current problems. Several analysts have interpreted the portions dealing with current problems as revealing significant controversy within Stalin's immediate entourage on fundamental issues, notably on the foreign policy question. The immediate challenge to Stalin's inflexible and provocative foreign policy was overruled but subsequent developments suggest that the basic conflict was not resolved. The decision to proceed full-speed with the Sovietization of Eastern Germany (evidently dating from June 1952) indicated a further hardening of Soviet foreign policy, for it necessarily involved rejection of any possibility of negotiation on Germany.

In early 1952, Soviet leaders again ordered the drafting of a five-year plan. This order appeared to reveal that definite decisions regarding both foreign and domestic policy had been taken. There were indications of controversy regarding the plan; the decisions taken did not appear to resolve the fundamental questions that are presumed to have existed.

By at least June 1952, Stalin himself began to manifest an unusually high level of personal activity. In July, he held an interview with an Italian fellow-traveller, Pietro Nenni, unusual in that Nenni did not seek the interview and it was suggested by Soviet officials. Later, Stalin began to meet foreigners more frequently than he had done at any time since the war. He apparently did not take his regular vacation at Sochi in the fall, for he appeared at Sino-Soviet treaty ceremonies in September, the Party Congress in October and the anniversary ceremonies on 7 November.

This unusually high level of personal activity manifested by Stalin continued until his very death. In February 1953, for example, he held three interview with foreigners, two of these with ambassadors.

Sometime in mid-1952, Soviet leaders decided to convoke the 19th Party Congress. The announcement was made on 20 August, and the Congress was scheduled to begin on 5 October. The brief period between the announcement and the opening date of the conference, as well as the apparent haste evidenced in the organization of the various Republic congresses preliminary to the All-Union Congress, suggested a relatively sudden decision. The Congress itself was apparently dominated by Malenkov: The principal speeches of the Congress

were delivered by Malenkov and by two men who are believed to have been associates or proteges at that time, Khrushchev and Saburov. Changes in Party organization and Central Committee membership which were effected at the Congress appeared to work to Malenkov's advantage; furthermore, several of Beria's important associates either disappeared or were reduced from full to alternate membership on the Central Committee.

In the period from the October Party Congress to Stalin's death, a series of events took place which appeared to reflect high political tension, behind-the-scenes maneuvering and the beginning of rapid personnel changes in important posts. These events, along with the ominous Doctors' Plot announcement, appear to indicate that a political crisis had finally developed.

In addition to the above, there were indications of changes in the relationships and responsibilities of the top Presidium figures. Foremost, of course, was the increasing prominence accorded Malenkov. Ambassador Kennan reported in June 1952 that the "bets were running toward Malenkov," indicating that Soviet officials recognized his increasing stature. Other changes took place, however, which remain obscure and unexplained.

1. In December 1952, there was fragmentary evidence [redacted] that agricultural reports were being sent to Beria; this responsibility had previously been Malenkov's.

2. In February 1953, I. G. Kabanov was identified as Chief of Gossnab which, as late as November 1951 and possibly May 1952, had been headed by Kaganovich.

3. In February 1953, [redacted] Molotov as responsible for transport matters; Beria had previously held overall responsibility in this field. The timing of this shift is unknown, although as early as August 1951 [redacted] suggesting that Molotov was concerned with rail transport.

FOREIGN POLICY: STALEMATE AND FRUSTRATION

With the collapse of the North Korean Army in September 1950, the Soviet leaders were faced with the dilemma of either losing all of Korea or of attempting to salvage the situation by allowing or persuading the Chinese Communists to enter the conflict. The latter course was chosen. In spite of their initial successes, however, the Chinese Communists were unable to drive UN forces out of Korea.

Meanwhile, the Korean attack and the subsequent Chinese Communist intervention had provoked the US into an extensive rearmament program, had further stimulated US efforts to strengthen Western Europe's military forces, and had accelerated the NATO base program in Europe and Africa.

The immediate Soviet reaction to these developments was one of alarm, rage and frustration. This was exemplified in Pospelov's 21 January 1951 speech, which touched off what later was to be known as the Hate-America campaign. The US Embassy in Moscow noted that this speech marked a shift in propaganda from the theme of the inevitability of capitalism's economic collapse to that of its defeat through war. The embassy further noted that this speech carried no assurances that the USSR could finally win without war or that the Soviet peoples would escape involvement. Rage and frustration were also evident in Stalin's 16 February 1951 interview with a Pravda correspondent, in which he repeatedly and bluntly called Clement Attlee, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, a liar, and gave no hint of diplomatic negotiations or compromise. Stalin declared that peace could be preserved only if "peace-loving peoples" of Western countries would take its preservation into their own hands -- against the policy of their reactionary governments.

However, initial Soviet feelers with regard to a cease-fire in Korea were made in April 1951. In April and May, military operations had culminated in massive Chinese Communist offensives, which were decisively beaten. As a result of these defeats, Soviet hopes that the Chinese might be victorious were probably dispelled. Malik's cease-fire proposal followed in mid-June, and the cease-fire talks began shortly thereafter.

The truce talks soon bogged down over Communist insistence on the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line. The Communists concurrently were preparing another major offensive, which accumulated evidence indicated was scheduled for early September 1951. This offensive was apparently suspended at the last minute and, since UN operations at that time were not large enough to prejudice the offensive, the suspension probably represented a major policy decision. The truce talks were resumed at the end of October 1951, and progressed slowly until another stalemate developed in 1952 over the prisoner-of-war question. This stalemate prevailed until after Stalin's death.

In Europe, negotiations between the USSR, the UK, France and the US resulted in the prolonged and abortive Deputy Foreign Ministers meetings in Paris from April through June 1951. While the conference originally was intended to discuss the German question, the

Soviet delegation insistently attempted to introduce the question of NATO bases. In September 1951, the Soviet Union undertook an intense diplomatic campaign, officially protesting to a number of European powers with regard to EDC and NATO bases. In Germany, a renewed propaganda campaign was begun in September for unification and a peace treaty, standard Soviet propaganda themes since the early post-war years.

Within the USSR, there were a number of indications of apprehension over and dissatisfaction with the uncompromising and inelastic Stalinist foreign policy. Observers of the Soviet Union are unanimous in the opinion that US rearmament, Western consolidation and the progress made in establishing NATO bases constituted a growing and, finally, dominating preoccupation of Soviet leaders through 1951 and 1952. Furthermore, the inexplicable shifts in Korea suggest that conflicting political tendencies were operating. This was equally evident in Soviet press discussion of foreign affairs, where there was no attempt, as Ambassador Kennan observed in June 1952, to reconcile contradictory points of view regarding future foreign developments.

Stalin's letter of February 1952, which formed the main piece of his Economic Problems of Socialism, discussed some of these questions, but arrived at no new policy formula. Stalin reaffirmed that the West was incapable of achieving lasting unity and that, regardless of Soviet intransigence, the "peace" movement and the West's own economic disputes would arouse enough disagreement in the Western world to assure its final collapse.

In this letter, Stalin identified what might be called "opposition" points of view on foreign policy when he said that "some comrades" believe wars between capitalist states are no longer inevitable. He denied as "heretical" the following points of view: the US was successfully integrating the non-Soviet Orbit powers; capitalist leaders had learned from disastrous experience to avoid future wars; and "imperialism" must attack the USSR. The foreign policy position adopted by Stalin in the February 1952 letter was much quieter in tone and content than that of one year earlier. The letter was a tension-reducing statement, affirming that there was no immediate danger of Western attack, but also giving no hint of forthcoming concessions to the West. Stalin's position was one of no adventures, but equally, no retreats.

Vacillation and possible dissension on the German question are also suggested by several events that took place between March and June 1952. In March, the USSR proposed a draft peace treaty for Germany which embodied several significant shifts from the previous

Soviet position. Mr. Kennan has interpreted the draft treaty proposal as possibly representing the temporary triumph of a "negotiation" school of thought in Moscow. Subsequent diplomatic exchanges, however, came to nothing. In June 1952 the Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic, G. M. Pushkin, was replaced by I. I. Ilichev. In July, a harsh Sovietization program was finally inaugurated, involving collectivization, increased attention to the creation of an East German army, intensified security measures and the sealing off of the GDR from West Germany.

Thus, Soviet policy on Germany finally crystallized, and restraints which previously had held back the conversion of the GDR into a "normal" Satellite disappeared.

INDECISION IN INDUSTRIAL PLANNING

There is considerable evidence that Soviet industrial planners were called upon to draft the second post-war five year plan at least three times, in 1950, in 1951 and in 1952. It should have gone into operation in January 1951, but it was not even announced until August 1952.1/

Preparation for the five year plan presumably began on schedule in 1950. The first specific indication of indecision appeared in 2 October 1950, which referred to a 16 September proposal that a new draft for the five year plan be drawn up.

In 1951, there were several references which suggested that the planning process had been started anew in March of that year.

In 1952, the planning process was repeated yet another time. reparation of a "new Stalin Five-Year Plan for the Building of Communism."2/

1/ As of this writing the Fifth Five Year Plan, announced in August 1952 and approved at the October Party Congress, has not yet been ratified by the Supreme Soviet.

2/ Curiously, this was not to be the title of the new plan as announced in August 1952; it was called simply the "Fifth Five-Year Plan of Development of the USSR."

of some moment was indicated by an intercepted radio-telephone conversation of April 1952, in which the Moscow speaker said: "Leave immediately with the Industrial Finance Plan...the Council of Ministers checks us each day. Now this is a matter not of production but rather one of political character. Leave immediately by plane ...."

Stalin discussed industrial plans in his Economic Problems of Socialism. Again the document of chief interest is his February 1952 letter, since subsequent letters merely elaborated one or another aspect of the first one. As in the case of foreign policy questions, Stalin merely reaffirmed and defended the prevailing course of Soviet policy, rejecting "radical" solutions of either extreme. In other words, he defended the standing policy of investments in the capital goods industries, and rejected the possibility of major changes, either in favor of heavier investment in armament production or in consumer goods.

It will be recalled that the Soviet rearmament program, begun in 1948, was probably scheduled for completion in late 1951 or early 1952. It thus seems very likely that the issue of the future emphasis of the investment program was sidetracked, i.e., that it was postponed until the rearmament program neared completion and until it became evident whether or not the USSR was faced with a serious possibility of war. Stalin apparently decided in late 1951 or early 1952 that circumstances did not call for major increases in Soviet armaments investment; yet, in making this decision, he was apparently subjected to considerable pressure to expand significantly the production of consumers goods. This he refused to do.

CONTROVERSY ON AGRICULTURE

It will be recalled that in February 1950 Politburo member Andreev was criticized for defending small-scale farming operations, and that subsequently N. S. Khrushchev, also a Politburo member, became the leading Soviet spokesman on agricultural policy. On 25 April 1950, Khrushchev began a new policy of merging small collective farms into larger ones; later, a Party Central Committee decree apparently applied this policy to the whole USSR.

The new agricultural policy provided for more than just administrative merger of the kolkhozes. On 28 January 1951 Khrushchev in a speech advocated not only the merger of the kolkhozes, but also the actual resettlement of peasants belonging to the merged kolkhozes in single "urban" centers, known as "agro-cities". The personal plots of land possessed by the individual peasants were to be located

on the outskirts of the new settlement, thus contributing to the "proletarianization" of the peasantry.

Soviet press treatment of two Khrushchev speeches on new agricultural policy provides the first indication that the new policy may have run into trouble. He delivered a major speech on the merger of the kolkhozes on 20 December 1950, but it was not published until 8 February 1951. A second speech on 28 January 1951, in which he discussed the agro-city proposal, was not published until 4 March. Pravda, which published this speech, carried a curious editorial note the following day stating that Khrushchev's article had been run as material for discussion, thus implying that it was not a statement of policy.

"Discussion" was not long delayed. A speech delivered by G. A. Arutyunov of Soviet Armenia, published in the Armenian Kommunist (daily newspaper) on 21 March, had this to say: "In connection with amalgamation of small collective farms, some comrades have made statements sowing confusion...(they declare) that one of the main problems of the amalgamated farms is to move small villages, i.e., merge the population of small villages and resettle it in one village....I am of the opinion that these proposals are closer to fantasy than to the real requirements of the collective farms....I will not dwell on other unacceptable proposals...(regarding) reducing private garden plots...."

On 26 May 1951, Bakinskii Rabochii of Baku published a speech of M. D. A. Bagirov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaijan, in which Bagirov asserted that the "Party had demanded an end" to the "incorrect idea" that the most important task in kolkhoz construction was the moving of small villages into single kolkhoz settlements. He also said that the practice of reducing the size of the garden plot near the peasant's home and moving part of his plot beyond settlement limits was harmful and intolerable. Most curiously, when Pravda published Bagirov's speech on 29 May 1951, it omitted this aspect.

Following the above developments, the agro-city concept disappeared from prominence, but the program of kolkhoz amalgamation continued. Malenkov, at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, asserted that, as a result of the merger program, the number of collective farms had been reduced from 254,000 to 97,000. With regard to the agro-city program, Malenkov said that "certain of our leading officials have indulged in a wrong approach," their mistake being that they had "overlooked" the main task, i.e., agricultural production. Stalin, in his Economic Problems of Socialism, avoided direct mention of the agro-city policy but, in discussing the

elimination of essential differences between "town and country," said that "new great towns will appear as centers of the maximum development of culture, and as centers not only of large-scale industry, but also of the processing of agricultural produce...and will tend to even up conditions of life in town and country." He discussed the agricultural problem at length in each of his letters (February, April, May and September). In general, Stalin's discussion envisaged the ultimate elimination of the "free market" aspects of Soviet agriculture and the expansion of so-called "product exchange" as the ideal market relationship between kolkhozes and the rest of the economy. This "product-exchange" is simply a form of barter which takes place between the kolkhozes and the Soviet Government. Stalin envisaged that product-exchange would eventually displace all forms of marketing engaged in by the kolkhozes. However, Stalin repeatedly emphasized the long-term nature of this program and stressed the necessity for proceeding slowly and cautiously.

Meanwhile, throughout the period under review, Malenkov [redacted] Andreev, too, remained as chairman of the Council for Kolkhoz Affairs. Andreev, it will be recalled, was no longer the Politburo spokesman for agriculture, following the censure he received in February 1950.

The question now is: What did these various developments signify: It has been argued that the kolkhoz merger and agro-city proposals had been originated by Stalin himself, and then withdrawn when they ran into peasant resistance. Some observers have considered the agro-city program to have been an experiment in developing a new form of agricultural organization. A third hypothesis is that the merger and agro-city proposals had been advanced by some one figure or another below Stalin, and these proposals met with disagreement within the Politburo. While the problems involved in these hypotheses cannot be definitely answered, some possibilities can be suggested.

The handling of the agro-city proposal in Arutyunov's and Bagirov's speeches suggests that it also was intended to be Union-wide. The fact that the agro-city proposal was rejected so promptly after its inauguration, without allowing time for the "experiment" to run its course, also suggests that it had not been conceived as an experimental program.

It seems unlikely that the merger program and agro-city proposals were merely experimental in nature. The merger program, while begun in the Moscow Oblast, was not limited to it, but rather was applied Union-wide later in the same year. This is evident [redacted]

[redacted] Furthermore, as previously noted, a Party Central Committee decree was issued on the subject. Lastly, the program was continued even after the agro-city proposal was repudiated. With regard to the agro-city proposal, it also appears that this was not an experimental program, although the evidence in this case is less definite.

These latter considerations also argue against the idea that the agro-city proposal was one which had been originated by Stalin, and then abandoned in the face of widespread peasant resistance. In particular, it is very unlikely that Arutyunov and Bagirov would have discussed it in such strong language (i.e., "fantastic" and "unacceptable" proposals) if the program had been initiated personally by Stalin.

There is good reason to suppose that both the kolkhoz merger and the agro-city proposals originated with Khrushchev: It was Khrushchev who took over from Andreev in 1950 the position of Politburo spokesman on agriculture. Secondly, the kolkhoz merger program was begun by Khrushchev in Moscow Oblast at least by April 1950, and it was not until later that year that a Central Committee decree was issued on the subject. This suggests that Khrushchev had begun the program in Moscow Oblast before it was All-Union Party policy. Finally, Khrushchev, in his three speeches on the merger program and the agro-city proposal, continually cited illustrative experiences from the Ukraine, where he had been First Secretary from 1938 to 1949 (except for a brief period in 1947), suggesting that he was attempting to sell, on an All-Union basis, policies he had previously developed in the Ukraine.

The last question concerns the nature and identification of opposition to the agro-city proposal. It is generally conceded that Arutyunov and Bagirov had Politburo level support before they made their speeches denouncing the agro-city proposal. Likewise, the curious editorial note opening Khrushchev's 28 January 1951 speech "for discussion" is considered to be highly irregular and possibly indicative of top-level dissension. Lastly, it may be noted that Khrushchev, unlike Andreev the year previous, was not required to apologize or recant for his "incorrect" views.

Who formed this opposition? Andreev had been humiliated the previous year (1950) and he did not reappear as a prominent figure following repudiation of Khrushchev in 1951. Malenkov had been, and still was at the time of the dispute, actively concerned with agricultural problems, [redacted] nor did he lose jurisdiction over agriculture following Khrushchev's repudiation. Neither Malenkov nor Stalin, in their respective

statements on the subject in 1952, criticized the agro-city concept per se; Malenkov, it is true, did criticize it in terms of timing.

One clue is provided by the allegation that Beria exercised overlordship over the Soviet Transcaucasus, within which are both Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as Georgia. Thus it may have been the case that Arutyunov and Bagirov, in their attacks on Khrushchev's proposals, were speaking with Beria's approval and support[1]. [redacted] has reported a close association between Arutyunov and Beria. Bagirov likewise has been reported on close terms with Beria, although there is conflicting evidence on this point.

REPLACEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY

In August of 1951, a development of major importance took place when Minister of State Security Abakumov was replaced by S. D. Ignatiev, a Communist Party functionary. Abakumov had held this position since July 1946. Following his replacement, at least nine Republic MGB Ministers were replaced, while four new Deputy Ministers appeared at the Ministry in Moscow. One of these, the Deputy Minister for Personnel, was identified [redacted] as A. A. Epishev, who, like Ignatiev, had previously been a Party functionary rather than a career security officer. Epishev had earlier been a prominent Party official with Khrushchev in the Ukraine.

These Party appointments, as well as an unusual statement by the new MGB Minister in Georgia, A. I. Kochlavashvili, which was published in September 1952, shed some light on this shift. Kochlavashvili stressed the need for more effective Party control over the

1/ This supposition was given added weight on the occasion of Beria's purge. On 10 July 1952 the Pravda editorial stated: "It has now been established that Beria, under various fictitious excuses, hindered in every way the solution of very important, urgent problems in the sphere of agriculture. This was done to undermine the collective farms and to create difficulties in the country's food supply." This charge was a very curious one, since Beria had never been overtly associated with agriculture, nor was the charge subsequently elaborated to any extent in propaganda on the Beria case. It may be that the present leaders do not wish to go into concrete aspects of the Beria "agricultural platform" for domestic political reasons.

local MGB and continued vigilance by local MGB organs. He criticized local Party organs for insufficient attention to the political education of the security police, and declared that the Georgian Central Committee had sent "experienced Party workers" into the MGB. He promised that this practice would continue in the future. The most significant aspect of Koshlavashvili's speech is its suggestion that Party supremacy had been jeopardized by the actions and negligence of the police; the admonition to follow Party directives and the transfer of Party workers to the MGB imply that the MGB organization had been becoming a law unto itself. In addition, a report of December 1951 asserted that Abakumov's replacement had been due to criticism of the security organ.

While there is no firm information on the actual reasons for this MGB shift or on the details and ramifications of it, the replacement of Abakumov by a Party figure could not have been anything but a blow to Politburo member Beria. Abakumov was of Transcaucasian origin, and in 1938 was a junior security officer in the Caucasus. In 1940 or 1941 he became Beria's counter-intelligence chief and in 1943, after the NKGB was separated from the NKVD, he became a Deputy Minister of the NKGB. He replaced Merkulov as Minister in mid-1946. Thereafter the MGB (formerly NKGB) continued gradually to gather under its jurisdiction all police and militia functions. [redacted] Beria retained Politburo level responsibility for State Security matters, at least up to May of 1950. Beria was last associated with security questions in February 1951; at that time he went to Prague for a series of conferences following the widespread arrests of key men in the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Czech security apparatus.

[redacted]

THE GEORGIAN PURGES

Another area in which previous and long-standing arrangements were changed was in the Georgian Republic, from the latter part of 1951 through August 1952. During this period there was a complete reshuffling of positions, in the course of which all of the Central Committee secretaries were changed, the Buro of the Central Committee was completely revamped, and many of the Ministries, including those of Internal Affairs and State Security, were given new chiefs.

The personnel shifts began in November 1951, when the Georgian Central Committee removed M. I. Baramiya from his post as Second

Secretary and expelled A. N. Rapava, Minister of Justice and former Minister of State Security from the Party. Rapava and Shoniya, the Procurator of the Republic, were relieved of their offices and turned over to the courts for prosecution. These actions climaxed disclosures of large-scale embezzlement in one of the largest Tbilisi construction trusts; the charges against the three men included the assertion that, as is "well known," they "gave protection to various workers who had perpetrated crimes, and in every way defended them." At the same time K. Chichinadze and V. Kuprava were removed from their positions in the Georgian apparatus for "mistakes in...selecting cadres." The purges continued in December 1951 and January 1952. The First Secretary of the Komsomol, I. S. Zodelava, was removed and replaced by M. Megrelishvili.

Later, at an April 1952 meeting of the Georgian Central Committee, which L. P. Beria attended, Georgian First Secretary Charkviani was removed from his position and replaced by A. I. Mgeladze, who had been prominent in Komsomol work and was at the time First Secretary of the Abkhaz ASSR. Charkviani, who had held his post as Georgian First Secretary since 1938, had presided at a January meeting in Tbilisi of leading officials at which economic malfeasance in many ministries was aired. In the words of N. Rukhadze, the Minister of State Security, Charkviani's sin had been "a blunting of vigilance and...political blindness," which had "enabled hostile elements to ingratiate themselves, occupy responsible positions, and inflect damage on Party work and the Georgian people." It was reported that Charkviani had "departed from the limits of the Republic." Consequently, he was removed from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet as well as from his other posts.

Charkviani's removal did not end the purge. In April 1952, the four remaining old secretaries of the Georgian Komsomol were removed, and in July, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Trade and even Rukhadze, the Minister of State Security, fell. At the Georgian Party Congress in September 1952, it was revealed that nineteen governmental officials had lost their jobs between June and August, and that Kvirkveliyz, who had been made a Secretary of the Central Committee only the previous December, had already lost his post.

The official charges had sufficient truth in them to constitute a partial justification for the complete overhaul of Georgian personnel. Economic inefficiency on the part of governmental officials, collusion with Party personnel, embezzlement and other economic crimes, and an increase in Georgian nationalistic outbursts were, in themselves, sufficient to condemn Party leadership in Georgia. These charges carried over into the Georgian Party Congress held in September 1952 and formed the major substance of the speeches. The cry

went up for vigilance against economic saboteurs and internal and external enemies of the State who were trying to undermine socialist advances at the behest of the capitalists.

There can be little doubt that this purge was directed from Moscow. ordered the shake-up in Georgia. reported that Stalin ordered the purge following a visit there in 1951; according to Stalin's visit had in part been motivated by mounting rumors of embezzlement and other irregularities in Georgian affairs. Stalin may have been in Georgia in September 1951; the purge began there in November. According to there were rumors that the purge of November 1951 was personally directed by Malenkov, acting as Stalin's emissary. assert that these purges weakened Beria's position considerably.

Throughout the period, propaganda insisted that the purge was instituted under the direct guidance of Stalin and, after Beria's attendance at the Plenum of 1 April which removed Charkviani, the Tbilisi newspaper Zarya Vostoka wrote that Beria "aided in...uncovering the mistakes and shortcomings in the work of the Georgian Party organizations." The 17 April Tbilisi meeting adopted a message to Beria promising him that "we will resolutely struggle against any attempts of a hostile agency to harm the task of communist construction and undermine the might of the Soviet State."

There is ample reason, despite Beria's presence at the April 1952 Central Committee meeting and the propaganda associating him with the purges, for believing that the Georgian purges were an adverse reflection on him. Beria has been assumed to have had a personal interest in Georgian affairs for many years, but Stalin, a Georgian by birth, had also taken a personal interest in these same affairs. The severity of the purges may have been an indication of Stalin's personal dissatisfaction with the course of events there.

STALIN'S "ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM"

Frequent reference has been made throughout this paper to Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism, published on 2 October 1952.1/ The publication of this document, with its accompanying

1/ There will be no attempt here to recapitulate Stalin's declaration on particular policy problems, which were covered in the appropriate sections. The attempt here, rather, is to present certain aspects of the Economic Problems not easily discussed in the other sections.

propaganda fanfare, tended to overshadow the opening of the Party Congress three days later.

The Economic Problems is a series of four letters, ostensibly written by Stalin, dated 1 February, 21 April, 22 May and 28 September 1952. The first letter constitutes a commentary by Stalin on the proceedings of a conference of economists, purportedly held in November 1951, which discussed a draft textbook on the "political economy of Socialism."[1] The other three letters are replies to economists who had written to Stalin in response to his first letter.

Stalin's letters discussed Communist politico-economic theory, the prerequisites for attaining Communism in the USSR, and the inevitability of war between capitalist states. As has already been noted, a large part of the discussion of the transition to Communism concerned the Soviet agricultural problem and commodity exchange in the USSR. As one study of Soviet economic theory has pointed out, Stalin's Economic Problems selectively summed up pertinent trends evident in Soviet theoretical thinking since the war.[2] Another summary declared it to be "a theoretical grounding of policies and an attempt to settle troublesome points of theory never satisfactorily reconciled with reality."[3]

Isaac Deutcher has noted that "the transition from Socialism to Communism is...the chief 'double-talk' formula for the discussion of real problems" in Stalin's letters.[4] The author further commented:

1/ Such a textbook had long been discussed in the USSR, but an acceptable book had never been produced. In 1947, Zhdanov mentioned that one was being prepared. According to Dedijer's biography of Tito, Malenkov told the Yugoslavs in September 1947 that Soviet theorists were working out Soviet politico-economic doctrine on the basis of Utopian Socialism. [redacted] reported rumors in 1949 or 1950 that Stalin had assigned to Malenkov the task of preparing a standard work on the economic principles of Communism; reportedly the task was entrusted to a special commission under Malenkov's direction. [redacted] the stories were told in the form of a joke.

2/ Soviet Studies, April 1953, "A Political Economy in the Making," J. Miller.

3/ Current Soviet Policies, the Current Digest of the Soviet Press.

4/ Soviet Studies, April 1953, "Dogma and Reality in Stalin's 'Economic Problems,'" I. Deutscher. This article had been written before Stalin's death.

"Stalin's recent writings offer a glimpse of the movement of ideas going on in the Soviet ruling circles behind the half-real and half-deceptive facade of uniformity. It is this movement that distinguishes present day Russia from the Russia of the late thirties which was from head to foot stunned and petrified after the shock of the great purges. The movement of ideas reflects conflicting social aspirations and pressures which even a monolithic regime is not in a position to eliminate for good."

Deutscher goes on to suggest that the discussions of the "transition from socialism to communism," which had been started in 1947, had provided an opportunity for implicit criticism of the regime: "The guesses about the future sometimes sound like reflections on the present -- this is not the first time that Utopia is either an implied critique of existing society or an escape from it."

