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Contents

(continuation of the numbers order started from the first volume)

18. "From the January Plenum to the July Plenum (1955)—Antecedents and Aftermath of Malenkov's Resignation from the Premiership," 12 March 1958. 57 pages. **7**

The author reviews the events leading up to and after Malenkov's resignation, "in order to introduce information relating to Malenkov's demotion obtained only subsequently, and in order to provide some perspective for a discussion of policy changes undertaken in the months after February 1955."

19. "From the July Plenum (1955) to the 20th Party Congress—Antecedents and Aftermath of Malenkov's Resignation from the Premiership," 19 June 1958. 69 pages. **65**

"Khrushchev's increasing role in Soviet policy formulation and implementation and the consequent loss of influence by Malenkov and Molotov meant essentially that the circle of top leaders had been reduced, and it was doubtful if the addition of Kirichenko and Suslov to the presidium by the July plenum would serve to enlarge that circle."

20. "The Tie That Binds—Soviet Intrabloc Relations: Feb 1956 to Dec 1957," 29 July 1958. 55 pages. **135**

"The USSR's post-Stalin policy thus was designed so as to transform its slaves into willing allies, and, coincidentally, to render international communism more palatable to the non-Communist world."

21. "The Failure of the Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement," 3 November 1958. 26 pages. **191**

"If Moscow had been content to accept Yugoslavia as an independent neutral, and the Yugoslavs had refrained from meddling too actively in satellite affairs, Belgrade's demonstrated willingness to pursue a foreign policy close to that of the USSR would have precluded serious conflicts between the two states."

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12 March 1958

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STUDY

FROM THE JANUARY PLENUM TO THE JULY PLENUM (1955) - ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH OF MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PREMIERSHIP

(Reference title: CAESAR I-58)

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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PREFATORY NOTE

It was originally intended to begin this study at the point where Caesar II, Resignation of Malenkov, left off. It seemed to the author as he progressed, however, that it would be useful to go over some of the chronological ground covered in the earlier study for two reasons: in order to introduce information relating to Malenkov's demotion obtained only subsequently, and in order to provide some perspective for a discussion of policy changes undertaken in the months after February 1955. It will be seen, therefore, that points already discussed in considerable detail in earlier chapters--as, for instance, the numerous changes in government and party appointments made between the time of Stalin's death and Malenkov's resignation and the procedural circumstances of the latter event--are treated here only sketchily or not at all. On these points the reader is referred to Caesar chapters Nos. 2, 5, 10 and 11.

FROM THE JANUARY PLENUM TO THE JULY PLENUM (1955) - ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH OF MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PREMIERSHIP

Introduction

The January 1955 plenum of the party central committee and the Supreme Soviet session which followed in February marked the end of a phase in Soviet policy as well as in the political relationships developed after Stalin's death. At that point the two factors, power and policy, were inseparably linked. Malenkov's "resignation" denoted his defeat in the struggle for political dominance which had gone on uninterruptedly among Stalin's successors, but it was, at the same time, a device for demonstrating publicly and emphatically that important parts of the New Course, with which Malenkov's name was commonly linked, had been scrapped. The ritual of political penance was surrounded by a strident propaganda campaign against the consumer goods heresy which, by painting a picture in blacks and whites, tended, perhaps deliberately, to conceal the complexity of the policy problems with which the regime was confronted and the sources of personal rivalry within the party presidium.

Given the immensity of Stalin's power, it would have been remarkable if "collective leadership" and a coherent body of policies capable of advancing the regime domestically and abroad had emerged instantly in March 1953. The period which followed almost inevitably involved a certain amount of trial and error. By the end of 1954 a number of policy difficulties had developed and there had arisen within the party presidium a faction with the power to insist on change. Thereafter, however, though certain of the remedies applied under Malenkov were discarded as fruitless or injurious and the reins were taken out of his hands, the policies laid down by the regime continued to testify to a recognition that Stalin's personal despotism had been buried with him, and that the political and economic system which he had set up in the Soviet empire, together with the popular attitudes which it had engendered, needed reform. Though later events were to show that many serious problems remained or that new ones had been created, by the time the 20th party congress opened in early 1956, the regime seems to have felt many of the solutions it was seeking had been found and that it was well on the way to overcoming its Stalinist heritage.

The Post-Stalin Experiment - Domestic and Foreign Setting

The view of the USSR's strategic position which shaped the broad lines of post-Stalin policy had already emerged at the 19th party congress in October 1952. It appeared in Stalin's last theoretical pronouncement, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, which recognized an ebb in the tide of Communist territorial expansion and diminishing likelihood of the immediate overthrow of capitalism through subversion or armed aggression. It seems likely, however, that Stalin's successors knew only in general terms where they wanted to go. Once the danger of public "panic," against which the new regime had appealed in its first communiqué, had passed, the first order of business was to agree on and put into practice some arrangement for the exercise of the enormous powers which had been concentrated almost solely in Stalin's hands. This was a prerequisite to the launching of a New Course designed to release the "hidden reserves" in the Soviet economic machine and its human cogs--reserves which had been held back under Stalin--and to create new opportunities for the USSR in the international arena. But group rule had only the dimmest prospects until something was done to eliminate the terror factor from the political equation. By executing Beria and clipping the wings of the political police, the collective leaders hoped to free themselves from the greatest hazard of political intercourse among themselves (which, in the "Doctor's Plot," devised toward the end of Stalin's life, threatened to produce a new purge) and, at the same time, to begin a reform of popular attitudes by offering to end Stalin's undeclared war against his own people.

This withdrawal from primary reliance on enforced consent at home had its analogy elsewhere in the bloc, in an attempt to elaborate gradually a new Soviet-satellite relationship, in which economic dependence and ideological affinity were intended to substitute partly for direct military-police control and the cement of Stalin's unique authority.

However, the departure of Stalin from the scene and the reduction-in-grade of the police apparatus on which he had relied so heavily, left a large gap to be filled. Despite the citations of precedent and dogma, the question of how, in direct, everyday terms, power was to be shared within the leading group and of how and through which channels consent to the collective will was to be obtained, remained to be worked out in practice. The working out promoted personal

rivalries and political in-fighting at the top as well as some jurisdictional confusion between the frequently over-lapping organizations of the party and the government.

Mikoyan told the 20th party congress that after the previous congress in 1952 "certain ossified forms of our diplomacy...were discarded," and "the leading collective body of the party introduced a new, fresh course, pursuing a high policy of high principles, active and elastic, maintained on a calm level, without abuses, proceeding from Lenin's firm injunctions on the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems...." Although the beginnings of the "peaceful coexistence" campaign can be traced back to about the time of the 19th party congress, as Mikoyan does here, Stalin's death, nearly six months later, gave the successor regime an opportunity, which it readily grasped, to push ahead on a new footing. Malenkov took the first step, in one of the earliest public statements of the new regime, when he told the USSR Supreme Soviet on 15 March 1953: "There is not a single controversial or unsettled question which could not be solved by peaceful means on the basis of the mutual agreement of the interested countries." The first important result of this profession was the Korean armistice, on which negotiations were reopened in April 1953 on terms rejected by Stalin (i.e., exchange of prisoners).

In general, the objective of this policy was, first of all, to reduce international tension and the strain placed on the Soviet bloc from the dangerous level of the Korean war and to ease the Soviet Union out of the hardened positions of the cold war, positions which allowed little room for maneuver and had had the effect of promoting cohesion in the non-Communist world. Its assumption was that, with the removal of the cement of common danger, built-in rivalries would soon destroy the structure of non-Communist alignments. By setting in motion the divisive forces espied at the 19th party congress, the USSR hoped, in the short term, to prevent the integration of a rearmed Western Germany in the Western alliance; its longer range objective was to isolate the United States from its major allies, and, thus, to rupture the whole fabric of Western defense.

But, while it strove to appear more conciliatory, the regime did not relinquish its claims of strength, lest the West conclude that it was leading from weakness. A principal purpose of the "peaceful coexistence" campaign

was probably to promote acceptance of the notion of mutual nuclear deterrence and thus to provide a safeguard behind which the USSR could move to encourage and exploit conflicts in the outside world while pursuing domestic objectives with fuller concentration. The two facets of this thinking, which has been called "peace at no price," were displayed at the August 1953 session of the Supreme Soviet when Malenkov announced that the Soviet Union had tested a hydrogen weapon while, at the same time, asserting: "If today, in conditions of tension in international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by internal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration."

Presumably, then, the regime expected to draw positive advantages from a foreign policy with a "new look." Apart from these, however, it had set itself objectives at home which could probably best be pursued in an atmosphere of international detente. However it defined the problem, the regime must have realized (perhaps well before Stalin's death) that the material and manpower resources for further primitive forced-draft industrialization were running short and that the Soviet economy was entering a period in which the overcentralized, highly bureaucratized, and inefficient Stalinist organization of production could not be expected to promote continued rapid industrial growth. In the face of a developing manpower shortage and increased attention to agriculture, it was becoming difficult to maintain the industrial growth rate at a desired level in the traditional Soviet manner, simply by pouring additional manpower and material resources into the economy. The underlying purpose of post-Stalin economic policy, under Malenkov and after, has been somehow to find a cure for the sore spot of low productivity and inefficiency in agriculture and to find new sources of growth in the rationalization

of the economic structure and in increased labor productivity--to be achieved by stirring the worker out of his psychological torpor, by appeal to his material interest, and by technological improvement.*

Miscarriages in the New Course --
The Malenkov Government's Foreign Policy

The threads of the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign objectives cross and recross so that it is not really possible to untangle the two. In the program which developed during the nearly two years of Malenkov's premiership, however, the focus seems to have been mainly inward. It may have been one of the shortcomings of the New Course that it attempted to enjoy the fruits of detente before detente had been assured.

The slogan of "peaceful coexistence" was given some concrete meaning in the Korean armistice and in the Indo-China settlement, and some progress was made toward easing the suspicion with which the non-Communist world viewed the Soviet Union. Under the phrase "normalization of relations" a cautious beginning was made toward healing the breach with Yugoslavia--a breach which, in Stalin's last years, had become wider and wider and had finally led Tito to seek alliance with Greece and Turkey. In numerous smaller ways--by lowering somewhat the cultural barrier between East and West, and by emerging from the shadows of the Kremlin--the regime, besides putting on display the new model of Communist leadership, sought to demonstrate that it was not cast in the same forbidding mold as Stalin.

*A post-Malenkov statement on one aspect of this problem, and evidence of its persistence, appeared in Pravda on 12 January 1957. Denying that the December 1956 plenum was symptomatic of economic difficulties, Pravda asserted: "The point /of the plenum's decisions/ is not...retreat, but a movement to a higher level of economic development, in which a rapid growth rate is made possible not only, or so much, by big new investments, but rather by better use of existing production possibilities, by a more rational organization of the job corresponding to the present stage in the building of Communism."

However, when compared with the gambits attempted in 1955, after Malenkov's resignation--the Soviet disarmament proposals of May 1955, the Austrian treaty, the Belgrade reconciliation, and the Summit conference--these steps appear cautious and tentative.

A former official [redacted] has described the policy of the Malenkov interregnum as a "programless program," which led to the loss of the "spirit of attack." Having discarded certain features of Stalinist policy, he argues, the Malenkov government's failure to develop a substitute offensive program gave the impression of a general retreat on all fronts. This was particularly evident, he continues, in the concept of peaceful coexistence which, to him, seemed to involve nothing more than a period of rest during which the Soviet state reorganized itself internally. We are, of course, dealing here with general impressions. It does seem to be true, nevertheless, that the Malenkov government, while striving to appear more conciliatory than Stalin's, took few risks in the international arena and, by the end of 1954, was in danger of losing the initiative. Perhaps Malenkov labored, throughout his premiership, under certain impediments: presumably, he was obliged from the beginning to defend himself against the encroachments of his rivals in the presidium and thus unable to establish unequivocally his own line; there is also some reason to infer that Malenkov, through temperament or intellect, leaned more toward discretion and a less confident view of things than Khrushchev (cf. Malenkov's March 1954 statement with respect to the possibility of mutual nuclear destruction). In any event, a feeling that Soviet foreign policy needed a new edge and drive may well have figured in the change of management in early 1955. It seems to be what Khrushchev had in mind when he complained to a foreigner after Malenkov's resignation that the latter had not been sufficiently "strong" in his foreign policy.

It is not unlikely that general dissatisfaction with the drift of international events was sharply accented, just before Malenkov's resignation, by the realization that a prime objective of Soviet diplomacy--the denial to the Western alliance of the strength of a rearmed Western Germany--was on the verge of defeat. Unquestionably, Germany figured large in Soviet thinking, not only because of the memories of the two world wars which it evoked, but also because its weight was crucial in the European balance of power. Ratification of the Paris accords by the French assembly in December 1954,

which cleared away the last real hurdle to West German rearmament, presented Soviet diplomacy with one of its most serious setbacks in the postwar period and added an important new ingredient to the strategic picture.

We have no evidence that Malenkov was ever called to account for this development. Neither in his resignation letter nor in the available summary of the central committee's explanatory circular was this point raised. Nevertheless, it was very probably a contributory, if indirect, cause of his resignation in that it forced the regime to look to its defense position and drew attention to the several problems which were then facing the Soviet economy. A suggestion of this appeared in Khrushchev's interview with the Hearst group in February 1955, when he complained that "Churchill and Dulles by positions of strength do not mean a balance of power but rather that one position should be stronger than another in order to enforce its will on the other side." This, he continued, "led to an armaments race with all its dangers and unfortunate economic consequences." The point appeared again a year later when Khrushchev told a foreign diplomat that Malenkov's demotion had been accompanied by certain economic adjustments, which, he implied, had been stimulated by Western agreement on German rearmament.

Economic Problems at Home

The New Course was conceived as a device for putting new momentum into the Soviet economy and for drawing popular support to the new regime. From its starting point and propaganda highlight--the promise to raise the output of consumer goods and, thus, the Soviet living standard substantially "within two or three years"--the program led through a number of expedients to the discovery that it had raised a whole series of unforeseen problems. Within less than two years its most conspicuous elements were discarded, and with them the man who was most nearly the public symbol of its original objectives. The public was encouraged to believe that the New Course had to go because it had come into conflict with a basic axiom of Soviet economic theory, the primacy of heavy industry, but this was a propagandistic oversimplification of the problem and, in any case, dealt with results not causes. The New Course failed because, at the outset, it overestimated the capacity and resilience of the Soviet economy, especially its agricultural sector, because it tended to intensify competition for scarce material and manpower resources, because it created ideological and operative confusion among Soviet cadres, and because, by stimulating expectations which it was, in the end, unable to fulfill, it threatened to damage rather than to strengthen popular morale.

The New Course expected to find "new production possibilities" primarily by arousing the "material interest" of the urban worker and the peasant. The goals of raising the production of consumer goods and increasing agricultural output were interdependent. An increased flow of consumer goods was intended to stimulate agricultural production which, in turn, would provide the foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials on which increased consumption largely depended.*

Increased output of consumer goods appears to have been achieved, in practice, by giving light industry a higher priority in the allocation of materials, by diversification of production in certain heavy industries, by withdrawals from state reserves and inventories, by some increase in imports to be financed largely from gold reserves, but, primarily, through the expansion of light industry plants on the basis of increased state investment. The result was that, according to Soviet statistics, in 1953 and 1954, for the first time since 1947 (when heavy industry was still under reconstruction) the output of consumer goods increased at very nearly the same rate as the output of producer goods.**

Measures were introduced to give the consumer the wherewithal for the purchase of the promised consumer goods by raising his money income. In 1953 the state loan was scaled down by one half and the annual cut in retail prices on consumer goods was twice as large as those put into effect in the previous seven years. The peasant, who was so vital to the success of the New Course, was given additional financial concessions through a reduction of the tax on the private plot, the cancellation of tax arrears, and the reduction of obligatory delivery norms and increased procurement prices on those commodities whose output the government especially wanted to encourage.

*Agriculture is estimated to provide the basis for about three fourths of Soviet consumption.

**These figures show a rate of increase in both categories of approximately 12 percent in 1953. In 1954 the rate of growth in heavy industry was approximately 14 percent and in light industry, approximately 13 percent.

Besides offering the peasant the inducement of more consumer goods and financial relief, the government attacked the agricultural problem by increasing its investments in that sector. In 1954, for example, it was planned to increase capital investment in agriculture from the budget to 21 billion rubles from the 12 billion rubles allocated in 1953.

The measures taken by the regime in August and September 1953 encouraged the peasant to increase the output of vegetable and livestock products on his private plot and thus lifted partially the threat to the plot glimpsed in Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. Simultaneously, however, steps were taken to strengthen organizational control over agriculture from the center by reinforcing the Machine Tractor Stations, the government's main lever in the collective farm economy, and by increasing party authority in the countryside. These included a program to transfer 7,000 mechanical engineers to the MTS's, to install in each of the 9,000 stations a group of party instructors, and to send into the MTS's and collective farms upwards of 100,000 agronomists and other technicians.

As laid out by Khrushchev at the September 1953 plenum of the central committee, the immediate aim of the agricultural program was to raise the output of livestock products, potatoes, vegetables and fruit, primarily by reliance on incentive measures as a means of raising yields. At this stage, agricultural policy was not only consistent with, it was an integral part of, the New Course as a whole. It seems to have assumed, however, that there was no urgency to the problem of insuring an adequate grain supply. This was indicated by Malenkov at the August 1953 Supreme Soviet session when he asserted: "Our country has plenty of grain." Khrushchev spoke in somewhat the same sense, though with an added caveat, when he told the central committee in September: "We are in general satisfying the country's need for grain crops, in the sense that our country is well supplied with bread. We have the necessary state reserves and are exporting wheat on a limited scale." Agricultural procurements in 1953 proved, however, to be at the lowest level in the Fifth Five-Year Plan period,* and within a few months the estimate of grain needs had been sharply revised. Khrushchev informed

*This fact was not revealed until 1956 (Izvestiya, 4 Oct 56)

the February-March 1954 central committee plenum that "the level of grain production so far has not met all the requirements of the national economy," and therewith launched the "new lands" program which called initially for the expansion by 32,000,000 acres of the area sown to grain. The goal was extended in August 1954 to 37,000,000 acres.

In his interview with the British scientist John Bernal (published in late December 1954, on the eve of Malenkov's resignation), Khrushchev tended to minimize the differences between himself and Malenkov over agricultural policies. He said:

> "There was a lot of talk abroad about a seeming contradiction between the statements by J. V. Stalin at the 18th party congress and by G. M. Malenkov at the 19th party congress about the grain problem in our country having been solved and the decisions of the latest plenary meetings of the central committee of the CPSU which point to the need for increasing grain production and expanding the grain areas in virgin lands. Actually there is no contradiction here. J. V. Stalin and G. M. Malenkov were quite right when they said we had enough grain to assure bread for the population. Our country was satisfying its bread requirements. We have enough of it now, too, and we have the necessary reserves. But man does not live by bread alone. It is precisely other requirements of man that indirectly demand an increase in grain production."

More recently, however, Khrushchev has alluded on several occasions to misgivings among certain of his presidium colleagues over the "new lands" scheme, and, since the June plenum of 1957, he has explicitly cited Malenkov for opposition on these grounds. It is doubtful, however, if the differences between them were across the board.

It has been suggested (most recently by Party Secretary Belyayev, following the removal of Malenkov from the presidium) that Malenkov and Khrushchev differed, as a matter of principle, on the issue of increased yields as against expanded acreage as a means of solving the agricultural problem. This, again, appears to be an oversimplification for propaganda purposes. Malenkov's resignation letter took care to represent the agricultural tax reform, a key measure for raising yields in the older cultivated areas, as party rather than personal policy, and this measure continued in force after his removal. Moreover,

Khrushchev has recognized on more than one occasion, public and private, that extensive cultivation is not a long-term panacea for Soviet agriculture. In March 1955 Khrushchev told an agricultural conference:

> In order to increase grain production up to the necessary amounts under the existing distribution of crops it is necessary to raise the yields sharply and for this it is necessary to increase fertilizer production by several times, which requires enormous capital investments in the chemical industry.
>
> But we can achieve this aim even within a shorter period of time and with small expenditures of funds, if we pay particular attention to corn.

In the same connection, a foreign diplomat reported the following discussion on agriculture with Khrushchev in January 1957:

> /Khrushchev/ said he was pleased by the good harvest in the virgin lands, which meant that Soviet grain requirements for the year were satisfied. However, Khrushchev expressed the view that extensive cultivation was no answer for the long-term needs of the Soviet economy and that a real effort would have to be made re intensive cultivation. This would require fertilizers and the USSR had insufficient fertilizers and not enough factories to manufacture fertilizers. Khrushchev said he hoped something could be done about this, but that the Soviets couldn't do everything at once.*

But, however, the "new lands" program was conceived--whether as a "get-rich-quick" scheme which could strengthen the political hand of its backers, or as a feasible step toward solution of the agricultural problem--there is a good possibility that it was the subject of serious debate in the presidium. It might have been anticipated that it would

*The regime's continued interest in increased yields was reflected in plans to double production of chemical fertilizers under the 6th FYP.

superimpose on the New Course substantial additional demands for financial means, machinery and manpower,** and that it might (as, in fact, it did) set up a competition for resources which would endanger the New Course's consumption goals. It is possible to suppose, knowing what we do about Khrushchev's temperament, that he came to regard the agricultural program as more or less his own private campaign and to make more and more insistent demands for the means to fulfill it. A possible clue to his thinking was his statement to the Hearst party that "the development of livestock farming is impossible without the development of heavy industry, which supplies tractors, agricultural machines, etc. to agriculture." And, in a somewhat different context, a Westerner reported him as saying in January 1956 "that the emphasis on technological progress and productivity of labor was in part due to a desire to halt the flow of labor from the countryside to industry," and "that the alternative of continuing the present rate of increase of plant capacity would have necessitated an increase in the industrial labor force with a resultant drain from agriculture."

It is not unlikely, therefore, that as Khrushchev's strength in the presidium increased he came into personal conflict with Malenkov over how available resources were to be distributed and that the issue came to be drawn for the purposes of political debate in terms of the relative priorities of investment and consumption. This helps to explain, perhaps, why, in resigning, Malenkov was forced to assume responsibility for difficulties in agriculture.

Heavy vs. Light Industry

There is some reason to suppose that the New Course, as first outlined by Malenkov, was really designed to do no more than it claimed--that is, through a concentrated, short-term

**On the basis of 1955 allocations it has been estimated that "the effect of the new lands program on the agricultural budget has been to increase capital investment by about one third and to increase the operational expenditures of the Machine Tractor Stations by about one fourth." With respect to manpower, a Soviet source states that, "Already in the first half of 1954 the number of workers in agriculture (Machine Tractor Stations and state farms) increased by 2,300,000 over the first half of 1953."

effort, to correct the "disproportion" between the output of producer and consumer goods, not to deprive heavy industry of its longer term priority. If this is the case, Malenkov can be taken at face value in his August 1953 speech when he indicated that he foresaw no conflict in priorities:

> Until now it has been impossible to expand the light and food industries at the same rate as heavy industries. At the present time we can, and therefore are obliged to speed up light industry with the aim of a more rapid improvement in the material and cultural well-being of the population....We will expand with all means the heavy industries....We must always remember that heavy industry is the foundation of foundations of our socialist economy, because without its expansion there cannot be assured the further development of light industry, the growth of the potential of agriculture and the strengthening of the defense ability of our country.

In this he was echoed by his presidium colleagues.* It was assumed, or hoped, apparently, that the Soviet economy was capable, over a period of two or three years, of increasing sharply the output of consumer goods while heavy industry continued to expand substantially, though at a somewhat slower rate than in the immediate foregoing period.**

*By Khrushchev, in April 1954, as follows: "Our most important task in the immediate future, is, without weakening our attention to the development of heavy industry, the foundation of foundations of the Soviet economy, to organize a sharp upsurge of agriculture, to increase sharply the production of consumer goods, to supply the population in the next two or three years with sufficient industrial products and foodstuffs, to raise decisively the living standard of the workers."

**Academician Strumilin put it this way: "To raise the level of consumption of the workers by 30-40 percent even over 2-3 years could be considered all the greater an accomplishment in that it would not demand a significant retardation even in the general growth of the means of production...."

Some of the increased output of consumer goods was evidently intended to be at the expense of heavy industry. In 1954, for example, heavy industry was to receive 53 percent of total state investments as compared with 55 percent and 56 percent, respectively, in the 1953 and 1955 plan, while the share of the light, food, and local industries rose from 5 percent in 1953 to 8.5 percent in 1954 plan, falling back to about 7 percent in the 1955 plan. In addition, a portion of the investments in heavy industry were to be used for the production of consumer goods. In the main, however, the increased investment in light industry was to be achieved through a sharp increase in total investment rather than through cuts in heavy industry's share.

Some of the means for this increased investment was probably to come from the general growth of the economy, and from discontinuation of some of the investment-hungry "great Stalinist projects." An additional source may have been sought in some reduction in the share of a major claimant to production, defense. This is suggested by the fact that explicit defense expenditures in 1954 were planned at a level 10 percent below the 1953 plan, although total investment from the budget was to increase by approximately 20 percent. It is, of course, risky to draw conclusions in terms of the over-all Soviet defense picture from this kind of data, since direct allocations to the Ministry of Defense through the budget account for only part of the total defense outlay. Nevertheless, the shift of expenditures between 1954 and 1955, viewed together with the progress of arrangements for West German rearmament and the elevation of Marshal Zhukov to the post of defense minister, suggests that defense considerations played a major part in the reexamination of economic policy which preceded Malenkov's ouster.

Increased investment under the New Course and the increase in income of workers and peasants which resulted from the government's fiscal policies, added to the need to halt the flow of manpower from the countryside, enlarged the significance of labor productivity. Unless the increase in labor productivity kept pace with the increase in the wage fund the state savings needed for increased investment could not be accumulated. In fact, however, labor productivity failed to increase at the expected rate. It grew by only 7 percent in 1954 and at the end of the year was well behind

the schedule set in the Fifth Five-Year Plan.* In an effort to fulfill its production goals the government was forced to resort to the expedient of increasing the labor force beyond its intentions.

The problem was complicated by the fact that the consumer goods goals were not fully met, largely because a sufficient increase in agricultural output did not materialize, and, consequently, purchasing power ran ahead of available supply. The effect of the government's policies was thus to increase demand before it was able to provide the consumer goods to meet it and, therefore, to vitiate the incentive element in its program. In a March 1955 conversation with a foreign diplomat in Moscow, Khrushchev reportedly criticized Malenkov directly on this score, alleging that he had "created demands in the Soviet people without having created the capacity for satisfying them." Much the same point was made by Kaganovich, who remarked to a Western diplomat that "it was a mistake to raise the standard of living too quickly as this produced demoralization and lack of discipline among the population." But, though it had failed to meet its goals, the program had apparently had the further undesirable effect of putting a drain on state reserves, a condition which Bulganin, in his first speech as premier, said could not be allowed.