Ambassador Kennan's analysis of the Economic Problems, on 20 October 1952, drew attention to two significant aspects of the document. Mr. Kennan described the view of the world put forward by Stalin as "a very old-fashioned view," reminiscent of the thirties and appearing to ignore "all that has happened in the intervening fourteen years" since Hitler's attack on Poland. Mr. Kennan went on to say:

"We see reflected (in this) the fact that this Soviet Government is today an old man's government, ruthless and terrible to be sure, but insensitive to the contemporary evolution of its external environment just as it is to the deeper experiences of its own subject peoples, living in its own past..."[1]

Mr. Kennan then analyzed certain political implications of Stalin's discussion of the capitalist world, and noted that, judging from the letters, the view Stalin had put forward was not a unanimous view in the Kremlin but one that had been opposed by a group which doubted its soundness and challenged it.

1/ This observation takes on considerable significance in light of subsequent medical analyses of Stalin's physical and emotional condition, based on the report of Stalin's illness and the autopsy report. The majority opinion of medical specialists is that Stalin had suffered emotional changes for some time prior to his final illness, and these changes would have been in the direction of "living in the past." This will form the subject of a separate paper.

"It requires no great stretch of the imagination to see that this difference of opinion was no abstract disagreement about the nature of capitalism; it was a policy issue of greatest moment. Whoever said that it was dangerous to depend on the internal break-up of capitalism and the development of another war between Germany and the western powers, presumably said that you had to face up to the reality of the western coalition and its growing strength, which meant that you had to prepare sooner or later to fight it or to come to some sort of accommodation with it --- whether to do the one or the other to depend, we must assume, on what terms you could get. This, however, meant negotiations --- and not only 'demonstrative' negotiations for propaganda purposes, or disarming approaches to weaker members of the western coalition with divisive intent, but actually negotiations with the major member of the western coalition: the United States.

"This view was obviously overruled. There are only two major arguments that could have been used against it by the dominant group whose views found Stalin's support. The first is the argument that has now been made public: it is unnecessary to negotiate with the Americans; their world, with a little help from us, will go to pieces on them anyway. The second argument, however, may have been: it is impossible to negotiate with the Americans; they are bent only on the overthrow of the Soviet system, by subversion or war as the case may be; they could never be induced to negotiate seriously. Plainly, to the extent that this latter thesis can be established it overshadows and renders unnecessary further discussion of thesis number one. But it is thesis number one which has been revealed as the real center of ideological disagreement in Kremlin circles."

THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS: OCTOBER 1952

On 20 August 1952, it was announced that the long overdue Party Congress would be convened on 6 October.

There is some evidence which suggests that the Party Congress was to have been held in 1948 or 1949. For example, the new name which the Party adopted in October 1952, i.e., Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had been used by Suslov, Malenkov and others during 1948. As noted earlier, Madame Kollontai referred in April 1949 to a forthcoming Party Congress, and there were many rumors in 1948 and 1949 that one would soon be held. Moreover, as Mr. Kennan has pointed out, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would have accused

Tito and the Yugoslavs of not having held a Party Congress for many years if they were not planning to hold one soon themselves. Thus it appears very probable that the Congress was indeed planned at that time, but for some unknown reason was suspended.

When the Congress was finally convoked, the period allowed for the holding of preparatory regional Congresses was extremely short, and in many cases there was evidence of haste.

The announcement calling the Congress outlined as subjects for "discussion" a series of changes in the Party statutes. Two of the most important changes indicated were the dissolution of the Orgburo (one of the three bodies which had been set up originally to handle matters in lieu of meetings of the Central Committee) and a change in the name of the Politburo. The new Presidium, as the Politburo was to be called, would "control the work of the Central Committee between plenary sessions," and the Secretariat was to "control current work, primarily organizing verification of fulfillment of Party decisions and selection of cadres."

As was the case with the other changes in the Party statutes, these changes seemed intended to regularize already existing practices rather than to institute new ones. The Orgburo apparently had ceased to function, and the authority of the Secretariat in personnel matters had been increased accordingly. Both the Secretariat and the Orgburo had been controlled by the Politburo, which was responsible for final policy decisions and, in the person of Stalin, had exercised ultimate authority in the selection of personnel for all important posts. The new statutes abolishing the Orgburo and assigning personnel selection "primarily" to the Secretariat did not therefore reduce the authority of Stalin and other top Politburo (Presidium) members over top-level personnel matters.

The Presidium that was appointed at the Congress was much larger than the old Politburo and may have been designed largely as an honorary body. While the Politburo had 11 full members and one alternate, the Presidium included 25 full members and 11 alternates. This loose, unwieldy body may never have met; decisions probably were taken in its name by a "Buro" of the Presidium, a body whose existence was not acknowledged until Stalin's death.1/ An analysis of

1/ New members to the Presidium apparently did not surrender their old positions. One Presidium member, Korotchenko, was subsequently identified [redacted] as functioning in his old position.

the composition of the Presidium gives us some clues as to its probable function, as well as to the probable membership of the "Buro".

The most important members of this body were the ten men from the old 12-member Politburo: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Khrushchev and Shvernik.1/ The only portraits prominently displayed in Red Square on November 7th were of these ten leaders. The treatment these men received in propaganda, and references after Stalin's death to a "Buro" of the Presidium, suggests that the Presidium as a whole was in no sense a ruling body, but rather that the old Politburo members constituted its nucleus.

The remainder of the Presidium was composed, for the most part, of two categories of personnel: Government and Party administrators on the level just below the old Politburo, and regional Party secretaries or members of the Central Party apparatus. The former group included the four remaining Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers who had not been in the Politburo, Pervukhin, Saburov, Malyshev and Tevosyan; two members of the old Secretariat, Ponomarkenko and Suslov; the Secretary of the Komsomol, Mikhailov; the head of the Party Control Commission, M. F. Shkiryatov; and, among others, Vyshinsky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Zverev, the Minister of Finance.

Party Secretaries from key areas and Party and propaganda specialists comprised the balance of the 36-member Presidium. Andrianov from Leningrad, Korotchenko and Melnikov from the Ukraine, Aristov from Chelyabinsk and Brezhnev from Moldavia were a few of the regional officials to be included. From the Central Committee apparatus came N. M. Pegov, head of the Light Industry Section. D. I. Chesnokov, Chief Editor of Questions of Philosophy, P. F. Yudin and M. B. Mitin represented the Party propaganda specialists.

[redacted] that the Politburo had ruled through a system of committees which handled various aspects of Soviet policy, and that top level administrators had reported to these committees on technical aspects of problems; the inclusion on the Presidium of those members of the technical bureaucracy who presumably would have reported to these committees suggests that much of the enlargement of the Presidium was a formal recognition of this system.

1/ Politburo member A. A. Andreev was dropped completely, while A. N. Kosygin was reduced to candidate membership of the new Presidium.

At the same time, the enlargement of the Presidium and the Secretariat, as well as of the Central Committee itself, created more honorary positions in the top hierarchy for deserving Party members. Soviet leaders may have been concerned over the gap which had been developing between the top and lower echelons of the Party hierarchy. Since the 1930's, real power had been concentrated in a small, self-perpetuating group which the Party functionary had little hope of ever entering. [redacted] have reported that Party functionaries had lost their early ideological fervor and had become primarily concerned with maintaining their positions, raising their own standards of living, even illegally, and eluding the Party's multiple control mechanisms.

At the Congress, the spate of criticism directed against bureaucratism and the repeated demands for improved leadership pointed to the growth of this self-seeking group as one of the regime's most pressing internal problems. To alleviate this situation, the Kremlin was tightening controls, demanding greater Party discipline, and placing increased emphasis on education and criticism and self-criticism.

At the same time, however, new rules concerning methods of expulsion from the Party were introduced as a means of safeguarding the position of the members of the hierarchy. It was stipulated that, on the lower levels, a member was to be allowed to continue to take a full part in the work of his cell, including its secret meetings, until his exclusion had been ratified by higher committees. For members of the Party committees at any level, expulsion was to be decided upon by a two-thirds majority of the plenary session of the committee to which the member belonged. The expulsion of an All-Union Central Committee member was to be decided upon by a Party Congress, to be convened once in every four years, or by the All-Union Central Committee between congresses. In this way, while the new rules made greater demands on Party members, they also made their positions, at least formally, more secure.

Of the five new members added to the Secretariat, only two had been full members of the old Central Committee elected in 1939. The remaining three had been alternates; one of them, N. G. Ignatov, had been elected as an alternate member in 1939 but excluded in 1941 for failure to discharge his duties. His return to membership, not only on the Central Committee but on the Presidium and the Secretariat as well, suggested the backing of some powerful figure on the old Politburo level. N. M. Pegov, another of the newly elected members of the Presidium and Secretariat, had worked in the Central Committee apparatus since at least 1947 when he was identified as Chief of the Light Industry Section. [redacted]

The election to the Central Committee of 125 full members and 111 candidates broke a precedent set in the late 1920's when the full membership was stabilized at 71 and the candidate membership at 68. Prior to this time, the Central Committee had reflected the continued growth in Party membership. The stabilization in 1927, despite a continually growing Party membership, occurred after Stalin had completely consolidated his personal supremacy by packing Party organizations with his own appointees.

The expansion of the Central Committee in October 1952 indicated the elevation of Party careerists over specialists and technicians from other sections of society and clearly indicated the comparative importance of the professional Party worker. This development probably increased Malenkov's influence in this body, since he was the Party organization specialist and therefore probably had had a great deal to say in these appointments.

Of the 156 new Central Committee members, some 61 full members and 17 candidates are Party careerists, as contrasted with some 15 full members and 47 candidates who have governmental assignments. Seventy percent of the full members of the Central Committee have come up through Party ranks. Only 26 of the 236 Central Committee members have military command assignments; in 1939 the ratio was 20 to 139, and in 1941 it was 27 to 139. After 1941 there were nine full members of the Central Committee who were career military men; the new Central Committee has only five. Several officers who previously had been full members were dropped to alternate status. Rather than having increased its share of these honorary positions, the military appeared to have lost considerable ground.

The belated announcement on 30 October that Marshal G. A. Govorov had been inadvertently left off the list of candidate members aroused speculation regarding the operation of behind-the-scenes influences involving military leaders. Observers pointed out that a mistake of this nature was inconceivable and that some disgruntled element must have forced the addition of Govorov to the Central Committee after the initial selection. Govorov, it will be remembered, was apparently part of, or on the periphery of, the Zhdanov "faction," and he later figured in the Doctors' Plot announcement.

The problem of succession was not dealt with overtly in the major readjustment of Party leadership at the conclusion of the 19th Party Congress. However, the increased importance accorded to the

regional Party secretaries, as demonstrated in their election to the leading Party organs, reemphasized Malenkov's key position. Since the basis of their selection appears to have been more their personal qualifications and connections than the significance of the geographical areas which they represented, it is highly probable that they owed their advancement to Malenkov, as well as to Stalin. The Congress itself was apparently dominated, at least indirectly, by Malenkov since it was he who delivered the keynote address, i.e., the "report" of the Central Committee, which at past Congresses had been given by Stalin.

POST-CONGRESS DEVELOPMENTS: POLITICAL CRISIS

Every republic Congress held before the 19th All-Union Congress strongly emphasized the need for vigilance, stressing that the bourgeois nationalist rather than the actual "spy" was the root of trouble. Only the Congresses in Georgia, Lithuania and Estonia specifically cited foreign spies -- British, American and Turkish -- as the enemy to be watched, but even here the internal enemy, the bourgeois nationalist and the lax person, was strongly condemned.

The uniformity of certain remarks made at these congresses, concerning espionage and hostile actions by kulaks and bourgeois nationalists and concerning negligence and crime by industrial managers and workers, pointed to the existence of one or more central Party directives on these subjects. The cause for these criticisms seems to have been long-standing apathy toward Party aims, neglect of responsibility and failure to react properly to the line of Great Russian nationalism. Speeches at the 19th Congress left no doubt concerning these problems. Malenkov, Suslov, Bulganin and Poskrebyshev, among others, strongly warned against such errors. The Party statutes, which increased the Party members' duties and made ideological study mandatory, were aimed at erasing apathy.

Throughout November 1952 a number of arrests for crimes ranging from embezzlement to cheating the public and state were announced in the press. On 2 December, the death penalty was imposed on three persons charged with leading a gang in "speculation, embezzlement, and racketeering." This was the first application of the death penalty for economic crimes since this penalty had been reintroduced in January 1950. Also in December 1952, an editorial and propaganda campaign was begun against "wool gathering" and "gullibility."

Following the October Party Congress, a number of other events indicated continued political tension and maneuvering behind the scenes.

1. On 30 October, fifteen days after the conclusion of the Party Congress and the publication of the list of new Central Committee members, a special announcement stated that the name of Marshall L. A. Govorov had been mistakenly omitted from the list of Central Committee members. He was added to the Central Committee as an alternate member.

2. On 24 December, an article in Pravda by M. A. Suslov criticized P. Fedoseev for having written articles on Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism without at the same time admitting that he too had held the erroneous views denounced by Stalin. Fedoseev's articles had appeared in Izvestia about two weeks earlier. Fedoseev hastily apologized in public for this error, while the Izvestia editorial board apologized for permitting the articles to run. In his article, Suslov questioned whether or not Fedoseev was "being sly" and had really changed his views.

3. D. T. Shepilov, ousted from Agitprop in 1949 for numerous "shortcomings" including complicity in the Voznesensky affair, was identified in mid-December as the new editor of Pravda.

4. On 13 January 1953, the Doctors' Plot was announced.

5. In January 1953, conferences of economists and of social scientists were held, in which various figures apologized for having held the incorrect views criticized by Stalin. The chief report at the session of the Academy of Sciences on 31 January 1953 was given by Pavel Yudin. In these conferences, numerous specific figures were criticized, while Yudin, in his speech disclosed that the proscribed views were widely held in high Soviet circles.

6. It was learned in January that Pospelov had been removed as head of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute and reassigned as a Deputy Editor of Pravda. At the 21 January ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of Lenin's death, the principal speech was given by N. A. Mikhailov; since 1949, this speech had been delivered by Pospelov. Curiously, for the first time since 1925, the Soviet press failed to publish the list of Politburo members who had attended.

7. On 6 February, Pravda published a vitriolic article entitled "Revolutionary Vigilance," which was striking in the extent to which it revealed disputes. The article lashed out at "certain rotten theories," i.e., that capitalist encirclement no longer exists, and that capitalism will renounce its

attempts to harm the increasingly strong Soviet Union. The article charged that "Soviet successes" had given rise to moods of complacency, self-satisfaction and conceit. In its pronouncements on foreign policy, the article appeared to both paraphrase and supplement Stalin's foreign policy discussion of February 1952. Its sharp tone, in the context of the vigilance campaign following the Doctors' Plot announcement, suggested that the foreign policy disputes had not been resolved, but rather had become more acute, over the year since February 1952.

TOP SECRET

CAESAR - 9

12 March 1954

[redacted]

POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMY

Developments since October 1952 relating to the political status of the Soviet armed forces

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Office of Current Intelligence

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TOP SECRET

CAESAR-9

Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
12 March 1954

MEMORANDUM

This paper, the ninth in the CAESAR series, addresses itself primarily to developments within the Soviet armed forces during the period October 1952-December 1953. Its purpose in chronologically summarizing these developments is to place in perspective the position of the military within the context of the new Soviet leadership. It should be regarded as a working paper. Valuable contributions have been made by many parts of CIA and other intelligence agencies. The views expressed are the views of the authors, however, and do not represent the official views of the Agency. As in the case of the previous papers in this series, suggestions and criticisms will be welcomed.

POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMY

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POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMY

Summary and Conclusions

The Soviet armed forces do not have a history of successful interference in internal political crises as a single, organized element of power. Their heritage includes a tendency toward fragmentation and inaction during internal crisis. Military freedom of action is restricted by the interlocking networks of political officers and security police operating within the ranks, by a tendency toward conformity among officers and men alike, by a growing officer caste system, and by the presence in the ranks of a high percentage of Communists subject to Party discipline. Unless the existing controls break down under drastic circumstances, the armed forces as a whole must be looked upon as a relatively passive and non-monolithic body with regard to a Soviet succession crisis. This study of the post-Stalin period is undertaken to discover what effects recent political changes have had on the armed forces as a whole and on individuals or groups among the high-ranking military leaders, and what influence these military leaders have exerted within the government.

During the year from October 1952 to October 1953, the political position of Soviet military leaders progressed through several phases. From the XIX Party Congress until Stalin's death, there were some indications of the participation of military leaders in political maneuvering, as evidenced by Govorov's belated designation as a candidate member of the Central Committee and by the naming of military officers in the Doctors' Plot announcement. The period of the post-Stalin struggle between Malenkov and Beria, from March until June, was a time of outward passivity on the part of the military leaders, with an increase in political control over them, indicated primarily by the reorganization of the ministry of armed forces and the return of Bulganin as minister. The re-emergence of Zhukov, probably considered by the Party leadership as a safety measure at a critical moment, gave increased influence to an outspoken professional officer.

A shift from a passive toward a more active role of the military in politics probably occurred beginning with the East German riots and the Beria purge. The armed forces apparently participated in the removal and denunciation of Beria, and the present Party leadership probably bought military acquiescence or support by giving the professional military men greater freedom within their own establishment. After June, some high officers of the armed forces

were promoted, professional officers were placed in important security assignments, and greater consideration was given to a military point of view regarding questions of morale and security in the armed forces. The political position of the Soviet military leaders appeared better than it had for several years previously, and an uneasy alliance was probably maintained between top professional officers and Party leaders.

Developments of the winter of 1953-1954 have tended to confirm the impression that the political influence of Soviet military leaders has increased. The prominence of Konev on Beria's trial board in December 1953 and the apparent participation of Vasilevsky in decisions affecting the MVD in early 1954 suggest the greater importance of the military leadership in the formulation of Soviet governmental policy.

I. Position of the Military Prior to Stalin's Death

Role of the Military at the XIX Party Congress:

The point of departure of this study of recent events affecting the Soviet armed forces' political position is the XIX Congress of the Communist Party, held in October 1952. It was a milestone in Soviet history, the first Party Congress to be held for thirteen years. The position of the military leadership had been relatively stable for several years prior to the time of the Congress.

The Congress itself produced little change in the position of the leaders of the Soviet armed forces. Routine speeches were made by Marshal N. A. Bulganin, then Politburo member with general responsibility for military affairs, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, then Minister of War, and by the heads of the political directorates of the Soviet Army and Navy. Stalin's praise was loudly proclaimed by these leaders as by all others, and the themes of Western aggression and the need for vigilance were emphasized. The high percentage of Communists in the army was asserted by Vasilevsky, who claimed that 86.4% of all officers were Party or Komsomol members. The authority of commanders as compared with that of political officers, a subject on which the Soviet leaders have long been unable to make up their minds, was mentioned by Vasilevsky, who announced that, in recent years, the commanders' position had been further strengthened.1/

Military representation in the highest Party body did not increase; even the enlarged Presidium included only Bulganin and Marshal K. Y. Voroshilov. The proportion of military men elected as full members of the second highest Party body, the Central Committee, showed a definite decrease in comparison to the percentages elected at the XVIII Party Congress in 1939 and the XVIII Party Conference in 1941. A slight proportional decrease in military representation on the candidate membership list in contrast to that of 1941 is also evident.

1/ For details see Leo Gruliow, ed: Current Soviet Policies, the Documentary Record of the 19th Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death; New York 1953.

Military Officers Elected to the Central Committee

	Full Members	Percentage of Total	Candidate Members	Percentage of Total
1939 Congress	11	15.5	10	14.7
1941 Conference	9	12.7	15	22.0
1952 Congress	7	5.6	22	20.0

Members and candidate members elected at the XIX Party Congress included a virtually complete roster of the high command of the Soviet armed forces, including the commanders of certain key military districts and field forces, such as the Belorussian, Kiev, Moscow and Baltic MD's, the Forces of the Far East and the Group of Occupation Forces, Germany.1/

Bulganin and Voroshilov, although included as military men here, are really "political generals." They are "old Bolsheviks" who were close associates of Stalin and are primarily representatives of the top political hierarchy. Bulganin's experience prior to World War II was that of a Party trouble-shooter; his military service during the war was as a Party representative on the Military Councils of the various fronts and as a member of the State Defense Committee. Voroshilov was a high military officer during the civil war period and later attained the positions of Defense Commissar and Politburo member, but his generalship proved inadequate in the Finnish campaign and in the early stages of World War II; his subsequent continuance in high military positions is generally considered to be the result of his political connections. Other examples of "political generals" include A. S. Shcherbakov, wartime head of the Chief Political Directorate (now deceased), and L. I. Brezhnev, head of the Navy's Political Directorate during 1953; both these men rose through the Party ranks rather than the military ranks. [redacted] analysis has suggested, however, that, for a military man, election as candidate member of the Central Committee is not necessarily a reward for intensive Party activity but may be more or less automatic for key commanders.2/ The

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1/ For a complete listing of military officers elected as full and candidate members of the Central Committee in October 1952, see Appendix I.

2/ [redacted]

commander of a military district is also quite generally a member of the Party buro in the area of his post. Men who rose through the military ranks but who have been elected to the Party's Central Committee include Marshals I. S. Konev, A. M. Vasilevsky and V. D. Sokolovsky.

The first of a series of peculiar events involving military personalities occurred two weeks after the publication of the list of Central Committee members at the close of the Party Congress. On 30 October 1952, a special announcement was made by the Party Secretariat to the effect that Marshal L. A. Govorov had been elected a candidate member but had been omitted from the list through an oversight. Such an error is almost unheard of in the USSR, in view of the importance of these listings, so that the explanation given can scarcely be accepted. It has been suggested that Govorov's belated appointment indicates that he represented a faction which had been side-tracked at the Congress but had begun a strong fight to regain its position immediately afterwards. Govorov, Inspector General of the Soviet Army since January 1947, is one of a very few ex-Czarist officers now active.1/ He was closely associated with Zhdanov in the defense of Leningrad during World War II and was one of four chief orators at Zhdanov's funeral in September 1948, speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Armed Forces. Previous CAESAR studies have presented strong evidence of rivalry and enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov during the immediate post-war period, and it is generally agreed that Malenkov dominated the XIX Party Congress. If Govorov, as a remnant of the Zhdanov group, was passed over at the Congress, he must have had exceedingly powerful backers to have had his name added to the list.

The Doctors' Plot--Military Victims:

The announcement of the Doctors' Plot on 13 January 1953 is generally considered to have been a warning to some individuals or groups who were contesting the political status quo in the USSR. Because it cast doubt on the past effectiveness of the MGB during a period when Beria held responsibility for security affairs, and since it attempted to fix blame for Zhdanov's death, the Doctors' Plot announcement has been viewed as an intended blow at Beria, engineered with Stalin's blessing by a group which may have included Malenkov.

1/ Of the living Soviet officers of marshal or equivalent rank, only Govorov, Rokossovsky and Fleet Admiral Isakov (who is now retired) are known to have held commissioned rank in the imperial service. There are many high-ranking Soviet officers, however, the record of whose early careers is not available.

The two "victims" listed in the 13 January announcement were former Politburo member A. A. Zhdanov, and A. S. Shcherbakov, who headed the Army's political administration from 1942 until his death in 1945. All five men listed as "intended victims" of the plotters were career military officers. It is generally believed that the story of the plot contained very few, if any, real facts. There must have been some calculated reason, therefore, for naming Marshals Vasilevsky, Konev and Govorov, General Shtemenko and Admiral Levchenko as intended victims, with the implication that the vigilance of the new leadership of the MGB had only just saved their lives from being "shortened." At the time of the announcement, Vasilevsky was Minister of War of the USSR (War and Navy were separate ministries). Konev was or had been Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces.1/ Govorov was probably Inspector General, Shtemenko was the recent Chief of the General Staff, and Levchenko was a recent Deputy Minister of the Navy, probably in charge of training. It is possible that they were named simply as representatives of the Soviet armed forces--a branch of government known to be popular with the Soviet people--in order to gain the people's sympathy or the sympathy and support of the members of the armed forces. This group does not seem to be fully representative of the armed forces, however: no air officer was included, the naval officer was not particularly well-known, and several army officers better known than Govorov and Shtemenko could have been chosen. It seems more probable, therefore, that the five potential victims were selected as representing a faction or factions needing to be warned that their lives were under the protection of the Party and the MGB and could be "shortened" if they did not stay in line.

1/ It is now considered quite likely that Konev was no longer Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces at the time of the Doctors' Plot announcement. Konev was first suspected to be in Lvov, possibly as commander of the Carpathian Military District, when he was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party in September 1952. There have been frequent reports of his presence in the western Satellite area; the importance of the Carpathian MD is increased because of its proximity to this area. He was nominated as a candidate to the Supreme Soviet from the Lvov Oblast in February 1954. The former commander of the Carpathian Military District, Col. Gen. K. N. Galitski, was probably transferred in the fall of 1952 to the Odessa Military District, which he currently commands.

There is little in common among the military leaders named in the Doctors' Plot announcement. Govorov is certainly the most controversial figure: in addition to his connections with Zhdanov, in 1948 he was chairman of a military board that tried Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, Soviet Navy chief during World War II, on charges of giving secret information to the Western Allies. (Kuznetsov was demoted to Rear Admiral and retired. He returned to his old post after July 1951.) Admiral Levchenko was one of the other two members of that board. Marshal Vasilevsky, Minister of War prior to the 1953 reorganization, is believed to be a highly capable staff officer, who served in the Stavka under Zhukov during World War II and therefore had been quite close to Stalin. It has not been possible to identify Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, or Konev with any particular political faction within the Soviet hierarchy, although the first two were members of the honor guard at Zhdanov's funeral and all three had been close associates in the military ministry at Moscow after 1948.

The careers of the military men named in connection with the Doctors' Plot have been followed with some interest during subsequent months. Govorov has continued to receive attention befitting his rank and assignment at important occasions; he seems never to have suffered any loss in prestige. Vasilevsky was replaced as Minister in connection with the governmental reorganization in March; he was made a First Deputy Minister, however, and has shared the honors of this post with Zhukov ever since. Konev was not listed as participant in an official function or signatory to an obituary for some months after serving as a member of the honor guard at Stalin's bier, but his name reappeared on an October obituary and he was chairman of the tribunal which convicted Beria of treason in December. Levchenko may have suffered temporary difficulties and apparently was long absent from the Moscow scene, returning only last fall. During the year from September 1952 to September 1953, he appeared at only one official function in Moscow (a reception in May 1953), whereas previously his appearances had been quite frequent. He has since attended Moscow functions held by the North Koreans, Mongolians, Chinese and Bulgarians, and it is possible that he was in the Far East during his absences from Moscow. The fifth "victim," General Shtemenko, had almost certainly been relieved as Chief of the General Staff of the War Ministry prior to the XIX Party Congress, although he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee at that time. He was seen in Berlin in October 1952 and attended the Soviet Army Day reception there on 23 February 1953; on that date, he stood next to Chuikov, the Soviet commanding general in Germany, and was said by a Soviet officer to be a "kind of deputy" to Chuikov. The invitations to

Army Day in Moscow that year were signed by Marshal Sokolovsky as Chief of the General Staff. Shtemenko has not been identified since.1/

The Death of Stalin:

The Doctors' Plot announcement ushered in a period of extreme tension within the USSR, marked by a wave of intensified "vigilance" propaganda which continued until after Stalin's death. The publicity accompanying Army Day on 23 February 1953 took an especially belligerent tone, stressing the liberation role of the Red Army in World War II.

On 17 February, there appeared in Izvestia a cryptic announcement which further suggested that all was not well in the Kremlin. The commandant of the Kremlin Guard announced the "untimely death" two days previously of Major General P. E. Kosynkin, who was not further identified. The only other paper to mention his death was the Army publication Red Star, which carried a statement by a group vaguely designated as "a Group of Comrades;" this provided the

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1/ A note on the use and significance of official listings of Soviet military leaders seems in order here. Soviet publications practically never announce the relief of an officer and his replacement by another. This is similar to the lack of information about changes of post in other branches of the government which led one writer to complain that, when the top brass in the Kremlin fall out, it is like watching a dogfight under a blanket. The Russians seem to inform each other of changes, however, by rearranging names as they appear in various official listings of celebrations and receptions, and on notices and obituaries. It is believed that this is done to inform those Russians who have learned to read between the lines about the essential facts of Soviet leadership. The absence of a man's name from a list on which it should appear does not necessarily mean that he has been removed from his post. It may indicate that he is temporarily away from the town where the list is datelined; but the complete absence of a name from any lists for a period of months, together with a lack of any other identification during the same period, raises a legitimate question as to the fate of the individual.

information that Kosynkin had died suddenly and that he had been in responsible military work from 1938 "to the last days of his life." Practically nothing is known about Kosynkin's background. He entered the Red Army in 1921 and had been a Party member since 1925. The possibility that he switched to the MVD or MGB is suggested by his appearance in 1944 on a list of promoted Red Army officers, most of whom have been identified as MGB or MVD personnel. It seems almost certain that, at the time of his death, he was a member of the Kremlin Guard, an organization subordinate to the MGB.

The announcement of Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 thus came in a period of extreme tension in the Soviet Union, permeating all walks of life including the armed forces, with evidence of serious infighting among the top leadership. The peculiar incidents occurring in the period after the XIX Party Congress suggested that some persons or groups in the armed forces were involved in the infighting, to an extent not revealed by the available information.

It is evident that the removal of Stalin from the scene was followed by a period of deadly struggle among Soviet political leaders. An uneasy Malenkov-Beria-Molotov triumvirate emerged upon Stalin's death. Concentration of power in Malenkov's hands after he assumed chairmanship of the government was reduced when he "resigned" as Secretary of the Party shortly thereafter, precluding any immediate bid for one-man leadership. The government took some steps to ease international tension and adopted a series of measures to relax economic and political pressures on the Soviet population. Beria apparently attempted to use his police apparatus to strengthen his own position and possibly to achieve dominance in the Presidium. This crisis was resolved by his arrest in late June. There have been indications since that time that stability has not yet been reached.

The remaining sections of this study are concerned with the effects of the Stalin succession crisis on the Soviet armed forces and with the part which the armed forces played in the crisis itself.

II. Possibilities of Military Intervention in the Succession Crisis

The Historical Tradition:

Some observations are appropriate here regarding the nature of the role which the Soviet armed forces might have been expected to play in internal affairs at this moment of Russian history. Practically every available source, with the exception of some of the more imaginative columnists, warns that we should be very cautious about ascribing any great political influence or freedom of action to the Soviet armed forces of today.

Historically, the Soviet armed forces have not inherited a tradition of successful intervention in internal affairs. [redacted] three major succession crises in the history of Czarist Russia: the Time of Troubles, 1584-1613, following the death of Ivan the Terrible; the period of Palace Revolutions, 1725-1762, following the death of Peter the Great; and the Decembrist Revolt of 1825.1/ In these three crises, Russian autocracy was challenged after the death of a strong ruler by various elements who sought to share in power and to improve their own living conditions; the autocracy survived all three challenges and continued to consolidate. A feature of the Time of Troubles was the development of fragmentary military power by various groups and temporary coalitions, who attempted unsuccessfully to gain controlling power for themselves. The strong Romanov family was finally able to stabilize the situation after hatred of Polish intervention had goaded the stalemated Cossacks and Russian gentry into joining forces. The Palace Revolutions of the 18th Century were dominated by the small but influential Guards regiments, originally created by Peter the Great to protect the throne. Well-placed and closely knit, they were able to exert their strength at the top to influence the selection of four monarchs after the death of Peter. The remainder of the large army which had been built by Peter was not influential in these palace

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1/ Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and Its European Satellites to Political Warfare; Cambridge 1952; Vol. II, Annex 3 (Succession Crises in Russian History, by Alfred Levin).

intrigues. The unsuccessful Decembrist revolt of 1825, a futile Guards action, was not, as its predecessors had been, part of a palace intrigue to attain limited class gains. It was an open revolt, with the avowed purpose of overthrowing autocracy. As such, it lacked sufficient organization, planning, and military and popular support to achieve success.

The period of Communist revolution and civil war of 1918-1921 was in one respect reminiscent of the Time of Troubles, with a complete fragmentation of the nine million-man army and the development of separate nuclei of military force in many parts of Russia. The stories of Kolchak and the Czechs, Kornilov, Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel are well known. Even the Communists were surprised at the number of Czarist officers who joined Communist ranks (an estimated 48,000 were either drafted or volunteered for the Red Army between June 1918 and August 1920); many were forced to join by Trotsky's coercive methods, many others acted purely opportunistically, while some were motivated primarily by patriotism, believing that the Communists were the only group with a chance of saving Russia from foreign domination.

The Soviet period itself is devoid of significant independent action on the part of the military in time of internal crisis. The revolt of the sailors at Kronstadt in March 1921, although highly significant as the epitome of widespread popular dissatisfaction with Soviet economic and political policies, was rather isolated, lacked initiative, and, like the Decembrist revolt of 1825, suffered from its prematurity. Fedotoff White records that the rebels rejected a plan to enlarge the base of the rebellion by undertaking military operations on the mainland. They limited themselves to issuing pronouncements and defending Kronstadt. They were quickly overwhelmed.1/ The struggle for power between Trotsky and Stalin, reaching its height after Lenin's death in 1924, was conducted to a large extent according to the personalities of the protagonists. Stalin used all the power available to him as Party Secretary to control appointments and line up votes. Trotsky, although he was People's Commissar for War, made little use of his office in the struggle, relying primarily on the weapons of debate and agitation; he made no attempt to rally the army for a coup d'etat. He allowed the struggle to remain a political one inside the framework of the

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1/ D. Fedotoff White: The Growth of the Red Army; Princeton 1944; page 45.

Party. The Great Purge of the late 1930's also found the armed forces in a passive role, even as their own ranks were riddled. An idea of the extent of the purge within the armed forces is provided by Japanese and former Soviet sources, who estimate that, following the execution of Tukhachevsky and other leaders in June 1937, the purge removed more than 400 officers in the positions of brigade commanders and higher, 90 per cent of the generals, 80 per cent of the colonels, and approximately 30,000 other officers, totalling about half the entire officer corps. Three of the five Red Army marshals were purged, as well as all eleven Vice-Commissars of War and 75 of the 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, including all the military district commanders.1/ Certainly there had developed serious differences between the group around Tukhachevsky and the Stalinist leadership. Whether or not an anti-Stalin coup was seriously planned may never be known; if so, it was nipped in the bud, and it is clear that there was no united effort on the part of the officer corps to strike back.

It can be seen, therefore, that the Soviet armed forces entered the post-Stalin period without a history of successful interference in internal political crises by the military as a single, organized element of power. Their heritage instead was a tendency toward fragmentation, splitting up and taking sides, and failure to act at all under the stimulus of crisis. As a concomitant to this generalization, it is noteworthy that a small, well-placed military group once exercised considerable influence under conditions of palace intrigue.

Restrictions on Military Freedom of Action:

Real restrictions are placed on the freedom of the armed forces to act as a unit, the most powerful being the interlocking networks of control operated within the armed services by the Party and the security police, now the MVD. These organizations operate separate chains of command, paralleling the normal army chain of command up from company or regimental level, but responsible to essentially non-military agencies. As [redacted] has put it, there is triple-control within the army: "the invisible, autonomous political police, the open, brazen power of the Party dictatorship, and the officers, whose knowledge and figure are

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[redacted]

merely tolerated." The Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, to whom the political officers are responsible, is at once a directorate of this ministry and a department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It is responsible for carrying out the will of the Party in the armed forces, accomplishing this by unceasing indoctrination of the troops, responsibility for the maintenance of morale and discipline, guidance of the activities of Party cells at the various echelons within the armed forces, and detailed reporting on the political reliability of all officers and men, regardless of rank. The Chief Directorate for Counterintelligence was officially transferred from the Ministry of Armed Forces to the MGB in 1946, thus formalizing a de facto situation. Its officers, found throughout the regimental echelon (there are staffs at the higher levels) are the successors of SMERSH, responsible for investigation and surveillance, and for liquidation of counter-revolutionary elements and enemy penetrations within the armed forces. Thus the Soviet armed forces are permeated with informers, monitors and special operatives, many of them under cover, all of them potential enemies of any group or clique seeking to develop an independent line of action on any subject.

A wealth of material attests to the influence exerted by the Party and MVD in fragmenting the Soviet armed forces as well as the population in general. Colonel Ely sums up the position of the political officer, as follows: "The political officer on the commander's staff is in effect a spy, is generally regarded as such, and is usually thoroughly hated."1/ Ely further states that the Russian, having accustomed himself to this constant surveillance, copes with it by adopting a personal policy of conformity. The whole system of controls and indoctrination severely limits individual initiative throughout the ranks of the armed forces, despite the efforts of the authorities to develop the double standard of flexibility in military matters and conformity in political matters. [redacted] studying Soviet defections has found that many average Russians have come to adopt an attitude of opportunism, associating themselves with the winning side without regard to convictions.2/ This attitude has been advanced as one of the reasons that the army failed to act in its own defense during the Great Purge; younger officers found that the purge of senior officers opened up tremendous possibilities for personal advance-

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1/ Louis B. Ely: The Red Army Today; Harrisburg 1949; page 128.

2/ [redacted]

ment. (A popular example is the rise of N. G. Kuznetsov, now Navy chief, to command of the Pacific Fleet at the age of 37 as a result of the purge of several superiors.) Undeniably, the memory of these purges is still in the minds of the Soviet military hierarchy, and this may be a strong deterrent to any independent action. After World War II, a tendency was shown toward reassigning officers who had seen combat together, in order to destroy the feeling of comradeship which had grown up. [redacted] has chosen a typically Russian expression to describe the lack of comradely solidarity and indifference to the fate of others that the system has created among military personnel: "One's shirt is nearest to one's body."

The Soviet armed forces are also split horizontally by a caste system which has developed at least since the re-introduction of military ranks for officers during the period of preparation for World War II. Colonel Ely states that "the marshals form a caste of their own and the generals form another, both being as distinct from the officer caste as the latter are from the enlisted group."1/ Pay and privileges now create a greater gulf between higher officers and troops than exists in many Western armies. The officers owe their privileges and high standard of living to the regime and its continued existence. In addition, the Suvorov schools, created in 1943 to train young boys from the age of nine or ten to become career officers, annually turn out a group of politically indoctrinated, highly regimented and class-conscious cadets, who will tend to harden this caste system. G-2 estimates that there are now 28 Suvorov schools, each having an average attendance of 600. Most of the students are sons of World War II casualties, high-ranking officers and influential Communist Party members.

Finally, the very presence in the armed forces of a high percentage of Communists, subject to Party discipline, is a factor limiting the armed forces' freedom of political action as long as Party solidarity is outwardly maintained at the top. In the postwar years, Party membership has become essential to a successful career as a Soviet military officer, and favoritism is shown to Party stalwarts in promotions and assignments. The question of which comes first, Party membership or professional success, has been raised by many students. It is generally agreed that, during the war, military competence was a much more important factor in

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1/ Ely: op. cit.; page 115.

an officer's career than it is today. Statistics on decorations awarded during the war provide some interesting hints on this point. A high percentage, but by no means all, of the recipients of awards were Party members. At the XIX Party Congress, F. F. Kuznetsov stated that, of the 11,000 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 7,500 (60 per cent) were Communists. Other Soviet sources indicate that an additional 18 per cent or 27 per cent were Komsomols.

To sum up, there is much in the recent and past history of the Soviet armed forces to limit severely their ability to act as a unit in time of internal political crisis. The armed forces as a whole must be looked upon as a relatively passive body, non-monolithic, probably not capable of being "delivered" to anyone as a unified element of political power unless the existing controls break down under circumstances far more drastic than any yet evidenced. Instead, the post-Stalin era should be studied with an eye toward discovering what effects the political changes have had on the armed forces as a whole (especially on the control mechanism operating within them), what attitudes the political leaders have displayed toward the armed forces, what cliques or groups of high-ranking military leaders have profited by the changes in the regime, and what influence these military leaders have had within a non-revolutionary framework of palace intrigue in a highly centralized state.

III. Position of the Military after Stalin's Death

The Governmental Reorganization of March 1953:

The first official move by the Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin was the complete reorganization of the government's structure. The general effect of the reorganization was to centralize and streamline the governmental structure at the top, with a reduction of the number of ministries by about one-half and a return of the old Politburo group to direct control over key ministries. In the reorganizations of 6-15 March, the armed forces were treated in accordance with this general pattern; the War and Navy Ministries were merged into a single Ministry of Defense, and Bulganin returned to direct control as Minister. This action reversed a six-year trend toward relaxation of personal control of the armed forces ministry by the Party leaders. During the immediate postwar period, when Stalin was engaged in minimizing the battle-won popularity and independence of Soviet military leaders, he retained his position as People's Commissar of Defense and assumed the title of Generalissimo. In March 1946, the services were unified. A gradual, limited relaxation of control over the ministry may have begun some time during the next year, although not until the most popular military leader, Marshal Zhukov, had been packed off to Odessa. Stalin resigned as Minister in March 1947 and appointed in his place a loyal "political general" and old comrade, General Bulganin, who was promoted to marshal shortly thereafter. Bulganin withdrew from the post in 1949, to become Politburo member without portfolio (but still reliably reported to have general responsibility for military matters). Marshal Vasilevsky, an able staff officer, replaced Bulganin. In February 1950, the services were again separated, with Vasilevsky becoming Minister of War. The Navy regained status as a ministry, and the next year the post of minister was returned to Vice Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, who came out of his enforced retirement but did not receive his former rank of Admiral of the Fleet. The reunification of the services in March 1953 returned them to the situation existing under Bulganin in 1947-1949, tending to re-establish closer control by a top Party leader.

The neutralizing influence of this step may be related to the personal status of Bulganin himself, who at that time appeared not to be a serious contender for personal supremacy but, rather, a non-partisan representative of Soviet collective leadership. In the published listings of high Soviet officials since Stalin's death, Bulganin has regularly ranked just behind the topmost leaders; he was listed sixth in the Party Presidium on 13 March 1953 and was

fifth on 7 November, Beria having been eliminated. A special CIA study concludes that, within the armed forces, Bulganin cannot claim either professional or personal popularity but is considered a capable administrator who acts as watchdog for the Presidium. At the two major celebrations involving the armed forces in 1953, May Day and October Revolution Day, Bulganin took the parade and delivered the military speech; except for one year, previous practice had been to honor two different military leaders at these celebrations.

The March reorganization brought the announcement of the return of Marshal G. K. Zhukov from relative obscurity to be a First Deputy Defense Minister, an appointment which could not fail to draw wide notice and would appear to contradict evidence of attempts to tighten political control over the armed forces. Zhukov's appointment probably had both political and military implications; it would help to insure support for the government by the lower ranks of the army, and it represented the return to headquarters of a top Soviet military strategist at a time of possible danger to the nation. Zhukov, the best known of the Soviet marshals, is considered an example of an "ideal type," the anti-political professional officer. There is some question as to the truth of various colorful stories regarding Zhukov's past brushes with Presidium members, including Malenkov, Bulganin, and Voroshilov (all of whom presumably had to give at least tacit consent to Zhukov's appointment in March), but it is known that Zhukov is outspoken, blunt, and not afraid to make enemies in high places. Zhukov's opposition to political interference in military matters is well confirmed, particularly his belief--expressed publicly after the Finnish campaigns--that the power of the political officers should be strictly limited. An extremely able strategist, Zhukov headed the wartime general headquarters, the Stavka, during its entire existence from 1942 to 1946; in this post and as First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, he was directly under Stalin. It is generally believed that Zhukov's great popularity with the Soviet people was the basic cause for his relegation to command of the Odessa Military District in 1946, probably as a result of the personal decision of Stalin. A contributing factor may have been his friendly contact with Western military leaders, including General Eisenhower. According to the immediate cause was Zhukov's clash with Vasily Stalin

and his own deputy for NKVD and NKGB matters.1/ Zhukov sent unfavorable reports from Germany to Moscow about Vasily, who was recalled; but the deputy then submitted reports highly favorable to Vasily and unfavorable to Zhukov. Zhukov was recalled in March 1946, summoned before the Central Committee, disciplined for various delinquencies, and sent to Odessa. Zhukov's brief assignment as Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces from March to June 1946.) Zhukov's eclipse, reported by a Soviet officer is that Zhukov and Govorov were personal enemies, and Govorov, acting in the capacity of Inspector General, turned in a highly unfavorable report on Zhukov. It is important to note that Zhukov was not in disgrace during Stalin's lifetime, even after his removal from the Moscow scene. He appeared with Molotov at the Polish Liberation Day celebrations in July 1951, delivering a widely-reported but non-controversial speech; he was re-elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in October 1952; his name had appeared high on recent lists of signatories to military obituaries, suggesting that he had returned to Moscow prior to that date. Since March, Zhukov's name has alternated with Vasilevsky's in the top military spot after Bulganin.

The merger of the Navy into an armed forces ministry dominated by ground force officers must have disappointed many of the naval officers who had enjoyed greater independence since 1950. It must have rankled especially to have Admiral Zakharov, chief of the Navy's political directorate, replaced on 7 March by L. I. Brezhnev, a wartime army political officer but primarily a Party functionary who had been appointed to Malenkov's enlarged Secretariat at the

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1/ Zhukov's deputy for security affairs in Germany was Col. Gen. I. A. Serov. He was a Deputy Commissar for Internal Affairs from 1941 to 1946 and a First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs from 1947 to 1952; in these positions, he was necessarily in close contact with Beria. In September 1952, he received an award in connection with work on the Volga-Don Canal. His present position and whereabouts are unknown.

time of the XIX Party Congress.[1] Even the Navy newspaper, Red Fleet, was suspended and merged with Red Star on 8 April, after 14 years of publication; Red Fleet had continued to publish during the previous period of armed services unification, from 1946 to 1950. Evidence of efforts to reassure the naval leadership subsequent to the establishment of increased control may be found in the awarding of medals in April to a number of military officers, mostly navy officers, for "long and meritorious service;" the reported designation in June of former Navy Minister Kuznetsov as a First Deputy Defense Minister; Kuznetsov's promotion during the spring to his World War II rank of Fleet Admiral; and extensive, favorable publicity given in the Soviet press to Navy Day in July and to the visit of the cruiser Sverdlov to the British coronation in June.

The Period of Uncertainty in the Spring of 1953:

The months following Stalin's death witnessed a reversal of some of the unpopular policies of the Soviet government, with the iron hand removed from the top, the new leaders vying to ingratiate themselves with their people, the Satellites, and the world, and Beria making a strong bid for personal supremacy. On 27 March the amnesty brought pardon to minor civilian and military offenders, in April the largest price cut in four years was announced, and in the next two months the first indications appeared of an easing of the agricultural and consumer goods situations. The army participated in Soviet efforts to relax international tensions: in mid-March, after a British aircraft had been shot down by Soviet fighters in Germany, General Chuikov sent a most conciliatory note, which resulted in the opening of negotiations on revision of the Berlin air corridor rules (the negotiations have accomplished nothing, although they continued in desultory fashion until late 1953). The renewed Soviet propaganda theme of cooperation among nations was aided by Bulganin on May Day: after an unusually short military parade, he

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1/ Brezhnev was later identified as a deputy to the Chief of the Chief Political Directorate of the Defense Ministry. He probably held the post until February 1954, when he was assigned by the Party to Kazakhstan. His replacement has not been identified.

emphasized the defensive role of the Soviet armed forces, in contrast to the belligerent press releases of Soviet Army Day in February 1953.[1]

The most dramatic and most fantastic of these post-Stalin measures was the reversal of the Doctors' Plot, announced by Beria's MVD on 4 April. The accused were innocent, the accusers were guilty, the warned were unwarned. There was no public reaction on the part of the five military leaders previously named as intended victims, who may well have wondered whether the danger to their lives had now increased or decreased. Some information is available, however, on reactions within the ranks of the armed services. [redacted] reported that the reversal of the Doctors' Plot was actually a great disillusionment to the personnel in Germany. They had accepted the plot at its face value, as they did all government announcements, but the reversal was greeted with contempt and exasperation, because it seemed to bring the whole system into disrepute. One of these [redacted] adds that the reversal made Beria more hated than he was before. [redacted] also reveal that, at this time as well as at the death of Stalin and the arrest of Beria, discussion in the ranks was severely limited: officers were authorized only to read the official communiques and to offer no personal opinion or comment, political meetings were conducted with prepared agenda received from higher levels, and political officers were instructed to report on anything that was being said. The illness and death of Stalin were accompanied by the cancellation of leaves and by orders to increase vigilance.

1/ One other interesting feature of May Day 1953 was the conspicuous absence of Lt. Gen. Vasily Stalin, since 1949 commander of the Moscow air garrison. He had led the air sections of the parades until Aviation Day in 1952, on that occasion commanding a formation which spelled out "Glory to Stalin." He was not in evidence at either occasion in 1953, and his present whereabouts is unknown. At Aviation Day in 1953, the formation spelled "Glory to the USSR."

Following the reversal of the Doctors' Plot, emphasis was on respect for legality and willingness to admit a mistake on the part of the Soviet government, which nobody believed.

Other interesting source material on propaganda fed to the Soviet troops during this period is found in the programs of Radio Volga, which broadcasts to Soviet troops in East Europe for about 14 hours daily. Most of this broadcast time is devoted to rebroadcasts of Moscow transmissions, in which the soldier hears exactly the same news and propaganda as the Russian civilian, but three hours daily are devoted to political lectures, literary programs and technical information designed specifically for the troops. It is believed that this material is written by the Party. The following significant features emerge from a study of Radio Volga broadcasts specifically intended for Soviet troops between 9 March and 15 October 1953:1/

- A striking continuation of the Stalin myth, even though this theme was all but dropped by other propaganda media almost immediately after Stalin's death. The emphasis on the dead leader actually increased throughout April and May, with Radio Volga lecturers displaying a curious tendency to continue speaking of Stalin in the present tense, as if he were still alive. Stalin comment had slacked off by July, but it continued to be frequent in comparison with other media.

- Continued prominence of the vigilance theme, primarily directed at external enemies, with some stress on the need to safeguard military secrets. In keeping with this "hard" line, the troops heard considerably less of welfare and consumer goods propaganda than the general public.

- Mention of Malenkov's name considerably more often than that of any other living leader.

1/ Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Radio Volga Broadcasts to Soviet Troops, April to October 1953; FBIS Research Report #RS-2; 9 November 1953 [redacted]. Inasmuch as these broadcasts were not monitored regularly before March 1953, there is no basis of comparison with the period prior to Stalin's death.

- Emphasis on loyalty to the Party, the Motherland, and the government. There was constant reference to the role of the Party organization in the Army.

- Failure to emphasize present military leaders or to stimulate loyalty to military heroes of the Russian past, such as was the practice during World War II. Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Vasilevsky were the only names mentioned, and these only rarely. After April, however, considerable broadcast time was devoted to popularizing the Soviet commander as such, urging "the increased authority of commanders."

This review shows that the material prepared for the troops did not respond significantly to events, remaining notably inflexible during the entire period.

In early June, the Soviet policies of conciliation were intensified, with the compromise proposal on Korea on 8 June and the announcement of the "new course" in East Germany on the 9th. The dissolution of the Soviet Control Commissions in Germany and Austria is now considered to have been preparation for the easing of tensions in East Europe, although at the time there was speculation that the Soviet Foreign Ministry was asserting itself over the Army in the occupied areas. (One article in Taeglische Rundschau, the Soviet newspaper in East Germany, placed some of the blame for previous repressive policies on the military chief of the Control Commission, but this was not repeated.) The Control Commission in Germany was abolished on 28 May. Army General V.I. Chuikov, its chief, had his responsibilities restricted to military matters, and his former political adviser, V.S. Semenov, was made High Commissioner, later Ambassador. On 7 June Chuikov was transferred from Germany to an unnamed post in the USSR and was replaced as military commander by Col. Gen. A.A. Grechko, who had been commander of the Kiev MD. Chuikov's appearance on 7 November as commander of the Kiev MD revealed that these men had simply switched jobs. Also in June, I.I. Ilyichev, a career diplomat, assumed the duties of High Commissioner in Austria, and shortly thereafter Lt. Gen. V.P. Sviridov was replaced as military commander in Austria-Hungary by Col. Gen. S.S. Biryuzov, former commander of the Maritime MD at Vladivostok and once Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria. Sviridov has not subsequently been identified.

One of the outstanding revelations of the East German riots of 17 June was the complete reliance on the power of the Soviet Army to maintain Communist control in East Germany. Soviet authorities reacted swiftly and efficiently, correctly evaluating the nature of the situation and calling in the troops. The first troops were actually arriving in East Berlin in the early morning of the 17th, martial law was declared at 1:00 p.m. the same day, and by the 19th a total of 25,000 Soviet troops with at least 450 tanks and self-propelled guns were estimated to be in the city. A general alert was maintained by the Soviet 24th Air Army from 17 to 20 June, [redacted] During this period, Soviet military units were returned from their summer training areas to more than 50 cities and towns in East Germany. In contrast, units of the East German Garrisoned People's Police were reportedly alerted but confined to their barracks on 17 June. They were not committed in Berlin until the riots had been brought under control by Soviet forces, and they did not begin to replace Soviet units in the city until mid-July. The firm but generally calm manner in which the Soviet forces handled the East German disturbances was a clear reminder to the Soviet political leadership of their capabilities as a security force and could not help but enhance the already high reputation of the Soviet armed forces among the Soviet people.

The Military and the Purge of Beria:

The exact circumstances of the removal of Beria later in June are not known, but strange developments in Moscow on the night of 27 June give rise to the strong suspicion that elements of the army were involved. The first indication that Beria had come to grief was his absence from a carefully staged tableau of Soviet political leaders which presented itself at the opera that evening. (The opera, incidentally, was "The Decembrist," dealing with the unsuccessful military coup of 1825.) Reports from Western military attaches in Moscow indicate that there were unusual military movements in the city beginning in the late afternoon of the 27th. Several dozen tanks and military vehicles arrived in Moscow by rail at about five o'clock and apparently proceeded from the station into the city and along the boulevard leading past the Kremlin and Beria's residence. Their destination was not discovered. Additional movement of military vehicles was heard or seen during that night and on subsequent nights through 30 June. Early on the 30th, tank tracks were seen on streets in the city. Although much of this activity could have been connected

with summer training of military units in the Moscow area, the presence of the tanks and vehicles in the center of the city, highly unusual in itself, was so closely timed with the staged hint of Beria's downfall as to make mere coincidence seem doubtfull. This is not to suggest that Beria was arrested by a tank crew. Assuming, however, that he was taken into custody on or before 27 June, a show of military force in Moscow when his demise was publicly revealed could have served at once as a sign to Beria's loyal followers that resistance was futile and as a precaution against any popular disorders.1/

Unfortunately, the tanks in question cannot be positively identified. The US Army Attache in Moscow reported that their turrets bore single-digit identifying numbers, instead of the three-digit numbers carried by tanks of the field forces. The possibility has been raised that they were not army tanks at all, since at least one motorized MVD division--assumed by G-2 to have some organic tanks--is known to be stationed in Moscow. In view of the circumstances, however, and of Beria's position as MVD head, it is considered most likely that the tanks were army tanks brought in from outside the city.

Personnel of the armed forces were prominently used to help signify the completeness of Beria's disgrace and the solidarity of the government. On about 13 July, shortly after the 10 July announcement of Beria's purge, Army General A. I. Antonov, commander of the Transcaucasus MD (which includes Beria's native Georgia) addressed a special meeting of the military district at which he denounced Beria and pledged the unity of all army Communists behind the decision of the Central Committee.2/ This was one of the first meetings of this type to

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1/ Although there is conflicting evidence on this point, it seems most likely that Beria's arrest occurred on 26 June, since the Presidium decree regarding his "anti-state activities," presented to the Supreme Soviet for ratification in August, was dated 26 June.