Confusion in the Ranks

Towards the end of 1954, apparently, there was a fair amount of perplexity as to the regime's aims and intent. [redacted] cited above (p. 6) has described a meeting of ideologists and economists which he attended in Moscow in December 1954. "When the subject of relative stress on light and heavy industry came up for discussion," he says, "there was a situation amounting to 'bourgeois liberalization,' with every man expressing his own interpretation of the party position. It was complete disorder and the first

*According to Soviet statistics, labor productivity increased only 33 percent for the 1951-54 period, whereas real wages increased 37 percent. From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, such a relation between these rates of growth is highly unfavorable, because it tends to constrict the surplus available for investment and hence the rate of growth of the Soviet economy.

step to a right-wing deviation." He stressed that absolutely clear directives must be issued by the party on a central issue like that of economic policy in a Communist state."

It was said again and again, once the full-scale campaign of "rectification" was begun in early 1955, that the regime had always based its policy on the primacy of heavy industry. In a strictly literal sense, this was true. Malenkov's statement on this point in his keynote speech of August 1953 (see p. 13 above) remained as the official position throughout the New Course. Nevertheless, the relatively high consumption targets, by virtue of their novelty and the very heavy emphasis they received in propaganda, must have seemed to many to be the core of the New Course.

Once the regime concluded that it had overreached itself in the New Course, the false hopes which had been raised had to be put down and it chose to do so, typically, by calling out the hobgoblin of ideological deviation. Suitable targets were found in the persons of a number of economists who had come through the opening in the ideological front to propose that (in Khrushchev's words to the January 1955 plenum) "at a particular stage of socialist construction the development of light industry can and must overtake all other branches of industry."

It remains an open question to what extent the errant economists had become involved in the tug-and-pull among high-ranking figures. It is possible that some of them at least had merely tried to find theoretical groundwork for what they supposed was approved policy, and that their greatest sin was failure to foresee an impending change in line. Indeed, until late 1954, the consumer goods line seemed to be still intact, though there had been some signs of wavering in earlier months. One of the earliest of these signs was an article by the economist K. V. Ostrovityanov in the March 1954 issue of Kommunist which said that to let consumer goods production run ahead of capital good production was undesirable in the Soviet economy. However, a new edition of the official party textbook Political Economy, published in August, once again reaffirmed that, in certain periods, consumer goods production could outrun producer goods output, while three months later, in the November anniversary speech, Saburov also suggested that the New Course

would remain in effect.* It was curious, therefore, that the slogans issued for the anniversary did not, as had the slogans issued the year before and at May Day 1954, give it as a goal of the regime "to satisfy abundantly in the next two to three years" the population's requirements in foodstuffs.

In December, signs of the coming shift multiplied. In a keynote speech to a Soviet construction conference which met on 7 December (the speech was not published until 28 December), Khrushchev appeared to stress more than usual the importance of heavy industrial development. On 21 December, the anniversary of Stalin's birth, Pravda and Izvestia published commemorative articles, the former's authored by V. Kruzhkov, then the chief of the central committee's department of propaganda and agitation, and the latter's by F. Konstantinov, also a prominent publicist. Kruzhkov came down hard on the point that heavy industry was the be-all-and-end-all of economic policy, omitting entirely the conventional promises to the consumer. Konstantinov, by contrast, made only a polite bow in the direction of heavy industry and continued to speak blithely about "forcing the production of consumer goods." This was unquestionably a meaninful divergence, but it is less certain that the two newspapers were consciously at odds with one another. If these two central organs had, indeed, momentarily broken ranks and were lending themselves to the exposition of conflicting views on a major policy issue, it seems that Izvestia would have been forced to admit its error once the heavy vs. light line had been dogmatically defined.** It might have been expected, too, that the Izvestia author would have paid a price for being on the wrong side, but, to all appearances, Konstantinov has prospered since the end of 1954. In March 1955 he was identified as rector of the Academy of Social Sciences, in April or May

*"This year," Saburov said, "a start has already been made on practical accomplishment of this /consumer goods/ program," thus implying that more was to come.
**The monthly journal Problems of Economics, which had published an article by one of the condemned economists in September 1954, apologized for its error in its March 1955 issue, after failing to appear during the first two months of the year.

he was added to the editorial board of Kommunist, and by the following autumn he was in Kruzhkov's former job as head of Agitprop.

It may have happened that Izvestia was routinely purveying the line which had been in force just as a new one was emerging on the pages of Pravda. The Pravda article probably signified that the presidium decisions which meant the end of the New Course had finally been taken. Delay in the refinement of the propaganda orchestration may account for Izvestia's having been, for a time, awkwardly out of tune.

By the following month the line was crystal clear and a full-scale attack was begun against the advocates of consumption preference. The high points were Shepilov's denunciation in Pravda for 24 January of "right opportunists," and Khrushchev's still rougher language before the January plenum of the central committee, where he accused certain theoreticians of "reurgitation of the right deviation, regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views which Rykov, Bukharin and their ilk once preached."

There was a certain danger, in an ideological sense, in the propositions put forward by the condemned theoreticians. In arguing that the Soviet economy had progressed to a point where it was not only possible but necessary to develop light and heavy industry at equal rates, it may have seemed that these economists were attempting to convert a temporary line of policy into a dogma and, thus, to limit the regime in its right to promulgate economic laws in its own political interest. It is possible, too, that the handful of professional economists who were cited by name were merely the exposed salient of a more or less widespread body of thought.

The charges of theoretical heresy were probably, in part, the reflex action of a regime long accustomed to rationalizing its policies in the pseudo-theological language of Marxism-Leninism, and, in addition, a sign that it wanted no one to miss its propaganda point.

Publicly at least, Malenkov was never tied directly to the heavy-light industry heresy. Khrushchev seems deliberately to have avoided this charge in his conversations with foreigners, though he freely ascribed other sins to Malenkov. Certainly, it would have been incongruous in Communist terms if Malenkov had remained on the presidium after having been publicly stigmatized as a "right deviationist." However,

party members who were familiar with the contents of the central committee document on Malenkov's resignation were told that "by his emphasis on light industry, he advocated slowing down the tempo of heavy industry construction," and "termed this a rightist deviation." Thus, the threat of further disgrace was left hanging over Malenkov's head.

The Political Problem

At the end of 1954 there was no lack of substance for policy controversy within the Soviet presidium. The goals of the New Course had proven overambitious. The investment squeeze which had developed brought the question of priorities to the front and indicated that, as between heavy industry, defense, agriculture and consumer goods something had to give way. The approach of a new Five-Year Plan period, the impact of international events and significant technological developments on Soviet defense needs, to which might be added the unknown quantity of the USSR's economic commitment to Communist China and other bloc members, are some of the factors which converged to demand a readjustment of policy then and there.

Whether the policy issues were in themselves large enough and deep enough to bring Malenkov down or whether a conflict of political ambitions was the real starting point, seems to be still, three years later, a chicken-and-egg question. It remains a matter of speculation as to how deeply Malenkov was personally committed to the New Course and as to whether he carried the issue of its continuation to a point from which it was impossible to retreat. The Soviet leaders themselves had, of course, tried to picture "collective leadership" as a well-oiled machine and to minimize the likelihood of malfunctions--sometimes protesting a little too much.* However this might be, it was difficult not to see in the circumstances of Malenkov's resignation, with its degrading admission of incompetence, in his appointment to an inferior post, and in some of Khrushchev's comments to

*A prime example of this is Malenkov's resignation letter: "One may expect," he said, "that various bourgeois hysterical viragos will busy themselves with slanderous inventions in connection with my present statement and the fact itself of my release from the post of chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, but we--the Communists and the Soviet people--will ignore this lying and slander."

foreign diplomats on the subject, an element of personal animosity and revenge. While the circumstances of the policy shift may have called for a high-ranking scapegoat, there was, nonetheless, a contrast between the treatment of Malenkov and the graceful exit from the Ministry of Trade (24 January 1955) and subsequent promotion to a first deputy chairmanship of the Council of Ministers (28 February 1955) of Mikoyan, who had been hardly less concerned in the consumer goods program.

There can be little doubt that Malenkov's political stock had declined considerably between March 1953 and January 1955 and that Khrushchev's had risen sharply. At the time of Stalin's death, there were signs that Malenkov was poised to become the new Soviet autocrat. His starring role at the 19th party congress a few months earlier had seemed to stamp him as Stalin's most likely heir. Two days after Stalin's death he was named premier of the new government. He had become, at the same time, the senior member of the party secretariat. Whether from habit or under orders, the press began what appeared to be a build-up of the new chieftain, and on 10 March Pravda published its famous cropped photograph, which reduced a group scene to the trio of Malenkov, Stalin, and Mao.

On 21 March, however, the press announced that on 14 March a plenum of the central committee had accepted Malenkov's resignation from the secretariat. Khrushchev at that point became its ranking member. Malenkov suggested the reason for this change in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 16 March; a source of strength to the leadership, he said, was its "collectivity," a point which neither he nor anyone else had thought to mention at Stalin's funeral a week earlier. Sometime between these two dates, evidently, the members of the presidium had been obliged to sit down together to work out an arrangement for the division of power. If any one event marked the beginning of Malenkov's descent from the apex of power it was this--the loss or surrender of his pre-eminent place in the party organization, within which, almost exclusively, he had made his mark through the kind of maneuver and manipulation which leads to power in the arena of Soviet politics.

During March and the following months the government was reorganized and a number of important party posts were reassigned.* The guiding purpose was to ease the regime through its postnatal period, but there were also signs of political maneuvering in a number of irregularities which accompanied the process. In March, A. I. Kozlov, minister of state farms, was appointed head of a consolidated agricultural ministry and I. A. Benediktov, long-time minister of agriculture, was somewhat incongruously appointed ambassador to India. After the arrest of Beria, however, Benediktov was recalled from New Delhi, and in September was named to head a newly organized Ministry of Agriculture and Procurements. Kozlov was, at the same time, appointed to the lesser post of minister of state farms. Also in March, M. Z. Saburov, though retained on the party presidium to which he had been elevated at the 19th party congress, was relieved from Gosplan, which he had headed since 1949, and appointed minister of machine building. The transfer was reversed on 20 June, and he once again became Gosplan chairman. M. D. Bagirov, party chief in the Azerbaidzhan Republic, was made a candidate member of the party presidium in March only to go down in a July purge of Beria followers. In April, there was a party shake-up in Beria's native Georgian Republic and, in June, L. G. Melnikov was removed as first secretary of the Ukrainian party, in a move which there is reason to believe was engineered by Beria.

It is probably not possible to trace all of these results to a single cause, but Beria's hand was clear in some of them and it is almost certain that he was making a none-too-subtle play for power in defiance of the new, unwritten rules of "collective leadership."

An earlier collaboration with Beria was among the charges reportedly made against Malenkov at the January 1955 plenum. There is, indeed, some evidence pointing to an alliance between the two at various times in Stalin's late years, and the threat of its renewal may well have alarmed the other members of the presidium. Malenkov, however, had apparently himself turned on Beria and reportedly joined in the decision which led to Beria's arrest and execution. But while this fact may have helped to save Malenkov from total

*The circumstances in which the first post-Stalin regime was formed and the series of reorganizations effected in succeeding months are discussed in detail in CAESAR 2.

political extinction in 1955, the threat of subsequent damaging revelations with respect to his involvement in police terror was kept alive. When, for example, announcement was made in December 1955 of the execution of former MVD chief Abakumov, there was a reference to the latter's criminal complicity in a "Leningrad case." The public implication of Malenkov in the same case after his expulsion from the presidium in June 1957 plainly suggests that the earlier reference had been a barb for Malenkov.

Political neutralization of the police and a general loosening of the mechanism of repression continued after Beria's arrest: in late June a new man was appointed to head the procuracy, and thereafter procedural revisions were introduced to limit the power of that organization; a mop-up of Beria adherents began and there were further purges of high police officials; finally, in April 1954 a Committee of State Security, presumably subject in principle to collegial control, was formed.

But Beria's arrest removed the immediate threat to "collective leadership" and opened the way to the formulation of new domestic policies. Within two months of Beria's arrest Malenkov was before the Supreme Soviet to announce the New Course. The interrelationships of "collective leadership" were by no means firmly fixed, however, and the competition for power continued, though in a more gradual and less violent way. Malenkov had evidently reached his high water mark at the August Supreme Soviet. By September, Khrushchev was established as first secretary of the party and was busy laying down agricultural policy before a party plenum. Numerous changes in party personnel followed, of which the most important was the November 1953 shake-up of the Leningrad party organization, over which Khrushchev himself presided. The result was the removal from leadership of the Leningrad organization of V. M. Andrianov, possibly a Malenkov adherent, and his replacement by F. R. Kozlov, who subsequently emerged as a Khrushchev partisan. At the February-March 1954 plenum of the central committee Khrushchev was again the spokesman on agricultural policy--this time the New Lands program. In April he put another feather in his cap by addressing the Supreme Soviet, a governmental body, on equal protocol terms with the premier, Malenkov. The introduction, in June, of alphabetical listings of the leaders' names, ending the previous practice of listing Malenkov first, was in keeping with the "collective" idea, but also a formalization of Malenkov's loss of precedence. Khrushchev had, in the meantime, begun to accumulate publicity

and prestige from his vigorous stumping on behalf of the New Lands program and had begun to develop his own style of "ward-heeling." His appearances at party congresses in Warsaw and Prague in the spring of 1954 and his trip to Peiping as head of a Soviet delegation in September were further indications of his rising importance in the Soviet hierarchy. By the end of 1954 he was receiving extensive notice in the Soviet press partly on the basis of sheer activity and partly, it seems, on the basis of an officially inspired build-up. The latter was especially evident in an attempt to magnify retrospectively his and Bulganin's personal roles in the war at the expense of the State Defense Committee, of which both Malenkov and Stalin had been members.* In December he gave the principal address to a construction conference held in Moscow, thus, apparently, laying public claim to authority in an area outside agriculture.

Fear of Malenkov's ambitions may have assisted the rapid political ascent of a man who seemed a comparatively secondary figure in March 1953. In view of what he has shown since in the way of assertiveness and political skill it must now seem unlikely, however, that his backing initially derived simply from an urge in the presidium to set up a buffer against Malenkov. With the party as footing and his own native boldness as a club, he began to challenge Malenkov's primacy at a very early stage and, when the challenge had succeeded, was able to make his own views on policy stick.

The conflict between the two men seems to have been fought out to some extent in terms of rival claims to competence and authority on the part of the institutions of party and government. In part, this was probably a result of a natural tendency of each to use the weapons at hand, but it was apparently converted along the way into a political and ideological issue. Thus, it is reported, Khrushchev complained to a foreigner in March 1955, that Malenkov had tried to run things through the government apparatus rather than through the party. This was also the implication of Bulganin's pledge, in accepting the premiership, that "the Council of Ministers will also in the future faithfully carry out the policy worked out by the Communist party."

*Beginning with a 5 March 1954 Trud article commemorating Stalin's death.

Khrushchev undoubtedly profited from a policy designed to "reactivate" the party--a policy which he naturally did everything possible to promote. August 1953 was the first and last time that major policy was enunciated initially before the Supreme Soviet--thereafter, and with increasing frequency, the central committee provided the forum whenever the regime saw fit to discuss its intentions outside the presidium.

There were good reasons, both theoretical and practical, behind the policy. The regime not only needed a substitute for the primitive (but, in its way, effective) symbol of the "vozhd" represented by Stalin, but it also needed a clear institutional channel for the transmission of the authority vested in the centralized state. The various instruments of control and persuasion had been personalized by Stalin and the distinctions between them had become, to some extent, blurred. Moreover, after his death, the scope of police authority had been limited. Partly as a result of this, the army gained importance as a reserve of coercion and its prestige increased. But the party, though its spirit of uniqueness and initiative had been dampened under Stalin, had the whole weight of theory and legitimacy on its side. It had in Khrushchev, moreover, a first secretary who would prod it into exercising its rights and would forcefully reassert its primacy in Soviet life.

A New Tone to Policy

With the events of January-February 1955 the New Course phrases about forcing the development of light industry passed into oblivion. The change was also reflected in a reallocation of resources in the 1955 budget, announced to the February session of the Supreme Soviet.

The factors of economic growth, defense preparedness, popular morale, and labor productivity were still interdependent, however, even though the Bulganin government had decided, in effect, to enter the circle at a different point. The pressure for rationalization of the economy, and, with the movement away from the Stalinist method of virtually undiluted coercion, the need for some accommodation to the popular urge for a "better deal"--an improved diet, better housing, a more equitable return on labor, and more leisure--remained to be dealt with. In succeeding months the Bulganin government introduced a number of new measures which looked in that direction.

As before, the regime's domestic goals conditioned and were conditioned by its foreign policy. The creation of an international setting which would permit the extension of Soviet influence without the risk of nuclear war remained a prime objective of that policy. After a brief interlude in which there were signs of a reversion to the old glowering inflexibility, a new period of diplomatic maneuver opened, characterized by a greater boldness and mobility than the preceding one. The addition of the word "competitive" to the phrase "peaceful coexistence" was a revealing expression of a new strain in Soviet thinking--a belief that success came from a spirit of initiative and aggressive self-confidence--in which the Khrushchev personality shows through. Within a half year the Khrushchev-Bulganin team had undertaken two major ventures--the visits to Belgrade and Geneva--and had begun in earnest to seek a foothold in the Middle East, all of which, though not inconsistent with the "peaceful coexistence" of the Malenkov government, represented a considerable extension of that policy.

Economic Readjustment in 1955

The 1955 budget revealed a shift in the pattern of allocations to the economy. Allocations to the heavy industry sector went up to 101.2 billion rubles, an increase of approximately 27 percent over planned allocations in 1954, although budget expenditures within the over-all category "Financing the National Economy" were to rise by only about 2.8 percent above the level planned for 1954 (approximately 4.2 percent above actual expenditures in 1954). Direct outlays from the budget for defense were to increase by nearly 12 billion rubles, an increase of about 12 percent. At the same time, allocations to light industry were to be reduced from a planned 12.6 billion rubles in 1954 to 10.6 billion rubles. In absolute terms this was not a sharp reduction, especially if the 1955 planned allocation is measured against the amount which was actually used up in 1954. It has been pointed out, however, that "one must properly compare, not 1955 with 1954, but 1955 with what 1955 should have been if the post-Stalin economic policies had been pursued." If this yardstick is used, the change in emphasis shows clearly.

Figures on the relative rates of growth of the producer and consumer goods sectors in 1955 shows an even more pronounced change than was foretold in the budget. The upward revision of the annual production targets, undertaken after the over-all production goals of the Fifth Five-Year Plan

had been met in May, apparently placed additional emphasis on heavy industry. According to Soviet statistics the volume of output of producer goods increased by approximately 15 percent as compared with an increase of approximately 8 percent in consumer goods output, whereas in the preceding two years the rates of growth in the two sectors had been nearly equal. (see footnote, p. 8)

In conjunction with the cutback in light industry, the regime acted to constrict purchasing power--by enlarging the budget surplus and by canceling some of the fiscal concessions granted during the preceding two years. The state loan was upped to the pre-1953 level and the price reductions granted annually since 1947 were withheld.

On the heels of the shift in economic emphasis a revision of propaganda formulas took place. The press continued to thunder intermittently against the economic "heretics" for several months, but, in the meantime, the enticing phrases of the New Course had been universally replaced by a guarded promise of "a further development of the light and food industry."

In both word and deed, therefore, the government had reduced the consumer's expectations to a more reasonable level. It does not follow from this, however, that the regime had come to reject entirely the New Course assumption that increased consumption was important to higher labor productivity and improved morale. The difference between the new policy and the one which had preceded it was, at least in the abstract, more one of timing than of intent (although the policy debate did not have to be any the less heated for that); and there is reason to suppose that the regime regarded consumption as something which could be postponed but not permanently ignored. In a conversation with a Westerner in Moscow, Khrushchev used the word "premature" to describe the Malenkov government's emphasis on consumer goods but went on to predict that "a second or third five-year plan from now" would see light industry grow at a more rapid rate than heavy.

An interesting sidelight on this can be found in a Pravda article of 27 March. Apparently the new line was interpreted in some overzealous quarters to mean that consumption was virtually anathema. The Pravda article, written by Ostrovityanov, one of the regime's top economic spokesmen, set the record straight for these people, too, and, in the process, gave one of the fullest expositions of the thinking

which underlay the policy change to appear in the Soviet press. It is interesting also because of its implicit defense of the New Course's intent:

> Soviet public opinion has firmly condemned the anti-Marxist reasoning of certain economists who deny the law of preponderant development of heavy industry under socialism. However, there have been found economists who took this criticism dogmatically, pedantically, and went to the opposite extreme. They began to maintain silence on the party and government decisions on expanding production of consumer goods, on a sharp advance in agriculture, on further development of the light and food industries in proportion to the growth in raw material resources produced by agriculture.
>
> These economists are ignorant of the fact that the requirements of the objective economic law of preponderant growth of production of the means of production can be met only on condition that there is proportional development of all branches of production.
>
> In the course of the development of the socialist economy individual branches may lag, as a consequence of which partial disproportions arise in the economy. To eliminate these disproportions the lagging branches, insofar as the necessary material prerequisites are created, must develop at forced pace for a certain period of time. But this by no means contradicts the fact that the firm basis of the general line of development of the socialist economy is the law of preponderant growth of the means of production.

Continuation of the Agricultural Effort

The search for a firmer agricultural base was reflected in a further increase in budget allocations to that sector in 1955. The New Lands program again accounted for a sizeable proportion of the total (see footnote, p. 12). Agricultural policy, in general, now had four primary features, outlined by Khrushchev as follows: "yields in all areas must be increased, harvesting losses decreased, virgin and idle lands reclaimed and the area sown to corn considerably expanded."

This last, a program to increase the area sown to corn from 10,000,000 acres to 40,000,000 acres during 1955 and to 70,000,000 acres by 1960, was another device for increasing the supply of livestock fodder. Introduced by Khrushchev at the January plenum of the central committee, the corn program, like the New Lands program, matched the prospect of a quick return against the economic risk involved over the longer run. And like the earlier venture it seems to have had behind it both the authority and personal interest of Khrushchev: Speaking to the central committee of his republic on 15 February 1955, Ukrainian party leader Kirichenko described it as though it were Khrushchev's personal project, stating that "The spread in every possible way of corn growing, as is known to many of you, has long been the dream of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev. He helped us to understand the great importance of corn growing for the national economy."

An extensive propaganda campaign in support of corn cultivation was reinforced, during the spring of 1955, by a number of regional agricultural conferences. Khrushchev was on hand to make long speeches which stressed the regime's insistence on immediate implementation of the new agricultural directives. Resort was also had to the incentives device: a decree of 21 May 1955 made it possible for the peasant to receive up to 15 percent of the harvested corn crop in grain or silage.

Revision of Agricultural Planning

Ever since Stalin's death the regime had tried to come to grips with the problem of overcentralization and over bureaucratization of the economy. Under the Malenkov government this had produced legislation designed to reduce the size of the administrative apparatus and the volume of paper work; to effect some decentralization in the economic structure through the creation of Union-Republican ministries in a number of industries which had theretofore been managed from the center; and to give executives below the top somewhat greater authority in plan formulation. The press freely admitted that the topheaviness of the economic structure was an obstacle to flexibility and initiative and that these effects were especially pernicious in agriculture.

At the February-March 1954 plenum of the central committee, Khrushchev had declared:

> Local personnel are quite correct in raising the question that our planning is too centralized. This prevents the utilization of existing opportunities, hampers the creative initiative of the collective farmers and weakens their personal self-interest in increasing yields....We should establish a planning procedure which would retain planned state guidance over the development of agriculture at the same time that it released local initiative.

Malenkov had also addressed himself to the subject in a speech to the April 1954 session of the Supreme Soviet, where he declared that the central planning agencies attempted to encompass too much detail "without the requisite knowledge of diverse local conditions and potential" and "such planning creates difficulties in the work of local areas and binds the initiative of local agencies."

With these considerations in mind the central committee and the Council of Ministers issued a joint decree on 9 March, "On Revising the Practice of Planning Agriculture." The effect of the decree, in brief, was to abolish the practice of setting both the output targets and production pattern for each agricultural unit from the center. Thenceforth, although the delivery quotas were still to be centrally determined, the collective and state farms were to work out for themselves the pattern of utilization of acreage and herds. It was specified, however, that this was to be done in consultation with the MTS and was to be subject to review by the local governmental organs.

Although it gave some encouragement to local initiative, provision was also made for ensuring control from the center with the announcement on 5 April that a new urban levy was to be raised and shifted to the countryside. By July 1955, according to Pravda, 30,000 "experienced members of party, government, business and engineering-technical staffs, and manual and office workers" were to be assigned to the chairmanships of backward collective farms. This meant that nearly one third of all collective farms were to be given new chairmen, on the premise, as Khrushchev put it in typical fashion, that "if there is a real organizer at the head of every collective farm we will be able to bring any farm up to the level of an advanced farm within a short time." Although some provision

was made for the training of the new chairmen and their orderly integration into the collective farms,* familiarity with and responsiveness to the regime's purposes seems to have been a more important criterion of selection than agricultural expertise. A case in point in a certain Grigorev, who was converted from district prosecutor to chairman of a collective farm in the Moscow Oblast. He was held up as a model of the new type of chairman by Krhushchev at a local agricultural conference, mostly it seems, on the strength of a speech which faithfully parroted the latter's own ideas on agriculture.

Limited as this revision of agricultural practice was, there can be seen in it the germs of the much broader scheme of economic decentralization undertaken later, in 1957. The regime had been confronted for some time with the problem of more rational organization and there were signs in 1955 that it was even then mulling over further changes. Pravda reported in May, for example, that at an industrial conference in Moscow "Comrade Khrushchev devoted much attention...to questions of planning. He pointed out that it was necessary that we plan production not only on a nationwide scale but also according to particular economic regions, making wider use of all their potentialities."

Along similar lines, Bulganin told the July 1955 plenum of the central committee:

> The principal shortcoming in the activity of our ministries with regard to leadership of industry consists in the fact that they do little work on the direct organization of production, but direct the plants, factories and mines that come under their spheres of competence from their offices, making use of a large and multilevel apparatus....
>
> If the quality of the industry's leadership is to be improved, the administrative apparatus must be brought closer to production....

*The selectees were to take courses locally and to work for a trial period on the collective farms. If this had not prepared them adequately they might be assigned for a time as assistant chairmen and, if still unacceptable, eventually rejected altogether.