2/ Antonov, curiously, was not elected either member or candidate member of the USSR Central Committee in October 1952, although he commanded a key military district and was active in the Georgian Communist Party. During World War II, he had been deputy to Marshal Vasilevsky on the general staff. When Antonov was Chief of the General Staff for a brief period immediately after the end of the war, Shtemenko was his deputy.

be held in the USSR and was the first such meeting of a military district to be publicized in Red Star. At the time, it seemed that the denunciation by the military commander in Georgia could be a warning to Beria's followers that the army was maintaining firm control over the situation in Beria's native state; subsequent events confirmed this impression.

The pledge was taken for all the armed services in a Moscow meeting which was publicized in Pravda on 16 July, under the headline "Boundless Devotion to the Communist Party." According to this article, a meeting of the Party aktiv of the Defense Ministry had "recently" been held to discuss the decisions of the Central Committee regarding the dismissal of Beria. The speakers included Bulganin, Zhukov, N.G. Kuznetsov, Sokolovsky, Budenny, Govorov, and others, but evidently not Vasilevsky or Konev. The standard resolution was then unanimously adopted, pledging "true and devoted support" to the Party, service to the cause of the Soviet people, and "determined and unconditional" fulfillment of Party and government decisions. No political leaders were specifically mentioned in the resolution.

The period of confusion at the time of Beria's purge produced a spate of rumors in Moscow, supposedly from Soviet sources, suggesting a keen awareness of the potentially important role of the military among the Soviet rank-and-file, as well as among the diplomatic community. It was at first rumored that Zhukov was under arrest, but this was quickly disproved by his appearance at a reception on 12 July. The [redacted] then reported the rumored arrest of the commander of the Moscow MD and the commandant of the city of Moscow. One of these men appeared at receptions on 14 July and 22 August, but subsequently the replacement of both was revealed in the Soviet press. [redacted] also cited rumors that the government planned a reduction in the size of the armed forces, and the [redacted] reported rumors that the term of military service for specialists was to be reduced and deferment policy liberalized. The absence of both Zhukov and Vasilevsky from official functions and listings from 22 July to 8 September, including absence from Air Force Day celebrations on 23 August, gave rise to false rumors that they had been removed, but both have appeared often since, and in early 1954 were nominated as deputies to the Supreme Soviet. Reports of such rumors in Moscow tapered off after last summer.

Rumors about the Soviet army's role in politics were prevalent all over the world during the summer. Stories under London datelines claimed that a military triumvirate (Voroshilov,

Bulganin and Zhukov) had assumed real power in the USSR, that Beria was in a military prison in Moscow, and that Konev had been arrested as a supporter of Beria. Italian, Austrian, and US newspapers carried various other "inside" stories. Such stories are not believed to have any validity regarding the actual situation in the USSR.

IV. Evidences of an Improvement in the Position of the Military

Promotions and Reassignments of High-Ranking Personnel:

Since June 1953, a number of developments have occurred which suggest a greater mobility for top military personnel, somewhat greater freedom from close control, and some increase in participation in political matters. The general impression created is one of a shift from a passive toward a more active role, beginning with the incidents of the East German riots and the Beria purge.

The feeling of increased mobility is conveyed by the number of promotions and reassignments of top commanders. The Soviet press has disclosed the promotion of two men to the rank of marshal, one to fleet admiral, one to admiral, and six to army (four-star) general since June 1953.1/ In general, those promoted are noted more for their professional abilities than for their political connections. For several years previously, ranks had apparently been frozen for top Soviet Army officers. The only promotions to army general between the end of World War II and 1953 occurred in 1948 (in that year four officers received the rank) and the only promotions to marshal were Sokolovsky's in 1946 and Bulganin's in 1947.

The turnover in top jobs in the Defense Ministry was also greater in 1953 than for several years past. There is now firm or probable evidence of the assignment of new persons to nine key military posts since Stalin's death, with seven of these changes revealed since last May Day. A rough comparison with recent years shows that, in 21 key jobs in the ministry, there were nine known changes in 1953 but only two in 1952, three in 1951 and none in 1950; in years prior to 1950, the known turnover was more nearly comparable to that of 1953. In addition to the Moscow MD, eleven other military districts probably have had a change in command since Stalin's death, partly as a direct result of the changes in the top jobs in the ministry.2/

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1/ For a detailed listing of these promotions, see Appendix II.

2/ The top posts considered in this comparison are those of Minister, First Deputies (3 in number), CinC Ground Forces, CinC Naval Forces, CinC Military Air Forces, CinC Long Range Aviation, CinC Airborne Forces, CinC Rear Services, CinC Artillery,

Most of the changes and promotions have been in the ground forces; naval and air officers hold fewer of the top positions in the Soviet armed forces, and there does not appear to have been any freeze in rank in these two services before 1953. Within the Navy, one of the more interesting appointments was that of Vice Admiral V. A. Fokin as Navy Chief of Staff, revealed in semi-official Soviet announcements in February and May 1953, and his promotion to admiral during the summer. ONI has noted that Fokin was for ten years closely associated with Admiral Levchenko, a Doctors' Plot "victim," and may be a protege of Levchenko. Admiral A. G. Golovko, whom Fokin replaced as Chief of Staff, has probably taken command of the South Baltic Fleet. None of these men is a member or candidate member of the Central Committee.

Within the air forces, where there has been considerable turnover in top positions since the end of World War II, there was little known change in 1953. The announcements of Aviation Day in August revealed that Col. Gen. P. F. Zhigarev, CinC of Military Aviation, had been made a Marshal of Aviation, in a move similar to the elevation of the Navy's chief to Fleet Admiral. In addition, it has been noted that, since July, Marshal of Aviation K. A. Vershinin has been signing obituaries directly after Zhigarev. Vershinin, former Air Force chief, had been replaced by Zhigarev in 1949 and had been in obscurity since that time, although he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in October 1952. He is reported to be a strong opponent of ground force domination among the services.

Among the more significant reassignments are changes in three key commands in the Moscow area:

- As commander of the Moscow MD and chief of the Moscow garrison, Col. Gen. P. A. Artemev was replaced by Col. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko. Soviet press material indicates that the change

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CinC Armored Forces, Inspector General, Chief of the General Staff, head of the Chief Political Directorate, Chairman of DOSAAF, commanders in Germany and Austria (2), commander in the Far East, and commanders in the Moscow Area (2). (Changes in job designations caused only by reorganizations of the armed forces were not counted when the individual's duties did not change.) For details of these and other personnel changes in the armed services since Stalin's death, see Appendix III.

probably occurred some time between 23 May and 22 July 1953. This command is responsible for all Soviet Army troops in the Moscow area, with at least one rifle division and other units. They are primarily show troops, with specially selected personnel, the best equipment, and well-qualified, politically reliable officers.

-As commandant of the city of Moscow, Lt. Gen. K. R. Sinilov was replaced by Maj. Gen. I. S. Kolesnikov, probably between 22 August and 8 September.1/ This command controls housekeeping and medical elements of the Soviet Army in the Moscow area. Although the commander has no tactical units of his own, he acts at times as a deputy to the commander of the Moscow garrison and is regularly charged with maintaining order during important Soviet anniversaries and celebrations.

-As commander of the Kremlin Guard, Lt. Gen. of MVD N. K. Spiridonov was replaced by Maj. Gen. A. Y. Vedenin, probably between 1 May and 7 November. This position, in the past held by an MVD officer, bears overt responsibility for the physical security of the Kremlin. The commander reportedly controls one picked MVD division and is subordinate to the Government Guard Directorate, which was presumably transferred from the MGB to the MVD in the governmental reorganization of March 1953. Maj. Gen. Kosynkin, whose death was announced in mid-February, was an officer of the Kremlin Guard.

As can be seen from the description of these commands, their incumbents are in a position to exert considerable influence at the center of Soviet government during times of crisis or tension. In some respects, they are as strategically placed as were the Guards regiments created by Peter the Great.

The replaced officers had all held their positions for many years, encompassing the period from at least early in World War II until after Stalin's death. Of the three, only Spiridonov is identified as an MVD man. Artemev had some MVD experience, his last known security assignment being command of an NKVD rifle division in 1939. Sinilov had been charged with preservation of order in

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1/ As mentioned earlier, a rumor was current in Moscow during July 1953 that both Sinilov and Artemev had been relieved of their commands and arrested.

Moscow when the Germans were at the gates of the city in 1941.1/ Since their replacement, the whereabouts of these three men has not been determined.

Biographic records show that the new appointees in the Moscow area are primarily professional military men, all three of whom held combat commands during World War II. Moskalenko, an ex-cavalry officer, had commanded an army which was on the Fourth Ukrainian Front from 1943 until 1945 and was in the Carpathian MD after the war. In about 1950, he became PVO (air defense) commander in the Moscow area. In September 1953, the Soviet press revealed his promotion to army general. Little is known concerning the careers of Kolesnikov and Vedenin. In 1944, as a lieutenant colonel, Kolesnikov received the award of Hero of the Soviet Union for his successful crossing of the Dnieper. Vedenin was a rifle division commander in World War II and a rifle corps commander in Germany in 1952. None of these three men was elected member or candidate member of the Central Committee in October 1952, although Moskalenko attended the Party Congress as delegate from the Moscow Party Committee and both he and Vedenin have participated in Ukrainian Party affairs.

The unusual number of recent promotions to high rank in the Soviet armed forces has led to theorize that the promotions are connected with Zhukov's appointment as First Deputy Minister, which believes was for the purpose of revising Soviet war plans in line with the post-Stalin governmental reorganization. The promotions, he believes, are consistent with the creation of new commands and the possible organization of large subordinate planning headquarters. This hypothesis would appear to hinge primarily on the inclusion among those promoted to army general of Biryuzov, the new commander in Austria, and M. M. Popov, commander of the Tauric MD in the Crimea. So far, however, there has been no other evidence to support the theory of enlarged commands. No known increases in size or expansions of function have occurred in the commands in Germany, Austria, or the Crimea. Also, although Sviridov had been only a lieutenant

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1/ The pertinent extract from Stalin's order of 19 October 1941 provides an instructive sidelight on the relationship between the army and the security forces in that time of crisis. After declaring a state of siege and martial law in Moscow, Stalin proclaimed that "the maintenance of strictest order in the city and adjacent raions has been assigned to the commandant of the city of Moscow, Maj. Gen. Sinilov, for which purpose the commandant has at his disposal the troops of internal security of the NKVD, the militia, and volunteer workers' detachments." Thus the army commander was temporarily given control over the security forces.

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Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

general, his predecessor in Austria had been promoted to army general in 1948, while in the command. For some years, Western intelligence has been watching for the establishment, in key Orbit border areas, of strategic command echelons above the Military District or Occupation Group level. Thus far, the only identified command comparable with the World War II "Front" has been Malinovsky's headquarters, organized in September 1947, with operational and administrative control over the three Military Districts of the Soviet Far East. It appears logical, however, that Zhukov's responsibilities should include review and revision of strategy, and the promotion of professional officers might be a result of his influence.

[redacted]

Possible Shifts in Army-MVD Relationships:

The changes in the three Moscow commands have been interpreted tentatively [redacted] as "tokens of rising military ascendancy over the MVD." Certainly, the appointment of a combat officer to command the Kremlin Guard raises the question whether the responsibility for Kremlin security has been transferred from MVD to Army control. This question might be clarified if up-to-date information should become available on the present status of the Government Guard Directorate, to which the Kremlin Guard is subordinate, and of its chief, reported [redacted] in 1950 to be Lt. Gen. of MVD N. S. Vlasik. The other two key Moscow commands were under army officers all along, but now their long-entrenched incumbents have been replaced by persons known primarily as professional military men.

An army man has encroached upon the MVD in at least one other instance; here again, the location adds to the significance of the change. On 2 August 1953 the Georgian press announced the appointment of A. I. Inauri as Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD) in the Georgian SSR, succeeding V. G. Dekanozov, who had been dismissed from the Georgian Communist Party as a supporter of Beria. Inauri is a professional army officer, now a major general, who commanded Soviet troops in Iran in 1945 and 1946 and commanded a mechanized division in Germany from 1948 until at least 1952. This is the first known instance in recent years of the appointment to a high MVD position of a man who is neither a member of the MVD nor a Party careerist. Later, in mid-September, the Georgian Party buro was reorganized to remove the last of Beria's followers, and Inauri and Army General Antonov, who had made the initial army denunciation of Beria, were appointed members of the ten-man buro.

The question of Army-MVD relationships is also raised by [redacted] reports indicating that, during the summer and early fall of 1953, the Soviet espionage system underwent a process of reorientation and personnel replacement. The Defense Ministry and the MVD perform most of the Soviet foreign intelligence functions. The organizations directly concerned are the foreign and counter-intelligence directorates of the MVD and the intelligence directorate of the Defense Ministry. The first two are primarily concerned with political intelligence, psychological warfare and counter-intelligence, while the last gathers chiefly military, scientific, and economic intelligence. During the summer of 1953, many of the official Soviet representatives abroad believed to be associated with these directorates were withdrawn. The foreign intelligence organization of the Defense Ministry had returned to its former strength by mid-November, but it appears that only a small number of MVD personnel returned to foreign assignments. This may of course be a routine reorientation, security measure, or economy move. The previously mentioned [redacted] reports state that, in the army, intelligence has been reduced from a Chief Directorate of the General Staff to a Directorate. There is no positive evidence to show any recent change in the activities of the Chief Directorate of Counter-intelligence of the MVD within the armed services; [redacted]

In addition to the several events since June 1953 tending to increase the influence of Army leaders at the direct expense of the MVD, developments of that year reduced the position and authority of the MVD with respect to all other agencies of the Soviet government, including the Army. These developments included the Doctors' Plot fiasco, the purge of Beria, and the appointment of a new minister without Presidium status. The scope of MVD activity was reduced, at least temporarily. The awareness of this decline among Soviet rank-and-file is illustrated by evidence of consternation among MVD officials in occupied Europe in June and by the attitude of [redacted] He commented that the discomfiture of the "MGB" was not disagreeable to the military.

Developments in the Mechanisms of Party Control:

With regard to relations between the Party and the armed forces, perhaps the most significant appointment of 1953 was the appointment of Col. Gen. A. S. Zheltov as head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. This appointment was revealed on 16 July in the public notice of the meeting of the Defense Ministry's Party aktiv, at which Zheltov reported on the Central Committee's decision to purge Beria. (The exact date of the appointment is not known; a New York Times release cleared by the Moscow censor on 16 July stated that Zheltov had held this position "for some time.") Little is known regarding Zheltov's career, except that he was once champion wrestler of the Red Army. A general officer since 1939, he served during World War II as a member of military councils in the Far East and the Ukraine. From 1945 until 1950, he was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet element of the Allied

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1/ A curious but entirely unconfirmed report alleges that the ouster of Beria produced a shift in army-security relationships in Bulgaria. [redacted] claim that, in late July, all Bulgarian military intelligence activities, including those of the Bulgarian SMERSH, were returned to military control. Officials of the Soviet MVD working in the intelligence section of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense were allegedly replaced by Soviet military personnel. In addition, there have been unconfirmed reports of widespread replacement of MVD personnel in the Satellites.

Control Council for Austria and was also reportedly chief of the Political Directorate of the Central Group of Forces in Austria and Hungary. In September 1950, he returned to Moscow for "other duties." After that time, his name appeared frequently on obituaries, but it is noteworthy that he was not elected a member of the Central Committee in October 1952. Zheltov appears to have been appointed over the heads of at least two logical candidates whose Party status was higher than his. One of these men, Col. Gen. F. F. Kuznetsov, had been the head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of War prior to Stalin's death. Kuznetsov's background is of some interest: he was active in the Army's Chief Intelligence Directorate beginning in 1938 and headed it from 1946 to 1948; in 1944, he had served on the military council of the Leningrad front under Zhdanov and Govorov; he may have been something of a protege of L. Z. Mekhlis, who had taken over the Army's political administration in the midst of the Great Purge of the 1930's, and he was a member of Suslov's committee to arrange the funeral of Mekhlis in February 1953. Kuznetsov had been elected a candidate member of the Central Committee at the XIX Party Congress and had spoken on Party affairs in the Army at the Congress.1/ The other logical candidate passed over by Zheltov was Maj. Gen. L. I. Brezhnev, the Party leader who had become political chief of the Navy early in March. It is likely that, even after Zheltov's appointment, Kuznetsov and Brezhnev still headed the political organizations of the army and navy. Kuznetsov signed an obituary after Zheltov on 20 October, and Brezhnev opened the Aviation Day ceremonies on 8 August, at which time his promotion to lieutenant general was revealed. Even Admiral Zakharov, replaced as navy political chief in March 1953, is apparently not in real disfavor, since on 6 November he was decorated for long service.

Changes in the Chief Political Directorate are of the utmost significance because of its responsibility for Party affairs and morale within the armed services and its direct control over the thousands of political officers within their ranks. The proper function of this whole organization has been a problem about which Communist leaders have exhibited considerable vacillation over the years. The position of Red Army Commissar was created by Trotsky's

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1/ F. F. Kuznetsov should not be confused with Col. Gen. V. I. Kuznetsov, former chairman of DOSAAF, the Soviet paramilitary and civil defense organization. V. I. Kuznetsov was apparently replaced as DOSAAF chairman on or before 26 July 1953 by Lt. Gen. K. F. Gritchin, a wartime air defense specialist.

order in 1918, primarily to provide a mechanism for establishing close surveillance by Party stalwarts over the ex-Czarist officers who were desperately needed to win battles but whose loyalty was suspect. A resolution of the Congress of Soviets that year provided that commander and commissar should exercise dual command of the unit, with the commissar holding veto power over all decisions. In May 1919, the Political Directorate was created, to direct the work of the commissars and to serve under the Party's Central Committee. After the end of the civil war, the commander's single authority was established in the spheres of combat, supply and administration, and in the late 1920's, as the size of the army decreased and the percentage of Communist commanders increased, the responsibilities of commander and political officer were combined in most units. The Great Purge brought a complete reversal of this trend. A decree of 15 August 1937, two months after the execution of the Tukhachevsky group, re-established the equality of commissars and commanders in both the military and political phases of army life; Voroshilov is quoted as saying some time thereafter, "both the commander and the military commissar will lead their unit into action."1/ The undeniable shortcomings displayed by the army in the Finnish campaign were blamed in large part on the commissars; both Zhukov and Marshal K. A. Meretskov, who commanded the troops in the later stages of the Finnish war, publicly criticized the system. In August 1940, a few months after Timoshenko replaced Voroshilov as People's Commissar of Defense, the system of dual command was abolished and the political commissars became deputy commanders for political affairs (called "zampolits"). In the disastrous first days after the German attack in 1941, however, the commissars and dual command were once again revived, to curb desertions and low morale. This was the period in which commissars were ordered to shoot commanders whose loyalty or determination showed any sign of flagging; one student has commented that the response of the Party to the crisis was to strengthen its "most loyal phalanx" within the army.2/ On 9 October 1942, the system reverted to the pattern of political officers subordinate to military commanders, a pattern which has been maintained at least on paper ever since. The abolition of the commissars in 1942 occurred two months after Gen. A. S. Shcherbakov became head of the Chief Political Directorate. The timing of this action indicates that it probably represented an effort to increase military efficiency and morale at a crucial moment

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1/ White: op. cit.; page 398.

2/ Merle Fainsod: How Russia is Ruled; Cambridge 1953; page 407.

at the end of the long retreat prior to the first major Soviet offensive. One source states that Zhukov demanded curtailment of the power of the political officers for the defense of Stalingrad.

Morale vs. Security in the Soviet Army in 1953:

As World War II drew to a close, the political apparatus regained some of its former power. The encroachment of political officers on the position of commanders became so flagrant that, according to [redacted] a decree was issued in August 1951 re-emphasizing the "undivided authority" of military commanders and reprimanding the political officers for their arrogant attempts to usurp authority. The XIX Party Congress speech by Vasilevsky, citing recent measures to strengthen the authority of commanders, plus Radio Volga's subsequent emphasis on unity of command, lend credence to this [redacted] statement. [redacted] added that the same order demanded stricter compliance with army regulations and enforcement of military discipline; in effect, therefore, it told political officers to get out of the commanders' business and to crack down in their own field. In Germany, this directive reportedly produced a series of bulletins and orders tightening regulations, intensifying political indoctrination of personnel, restricting the sale of liquor to military personnel, and re-emphasizing the order forbidding fraternization with the local population. The implementation of this new policy is well confirmed; beginning in mid-1951, intensive measures were taken throughout occupied Europe to isolate Soviet military personnel and installations, including the movement of headquarters from urban to rural areas, building of fences around installations, replacement of local civilian employees with Soviet nationals, and strict enforcement of the ban on fraternization. The general effect of this policy was to make barracks life for the troops in occupied Europe seem very like being in prison. Troops were scarcely allowed out of their compounds except in escorted groups, fraternization was forbidden, and what little free time there had been was filled with more political lectures. Most sources agree that, by 1953, although desertions had been cut down, morale among the men and officers in occupied Europe was low; morale had been sacrificed for security.

Following Beria's purge, many of the oppressive restrictions on Soviet troops in East Europe began to be lifted. On two occasions in July, Soviet officers in Berlin attended receptions in civilian clothes; when questioned about this, they replied that they were now permitted to wear civilian clothes when off duty. Beginning about 1 August, German innkeepers reported that Soviet troops could leave their quarters during off-duty hours and that many were

making excursions into towns near the training areas to attend dances and visit the taverns. One report stated that 10 per cent of the troops were being given passes each evening, with enlisted men observing a one a.m. curfew and officers allowed out overnight. Fraternization became prevalent in Germany during August and in Austria after about 1 September. Several reports of early September indicated that local civilians would again be employed at Soviet installations. In late October, the families of Soviet officers of the rank of lieutenant and above began to arrive in East Germany from the USSR, and it was rumored that teachers would soon arrive to set up schools for their children. In mid-November, Austrian Minister of Interior Helmer stated that Soviet military authorities were renting additional housing for dependents, and a Soviet officer in Austria reportedly said the dependents would arrive in December and January; the field commented that all Soviet officers were to be permitted to bring their families to Austria. (After mid-1948, only high-ranking officers and security personnel had been permitted to have their families in occupied Europe, and no provision was made for schooling.) At the same time, however, there was evidence that Soviet officers would have to serve longer tours of duty in the occupied areas: [redacted] reports that, on 18 November, a Soviet officer in Austria said his scheduled return to the USSR had been cancelled only a few hours before his departure and that he would have to remain for three more years. It was suggested that lengthened tours of duty were an economy measure, but the saving would not seem to outweigh the cost of transporting families and providing housing for them, which is a Soviet expense in Austria now that the USSR has assumed the cost of maintaining its occupation forces.

There is also some evidence that a more liberal attitude was adopted toward the problem of military security in the summer of 1953. On 22 June travel restrictions in the USSR were relaxed slightly and many areas previously closed to foreigners were declared open; this relaxation was partially rescinded in November, when a few areas were closed again. On 6 September the Ministry of Defense published the annual order for the routine call-up and demobilization of conscript classes, the first such public notice since 1948, and a Tass announcement of 16 October referred to the demobilization of soldiers of a specific Soviet tank division. Bulganin's 7 November speech revealed the completion of autumn maneuvers. These developments suggest a more realistic security policy, allowing the revelation of non-sensitive military information.

The Greater Influence of the Military Point of View:

Obviously the measures relaxing security controls over the troops were not the sole responsibility of the Army or of the Chief Political Directorate. They are consistent with the general effort to improve living conditions for the Soviet people, followed since Stalin's death by the new regime; but it is pertinent to our problem that the relaxation of controls on the troops bears directly on the ability of the political officers and the MVD agents to keep close tabs on all personnel and to press their political indoctrination. Although there has been no evidence of any change in the political officers' responsibility for detailed reporting on political reliability, a man with free time, in civilian clothes and allowed to go where he pleases, is hardly susceptible to close surveillance. It seems clear that this is essentially a military man's solution to the problem of army morale--the soldiers were to be treated like soldiers instead of being cloistered like a bunch of children, and the power of the political officer and the MVD man over them was reduced. Likewise, the more realistic approach to matters of security would appear to reflect a military man's point of view toward that problem. Several appointments of past months also suggest that a military point of view was taken into consideration, particularly those appointments in which professional army officers were placed in positions formerly held by Party or MVD personnel.

Is there support for the inference that a military man's point of view can exist in the USSR, shared by some members of the professional officer caste and possibly even by some political officers? It was cautioned earlier that the armed services should not be considered a monolithic unit and probably do not constitute an autonomous source of political power. In spite of the tendency toward fragmentation and lack of initiative, can at least some persons within the services express a military point of view in competition with other branches of government, especially the Party and the MVD, within the limits imposed by the prevailing system? It is not believed that Party membership is in itself a deterrent to the existence of a military point of view; in fact, H. J. Berman, in commenting on the high percentage of Party members in the officer corps, has raised the cogent point that, while this may constitute a threat to the military tradition, "it may equally constitute an infiltration of the military mentality into the Party itself."1/ Military terminology was of course commonly used by Party leaders to describe their political and economic "campaigns"

1/ In his article, "The Basic Facts about Russia's Army;" The Washington Star, 31 August 1953.

since before the Revolution. Fedotoff White studied the history of the political commissars in the civil war period, commenting that the "ancient rhythm of army life," the planning of strategic maneuvers and the administrative details of a detachment, held a strong attraction for these energetic young Communists, who therefore often tended to neglect their own official responsibilities.1/ "Political work among the greenhorn Communists in the ranks, who were fumbling with the basic tenets of Marxism, was a tame pastime in comparison with the 'glory' of the battlefield and the exercise of authority in the everyday life of the camp." Even Gen. Jan Gamarnik, who headed the army's political directorate and who committed suicide in June 1937, was implicated in the Tukhachevsky affair.

Strong ties presumably developed among top military commanders out of the experience of World War II, when the privilege of rank was great and professional military men had great influence on national policies. The roster of Zhukov's wartime comrades-in-arms, for example, includes Konev, Rokossovsky, Timoshenko, Govorov, Malinovsky, Voronov, Vasilevsky, Chuikov, Kurasov, Sokolovsky and Popov. Men who were directly subordinate to some of the top military leaders during the wartime and immediate postwar years have in some cases emerged in key positions more recently. For example, Army General V. V. Kurasov, head of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (roughly comparable to the US Army War College), Col. Gen. A. S. Zhadov, head of the Frunze Military Academy (comparable to the US Command and General Staff College), and Zheltov, new head of the Chief Political Directorate, all served under Marshal Konev in Austria. The present positions of these three generals are influential in the molding of Soviet military thought.

As has been suggested, those individuals who hold a military point of view might be expected to be less rigid in their thinking than doctrinaire Party officials, and less reliant on indoctrination and surveillance as a solution to their problems. Likewise, they might be less morbidly concerned with security and secrecy than those whose thinking had been conditioned by years of training and service in the MVD and its predecessor organizations. Like the members of any professional group, those holding the military point of view might be impatient with interference and meddling by non-professionals in what they considered vital problems affecting Soviet defenses. Their attitudes regarding such problems might be "non-political" or even "anti-political," as very probably in the case

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1/ White: op. cit.; page 89.

of Zhukov. The non-political or anti-political officers might have a more realistic, hard-headed approach to certain national problems and might display more independence of thought regarding solutions than would "political generals" such as Bulganin. Such an attitude in the field of national defense affairs might carry over into the field of Soviet international relations. It thus could be speculated that the somewhat increased flexibility in foreign policy shown by the Soviet regime since Stalin's death has been fully supported by the military point of view in the USSR. It must be cautioned, however, that there is no really useful current information on the formulation of Soviet foreign policy and that most opinions regarding the attitudes of top Soviet military men toward the West are mere suppositions. In the absence of reliable information, it would be extremely dangerous to assume that the military point of view in the USSR is more friendly toward the West than are other Soviet points of view today, or, conversely, that the military mind is any more determined to seek war with the West.

Summary of the First Year:

A review of the significant developments of the period from October 1952 through October 1953 affecting the political position of the Soviet armed forces shows a progression through several distinct phases. In the months preceding Stalin's death, there was evidence of the participation of certain army leaders or factions in political maneuvering. The period of the post-Stalin struggle between Malenkov and Beria, from March until June, was a time of outward passivity on the part of the Soviet military leaders, with an increase in political control over them. After June, however, high officers of the armed forces enjoyed somewhat greater mobility, professional officers were placed in important security assignments, and greater consideration was given to a military point of view regarding questions of morale and security within the armed forces. It seems quite likely that these changes resulted in part from the increased influence of Zhukov and others of an "anti-political" frame of mind. The armed forces leadership participated to some extent, possibly only verbal, in the removal of Beria, and it seems reasonable to conclude that the present Party leadership bought military acquiescence or support for its control by giving the professional military men greater freedom within their own establishment. There was no clear evidence, however, of any drastic change in the formal relationships between the armed forces and any other branch of the Soviet government. The alliance between top army and Party leaders was probably an uneasy one; Zhukov and the military point of view were hardly on what would be called close terms with Malenkov and the other top Soviet leaders.

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Military Participation on Beria's Trial Board:

On 23 December, Izvestia announced that a special session of the Supreme Court, under the chairmanship of Marshal I. S. Konev, had tried and convicted Beria and six accomplices on charges of treason and that the death sentence had been carried out. On the face of it, the appointment of a high military man as chairman of this court is another indication that Army leaders are now active participants in, and supporters of, the policies of the present Soviet regime. Membership on the court of a Soviet Army marshal may be partially explained by reasons of protocol, since Beria had held the rank of marshal since 1945. The sentence specified that the defendants were stripped of "all their military titles and awards." This was not essentially a military tribunal, however; for this reason it seems that, as chairman, Konev was given unusual precedence over a high Party figure, alternate Presidium member N. M. Shvernik, who was a member of the court.

Regarding Konev, the most obvious point of interest that comes to mind is the fact that he was named as a Doctors' Plot "victim," although he had been considered a loyal, personal friend of Stalin. He was one of seven top military leaders chosen to guard Stalin's coffin but was absent from official functions covered in the Soviet press from that time until September. Using the hypothesis that Malenkov was behind the Doctors' Plot announcement, that it was in part a warning to Konev and others, and that Beria later reversed it, it can be speculated that Konev's appearance on the trial board reflects his shift from opposition to support of Malenkov. On the other hand, membership in the group convicting Beria may have been considered an undesirable assignment for any military or civilian leader, because of the possibility that it might backfire later, and Konev may have accepted it only reluctantly.

Another member of the court was Army General K. S. Moskalenko, who became commander of the Moscow MD at about the time of Beria's arrest. His membership is another hint that military forces in the Moscow area participated in the arrest and imprisonment of Beria. If the presence of Konev and Moskalenko on the court indicates active military participation in the policies of the present regime, it must also be noted that Ambassador Bohlen has commented that the court included representatives of the Army, the trade unions, the MVD and the Georgian branch of the Communist Party, suggesting an effort to involve representatives of a number of institutions in the decisions.

A curious note regarding the present influence of the armed

forces is found in an omission from the court's report. The State Prosecutor's indictment of 17 December specifically accused Beria, among other things, of weakening the defensive capacity of the USSR. The Court's report of 24 December said that all preliminary investigations and accusations had been "completely confirmed;" but, in the detailed listing of Beria's criminal acts which followed this statement, Soviet defenses were not mentioned.

Other Recent Developments:

As pointed out earlier, the relaxation of controls over the troops in occupied Europe was consistent with the general effort to improve Soviet living conditions. An illustration of the close relationship between some policies of the government and the Army is a measure adopted by the Supreme Soviet on 26 November 1953, which will influence both civilians and military personnel. A decree of that date rescinded a 1947 decree which made marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners illegal; the 1947 decree was thought to have been partly directed at Soviet military personnel abroad. Ambassador Bohlen commented that the action of 26 November seemed connected with efforts to liquidate some of the most inflexible and damaging aspects of Stalin's policy, the advantages of which were not commensurate with the losses involved. In January 1954, it was reported that a decree permitting marriage to Austrians was read to Soviet troops in the Vienna area.

It is noteworthy, however, that some of the liberal Soviet policies initiated during the summer were partially reversed by the end of the year. On 14 November, five new areas of the USSR were closed to foreigners; this action reversed the trend toward easing travel restrictions which had appeared in June. During the autumn, various instances of the abuse of increased privileges were reported from the East European areas occupied by Soviet troops. Disorders and crimes were reported, and [redacted] stressed the unfavorable reaction of the German population to the Soviet soldiers' attempts at fraternization. Curfews, off-limits areas, escorts for enlisted men on passes, and in some cases restrictions to barracks were imposed, and by late December it was apparent that restrictions on the troops had been partially re-instituted in both Germany and Austria. The impression conveyed by the reports, however, was that increased freedom for the troops was still the general rule, with exceptions where security required it, whereas before the summer tight controls over the troops had been the rule.

Dependents of Soviet officers arrived in Germany daily during

December, and by January 1954 they had occupied at least 4,000 family dwelling units there. The influx continued despite considerable discontent on the part of German civilians in areas where many quarters were requisitioned. USAREUR estimated that, by the end of January, 18,000 - 20,000 dependent groups had arrived in East Germany. In Austria, where housing was apparently requested and paid for rather than requisitioned, few dependents had arrived by the end of 1953. Their arrival was suspended temporarily about the first of the year. The explanation given to the officers was reported to be a shortage of housing, and stated that renovation of apartments for dependents was under way at 22 locations in Austria, with 1 March 1954 the scheduled completion date for most quarters. Preparations for the arrival of Soviet officers' dependents have also been reported under way in Poland and Hungary. At the same time, an accumulation of information has led to accept reports that the tour of duty for Soviet officers in occupied Europe has been lengthened from three to five years. The explanation for this has not been learned by any

The question of the Army-MVD relationship remains open, and the relationship itself may still be in a state of flux within the USSR. Various rumors have had it that the Army has taken over many of the police functions of the MVD, particularly in the Moscow area, but these stories are not supported by the day-to-day reporting this winter in Moscow. A stated in January that, in Tiflis, Army personnel were supervising the checking of visitors' documents, a function normally performed by the MVD; this could tie in with the increase in importance of high military men in Georgia last summer.

APPENDIX I

MILITARY PERSONNEL ELECTED TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AT THE XIX PARTY CONGRESS, OCTOBER 1952

NOTE: These lists include only those actively associated with military affairs; they do not include the following men who hold military rank and who held the following positions in October 1952: the ministers and first deputy ministers of the armaments, aviation, and shipbuilding industries; the minister of the machine and instrument making industry; and the head of the First Chief Directorate of the Council of Ministers (atomic research).

Key:
x - re-elected in same status
xx - promoted to full membership from candidate status
xxx - demoted from full membership to candidate status
/ - elected as full or candidate member for the first time at the XIX Party Congress

FULL MEMBERS

Name	Position at time of election	Present Position
x Marshal N.A. Bulganin	Dpty Chairman, Council of Ministers; Member, Politburo, CC, CPSU	Minister of Defense; 1st Dpty Chairman, Council of Ministers; Member, Presidium, CC, CPSU
x Marshal K.E. Voroshilov	Dpty Chairman, Council of Ministers; Member, Politburo, CC, CPSU	Chairman, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet; Member, Presidium, CC, CPSU
x V-Adm N.G. Kuznetsov	Minister of Navy	CinC, Naval Forces; 1st Dpty Minister of Defense
xx Marshal I.S. Konev	Dpty Minister of War; CinC, Ground Forces (?)	Dpty Minister of Defense; CinC, Ground Forces (?)
/ Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky	Minister of War	1st Dpty Minister of Defense

Full Members (Cont'd)

Name	Position at time of election	Present Position
/Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky	1st Dpty Minister of War	Chief of Gen Staff, Defense Ministry
/Maj Gen L.I. Brezhnev	Secretary, Central Committee, Moldavia	Probably ex-Chief, Political Directorate, Naval Forces; ex-Deputy Chief, Chief Polit Directorate, Defense Ministry; now 2nd Secretary, Kazakh CC.

CANDIDATE MEMBERS

Name	Position at time of election	Present Position
x Marshal G.K. Zhukov	Commander, Ural MD (?)	1st Dpty Minister of Defense
x Marshal K.A. Meretskov	Commander, White Sea MD	Commander, White Sea MD
x Admiral I.S. Yumashev	unknown; released as Minister of Navy, July 1951, "at own request," probably retired	unknown, probably retired
xxx Marshal S.M. Budenny	CinC, Cavalry Troops, Soviet Army	CinC, Cavalry Troops, Soviet Army
xxx Marshal S.K. Timoshenko	Commander, Belorussian MD	Commander, Belorussian MD
xxx Admiral S.E. Zakharov	Chief, Chief Political Directorate, Soviet Navy	relieved March 1953; present position unknown
/ Col Gen P.A. Artemev	Commander, Moscow MD	relieved; present position unknown
/ Army Gen I.K. Bagramyan	Commander, Baltic MD	Commander, Baltic MD
/ Adm N.E. Basisti	1st Dpty Minister, Navy	Dpty CinC, Naval Forces
/ Marshal S.I. Bogdanov	Commander, Armored Troops	relieved (?)
/ Marshal of Aviation K.A. Vershinin	unknown	unknown
/ Col Gen A.V. Gorbatov	Commander, Airborne Troops	Commander, Airborne Troops
/ Col Gen P.F. Zhigarev	CinC, Military Air Forces	CinC, Military Air Forces

APPENDIX II

PROMOTIONS SINCE DEATH OF STALIN

Name	Rank	Present Position
P.F. Zhigarev	Marshal of Aviation	CinC, Military Air Forces; Dpty Minister of Defense
M.I. Nedelin	Marshal of Artillery	Dpty Minister of Defense; probably PVO head
N.G. Kuznetsov*	Admiral of Fleet	CinC, Naval Forces; 1st Dpty Minister of Defense
M.M. Popov	Army General	Commander, Tauric MD
K.S. Moskalenko	Army General	Commander, Moscow MD and Garrison
S.S. Biryuzov	Army General	Commander, Central Group of Forces (Austria)
M.S. Malinin	Army General	Dpty Chief of Gen Staff, Ministry of Defense
A.A. Grechko	Army General	Commander, Group of Occupation Forces, Germany
V.A. Fokin	Admiral	Chief of Naval Staff
L.I. Brezhnev	Lt General	Probably ex-Chief, Political Directorate, Naval Forces; ex-Dpty Chief, Chief Political Directorate, Defense Ministry; now 2nd Secretary, Kazakh CC
N.I. Krylov	Army General	Commander, Far East MD

* Kuznetsov's promotion was revealed in the Soviet press in June 1953. All others were revealed subsequent to Beria's arrest.

APPENDIX III

PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE ARMED SERVICES SINCE THE DEATH OF STALIN

Position	Present Incumbent	Former Incumbent	Date of Change
*Minister of Defense	Marshal N.A. Bulganin 1/	----------2/	March 1953
*1st Dpty Ministers of Defense	Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky3/	----------2/	March 1953
	Marshal G.K. Zhukov	----------	March 1953
	Admiral of Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov	----------	Identified June 1953
*Chief, Chief Political Directorate, Ministry of Defense	Col Gen A.S. Zheltov	Col Gen F.F. Kuznetsov	Identified July 1953
Chief, Political Directorate of Naval Forces	Lt Gen L.I. Brezhnev	Adm S.Ye. Zakharov	March 1953
*CinC, Tank and Mechanized Troops	Col Gen of Guards A.I. Radzievsky (?)	Marshal of Tanks S.I. Bogdanov	Sept 1953 (?)

*. Considered top military posts in text.

1/ Had been Presidium member with general supervision over military matters prior to March 1953.

2/ The posts of Minister and Deputy Minister of Defense were newly created in March 1953.

3/ Vasilevsky had been Minister of War and Kuznetsov Minister of the Navy prior to March 1953. Their appointments as First Deputies therefore cannot be considered major changes and are not included in the total of 9 top appointments since Stalin's death.

Position	Present Incumbent	Former Incumbent	Date of Change
*Chairman, DOSAAF Organizational Committee (now Chairman, Central Committee, DOSAAF)	Lt Gen K.F. Gritchin	Col Gen V.I. Kuznetsov	Identified July 1953
*Commander, Moscow MD and Garrison	Army Gen K.S. Moskalenko	Col Gen P.A. Artemev	Between May-July 1953
*Commandant, City of Moscow	Maj Gen I.S. Kolesnikov	Lt Gen K.R. Sinilov	Between 22 Aug-8 Sept 1953
Commander, Kremlin Guard	Maj Gen A.Y. Vedenin	Lt Gen N.K. Spiridonov	Identified 7 Nov 1953
Commander, Air Forces of Moscow MD	Lt Gen S.V. Rubanov	Lt Gen V.I. Stalin	Identified Aug 1953
*Commander, Group of Occupation Forces, Germany	Army Gen A.A. Grechko	Army Gen V.I. Chuikov	June 1953
*Commander, Central Group of Forces (Austria)	Army Gen S.S. Biryuzov	Lt Gen V.P. Sviridov	July 1953
Commander, Transbaikal MD	Lt Gen E.G. Trotsenko	Col Gen D. Lelyashenko(?)	1953
Commander, Kiev MD	Army Gen V.I. Chuikov	Col Gen A.A. Grechko	June 1953
Commander, Ural MD	unknown	Marshal G.K. Zhukov	March 1953 (?)
Commander, Turkestan MD	Col Gen A.A. Luchinski	Col Gen I.Z. Susaikov(?)	Identified Feb 1954

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Position	Present Incumbent	Former Incumbent	Date of Change
Commander, Leningrad MD	Army Gen M.V. Zakharov	Col Gen A.A. Luchinski	autumn 1953
Commander, Maritime MD	unknown	Col Gen S.S. Biryuzov	summer 1953
Commander, N. Caucasus MD	unknown	Col Gen S.G. Trofimenko (died Oct 1953)	Oct 1953
Commander, Ural MD	Col Gen M.I. Kazakov (?)	Marshal SU G.K. Zhukov	prior Feb 1954 (?)
Commander, Volga MD	Col Gen V.I. Kuznetsov (?)	unknown	between July 1953-Feb 1954 (?)
Commander, Don MD	Army Gen A.I. Yeremenko (?)	Col Gen V.Z. Romanovski	prior Feb 1954 (?)
Commander, West Siberian MD	Col Gen N.P. Pukhov	Army Gen A.I. Yeremenko	Identified Feb 1954

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CAESAR - 10

17 August 1954

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PURGE OF L.P. BERIA

Office of Current Intelligence

HR70-14
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CAESAR-10

Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
13 August 1954

MEMORANDUM

This paper is the tenth chapter of the CAESAR series, and is devoted to the purge in 1953 of the Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, L. P. Beria. This paper, as all other chapters of the CAESAR series, is a working paper, intended to assemble pertinent information from all sources in a retrospective analysis of developments affecting the Soviet leadership. The reader is again reminded that the views expressed are those of the authors, and do not represent official views of the Central Intelligence Agency.

THE BERIA PURGE

Table of Contents

THE BERIA PURGE

Summary and Conclusions

Beria's star, which had been declining since mid-1951, rose to an extraordinary height following Stalin's death. At that time he again took over the direct control of the USSR security forces and carried out a number of moves of the greatest importance. He attempted to purge the Soviet apparatus of those who had opposed him or had been used by others to oppose him. He appointed some trusted followers to positions in the MVD. He apparently initiated and promoted a de-Russification policy, and used this policy to oust some important local officials. He also carried through an extensive purge in Georgia and restored his followers to office in that republic. Beria thus appeared to be forging to the front in the leadership race.

Many of Beria's actions in this period appear to have been unilateral and as such to have threatened the method of leadership which had been established after Stalin's death. The presidium had been acting collectively and stressing the principle of collegiality since Stalin's death. This compulsion for collectivity apparently arose originally from the lack of any overwhelmingly strong individual heir apparent for the dictator's mantle and from distaste at the summit of the hierarchy for the consequences of a one-man rule of the Stalinist type.

Realizing that unquestioned supremacy for any one of their number would soon lead to the liquidation of at least some of the remainder as potential rivals, the ruling group apparently determined to prevent the assumption of Stalin's power by any one individual. It must have appeared to the other leaders that Beria was making his bid for this power; or possibly, someone was able to convince the others that this was so. The development which goaded the party presidium to act against him may have been his moving two MVD divisions into the Moscow area, an action that has been reported or rumored by at least four different sources. This move, if it occurred, was undoubtedly too much for Beria's fellow leaders to take even if they had previously agreed with some of the policies he had sponsored.

The charge that Beria had attempted to place the MVD above the party and government received primary attention in Soviet propaganda and contained elements of truth. The allegation that he had "impeded important decisions," particularly in agriculture, may date back to the agrogorod controversy of 1950. The accusation that Beria attempted to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR tends to confirm the view that he was behind the de-Russification policy, while the charge that he followed a "capitulatory" policy may also be a reflection on his "de-Russification" policy and on his much quoted statement on "the constitutional rights of Soviet citizens." The allegation that he "distorted" important party and government orders may have been connected with the implementation of the Soviet amnesty program.

Finally the charge that Beria attempted to weaken the defensive capacity of the USSR may have related to his previous responsibilities in the field of atomic energy.

All of Beria's co-defendants were either MVD officials or had worked previously with Beria in the security forces. Furthermore, Dekanozov and Meshyk were MVD ministers in important republics at the time of their arrest and had apparently carried through Beria-inspired purges in those republics. Merkulov had previously headed the MGB under Beria, had been in charge of the Chief Directorate of Soviet Property abroad, and since 1950 had headed the Ministry of State Control. Beria may have used Merkulov in this last named post to influence the Soviet economy.

[redacted] sources have disclosed that there was a long central committee document disseminated to selected party and state officials on the subject of Beria's purge. This document reportedly included the information that Beria had moved two MVD divisions into Moscow in an attempt to carry out a coup, but that this had been countered by the army.

As a consequence of Beria's purge, a number of personnel changes were made in the party and government apparatus. Beria had begun to restaff the central and republic MVD organizations with his followers shortly after he resumed direct control over the MVD in March 1953, but was not able to accomplish this in one sweep. On Beria's dismissal, a few of his MVD appointees, notably Meshyk and Dekanozov, were also removed from office. In most cases, however, replacements for Beria appointees were not made for several months, and virtually no effort was made to link those replaced with Beria. Some, in fact, continued to occupy important state and party positions in February 1954. Replacements for Beria's followers in the central and republic MVD organizations were drawn largely from old MVD officials who had served under the present MVD minister, S. N. Kruglov.

Party and government personnel shifts following Beria's ouster do not appear to have been extensive, except in Georgia. As in the MVD changes, the party and government shifts were carried out rather slowly and with little attempt to relate the changes to the Beria case. The purge of Arutunov in Armenia in December 1953 is the last important regional party purge which can be related to the Beria case.

The reticence over relating the regional purges to Beria may be part of a general policy of playing down the whole episode and confining the case to the MVD. Such a policy is also reflected in the official indictments and in propaganda treatment of the whole episode. Failure to play up the case and make a real propaganda scapegoat of Beria and his followers plus the limited nature of the post-Beria purge may be due to the continued presence within the hierarchy of important officials who had co-operated with Beria, particularly in the period between Stalin's death and his ouster.

It may also be due to an understandable fear on the part of at least some of the collegial leaders that an extensive purge might jeopardize their power and their lives. However, the fact that the case has several loose ends makes its reopening a definite possibility should the Soviet leaders find it expedient as an adjunct to the implementation of their policies.

It is most probable, however, that, unless some other leader moves in the same direction as Beria and attempts to usurp power for himself, the episode is closed. The caution with which the purges in the MVD and the Transcaucasian area were carried out and the lack of publicity concerning them is consistent with the policies that have been developed since Stalin's death. Open terror and coercion have been played down in the Soviet press and the ubiquitous police power has been minimized. The concept of collective decisions has been expressed with the heaviest emphasis on the operation of this concept at local levels, and criticism from below has been stressed. An attempt to improve morale throughout the Soviet Union has been evident. All of these moves would have been jeopardized by purges of the scope of the 1930's, or purges that were highly publicized. The leaders clearly were against this. Their interest appears to have been to continue to rule collectively and to control the MVD so that it could never be used as an instrument to ensure the rule of one man. In this, they appear to have been successful.

I. The Beria Purge

Immediate Background

On 27 June 1953, the presidium of the party, attending its first social function as a group, appeared at the Bolshoi theatre for a performance of the opera "The Decembrists." Missing from the ranks were Beria and alternate members Bagirov and Melnikov. Beria's absence was both significant and inexplicable. Earlier on the 27th, unusual military movements had been noted in Moscow; several dozen tanks and military vehicles arrived by rail and proceeded through the city to an unknown destination. Additional movements of military vehicles were observed during that night and these movements continued until 30 June. On 6 July, US ambassador Bohlen reported a Moscow rumor that Beria was in difficulty because of the security breakdown in East Germany where unprecedented riots had broken out on 17 June.

On 4 July, an anonymous Pravda article had made some pointed remarks about party unity and discipline. Pravda claimed that "the party removes with determination any appearance of petit bourgeois individualism." It quoted Stalin as saying that the Russian Bolshevists would have ruined the cause of the revolution "had they not known how to subordinate the will of individual comrades to the will of the majority, had they not known how to act collectively." Continuing in this vein the article said: "The person who lags behind in an ideological political respect is not able to understand correctly the internal and external situation and cannot fulfill the role of a political leader." On 7 July, an Izvestia editorial carried this theme further. Calling Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism a striking example of a creative attitude and a "brilliant development" of Marxist theory, it stated: "A leader who neglects theory, who does not raise his ideological-political level ... inevitably lags behind life. He is unworthy of being a leader and life will sooner or later strike him off the list." On 10 July, Beria was "struck off the list."

The Official Record

TASS published on 10 July the texts of communiques on Beria's ouster issued by the central committee of the party and by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet:

The central committee communique--"After listening to and discussing the report of the presidium of the central committee by G. M. Malenkov as regards the criminal antiparty and antistate actions of L. P. Beria intended to undermine the Soviet state in the interest of foreign capital and

manifested in the perfidious attempts to place the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs above the government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the plenum of the Soviet Communist Party central committee decided to remove L. P. Beria from the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and to expel him from the ranks of the party as an enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet people."

The communique of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet--"In view of the fact that criminal antistate actions of L. P. Beria intended to undermine the Soviet state in the interest of foreign capital have been brought to light, the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, having considered the report of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on this question, has decided: (1) to remove L. P. Beria from the post of 1st deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and from the post of minister of internal affairs of the USSR; (2) to refer the case of L. P. Beria's criminal actions for the consideration of the USSR Supreme Court. The presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has appointed Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov minister of internal affairs of the USSR."

Pravda's Amplification

The case against Beria was spelled out more fully in an accompanying Pravda editorial on the day the news broke. Pravda said that Beria's "criminal, antiparty and antistate activity was deeply concealed and masked, but lately, having become impudent and letting himself go, Beria started to disclose his real face." According to Pravda, the "intensification of Beria's criminal activities can be explained by the general intensification of the undermining, anti-Soviet activities of international reactionary forces which are hostile to our state." The editorial specifically accused Beria of the following:

1. "Attempting to put the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs before the party and the government, and, by using MVD organs in the center and local bodies against the party and its leadership, and against the government of the USSR, by selecting workers for the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of personal loyalty to himself."

2. "Beria under various invented pretexts ... impeded decisions on most important and urgent items concerning agriculture. It was done with the view to undermining the collective farms and creating difficulties in the country's food supply."

3. He "strove to undermine the friendship of the Soviet peoples ... to disseminate hostility among the USSR peoples and to activize bourgeois-national elements in union republics."

4. "Being compelled to carry out direct orders of the party central committee and the Soviet government regarding the strengthening of the Soviet legislation and liquidation of some facts of lawlessness and arbitrary action, Beria intentionally impeded the implementation of these orders, and in several cases attempted to distort them."

5. "He hatched plans to grab the leadership of the party and country with the aim of actually destroying the Communist Party and of changing the policy elaborated by the party by a capitulatory policy which would have brought about ultimately the restoration of capitalism."

Pravda said that the necessary conclusion to be drawn from the case was that "the strength of our leadership lies in its collectivity" fully corresponding to the statements of Marx "on the harm of the cult of personality." The paper added that party organizations must systematically check the work of all organizations and of all leading workers, particularly the activities of the MVD, and that this was not a right but a duty.

Aftermath

This bombshell of 10 July which blasted out of the party's ranks its second most important figure was followed by a series of meetings all over the USSR staged to demonstrate loyalty to the regime and to excoriate Beria. Perhaps the most interesting of these was that held by the "aktiv" of the Ministry of Defense on 16 July when the prominent military men in the USSR, less Vasilevsky and Konev, pledged allegiance to the "collegial" leadership. References to meetings supporting the leadership subsided after a few days as did references to the case in Soviet propaganda media. This blackout gave rise to rumors in the West that Beria had escaped his tormentors and was seeking sanctuary.1/ The next official word on the case came on 8 August when the Supreme Soviet, meeting after an unexplained postponement of eight days, confirmed the earlier decree of its presidium removing Beria from his government post and revealed that the said decree had been dated 26 June, thus fixing the timing of Beria's arrest as

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1/ These rumors were given some credence by journalists because nowhere in the early official texts was it ever stated that Beria had been arrested. The announcement of the results of Beria's trial published on 24 December stated that the accused had again admitted their guilt "in court" and that the sentence--death by shooting--had been carried out on 23 December. However, as in the case of Stalin's death, we are completely dependent on official Soviet sources for this information.

occuring on or about that date. Again, a long blackout ensued until 16 December, when it was officially announced that the Prosecutor's office had completed its case against Beria.

The Indictment of Beria

The prosecutor's statement of 16 December alleged that the following had been established:

1. Beria had collected a group of plotters and the group had aimed to use the MVD against the government and party in the "interest of foreign capital," striving to place the MVD above the party and government, to grab power, liquidate the regime, restore capitalism and revive domination of the bourgeoisie. After Stalin's death Beria intensified his criminal actions "primarily by using MVD organs for the seizure of power, which made it possible in a short period of time to lay bare the true face of the traitor of the motherland and to take decisive measures to put an end to his hostile activity." The plotters "subjected to persecution ... honest workers of the MVD who had refused to carry out the criminal instruction of Beria."

2. "In order to subvert the collective farm system and to create food difficulties ... Beria by all manner of means, sabotaged and interfered with the implementation of most important measures ... directed toward an upsurge of the economy of collective and state farms and toward a steady improvement of the well being of the people."

3. "Beria and his accomplices carried out criminal measures in order to resuscitate remnants of the bourgeois nationalist elements in Union Republics, sow hatred and discord among the people of the USSR and primarily to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR with the Great Russian people."

4. Beria had established contact through "planted spies" and through secret contact with counterrevolutionary Georgian mensheviks and "agents of a number of foreign intelligence agencies."

5. Beria had made his career by "slander, intrigues and various provocations against honest party and local government workers who stood in his path"--a whole series of such "machinations" were uncovered; for example, Beria had waged a criminal campaign against Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who had distrusted Beria. The plotters also murdered people from whom they feared exposure; for example, M. S. Kedrov. Other facts relating to terrorist murders were also uncovered.

6. "As established by the investigation Beria and his accomplices committed a number of treacherous acts, endeavoring to weaken the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union."

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7. Other crimes committed by Beria were also uncovered, testifying "to his profound moral depravity" and in addition facts regarding "criminal mercenary actions" were also established.

Having been exposed by "numerous witnesses" and "true documentary data the accused admitted their guilt of having committed a number of most serious state crimes." They were charged with high treason and tried according to the law of 1 December 1934.1/ The accused, besides Beria, were: Merkulov, minister of state control; Dekanozov, MVD minister in Georgia; Kobulov, deputy minister of MVD; Goglidze, chief of one of the MVD departments; Meshik, MVD minister in the Ukraine; and Vlodzimirski, chief of the MVD Department of Special Investigations.