...excessive centralization has arisen in the leadership of industry. A great number of enterprises are directly subordinate to the union ministries, although the republic organizations could successfully carry out the guidance of them. Such centralization is not beneficial. On the one hand, it hinders the organization of operative and concrete management of enterprises, and, on the other hand, it diminishes the responsibility of republic economic, party and soviet organizations for the work of industry....

Ministries must decisively decrease the types of items produced by individual enterprises, free specialized enterprises from turning out production for which they are not intended, create new specialized enterprises and expand cooperation inside and among ministries, bearing in mind the interests of individual economic areas.

The Search for New Economic Stimulants

In May the government convened an industrial conference in Moscow at which Premier Bulganin presented a general review of the perspectives of the industrial economy. He proposed several innovations which supplemented the earlier measures for decentralization and administrative reorganization and were primarily designed to meet the problem of unsatisfactory labor productivity and a diminishing labor pool. The appropriate enabling legislation was enacted by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet later in the month.

Increased labor productivity, Bulganin told the conference, was vital to further economic growth. A key to this increase was technological progress and he called for the modernization of Soviet industry, with stress on mechanization, automation, and technological innovation in the production process. There was, he indicated, a widespread tendency among industrial managers to seek safety in familiar ways and, consequently, a resistance to change. Among scientists and technologists there was insufficient appreciation of Western advances--a holdover, although he did not say so, from the xenophobia of Stalin's last years. To remedy these defects he proposed that a State Committee on New Technology be set up under the USSR Council of Ministers--thus recreating an organization which had existed from 1948 until 1951 when it was absorbed into Gosplan. The committee (Gostekhnika) was formally established, under the chairmanship of the late V. A. Malyshev by a decree of 28 May

1955. Its assignment was to draw up current and long-range plans for advancing Soviet technology, to devise incentives to and means for propagating technical innovations (both home-grown and foreign), and to coordinate the efforts of the ministries in this sphere.

The planning apparatus, Bulganin indicated to the conference, was to undergo a reorganization designed to overcome two major weaknesses: the mechanism was so cumbrous that it frequently failed to provide production units with annual targets until the plan period was under way, and, conversely, it was so preoccupied with current business that it tended to lose long-term perspective. Accordingly, Gosplan was to be divided into a State Commission for Current Planning (Gosekonomkommissiya) and a State Commission on Long-Range Planning (retaining the title Gosplan). The proposal became law on 25 May. Gosekonomkommissiya, under M. Z. Saburov, who had been chairman of the combined organization, was given responsibility for drawing up the annual plans and overseeing their breakdown into quarterly and monthly sections, and, also, responsibility for assuring the even production and distribution of materials and equipment throughout the economy. The new Gosplan, under N. K. Baibakov, who had been minister of the oil industry, assumed responsibility for the five-year plans; for formulation longer term plans for the development of key sectors such as fuel and power; and, more generally, for gauging future economic prospects with a view to determining "at what time the various branches of /Soviet/ industry will overtake the most advanced capitalist countries in per capita production."

This process of organizational manipulation continued with the creation of another new committee--the State Committee for Labor and Wages of the USSR Council of Ministers under L. M. Kaganovich, who had held a variety of economic posts in his long party career and was, like Saburov, a member of the party presidium. Creation of the committee was an additional response to the problems of unsatisfactory labor productivity and undesirable mobility in the labor force. Its task was to undertake the first comprehensive revision, since 1931, of the wage system. As Bulganin pointed out at the July plenum, the system had become over the years something of a crazy quilt of frequently revised and ofter disparate norms, complicated schedules of bonuses and piece rates, and did not take account of technological change.

Renewed Diplomatic Activity

Against a backdrop of increased military spending and a propaganda attack on the Paris Agreements which had produced a good deal of truculent language, there was a suspicion outside the USSR that the accession of the Bulganin government foreboded a harder line in Soviet foreign policy. Nor was the obvious ascendancy of Khrushchev particularly reassuring, since he had, till then, given the appearance of a bellicose "doctrainaire" who lacked Malenkov's subtlety and flexibility. This impression was strengthened, on the day the new government was announced, by Molotov's harsh foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet. It heaped one on top of the other charges of Western aggressiveness and bad faith, contained hardly one conciliatory phrase, and was capped by a boast of Soviet nuclear superiority.

At the same time, however, there were signs at variance with this picture of renewed intransigence. Just before the Supreme Soviet met, the Hearst party, then in Moscow, was unexpectedly informed that it could interview Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov and Zhukov. Some of the interviews took place before the 8 February Supreme Soviet session and some after, but it soon became apparent that they were arranged with an eye to balancing the impression which the governmental change and Molotov's speech might create in the West. At that juncture, the Hearst party provided a convenient medium of communication with the non-Communist world. The comments which the interviews produced were consistently moderate and seemed to have a single purpose--to assure the West that the USSR was still interested in "peaceful coexistence." One member of the Hearst group has offered this explanation:

> I think the Soviet leaders wanted to offset through conciliatory statements to us the effect of the violent attacks which they decided Foreign Minister Molotov and Premier Bulganin must make against the United States in the Supreme Soviet.
>
> I believe the intensity of those attacks against us was prompted by a desire to offer the Russian people a scapegoat for the decision to curtail the production of consumer goods in order to concentrate once again on heavy industry.

In mid-January the Soviet ambassadors to France, Great Britain, the United States, and East Germany and the Soviet high commissioner for Austria had been recalled to Moscow. Very

probably Soviet foreign policy, particularly as it concerned Western Europe, was undergoing re-examination in the light of current domestic and international developments. The divergence between the attitudes displayed in the Hearst interviews and before the Supreme Soviet may have meant that cross-currents were at work within the regime and that it was facing a choice between "hard" and "soft" lines of policy.

However, the adamancy and "sabre-rattling" displayed before the Supreme Soviet did not strike an entirely new note. They were to some extent, probably, the tag-end of the campaign against the Paris Accords, which, toward the end of 1954, had become full of bluster and threat. Much was made in propaganda of the new war danger posed by German rearmament. In January, propaganda broadcasts warned that, in the event of a new war, "all the consequences of atomic warfare will come crashing down on the British Isles" and that the war would "sweep onto the American continent as well." Britain and France were notified that the USSR would annul its treaties of alliance with them if they ratified the Paris Agreements. In December 1954 a bloc security conference had been convened in Moscow to discuss the formal establishment of a military counterpart to NATO, and at about this time there were signs of renewed pressure on Allied forces in Austria and Berlin.

A further threat was contained in reiterated hints that German rearmament would preclude further negotiation between the USSR and the West on European problems. In the midst of these tirades, however, there were signs that the USSR was already preparing for the next diplomatic phase. On 15 January it put forward revised proposals on all-German elections and called for the establishment of diplomatic relations between itself and the German Federal Republic. On 25 January the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet formally ended the state of war with both parts of Germany. A hint of another Soviet initiative was contained in Molotov's statement on Austria before the Supreme Soviet on 8 February, which foretold the negotiations which led to the signing of an Austrian Treaty on 15 May. Even Molotov, presumably, was reckoning with the likelihood that German rearmament would be formally approved and was contemplating means to hobble its implementation.

On 26 March, Premier Bulganin stated that the USSR took "a positive view" toward the suggestion of great power negotiations contained in President Eisenhower's statement three days earlier, and thus took the first step, on the Soviet side, toward the July Summit conference. In May the USSR made a

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further effort to re-establish a negotiable position by offering disarmament proposals which accepted many of the points in the Anglo-French position. The opening of a new phase in Soviet policy was further marked in that month by the announcement of a Soviet-Yugoslav meeting "at the highest level" and the first Soviet offer of arms aid to Egypt.

Important elements in the post-Malenkov "activist" policy seem to have been present at the time of his ouster or to have emerged soon thereafter.* If this is true, then the breast-beating in February is, perhaps, best seen not so much as a policy interlude as an attempt to provide a setting for what was to follow. It was partly for the benefit of the Soviet public, which was obliged to scale down its expectations of a rapid improvement of the living standard, and partly a means of projecting an image of strength and self-confidence to the outside world at a moment when the Soviet leadership was showing signs of instability. It was probably no coincidence that at the same time a small tempest was stirred up, first by Molotov and then by a number of others,** around the question of whether "civilization" or only the capitalist world would be destroyed in a nuclear war? Whether this was also a veiled attack on Malenkov, who had referred to the possible "destruction of civilization" in a March 1954 speech, is still a matter for conjecture.

Molotov's "tough talk" was, therefore, probably not exclusively the expression of his own hidebound point-of-view. Nevertheless, there had already been signs, subsequently confirmed, that Molotov was not enthusiastic about the foreign policy approach adopted after Stalin's death and had begun to "swim against the stream." His omission from the delegation to

*There is some reason to suppose that the groundwork for the Belgrade conference was laid before Malenkov's removal. For a discussion of this point see below pp. 44-45.
**The "destruction of civilization" idea was denounced by, among others, Maurice Thorez in a 3 March letter to Humanité, by Konstantinov in the 5 March Pravda, and by Voroshilov before the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet on 26 March.

Peiping in September-October 1954 suggested a declining influence on Soviet diplomacy. Later in the year, on two separate occasions, Western diplomats detected what appeared to be resentment in the usually inscrutable "stone bottom" and conjectured that his foreign policy views had come under criticism in the Presidium. Later on, in his February 1955 interview with the Hearst party, he left the impression that, though his words were much the same, his attitude was distinctly more frigid than Khrushchev's, Bulganin's, and Zhukov's. In succeeding months, indications of his diminishing role in Soviet diplomacy accumulated, as Khrushchev and Bulganin more and more took public command. He took a back seat at the bloc security conference which met in Warsaw in May; and in Vienna for the Austrian Treaty negotiations during the same month, he himself hinted at retirement from the Foreign Ministry. Because of his opposition to reconciliation with Tito, he was left out of the Soviet mission to Belgrade and at the Summit conference in July he once again played a secondary role.

Molotov's whole approach to foreign policy--his attachment to the "ossified forms of diplomacy" which Mikoyan condemned at the 20th party congress--and his view on intra-bloc relationships were apparently at issue.

However, his dogged resistance to rapprochement with Yugoslavia seems to have weakened his position as much as any one thing. The curious exchange which took place between Tito and the Russians in March was evidently an expression of this policy conflict. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet in February, Molotov had said:

> As we know, progress has lately been made in the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
>
> We do not consider that everything has already been done in this respect, but we believe that this no less depends on Yugoslavia herself. Evidently, in these past years Yugoslavia has to some extent departed from the position which she held in the early years following the second world war. That, of course, is exclusively her internal affair.

On 10 March, Pravda and Izvestia published a report of a speech delivered by Tito to the Yugoslav National Assembly on 7 March. Tito, according to the Soviet newspapers, had

complained that "some countries of Eastern Europe" were saying that "although Yugoslavia is still what she had been accused of, nevertheless, she has now recognized her errors somewhat and is trying to reform." "This is nonsense," he continued, "and naturally it can cause us to doubt the sincerity of the statements made by responsible leaders of these countries in the course of direct contact, regarding the unjust accusations against Yugoslavia in 1948. Unquestionably Mr. Molotov's formulation regarding Yugoslavia in his speech to the Supreme Soviet does not correspond to fact and in some respects coincides with these assertions. We consider this an attempt to conceal the facts from his own people, again at our expense. It is time to describe things as they are and as they developed, instead of stopping halfway toward normalization and raising new doubts among the people."

Two days later Pravda published a reply. It denied that the USSR took the position which had offended Tito. It argued that Molotov's remarks on post-1948 Yugoslavia were consistent with statements by Yugoslav leaders themselves to the effect that 1948 had been a turning point for them, and could not, therefore, be taken as a gratuitous insult. The USSR, Pravda affirmed, desired further improvement of relations with Yugoslavia, but, it said, repeating Molotov, this depended "in no less measure upon Yugoslavia herself."

Tito's speech, taken together with other statements by Yugoslav officials at about the same time, plainly indicated that discussions between Belgrade and Moscow had gone further than was publicly admitted. Evidently, the subject of a Soviet-Yugoslav conference had already been broached. Tito's speech, in effect, restated his terms for such a conference, which included withdrawal of the 1948 charges. Molotov's scarcely flattering remarks apparently provoked him into demanding a further token of Soviet sincerity, perhaps including Molotov's "head." The Soviet press replied with something less than a full apology but had at least taken note of Tito's protest. Publication of Tito's personal attack on the Soviet foreign minister was, moreover, unprecedented and, if nothing else, showed little regard for his prestige and sensibilities. It is not surprising that one Yugoslav official concluded that Molotov had fallen into disgrace.

"Collective Leadership" After Malenkov
Promotions and Demotions

In March 1953 the three men who had given the eulogies over Stalin's coffin--Malenkov, Beria and Molotov--seemed to be a powerful triumvirate capable of dominating the Soviet leadership. Two years later Beria was dead, Malenkov had been demoted and disgraced, and Molotov's authority had been considerably reduced. In the relatively brief period it had functioned, "collective leadership" had plainly undergone a substantial readjustment. Khrushchev's rapid and conspicuous ascent to a commanding place in the leadership prompted speculation that the pattern of the 20's, when another "dark horse" had moved out front by splitting his rivals, was being repeated. Was "collective leadership," which had to entail some sharing of power, about to become a propaganda slogan without real political substance?

In the months after February 1955 there were a number of changes in governmental appointments which involved persons at or near the top of the political ladder. There was also a small-scale shake-up of party personnel at the provincial level and below. In some cases, it appeared that Khrushchev was using the power of appointment to augment his already formidable strength, particularly where the party apparatus was concerned. The circumstances in which other changes took place, however, suggested that the high-level appointments, at least, were still subject to negotiation in the presidium.

At the same time, the idea of "collective leadership" gained a considerable vogue in Soviet propaganda, perhaps as a means of compensating for the implications of Malenkov's demotion. "Collective leadership" took on a certain doctrinal legitimacy from having been designated a "Leninist principle," while its opposite, the idea of the infallible one-man leader, was treated with increasing opprobrium. The public symbols of individual political power were altered hardly at all--certainly far less than in the two years which preceded Malenkov's resignation. Throughout the spring of 1955 Khrushchev continued to be vocal and remained very much in the public eye in appearances before a series of agricultural conferences and a meeting of industrial officials. The press, however, acted with what appears to have been deliberate restraint, and it was noted in Moscow that Khrushchev seemed, if anything, to be receiving less individual publicity than before Malenkov's resignation. There was little doubt that Khrushchev had become the single most powerful leader, and the stamp of his personality and political style on both

domestic and foreign policy was even plainer than before; but, for the moment at least, he was at pains to conceal any inclination to make a grab for total power or to overthrow the "checks and balances" implicit in "collective leadership."

Malenkov was left in an equivocal position. The general public was given no explanation of what had happened beyond that contained in his resignation letter and, as far as observers on the spot could judge, seemed to regard the event with indifference. A central committee letter, containing a "bill of particulars" against the former premier was, however, circulated among party members, a fact which must certainly have weakened whatever political support remained to him. Within a few days of the Supreme Soviet meeting, rumors began to be heard in Moscow that Malenkov was in poor health, which, when added to the clamor over the "destruction of civilization" issue, raised the possibility that further punishment was in store for him. Nothing came of this then, however, and he continued to appear alongside his presidium colleagues at public functions much as before, except that he had moved down the line of precedence. The disgrace of his public admission of executive incompetence was underscored by his appointment to the second-rank post of minister of electric power stations, and, somewhat later (28 February), by the elevation of Mikoyan, Pervukhin, and Saburov to positions as First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. This left Malenkov the only party presidium member on the government council without that status and carried the implication of political isolation.

Be this as it may, the promotion of Mikoyan, Pervukhin, and Saburov was also part of a reorganization of the Council of Ministers designed to strengthen high-level operational control of key sectors of the economy. It paved the way for the appointment of four new deputy chairmen, of whom three were industrial or construction specialists and one an agricultural specialist. A. P. Zavenyagin (died 31 December 1956) had had a long career in construction and heavy industry and had been a top administrator of the Soviet atomic energy program, while, another new deputy chairman, M. V. Khrunichev, had worked in the aircraft and other defense industries for a number of years. V. A. Kucherenko, who was head of the Moscow Construction Administration at the time of his promotion, was subsequently (30 March) named chairman of the State Committee on Construction Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers. Of the four new appointees he seemed most likely

to have enjoyed the personal patronage of Khrushchev, under whom he had served in the Ukraine. Since mid-1954, when he began to beat the drums for prefabricated ferro-concrete building sections, Khrushchev had taken a direct interest in construction affairs, and had had kind words for Kucherenko's work at the Moscow builders conference in December 1954. The fourth new man, P. P. Lobanov, had been minister of agriculture in the Russian Republic and an active promoter of the New Lands program. In succeeding months he shared the platform with Khrushchev at a series of regional agricultural conferences, suggesting that he had been given broad responsibility for the implementation of agricultural policy within the Council of Ministers.*

Following this reorganization, the Council of Ministers was composed of a chairman, Bulganin; five first deputy chairmen, all members of the party presidium; eight deputy chairmen, including Malenkov, with general responsibility for diverse sectors of the economy; and, beneath these upper coordinating levels, 48 ministers and three officials with ministerial rank.

On 2 March a shake-up of agricultural administration took place which resulted in the firing of A. I. Kozlov as minister of state farms and his replacement by I. A. Benediktov, who had been serving as minister of agriculture. The careers of both of these men, it will be remembered, had taken somewhat peculiar turns in the months immediately after Stalin's death. (See above p. 21). They had held the posts of which they were now relieved since September 1953,** that is, from the point at which the agricultural side of the New Course was laid before a party plenum by Khrushchev. Since that time the press had frequently found fault with their ministries (among others) and both had been criticized--Kozlov is especially blunt terms--by Khrushchev at the February-March 1954 party plenum. There is some evidence of a political

*In April 1956 Lobanov was relieved of his Council of Ministers post and appointed President of the all-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, succeeding the controversial agronomist-geneticist T. D. Lysenko.
**At that time Benediktov was appointed Minister of Agriculture and Procurement. A separate Procurement Ministry under L. R. Korniets was established in November 1953.

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affiliation between Kozlov and Malenkov dating from the time when they were both concerned with agricultural affairs in the central committee apparatus, but the only evidence that Benediktov had fallen victim to political rivalries in the presidium is circumstantial.

For reasons which are still obscure, Benediktov's post at the Ministry of Agriculture, which would have been, presumably, among the first to be filled if Khrushchev had had carte blanche, remained vacant from 2 March until 18 October.

There were curious political overtones and a suggestion of behind-the-scenes tug-and-pull in another shift of second-echelon officials begun in March. Early that month, rumors began to circulate in Moscow that G. F. Aleksandrov had been removed as minister of culture, allegedly because of personal misconduct, including use of his official position for "immoral purposes." Aleksandrov, who had made his name as a philosopher-propagandist, had had a somewhat uneven career. His ups and downs in the postwar period had to some extent coincided with those in Malenkov's career, and it has often been supposed that he figured somehow in a Malenkov-Zhdanov rivalry. In 1947 he had run afoul of the ideological purification campaign when his History of Western Philosophy was, on Stalin's orders, attacked by Zhdanov for its "bourgeois philosophical thought." He was removed as chief of the central committee's Department of Propaganda and Agitation at that time but he was appointed to a number of higher academic positions thereafter. He was appointed minister of culture in March 1954, replacing P. K. Ponomarenko. At the February 1955 Supreme Soviet he was personally criticized for the poor work of his ministry in the New Lands area; and soon after his removal, Pravda charged that the textbook Dialectical Materialism, which he had edited, was tainted with the consumer goods hersy.

Aleksandrov's removal was not announced officially until 21 March, nearly two weeks after the rumors began to spread. His replacement was N. S. Mikhailov, who had himself been subject to shifting fortunes. He had been first secretary of the Komsomol from 1938, when he replaced one of the victims of the Great Purge, until 1952. At the 19th party congress in October 1952 he was one of a number of second-rank party officials appointed to the enlarged party presidium--a move which, Khrushchev's secret speech implied, was preliminary to a new Stalin purge of senior leaders. He was dropped from the presidium when it was reduced to its former size after Stalin's death and was appointed Khrushchev's successor as

first secretary of the Moscow Oblast party organization. Though somewhat below the top level of itself, this was still a ranking post and probably reflected Mikhailov's true hierarchical standing more accurately than his brief and largely artificial presidium membership. A year later, in March 1954, he was named Soviet ambassador to Poland.

The case of L. G. Melnikov is still mystifying. He had succeeded Khrushchev as first secretary of the Ukrainian party in 1949. Like Mikhailov, he had been elected to the presidium in October 1952, but in the March 1953 reorganization he was retained as a candidate member, not dropped entirely. He lost this post together with his Ukrainian party post in June 1953, amidst charges of excesses in the Russification and collectivization of the annexed territories of western Ukraine. Subsequently, the reverse of those sins were attributed to Beria to strengthen the supposition that he had had a hand in Melnikov's dismissal. Melnikov was given a new assignment as Soviet ambassador to Rumania in July 1953, within a few weeks of Beria's downfall. In April 1955, he was recalled from Bucharest to head a newly formed Ministry of Construction of the Coal Industry. His earlier career in the Ukraine points to an affiliation in the political sense between him and Khrushchev and the latter's patronage may well have had something to do with his return to Moscow. At the same time, the fact that Melnikov had not then, nor has he since, regained his former high rank beclouds the question, and suggests that that patronage, if exercised, had had only limited effect.

Following Mikhailov's recall on 22 March, the post of Soviet ambassador to Poland remained open until the appointment of P. K. Ponomarenko was announced on 8 May. A veteran of both party and government work, Ponomarenko was a candidate member of the party presidium at the time of his appointment.

In 1938, after several months of service as Malenkov's deputy in the central committee's Section of Leading Party Organs, he had become first secretary of the Belorussian party and continued in that post until 1947. He became a member of the party secretariat in 1948, apparently filling the vacancy created by Zhdanov's death. In this post he had some responsibility for agricultural affairs and, in 1950, he was appointed Minister of Agricultural Procurements. He was made a member of the party presidium at the 1952 party congress but, like Melnikov, was reduced to candidate standing

at the time of Stalin's death. At the same time he lost his place on the party secretariat and was appointed minister of culture. In February 1954 he was appointed first secretary of the Kazakh party as part of a shake-up which followed criticism of agricultural administration in that republic. Khrushchev was on the scene for the change and it was apparently expected that Ponomarenko, on the strength of his executive experience in agriculture, would provide effective direction of the newly inaugurated New Lands program in Kazakhstan. There was never any indication that Ponomarenko had fallen down on this job. The Warsaw assignment was a responsible one and conformed to the practice of appointing experienced party officials to the satellite capitals, but it appeared, nevertheless, to be below par for a candidate member of the presidium. It signified his exclusion from the inner circle, a fact which was confirmed at the time of the 20th party congress, when he was not re-elected to the presidium.

Probably the clearest case of the fall from grace of a "Malenkov man" is that of N. N. Shatalin. Since the late '30's Shatalin had worked in the party apparatus and at various times had been Malenkov's deputy in the central committee section which dealt with party personnel appointments. Defector reports have consistently placed him as a Malenkov adherent. He became a member of the party secretariat in March 1953 in a move which showed traces of a political compromise. At the time of his appointment on 6 March he was only a candidate member of the central committee. On 14 March this irregularity was corrected after the fact by his election to full membership at the same central committee meeting which received Malenkov's resignation from the secretariat. Conceivably, the two events were related, with Shatalin being intended to serve on the secretariat as a last link between Malenkov and the party apparatus. While on the secretariat, Shatalin seems to have had a hand in two of its most vital functions--personnel appointments and party supervision of the police--and, in view of his ties to Malenkov, might easily have become an obstacle between Khrushchev and firm control of the party apparatus. On 14 March 1955, it was announced that he had been appointed party first secretary in the Primorye Krai--a very far Krai from Moscow. In late January 1956 he lost this post and at the 20th party congress in the following month he was dropped from the central committee.

The Khrushchev-Bulganin Visit to Belgrade

According to a reliable report on the proceedings of the July 1955 party plenum, Bulganin told the assembled party officials that the Belgrade trip had been preceded by a two-year exchange of correspondence between Belgrade and Moscow, initiated by the latter. The fact of such an exchange, commencing soon after Stalin's death, receives some confirmation from Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj who told a London Observer correspondent in February 1955 that "there had been during the 'normalization' period fuller discussions between Yugoslavia and Russia than had ever been described publicly." What the subject of these discussions was is unknown, but it can be supposed that they began on a cautious, exploratory basis. Overtly, the rapprochement developed through the various stages of "normalization," which meant, in general, raising the various forms of seige which Stalin had applied against Yugoslavia in his futile campaign to overthrow Tito.

On 29 April 1953, Molotov received the Yugoslav chargé in Moscow and the appointment of a new Soviet chargé soon followed. In June the two countries agreed to restore the exchange of ambassadors. Thereafter, the border conflicts between Yugoslavia and her satellite neighbors came to an end, the economic blockade against Yugoslavia was lifted and trade negotiations were opened, and the bitter propaganda battle was mutually terminated in Moscow and Belgrade. So far, however, Soviet acts and gestures appeared to be still within the framework of the post-Stalin policy of détente.

In the fall of 1954 the USSR first showed an inclination to carry the process further and to explore the possibility of an ideological rapprochement. In the 6 November speech on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Saburov appealed for a renewal of "the ancient bonds of friendship" between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Later in the month, at a reception in the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Molotov offered a toast to "Comrade Tito and the Yugoslav Communist party" in a clear gesture of ideological reconciliation. Several sources have reported that in November or December of 1954, the Russians made a formal proposal for a conference of party representatives which included an invitation to Tito to visit Moscow. Tito, according to one of these reports, did not reply until January 1955 and then made the counterproposal that a Soviet delegation should come to Belgrade. These exchanges

apparently also included some discussion of the terms on which a meeting should be convened, for in February, Yugoslav officials claimed that the USSR had conceded in private that it had mistreated Yugoslavia in 1948, that there could be different paths to socialism, and that Yugoslavia was a bona fide socialist state. These were virtually identical with the terms on which the Belgrade conference was to be conducted.

The Soviet political upset of January-February 1955 apparently resulted in a temporary suspension of negotiations. The Yugoslavs at first feared that Malenkov's ouster might signal a halt in the process of post-Stalin change about which they had been consistently hopeful. Tito's 7 March speech, taking issue with Molotov, was evidently an attempt to find out if the winds had shifted, and Pravda's handling of the matter suggests that it was read in Moscow in just that way. Another indication of this was the sudden trip to Moscow, soon after Tito's speech, of Soviet Ambassador Valkov. Upon his return to Belgrade, towards the end of March, Valkov was immediately granted an interview with Tito. The Yugoslav foreign secretary admitted to foreign diplomats in Belgrade that the interview had dealt with the Molotov-Tito exchange. At this point, apparently, the concrete negotiations which preceded the 14 May announcement of a high-level Soviet-Yugoslav meeting had begun.