The Trial Announcement

On 24 December the Moscow press published the findings of the Supreme Court, its sentence and the notice of execution of Beria and his six co-defendants. The special session of the court was chaired by Marshal Konev and included the following members: Shvernik, alternate presidium member and trade union chairman; Zeyin, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Court; General Moskalenko, commander of the Moscow Military District and

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1/ See footnote 1, page 3 to the effect that the Beria group had been "in court" at the time of their trial. The law of 1 December 1934 (promulgated immediately after Kirov's assassination) provides that "cases must be heard without participation of the parties." This has been interpreted by legal experts to mean that neither the defendants nor their counsels can participate in court during consideration of the case, and thus leaves inexplicable the reference to a further admission of guilt by Beria and his cohorts in court.

It should be noted that in the Soviet Union it is extremely rare that laws are publicly ignored or tampered with. It is possible that this provision of the law was ignored so as to make it clear that Beria agreed that his guilt was absolute and concurred in the sentence, since, under present conditions, the new leadership apparently wished to avoid a public trial comparable to those of the 30's in which this could have been brought out.

The law also provides that investigation of such cases must be terminated during a period of not more than ten days; that appeals against the sentence and petitions for pardons are not to be admitted; and that sentence of death is mandatory and must be carried out immediately. These provisions appear to have been carried out to the letter as well as in the spirit of the law.

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garrison; Mikhailov, secretary of the Moscow oblast committee; Kushava, chairman of the Georgian trade unions; Gromov, chairman of the Moscow court; and Lunev, first deputy minister of the MVD. The court confirmed the evidence of the preliminary investigations and the accusations laid down in the prosecutor's indictment. The court established that Beria:

1. "acting in the interest of foreign capital ... set up a treacherous group of conspirators." They intended to use the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs against the Communist Party and government, to place the MVD above the party and government in order to seize power, restore capitalism and restore the control of the bourgeoisie.

2. The beginning of the treasonable activity occurred in 1919 and lasted up until Beria's arrest. After Stalin's death, these activities were intensified, bringing about the exposure. After Beria became MVD minister he promoted his conspirators in the movement and persecuted honest workers.

3. The group carried out a number of criminal measures "to activize remnants of bourgeois nationalist elements in the union republics to sow hostility between the peoples of the USSR."

4. Beria, "with the aim of creating food difficulties ... sabotaged and hindered the carrying out of the most important measures on the part of the government that were directed toward the raising of the economy of the collective and state farms."

5. "Beria and his accomplices committed terrorist acts against the people whom they feared would expose them"; "the crimes committed by L. P. Beria that testified to his deep moral corruption" were also established.

The guilt of the accused was "fully proved in court by genuine documentary data, personal notes of the accused and evidence of numerous witnesses." The accused were sentenced to "the highest measure of criminal punishment--shooting--with confiscation of their personal property and with the stripping of all their military titles and rewards. The sentence is final and there is no appeal. The sentence has been carried out."

Review of Beria's Position in the Hierarchy

What can be said of this official record of Beria's purge? Before such an examination, it may be worth while briefly to consider again Beria's position in the hierarchy prior to Stalin's death.

The replacement of MGB Minister Abakumov by party official S. D. Ignatiev in August 1951 was taken as a sign that Beria's power was

slipping, particularly since it was followed by the ouster of at least eight and possibly eleven republic MGB officials. Another suggestion along this line occurred in September 1952 when Kochlavashvili, a newly appointed Georgian MGB minister, publicly criticized that ministry's operations and claimed it needed more party control. Then, at the party congress in October 1952 and later at the 7 November anniversary celebrations, there were slight hints that Beria's star was dimmer in the fact that his relative ranking had dropped. The "doctors' plot", publicized in January 1953, added further fuel to this argument.

Stalin's death, however, abruptly reversed this decline of Beria, and he shot up to new heights by becoming second only to Malenkov. He also regained control of the MGB, which was merged with the MVD, under Beria as minister. Ex-MGB chief Ignatiev, the interloper, joined the party secretariat for a brief period but fell into disgrace in April when the doctors' plot was reversed.

The reversal is believed to have been instigated by Beria. There were at least two other developments in the period following Stalin's death that also appeared to be Beria-instigated. The first was the movement of some long-time associates of Beria back into key MVD positions, and the second was a de-Russification policy which had as its offshoot the removal of some outspoken supporters of Stalin's nationality policy such as Melnikov in the Ukraine. A new housecleaning was accomplished in Georgia, and, though leaving a few loose ends, it clearly proclaimed that Beria was the man running that particular political machine. These developments marked Beria as a powerful figure in the hierarchy,1/ and suggested that he had probably been in agreement with, if not the primary sponsor of, the "new look." From all outward appearances, therefore, Beria was at the height of his power on 27 June when he did not show up

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1/ [redacted] reported [illegible] party member fresh from a provincial party meeting who related that a "big" official told the meeting that the political unrest in Moscow would be over very soon and that "Mr. Malenkov will be replaced by Mr. Beria who is very strong, very intelligent. Mr. Beria will be the dictator and a very fine ruler."

at the opera party. His was no gradual decline, but a precipitous one.1/

The Arrest

The pressing questions among Western observers at the time of Beria's arrest were: how was it actually brought about and how could the arch-conspirator have failed to know about the plot against him? Little evidence has been unearthed on this point. However, Beria was neither omniscient nor all powerful. Other security chiefs had been purged before him, although they admittedly did not rank so high in the Soviet hierarchy at the time of their disgrace. He was at the height of his power and possibly less wary than usual. Beria's ranking associate was named as his successor and may well have had a part in his detention. This, too, is not unusual in Soviet history.

The logic of the situation would seem to point to an "inside job" rather than a pitched battle, and the arrest probably took place before 26 June. This timing is arrived at by noting that the Supreme Soviet meeting in August which confirmed the decree of its own presidium regarding Beria reported that the subject decree had been dated 26 June. How long before 26 June the event occurred is not known.

[redacted]

Some propaganda after the public announcement of Beria's ouster associated his "becoming impudent" with the "imperialist adventures" in Berlin and Korea, which would place the crisis some time after 17 June.

[redacted]

The central press, also appeared unaware of the development. On 27 June Izvestia cited Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov as collegial leaders.

1/ One flaw mars this picture. After the formation of the new MVD under Beria, some of the economic functions which had been the primary mission of the old MVD passed to the corresponding government ministries handling these problems. Even slave labor control appears to have been taken away from the MVD and given to the Ministry of Justice.

The reason for this action is not clear and there appear to be only two possible explanations: either Beria deliberately acceeded to the breaking up of his empire in a bid to shake off the dread stigma of "policeman" attached to his name, a bid also manifested in the doctors' plot reversal and the nationalities policy, or this economic empire was being taken from him in the give-and-take atmosphere attendant on the division of spoils following Stalin's death.

Possible Military Involvement

More important than the establishment of the precise time that Beria was cut down is the determination of the reason behind the action at such a crucial period in Soviet history when the party was still reeling from the departure of Stalin. On this point there is rather curious and somewhat surprising information. [redacted] have reported information that Beria had moved MVD units into position in the Moscow suburbs to back up a projected coup and that this action was countered by a similar movement on the part of the army. [redacted]

[redacted] Nevertheless, it will be recalled that unusual military movements were observed in Moscow from 27 through 30 June. Conceivably these movements could reflect the reported army counteraction occurring shortly after Beria's purge and shortly before the Soviet public was apprised of his ouster.

The actual details of Beria's arrest and whether or not this show of force actually occurred may never be known. It therefore seems particularly advisable to review in detail the official Soviet record of Beria's perfidy in a search for clues as to the meaning and significance of the purge.

Examination of the Record

The Official Communiques: The communique of the central committee issued on 10 July said that it had been decided to expel Beria from the party as an enemy of the party and of the people after listening to and discussing the report of its presidium given by Malenkov. The report said that Beria's nefarious activities in the interest of "foreign capital" were manifested in his attempts to place the MVD above the government and the party. The communique of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet said that in view of the fact that traitorous actions of Beria had been brought to light, it was decided to relieve him of his government posts, refer his case to the Supreme Court and appoint Kruglov as MVD minister.

The central committee communique thus indicated that the primary charge being levied against Beria, at least for public consumption, was

this alleged attempt to place the MVD above the party and the government.1/

The fact that Malenkov presented this case to the central committee was not unusual. As the ranking presidium member he was the logical candidate to defend the party and the government. The fact that Beria was acting so "wickedly" in the interest of "foreign capital" was also a standard and a necessary insertion; since he was not conducting himself in the interests of the party, he had to be conducting himself in the interests of its enemies.

With respect to the communique of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the important thing was that S. N. Kruglov was named Beria's successor. The choice was a curious one,2/ implying that he had conspired against Beria. Two reasons have been advanced in explanation of this appointment: (a) with Kruglov at the helm, at least temporarily, the MVD careerist security elements would probably raise little opposition to Beria's ouster and might even imagine that individually they could ride out the storm; (b) Kruglov was acceptable to the majority of the collegial leadership as a neutral official who was not predisposed to assist one of their number to become another Stalin.

The Pravda Editorial: The Pravda editorial accompanying the communiques provided interesting additional details. Although Beria's criminal activity had been "deeply concealed," after Stalin's death he became "impudent" and started to disclose his real face by "letting himself go." This would accord with rumors reported in the press that Beria had been preparing a coup. The phraseology gives one the impression that the Soviet leaders at Stalin's death had picked up one end of a rope, had given the other end to Beria and had played out enough length for Beria to hang himself. The charge of placing the MVD above the party and

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1/ This charge remained paramount throughout all the official Soviet statements on the case, and may have had some factual basis. For example, in the period following Beria's arrest, newspapers in Azerbaijan contained numerous references to party-MVD rivalry in that republic, and it appeared that numerous MVD officials had "broken loose" from party supervision and either ignored or overridden party decisions in many instances.

2/ Kruglov is known to have occupied a high post in the MVD after Beria became minister. [A Soviet plain-text message of 2 June, for example, refers to Kruglov in such a way as to indicate that he had deputy minister status.] It is probable that Kruglov was Beria's first deputy minister.

government was clarified somewhat by the statement that Beria had attempted to select MVD workers "of personal loyalty to himself." Beria actually had not brought any new personnel into the apparatus. He had, however, reinstated and promoted some old officials like Dekanozov who had fallen into disfavor, presumably without clearing it with the party. It must have been obvious to the other Soviet leaders at the time of Beria's appointment as minister that he would return some of his former lieutenants to power.

The second charge levied against Beria by Pravda was that he had impeded (past tense) decisions on important items concerning agriculture in order to undermine the collective farms and create difficulties in the country's food supply. This charge served as a forerunner for the startling admissions about agricultural failures that Khrushchev was to make in September 1953. Yet strangely this sin of Beria's was not pressed too strongly in propaganda and not referred to by Khrushchev in his unusual agricultural report to the central committee. Perhaps the reason for overlooking this ripe propaganda plum was the controversial nature of agricultural policy itself. Beria had never directly taken a public position on this policy as had, for example, his fellow politburo members Andreev and Khrushchev. It has been speculated earlier that Beria's side in this dispute, the anti-Khrushchev side, was made known through his two Transcaucasus satraps, Bagirov and Arutinov, and that it was Beria who caused the abandonment of Khrushchev's radical agrogorod policy in 1950.1/ This speculation received some credence when both Arutinov and Bagirov were deposed following Beria's arrest.

Beria was also accused of undermining the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, disseminating hostility among them and activating bourgeois nationalist elements. This appeared to confirm suspicions that Beria had been behind the new nationalities line evident in the USSR since Stalin's death, a line which was sharply curtailed following his arrest. It raised the unanswerable question of Beria's motivation in this regard. Although a Mingrelian (Georgian) himself, it seems doubtful to the authors that Beria had any particular concern about the inequities of Great Russian chauvinism. Conceivably, his experience in security matters may have convinced him of the impracticality of such a policy.

1/ There is no known basis for press reports that the Machine Tractor stations had "been turned into bases for the secret police and a weapon of political power."

Another and stronger possibility is that Beria, by becoming identified with a policy of this sort, may have hoped to build up wider support in non-Russian republics and areas and to pose as a liberal humanitarian rather than a hard-hearted security officer.1/

The Pravda editorial then raised a point which was never again to be reiterated--that Beria intentionally impeded and in some cases "distorted" orders regarding strengthening Soviet legislation and "liquidation of some facts of lawlessness and arbitrary action." While it is perhaps unnecessary to comment on the legitimacy of such a charge, it is nevertheless conceivable that it was directly connected with the case. It is known, for example, [redacted] that there was a rather noticeable upsurge in crime, particularly in the Moscow area, following the amnesty of 27 March. This amnesty [redacted] resulted in the release of criminal elements in the camps and did not appreciably affect political prisoners. There was also a report [redacted] which said that prior to the arrest of Beria there had been some relaxation of coast guard patrols along the shore. Individuals were allowed access to the beach without special document checks and it was rumored that "one could fish where one liked." After Beria's removal, however, the security measures in the area reverted to their former standards. These examples are cited not as proof that Beria was encouraging illegality, which would be a rather foolhardy move on his part, but as possible support for the thesis that his co-leaders were using the damaging effects of his "capitulatory" policy to round out the case against him.

Pravda lastly accused Beria of attempting to grab the leadership of the party in order to destroy it, change its policy into a "capitulatory" one and bring about the restoration of capitalism. It must be borne in mind of course that when a decision to purge a key official is taken in the USSR, that official is usually found guilty of every crime in the book. Nevertheless, some of these charges had a ring of truth

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1/ [redacted] mentioned that while there was rejoicing among some that the Chekha executioner had met his doom, others "feared that the policy of more leniency toward national interests, which Beria had sponsored, would receive a setback." [redacted]

in them. This "capitulatory" policy idea must have been a delicate one [redacted]

Pravda concluded its case against Beria by stressing the necessity for collective leadership and pointing out that it was not a right but a duty for party workers to check the actions of the MVD.

The Indictment

The indictment of Beria, which was not published until 16 December, five months after his arrest, named six co-conspirators who had plotted with him through the years. It repeated most of the charges made in the original Pravda article with two noticeable exceptions, and it added several more. The two charges dropped were those dealing with Beria's failure to carry out orders to liquidate lawlessness and his pursuit of a "capitulatory policy."

The first additional charge was that Beria had started his nefarious career as early as 1919 when he was engaged in undercover work in Georgia. In 1920 he was said to have established contact with the Menshevik secret police in Georgia who were allegedly in league with British intelligence. This accusation involved some rewriting of history, because Beria had been officially praised for his great success in carrying out the orders of the central committee in that area. This particular charge was the only one that impinged on any of the other Soviet leaders in a direct manner. For example, A. I. Mikoyan's career had closely paralleled that of Beria in 1919 and 1920, both having been engaged in the same work in the same area for the party. Both had been captured and had spent time in Georgian jails.1/

Another new charge was that Beria had intrigued against various "honest" party workers such as Ordzhonikidze who had stood in his way. Ordzhonikidze was thus being held up to those who might be tinged with

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1/ It is obvious, however, that any of the Soviet leaders could be tied to Beria's clique of conspirators if there had been any desire to do so. All of them had worked closely with Beria. To take one example, Malenkov had been nominated for the premiership by Beria slightly over three months prior to his arrest.

"bourgeois nationalism" in Georgia, as an example of a good Bolshevist.1/ Ordzhonikidze may well have died an unnatural death. Kravchenko claimed, "That he died by violence, that his end was not natural, my sources have not the slightest doubt."2/

Of perhaps even more importance in this additional charge was the allegation that the plotters had actually murdered people from whom they feared exposure. "Terrorist" murder seems to be a common thread running through the great purge trials. This accusation against Beria implicitly drew attention to other so-called "murders" in recent Soviet history, particularly those of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov. Their actual instigators, unlike those of Kirov, for example, had not been brought to trial. Only the "intermediaries" and their hirelings the "doctor-wreckers" had suffered. The "doctors' plot" reversal set the accused free and it was a reversal in which Beria is believed to have had a direct hand. The charge that Beria had actually murdered to achieve his ends raised the possibility that it someday might be alleged that Stalin himself had fallen victim to Beria. Such a charge, it must be said, has indeed never been hinted, but it is one that could be formulated without difficulty if a future need should arise. In this connection it should be noted that the indictment is open-ended enough to provide for the "discovery" of more conspirators if necessary.

A third new element which appeared in the indictment was that Beria had "committed a number of treacherous acts, endeavoring to weaken the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union." It is difficult to determine whether this was merely a way of rephrasing the other charges or whether it was designed to cover another area of crime. It may be that Beria

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1/ Pravda on the 30th anniversary of Ordzhonikidze's death in February 1950 quoted him as saying that the "party attitude" is the main thing. "He who is distracted from this path with perish ... the party attitude comes first and foremost." A further posthumous honor was paid to Ordzhonikidze in early 1954, when a town at the northern end of the Caucasian military highway was renamed for him. The town had previously borne his name from 1932 to 1944.

2/ This, incidentally, was not the first time that Ordzhonikidze's name had cropped up in a purge trial. One of the accused members of the "anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center," the chauffeur Arnold, testified that he had been commissioned to kill Ordzhonikidze in an automobile wreck, but did not have the courage to go through with it.

manipulated his control of the atomic energy program for his own advantage and may have differed with other Soviet leaders on the program. Ironically enough, less than two months after his arrest, Malenkov declared that the US "hydrogen monopoly" no longer existed, and on 12 August the Soviet test of a thermonuclear device occurred. Beria was thus ill rewarded for his efforts. His detention meant that someone else would have to be called in to head this program; that individual has yet to be identified. There is some evidence to suggest that the military has a larger role in the program than previously, but this is by no means firm. There have also been persistent rumors that the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, which was formed on the same day that the Supreme Soviet passed its decree regarding Beria's arrest, and is now under Malyshev, has taken over the problem.

The indictment, in conclusion, lumped one final set of charges together, presumably to take care of anything that might have been overlooked. It alleged that "other" crimes of Beria were uncovered, testifying to his "profound moral depravity," and in addition facts regarding his "criminal mercenary action" were established. The accused were said "to have admitted their guilt of having committed a number of most serious state crimes."

The Party Indictment

There was at least one other official Soviet statement on the Beria case, the existence of which is known [redacted] This was an extremely lengthy document prepared by the central committee in December 1953 for selected party and state officials. Detailed dissemination instructions were given: party and komsomol officials through the level of the rayon buro and some government officials were to read it under a system of strict control and accountability. These officials were warned that "no one except those who read this material has the right to pass anything on."

Detailed information is now available on this document in a report [redacted] It appears that the document, drawn up by the central committee but signed by Procurator General Rudenko, was a detailed development of each of the publicized charges. It began with a discussion of Beria's actions around the time of Stalin's death; how he had surrounded himself with Georgians and faithful servants in order to overthrow the government and seize power for himself. It alleged that he was attempting to use MVD organs to achieve the overthrow and to further his treasonable activities. It further claimed that Beria had been shown, through the investigations, to be an agent of international imperialism.

The report then went on to demonstrate the allegations by covering various phases of Beria's life and career under separate chronological

In short, the party indictment differed from the published indictment only in providing more details rather than in developing any new charges.

Beria's Co-conspirators

A word is necessary here about those accused with Beria. All were former security officials. Meshik, as MVD minister in the Ukraine, was probably involved in the post-Stalin purges there, including that of Melnikov. The same can be said of Dekanozov, who presumably carried out the spring housecleaning operation in Georgia. Merkulov had not been directly connected with the MGB since June 1946, at which time Abakumov relieved him as MGB minister. He had been minister of state control since October 1950 and had been confirmed in that post by the March 1953 Supreme Soviet meeting which ratified the post-Stalin government organization.2/

Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, and Vlodzimirsky were all key figures in the postwar Chief Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad (GUSIMZ) which played an important role in implementing Soviet economic policy in the Satellites. This Chief Directorate was peopled with security personnel.

1/ There is evidence that Ordzhonikidze's wife has resided in the Kremlin for several years.

2/ Further research is needed on the job of the minister of state control, particularly during Merkulov's tenure. The official Soviet announcement stated that Merkulov had been relieved of his appointment on 17 September. while Merkulov had probably been out as minister in mid-July 1953, his replacement had not taken over as late as 16 October. His successor, Zhavoronkov, is not a security man, but has been employed in the past as a party trouble shooter.

Although nominally attached to the Council of Ministers, its personnel were presumably close to Beria and possibly subject to his personal direction. The linking of these four men with Beria suggested that the bugaboo of Soviet policy toward Germany was being raised and that Beria's role in this policy, particularly with respect to GUSIMZ, was being attacked.1/

It will also be recalled that Dekanozov had been ambassador to Germany at the time of the Soviet attack and had later reached the level of deputy foreign minister.2/ With respect to Vlodzimirsky, the fact that he was called "the former head of the Investigation Department for particularly important matters" suggested that he had been the "Ryumin" of the doctors' plot reversal and provided yet another indication that Beria had been responsible for this action. Lastly, the fact that only these six of Beria's associates were selected to stand trial with him bore out other indications that the main target in the purge was the MVD and control of this organization.

The Court's Findings

On 24 December the press published the findings of the Supreme Court, its sentence, and the notice of Beria's execution all at the same time. The guilt of the accused had been "fully proved." They had been sentenced

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1/ Research is also needed on the role and function of GUSIMZ. There were numerous rumors and reports that Beria supported the so-called "soft" policy toward Germany and/or that he was held responsible for the security debacle which followed the institution of this policy. We have been unable to shed any light on these rumors except to point to previous reports regarding the dispute over the postwar dismantling policy in Germany reportedly supported by Malenkov and reportedly opposed by Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Beria, inter alia.

2/ Dekanozov was also a key figure in the contacts which the USSR is reported to have attempted with the Germans in 1942-3. According to these reports, the USSR made contact with the chief of the Ostland Branch in the Main Political Directorate of the German Ostministerium, in an effort to arrange meetings between German and Soviet officials in Sweden. One of the Soviet officials was to be Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov, and the object of this meeting was said to be the arranging of a separate peace between Germany and the USSR. There were other reports from Georgian refugees to the effect that Beria and other Georgian leaders sent a representative to Berlin in 1943 to approach Hitler about the possible creation of an independent state of Georgia.

to death and their execution had been carried out. While the court allegedly confirmed all the accusations of the prosecutor's indictment,1/ the one charging Beria with weakening the defenses of the USSR was not reiterated in the release of the court's findings, as were all the others.

The selection of Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev as chairman of the special session of the Supreme Court which conducted the trial and passed sentence was partially explained by reason of protocol, since he held the same rank as Beria. The question arose as to why Marshal Konev was singled out for this dubious honor (there are about 12 other Marshals of Soviet Union). He had been one of the three marshals mentioned as intended victims of the doctors' plot and on this ground the choice might be said to have a certain peculiar logic--an alleged victim sitting in judgment on his implied attacker. A surprise member of the court was K. F. Lunev, whose rank was given as first deputy minister of the MVD. Lunev was a second level party official of the Moscow Oblast with no known security experience.2/ His appointment to this post recalled the parallel of Ignatiev's assignment to the MGB in 1951.

1/ Presumably the prosecutor was Procurator General Rudenko who had been appointed after Beria's arrest. Rudenko had previously been public prosecutor in the Ukraine for a number of years, and since he has never been relieved may now be holding both positions.

2/ The earliest available reference [redacted] to Lunev as deputy MVD minister dates from early December 1953.

II. Some Consequences of Beria's Fall

Personnel Changes in the MVD

As has been pointed out, the manner in which the Beria case was handled indicated that a determined effort was being made to confine both the blame and the consequences of the "conspiracy" to the security forces alone. The indictment, trial documents and propaganda surrounding the case gave primary emphasis to the charge that Beria had attempted to build up a conspiratorial group within the MVD in order to usurp power from party and state organs. No party or state officials other than Merkulov were publicly implicated in the "conspiracy," and even in the case of Merkulov, neither his Ministry of State Control nor any of its officials were accused of complicity in the case.

The propaganda potential contained in the accusations was not intensively exploited. A virtual silence in the Soviet press regarding Beria set in a few days following his arrest, and the propaganda campaign at the time of his execution was silenced also within a few days of the event. No real attempt was made to make the Beria "conspirators" responsible for current shortcomings, such as those in agriculture, in spite of the fact that the indictment would have provided ample ammunition for such a campaign.

Beria's arrest was followed by the replacement of his followers in Moscow and in the regional republics. In the republics, however, most of his appointees were not removed for a number of months after his detention and their removal is not known to have resulted in their arrest. Some, in fact, continued to enjoy responsible posts in both the party and government apparatus of their respective republics.

The extent of the Beria purge may have been partly conditioned by the extent to which Beria had been able to place his men in the MVD apparatus between March and June 1953. His resumption of direct control over the security forces in March had been followed by a number of organizational and personnel changes in Moscow and in the republics, and it became apparent, as the charges against him were to specify, that Beria was attempting to place his adherents in positions of importance in the new MVD. It was equally apparent, however, that Beria had not been able to complete the restaffing of this organization and that the MVD still contained a number of non-Beria or anti-Beria officials at the time of his arrest.

As has been noted, in the March reorganization, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) under Minister S. N. Kruglov and the Ministry of State Security (MGB) under S. D. Ignatiev were merged into the new Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) under Beria. Kruglov was retained in the new

organization as a deputy minister, but Ignatiev was reassigned to the party secretariat. Upon reversal of the "doctors' plot" in April, however, Ignatiev was dismissed from the secretariat for "gullibility," which he had allegedly displayed as MGB minister.

The deputy ministers who had served under Kruglov and Ignatiev were not identified in the new organization, and it is probable that Beria carried through a thorough restaffing of the new MVD on this headquarters level with men whom he could trust more fully. I. I. Maslennikov and I. A. Serov, deputy ministers of the old MVD under Kruglov, were not known to have retained their posts under Beria, and the same was true of men who had served as deputy ministers of the MGB under Ignatiev. A. A. Epishev, who had been deputy minister of the MGB for personnel, dropped from sight.1/ The other deputy MGB ministers under Ignatiev, Stakhanov and possibly Voronenko, were not identified as deputy ministers of the new MVD, and it is possible that they were either demoted or ousted when Beria reorganized the ministry in March. Stakhanov, for example, was identified [redacted] at the Chief Directorate of Militia in May 1953 with no indication as to the position he held there, although it is assumed that he was acting as chief. Ryumin, deputy minister for investigations under Ignatiev, was arrested and charged with responsibility for the fraudulent "doctors' plot." His replacement appears to have been L. B. Plodzimirsky, one of Beria's co-defendants. The trial proceedings disclosed that Beria had also brought in B. Z. Kobulov as deputy minister and S. A. Goglidze as head of an unspecified directorate in the new MVD.

Beria's arrest was followed by that of three close associates in the MVD apparatus in Moscow; Kobulov, Vlodzimirsky and Goglidze were all tried and executed along with him. [redacted] have reported that N. N. Shatalin, a member of the all-Union secretariat, was placed in the MVD for a month after Beria's arrest as a first deputy minister to insure that Beria's influence was erased and that orders from the presidium were being carried out. In addition, the party's control of the MVD was apparently assured through the appointment of K. F. Lunev, a party careerist, as first deputy minister. Public identification of Lunev in this position came in December when he served on the Beria trial board, but defectors report that he was appointed in September.

1/ Epishev has subsequently been identified as first secretary of the Crimean Oblast party organization.