Khrushchev's ascendancy, following on Malenkov's defeat and the decline of Molotov's authority, undoubtedly had much to do with the timing and form of the rapprochement with Yugoslavia. On the face of it, the trip to Belgrade meant that the Soviet leaders had agreed to swallow their pride and to pay the price exacted by Yugoslav vanity. But the USSR was playing for potentially large stakes. To remove from the record this singular example of defection from the Communist ranks and to reverse the trend which had brought Tito onto the fringe of the Western alliance were only minimum Soviet objectives, which, if everything went well, could be enlarged upon. The dominant element in the Soviet leadership entertained the hope that Yugoslavia could be drawn back into the "socialist camp" and felt that this possibility should be exploited to the fullest. A dramatic gesture of reconciliation, public admission that the USSR had erred in the past, recognition of Yugoslavia's right to certain national peculiarities, and formal reinstatement of Tito into the ranks of "true believers"--these things would remove Belgrade's suspicions

and it would then feel an irresistible urge for complete realignment. This, in turn, promised to reduce the risk in the effort, which was to be more fully unfolded at the 20th party congress, to organize the Soviet bloc on looser terms of unity and discipline than those applied by Stalin, since the satellite states would no longer have the insidious example of Tito's independent Communism before them.

In his report on the Belgrade conference to the July planum, Bulganin is said to have described the Soviet mission as a mission of clarification. Its purpose, he asserted, was first of all to prevent the further extension of US influence in Yugoslavia and to assess the likelihood of her return to the "camp of socialism." The Soviet assessment of Yugoslav socialism made at the Belgrade conference did not overlook entirely the points of disagreement between the two sides, but there was, nevertheless, as the summing-up at the July plenum showed, a tendency to stress the degree of sameness and to regard it as a hopeful basis for further consolidation. Reportedly, Mikoyan, having conceded that Yugoslavia had much in common with non-Communist socialism, went on to point out that in the satellites many eminent Communists had come from socialist ranks, and to conclude optimistically that Yugoslavia would certainly return to the Soviet bloc.

It was probably not envisaged, however, that Yugoslavia would return to the fold on pre-1948 terms. There is much to suggest that the Belgrade venture was only part of a broad effort to reorder intrabloc relationships. Already, since Stalin's death, there had been signs of this in the replacement of Stalinist gauleiters, many of them police officials, by party professionals in the USSR's satellite and Chinese embassies--a process intended to stress the bonds of political sympathy over those of compulsion. The Soviet regime, at the same time, was searching for an arrangement elastic enough to permit the play of nationalistic pressures within the outer band of Soviet hegemony. It was aware that nationalism remained a real force within the bloc, that Stalin's policy had suppressed but not eradicated it, and that, like religious feeling at home, it should be worn away not battered. Consideration of China's present and future place in the socialist commonwealth undoubtedly had a part in stimulating this rethinking. China, like Yugoslavia, obviously did not fit into the scheme of a monolithic bloc made up of the USSR and a group of compliant satellites, and it may have been

more than coincidence that the groundwork for the Belgrade conference began to be laid soon after the return of Khrushchev and Bulganin from Peiping in late 1954. Moreover, a clear connection between the Belgrade conference and the over-all problem of bloc relations was drawn at the July plenum. According to all accounts, the various Soviet leaders who addressed the plenum dwelt on the damage which had been done in the past to relations with China, Yugoslavia, and the satellites by Soviet arrogance and offenses to nationalist sensibilities. Nationalism, Khrushchev reportedly said, should be dealt with tactfully and it was current policy of the Soviet party to take the problem more fully into account.

Where the satellites were concerned, however, qualification of the principle of Soviet dominance and changes in the forms of its application was something less than denial of the principle. Soviet acknowledgement in the 2 June communiqué concluding the Belgrade conference that socialism might take different forms in different countries, was, in the case of Yugoslavia and China, merely recognition of an existing situation. But the USSR's political and economic hold on the satellites meant--or so the USSR evidently reckoned--that they had been given a verbal concession which they were in no position to exploit. On his way back to Moscow from Belgrade, Khrushchev stopped off in Sofia and Bucharest for conferences with satellite party leaders at which, according to one report, he made this point clear--that what was sauce for Tito's goose was not necessarily sauce for the satellite gander.

The Yugoslavs had somewhat different thoughts in mind when they accepted the Soviet conference proposal. They sensed the danger of being crushed in the Soviet embrace, but in view of their own preachments on "peaceful coexistence" it was impossible for them to refuse to negotiate. Furthermore, the Yugoslav economy stood to benefit from any settlement which recognized Yugoslav claims arising from the Soviet-satellite economic blockade. But the key factor for Yugoslavia was its own international ambitions and its belief that it could, having closed the rift with the USSR, have an important influence on the future course of events in the Soviet bloc. With regard to this objective, the Yugoslavs insisted that the process of change that began with Stalin's death would inevitably continue and should be given every encouragement.

Tito saw an improvement of relations with the USSR as a means of strengthening his bargaining position vis-a-vis both East and West and a means of establishing a role as intermediary, both political and ideological, between the two sides. He aspired to become a Balkan Nehru whose good offices would be sought by the West, the East, and the "neutralists." His attitude was a blend of self-interest and a kind of missionary idealism, the latter stemming from his belief that the two great international antagonists were both interested in a peaceful settlement and that, eventually, a lasting reconciliation between Soviet Communism and Western democracy could be achieved. Thus it was that on 15 May, the day after announcement of the Belgrade conference, Tito declared that Yugoslavia was a moral leader with "a place in the world that even the big powers may envy," and described Belgrade's policy as an attempt "to create a third force of world moral strength for all those who love peace and freedom." The root of the Yugoslav conception is found in Tito's phrase "active peaceful coexistence," which denoted movement between the two antagonists designed to bring them closer together, and Belgrade's commentary in connection with the May - June conference was at pains to reject for Yugoslavia the stationary role of a neutral buffer state. It was in keeping with the "bridge" idea that the Burmese and Indian premiers were to visit Belgrade following the conference with the Russians and that the US, Britain, and France were invited to send there special representatives, other than the permament envoys, for a discussion of the international situation.

The tugging and pulling that went on between the Yugoslavs and the USSR over the question of whether a party-to-party relationship was to be re-established was one expression of the divergence of purpose and outlook between them. This had been a Soviet objective in the preconference negotiations but the Yugoslavs had held out against it. The Russians were persistent, however, and their delegation to Belgrade was headed by Khrushchev, the party chief, though the pretense was maintained that he had come as a member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, a governmental body. On his arrival at the Belgrade airport on 26 May, Khrushchev startled the Yugoslavs by declaring:

As representatives of the Communist party of the Soviet Union--the party created by the great Lenin--we consider desirable the establishment of mutual trust between our parties also. The most stable relations are established between the peoples of those countries in which the leading forces are parties which base all their activities on the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.

This was a typical Khrushchev gambit, an attempt to solve a complicated problem by charging straight into it. Tito did not respond to the airport speech and it was reported that the Yugoslavs had emphatically rejected the overture. It was reported also that they gave no definite reply to a memorandum on party relations, signed by Khrushchev and Pravda editor Shepilov, which proposed that arrangements be made for party consultations and the exchange of party representatives. The Belgrade press, furthermore, maintained throughout the conference that it was being conducted on a government-to-government, as distinct from a party-to-party, basis, and the conference's final declaration was signed on behalf of the USSR by Bulganin, the government head. Nevertheless, the declaration contained a provision for "cooperation among the social organizations of the two countries through the establishment of contacts, the exchange of socialist experience, and a free exchange of opinions," which, as the Yugoslavs soon admitted, implied some form of interparty relations.

Why all this strange maneuvering? Both sides realized that renewal of party relations was synonymous with the reopening of ideological intercourse. The Yugoslavs wanted this intercourse, too, because if, as they hoped, they were going to exert any influence on the "socialist camp," it would be necessary to use a common language, i.e., the language of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, they had to move cautiously so as not to alarm the West and so as to satisfy themselves that the relationship was not to be restored on the old one-sided basis of "socialist internationalism"--the subordination of national interests to the purposes of the Soviet state.

The Yugoslavs hesitated also because they had fewer illusions than the Russians about the depth of their differences. The latter, in their haste to get ahead with the reconciliation, appear to have fixed their gaze too intently on the points of mutual agreement and to have exaggerated Yugoslav nostalgia for the "good old days" of proletarian solidarity. In this connection, however, there is room

for speculation that the USSR was disingenuously appealing over the heads of Yugoslav leaders for the sympathy and support of the less wary rank-and-file.

Since 1948 the Yugoslav-Soviet rift had developed in some ways like a religious schism. Tito's divergence from Moscow seemed, in the beginning, to have little to do with the formal points of ideology and he was professedly still in agreement with its fundamental philosophical premises and final purposes. Nevertheless, he had come to the conviction that once-shared beliefs had been distorted by Stalin, and insisted on the possibility of various interpretations. The charges of "revisionsim" thrown at the Yugoslavs later when the reconciliation had gone slightly "sour" were, from the point of view of a Soviet Communist, no less justified in 1955. Driven by the simple need for survival, Yugoslavia had attempted to find viability in revisions of its internal system and in intercourse with the non-Communist world. This left them at variance with Moscow on two important points: their belief that their innovations should be studied, not merely tolerated, by the Communist bloc, and a belief that the "socialization" of the world should be seen as a process of evolutionary transformation rather than in the Soviet terms of "who shall beat whom?" Thus, while Moscow contemplated the return to the fold of a stray sinner, the Yugoslavs probably hoped eventually to convert the whole body of believers to their own persuasion.

The July Plenum

Khrushchev and Bulganin reported on the results of their Belgrade trip to a plenum of the party central committee held from 4 to 12 July. The plenum also heard a comprehensive report on Soviet industry from Bulganin, approved the admission of several new members to the party's top bodies, voted to convene the 20th party congress in February 1956, and participated in the censure of Molotov.

The plenum gave only passing notice to agricultural policy, which had been the subject of most of its discussions since Stalin's death, and turned its attention instead to the industrial front. Bulganin's speech was a more elaborate and definitive statement of the points raised at the industrial conference in May. It focused attention on the problem of continued industrial expansion as it pertained to the Sixth Five-Year Plan, which was to be presented to the coming party congress. Bulganin spoke

in conventional terms about the successes achieved by Soviet industry. He again condemned those who would slow its growth by giving priority to consumption and affirmed that "the general line of the Communist party, directed toward preponderant development of heavy industry, was and remains unshakable." The USSR, Bulganin told the plenum, was "standing on the threshhold of a new scientific, technical and industrial revolution." In this fact, he suggested, lay the secret of further economic growth on the basis of available resources. He proposed an approach along three lines--technological improvement, a more rational organization of production, and increased labor productivity--and the bulk of his speech was devoted to a discussion, in considerable detail, of shortcomings and possibilities in those areas.

The plenum was called on to ratify several appointments to the party's presidium and secretariat. A. I. Kirichenko, party boss in Khrushchev's old Ukrainian bailiwick, and M. A. Suslov, a member of the secretariat who had been concerned in Soviet-satellite affairs, were made full members of the presidium. The secretariat, the highest body for organizational control over the party apparatus and presided over by Khrushchev, was enlarged by three members. One of them, D. T. Shepilov, then editor of Pravda, had already begun to play an active part in Soviet foreign affairs and had only recently been a member of the Soviet delegation to Belgrade. A. B. Aristov and N. I. Belyayev were advanced from posts as provincial party chiefs. Some at least of these appointments were presumably in Khrushchev's interest and their net effect was apparently to strengthen his hand prior to the 20th party congress.

The available accounts of the proceedings of the July plenum differ only in detail as to the circumstances and substance of the Molotov censure, which took place on 9 July. It was decided to take the unusual step of humbling Molotov before his inferiors on the central committee, because he had refused to surrender his opposition to reconciliation with Yugoslavia, even after the proposition had won a majority in the party presidium and after the Belgrade conference was an accomplished fact. The accounts of the plenum give an unusually clear picture of Molotov's stubbornness and the very "Stalinist" cast of his thinking.

Khrushchev led the attack and was joined by Bulganin and Mikoyan. Molotov was left to make a solitary defense,

although it is reported that Voroshilov showed some reluctance to join in the denunciation. Molotov had kept up a rear-guard action throughout the presidium's deliberations on Yugoslavia, his critics charged. First, he had been against any attempt at all to improve relations with Yugoslavia. He was overruled but even after the Belgrade trip was decided on he argued that Yugoslavia should be dealt with exactly as any other "bourgeois state." He insisted that the 1948 break had been justified, that the Yugoslavs had been and remained "deviationist," and he contended with some foresight, that any coddling of Belgrade would set a dangerous precedent. He held to this position at a central committee plenum which met just before the Soviet delegation departed for Belgrade and again in the presidium after its return.

Molotov replied to these charges at the July plenum in an unrepentant rebuttal. He stated his position in the same terms as before, argued that current policy toward Yugoslavia was "un-Leninist," and reminded those present that, among the top leaders, he was the only remaining "comrade-in-arms" of Lenin. Molotov's attempt to throw the book of dogma at his critics and the appeal to his party seniority apparently touched a sensitive nerve and may explain why somewhat later (in an October issue of Kommunist) he himself was forced to admit to ideological laxity. At the plenum itself, his attitude provoked a sharp counterattack in which the list of his offenses was lengthened to include inflexibility in the direction of the Foreign Ministry, an insulting attitude toward the satellites, and, finally, defects of character in himself and his wife. Molotov was warned that unless he corrected himself he might be "pensioned."

Although the several accounts are not consistent on this point, the censure proceedings apparently ended with a terse reply from Molotov in which he formally stated his acceptance of the accusations against him and agreed to submit to the judgement of the central committee.

Conclusion

In many ways it was fitting that the July plenum should have been the occasion for summoning the 20th party congress, which was to meet in February 1956 eight months before the deadline established by the party statutes. The theoretical propositions and the main elements of the policies which it would be the congress' duty to confirm had already begun to emerge. Bulganin's statement on industry supplied the groundwork for the new economic plan which was to be presented to the congress. The congress pronouncement on "different roads to socialism" was anticipated in the communiqué which ended the Belgrade Conference. The impending denunciation of Stalin was, however, hardly signalled by the stress given "collective leadership" and the occasional allusions to a harmful "cult of the individual."

In the prolonged struggle for precedence within the top leadership, Khrushchev had clearly gained considerable momentum. Following the extinction of Beria he had succeeded in building an effective combination against Malenkov which presumably included such people as Molotov, Kaganovich and Zhukov. Now Molotov had been made the victim of the same tactic.

A party congress evidently appealed to Khrushchev at this juncture as a means of pressing home his advantage--he would obtain from it solemn ratification of his policies by the party's highest formal authority as well as the election of a new central committee.' A subsequent paper in this series will examine the period between the July plenum and the party congress in an effort to discover any trend in appointments or policies which might have flowed from a further rearrangement of power relationships.



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FROM THE JULY PLENUM (1955) TO
THE 20th PARTY CONGRESS - ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH
OF MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PREMIERSHIP
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FROM THE JULY PLENUM (1955) TO THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS - ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH OF MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PREMIERSHIP

Introduction

With the defeat of Malenkov in January 1955, Khrushchev became unquestionably "number one" in the Soviet "collective leadership" but he did not thereby command full and continuing support from all the other members of the party presidium. "Old Bolsheviks" Molotov and Kaganovich, who must have initially welcomed and probably assisted Khrushchev to victory over Stalin's first successor, were almost certain to view with alarm both the rapidity with which he, as the second successor, put into action new policies and tactics and the direction those policies and tactics were taking. The July 1955 plenum of the party central committee, by its censure of Molotov for not accepting gracefully the rapprochement with Tito, put a powerful brake on any ambitions Molotov may have had for a stronger voice in Soviet policy; and at the same time, in its resolution on Bulganin's exposition of problems and policies in the field of industry, it put the public stamp of high party approval on an approach to industrial problems which Kaganovich was to view with growing apprehension.

Khrushchev's increasing role in Soviet policy formulation and implementation and the consequent loss of influence by Malenkov and Molotov meant essentially that the circle of top leaders had been reduced, and it was doubtful if the addition of Kirichenko and Suslov to the presidium by the July plenum would serve to enlarge that circle. But though the voices of Malenkov and Molotov had been diminished they were still members of the presidium and potentially could challenge Khrushchev's continuing leadership.

Having eschewed police terror as the cornerstone of control, both of the regime over the populace and of himself over the presidium, Khrushchev was far more vulnerable to political machinations and policy failures than Stalin had been for many years. He had, it is true, already shown considerable skill at political maneuvering, but his new policies had yet to be fully implemented and proven in practice.

I. POLICY ISSUES AND RELATIONS AMONG THE TOP LEADERS

The July Plenum and the 20th Party Congress

The last item on the agenda of the central committee plenum, held from 4 to 12 July 1955, was the calling of the 20th party congress to meet on 14 February 1956, just three years and four months after the 19th congress had finished its work. There was no announcement of the reason for calling the congress before October 1956--the outside date for holding the next congress under the party rule adopted in 1952 which established that "regular congresses of the party are called not less than once every four years." The year 1955, however, ended the Fifth Five-Year Plan period, and the necessity to consider party directives for a new plan for the period 1956-60 probably accounted for holding the congress as early as possible in 1956. The motivation for so much advance notice of the time and agenda of the congress--only six weeks' notice was given in 1952--was not so evident. It is conceivable that Khrushchev, clearly in the ascendancy in mid-1955, intended to use the upcoming congress as a propaganda peg for his policies and for securing increased productivity in "honor of the congress" by typically Soviet storm tactics. However, such a propaganda campaign did not materialize; after a brief period of publicity, mention of the congress became increasingly rare in the Soviet press. By January 1956, failure of Soviet media recently to mention the date of the opening of the congress led to reports that it might be postponed.

The resolution calling the 20th congress was similar to the one issued in 1952 for the 19th congress. The agenda provided for the report of the central committee to be delivered by Khrushchev, the auditing commission report by chairman of the commission P. G. Moskatov, presentation of the draft directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan by Bulganin, and election of the central party bodies. No major revision of the party rules such as occurred in 1952 was apparently contemplated. Delegates to the congress were to be elected according to the same norms--one voting delegate for each 5,000 party members and one nonvoting delegate for each 5,000 candidate members--and in the same manner. The only innovation was a provision for members of party organizations in Soviet Army and Navy units abroad to elect delegates at party conferences in their military units. Military personnel abroad had long been provided representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of deputies elected in special military electoral districts. The extension of this privilege to the election of delegates to the party congress was another of the many gestures to the military which were made after Stalin's death.

The resolution also called for the holding of oblast and kray party conferences and republic party congresses in December 1955 and the first half of January 1956 in preparation for the 20th congress. Within the next several weeks party plenums in the union republics dutifully set dates for their congresses. Three republics, for reasons unknown, called them to meet in the latter half of January instead of the first half as specified by the July plenum's resolution: the Ukraine, 17 January, Belorussia, 20 January, and Uzbekistan, 26 January.

Delay in Drafting the Sixth Five-Year Plan

As it turned out, nearly all republics held their congresses in the latter half of the month, for reasons apparently related to the completion of the draft directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The latter were not available until 14 January. All republic party congresses which were to meet before the 14th were rescheduled to meet after that date; the four congresses which were to meet on the 14th and later, met as scheduled.

The delay in preparation of the plan may have been due to little more than a miscalculation--in mid-1955--of how long it would actually take to develop the directives. It is also possible that Soviet planners and political leaders ran into unexpected difficulties involving differences over aspects of economic policy. The apparent divergence of views expressed at the 20th party congress in February by Deputy Premiers and party presidium members M. Z. Saburov and M. G. Pervukhin on the one hand, and Minister of Coal Industry A. N. Zademidko and Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy A. G. Sheremetyev on the other, probably reflected a behind-the-scenes battle in the formulation of the draft Sixth Five-Year Plan directives. The disagreement was over the chances of the two ministries' fulfilling the production goals assigned them, but behind the specific issue were basic differences between regime objectives and the interests and propensities of the economic bureaucracy that exists to translate those objectives into reality--the conflict of interest between those at the apex of the regime and the lower echelons concerning the tempo of industrial growth and the balance between objectives and means.

One of the aspects of Soviet life that is almost universally resented is the frenetic tempo of economic activity, the pressure on the individual, which is engendered by the regime's efforts to maximize growth and with which the concomitant and inevitable shortages of housing and consumer goods is associated. While it is probably not correct to conclude, as Barrington Moore does,

that resentment of the tempo is so great that the Soviet economy would stagnate if the dynamic forces emanating from the top leadership were removed, there is considerable evidence to support the belief that if the lower echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy were making the decision, the rate of growth would be much lower. The principal evidence for foot dragging at levels not far removed from the top leadership is found in the public statements of the leaders themselves and hence must be presumed to be but a small sample of the foot-dragging attempted throughout the system.

In late 1954, amid complaints that several major ministries had proposed very moderate expansion in their activities, the planned growth of industrial production for 1955 was set at 9 percent instead of the usual 11 to 13 percent. The Soviet leaders, however, proceeded to tighten the screws and an increase of nearly 13 percent resulted. Scattered evidence indicates that when the time came to draft the Sixth Five-Year Plan directives the producing ministries again proposed only moderate increases. In his speech to the 20th party congress, Saburov noted, as an example, that the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy had "stubbornly defended" production increments of 1,300,000 tons and 1,700,000 tons of rolled steel below the increments finally incorporated into the 1956 plan.* It seems clear that if left to their own devices, the bureaucrats and engineers who run the Soviet economy from the ministries down to the plant would settle for growth at a level well below that demanded by the leadership.

The conservative production goals submitted by the producing ministries did not derive only from opposition to the tempo. Very important was the managers' desire to maintain a cushion, to keep a certain amount of "fat" to protect them from the inevitable exigencies of the system and the insatiable demands of the top leadership. The general attitude of the lower echelons was to ask for more than they needed and propose to do less than they could and this attitude was countered by the people at the apex of the pyramid by setting production goals high and calling on the producing ministries to make up the difference out of "unutilized internal reserves." "Internal reserves" refers to any improvement in the use of resources which will yield a greater output with no increase in inputs. "Unutilized" simply

* Another example was the more than doubling of the 1960 goal for the production of blister copper in Kazakhstan over the figure which the Kazakh leaders as late as 18 December 1955 seemed to consider proper. An article on that date in the Kazakh Republic newspaper, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, gave the 1960 goal as an increase of 43 percent over 1955 production. The plan directives, published in January, called for an increase of 90 percent. Since Kazakhstan produces almost half of total USSR blister copper this represented a substantial change.

means that owing to a combination of lack of imagination and conscious decision to hoard and to keep some "fat" available, the responsible managers, at whatever level, have not taken the necessary steps to realize potential economies. The point of view of the top leaders was well expressed by both Saburov and Pervukhin at the congress. Saburov noted that:

> The directors of certain ministries and institutions incorrectly understand their tasks in the sphere of planning and directing the economy; they direct the efforts of their apparat toward drawing up and implementing plans in a manner designed to extract excessive means and resources from the state, rather than striving to expose and utilize existing internal reserves and thus fulfilling the agreed-to plans with the maximum economy in the use of state resources.

Pervukhin approached the problem from a somewhat different angle but in the same spirit and with a similar conclusion. After berating the oil and chemical industry ministries for neglecting natural gas as an excellent cheap fuel and as a valuable raw material for the chemical industry, Pervukhin said:

> Such a narrow departmental approach to intersector problems is a serious deficiency of many ministries and institutions. Certain Communists--directors of ministries, economic organizations, and enterprises--are so bound up with narrow departmental interests that they cannot see beyond the end of their noses, and therefore they bring a narrow, utilitarian attitude rather than a broad state attitude to the solution of the most important intersector questions.

He then berated the ministries for purposely overestimating construction costs, stating that the ministerial cost estimates for the Sixth Five-Year Plan investment program had been scaled down some 250 billion rubles, from about 1,240 billion rubles to the 990 billion programmed in the directives, and arguing that:

> By strictly observing a regime of economy and by correctly distributing the resources allocated to capital construction, all the investment projects for the Sixth Five-Year

> Plan for developing the various branches of the national economy, the construction of housing and social-cultural institutions, can be unconditionally fulfilled without supplementary capital investment.

The case for the opposition was presented by Zademidko and Sheremetyev. Zademidko's position was simply stated. Yes, there had been "internal reserves" in the coal industry; despite a considerable lag in new mine construction the industry had overfulfilled the Fifth Five-Year Plan goals. But the overfulfillment had exhausted all the "unutilized internal reserves"; there was no "fat" left, not even sufficient reserve capacity to permit the minimum necessary repair and maintenance work. Zademidko concluded by stating flatly that the investment allocations to the coal industry for the Sixth Five-Year Plan were not sufficient and that Gosplan would have to re-examine the matter and increase allocations.

Sheremetyev stated a similar case. The "internal reserves" in his industry had also been largely exhausted, the iron ore situation was unsatisfactory, and the prospects for improvement were dim owing to the unsatisfactory progress of new ore mines. Although Sheremetyev did not say that the investment allocations were insufficient, he did say that the 1960 goals for ferrous metals could not be reached if the construction of new mines, blast furnaces, rolling mills, and other new plants fell short as had happened in the 1951-55 period.

The conflicts of interest illustrated in these differing assessments of production capabilities are, of course, inherent in the Soviet economic and political system and have played a role in the preparation of all state economic plans beginning with the first in 1928. What may have exacerbated the situation in late 1955 and stiffened lower level resistance to the changes proposed by the top planners was the fact that in several industries--coal, ferrous metals, cement, and possibly others--the pressure for production, coupled with a failure to provide sufficient new plants in the past, had squeezed out most if not all of the "unutilized internal reserves" and left the ministries concerned dependent on new capital construction to meet the high production goals assigned them. Neither Pervukhin nor Saburov, nor for that matter, apparently, any of the other top leaders, appeared willing to consider the possibility that not all of the ministries were asking for more than they really needed, and that there was an element of increasing urgency in the requests of all.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

The regime was well aware that the economy was facing some potentially serious problems. For example, it recognized that outmoded machinery and equipment and industrial processes constituted a major drag on improving the quantity and quality of production, and that labor could no longer be transferred from the agricultural to the industrial sector to meet industrial production goals without sacrificing necessary agricultural production. This realization increased the attractiveness of some demobilization which, in the regime's view, depended in turn on easing international tension, and it was clear that the required increase in labor productivity was to a certain extent, at least, dependent on improving incentives--rationalizing the wage structure and increasing the availability of housing and consumer goods.

The regime was also aware that the system of industrial organization was too centralized to make effective use of available talent, both managerial and technical, or to develop talent and initiative at lower echelons. Moreover, there was a developing imbalance between the growth of the basic materials and fuel industries on the one hand and the fabricating industries on the other, with, as indicated above, warnings of impending trouble in at least two of the key basic materials industries because of insufficient new investment and delays in the completion of new construction. But the dominant Soviet leaders were apparently blissfully confident that these problems were either not really urgent or else could be overcome by ad hoc measures within the traditional framework of Soviet "political" planning. If any members of the collective leadership disagreed with this view, they were careful not to press the issue.

Another possible reason for the failure to complete the plan directives as early as had been anticipated was the apparent redrafting of plan submissions from lower echelons in the industrial hierarchy in September in accordance with an August letter from the party central committee. The letter was probably decree No.1422, dated 5 August 1955, jointly issued by the central committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. It was entitled "On Letters to Directors, Secretaries of Party Organizations, and Chairmen of Trade-Union Committees in Connection With Drawing Up the Draft of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy" and dealt with procedures for drawing up of the draft plan and apparently emphasized improving labor productivity, lowering costs, and increasing the

output of industrial products.* Aside from the natural propensity of enterprise officials to ask for more resources than they needed and to propose to produce less than they could, there were at least two recent developments that might have necessitated a redrafting of the plan submissions made earlier.**

The first of these was the increased attention to modernization--new technology--evident in the creation in late May of a special State Committee for New Technology under the chairmanship of Deputy Premier V. A. Malyshev and the emphasis Bulganin placed on technological improvements in his speech to the July central committee plenum. The other development was the success of the regime's efforts toward achieving international detente, symbolized by the summit conference and the "Geneva spirit." The close connection of the latter with problems of economic planning was frankly asserted by Saburov in early July conversations [redacted] Saburov, describing his special worries as planning chief, insisted again and again that a lessening of tension must take place at Geneva because the Kremlin must put an end to indecision in economic directives, that is, must settle the question of the relative share of resources to be devoted to defense, investment, and consumption.

Summit and After

On 26 May, the day Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Shepilov traveled to Belgrade for the historic rapprochement with Tito, the Soviet Government, in notes to Great Britain, France, and the United States, formally accepted the Western invitation to a four-power, heads of government (summit) conference. Another step was thus taken toward realizing what had been a continuing goal of the post-Stalin leadership--a relaxation of international tensions that would enable the Soviet Union to reduce military expenditures and devote more attention to domestic economic problems. One of the clear differences between the Malenkov and post-Malenkov regimes was that the former, as described in a previous study in this series, had "attempted to enjoy the fruits of detente before detente had been assured."

* Decree No. 1422 was mentioned and partially described in a joint decree of 5 January 1956 published in Spravochnik Partiynogo Rabotnika. Moscow: 1957, pp. 131-133.

** One trust had submitted its draft as early as May, and a June deadline for such submissions is a reasonable assumption.

The Khrushchev-Bulganin regime sought to remedy this mistake by increasing its efforts to secure agreement on a set of general principles of peace, security, and coexistence. Where the Malenkov government had been hesitant, defensive, and perhaps somewhat fearful in pursuit of its foreign policy, Khrushchev's regime was confident, bold, and imaginative. The Austrian treaty and the improvement of relations with Belgrade were followed by the summit conference in July, an announcement of armed forces reduction in August, establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany in September, the foreign ministers conference in ber, and a trip to South Asia by Bulganin and Khrushchev in Octo-November-December. All this activity was marked by increasing evidences of a new face of amiability and reasonableness in endless rounds of visits and cocktail parties with the Soviet leaders and among Soviet diplomats abroad.

Bulganin, as premier, was Soviet head of government, and therefore certain to be head of the Soviet delegation to the summit conference, but there was some skepticism in Western circles concerning the conclusiveness of his authority. A Western newsman asked Khrushchev in early May if it were true that he was "the power behind the throne in Russia and if, in that case, it was necessary (for him) to attend such talks also?" Khrushchev's reply that "If Bulganin goes, I do not have to go to look over his shoulder" seemed to answer the question of Khrushchev's participation but did not relieve the doubt about Bulganin's authority. President Eisenhower in his press conference on 29 June voiced this doubt when he queried whether the Soviet leader at Geneva would be able to make decisions binding on the other leaders. The press gave unusual coverage to the President's query, and the regime announced that the delegation would include Khrushchev, despite his earlier disavowal of any necessity to go, as reassurance to the West that the Soviet delegation would be able to make binding "on the spot" decisions at Geneva, and that the Soviet leaders were making a genuine effort to seek a detente. In a press conference on 15 July, Bulganin emphasized this last point by stating that the Soviet delegation sincerely desired a peaceful resolution of the world's problems and was going to Geneva with every intention of cooperating in the search for peace.

Khrushchev, the principal architect of the regime's new "activist" approach in foreign relations, was certainly not a reluctant participant in the conference, and to have to sit at home while one of the major steps in this approach was being taken might well have galled the self-confident and impatient first secretary. Foreign Minister Molotov was the only other member of the top leadership included, the remaining members

of the five-man delegation being Defense Minister G. K. Zhukov and First Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. Zhukov, of course, was included in order to capitalize on the wartime relationship of friendship and respect established with Eisenhower, while Gromyko was to supply technical advice.

At the time of the summit conference Molotov's role in the Soviet top leadership and the extent of his influence was not clear. His censure by the central committee at the July plenum for continuing to oppose the reconciliation with Yugoslavia after the decision had been taken in the presidium and affirmed by the central committee, showed, of course, that he had suffered a severe loss of political power, but he had not been removed from the presidium nor relieved as foreign minister and so presumably retained some voice in Soviet foreign policy. The party censure may well have softened Molotov's voice but he was obviously a tough nut to crack and it is entirely conceivable that he continued to express his dissatisfaction with various of Khrushchev's policy proposals.

The summit conference itself appeared to provide few grounds for additional disagreements arising between Molotov and the others, either in regard to Soviet objectives or the mechanism of the conference. Molotov may have been somewhat apprehensive, however, about how far the attempt to create a spirit of conciliation might carry Bulganin and Khrushchev toward making substantive concessions, and be would most likely have been more comfortable without Khrushchev's presence.

As events transpired, Molotov need not have been overly concerned about concessions, and Khrushchev, so far as is known, neither usurped Bulganin's role as head of the delegation nor interfered in Molotov's job of drafting, in conjunction with the foreign ministers of the other three powers, the communiqué or directive which represented the substantive results of the conference. This was the difficult task of diplomatic negotiation, the painstaking formulation, word by word and comma by comma, of what the parties to the conference could agree on. It was Molotov's responsibility as foreign minister and a job he was comfortable doing. In the round of luncheons, dinners, and cocktail parties, however, he took a back seat to Khrushchev and Bulganin in propagating the spirit of cooperativeness, amiability, and general good feeling--the "Geneva spirit"--which was the main Soviet objective at the conference.

The contrast between the early part of the conference, when Khrushchev and Bulganin were intent on creating this cordial atmosphere, and the later stages of the conference, when Molotov and Gromyko were hardheadedly negotiating the conference agreement,

led some observers to conclude that Molotov was a stumbling block to conciliation, and that so long as he remained foreign minister little real progress could be registered toward the settlement of outstanding issues. Bulganin, in apparent agreement with this view, remarked at Geneva, according to one report, that it might be necessary to get rid of Molotov as foreign minister before the foreign ministers' conference, which the four powers had agreed to hold in October.

The context within which the remark was allegedly made was not stated, but it is likely that Bulganin was responding to criticism of what one observer described as Molotov's "tactics of trickery and deviousness." Bulganin, therefore, was probably seeking to dispel any feeling that the regime was not sincere in its talk of peace and relaxation of tensions, rather than indicating any imminent move to remove Molotov. The remark did appear to show, however, that Molotov's future was still in question.

In the weeks following the summit conference, Molotov's status appeared unchanged. He was present with the other Soviet leaders at the Supreme Soviet session in early August at which Bulganin reported on the summit talks, and he participated in the campaign for affability at Bulganin's unprecedented party on 7 August for the chiefs of foreign missions accredited to Moscow, with their wives and children, an afternoon of walking, rowing, refreshment, and exchange of pleasantries. Moreover, he was among the presidium members who delivered reports on the July central committee plenum to local party meetings in Moscow, his being to a party meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Khrushchev and Bulganin continued, however, to play the principal roles in relations with foreign states. They stopped off in Berlin on their return from Geneva to reassure the East German regime concerning Soviet intentions vis a vis the reunification issue and probably to discuss their tactics in regard to the forthcoming talks with Adenauer and negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany; and they took the lead at receptions and talks with foreigners in Moscow in the program to "humanize" the Soviet regime.

Further Moves Against Molotov

What was either evidence of a further deterioration in Molotov's position or a dramatic rendation of the low estate to which he had fallen was apparent during the talks with Chancellor Adenauer, 9-13 September. The Soviet policy of seeking detente on the basis of the existing power positions in Europe involved the immediate objective of winning general recognition of the

existence of two German states. The first step in that objective was for a "normalizing" of Soviet relations with West Germany, and steps to that end had been initiated as early as January 1955. During the four days of the sometimes bitter negotiations which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations, Molotov sat in the second row at the conference table and did not participate in the exchange of views. [redacted] Molotov's appearance was "depressing, and at times pitiable." "At times he was the official, and at others, he seemed a romantic of the old days who no longer knew how to conduct himself." Both Khrushchev and Bulganin apparently went out of their way to treat him in a degrading manner. When ideas were agreed to or decisions reached they continually used the expression "let Molotov work this out," treating him like a secretary. [redacted] Bulganin berated Molotov at one point for agreeing to a statement he had worked out with the German state secretary: "You are not to make agreements with anyone! that is our business and not yours. Your sole task is to draw up the agreements. You are our editor." Chancellor Adenauer himself, [redacted] was shocked at the manner in which the Russians treated Molotov. He related how Khrushchev and Bulganin joked over someone's comment that Molotov's photographs portrayed him looking duller than reality. Khrushchev laughed, nudged Bulganin and inquired if he noticed any improvement in real life.

The whole episode made a very bad impression on the West Germans, so it is difficult to see what provoked both Bulganin and Khrushchev into this demonstration of Molotov's insignificant influence and power. A possible clue is provided by issue number 14 of Kommunist, approved for publication on 30 September, which carried Molotov's forced admission of having made a "theoretically mistaken and politically harmful" declaration about the achievement of socialism in the USSR. Molotov undoubtedly resisted this additional move against him with all the strength he could muster, so it is conceivable that the writing of the letter, dated 16 September, the day before he left for the UN General Assembly, followed an acrimonious struggle within the presidium which carried over into Khrushchev's and Bulganin's treatment of him during the negotiations with West Germany.

The ideological "mistake" which was the basis of Molotov's public penance was certainly a pseudo issue. It is highly unlikely that anyone could seriously have been misled by Molotov's faux pas, which occurred in the course of a long speech to the Supreme Soviet on 8 February 1955 devoted entirely to foreign policy:

> Along with the Soviet Union, where the foundations of a socialist society have already been built, there are also such countries of people's democracy as have made only the first, but highly important, steps in the direction of socialism. (italics added)

The phrase was clearly at variance with official dogma which, since 1936, had stated that socialism has been achieved in the main and that the Soviet state is now on the path to communism. But this was a slip in terminology rather than an attempt to contradict official doctrine since just five paragraphs earlier in the same speech he had "correctly" stated that "socialism had already triumphed in our country in the period before the second World War."

The lead editorial in the same issue of Kommunist that published the letter used Molotov's "error" as a springboard for a broad exposition of party propaganda on both external and internal affairs. The main stress of the editorial was on the need for a "creative" rather than a "dogmatic" application of Marxist theory:

> Marxist theory illuminates the path of practice toward great aims. But advanced theory only proves capable of this by virtue of always sensitively heeding the demands of life.... The isolation of theory from life, attempts to cling fast to dogma, are particularly impermissible.

The editorial was a pointed warning, certainly to Molotov, but possibly also to other high-ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy, to cease opposition or foot-dragging against the new policies of the Khrushchev-Bulganin regime:

> Guided by the revolutionary dialectic, the party analyzes the phenomena of life from the angle of the struggle of the new with the old, in every way supports what is positive and eradicates what is negative, takes the necessary measures for removing from our path the obstacles impeding the unfolding of the creative forces of the Soviet people. The party is intolerant of the complacency, the conceit of certain leaders, of instances of their isolation from the masses. (italics added)

Both domestic and foreign relations problems were mentioned in this connection, making it clear that the editorial was directed against general inflexibility and obstructionism and not exclusively at a dogmatic approach in foreign policy.

A central committee censure such as that given Molotov in July would probably have been sufficient to bring most Soviet officials into line, but Molotov was not so easily broken. There is more than a hint of continued intransigence in a remark he is reported to have made to one [redacted] in early September. Referring to the new approach in foreign policy, he said in obvious disgruntlement, "In order to accomplish something, we do not need new methods of negotiation." Though undoubtedly somewhat subdued, he may have continued to carry on a rear-guard action against Khrushchev's program thus giving the aid and comfort of an Old Bolshevik, widely respected throughout the Soviet Union, to those Soviet officials who for one reason or another were opposed to any aspect of the new policies.

The familiar Bolshevik ritual of public penance for past mistakes may, therefore, have been resorted to as a means of dramatically illustrating the strength of the Khrushchev faction and the extent of Molotov's political bankruptcy in order to underscore the futility of continued opposition and the seriousness with which such opposition or foot-dragging would be viewed. If this were the sole reason for the letter of recantation, it would suggest that Khrushchev was having more difficulty putting his program into effect than is readily apparent from other information.* Outwardly, at least, the policies espoused appeared

* A behind-the-scenes controversy over agricultural policy, perhaps involving the introduction of ideas gleaned from US agricultural practice, however, might have been going on at this time. The post of minister of agriculture, which had been vacant since 2 March 1955, was filled by the appointment of Khrushchev's protegé V. V. Matskevich on 14 October, just six days after Kommunist No. 14 was distributed. Matskevich, who was the acting minister, had headed a Soviet agricultural delegation to the United States (16 July-25 August) and was apparently very much impressed with some aspects of American agriculture, particularly the relatively few laborers required to farm America's acres. In early January 1956 a letter was sent out by the party central committee calling attention to "serious deficiencdes" in agricultural work. The principal deficiencies listed were the low productivity of labor on the kolkhozy, the poor use of agricultural machinery, and the poor efficiency in farming. As an example of efficient employment of labor, reference was made to the USA, where only one man was needed to farm one thousand hectares of corn. The letter also cited the successes of US farming in corn harvesting, silaging, hay harvesting and other activities.

the schedule set in the Fifth Five-Year Plan.* In an effort to fulfill its production goals the government was forced to resort to the expedient of increasing the labor force beyond its intentions.

The problem was complicated by the fact that the consumer goods goals were not fully met, largely because a sufficient increase in agricultural output did not materialize, and, consequently, purchasing power ran ahead of available supply. The effect of the government's policies was thus to increase demand before it was able to provide the consumer goods to meet it and, therefore, to vitiate the incentive element in its program. In a March 1955 conversation with a foreign diplomat in Moscow, Khrushchev reportedly criticized Malenkov directly on this score, alleging that he had "created demands in the Soviet people without having created the capacity for satisfying them." Much the same point was made by Kaganovich, who remarked to a Western diplomat that "it was a mistake to raise the standard of living too quickly as this produced demoralization and lack of discipline among the population." But, though it had failed to meet its goals, the program had apparently had the further undesirable effect of putting a drain on state reserves, a condition which Bulganin, in his first speech as premier, said could not be allowed.

Confusion in the Ranks

Towards the end of 1954, apparently, there was a fair amount of perplexity as to the regime's aims and intent. The [redacted] has described a meeting of ideologists and economists which he attended in Moscow in December 1954. "When the subject of relative stress on light and heavy industry came up for discussion," he says, "there was a situation amounting to 'bourgeois liberalization,' with every man expressing his own interpretation of the party position. It was complete disorder and the first

*According to Soviet statistics, labor productivity increased only 33 percent for the 1951-54 period, whereas real wages increased 37 percent. From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, such a relation between these rates of growth is highly unfavorable, because it tends to constrict the surplus available for investment and hence the rate of growth of the Soviet economy.

on disarmament on the 10 May proposals already rejected by the Western powers--in other words to stand pat on all three items on the conference agenda--it is doubtful that the letter had any adverse effect on the negotiations. Molotov ably upheld the Soviet position on all issues and managed at the same time to convey the idea that the failure of the conference to reach agreement on any of the main issues did not end the Geneva spirit or herald the return of the cold war. Though bereft of much of his old power and influence he continued to be a useful member of the presidium for his experience and skill at diplomatic negotiation.

The Decline of Kaganovich

Molotov's difficulties in adapting to the new foreign policy line and to Khrushchev's dynamic and sometimes unorthodox tactics were apparently in some measure shared by Kaganovich. In his four public speeches since Stalin's death, Kaganovich had revealed a continuing orientation toward a Bolshevik style of thought and reverence for Stalin, a rather reluctant endorsement of the post-Stalin "new look," and a tendency to emphasize a tough foreign policy. He was undoubtedly one of Khrushchev's staunch allies in the heavy vs. light industry controversy and he probably also supported him in his efforts to re-establish the supremacy of the party and instill a more militant spirit in party members.*

On 24 May, Kaganovich had been appointed chairman of the newly organized state committee for labor and wages in what appeared to be another of the trouble-shooting assignments for which he was justly famous. The formation of this supraministerial body was part of a broad program for increasing labor productivity which, in view of the smaller additions to the labor force likely to be available, was a major requirement for continuing the high rates of industrial growth desired by the regime. The committee was given responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the work of ministries and departments in the handling of labor resources, for regulating inter-industry and interregional wage differentials, the industrial and geographical distribution of the labor force, work conditions and safety, construction of dwellings and other buildings designed for worker use, and social insurance--in short, general supervision of all government activities in the labor field. The job of chairman was, therefore, one of prime importance and not likely to be given anyone felt to be out of sympathy with the aims of the regime.

* He was, for example, the first presidium member to come out publicly (early 1954) for Khrushchev when the latter began his climb to the top in the collective leadership.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Other signs that Kaganovich ranked high in the leadership were noted well into the fall: the photograph in the 28 July Pravda showing the return of Bulganin and Khrushchev from the summit conference has Kaganovich looming in the foreground as the most prominent of the greeters, and he was chosen to deliver the October revolution anniversary address, traditionally the most comprehensive and authoritative policy statement of the year.

The speech he delivered was a curious mixture of expressions and concepts of revolutionary Marxism, affirmation of the virtues of coexistence, and praise, albeit grudging, for the West. A major emphasis of the speech was on classical Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, a preoccupation unparalleled in October revolution speeches since the war. In this emphasis the speech was in line with the Kommunist editorial that accompanied Molotov's apology for ideological error. But whereas the Kommunist editorial inveighed against the "isolation of theory from practice, attempts to cling to dogma" and appealed for flexibility, Kaganovich stressed "devotion to principles" and the lessons of the 1917 revolution. He seemed to be trying to show that current Soviet policy with its innovating flexibility was part of the world revolutionary stream and constituted a "truly Marxist approach," but his militant doctrinaire orthodoxy so overshadowed the whole effort that the speech stands out as the major discordant note in the Soviet new look between the July plenum and the 20th party congress.

Two and a half weeks later, on 25 November, the Moscow subway, which had borne Kaganovich's name since 1935, was renamed for Lenin. The subway may have been renamed in imitation of the newly completed Leningrad subway, named for Lenin on 14 November, and to ensure that a lesser subway would not bear a greater name, but it was the first time that the name of a Soviet leader had been removed from a major Soviet institution except when such leaders were purged or otherwise disgraced, and so was unquestionably a blow at Kaganovich's prestige and a sign that he had slipped somewhat in power and influence. However, there was nothing in the subway incident to suggest that it was part of an attack on him--there was no mention, for example, that it had ever borne his name and one of the stations was immediately redesignated with his name.

Possibly Kaganovich had begun to slip even before his 7 November speech. There is some evidence, at any rate, to suggest that M. G. Pervukhin had gained in prestige and influence at Kaganovich's expense. Both men were first deputy premiers but Kaganovich was senior to Pervukhin, having been a first

deputy premier since March 1953, while the latter was not made a first deputy premier until February 1955. On 20 and 23 September and again on 19 October 1955, Pervukhin signed decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, presumably as acting chairman since decrees (postanovleniya) are signed by the chairman (or person assigned to act in his stead) and by the administrator of affairs. Pervukhin, therefore, would seem to have had seniority over Kaganovich, who was apparently in Moscow during the period covered by these decrees.* Pervukhin had apparently earlier been made chairman of a "Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers for Current Affairs" which had been created "to examine and decide all current questions" relating to areas of responsibility of more than one first deputy premier or deputy premier, in other words, to decide issues between deputy premiers. This would appear to be a job of considerable power and influence, but none of the problems with which the commission is known to have concerned itself appear particularly significant so it is possible that its power did not extend beyond relatively minor administrative disagreements. Even so, the job was an important one and served to enhance Pervukhin's position.

Following the ouster in June 1957 of the "anti-party group" (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov "who joined them") Kaganovich was charged in Sotsialisticheskiy Trud, journal of the State Committee on Labor and Wages, with having sabotaged the work of the committee while he was chairman (May 1955-June 1956):

> Kaganovich deflected it from solving the fundamental, pressing tasks of setting in order organization of work and quota-setting, improving working conditions, and consistently applying the socialist principle of payment and through stimulation of higher labor productivity... the only thing in which Kaganovich showed persistence was the policy of

* Premier Bulganin did not leave on his vacation until 23 September but may have been so busy by the 20th with diplomatic functions and last-minute preparations for the trip that he had already appointed Pervukhin to act for him. Of the other first deputy premiers, Mikoyan was absent from Moscow on vacation throughout the period; Molotov, who was away in September, had returned before 19 October but was not likely to rate the acting chairman's job; Saburov like Kaganovich was present throughout the period and was apparently therefore also outranked by Pervukhin.

liquidating (the committee). Sensing that there would be inevitable exposure of his inactivity in carrying out the 20th party congress decisions on putting in order the organization, quotas, and payment of labor, Kaganovich tried to put through a decision to disband the committee and thereby evade responsibility.

There is, of course, a suspicion of prevarication in such delayed criticism but the committee did make little observable progress during the period of Kaganovich's chairmanship, and the pace of the wage reform was stepped up considerably in the fall of 1956 after he was relieved. The main emphasis of Sotsialisticheskiy Trud's criticism was on the period following the 20th party congress, so there is a strong possibility that Kaganovich's opposition developed slowly through the fall and winter of 1955-56 but did not become really active until after the denigration of Stalin at the 20th party congress.

It seems improbable that Kaganovich was opposed to wage reform as such. More likely, he became generally disillusioned with the trend away from the tried and true practices of the past associated with Khrushchev's post-Malenkov policies. With his general ideological orientation it is certainly conceivable that he evaluated the results of the summit conference negatively, on the grounds that capitalists can't be trusted, and opposed any reduction in the share of national income to be devoted to defense in the coming five-year plan period. He may also have opposed even the very limited steps toward decentralizing Soviet industrial administration that followed Bulganin's July plenum speech, probably fearing that the regime would weaken its control of the industrial process. And he probably had strong reservations about the value of wage reform in increasing labor productivity, an issue more directly related to the work of his State Committee on Labor and Wages. However, despite the probability that he was less than enthusiastic for some of Khrushchev's policies, there was no public attack on him, suggesting that he was careful not to object too strongly.

Personal Diplomacy

The Soviet role in the impasse at Geneva suggested that the Soviet leaders had only a limited appreciation for formal multilateral negotiations, while the vigor with which they were pursuing informal and bilateral nonbloc contacts reflected Khrushchev's faith in personal persuasion. Mikoyan "vacationed" in

Yugoslavia from 18 September to 4 October, continuing the wooing of Tito and other Yugoslav party officials on an informal, unofficial plane, and during the summer and fall an unprecedented series of visits to Moscow by non-Communist leaders and delegations were solicited, a large number of which were accepted. Following the visit of Adenauer, there were visits by Finnish President T. K. Paasikivi in September, Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson, New Zealand Deputy Premier Keith Holyoake, and Burmese Premier U Nu in October, followed by one by Norwegian Premier E. Gerhardsen in November. Some of these came at the head of official delegations for negotiations with the Soviet leaders, others were just friendly visits.

Another type of contact which was fostered was the visit of parliamentary delegations. These visits had developed rapidly after the USSR had organized a parliamentary group on 29 June and decided to join the Interparliamentary Union. Visits of parliamentary delegations from Syria, Yugoslavia, Japan, France, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, and others followed in rapid succession. The Soviet group was a bit slow on returning the visits but did visit Yugoslavia and Finland. More specialized contacts were also sought, such as sending a construction delegation headed by Deputy Premier V. A. Kucherenko to Britain, France, and Italy; exchanging naval visits with Britain, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Sweden; and receiving such groups as an Austrian delegation of journalists, several agricultural delegations, and a delegation from the London County Council and such individuals as US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.

During the negotiations with or receptions for these foreigners, Bulganin and Khrushchev played the principal roles; and they were the stellar attractions, for the first time unaccompanied by other top leaders, in the most ambitious and dramatic of their post-summit efforts at personal diplomacy--the month-long tour of India, Burma, and Afghanistan which began on 18 November.

From the outset it was apparent that the Soviet Union intended the trip to be more than just a friendly visit and that Khrushchev and Bulganin expected to use it as a springboard for launching a major propaganda and policy bid to line up Asian "neutralism" behind Soviet "peaceful coexistence." The two appeared to work well as a team. In a tactic repeated with considerable effect, Bulganin as premier made the expected friendly, noncontroversial speech and Khrushchev followed with a vitriolic, rabble-rousing speech taking considerable liberty with historical developments and seeking to stir up hate for past colonial masters. Except in Afghanistan, the two made special efforts to break away from a VIP, conducted-tour routine

and meet the people. They strived to create an informal atmosphere, donned national costumes, tasted local foods, and gave special attention to little children.