Regional Changes in the MVD

A study of appointments and dismissals in the republican MVD organizations after Stalin's death and Beria's purge strongly suggests that while Beria made great efforts to restaff these organizations, presumably with his own men, he was not able to complete the process in the four-month period during which he again occupied the post of USSR security minister. It is also interesting that, with a few exceptions, most of these appointees were not removed from office immediately after his arrest. Several were elected to important posts in the republic party organizations in February 1954, and some of those who were replaced, rather than suffering arrest, were simply demoted to lesser positions. By the end of April 1953, 15 of the Union Republics had followed Moscow's lead in merging their MVD-MGB organizations into the new MVD.1/ In 12 out of 15 cases, the former MGB ministers of the republics were named to head the new MVD; in one case, a new minister was brought in from another area; and in one case a former MVD minister was named as minister of the new MVD.

All of these former MGB ministers had either been appointed under Ignatiev, or had served under him for nearly two years. It is possible that Ignatiev may have represented a faction in the Soviet party opposed to Beria, and that a few of these republic ministers may have been supporters of Ignatiev, even though some of them had at an earlier date served under Beria in the security forces. This contention is borne out by the fact that a number of these ex-MGB ministers were replaced by Beria subsequent to their appointments as MVD ministers in April. In addition, those former MGB ministers who survived the Beria period as heads of the local MVD organizations are still in office. This is true of N. P. Gusev in the Karelo-Finnish SSR; A. V. Tereshenko, Kirghiz SSR; I. L. Mordovets, Moldavian SSR; and V. T. Vaskin, Turkmen SSR. M. I. Baskakov, former Belorussian MGB minister, who was appointed to head the new MVD in April, was replaced in this post by his deputy, M. F. Dechko, on 29 June, but was restored as head of the Belorussian MVD in late August. Beria apparently brought about the ouster of new MVD ministers who had previously headed the republic MGB organizations in Estonia and Lithuania. In Estonia, V. I. Moskalenko was replaced as MVD minister by M. K. Krassman on 29 May. After Beria's arrest, Krassman was replaced by J. K. Lombak, the former MVD minister of Estonia.

1/ Fifteen of the 16 Union Republics have their own Ministries of the Interior. No MVD minister or MVD organization has ever been identified in the RSFSR, and although the RSFSR constitution lists an MVD among its other ministries, it is assumed that the all-Union MVD apparatus fulfills this function.

In Lithuania, P. P. Kondakov, former MGB minister in that republic, was replaced as MVD minister by I. L. Vildzhyunas, a native Lithuanian, on 18 June. This action closely followed a meeting of the Lithuanian central committee, which scored the old leadership of that republic for mistakes in agricultural policy and for "distortions" of the Soviet nationalities policy. These "distortions" consisted principally in neglecting the appointment of native cadres to important posts in the republic and overenthusiasm in forcing the use of the Russian language on Lithuanians. The charges closely resembled those made at the Ukrainian central committee meeting earlier in June which resulted in the ouster of Ukrainian first secretary L. G. Melnikov.

It is believed that the line regarding "distortions" of the nationalities policy is traceable to Beria and was used by him to get rid of Soviet officials whom he desired to unseat. K. F. Lyaudis, former second secretary of the Lithuanian party, was identified as Vildzhyunas' replacement in February 1954. Vildzhyunas, however, was identified as chairman of Vilnus city executive committee when he was elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1954. Before his appointment as MVD chief, Vildzhyunas was a rather obscure Lithuanian party official, with no known background in the security forces. P. P. Kondakov reappeared subsequent to Beria's fall as the UMVD chief of the important Vladimir Oblast near Moscow. Lyaudis, however, appears to have been a career party official, and his appointment would suggest that in the republics the party is closely supervising the work of the MVD.

The post-Stalin MVD minister in Azerbaijan, S. F. Yemelyanov, had previously been the MGB minister in that republic and had survived all of the republic's MGB changes since 1946. Since he survived the Beria period, only to be replaced in August after Beria's fall, it is likely that he was one of the few former MGB ministers who had remained loyal to Beria during the Ignatiev period. It is also possible that he was closely associated with M. D. A. Bagirov, the top man in Azerbaijan, whose fall also followed that of Beria. There is virtually no biographical information currently available on the new Azerbaijan MVD minister, A. M. Guskov.

V. G. Dekanozov, an early associate of Beria, replaced A. I. Kochlavashvili, the former MGB chief, as Georgian MVD minister in April 1953, and Kochlavashvili became deputy MVD minister in that republic. Following Beria's arrest Dekanozov was replaced by an army officer, A. I. Inauri, and later appeared as a co-defendant of Beria's in December, and was executed along with him.

In the Ukraine, P. Y. Meshyk, who had been appointed as MGB minister in the middle of March 1953, was confirmed as minister of the new MVD in April after the republic's MVD and MGB had been merged. Like

Dekanozov in Georgia, Meshyk was removed from office almost immediately after Beria's arrest, and was tried and executed along with him. Meshyk's replacement in the Ukraine, T. A. Strokach, was another former minister of the old MVD under Kruglov and had been Ukrainian MVD minister before the April reorganization.

Following the merger of the Latvian MVD and MGB, N. K. Kovalchuk, who had been appointed Latvian MGB chief in early March was confirmed as MVD minister in that republic. Prior to his assignment in Latvia Kovalchuk's official post had been that of Ukrainian MGB minister.1/ On 3 June, however, Kovalchuk was replaced as Latvian MVD minister by I. D. Zuyan, possibly in accordance with the "native cadres" program initiated by Beria. Although Zuyan was not nominated to the Supreme Soviet in early 1954, no replacement for him has been identified and it is believed that he still holds the post.

A. P. Byzov, who was appointed MVD minister of the Uzbek SSR in April 1953, had previously been Kazakh MGB minister under Abakumov, but was demoted to the post of deputy MGB minister of the Uzbek republic in 1950. Byzov seems to have survived Beria's decline since he was re-elected to the Uzbek central committee in February 1954.

In the one case where the minister of the previous republican MVD organization was named to head the new MVD in April 1953, that minister has remained in office. V. V. Gubin, the Kazakh MVD chief prior to the April MVD/MGB merger, took over the new MVD in that republic, has remained in office, and was elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1954.

Personnel Shifts in the Party and Government

In the six-month period following Beria's arrest, a number of important personnel shifts were made in the Soviet party and state apparatus. Some of these shifts were clearly related to the Beria case, while others related to the implementation of the "new course" in agriculture and industry. A third factor, which may have been operative in all of the personnel changes, seems traceable to the differences of opinion and

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1/ [redacted] has reported that Kovalchuk was serving as senior Soviet adviser to the Polish security forces in 1952 and early 1953.

jockeying for position among the post-Beria Soviet leaders.1/

In some cases, the post-Beria personnel shifts may be related to the Beria case with relative assurance. This is true of a few changes in Moscow, but more particularly of those in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. These party and government changes generally followed the pattern observed in the MVD replacements which followed on the purge of Beria: the shifts were not very extensive, except in Beria's native state of Georgia; but there, as well as other places, most of the replacements were not made immediately, but extended over a period of months. No indication was given that those replaced were arrested; little publicity attended the changes and in almost all cases there was a general reluctance to propagandize the link between these regional purges and that of Beria.

In Moscow, the most important government official known to have been purged as a Beria associate was V. N. Merkulov, minister of state control, and an old associate of Beria's in the USSR security apparatus. It has been mentioned earlier that, although Merkulov was not officially dismissed as minister of State control until 17 September he was probably removed earlier, since Deputy Minister Pavelev was signing messages as acting minister of state control in July 1953. The date on which Merkulov's successor, V. G. Zhavoronkov, was appointed is not known; as late as mid-October, [redacted] Merkulov's replacement had not yet been [redacted] nt was expected in a matter of days.

Merkulov had served as USSR MGB minister in the postwar period,2/ and later headed the Chief Directorate for Soviet Property Abroad. In 1950 he had taken over the Ministry of State Control and during the period of his tenure in that office began to enlarge the checking and control functions of that ministry. It is possible that Beria had used him both to influence Soviet policy in Germany through the Chief Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad (which contained a number of Beria followers other than Merkulov) and to extend his control over Soviet internal affairs

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1/ Beginning in late November 1953 a number of provincial and republican party secretaries and state officials were replaced, usually on charges of inadequate implementation of the new economic course. These changes will be discussed more fully in a later study.

2/ Merkulov was head of State Security at the time that Shcherbakov was allegedly murdered by the participants in the "doctors' plot."

through use of the Ministry of State Control. The latter was apparently done by changing the responsibility of the ministry under Merkulov from one of checking to one of supervising various operational aspects of the state organizations under its cognizance.1/

In the official charges, however, it was not mentioned that Merkulov and the Ministry of State Control were guilty of an abuse of power, nor was it indicated that the ministry would undergo a purge similar to that of the MVD. Although state control ministers in some republics were removed following Merkulov's disappearance, there is no indication that the purge was very extensive, and there is no information available on removals in the central apparatus of the ministry.

The replacement of V. G. Grigoryan as head of the Foreign Ministry's Press Department is the only other change in Moscow which can be linked with any degree of assurance to the Beria case. Grigoryan had worked closely with Beria in Georgia in the 1930's and had later moved to central committee work in Moscow. He was appointed to this press post and to the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry in May during the period of Beria's ascendancy. His replacement by L. F. Ilychev was announced on 9 September.

Between the time of Beria's arrest and the 1953 October Revolution celebrations, a number of important changes in military positions were noted. At least three of these may have been related to the Beria purge. In Moscow, Col. Gen. P. A. Artemev was succeeded as commander of the Moscow Military District by Gen. K. S. Moskalenko, and Lt. Gen. K. R. Sinilov, Commandant of Moscow City, was replaced by Maj. Gen. I. S. Kolesnikov. Both appear to have been primarily military rather than security officers, although the new edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia states that Artemev had commanded "state security" as well as army troops in the past. Both officers had held their posts longer than any of their counterparts in other military districts and may have been due for transfer. However, Moscow rumors associated these shifts with Beria's purge.

The replacement of Lt. Gen. N. K. Spiridonov by Lt. Gen. A. Ya. Vedenin as commander of the Kremlin Guard seems more closely related to the Beria affair. The Kremlin commandant has traditionally been a security officer and the troops under his command have been drawn from the security forces. Spiridonov was appointed Kremlin commandant sometime between

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1/ Cf. Soviet State and Law, June 1952.

November 1938 and May 1939, around the time Beria came to Moscow to take command of the security forces from Yezhov. Lt. Gen. Vedenin, who replaced Spiridonov, is a career army officer, but there is as yet no indication that the Kremlin security function itself has been completely taken over by army troops.

Regional Party and Government Shifts

Georgia

The results of the Beria purge were most strongly felt in the Transcaucasian republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. In these areas, however, the replacement of the majority of Beria's followers was a prolonged process, with little propaganda relating the personnel changes to complicity in the Beria case.

In the Soviet republic of Georgia, the home state of Stalin and Beria and long a jungle of political intrigue, a joint plenum of the Georgian central committee and Tbilisi town party committee was held on 13-14 July to discuss the ouster of Beria. His activities were strongly condemned by Georgian party leaders whom he had apparently placed in office in April 1953. Beria was accused of giving harmful advice to the Georgian leaders and trying to sow the seeds of bourgeois nationalism in that republic. A number of individuals were criticized for giving assistance to Beria in his efforts to seize power. Among these were V. G. Dekanozov, Georgian MVD minister who was tried and shot with the Beria "conspirators;" B. Z. Kobulov, USSR deputy MVD minister who shared the same fate; A. M. Rapava, Georgian minister of state control, who had held a number of important posts in the MGB under Beria; N. M. Rukhadze, former Georgian MGB minister who had been purged in 1952; S. S. Mamulov, a member of the Georgian party buro, who had formerly held important posts in the MGB; and S. R. Milshtein, who formerly headed a directorate of the MGB, but whose whereabouts had been unknown for several years. Two former first secretaries of the Georgian party, Charkviani and Mgeladze, were criticized on the same grounds. All of these officials cited as Beria adherents are believed to have been so, with the possible exceptions of Rukhadze, Charkviani and Mgeladze.

A curious feature of the July meeting in Georgia was that it was conducted by Georgian party leaders who owed their positions to Beria. These were the men who headed the group which came to power in April 1953 in a reorganization which replaced virtually every important Georgian party and state official in office at that time. V. M. Bakradze, Georgian premier, A. I. Mirtskhulava, first secretary of the Georgian party, and V. M. Chkhivadze, third secretary of the party, are examples of this group and were among the principal speakers at the July meeting.

With the exception of Dekanozov, Rapava and Mamulov, most of Beria's appointees continued in office and were active in Georgian affairs until late September, when a plenum of the Georgian central committee was called to consider the implementation of the "July plenum of the central committee of the CPSU." This was the USSR central committee meeting which had dismissed Beria, and which apparently passed a decision regarding the manner in which Beria's followers were to be handled throughout the USSR. This oblique reference to the July plenum of the USSR central committee was the only way in which the republican purges were officially related to that of Beria. Failure to implement the decisions of this plenum (and other shortcomings) were the official charges leveled at outgoing leaders not only in Georgia, but also in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The September Georgian party plenum was attended by N. N. Shatalin, a member of the USSR party secretariat. This fact tended to underscore the role of the secretariat, headed by N. S. Khrushchev, in party personnel replacements, and the attendance of a party secretary at local party purges became a common feature of these purges. At this Georgian plenum, most of the Beria-appointed members of the party buro were dismissed, and it was "recommended" that the premier also be replaced. Party Secretary Mirtskhulava was supplanted by V. P. Mzhavanadze, a native Georgian. The latter's last post was that of deputy political officer of the Kiev Military District, and he had served in this post and on the Ukrainian orgburo during N. S. Khrushchev's tenure as first secretary of the Ukrainian Party. V. M. Bakradze, the Georgian premier, was subsequently replaced by D. D. Dzhavakhishvili, who had previously occupied a post of secondary importance in the Georgian republic.

Although most of Beria's appointees were replaced at the September plenum, some remained in office until early 1954. I. S. Zodelava, who had been released from imprisonment by the Beria forces in April to take the post of first deputy premier of Georgia, was not replaced in this post until January 1954.1/ The second and third secretaries of the Georgian party, D. Z. Romelashvili, and V. M. Chkhivadze, who had assumed their posts in April, did not decline in status until February 1954 when they were elected to the Georgian central committee, but not to the buro or secretariat. Romelashvili, however was elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

1/ More than a year earlier, Zodelava and a number of other Georgian officials had been purged on charges of embezzlement and other crimes. In April, three of these men including Zodelava were exonerated and restored to high offices in the Georgian party and government. This was the Georgian version of the doctors' plot reversal and, like it, a deliberate slap at the previous regime.

Azerbaijan

The purge of M. D. A. Bagirov in Azerbaijan may also be related to that of Beria, although certain aspects of this case remain obscure. On the basis of his background, Bagirov would appear to have been an important and close associate of Beria. Both had worked together in Transcaucasian security and political affairs since the 1930's, and there are some reports of friendship between the two. There is reason to believe, however, that Beria and Bagirov may have had differences of opinion over the Soviet nationalities policy. Both had earlier been ardent advocates of the "Russification" line and Bagirov continued to associate himself with the "Russification" approach in the period immediately prior to Stalin's death. Beria, as we have seen, apparently took an opposite tack. Further, Bagirov paid his allegiance to Malenkov in the period after Stalin's death rather than to Beria.

In any event, the announcement of Beria's arrest was closely followed by the purge of Bagirov in Azerbaijan. In mid-July a joint plenum of the Azerbaijan central committee and the Baku city party committee met to discuss the Beria case. The meeting was attended by a member of the USSR party secretariat, P. N. Pospelov. At the plenum Bagirov was stripped of his party posts and it was "recommended" that he also be removed as chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers.1/ The specific charges against Bagirov did not include collaboration with Beria; instead, it was stated that he had ignored the "party principle of collective leadership." He was accused among other things of having adopted a "vicious style of leadership" over a long period which had resulted in "serious violations of party principles of the selection of cadres."

Formal action on the central committee's "recommendation" that Bagirov be removed as Azerbaijan premier did not come until a month later. His replacement, T. I. Kuliev, was the man Bagirov had supplanted the previous April. Six days earlier, on 11 August, N. T. Amiraslanov had been appointed first deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers and A. M. Guskov named to replace S. F. Yemelyanov as MVD minister in that republic. A reported Beria associate, Y. D. Sumbatov-Topuridze, was also removed as deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers.

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1/ In mid-April Bagirov had "voluntarily" given up his post of first secretary of the Azerbaijan party to former Azerbaijan MVD chief T. A. Yakubov, and assumed the post of chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers. Bagirov may have been removed from his post and the all-Union party's presidium prior to 27 June. Like Melnikov and Beria, he was absent from the opera party on that date.

As previously indicated, the reasons for Bagirov's purge are somewhat obscure. A factor of importance may have been his open opposition to Khrushchev's "agrogorod" policy in 1951. The latter hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that the only other Soviet official to voice similar opposition was also purged in December 1953.

The situation with regard to Bagirov's replacement was quite striking. As previously stated, when Bagirov shifted from his position of first secretary of the Azerbaijan party, a position which he had held since 1933, to that of chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ta. A. Yakubov replaced him. Yakubov had worked under and with Bagirov since 1934, both in the central committee's apparatus and as a secretary of that organization. After Bagirov's purge, Yakubov remained as first secretary, and T. I. Kuliev, who had been replaced by Bagirov as chairman of the Council of Ministers, returned to this position. Thus, two men who had worked for many years with Bagirov were kept in important positions in the republic even after he was purged.

Both remained active in Azerbaijan affairs until February 1954. Kuliev was nominated as a deputy to the USSR Sumpreme Soviet in that month, and Yakubov delivered the accountability address to the Azerbaijan party congress in late February. At the congress, however, both were singled out for severe criticism. While working with Bagirov they were said to have agreed "in a cowardly manner with his unparty type of work and to have been obsequious to him." Kuliev was removed from the Supreme Soviet electoral list, and both were subsequently replaced in their posts.

There are two possible explanations for this peculiar action. It is possible that, because Bagirov had held this post for an inordinate time, possibly through Beria's protection, an advanced form of provincial dictatorial rule developed which stifled the vitality of the party. The post-Beria Kremlin leadership, therefore, was concerned not only with weeding out Beria's associates but also with correcting the damage done by them to active party control over all branches of Soviet life. The long delay in removing the remaining members of the Azerbaijan leadership suggests that they may have been granted a chance to reform but failed to respond. Apparently, the simple removal of Bagirov was not sufficient to correct the situation in the republic and the Kremlin then recognized the necessity for further purging in order to bring about a revitalization of the Azerbaijan party.

On the other hand, it is possible that these men were left in control during the six months which elapsed between Bagirov's purge and their removal because the Kremlin could not agree on either their guilt nor the extent of their association with Bagirov. The presidium may have been split into factions concerning the removal of these men and the weight of opinion fell to keeping them. By February, however, a shift in the balance

of power conceivably could have taken place, and those that wished to remove these men may have prevailed.

Armenia

A third republic in which the Beria purge had profound repercussions was Armenia. Here too, the purge of Beria's followers was long in coming. On 4 December, at a plenum of the Armenian central committee called to discuss the July (Beria) and September (agricultural) plenums of the USSR central committee, the entire Armenian secretariat, headed by G. A. Arutinov was dismissed and the membership of the party buro was thoroughly revamped. The meeting was attended by USSR secretariat member P. N. Pospelov, who had attended a similar session in Azerbaijan in July. As in Azerbaijan, the new Armenian leaders headed by S. A. Tovmasyan had previously occupied positions of secondary importance in the republic.

Arutyunov's ties with Beria extended back to the 1930's when both he and Bagirov had been closely associated with Beria in Transcaucasian affairs. Mention of the "July plenum of the CPSU" at the Armenian party meeting which dismissed Arutyunov indicated that his dismissal was related to the Beria purge. As in the case of Bagirov, an additional factor may have been Arutyunov's criticism of Khrushchev's "agrogorod" program.

Although the Armenian purge was indirectly tied to the Beria case, official Soviet propaganda did not stress the point nor accuse the former Armenian officials of implication in Beria's alleged plot to take over the Soviet party and government. Principal stress was laid on violations of the principle of collective leadership, on the dictatorial attitude of the old secretariat and buro, and on a "bureaucratic" approach to problems of agriculture and industry. These charges were again stressed in late February by the new Armenian secretary, Tovmasyan, at the republic party congress.

Rehabilitations

In the period following the arrest of Beria, two prominent officials apparently purged by him were partially rehabilitated. L. G. Melnikov was appointed Soviet ambassador to Rumania on 26 July, and S. D. Ignatiev was identified as first secretary of the Bashkir ASSR party organization on 17 February 1954.

Melnikov had been first secretary of the Ukrainian party organization and an alternate member of the USSR party presidium at the time of his purge in early June 1953. At that time he was accused of mistakes in agriculture and of violations of the Soviet nationalities policy, particularly in the western Ukraine. These charges, believed to have been

instigated by Beria, resulted in the removal of Melnikov from his party posts by the Ukrainian central committee and presumably in his dismissal from the USSR party presidium, although no official announcement was made to this effect.

S. D. Ignatiev had occupied a number of important party and state posts prior to his ouster in April 1953. He had served in regional party organizations such as those of the Bashkir ASSR and the Belorussian SSR, and had also held important posts in the USSR central committee apparatus. As is well known by this time, he replaced V. S. Abakumov sometime in 1951 as USSR minister of state security, and removed several Beria appointees in that organization. At the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 Ignatiev was elected a member of the central committee and of the enlarged party presidium. In March 1953 he was removed from the party presidium and appointed to the secretariat, at the same time that the old MGB was merged in a new MVD under Beria. The following month Ignatiev was publicly criticized for "political blindness and inattentiveness" in connection with the reversal of the "doctors' plot" and was removed from the party secretariat. Since his original appointment to the MGB was believed to have been engineered by a faction in the party hierarchy hostile to Beria, and since the "doctors' plot" was apparently directed at Beria, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ignatiev's ouster was due to the influence of Beria. Speculation to this effect by Western correspondents was passed by the Soviet censors. Following his removal, Ignatiev was not identified in another post until February 1954 when he appeared as the first secretary of the Bashkir ASSR party organization, a post which he had held some years previously.

While it is difficult to follow the thread back through the labyrinth of these post-Beria purges, the following seems to emerge from the exploration. There has been a general reluctance in propaganda and in official statements to implicate anyone in the Beria case other than those tried and executed in December. Little publicity surrounded the dismissals of MVD, party and government officials associated with Beria, and few were charged with actual complicity in his "conspiracy." The purge of his associates proceeded rather slowly. In considering the seriousness of the charges, the purge was limited in its scope and mild in its consequences, and there is no indication that the majority of those dismissed were subsequently jailed. Some, in fact, continued to occupy responsible party and state posts in the republics. There were also elements of indecision regarding replacements for some of these appointed to posts held by Beria's followers in the republics, since at least two of these were in turn replaced by new men several months later.

This indecision may be due to the continued presence within the hierarchy of a number of officials who co-operated with Beria during his bid for power. It is obvious that he needed at least the formal approval of a number of party and state officials for several moves made between

March and July 1953. These would include:

- The dismissal of S. D. Ignatiev from the party secretariat in April, which would have required the approval of members of the party presidium and/or the central committee.
- The appointment of V. G. Grigoryan to the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as the Foreign Ministry's press chief, which would have required at least the formal approval of important state officials.
- The June press campaign regarding "distortions" of the Soviet nationalities policy, especially in the Ukraine and Lithuania.
- The Ukrainian central committee's dismissal of its first secretary, L. G. Melnikov, and his presumed removal from the USSR party presidium.
- The numerous personnel changes on the republican ministerial level which required at least the formal approval of the republican State apparatus.

If it is true that there are important officials still in the Soviet hierarchy who had co-operated closely with Beria, it would help to explain some aspects of the case for which there is currently no other satisfactory explanation. It would explain why there was a deliverate attempt to confine the blame for Beria's activities solely to the security forces, and why those of his followers who remained in office at the time of his arrest were removed only slowly and apparently suffered no drastic retaliation for their co-operation. It would explain the rather curious propaganda handling of the Beria case--the fact that virtually no publicity was given to it between the announcement of his arrest and the trial, and the swift termination of the propaganda campaign following each of these events. This was done, in spite of the fact that Beria and his followers would have made excellent scapegoats for past and present shortcomings in the USSR which have received a great deal of publicity within the last year. In the important sphere of agriculture, for example, Beria had been accused of impeding important decisions but there was virtually no attempt to follow up this point. Treatment of the case contrasts strongly with that of the "doctors' plot" which featured an intensive, sustained propaganda campaign. Failure to accord similar treatment to the Beria "conspirators" and their collaborators is difficult to understand unless there are important people within the Soviet hierarchy who have good reason to want the Beria case forgotten.

CAESAR 10 -A

17 August 1954

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SUMMARIZATION OF REPORTS PRECEDING BERIA PURGE

[redacted]

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This document contains information within the meaning of Public LAW 513-81st Congress.

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CAESAR 10-A
Summary

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

With the publication of Caesar 10, the Beria purge, it was thought desirable to summarize briefly the preceding reports in the series. Caesar 11, which is in process, is concerned with developments in the leadership situation following Beria's purge. After its publication, a critical review of the whole series will be undertaken, which will also incorporate additional information received since publication of the various reports.

It must be reiterated that these reports are concerned primarily with the Soviet leadership. They make no attempt to give proper historical weight or perspective to events taking place in the USSR during the period covered.

CAESAR 10-A
SUMMARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Caesar 6 - The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship

This paper examined the validity of the hypothesis, current particularly among ex-Communists, that Zhdanov and Malenkov had battled for Stalin's favor and for control of the Communist Party. It was pointed out that Malenkov did suffer a definite political eclipse in 1946 and that this lasted until 1948. Zhdanov emerged as the leading party secretary in 1947 and 1948, while Malenkov spent this period in relative oblivion in the service of Soviet agriculture. At a time when agriculture was at least as difficult a problem as it is today, the chief spokesman was A.A. Andreev who headed the Council for Collective Farm Affairs. Conceivably Malenkov may have gone into this field as a trouble shooter and acted behind the scenes, perhaps as a balance to Andreev's Council. At any rate in terms of the Malenkov-Zhdanov struggle, it is clear that, whatever Malenkov's role in agriculture, it did not compensate for the setback he received in the party secretariat.

Caesar 6 also noted that "Malenkov was the only politburo member whose status dropped significantly in the period from 1946-1948 and whose position rose measurably after Zhdanov's death."

In an effort to determine how Zhdanov was able to persuade Stalin to demote Malenkov, the latter's association with Soviet intelligence activities, with Soviet policy toward Germany, and with the economist Varga, were explored. It was speculated that reverses in the foreign intelligence field and particularly a few key defections, such as that of Gouzenko, may have contributed to Malenkov's difficulties. With respect to his involvement in Soviet policy on Germany, several links were traced out which appeared particularly interesting.

Malenkov first became involved in foreign policy in connection with his chairmanship of the State Committee for Rehabilitation of Devastated Areas to which he was appointed in 1943. This body, called the "Special Committee," included Beria, Mikoyan, Vozresensky, and Andreev in its membership and later became the authority responsible for industrial dismantling in Soviet occupied areas in Eastern Europe. It was represented in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany by M.Z. Saburov, who at that time was reportedly very close to Malenkov. Several messages directly associated Malenkov with dismantling in Germany. This program

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was badly handled; valuable property was destroyed or lost and hostility toward the USSR was fanned in the areas dismantled. In July 1946, Molotov announced that the dismantling would be discontinued.

In mid-1947 a new program was identified under the Chief Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad headed by ex-MGB chief Merkulov. This involved Soviet ownership of controlling shares of industrial firms in the Satellites. The Directorate was responsible to the Council of Ministers and not to Mikoyan's Ministry of Foreign Trade as previously suggested. Merkulov's deputies were Kobulov and Dekanosov. Further research is indicated to determine to what extent Beria became responsible for Satellite affairs.