So far as relations between the two were concerned, the trip served to demonstrate the relative superiority of Khrushchev over Bulganin. Though Khrushchev had certainly been the more vocal in proclaiming the post-Malenkov new course, the West Germans had come away in September with the impression that the two were equal, neither apparently making a decision without consulting the other. Adenauer even entertained the idea that Bulganin might be the more important man. During the South-East Asia trip, however, Khrushchev quite obviously took the initiative on several occasions without prior consultation with Bulganin.* It was Khrushchev who announced the Soviet explosion of a multi-megaton device, who gave approval for dispatching a group of Soviet students and scholars to work in Indian educational institutions, and who took the lead in pursuing informal contacts.

That Khrushchev and Bulganin should have felt free to trundle around South Asia for over four weeks and to take with them the chief of the secret police, Serov, was convincing proof of the confidence with which they viewed the stability of their positions and the serenity of the political scene at home. Mikoyan, who had accompanied them to China in 1954 and Yugoslavia in 1955 but who had been left at home "to run the farm" when the two went to Geneva for the summit meeting in July, was apparently again left in charge during the Asia junket.

Toward the last of December, both Khrushchev and Bulganin gave reports on their trip to the Supreme Soviet, emulating the example set it in August when Bulganin reported on the summit conference. Bulganin's December report was largely a routine account of the trip while Khrushchev's remarks covered a whole range of international problems. Both expressed confidence that the trip had enhanced Soviet prestige and influence among the so-called "uncommitted" nations of Southeast Asia. The speakers in the ensuing "discussion" praised their activities and the Supreme Soviet formally commended them and expressed complete satisfaction with the results of the trip.

* Khrushchev's primacy in the presidium had already been more or less publicly acknowledged. On 15 October, Pravda published his remarks at the presentation of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor to the City of Sevastopol on 13 October in which, though Voroshilov had made the major speech in presenting the award, Khrushchev undertook to speak "on behalf of" the central committee and the presidium. On 3 November, Pravda published without change or comment a telegram from Deputy Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, mistakenly addressing Khrushchev by the old title of supreme leadership, "General Secretary of the CPSU."

II. PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS

Promotions to the Presidium and Secretariat

In his struggle to reach the commanding place in the leadership, Khrushchev, perhaps mindful of the reaction against Beriya, had apparently used with restraint and some hesitancy whatever powers he possessed in the manipulation of personnel assignments and packing of party and government bodies. Whether this was by choice or because he lacked a free hand in this field is relatively unimportant. The point is that the struggle took place primarily in a different arena. Both Malenkov and Molotov were bested in policy disputes and, though they received their demotion and rebuke at the hands of the central committee, this action was largely pro forma following the victory of Khrushchev's point of view in the presidium.

The July plenum appears to mark a slight change in Khrushchev's approach; he seems to become somewhat less restrained in securing personnel changes clearly in his political interest. It is difficult, for example, to see "collective leadership" at work in the selection of the new members added to the all-important presidium and secretariat at the plenum, the first to either body since the reorganizations following Stalin's death. Beriya's old position on the central committee was taken by Marshal Zhukov in July 1953, but no successor had been named to Beriya's place on the presidium and no replacement on the secretariat had been made for S. D. Ignatyev--removed in April 1953 for complicity in the Doctors Plot--or N. N. Shatalin--transferred to Primorye Kray in March 1955 following Malenkov's demotion.

A. I. Kirichenko, elected to the presidium, was Khrushchev's protegé and political steward in the Ukraine. Two of the new secretaries, N. I. Belyayev, party boss in the Altay Kray and an agricultural expert, and Pravda editor D. T. Shepilov showed evidences of being Khrushchev men. Belyayev had championed an aggressive virgin lands agricultural program in Altay Kray in December 1953 in apparent anticipation of Khrushchev's "new lands" program presented to the central committee in February 1954. Shepilov accompanied Khrushchev to Peiping in September 1954 for the fifth anniversary celebration of the Chinese People's Republic and to Belgrade in May 1955 for the rapprochement with Tito. Khrushchev's outraged description of Shepilov in July 1957 as a "shameless, double-dealing individual" supports the view that earlier, at least, he had been on Khrushchev's team.

Suslov, the other addition to the presidium, had become a central party secretary two years before Khrushchev. And though they were together on the secretariat for four and a half years there is no evidence to indicate more than a working relationship. Suslov, therefore, may have been sponsored by some other member or members of the presidium. The same can be said concerning the sponsorship of Aristov, transferred from the first secretary's post in Khabarovsk Kray to become the third additional central party secretary. It is difficult, however, to see who their sponsors might be. Neither Suslov nor Aristov had any special discernible ties with other members of the presidium and in any event their appointment hardly seems an adequate quid pro quo for the appointment of Kirichenko, Belyayev, and Shepilov. Moreover, Suslov's speech at the 20th party congress in February 1956 was the most frankly laudatory of Khrushchev of any by a top leader, and Aristov promptly took over responsibility for party organizational and personnel work, apparently acting in Khrushchev's interests for an increasing number of high-level appointments began to bear the stamp of Khrushchev's hand.

Control of Personnel Selection and Appointment - The Secretariat And Apparatus

Concentration of control over personnel assignments in all fields of Soviet life in the party secretariat and its executive staff, the apparatus, was one of the important, if not the most important, factors in Stalin's rise to supreme dictatorial power. If this power remained concentrated in the secretariat after Stalin's death, then Khrushchev, from March 1953 the top-ranking secretary and in September named first secretary, was from the very beginning in the most powerful political position, and it could be only a matter of time before he had established his own one-man rule as Stalin's true successor. That Khrushchev seems well on his way to a position of absolute political supremacy, however, is not proof that what was true for Stalin was true for Khrushchev. Khrushchev for a time at least may have had to rely on other means.

What is not clear in this connection is the extent to which the presidium in the months immediately following Stalin's death maintained a direct interest in and control over the secretariat and apparatus in the personnel field. Ultimate control over personnel selection and appointment, as in all substantive policy fields, was presumably intended to be exercised by the presidium, acting as a body. But this did not prevent Beriya from independently making personnel changes in a bid for supreme power.

It is doubtful, however, even if presidium control were for a time somewhat lax, if Khrushchev would have had a free hand within the secretariat. The maneuver in March which cost Malenkov his place on the secretariat left there one of his protegés, N. N. Shatalin, where he could report to his patron and possibly check any unilateral moves Khrushchev might make. The role of Suslov, who had become the ranking secretary in terms of tenure, and who presumably had ample opportunity in his six years of intimate day-to-day work with the professional party machine to learn the political ropes and build a following through personal relationships and patronage, is still something of a mystery. His political ties with members of the post-Stalin presidium are not clear, and it is extremely difficult to see his hand in more than a few of the personnel changes between the 19th and 20th party congresses. Pospelov seems to have been even less involved in political machinations. With the downfall of Malenkov and the consequent removal of Shatalin from the secretariat, Khrushchev's freedom of action within the secretariat and apparatus was perceptibly increased.

The Central Apparatus - Organization and Personnel

The value of the apparatus as an instrument of influence and power lies principally in its two major functions. It serves not only as a means of centralized control over personnel assignments but also as an important source of information and advice for the top leaders. Reports, memos, and staff studies emanating from the apparatus undoubtedly influence policy-making. Put to partisan purposes, such reports might be decisive in effecting policy decisions desired by Khrushchev.

Organizationally, the main developments in the apparatus in the two years following Stalin's death were a reversal of most of the departmental mergers which occurred shortly after the 19th party congress in October 1952, and an organizational innovation associated with Khrushchev--the division of the departments of agriculture and of party organs along territorial lines. Responsibility for the Russian Republic was given to the departments of "Agriculture for the RSFSR" and "Party Organs for the RSFSR," while the other 15 republics were served by the departments of "Agriculture for the Union Republics" and "Party organs for the Union Republics." In his speech to the central committee in January 1955, Khrushchev related the creation of the new departments "for the RSFSR" to deficiencies in the work of state and party organs connected with agriculture in the Russian federation.

TOP SECRET

THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE

1 NOVEMBER 1952

SECRETARIAT

Secretary
I.V. STALIN

Secretary N.S. KHRUSHCHEV	Secretary G.M. MALENKOV	Secretary M.A. SUSLOV
Secretary A.B. ARISTOV	Secretary P.K. PONOMARENKO	Secretary L.I. BREZHNEV
Secretary N.S. IGNATOV	Secretary N.A. MIKHAILOV	Secretary N.M. PEGOV

APPARATUS

PARTY, TRADE UNION AND KOMSOMOL ORGANS N.M. PEGOV	LITERATURE AND ARTS ?	CHIEF POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, MINISTRY OF WAR F.F. KUZNETSOV
PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION ?V.G. GRIGORYAN	ECONOMIC AND HISTORICAL SCIENCES AND VUZES ?A.M. RUMYANTSEV	CHIEF POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, MINISTRY OF NAVY S.Ye. ZAKHAROV
AGRICULTURE A.I. KOZLOV	NATURAL AND TECHNICAL SCIENCES AND VUZES Yu.A ZHDANOV	POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS G.A. CHUMACHENKO
HEAVY INDUSTRY V.I. ALEKSEYEV	SCHOOLS V.N. DERBINOV	POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, MINISTRY OF SEA FLEET ?
LIGHT INDUSTRY ?	LIAISON WITH FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES ? M.A. SUSLOV	POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, MINISTRY OF RIVER FLEET ?
TRANSPORT A.L. DEDOV	COMMISSION FOR TRAVEL ABROAD ?	? SECRET SECTOR ?A.N. POSKREBYSHEV
ADMINISTRATIVE G.P. GROMOV	PLANNING, FINANCE AND TRADE ORGANS N.N. SHATALIN	

Others?
A.G. FEDOROV, B.N. PONOMAREV, P.T. KOMAHOV, D.T. SHEPILOV, A.I. MARFIN, G.V. YENYUTIN, V.Ye. ZINCHENKO
(May head one of the departments listed whose chief is unidentified or may head a department thus far unidentified.)

Full Member, Central Committee, CPSU
Candidate Member, Central Committee, CPSU
Member, Central Auditing Commission, CPSU

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TOP SECRET

THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE

1 JULY 1955

SECRETARIAT

First Secretary
N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

Secretary M.A. SUSLOV	Secretary P.N. POSPELOV

APPARATUS

PARTY ORGANS FOR THE UNION REPUBLICS Ye.I. GROMOV	PARTY ORGANS FOR THE RSFSR ?	SCIENCE AND CULTURE A.M. RUMYANTSEV
AGRICULTURE FOR THE UNION REPUBLICS ?	AGRICULTURE FOR THE RSFSR V.P. MYLARSHCHIKOV	ADMINISTRATIVE TRADE AND FINANCE ORGANS ?
PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION V.S. KRUZHKOV	CONSTRUCTION N.P. DUDOROV	LIAISON WITH FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES ? B.N. PONOMAREV
HEAVY INDUSTRY ?	? TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS ?	COMMISSION FOR TRAVEL ABROAD ?
? CONSUMERS GOODS AND FOOD PRODUCTS INDUSTRY ?M.V. ROMANOV	? MACHINE BUILDING ? I.I. KUZMIN	CHIEF POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE A.S. ZHELTOV
	GENERAL A.N. MALIN	

Full Member, Central Committee, CPSU
Candidate Member, Central Committee, CPSU
Member, Central Auditing Commission, CPSU

80603 4D

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE

1 MARCH 1956



A general restaffing of leading posts was also carried out within the apparatus. The old corps of leading apparatchiks, developed for the most part during the period when Malenkov's influence within the apparatus was especially strong, had been largely replaced with new directing personnel, several of whom had had prior associations with Khrushchev.

In the months preceding the 20th party congress Khrushchev made additional appointments, and a reorganization of several departments and related personnel changes led to a completely new leadership supervising the party's activities in the propaganda, agitation, education, science, and cultural fields. V. M. Churayev, party first secretary for six years in the important Kharkov Oblast in the Ukraine when Khrushchev was Ukrainian party boss, was appointed head of the department of party organs for the RSFSR. To head the agriculture department for the union republics, Khrushchev picked P. Ye. Doroshenko who had risen in the Ukrainian party organization to serve as head of the agriculture department in the Ukrainian party apparatus and then first secretary in Vinnitsa Oblast.

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation was divided, apparently in October or November, into a department "for the union republics" and a department "for the RSFSR" along the lines of the departments of party organs and agriculture, earlier. F. V. Konstantinov, rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the central committee since March 1955, became head of the "union republics" department, and V. P. Moskovsky, until mid-November 1955 editor in chief of the Defense Ministry's newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, was assigned to head the "RSFSR" department. It is not clear whether Konstantinov replaced V. S. Kruzhkov as head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, earlier, in order to carry out the reorganization or came in just as the division took place. In any event, Kruzhkov, whose article in December 1954 was unquestionably on the right side of the light vs. heavy industry controversy, had been replaced by Konstantinov whose corresponding article appeared to be just as unquestionably on the wrong side. (See Caesar I-58, pp. 17-18.) The subsequent disappearance of Kruzhkov, who was last identified on 15 February 1955 as head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, has only served to deepen the mystery.

Sometime during the fall of 1955 the Department of Science and Culture was broken up and A. M. Rumyantsev, who had been its head since its formation in 1953, was named editor in chief of the party's theoretical journal, Kommunist, replacing S. M. Abalin who became editor in chief of the party's organizational

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

journal, Partiynaya Zhizn. Abalin's predecessor on Partiynaya Zhizn is not known. Out of "science and culture" came a Department of Schools, a Department of Culture, and, though not specifically identified, presumably a Department of Science.

N. D. Kazmin was transferred from third secretary of the Leningrad Oblast committee to head the new schools department. His background indicates that he was for a time, at least, a protegé of Malenkov's. He was head of a sector, presumably schools, of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation in January 1949 and was transferred to Leningrad Oblast as third secretary in July 1949 at a time when Malenkov appeared to be engineering the replacement of Zhdanovites in the Leningrad party organization. He remained in the third secretary's post until April 1953 when the assignment of N. G. Ignatov as second secretary moved him down one slot. In November 1953 he regained the third secretary's post in the shake-up, apparently engineered by Khrushchev, which marked the removal of V. M. Andrianov as Leningrad party boss and the end of Malenkov's control of the Leningrad party organization. Khrushchev's interest in and involvement with Leningrad affairs and the subsequent careers of such Leningradites as Kazmin and F. R. Kozlov and the curious career of N. G. Ignatov strongly suggest that the Leningrad party organization fell under Khrushchev's influence and control during 1953 and that a switch in the political allegiance of Kazmin and Kozlov was an important factor in Khrushchev's victory. (See below pp. 50-51.)

The head of the new Department of Culture, D. A. Polikarpov, had had a rather checkered career marked by nearly complete political eclipse from 1946 to 1953. He lost his job as secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers in 1946 in the reorganization of the union which accompanied the campaign for strict doctrinal orthodoxy in literature and the arts, a policy associated with A. A. Zhdanov. In 1953 he emerged from obscurity in the position of Director of the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute, became a secretary in the Moscow City party committee in March 1954 and in December again became a secretary of the writers' union, transferring to the Culture Department job in late 1955. His assignment in the Moscow party organization suggests that Khrushchev had a hand in his rehabilitation.

If as seems logical a Department of Science existed, there is reason to suppose that V. A. Kirillin was its head. Kirillin had been a teacher and deputy director in the Moscow Energetics Institute, named for Molotov. He became USSR deputy minister of higher education in mid-1954 and soon after the State Committee for New Techics (Gostekhnika) was created in May 1955, he was named deputy chairman. He was last identified in this

post in September and was not identified in the central party apparatus until November 1956, as head of the Department of Science, Higher Educational Institutions, and Schools, the result of a reorganization in 1956 involving the departments of culture, schools, and science. His election to the presidium of the 18th Armenian party congress in January 1956 and the fact that he was not elected to the Armenian central committee suggests that he was at the congress as a representative of the central party apparatus and hence may already have been head of some department, most likely a Department of Science.

In early November 1955 the editorship of Literaturnaya Gazeta was transferred from B. S. Ryurikov, who had succeeded K. M. Sinomov in the post in 1953, to V. A. Kochetov. Kochetov had been general secretary of the Leningrad branch of the Union of Soviet Writers; Ryurikov became deputy head of the Department of Culture.

The reason behind these moves is not yet clear. It has not been possible to find in the appointments evidences of controversy over policy but it may be observed that the organizational changes would probably aid in increasing flexibility in the party's operations in these fields, and that the personnel shifts would bring new blood to the solution of problems. What the regime may have intended was to prepare for a fresh approach to solving the dilemma which had plagued it since Stalin's death: how to stimulate creativity and at the same time maintain ideological conformity.

The bid of writers and other creative artists for a relaxation of political controls over the arts which was made in the "thaw" of late 1953 and early 1954 had been rebuffed, but total repression was not revived; and discussion at the second writers' congress in December 1954, though steering clear of the basic issue of political control, frequently called for greater aesthetic latitude and more imaginative approach. The status quo had its defenders but the regime failed to speak and the congress ended on an inconclusive note.

By the end of 1955 no clear, unequivocal line had yet been evolved by the regime. Apparently authoritative articles in Pravda and Literaturnaya Gazeta in November 1955, on the 50th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's work on Bolshevik Literature, strongly affirmed the propagandistic function of Soviet literature and asserted that the militant Zhdanov decrees on culture would remain the basis of party policy for a long time to come. In December, an equally authoritative editorial in Kommunist, republished in the regional press, carried the claims for

aesthetic flexibility further than anything that had appeared in the party press since the end of World War II, but the validity of the Zhdanov decrees was again stressed in January by A. I. Kirichenko at the Ukrainian party congress. There was thus an evident need for clarification of the party line and a suggestion in the Kommunist article, at least, that the regime might be tempted to make limited concessions in order to release the wellsprings of creativity. The emphasis on the Zhdanov decrees, however, served notice that Soviet creative artists must stay within party-defined limits.

The 20th party congress in February would have been an appropriate place for the concessions to be explained and the limits defined. Instead, Khrushchev made it clear that, with an extension of cultural contacts with the West, the party must guard against a relaxation of ideological discipline and the infiltration of "alien" influences. The congress, it is true, stimulated cultural ferment, not as a result of any newly defined policy in the cultural field, but of the iconoclastic destruction of the Stalin myth.

Changes in Republic Leadership

Changes in the leadership in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had the effect of preparing the way for the promotion of two of Khrushchev's protegés to the presidium at the 20th party congress in February. L. I. Brezhnev, the new party first secretary in Kazakhstan, had served as a political officer with the Soviet armed forces during the war--the years 1944-1945 in the Ukraine. He remained in the Ukraine after the war as first secretary of the industrially important Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk Oblasts under the close supervision of Khrushchev, then Ukrainian party boss. In July 1950, shortly after Khrushchev had returned to Moscow as a member of the central party secretariat and as agricultural spokesman for the regime, Brezhnev was appointed first secretary of the Moldavian Republic then plagued with agricultural difficulties. He was elected to the expanded party presidium at the 19th congress as a candidate member and to the party secretariat. Removed after Stalin's death, he returned to military political work directing the political directorate of the navy. In February 1954 he was sent to Kazakhstan as second secretary. P. K. Ponomarenko, a candidate member of the party presidium, was appointed first secretary at the same time.

The first secretary's post in Kazakhstan became vacant, in effect, when Ponomarenko was appointed ambassador to Poland on 7 May 1955 and its duties were performed by Brezhnev. On 6 August, Ponomarenko was officially relieved and Brezhnev named

first secretary. The reason for the delay in replacing Ponomarenko is obscure. In the few months immediately following Malenkov's demotion there were other delays in completing personnel shifts: G. F. Aleksandrov, removed as minister of culture on 10 March, was not replaced until 21 March; the post of ambassador to Poland, vacated by Aleksandrov's replacement, N. A. Mikhaylov, was not filled until, as noted above, 7 May. Aleksandrov, a Malenkov protegé, was an obvious target after his patron's demotion, but the ensuing delay in completing the chain of transfers suggests a complicated political maneuver with Ponomarenko also a victim and Brezhnev a beneficiary.

I. D. Yakovlev was named to assist Brezhnev as second secretary, and even then may have been thought of as heir apparent. He became first secretary in March 1956, Brezhnev having been transferred to Moscow as a member of the central party secretariat and a candidate member of the presidium by the 20th party congress. Yakovlev had had many years of service in the agriculturally important Novosibirsk Oblast, in which a portion of the "new lands" is located, as second secretary, and then, after 1949, as first secretary. He was succeeded in Novosibirsk by B. I. Deryugin, the second secretary, who appears to have had an industrial background.

On 22 December, N. A. Mukhitdinov replaced A. I. Niyazov as first secretary in Uzbekistan, the cotton basket of the USSR. Mukhitdinov had been republic premier. The shift came just a day after Khrushchev and Bulganin, who had stopped off in Tashkent for a republic agricultural conference, on their return from the tour of South-East Asia, had departed for Moscow. Niyazov, Uzbek party boss since 1950, was charged by the republic party plenum with responsibility for shortcomings in the Uzbek cotton industry, for neglecting ideological and cultural work, failure to support the press, persecution of innocent workers, and for serious errors in selection and training of cadres. The circumstances surrounding Mukhitdinov's promotion were reminiscent of those of a year before when he had received promotion as a result of Khrushchev's intervention. On 22 December 1954, Mukhitdinov, then a first deputy premier, was appointed premier of Uzbekistan to succeed Usman Yusupov. The action came following a plenum of the Uzbek central committee. Subsequent press reporting indicated that the criticism Khrushchev had leveled in November against Yusupov at a cotton growing conference in Tashkent had figured heavily in the decision to oust him.

Mukhitdinov has had an almost meteoric rise. An obscure central Asian oblast propaganda secretary in 1948, he became Samarkand Oblast first secretary in 1949, republic secretary for a few months in 1950, Tashkent Oblast first secretary in 1950, and republic premier in 1951. The postwar crisis in cotton

production appears to have given him the opportunity for rapid advancement. In the government reorganizations which took place after Stalin's death, he had relinquished the premier's post to Yusupov, former Uzbek premier and, since 1950, USSR minister of cotton growing. In February 1956 at the age of 38 he became the youngest member (candidate) of the presidium and the first Uzbek elected to such a high party position. S. K. Kamalov, Uzbek third secretary since 1950, was promoted over the head of the perennial second secretary, R. Ye. Melnikov, to succeed Mukhitdinov as premier.

On 16 August the party leadership in the Karelo-Finnish Republic was shaken up. A. N. Yegorov, removed as first secretary, was charged with inefficient leadership of industry, ignoring the principle of collective leadership, and suppressing criticism in party affairs. That Yegorov was held responsible for the backward state of the Karelo-Finnish timber industry seems clear. A joint decree of the CPSU central committee and USSR Council of Ministers, issued on 6 August just 10 days before Yegorov's dismissal, had called attention to the inadequate state of affairs in the Soviet timber industry and outlined measures for its radical improvement. Two months later the plenum of the Karelo-Finnish central committee held a major discussion on the republic's timber industry in which most of the shortcomings noted were charged to inadequate party leadership. Neither P. S. Prokonnen, the republic's premier, nor O. V. Kuusinen, the chairman of the Karelo-Finnish supreme soviet presidium who was to be made a full member of the central party presidium in June 1957 when Khrushchev won his victory over Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, seemed to be affected by the purge, though it would seem that Prokonnen would bear some responsibility for the state of affairs in the Karelo-Finnish Ministry of Timber Industry.

Be that as it may, in the charges against Yegorov there were political overtones which suggested that more was involved than just deficiencies in the timber industry, serious as they may have been. It is not clear whether "ignoring the principle of collective leadership and suppressing criticism in party affairs" was an accurate description of Yegorov's guilt or a euphemism for being on the wrong side in a policy dispute or struggle for power. He does not seem to have had any particular interest in any of the identifiable policy disputes involving the central party leadership, nor is it possible to connect him, politically, with any of the top Soviet leaders. Yegorov's replacement was L. I. Lubennikov, a party worker in Belorussia since the war--most recently first secretary of Minsk Oblast (1953-1955).

Oblast Shake-ups

A series of provincial personnel shifts, many of the musical chairs variety, took place in the latter half of 1955 and at the oblast and kray party conferences in December and January. By the time the process was completed the party bosses in more than a third of the major territorial divisions of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and three oblasts in the Ukraine had been changed. Nine secretaries were simply shifted from one oblast or kray to another; Belyayev and Aristov became CPSU secretaries and Yakovlev became Kazakh party secretary, as noted above; I. T. Grishin was transferred from Stalingrad to Prague and A. A. Yepishev was transferred from Odessa to Bucharest as Soviet ambassadors in those satellite capitals; and A. N. Kidin left Vladimir to work in the party apparatus in Moscow. Kidin apparently suffered a slight loss in party standing but none of the others mentioned lost status.

Fourteen secretaries, however, were not so fortunate; for them the shake-up in provincial leadership meant exclusion from high party circles. While it is clear that the shake-up was carried out in preparation for the 20th party congress, scheduled to meet in February, the exact political motivation is something of a mystery. Only Malenkov protegé N. N. Shatalin, removed from the top post in Primorye Kray, had clearly discernible ties with any of the top leaders (see Caesar I-58 p. 43), although D. G. Smirnov, replaced in Gorky, may have had a political tie with Malenkov stemming from work in the central party apparatus during the war. N. I. Gusarov, however, who was relieved as first secretary in Tula Oblast and subsequently disappeared, may have been a victim of malevolence on Khrushchev's part for reasons not directly connected with current political machinations. In November 1946, Gusarov, temporarily an inspector of the central committee, had presented a report on "Personnel Work in the Ukrainian Party Organization," sharply critical of the Ukrainian central committee bossed by Khrushchev. It is quite likely that the Gusarov report was responsible, in part at least, for the assignment in March 1947 of Kaganovich as Khrushchev's replacement. Khrushchev apparently took the first opportunity to get back at Gusarov. Having repaired the damage done his political career and maneuvered a transfer to Moscow as central party secretary and agricultural spokesman for the regime, he presumably engineered Gusarov's ouster as Belorussian party boss in July 1950 on charges of deficiencies in agricultural work. This was the post Guasrov had received in March 1947 as a reward for his attack on Khrushchev. Gusarov apparently fell into political oblivion until resurrected in December 1953 to replace N. I. Nedosekin--a possible Malenkov protegé--as party first secretary in Tula Oblast. Gusarov's patron at that time is not known.

Whatever may have been the full behind-the-scenes reasons for the personnel shifts in the oblasts (where any criticism was published in connection with them, leadership faults were stressed), Khrushchev did take the opportunity to promote a few of his political supporters. All-in-all, the provincial shake-up provided important jobs for 20 new people, six of whom show evidence of being in Khrushchev's camp: V. S. Markov (appointed Orel Oblast first secretary), M. M. Stakhursky (Khabarovsk Kray), A. I. Kirilenko (Sverdlovsk), L. I. Naydek (Odessa), and V. G. Komyakhov (Crimea) had developed their careers in Khrushchev's political fiefdom, the Ukraine. None of the others had discernible ties with any of the top leaders.

III. THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

The Top Leaders on the Eve of the Congress

As the delegates from all over the Soviet Union to the first post-Stalin party congress were gathering in Moscow, Khrushchev appeared unquestionably the most prominent member of the party presidium. His pre-eminence was reflected by the obvious influence he exercised in personnel appointments, by the adoption and continuation of major policies associated with him, and by the gradually increasing deference accorded him by lesser leaders.* Moreover, there was no evidence of strong opposition to his leadership within the presidium. Bulganin, whom Khrushchev had nominated for premier, seemed content to play a supporting role, and Mikoyan, who apparently "ran the farm" during the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to South Asia, appeared to approve fully of the state of affairs. Kaganovich seemed to have slipped but he had endorsed the policies of the regime, though reluctantly, in his speech at the revolution anniversary celebration on 6 November and still appeared to be a key economic expert. Malenkov's demotion had all but silenced his once powerful voice, and Molotov's declining influence on Soviet foreign policy and his public admission of ideological deviation indicated that his star was waning. The exclusion of both discredited leaders from the party

* For example, Ukrainian party secretary I. D. Nazarenko, at his republic's party congress on 20 January, said that the CPSU was "consolidated around its central committee and its presidium, headed by Comrade Khrushchev," and on 24 January the eighth congress of the Kazakh party elected an honorary presidium consisting of "members of the presidium of the central committee of the CPSU headed by the first secretary of the central committee of the CPSU, comrade N. S. Khrushchev."

presidium at the forthcoming congress appeared well within the realm of possibility and none of the other presidium members seemed to have either the means or inclination to pose a serious challenge to Khrushchev's leadership.

However, Khrushchev's leadership was still expressed "in committee" and there was little indication that he was moving toward a personal dictatorship. The lead article in the February Kommunist, issued just before the congress opened, strongly emphasized the principle of collective leadership, condemned the "cult of personality," and stressed the leading role of the central committee.

Report of the Central Committee - Khrushchev's Speech

In his six-hour central committee report, Khrushchev set the tone for the entire "open" part of the congress. He reaffirmed the correctness of the regime's policies as they had evolved up to that time; he expressed enthusiastic confidence in the strength of the regime, the USSR, and the Communist world; and he showed unequivocal faith in the inevitable triumph of the Communist world over capitalism:

> ...our party is correctly estimating the requirements that have arisen in both domestic and foreign policy and is working out timely measures to meet these requirements. This graphically demonstrates our party's close, indissoluble ties with the people, the wisdom of its Leninist collective leadership and the all-conquering power of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on which the work of the party is based.
>
> The Soviet state is growing and gathering strength. It towers like a powerful lighthouse showing all humanity the road to a new world.... our cause is invincible....the future is ours.

In varying degree most of the other leaders agreed with this unguarded optimism.

The congress had convened, as scheduled, on 14 February 1956 and was dominated by Khrushchev from the very beginning. He opened the congress--in the past some comrade other than the rapporteur of the central committee had been selected for the honor--and a much larger number of his friends and protegés

were elected to the governing bodies of the congress than those of the other leaders. In his opening remarks Khrushchev noted the death of Stalin, but unlike Molotov's warm eulogy of dead Soviet leaders Shcherbakov, Kalinin, and Zhdanov in opening the 19th congress, Khrushchev's statement was cold and abrupt:

> In the period between the 19th and 20th congresses, we have lost outstanding leaders of the communist movement--Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Klement Gottwald and Kyuchi Tokuda. I ask everyone to honor their memory by standing.

The slight to Stalin in such faint praise was unmistakable and was in sharp contrast to the publicity accorded him in December when his birthday was observed with unusual press and radio treatment equaling that attending his 75th birthday in 1954. Khrushchev thus took the lead in a new assault on the Stalin symbol.

Khrushchev took great pains in his central committee report to make clear that collective leadership was a basic party principle and that its practice was a major reason for the party's victories and the correctness of its policies. The main burden of his discussion of these points was to demonstrate that the Stalinist system was a thing of the past:

> It was necessary to restore the norms of party life worked out by Lenin, which had often been violated in the past. It was of cardinal importance to restore and strengthen in every way Lenin's principle of collective leadership.

He described the collective as a "businesslike group of leaders whose relations are based on a foundation of principled ideas which permit neither mutual forgiveness nor personal antagonism." While this formulation was probably intended to remove the onus of power struggle from the demotion of Malenkov and discrediting of Molotov, it could also be read as a warning against further opposition to Khrushchev's policies. It was clear that Khrushchev considered himself the true successor to the leader's mantle. But it was also clear that he wanted everyone to understand that it was his intention to exercise that leadership in a different way than had Stalin.

Judging from his speech, there was no doubt at all in Khrushchev's mind that the economic policies being followed by the regime, particularly those most closely associated with his

name--the "New Lands" and corn programs in agriculture, and emphasis on the priority of heavy industry in the industrial sector--were correct and that they had already proven themselves:

> From the results of our work in planting virgin lands, one can draw the indisputable conclusion that the party line of cultivating the new lands is correct....Did the party central committee make a mistake in recommending (corn), successfully grown in the south, for the entire Soviet Union? No, comrades, it was not a mistake...(the priority development of heavy industry) is the general line of our party--a line tried and tested by the whole development of the Soviet state and corresponding to the vital interests of the people.

In parts of his discussion, however, he seemed a bit overly defensive and this suggested that some criticism of these policies still continued. Mikoyan, for example, may have been more pessimistic concerning the value of the new lands program than suited Khrushchev. In a speech on 8 November 1956, on the occasion of awarding an Order of Lenin to the Komsomol, Khrushchev revealed that Mikoyan had earlier disagreed with him on the amount of grain that would be produced in Kazakhstan in 1956.* But whatever reservations Khrushchev's presidium colleagues may have had, they were careful not to air them to the congress.

Khrushchev's speech, however, was more than an optimistic reaffirmation of policies that were already in effect. He also introduced modifications which, though generally consistent with the main objectives of the post-Stalin leadership, were of a magnitude sufficient to inaugurate a new phase in the regime's pursuit of its goals. Not only was the studied slight to Stalin in his opening remarks carried over into his major speech, but he undertook the task of making revisions in Communist dogma. The motivations for both the downgrading of Stalin and the modificationsof ideology were essentially the same--to free the

* "When I told (Mikoyan) that Kazakhstan would produce a billion poods of grain in 1956, he didn't say a word. I said to him: 'Why are you silent?' He replied: 'I'm not arguing, but I don't quite see a billion. Maybe 750,000,000 instead of the 650,000,000 under the plan, but a billion?'"

regime of the more repugnant and counterproductive aspects of Stalinism--to erase the stultifying effects of terror from the domestic scene, to make the Soviet system more appealing politically, and to secure allies and a dominant place in world affairs.

Khrushchev linked the repudiation of Lenin's dogma that war between capitalist and communist states was "fatalistically inevitable" to the Soviet Union's "peaceful coexistence" campaign:

> When we say that the socialist system will win in the competition between the two systems--the capitalist and the socialist--this by no means signifies that its victory will be achieved through armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of capitalist countries... war is not a fatalistic inevitability.

Khrushchev's other major doctrinal revision--the assertion that Communists might win political power in capitalist countries through peaceful parliamentary means--was also part of the cloak of "peace and sweet reasonableness" with which the Soviet leaders were seeking to clothe their pursuit of international objectives. Neither change seemed immediately dangerous to the regime but doctrinal revisions are always risky and not lightly undertaken. Khrushchev's willingness to inaugurate these changes, and thereby associate his name with them (particularly in revising a Leninist precept) is further indication of the confidence with which he viewed his strength within the leadership and the ability of the regime to surmount difficulties that might arise.

De-Stalinization--Mikoyan's Assault and Khrushchev's Secret Speech

Judging from the speeches at the congress Mikoyan was the only Soviet leader who seemed to consider himself anything like on a par with Khrushchev.* His range of subjects was nearly as great as Khrushchev's; his language and means of expression were harder hitting; and on a number of points he went farther than Khrushchev in dotting the i's and crossing the t's of regime policy. There was in none of this, however, any sign of serious disagreement with Khrushchev. If the two did not see completely eye to eye, their differences were over how strong and clear policies should be stated rather than over the substance of those policies.

* Assuming, of course, that each of the speakers at the congress was relatively free to fashion his speech as he saw fit.

In one respect this possible difference had serious repercussions. Khrushchev had chosen to damn Stalin with faint praise and vague references to "norms of party life worked out by Lenin, which had often been violated in the past" and to restore "Lenin's principle of collective leadership." Mikoyan chose to assault the dead dictator more directly. On the first occasion of a Soviet leader's taking issue with Stalin by name, he said:

> Stalin's well-known pronouncement in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" to the effect that after the world market had been split up "the volume of production in (the USA, Britain and France) will contract" can hardly help us...and is hardly correct.

Mikoyan, moreover, made clear reference to Stalin's errors in leadership. "For about 20 years we had in fact no collective leadership...and this could not fail to have an extremely negative effect," and he topped his irreverent treatment with a sarcastic reference to Stalin's "We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin" funeral speech in 1924:

> How Lenin would rejoice if, after 32 years he could see...that we not only swear by Lenin's name but are exerting all our efforts to put Lenin's ideas into practice.

None of the other leaders mentioned Stalin, although they were in general agreement in condemning the "cult of personality" and deploring the arbitrary rule of the previous period. The decision to downgrade Stalin was presumably taken by the entire leadership, however, it being doubtful that Khrushchev and Mikoyan, despite their obvious self-confidence, would have taken the momentous step on their own. Moreover, there were signs that some such decision had been reached before the congress met. The Stalin symbol had been used in routine fashion throughout January; his name was invoked frequently, as a matter of course, in the press and on the radio, and in speeches at the republican party congresses in the latter half of the month. On 4 February, however, a change appeared when Voroshilov was greeted on his 75th birthday as "Lenin's faithful pupil" without reference to Stalin.* Soviet newspapers ignored Stalin in their editorials leading up to the congress, and Pravda's 14 February issue appeared with a half-page portrait honoring Lenin but no picture and no mention of Stalin.

* As recently as 25 November 1955, on the occasion of Mikoyan's 60th birthday, the usual phrase of "Lenin's faithful pupil and Stalin's comrade-in-arms" was still being used in such greetings.

The decision that had thus been made was certainly to de-Stalinize; whether it also included the denigration of Stalin's name may be open to some question. There was no hint in the published speeches, even in Mikoyan's disrespectful criticisms, of a decision to charge Stalin with mass murder, megalomania, and military incompetence. When, then, was the decision for Khrushchev's secret speech made and what lay behind that decision?

It is conceivable that the collective had not planned to carry the public attack on Stalin beyond Mikoyan's irreverent statements, but that it expected to give a fuller explanation to the congress delegates as an aid to them in guiding the de-Stalinization campaign in their respective bailiwicks. The documentation in Khrushchev's secret speech and the way in which its points dovetail with and support general Soviet policy and theoretical statements suggest that it was not a spur-of-the-moment creation. However, if the secret speech had been planned in advance as one step in the timetable of de-Stalinization, it is difficult to understand why it was not given earlier in the congress when it had become apparent that a new policy in regard to Stalin was being inaugurated--if not following Khrushchev's speech, then immediately following Mikoyan's. Moreover, in view of the facilities available in the party secretariat and its apparatus and in the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute it would appear that the secret speech could have been prepared in two or three days. There is, therefore, some reason to suppose that, though an anti-Stalin campaign had been planned before the congress, Khrushchev's secret speech had not.

There has been some speculation that Khrushchev decided to blast Stalin after he had witnessed a very favorable response of the congress delegates to Mikoyan's more extreme statements.*

* Some publicists (e.g. Myron Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev, Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, ©1958, pp. 52-53) have taken the view that Mikoyan's incidental reference in the course of his discussion on the need for a revision of history to Kossior, Khrushchev's predecessor in the Ukraine, was an attack on Khrushchev. Such an argument appears to be poorly conceived for it assumes either that Khrushchev was directly responsible for Kossior's purge and that such a fact was generally known by at least high party people; or, as Rush asserts, that Khrushchev profited so greatly from Kossior's downfall that the mere mention of Kossior's name conjured up visions of Khrushchev as a terroristic tyrant. There is no evidence to support the first premise; even Rush is constrained to throw Khrushchev's responsibility for the purge of Kossior into question. As for Rush's own argument, the Ukrainian party post, hundreds of miles from Moscow, was not likely to appear such a political plum for the party boss of the combined Moscow oblast and city party organizations, Khrushchev's job before the transfer to Kiev, as to give Mikoyan's remark in February 1956 the meaning Rush alleges it had.

Khrushchev, with his penchant for monopolizing the initiative and the public spotlight, it is argued, was piqued by the success of Mikoyan's approach and decided to do him one better with an all-out cataloging of Stalin's sins. It is true that Mikoyan's speech, according to the published versions, was more frequently interrupted by applause than that of any other leader and that the parenthetical notations at the end indicated audience response exceeded only by Khrushchev's and Bulganin's speeches, but it may be questioned whether Khrushchev would be apt to react so childishly in such a potentially serious matter. While undoubtedly underestimating the effect his speech would have, he must certainly have been aware that the exposition of Stalin's crimes would jolt the faithful and create confusion and consternation throughout the Communist world, and hence was a decision not lightly made. The reception given Mikoyan's speech would hardly seem so dangerous to Khrushchev's position or damaging to his ego to warrant his taking the risk of a unilateral decision on the conduct of the anti-Stalin campaign. Moreover, if Khrushchev were seeking to undercut Mikoyan, it is curious that he not only treated him respectfully in the speech but in fact credited him with standing up to Stalin:

> On one occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with members of the politburo, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted. You should have seen Stalin's fury....

Mikoyan was the only top leader, other than Khrushchev himself, and Marshal Zhukov, made a candidate member of the presidium two days later, to emerge from the speech with creditable virtues in his relations with Stalin. Most were treated as passive actors in a bad drama; Malenkov, however, was specially treated as Stalin's spokesman.

Thus it was most likely a collective decision in response to pressures generated at the congress that Khrushchev delivered his speech in denigration of Stalin. Several reports from Western Communist sources agree generally with this interpretation. According to these sources, some of whom were at the congress (but excluded from the secret speech session) and others who allegedly received their information from central committee members, the delegates to the congress, surprised by the open criticisms of Stalin in Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's speeches and not satisfied with their explanations, either insisted that

the Soviet leaders justify the attack; or the Soviet leaders, seeing the confusion created by the speeches at the congress, decided to give a fuller exposé of what transpired under Stalin's rule. Two of the reports suggest that rehabilitation prior to the congress of a number of individuals purged by Stalin played a role in creating confusion and questioning among the delegates. On the face of it, this is more apt to have been the delegate's reaction than the spontaneously enthusiastic support for a sharp attack on Stalin suggested by the applause notations in the published versions of Mikoyan's speech.

Political Miscellany--The Speeches of Bulganin, Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Malenkov, and Molotov

If range of subjects covered, doctrinal innovations introduced, or important policies inaugurated in congress speeches are measures of personal influence in the presidium, then it would appear that Bulganin was a less important figure than Mikoyan. Bulganin delivered the report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960); as chairman of the Council of Ministers it was his responsibility and he did an adequate, if uninspired, job of it, but the report was largely a restatement of well-known economic themes and a rather heavy, unimaginative presentation of the directives for the new plan. There were virtually no indications of individuality; only once did he venture to introduce a change in theory--discarding the traditional Soviet economic doctrine that "obsolescence of machines is a phenomenon inherent in the capitalist economy alone, and that in the socialist economy the development of technology does not give rise to obsolescence," and castigating "some" Soviet economists for holding that view.

The speeches of Kaganovich and Pervukhin cast some additional light on their respective positions and degree of influence which reinforced the view that Kaganovich had slipped and that Pervukhin had inherited at least some of Kaganovich's former sphere of responsibility.

Kaganovich's speech contained a rather superficial discussion abounding with Stalinist phrases and formulations of problems and policies in what were apparently his primary fields of responsibility--transportation, labor, and wages. The Stalinist usages could have been simply an unconscious use of language that came most easily to him; but that he still held to his previous conservative bent of mind was clear in the obvious reservations with which he endorsed the new doctrines enunciated at the congress. He declared, for example, that struggle against the cult of the individual was "not an easy question," and in

agreeing with Khrushchev that theory should not be divorced from practice, he emphasized the value of theory whereas Khrushchev had been emphasizing the value of practice.

Judging from Pervukhin's preoccupation with the heavy industry sector of the Soviet economy in his speech to the congress he had most likely succeeded to Kaganovich's former responsibility of supervising the heavy industry complex, and this would bring with it at least some increase in his influence on Soviet industrial policy. There was nothing in his speech, however, to suggest that he disagreed with any of the economic policies enunciated by Khrushchev or with the Five-Year Plan directives presented by Bulganin. That he was in general agreement with regime policies is virtually certain in view of his rising stature as an industrial administrator.

Malenkov's speech was apparently intended to convey a message of complete capitulation to Khrushchev's leadership and willingness to serve as a junior member of the presidium. The bulk of his speech was devoted to the electric power industry, which was his field of direct administrative responsibility, but he reserved substantial space for indicating his complete agreement with major regime policies and making generous, almost sycophantic references to Khrushchev:

> Comrade N. S. Khrushchev summed up in the central committee's report the great constructive work the Soviet people have carried out...Comrade N. S. Khrushchev was fully justified in noting in his report that in the period under review the party central committee's leadership was at the necessary high level...it is essential to draw attention again and again to the important thesis put forward by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev in his report as justification for the assertion that war is not inevitable...we want to hope, as Comrade N. S. Khrushchev said, that our peaceful aspirations will be more correctly appraised in the USA.

Molotov, too, made generous references to Khrushchev and, in contrast to the dogged conservatism and inflexibility he had earlier exhibited in the foreign relations field, he appeared to accept the fact that conditions had changed and that the policies and tactics of Stalin's day were not appropriate in the atomic age:

> We still suffer frequently from an underestimation of the new possibilities which have opened up before us in the postwar period. This shortcoming has also appeared in the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was pointed out in good time by our party central committee....We must stop underestimating the enormous opportunities we possess for defending peace and the security of peoples.

This was the extent of Molotov's self-criticism but his speech was sprinkled with phrases and formulations that had appeared in the lead editorial of Kommunist Number 14 in September, indicating that he had been impressed with the editorial's message, and he was careful to approve the Austrian peace treaty and the rapprochement with Tito and to refer several times to the USSR as a socialist state.

IV. THE NEW LEADING PARTY ORGANS

Continuity and Change in the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission

In the three years and four months which lay between the 19th party congress in October 1952 and the 20th congress in February 1956, a large number of shifts in personnel assignments affecting high level party and government officials (members of the central party organs--central committee and central auditing commission--elected in October 1952) took place. By the time of the 20th congress, just under 100 of the 273 members of the central party organs* had lost the party and government posts which presumably entitled them to central organs status. Some, of course, were dead. Whether

* In the analysis that follows, both full and candidate members of the central committee and members of the central auditing commission are lumped together despite the fact that they represent three different protocol and prestige levels. This is justified on the grounds that the only known time (June 1957) when any of these groups was called on to exercise real power of decision, the combined membership participated.

the others had been formally replaced on the central committee or auditing commission is not known--the promotions from candidate to full member of the central committee of N. N. Shatalin

Central Party Organs, 1952-1956, Continuity and Change

	1952	1956
Members in 1952 dropped in 1956	97	
Members in 1952 re-elected in 1956	176	176
New in 1956		142
	273	318

in March 1953 and G. K. Zhukov in July 1953 are the only changes in the composition of those bodies mentioned in Soviet sources. But whether formally replaced or not, it is virtually certain that they were no longer functioning as members of the central party bodies.

It would appear that the men and women selected to replace the purged and demoted as government officials and republic and oblast secretaries and the like had, by virtue of their assignments, achieved the central party status once enjoyed by their predecessors. If this did not involve formal election to the central committee and auditing commission at the time, it may well have carried the right of informal participation and, if the new appointees successfully retained their jobs, should have assured election to the central party organs at the 20th party congress.

The congress elected the new central committee and auditing commission presumably at the closed session on the night of 24-25 February at which Khrushchev delivered his secret speech. Available information provides few clues to the method of election other than the statement in the official stenographic report of the congress that the members of the central bodies were elected by the "delegates with deciding vote" by secret ballot. In view of past practice it may be assumed that the delegates were simply called on to approve a slate previously prepared by the Soviet leaders. This was the method used by the congress in "electing" its presidium, secretariat, credentials commission, etc., and it is the method used by each new convocation of the Supreme Soviet in "electing" its Presidium and the Council of Ministers. However, the belated inclusion of L. A. Govorov on the central committee in 1952--"A check has shown that Comrade L. A. Govorov actually was elected a candidate member of the central committee," said the announcement in Pravda, signed by the central committee secretariat--if taken at face value, would suggest that the

delegates voted on each name individually, and that there were more names considered than the actual number elected. The 15-day delay in "discovering" the error which had kept Govorov off the central committee was surely excessive, however, and makes it difficult to accept the Pravda notice at face value. Moreover, there is little evidence of serious competition for delegate votes either before or at the congress. The new central party organs, then, were most likely preselected by the party presidium, which had to decide on the size of the central committee and auditing commission and make the final selection of names.

Actually, the composition of the new central bodies was already pretty well established, the more important party and state jobs apparently carrying with them a slot on the central committee or auditing commission. Perhaps as much as 80 percent of the composition of these bodies was determined in this way, though in some cases the question of whether the slot was a full or candidate member of the central committee or, at the third level of importance, the central auditing commission, probably depended on a separate decision of the party presidium. The other 20 percent, the slots for about two thirds of which were created by the decision to expand the central party bodies, were probably the subject of negotiation among the top leaders at or shortly before the congress.

The new central party bodies should, therefore, reflect the political relationships established earlier as a result of Khrushchev's rise. In this connection, the single most remarkable feature of the new central committee and auditing commission is the degree to which their membership was carried over from the bodies elected at the 19th party congress in October 1952. Sixty-five percent of the membership of the 1952 central party organs was carried over in 1956, with 70 percent of the more important full (voting) members of the central committee being retained. These percentages are larger than at any time

Members of Central Party Organs Re-elected at Party Congresses As a Percentage of the Members Elected at the Preceding Congress

Congress	Preceding Congress	Re-elected
15th (1927)	14th (1925)	83%
16th (1930)	15th (1927)	83%
17th (1934)	16th (1930)	68%
18th (1939)	17th (1934)	16%
19th (1952)	18th (1939)	37%
20th (1956)	19th (1952)	65%

since the 17th party congress in 1934 when 68 percent of the membership of the 1930 central committee and central auditing commission was carried over.

There is no measure of "normal" turnover available so it is difficult to evaluate the full significance of this degree of continuity with the 1952 central organs."* It may be noted, however, that the rate of attrition between 1952 and 1956 on a per month basis was exceeded in the last 30 years only by the period of the great purges (1934-1939). Rate of attrition may, therefore, be a better indicator of the significance of high-level personnel actions in the political maneuvering following

Rate of Attrition in the Membership of the Central Party Organs Between Succeeding Party Congresses

Congresses	Members of the Central Party Organs Not Re-elected	Number of Months Between Congresses	Rate of Attrition
14th(1925)-15th(1927)	19	24	.70 per month
15th(1927)-16th(1930)	22	31	.55 " "
16th(1930)-17th(1934)	48	43	.74 " "
17th(1934)-18th(1939)	136	61	1.39 " "
18th(1939)-19th(1952)	120	163	.39 " "
19th(1952)-20th(1956)	97	40	.89 " "

Stalin's death. Even so, the conclusion seems inescapable that remarkably few of the politically more important individuals in the Soviet Union in October 1952 were purged or seriously downgraded as a result of the death of Stalin, the arrest and execution of the number two man in the post-Stalin collective leadership, the disgrace and demotion of the number one man, the censure and public humiliation of the number three man, and the rise of Khrushchev from the fifth-ranking position in March 1953 to that of unchallenged "first among equals" in February 1956. That such cataclysmic changes in the Soviet top party leadership could occur in such a short period of time without a greater turnover in the secondary leadership is a real tribute to Khrushchev's political finesse, and it brings into question the commonly accepted view that he "packed" the central committee with his supporters.**

* Some basis of comparison between Stalin's last years and the period between the 19th and 20th party congresses in rate of turnover is afforded by the republic central committees. An average of forty-five percent of the membership of the republic party bodies elected at the republic congresses in late 1948 and early 1949 was carried over in the 1952 republic bodies as compared with fifty-two percent of the 1952 bodies re-elected in 1956.

** Cf., for example, Merle Fainsod: "The Party in the Post-Stalin Era," Problems of Communism, Vol. VII, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1958, pp. 7-13, p.8.

About a third of the new members of the central party bodies elected in February 1956 received the job assignments that conferred central organs status on them before the June plenum 1954. During most of this period, group rule appeared to be a reality and this no doubt entailed some compromise and diffusion of

Number of New Members of Central Party Organs Elected in 1956 Who Received Job Assignments That Conferred Central Organs Status On Them in Periods Indicated

Period	Number
19th Party Congress (October 1952) to June Plenum (1954)	47
June Plenum (1954) to July Plenum (1955)	14
July Plenum (1955) to 20th Party Congress (February 1956)	39
Added at the Congress	42*
Total	142

* There were actually 45 more positions but three are accounted for by a previous multiplication of jobs probably carrying a slot on the central party organs.

influence among the top leaders on personnel assignments. (See above pp. 23-24) Khrushchev, it is true, was more successful than any of the other members of the collective leadership in getting his friends and protegés placed in strategic posts, but this was only a relative advantage. Only 11, possibly as many as 15, of the new appointees appeared to be in his interest, two suggested Mikoyan's influence, and one may have been supported by Kaganovich. The other appointments, perhaps as many as 50, are difficult to ascribe to the influence of any one of the top leaders and they may best be thought of as compromise or neutral in nature.

In the next year--the period between the June plenum 1954 and the July plenum 1955--there was a sharp drop in the number of assignments of new personnel to jobs conferring central organs status. Khrushchev apparently profited from three of 14 such appointments, Kaganovich may have been instrumental in two, and Mikoyan in one. The other eight appear to have been neutral or compromise candidates. The fact that so few personnel shifts affecting central organs status were made in the seven months preceding and five months succeeding Malenkov's demotion underlines the view expressed above (p. 22) that Khrushchev relied more on personal influence than on "packing" party bodies with his protegés. Even in the seven-month period immediately preceding the 20th party congress, when he was clearly the dominant member of the presidium and when an increasing number of

personnel assignments show his hand, less than half of the new appointees seem to have had prior political connections with him, and the same is true concerning those whose appointment to the central committee or auditing commission was made possible by the decision to enlarge those party bodies. In all, only about a third of the new members of the central committee or auditing commission had discernible ties with Khrushchev--hardly evidence of "packing" in the usual sense of the term.