The sixth chapter mentioned that various defector sources had reported Politburo conflict over Malenkov's dismantling policy. For example, one source stated Mikoyan was opposed to the policy and Zhdanov and Voznesensky sided with him; the Soviet Military Administration was also said to be opposed to it. While this source is somewhat suspect, there does appear to be good reason to believe that Malenkov's policy was repudiated. If the source's information is correct, it would appear that opposition to Malenkov's policy developed within the Special Committee itself. In this connection it is interesting to note that Mikoyan is the only one of its members in good standing today. Voznesensky and Beria have been purged and Andreev demoted.

With respect to Malenkov's connection with Varga, Caesar VI mentioned that Varga had espoused the dismantling program in a series of articles beginning in 1943 and had not come under attack until Malenkov's decline, suggesting an association between them. Various sources have also reported on this purported association.

Varga's book analyzing the impact of World War II on the Western capitalist economy, which had been completed in December 1945 and stood as the primary Soviet theoretical work in the field, was subjected to a highly critical review by a special conference of leading Soviet economists in May 1947. Several of the theses put forth by Varga and the Institute of World Economy and World Politics of which he was director had implied the ability of the capitalist system to undertake planning in the face of a great crisis and thus stave off its ultimate collapse. This ran counter to the narrow dogmatic interpretation of Marxian theory then held by doctrinaire party leaders and was particularly condemned at the conference.

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Following the May 1947 discussions, which had indicated the existence of considerable uncertainty even among Soviet economists on the course of developments in the capitalist economies, Varga and his Institute continued to publish controversial themes. In late 1947, Varga's Institute of World Economy and World Politics was merged with the Economics Institute (specializing in domestic economic problems) to form the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This new institute, of which Varga continued as a member, was placed under the "scientific-organizational guidance" of the USSR State Planning Commission, then headed by Voznesenski. In his work The Soviet Economy During the Second World War published in 1947, Voznesenski had specifically attacked certain of the principles proposed by Varga. It is noteworthy that despite these attacks, apparently by the Zhdanov faction, Varga, an assumed associate of Malenkov, did not cease to be an important economist in the USSR and was never completely disgraced.

Zhdanov's role in formulating Soviet policy, particularly with regard to foreign communism, was examined and found to be important, primarily on the basis of reports of defectors whose information was considered reliable. Specifically, Zhdanov was judged responsible for the militant Communist policy of 1947, the failure of which probably compromised his political career.

Caesar 7 - The Balance of Power

Caesar 7 began by tracing the ascent of Malenkov after Zhdanov's death. It was best symbolized by official politburo listings which saw Malenkov rise to the number-four position, and, after some initial jockeying with Beria, to the number-three ranking (behind Stalin and Molotov). Malenkov reappeared as a party secretary in July 1948. His name then cropped up again [redacted] on a wide variety of problems. Personnel problems again came under his jurisdiction and Kuznetsov who perhaps had assumed them in the intervening period was purged. In addition, Malenkov continued his interest in agriculture, the problem he had been assigned during his lean years.

Along with Kuznetsov, several other Zhdanov supporters were removed from office. Some interesting examples were:

Colonel General Shikin, chief of the Army Political Directorate, replaced by F.F. Kuznetsov; N.A. Voznesensky, politburo member and Gosplan chief, replaced in the latter position by M.Z. Saburov; P.S. Popkov, party secretary in Leningrad, replaced by V.N. Andrianov; and G.M. Popov, party secretary in Moscow, replaced by N.S. Khrushchev. With regard to these replacements a note of caution is in order. It would be flaunting standard bureaucratic procedure as well as Stalin's operating methods to insist that they were all Malenkov men.

The government changes of 1949 which saw Molotov, Mikoyan and Bulganin relinquish their direct ministerial control were also examined with somewhat inconclusive results. Concerning Molotov it was noted in passing that he reportedly was responsible for Soviet rejection of the Marshall plan and that Mikoyan and Kaganovich had held a different view. Molotov apparently retained politburo-level supervision over foreign affairs and it was suggested that he was concentrating on Far Eastern problems.

The Voznesensky case was examined in some detail and the hypothesis that he had been involved in a theoretical or practical policy controversy was largely discounted. Suslov's attack on Voznesensky's "un-Marxist" views in December 1952 was seen as an ex post facto one. It was concluded that the probable reasons for Voznesensky's disappearance were his close ties with Zhdanov as well as a possible failure in the planning and direction of the Soviet economy.

Another topic mentioned in this seventh chapter was rearmament. Some sort of rearmament or re-equipment program was thought to have begun in the latter half of 1948, the extent of which was unknown.

Pravda's attack on Andreev's "link" system of collective farming in February 1950 was briefly examined, as was Khrushchev's movement to enlarge the collective farms in the Moscow Oblast by merging the small farms. This program was first outlined by Khrushchev in April 1950. He later intimated in December of that year that his policy was being implemented throughout the USSR. The controversy was regarded as signaling the temporary triumph of one political faction over another.

In foreign policy the USSR was seen to have backed out of European problems and to have concentrated on the Far East. The shift seemed to be due more to circumstances than to a

controversy over foreign policy and was not held to be associated with Malenkov's rise.

There was also little reason for believing that the plan for the North Korean invasion provoked any controversy. Although there is good reason to believe that Molotov was in the Far East in August and later in October 1950, probably in connection with Chinese Communist entry into the war, there were no grounds for concluding that he or any other person was the primary sponsor of the North Korean attack. The static situation in the Soviet hierarchy following the Korean war suggests that Stalin served up no scapegoats for the reverses suffered and thus was either personally responsible for the war or did not regard it as a debacle.

Caesar 8 - Indecision and Stress, 1950 - 1952

This report examined the evidence available in several critical fields during the period. All of it seemed to point to "indecision and stress." The Soviet leaders appeared increasingly concerned over US rearmament, integration of Western defense and the spread of the Korean war, but their foreign policy remained the same--rigid and provocative. It was suggested that controversy developed over Stalin's inflexible line in foreign affairs. Here is a synopsis of the topics examined:

Foreign Policy: Korean cease-fire feelers were made in April after bitterly anti-Western propagandistic statements, by Pospelov in January 1951, and by Stalin in February. Malik finally made his proposal in June and the talks began. The discussions soon bogged down, however, and evidence accumulated that the Communists were preparing a fall offensive. This was apparently called off at the last minute and probably involved a major policy decision. The truce talks were then resumed and continued until late 1952 when another stalemate developed which continued until after Stalin's death. In Europe the deputy foreign ministers met in Paris from April to June 1951 but got nowhere and in September of that year the USSR sent out a rash of notes in protest against NATO. Although Stalin's letter of February 1952, which later formed a large part of his Economic Problems of Socialism, was much calmer than his remarks of a year earlier, he came up with essentially no new foreign policy formula. Stalin denounced as heresy the view that wars between capitalist states were no longer inevitable and that imperialism must attack the USSR.

Some vacillation on the German question was noticeable. In March 1952, the USSR proposed a draft treaty for Germany embodying a shift from its previous position but further exchanges proved unfruitful. In June the USSR shifted Ambassadors to the GDR and in July a harsh collectivization program was inaugurated suggesting that policy had crystallized on a divided Germany.

Industry: The international situation appeared to have complicated the internal planning system. Revisions in the draft Five Year Plan and subsequent efforts to redraft the plan in 1950 and 1951 probably reflected indecision regarding policy. In his February 1952 letter published in Economic Problems of Socialism Stalin stuck with the status quo solution and rejected changes in favor of either heavy investment in armament or in consumer goods.

Agriculture: In January 1951, Khrushchev carried his agriculture policy a little further in a speech advocating not only the merger of kolkhozes but the actual resettlement of peasants belonging to the merged kolkhozes in single urban centers known as "agro-cities"; the personal plots of the peasants were to be on the outskirts of the new settlements. Pravda's treatment of this policy indicated that it was too hot to handle: the speech was not published until 4 March and the following day Pravda ran a caveat saying that it had been printed "as material for discussion." Two regional party leaders ripped into it shortly thereafter: Arutinov of Aremlnia said the proposals were a "fantasy"; Bagirov of Azerbaijan said they were "harmful and intolerable." After this criticism the agro-city concept was discontinued but kolkhoz amalgamation continued.

Caesar 8 in attempting to analyze this curious disagreement reached the tentative conclusion that Khrushchev was expressing his owns views in this matter and that Arutinov and Bagirov were emboldened in their opposition by the support of Beria.

Malenkov's position in the dispute is not clear. He was still active in the field because, Andreev also continued active as Chairman of the Council for Collective Farms Affairs. At the October Congress Malenkov had mentioned that certain leading officials had indulged in a wrong approach and had overlooked agricultural production, the main task. This has been taken as a slap at Khrushchev. Stalin in his Economic Problems of Socialism remained aloof from the problem.

Bagirov and Arutinov were purged in the period following Beria's arrest, reinforcing the idea that he had been their patron. One of the accusations against Beria was that he had hindered the solution of urgent agricultural problems. Bagirov's latter day association with Beria however is still in dispute.

Security: In August 1951 MGB chief Abakumov was replaced by S.D. Ignatiev, a party functionary. Following this, nine new faces were numbered among the republic MGB chiefs and four among the deputy ministers in Moscow. One of the latter, A.A. Epishev, may actually have entered the ministry as a deputy minister for personnel as early as February 1951. He, like Ignatiev, was a party functionary of some stature and may have had links to Khrushchev by virtue of his service in the Ukraine. The shake-up was interpreted as a move by the party to strengthen its control over the MGB, particularly in view of a speech by the new Georgian MGB minister in September 1952.

The Georgian Purges: These purges which lasted from the latter part of 1951 through August 1952 were interpreted as considerably weakening Beria's position. This was based primarily on reports from [redacted] sources who were regarded as reliable. The sources also asserted that Stalin personally ordered the shake-up and one of them mentioned rumors that Malenkov had acted as Stalin's emissary in this matter.

Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism: Mr. Kennan's views were quoted to the effect that Stalin, in his discussion of the capitalist world, had put forward a theory which had been challenged by a group which questioned its soundness. This group had presumably wanted to face up to the reality of the Western coalition and to negotiate before deciding on a definite solution. This view was overruled by Stalin, who argued that it was unnecessary to negotiate since the Western world would go to pieces anyway. This seemed to be the center of ideological disagreement in the Kremlin.

The 19th Party Congress: Changes in the statutes were viewed primarily as regularizing already existing practices. The presidium, which replaced the old politburo, was regarded as largely an honorary body with real power still in the hands of a "buro" within it, composed of the old politburo members. The central committee expansion reflected the elevation of party careerists over specialists and technicians from other sections of society and indicated the comparative importance of the party worker. This development was interpreted as increasing Malenkov's influence in the central committee since he had been the party organization specialist. As a matter of passing

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interest it was pointed out that every republic Congress, prior to the all-Union one had stressed the need for vigilance--primarily against bourgeois nationalism.

Post Congress Developments: The most significant post-Congress development was the announcement of the doctors' plot on 13 January 1953, following an intense propaganda campaign directed against laxness, gullibility, and bourgeois deviations and emphasizing the need for "revolutionary vigilance."

Several other interesting developments were briefly noted: The announcement 15 days after the conclusion of the Congress that Marshal S.I. Govorov's name had been "inadvertently" left off the list of candiate members of the central committee; the identification of D.T. Shipilov, ousted in 1949 from Agitprop for numerous "shortcomings" including complicity in the Voznesensky affair, as the new editor of Pravda; and the period of high political tension and behind-the-scenes maneuvering in the period from the October Party Congress until Stalin's death.

Most of the propositions advanced in this chapter are of a hypothetical nature, and numerous problems remained unsolved. Chief among these is the problem of Abakumov's replacement as MGB minister by S.D. Ignatiev, the reasons for this shift and the political relationships involved in it. Clarification of this point may serve to unravel many of the problems of the two years preceding Stalin's death.

Caesar 1 - The Doctors' Plot

This chapter attempted to outline all the known relevant information pertaining to the doctors' plot and to suggest a tentative hypothesis regarding its meaning. The plot definitely had anti-Semitic and anti-American overtones. The wording of the announcement hinted that other Soviet leaders had either been murdered or had had their life span reduced; one of the doctors had been chief of the Kremlin medical directorate and had preumsably treated Stalin and other Soviet leaders. Only two low-level intermediaries were singled out in the plot, suggesting that there were more important participants whose names had not been disclosed. Because Shcherbakov's alleged murder occured in 1945 when Merkulov was MGB minister and Zhdanov's alleged murder occured in 1948 when Abakumov was the responsible security chief, it was suggested that the plot, primarily because of its criticism of the security elements, was directed ultimately against Beria.

No good reason could be adduced for the inclusion of the specific five military men mentioned. It did seem possible that the announcement was a warning against a group of

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individuals contesting for more political power. The belated appointment of Govorov to the central committee suggested that there was such a contest going on, but it was impossible to place the participants.

The plot set off an intense vigilance campaign in Soviet propaganda and both Stalin and Malenkov were employed as its oracles. This caused speculation that both were mixed up in the origin of the plot. However, in the vigilance campaign, Stalin's line (in his Economic Problems) that the capitalist countries were going to destroy themselves rather than get together against the Soviet Union, was abandoned for his earlier and stronger capitalist encirclement theory. One Pravda article, for example, said that certain "rotten theories" such as the view that capitalist encirclement no longer existed, were still prevalent in the USSR and must be rooted out.

Other indications of tension in the period leading up to Stalin's death were also briefly noted. The list of candidates for the local Moscow Soviets published on 27 January did not contain the names of several ministers, thus foreshadowing some of the organizational changes to be made after Stalin's death; P.N. Pospelov appeared as deputy editor of Pravda (Pospelov had earlier been replaced as head of the Marx-Lenin-Stalin Institute and had been passed over when the party presidium had been elected in October. The autopsy report on L.Z. Mekhlis, a party official who died on 14 February, listed I.I. Kuperin of the MGB as new chief of the Kremlin medical directorate; on 17 February Izvestia carried a curious announcement of the "sudden" death of General Kozynkin of the Kremlin guard; on the same day the [redacted] was struck by the grim atmosphere prevailing at a Chinese reception on the anniversary of the Sino-Soviet pact attended only by Bulganin; Red Army day ceremonies on 23 February stressed the "liberation" role of the Soviet army, a departure from previous practice.

The main view that emerged from the chapter was one of an atmopshere of tension, confusion and fearful expectancy in the period just prior to Stalin's death.

Caesar 2 - Death of Stalin

This chapter began by pointing out that until 4 March neither the Soviet people nor the rest of the world had been given any inkling in Soviet propaganda that Stalin was critically ill. While this tended to suggest that his death had caught even the Soviet leaders off guard, it was noted that the West was completely dependent on the Soviet press for all the news on this development and it was therefore impossible to say when or how Stalin died. The sudden announcement of

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Stalin's illness focused attention on his successor; the strongest contender appeared to be Malenkov, due to his hold on the party apparatus and because of the strong possibility that he also controlled the MGB through Ignatiev. There was no specific mention of a successor, however, and responsibility was placed in the hands of the central committee and the Council of Ministers.

The announcement of Stalin's death came on 5 March and again no specific Soviet leaders were mentioned. Khrushchev was named chairman of Stalin's funeral committee and burial was set for 9 March. On the 7th the big party and government reorganization was announced to prevent "panic and disarray." The whole system was streamlined. Malenkov was named premier and ranked first in the party presidium followed by Beria. Four of the old politburo members became first deputy premiers and, of these, three took over control of a ministry: Molotov--Foreign Affairs; Beria--MVD; and Bulganin--War. Voroshilov replaced Shvernik as "president." A strong indication that jockeying for position was going on underneath the surface was seen in the reorganization of the party secretariat--the group handling party personnel matters. The announcement indicated that of the nine incumbent secretaries the status of three--Malenkov, Suslov and Aristov--could not immediately be determined; four--Pegov, Ponomarenko, Ignatov and Brezhnev--were transferred to other duties; two--Khrushchev and Mikhailov--remained. In addition three newcomers were added--Ignatiev, Pospelov and Shatealin. The secretariat was to be reshuffled again a week later.

Reactions to Stalin's death were then explored, somewhat inconclusively. In the satellites unusual security restrictions were enforced. In the Soviet Union the Moscow citizens appeared relatively unmoved but in the provinces, a study based on [redacted] pointed out that there had been widespread grief and shock. A gradual de-emphasis of Stalin was begun, though nothing suggestive of criticism appeared. At the funeral only Molotov displayed any grief. Malenkov and Beria devoted their attention to the future. Beria did not once refer to Stalin. He indicated that the Party's policy would brook no interference and said that one of the decisions taken in this connection was the appointment of Malenkov as Premier. (Beria later made the nominating speech for Malenkov at the Supreme Soviet meeting called to ratify these changes in the leadership). Beria included one curious passage in his speech alluding to the government's regard for the rights of its citizens.

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The funeral ceremony presented the Soviet leadership as a triumverate with Malenkov primus inter pares closely trailed by Beria and with Molotov a relatively poor third. It was followed by an abortive Stalin-like build-up of Malenkov in the Soviet press which lasted only until 11 March. The uncertainty in Soviet propaganda as to Stalin's successor caused confusion in the Communist world outside the USSR. In addition several covert reports claimed that Communists in Western Europe thought Molotov would succeed Stalin.

The halt in Malenkov's build-up roughly coincided with the Central Committee meeting of 14 March where, at his own "request" Malenkov was removed from the Secretariat. Khrushchev, Suslov, Pospelov, Shatalin and Ignatiev were listed as members of the Secretariat and Shatalin was raised from alternate to full membership on the Central Committee. This development strongly suggested that Malenkov had succumbed to pressure either direct or indirect, from the other Soviet leaders, and had given up his direct control over Party personnel matters. Thus his power was being limited at the outset. The relationship between Khrushchev and Malenkov was explored in the chapter with inconclusive results.

The central committee meeting on 14 March seems to have formalized the collective leadership principle although realignment probably began on 6 March with the peculiar reshuffling of the secretariat and the statement that Khrushchev was to be assigned "leading work in the central committee." This meeting was not publicized until 20 March but it obviously prepared the way for the 15 March Supreme Soviet meeting which had apparently been postponed to allow the central committee to meet. At this session Malenkov came out publicly for the principle of collective leadership. The Supreme Soviet at this 15 March meeting ratified all the preceding government changes and made several more which were equally as sweeping. As mentioned previously, Beria made the nominating speech for Malenkov, and [redacted] observed that Beria clearly gave the impression of being the "ringleader." Molotov, however, of all the leaders, received the most applause.

At this meeting: the War and Navy Ministries were merged; A.I. Kozlov, a party official, received complete control of agriculture by inheriting several merged ministries dealing with the subject (the State Council of Collective Farm Affairs under Andreev was finally abolished); P.K. Ponomarenko, who some Western observers thought would become either a deputy premier or minister of agriculture, moved completely out of the latter field and became minister of culture; Gossnab and Gosprodsnab were merged with Gosplan giving it supervision

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over allocations of materials, food and industrial products, thereby greatly increasing its importance (Kosyachenko, its new chief, was not even a member of the central committee); Mikoyan, who earlier had been named minister of external and foreign trade, was made the only deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and thus given a peculiar niche all by himself; N.G. Ignatov, who had also been marked on 6 March for an important government position, was not even mentioned though he later turned up as a party secretary in Leningrad; V.V. Kuznetsov, who had been appointed ambassador to China on 10 March, was made a deputy minister of foreign affairs; A.A. Andreev was elected a member of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

[redacted] another major reorganization which was not publicized. The Chief Directorate of Camps of the MVD (slave labor) was transferred to the Ministry of Justice, and several other directorates of the MVD dealing with such matters as mining and metallurgy were transfered to their ministerial counterparts. In at least some cases the chiefs of these directorates as well as the personnel moved with them. Thus the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) which before the 6 March merger had been separate from the MGB (Ministry of State Security) and which had handled primarily economic functions, was gradually losing its economic role.

This development was of great interest, particularly because Beria had regained direct control of the reorganized MVD. Actually there had been some evidence [redacted] suggesting that he had never lost control over the MVD as he presumably did over the MGB. Furthermore the MVD functions included a good deal of construction for the atomic energy program which Beria was reliably reported to head. Therefore it was believed that Beria may have succumbed to pressure to give up this empire within an empire in the give-and-take atmosphere of 6-15 March.

Caesar 3 - the Reversal of the Doctors' Plot

On 4 April 1953, close on the heels of the 27 March amnesty, Pravda reported than an investigation committee of the new MVD had discovered that "ex-officials" of the MGB had used "illegal methods" to get the doctors to confess. The guilty officials were said to have been arrested. The

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announcement obviously caught some Soviet papers, notably Young Communist, completely by surprise since on the same day that journal ran an article praising the original informer on the plot. Six non-Jewish doctors were added to the list of those falsely accused while the names of two of the original nine were missing.

The language of the Pravda editorial on the release of the doctors as well as the actual circumstances appeared to indicate that Beria was a prime mover in the action. On 7 April the central committee removed S.D. Ignatiev, the MGB minister at the time of the doctors' arrest, from the party secretariat, less than three weeks after he had been confirmed in the post. On 10 April Izvestia promised that the persons found guilty of falsely accusing the fifteen Soviet doctors and attempting to foment racial prejudice would be punished. A curious postscript was seen on 22 April when Egorov, one of the accused doctors

On 22 May, N.N. Vasilev, minister of state control of the RSFSR, claimed that the guilty parties, including Deputy MGB Minister Ryumin, had been punished. Why or by what authority Vasilev made the announcement was never determined. On 8 May, the leading newspaper in Georgia linked Ryumin with Rukhadze, a former Georgian MGB minister, who had handled the 1951-52 purges there; Rukhadze was accused of fabricating evidence and attempting to stir up racial hatred. It seemed, therefore, that Beria was getting ready to clear out undesirable elements in the MGB. The doctors' plot reversal was followed in Georgia by a reversal of the 1951-52 purges there and V.G. Dekanozov, a Beria supporter moved in as minister of the reorganized MVD.

The various efforts made by the new regime to reduce internal and external tension were briefly reviewed in the chapter and it was concluded that on the external side the efforts were designed to promote a period of international relaxation while the collective leadership thrashed out its problems. Wedded to this, however, was the possibility that the new leaders, aware of the failure as well as the danger of Stalin's rigid foreign policy, were anxious to try something a little more safe, sane and productive.

Caesar 4 - Germany

P.F. Yudin's appointment as political adviser to the Soviet Control Commission on 15 April 1953, vice Semenov, did not result in any policy change. Walter Ulbricht maintained his dominant position and his "hard line" policy. On 28 May, Moscow completely revamped its representation in Germany, dissolved the Soviet Control Commission under General Chuikov, and named Semenov to the new post of high commissioner. Semenov's return 37 days after he had been replaced implied Kremlin indecision on its German policy and on the personnel and organizational set-up necessary to implement that policy.

Chuikov, whose function was now limited to command of Soviet troops in Germany, switched places with the commander of the Kiev Military District in early June. Yudin remained as deputy to Semenov until 2 December when he was named ambassador to China. A similar development occurred at the same time in Austria where Ilyichev, a professional diplomat, became Soviet high commissioner.

Four days after Semenov's return, the SED spectacularly reversed its program. A week following this reversal, on 17 June, the East German government encountered the greatest show of resistance ever experienced in any Satellite. Soviet authorities reacted swiftly and efficienty to quell the disturbances and employed Soviet troops. The revolt, however, did not effect the "new economic course" in the Satellites.

Ambassador Bohlen suggested on 19 June that the reforms embodied in the "new course" stemmed from a realization on the part of the Soviet leaders that a continuation of intersive socialism would lead to economic or political catastrophe which could be coped with only through measures of terror they were unwilling to employ.

In Poland, the USSR also shifted ambassadors. G.M. Popov replaced career diplomat Sobolev. Popov had been removed from the all-Union party secretariat in 1949 and also from his position as first deputy of the Moscow City and Oblast party committee. This was of interest, because Popov had been strongly criticized for his handling of agricultural problems in th oblast. His successor was N.S. Khrushchev, who was shortly to introduce his "radical" scheme for collectivizing agriculture.

Caesar 5 - Melnikov's Removal in the Ukraine

On 10 April the Ukraine began to reorganize its government apparatus in accordance with the USSR reorganization of 15 March. The MVD-MGB merger which took place there saw P.Y. Meshik, a reported associate of Beria, come in as the new MVD minister. On 30 May. A.Y. Korneichuk was appointed first deputy chairman of the Republican Council of Ministers. This was of some interest because he had been attacked by Ukraine party secretary Melnikov at the September 52 Ukraine Party Congress for his "bourgeois nationalist" tendencies. Interest in Ukraine party affairs had also been heightened, because, when the Malenkov propaganda build-up had ground to a halt in mid-March in the central press, the Ukrainian press, presumably under Melnikov's direction, had continued to play up Malenkov as the number one leader.

In early June the Ukrainian press began criticizing "violators" of the Soviet nationalities policy. Finally on 12 June, Melnikov, the first secretary of the Ukrainian party, was removed from office. He was also an alternate member of the all-Union party presidium and as such was the highest official purged since Stalin's death. Melnkiov was accused of allowing "distortions" of the Soviet nationalities policy in the western areas of the Ukraine. One of these "distortions" was the substitution of Russian for Ukrainian in the school curriculum. A.I. Kirichenko, a native Ukrainian, was named to replace Melnikov.

Melnikov's removal seemed to reflect on presidium members Khrushchev and Malenkov. Melnikov had been second secretary under Khrushchev from 1947-1949 when the latter was first secretary of the Ukrainian party. Melnikov had faithfully reflected Malenkov's views on party discipline, policy and procedure and had also taken a rather prominent part in the Soviet vigilance campaign which derived much of its ideological inspiration from Malenkov's speech at the party congress.

It was speculated that Melnikov's ouster was instigated by Beria, since it was the third instance of a party purge on charges of promoting Russification which seemed to come in the wake of MVD personnel changes. The first was the doctors' plot reversal and the removal of Ignatiev, and the second was the mid-April purge in Georgia following the appointment of Dekanosov. Melnikov's purge followed Meshik's appointment as MVD Minister in the Ukraine.

Caesar 9 - Politics and the Soviet Army

Caesar #9 included extensive background research to determine how important a political factor is the Soviet military, and what types of political action or influence might be expected of the armed forces and their leaders in times of crisis. This research revealed that the Soviet armed forces do not have a history of successful interference in internal political crises as a single, organized element of power. Their heritage includes a tendency toward fragmentation and inaction during internal crisis. Military freedom of action is restricted by the interlocking networks of political officers and security police operating within the ranks, by a tendency toward conformity among officers and men alike, by a growing officer caste system, and by the presence in the ranks of a high percentage of Communists subject to party discipline. Unless the existing controls break down under drastic circumstances, the armed forces as a whole must be looked upon as a relatively passive and non-monolithic body with regrad to a Soviet succession crisis.

Caesar #9 continued with a current review of developments beginning with the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, to determine what changes occurred in the political position of the Soviet armed forces and their leaders during the period of extreme tension ensuing from Stalin's death. From the 19th Party Congress until Stalin's death, there were some indications of the participation of military leaders in political maneuvering, as evidenced by Govorov's belated designation as a candidate member of the central committee and by the naming of military officers in the doctors' plot announcement. The period of the post-Stalin struggle between Malenkov and Beria, from March until June, was a time of outward passivity on the part of the military leaders, with an increase in political control over them, indicated primarily by the reorganization of the ministry of armed forces and the return of Bulganin as minister. The re-emergence of Zhukov, probably considered by the party leadership as a safety measure at a critical moment, gave increased influence to an outspoken professional officer.

A shift from a passive toward a more active role of the military in politics probably occurred beginning with the Beria purge. Representatives of the armed forces participated in the removal and sentencing of Beria, and the new party leadership probably rewarded military support by giving the

professional military men greater freedom within their own establishment. After June, some high officers of the armed forces were promoted, greater consideration was given to a military point of view regarding questions of morale and security in the armed forces. The political position of the Soviet military leaders appeared better than it had for several years previously, and an uneasy alliance was probably maintained between top professional officers and party leaders.