Khrushchev's Strength in Central Party Bodies

It may be assumed that any individual coming from the Ukrainian party organization is pretty apt to be favorably disposed toward Khrushchev. This assumption would probably hold whether he had actually been a high-level official in the Ukrainian organization during the time when Khrushchev was party boss--January 1938 to December 1949 (except for a few months in 1947)--or had developed later under L. G. Melnikov and A. I. Kirichenko, since Khrushchev's successors in the Ukraine probably acted as his political stewards. Moreover, the Ukraine has certainly profited from Khrushchev's rise. Its territorial jurisdiction was increased by the transfer of the Crimea from the Russian Republic, and the 400th anniversary of its union with Russia was celebrated with great fanfare, and in a more practical vein, many of the officials developed in its party organization and government service have been transferred to more important jobs elsewhere.

During Khrushchev's three years as Moscow oblast party boss he presumably developed another group of officials on whom he could depend, but there is somewhat less certainty in placing Moscow officials in his camp than those whose careers were developed in the Ukraine. The fact that all the top leaders worked in Moscow and had a vital interest in the party organization of the area makes it rather difficult to distinguish their respective spheres of influence.

Khrushchev's rather obvious interest in Leningrad and the "Leningrad Case" and the subsequent careers of some of the men associated with the changes in leadership in the oblast and city in 1953 suggest that the Leningrad party organization (the third largest in the USSR, after the Ukraine and Moscow) had come under his control by late 1953. On Stalin's death, it was announced that N. G. Ignatov, a secretary and candidate member of the short-lived enlarged presidium elected in October 1952, would be "transferred to a leading post in the USSR Council of Ministers." He was never identified there; instead, he was elected on 1 April 1953 as first secretary in Leningrad city

and second secretary in Leningrad Oblast. During the ensuing months he seemed to supersede Malenkov's protegé V. M. Andrianov, the oblast first secretary, in party activities in the area. In late November at a joint plenum of the oblast and city party committees supervised by Khrushchev, Andrianov was removed under fire and replaced by F. R. Kozlov, the former second secretary who had given way to Ignatov in April. Ignatov, his Leningrad assignment apparently successfully completed, was "transferred to duties in the central committee apparatus" and replaced by I. K. Zamchevsky as city party boss.

The election of Kozlov and Ignatov to the party presidium in 1957 appears in part at least to have been a reward for loyal service and suggests that Ignatov may have been despatched to Leningrad by Khrushchev to undermine Malenkov's authority and that Kozlov used his influence to put the Leningrad organization in Khrushchev's camp.

For the most part, however, Khrushchev's rise in influence and power developed primarily, it would appear, from his ability to impress others with the rightness of his views and to overpower them with his inexhaustible energy, dynamism, and powers of persuasion. Voroshilov, apparently impressed, emphasized these traits when he nominated Khrushchev for premier in March 1958:

> With tireless energy...Khrushchev...has faithfully served...the cause of socialism and communism.... In all this great creative work...an outstanding role has been played by our dear comrade Nikita Khrushchev - by his unfailing creative talent and truly unending and inexhaustible energy and initiative. (Italics added)

Of all Stalin's lieutenants, Khrushchev had most clearly exhibited the characteristics of the leader personality.

These personality characteristics and his dynamic policies, particularly his efforts to invigorate the party, undoubtedly impressed others. The maneuver which secured for him the title of first secretary in September 1953 gave him an important psychological advantage. Not only could he match his "first" against Malenkov's first in presidium listings, but, for party officials at least, Khrushchev probably suggested the more traditional seat of authority. When alphabetic listing of presidium members was instituted in mid-1954, Malenkov's principal symbol of leadership was destroyed. Furthermore there apparently was an almost complete absense of

countermoves on the part of his opponents. With each demonstration of Khrushchev's influence, authority, and capability, more and more members of the central committee and auditing commission and even a few of the presidium probably began to follow his leadership so that by the time the 20th party congress rolled around, Khrushchev could probably count as his adherents a good many more than is suggested on the basis of past associations. Unfortunately there is very little information available which will serve to indicate which members of the new central party organs had earlier jumped on Khrushchev's band wagon, and virtually none at all to indicate the degree of their loyalty. Moreover, the mere fact of some past association or other evidence of a patron-protegé relationship is no reliable guide to loyalty or continued reliability, as is clear, for example, in the case of Shepilov "who joined them."

For these reasons any listing of Khrushchev adherents, as opposed to those of Mikoyan, Suslov, Bulganin, Molotov, Malenkov, or other top leaders, except for a fairly small number of cases where the evidence for continued close association and loyalty is especially strong, is apt to be more misleading than enlightening. Whatever may have been the individual (personal) reasons--loyalty from past associations or favors granted, fear and intimidation, bureaucratic careermindedness, or genuine belief in the value of Khrushchev's leadership--when the showdown came in June 1957, the combined central committee and auditing commission voted in favor of Khrushchev and against what was reportedly a majority of the presidium. If the figures given by F. R. Kozlov in a speech in Leningrad following the ouster of the "antiparty group" can be taken at face value, nearly 70 percent of the members of the central party organs signed up for Khrushchev before the plenum had got fairly under way.

Occupational Representation

The proportion of party officials and government administrators on the new central party organs was approximately the same as in 1952 but among the government representatives there was a shift from the police and military to other functionaries. However, several of the party officials elected to the central committee and auditing commission in 1952 had transferred to work on the government side of things during the three years and four months between the congresses, and a number of the government representatives that were new to the central party organs in 1956 had recently been transferred from party to government work.

Central Party Organs, 1952-1956
By Major Occupational Categories

		1952		1956
Party officials		144		158
Government officials		131		148
of which:	military	28	21	
	police	10	4	
	diplomatic	9	17	
	other	60	65	
Miscellaneous		17		23
	Total	292*		329**

*Includes: 16 listed in both Party and Government categories
2 " " " " " Miscellaneous "
1 " " " Government and Miscellaneous "

**Includes: 9 listed in both Party and Government categories
1 " " " " " Miscellaneous "
1 " " " Government and Miscellaneous "

This infiltration of party functionaries into the government administration is a reflection of Khrushchev's campaign to reinvigorate the party and reassert its primacy in fact as well as in theory, but there is little evidence of any attempt to replace the engineer-administrator with the party man. The proportion of engineer-administrators in the central party bodies in 1956 was about the same as in 1952 and these were divided approximately 60 percent re-elected and 40 percent new. There is a hint in Khrushchev's congress report, however, that he may have been somewhat dissatisfied with this reliance on technicians. Castigating party leaders for considering "party work one thing and economic and state work another," he insisted that party officials should study technology, agronomy, and production.

The reduction in police representation from ten to four was in line with the reduced political role of the police in the post-Stalin period, and tended to show that the promotion in August 1955 of KGB chief I. A. Serov to the rank of Army General and Khrushchev's remarks to the congress cautioning against showing distrust of workers of the state security agencies, did not portend any resurgence of police power. The replacement of police careerist S. N. Kruglov as MVD head by party apparatchik N. P. Dudorov in January also seemed in line with the policy of maintaining strict party control over the police. However, this brought both police agencies, KGB and MVD, under the administrative direction of men indebted to Khrushchev for their career development, further strengthening the first secretary's control of the instruments of political power.

The cut in total military representation from 28 to 21 is a bit puzzling in view of the post-Stalin policy of increasing the prestige of the military and, in general, repairing the slights and other evidences of distrust which characterized Stalin's treatment of them. However, the effect of the cut was somewhat offset by a net gain of two professional soldiers among the full members of the central committee and the election of Zhukov as a candidate member of the party presidium where he was probably able to exercise increased personal influence on military policy.

The greatest cut was in the naval representation, from five in 1952 to one in 1956. To a certain extent this reflects the new Soviet estimate of the relative value of the navy in modern warfare, but a more immediate reason for the cut may be seen in the sinking of the battleship Novorossiysk in October 1955 with great loss of life after striking a mine in the Black Sea near Sevastopol. An investigation of the naval forces by Defense Minister Zhukov following the incident uncovered serious deficiencies in combat and political training and confirmed the fact that discipline was poor. According to one report, the party central committee issued a letter to all party and Komsomol members of the armed forces condemning the extremely poor state of discipline in naval units and stating that Admiral Kuznetsov had been relieved as commander in chief of the naval forces, reduced one rank, and retired, and that the commander of the Black Sea Fleet had been removed from his post and reduced one rank. Other naval officers were also disciplined.

The heads of the political directorates of both the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Navy were on the central committee in 1952, but there were no representatives from the Chief Political Directorate of the combined Ministry of Defense in 1956, despite the fact that A. S. Zheltov, head of the directorate, was a wartime collaborator on the Stalingrad military council with Khrushchev. This would seem to have been a sop to Zhukov and the professional soldiers who resented the interference of political officers in military affairs.

There were 12 ambassadors on the new central party organs, nine more than in 1952. A large number of these were former party careerists turned diplomat since Stalin's death and assigned to posts within the Sino-Soviet bloc. The total increase in diplomatic representation from nine to 17, however, probably reflects the change in emphasis in foreign relations from intransigent obstructionism to active diplomacy.

Stalin's successors, becoming increasingly aware of the stultifying effects of extreme centralization, sought to ameliorate the situation by some decentralization of decision-making and encouragement of greater initiative at lower levels in the administrative chain of command. This policy found expression

Central Party Organs, 1952-1956,
By Administrative Level of Major Occupation

		1952	1956
Central Officials		152	152
of which:	Party	47	41
	Government	107	107
	Miscellaneous	15	14
		169[a]	162[d]
Republic Officials		42	57
of which:	Party	20	22
	Government	21	35
	Miscellaneous	2	1
		43[b]	58[e]
Lower Level Officials		79	109
of which:	Party	77	95
	Government	3	6
	Miscellaneous	0	8
		80[c]	109
	Total	273	318

[a]Includes: 15 listed in both Party and Government categories
2 " " " " " Miscellaneous "
[b]Includes: 1 " " " Government and " "
[c]Includes: 1 " " " Party and Government "
[d]Includes: 9 " " " " " " "
1 " " " " " Miscellaneous "
[e]Includes: 1 " " " Government and " "

in the representation on the new central committee and auditing commission of more republic and lower level officials than was the case in 1952. The increase in numbers of these officials coincides with the increase in size of the central party bodies, suggesting that the addition of these officials was one reason, at least, for the expansion. Most of those thus added were party officials, but the presence of two industrial enterprise directors, three industrial workers, and two kolkhoz chairman helped

to inflate the political prestige of production work in line with Khrushchev's complaint to the congress that "a substantial proportion of Communists are engaged in work not directly connected with the decisive sectors of production."

The Party Presidium

On 27 February the 133 full (voting) members of the central committee met in plenary session and "elected" the party presidium, which, according to the party rules, "directs the work of the central committee between plenary sessions" and the secretariat, which "directs current work, chiefly as concerns verification of the fulfillment of party decisions and selection of cadres." They also organized the party control committee, a sort of investigative agency and trials board on questions of party discipline, and the Russian Republic bureau, called for by Khrushchev in his central committee speech.

All full members of the presidium were re-elected. In view of the evidences of Khrushchev's primacy in the presidium and the very strong position he occupied in the central committee, Malenkov and Molotov, and possibly Kaganovich, would seem to have been retained at his sufferance. He may have become so confident of his ability to deal with these men and any threat that they might pose to his power or program that he saw little to be gained at the time by further actions against them. On the contrary, there would probably be some adverse reactions. Malenkov still enjoyed considerable popularity among the populace for his championing of consumer goods production, and Molotov was widely respected as an old Bolshevik who had given years of valuable service to the party and state. Moreover, the ouster of any of the top leaders, even though their shields were somewhat tarnished, would almost certainly have raised the specter of mass purges and arrests and gone a long way toward destroying rising public confidence in the sincerity of the regime's disavowal of organized repression and its intention to maintain "socialist legality" as a basic cornerstone of post-Stalin policy.

Khrushchev, too, may have been reluctant to part with the knowledge and experience these men could contribute to policy formulation. Conservation of scarce leadership talent and experience, though the individuals embodying them might be somewhat unreliable from a strictly political point of view, was one of the important departures of the new regime from Stalin's methods of rule and a policy with which Khrushchev appears to have agreed. It has already been noted that in the period between the 19th and 20th congresses the secondary leadership in



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the USSR was remarkably stable despite the somewhat radical changes at the top. Moreover, of those who for one reason or another were excluded from the central party organs, over half have been assigned to other responsible work.

There is, of course, the possibility that Khrushchev wished to rid himself of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich but that his influence and power was not quite strong enough.* Mikoyan, Bulganin, Voroshilov, and others, though generally satisfied with Khrushchev's leadership and agreeing with him in the matters of Malenkov's demotion and Molotov's censure, may have balked at actually removing them from the presidium--possibly feeling that their exclusion might weaken the mechanism of collective leadership and expose themselves to the danger of increasingly unrestrained domination by Khrushchev.

Whatever limitations, external or self-imposed, may have figured in the selection of the full members of the presidium, Khrushchev was not restrained when it came to the candidate members. Five new candidates were added: Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov, Kazakh party boss L. I. Brezhnev, Uzbek party boss N. A. Mukhitdinov, Pravda editor in chief D. T. Shepilov, and Moscow city party boss Ye. A. Furtseva. At least three of these were pretty clearly Khrushchev adherents--Brezhnev (see above p. 31), Mukhitdinov (see pp. 32-33), and Furtseva. Shepilov, too, appeared committed to Khrushchev's camp, while Marshal Zhukov, who, in view of his personality, military standing, and personal popularity may have held himself aloof from the usual patron-protegé relationships, was probably closer to Khrushchev than he was to any other member of the top leadership.

Madame Furtseva, the first woman in the Soviet Union to enter the circle of top leaders, had begun her party career in Kursk Oblast, but from 1936 on she was associated with the Moscow party organization. Although she had risen to first secretary of the capital's Frunze Rayon by 1948, her first big boost came in January 1950, shortly after Khrushchev's return to Moscow as oblast first secretary, when she was named second secretary in Moscow city. This position, which traditionally carried a slot on the central committee, was responsible for her election as a candidate member of the central committee at the 19th party congress in 1952. In March 1954 she succeeded

* The public admission of ideological error extracted from Molotov in September 1955 certainly appeared intended to undermine his prestige and popularity in preparation for demotion.

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I. V. Kapitonov, who became oblast first secretary, as party chief in the Soviet capital. Khrushchev's continued interest in her career was underscored when he singled her out for honors at public fetes and receptions at various times during 1955.

The elevation of Madame Furtseva to the party presidium in February 1956 gave her a higher party status than that of Moscow Oblast first secretary Kapitonov, thus marking the independence of the Moscow city party organization from its previous subordination to the oblast leadership. Her promotion also made it appear that Khrushchev's lament to the congress,

> One cannot overlook the fact that many party and Soviet bodies exhibit timidity about promoting women to executive posts. Very few women hold leading party and Soviet positions....

was intended to have a practical application. There had been little improvement in this regard for many years: women, for example, constituted 19.2 percent of total party membership in 1952, but only 12.3 percent of the delegates to the 19th party congress were women, while the percentage of women on the central party bodies elected at the congress was only 3.7 percent. The corresponding figures for 1956 were 19.6 percent, 14.2 percent, and 4.1 percent.

Shepilov, who had entered the secretariat in July 1955, had had an interesting career as a Soviet publicist, propaganda director, and editor. Before and for a short period after the war he wrote on agricultural subjects. He served as a political officer during the war, for a time on the First Ukrainian Front where Khrushchev was the top political officer on the military council. In 1947 he was assigned to the central party apparatus as deputy to M. A. Suslov, the new head of the Propaganda and Agitation Administration who succeeded Malenkov's protegé G. F. Aleksandrov in a shake-up in the administration. When the administration was reorganized as a department in July 1948, Shepilov became its head. He was criticized in July 1949 for failing to exercise control over the journal Bolshevik and for permitting N. A. Voznesensky's book on the USSR's economy during the war to be recommended by Agitprop as a textbook. Presumably as a result of this criticism he was removed as Agitprop head and assigned to undisclosed work as an inspector of the central committee. At the 19th party congress he was elected a member of the central committee, possibly anticipating his assignment in early November as editor in chief of Pravda, replacing L. F. Ilichev.

Marshal Zhukov rose through the ranks to become the Soviet Union's chief professional soldier. He had achieved great personal popularity during World War II as a military strategist and trouble shooter but was relegated by Stalin to positions of secondary importance for several years after the war, and removed from candidate membership in the central committee. In his secret speech, Khrushchev praised Zhukov as "a good general and a good military leader" and described Stalin's motives thusly:

> ...after our great victory over the enemy... Stalin began to downgrade many of the commanders who had contributed so much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalin excluded every possibility that services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but himself.*

Zhukov was quietly returned to responsible military work in Moscow in 1950 or 1951, probably as commander in chief of the ground forces and, possibly, deputy minister of defense, and re-elected a central committee candidate at the 19th party congress. He did not publicly return to full favor until Stalin's death, however, at which time he was promoted to first deputy defense minister. Presumably as a reward for support against Beriya he was elected a full member of the central committee in July 1953, and when Malenkov was demoted in February 1955, he succeeded Bulganin as defense minister. Zhukov was listed first among the presidium candidates elected following the 20th party congress so was presumably next in line to become a full member of the presidium.

N. M. Shvernik, former chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and, since Stalin's death, head of the Soviet trade unions, was re-elected. He had been a candidate member of the politburo presidium since March 1939 and seemed destined never to be accepted as a full member. The central committee, however, also appointed him chairman of the Party Control Commission which, from the political standpoint, was a more important post than trade union head.

* In November 1957, however, when Zhukov was no longer in political favor, his 1946 demotion was attributed by implication to his failing to understand correctly the requirements and policy of the party in the leadership of the army and navy and in party political education of armed forces personnel.

The only casualty was P. K. Ponomarenko, whose assignment as ambassador to Poland in May 1955 had seemed a rather insignificant post for a presidium candidate. He apparently retained his position on the presidium, however, at least formally, until the party congress, for in the Pravda report of the concert at the Bolshoi Theater on 25 February dedicated to the 20th party congress, Ponomarenko was listed in the appropriate place of presidium candidate--after all full members and before the party secretaries. The exact reasons for Ponomarenko's fall from favor are not known but he had had close political connections with Malenkov, having served under him in 1938 in the central party apparatus and collaborated with him in 1944 in administering the program to restore the national economy in liberated territories. Ponomarenko, moreover, was appointed to the party secretariat in 1948 at about the time of Malenkov's return to favor after an apparent interlude of over a year. Continuing economic difficulties in Kazakhstan, where he was party secretary for over a year (1954-1955), suggest that he may also have been held responsible for the way Khrushchev's agricultural program was carried out there.

Khrushchev's Secretariat and the RSFSR Bureau

The six members of the old secretariat were re-elected and Brezhnev and Furtseva added. With five of the eight secretaries also on the presidium (two as full members and three as candidate members), a somewhat greater voice in policy-making had been granted the officials responsible for the party's day-to-day administration. Since these officials were responsive to Khrushchev's influence, the move had the effect of strengthening his hand in top party councils. (See chart on p. 57.) The added secretaries could also relieve Khrushchev of some of the burdens of party administration and enable him to devote more time to critical policy problems and political activities.

In the short space of a year, Khrushchev had built the secretariat from three in February 1955 (after Shatalin's removal) to eight in February 1956. This was the largest the secretariat had ever been except for the short-lived expanded secretariat elected at the 19th party congress. The executive duties of the secretariat appeared to be divided among the old members as follows: Khrushchev, of course, had general responsibility for the entire secretariat; Suslov, the second in command, had for several years had responsibility for relations with the satellite and other Communist parties and, judging from the emphasis on party organizational matters in his speech at the congress, may have had some responsibility for internal party

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EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY SECRETARIAT

1952 - 1956 UNCLASSIFIED



* Named First Secretary on 7 September 1953

matters.* Pospelov supervised propaganda and agitation activities and the party schools and academies for political and ideological research and training. Of the three secretaries added in July 1955, Aristov had been assigned responsibility for party organizational and personnel matters, and Belyayev for agriculture, but it is not clear what Shepilov's functions were. He had acted as special emissary to Nasir in July which suggests some involvement with foreign affairs, but this might not have been his special field of responsibility. All the secretaries

* Suslov may have had responsibility for this last field for a while prior to the addition of Aristov to the secretariat in July 1955 and he may have emphasized it at the congress because Aristov was otherwise occupied with the report of the credentials commission.

participated in protocol duties at diplomatic and state functions and, at one time or another, most had represented the regime in visits to foreign countries.

There were obviously other fields than those mentioned, and responsibility for them was presumably exercised by one or another of the existing secretaries. Aristov, for example, may have had responsibility for trade and finance bodies and the miscellany encompassed by the administrative department of the central party apparatus--courts, public prosecutor's office, organs of state control, the police and security forces, and health, social welfare, and physical culture organs. With the addition of Brezhnev and Furtseva in February 1956, some redistribution of responsibility was almost certainly contemplated. Brezhnev appeared fitted by training and experience for secretarial supervision of a variety of fields--agriculture, party organization, even industry--but his wartime service as a political officer and his post-Stalin assignment as a top official in the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense made him peculiarly qualified to supervise party control and political indoctrination in the armed forces. Unfortunately, Brezhnev's publicized activities as a secretary have not served to confirm this or any other as his specific fields of responsibility. Furtseva retained her post as Moscow City first secretary so she was able to devote only part time to central secretarial work. Her duties appear to have encompassed youth and women's affairs.

BUREAU FOR THE R S F S R

MEMBERS	OTHER POSITION
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich (Chairman)	1st Secretary, Soviet Communist Party
Belyayev, Nikolay Ilich (Deputy Chairman)	Secretary, Soviet Communist Party
Yasnov, Mikhail Alekseyevich	RSFSR Premier
Kapitonov, Ivan Vasilyevich	1st Secretary, Moscow Oblast
Kozlov, Frol Romanovich	1st Secretary, Leningrad Oblast
Cmurayev, Viktor Mikhaylovich	Head, Department of Party Organs for the RSFSR
Mylarshchikov, Vladimir Pavlovich	Head, Department of Agriculture for the RSFSR
Pusanov, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich	RSFSR 1st Deputy Premier
Ignatov, Nikolay Grigoryevich	1st Secretary, Gorky Oblast
Kirilenko, Andrey Pavlovich	1st Secretary, Sverdlovsk Oblast

The central committee's "Bureau for the RSFSR," which Khrushchev told the congress should be organized to "provide more concrete and effective leadership of oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics of the Russian Republic," was a logical extension of

the organizational principle first employed in the creation in 1954 of departments of agriculture and of party organs for the RSFSR in the central committee apparatus. The new bureau corresponded somewhat to the party bureaus already existing in the other 15 republics (called "presidium" in the Ukraine) but differed in the method of its selection, i.e., it was elected by the all-Union central committee instead of a republic central committee. The RSFSR bureau was presumably intended to act as a junior presidium, making republic-level policy decisions for the Soviet Union's largest republic, and thus lightening the load on the all-Union party presidium, which had previously had the task of dealing directly with each of the RSFSR's 78 oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics as well as with the other 15 republics.

Political factors also played an important part in the creation of the bureau. From the very beginning it was dominated by Khrushchev. Not only was he made its chairman and one of his protegés its deputy chairman, but with the possible exception of Puzanov, all the members were his friends and protegés. He thus strengthened his control of party affairs in the RSFSR, established a basis for direct intervention in the government of the republic, and assumed still another symbol of leadership.

CONCLUSION

There seemed little doubt by the end of the congress that Khrushchev's position had been greatly strengthened. Malenkov and Molotov and, to a certain extent, Kaganovich had had to eat crow before the assembled representatives of party organizations throughout the Soviet Union; Khrushchev had strengthened his command of the party machine by packing the secretariat with friends and protegés; he had increased the voice of the party professional in top party counsels by adding four of his men from the party machine to the presidium as candidate members; and his policies had been given the authoritative stamp of approval by a party congress. With good reason, it would appear, Khrushchev was ebullient, self-confident, and seemingly secure in the knowledge of his power and influence.

The congress was thus an additional Khrushchev victory and an important step in his quest for dominion within the regime. At the same time, however, seeds of difficulty were sown for the first secretary. These, in the order in which they sprouted, were his secret "denigration-of-Stalin" speech, the adoption of a five-year plan which failed to recognize the seriousness of a number of economic problems or to provide sufficient flexibility for the economy to adapt quickly to changed conditions, and the retention on the party presidium of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich--men with adequate reason to hate him and fear the consequences of his leadership. Subsequent papers in this series will explore the development of the crises which stemmed from these acts and the changes in power relationships which accompanied the process.

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29 July 1958
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SOVIET STAFF STUDY

THE TIE THAT BINDS - SOVIET INTRABLOC RELATIONS
Feb 1956 to Dec 1957
(Reference titles: CAESAR VI-A and VII-58)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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Gero's speech extolling Soviet Union touches off a spontaneous uprising. "Deviationist" Imre Nagy swept back into power. Revolt directed against communism itself. Nagy promises multiparty system, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and neutralization of Hungary. Suslov and Mikoyan arrive in Budapest on 31 October. The myth of independence in the satellites comes to an end.

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The USSR's declaration on the satellites is the most definitive since the 20th congress. Moscow declares its intention of playing a more active role in bloc affairs in effort to re-establish unity. "Liberalization" defended as correct. Moscow admits "outright mistakes" in past dealings with bloc countries. All satellites to remain on equal status with USSR, provided that they maintain "continuing bonds of interest" with one another and with the Soviet Union. Eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from the satellites is held possible. Document a Soviet attempt to reassert control in bloc and salvage lost prestige and influence before world.

The End of the Rebellion..... 20

All bloc countries recognize Kadar regime. Peiping hails Soviet military intervention in Hungary as the "second liberation" of the country. Few details of the revolt are available in the bloc.

New Problems to Be Faced..... 20

Soviet Union placed reliance on a "hard core" of orthodox Communist leaders in 1956 attempt to sponsor "liberalization" in the satellites. Policy details were left to local party cadres. The satellite parties became engrossed in internal disputes and factional strife and failed to agree, even individually, on meaning and practical application of "liberalization." Moscow underestimated anti-Soviet opinion and overestimated the ability of Communist politicians in the satellites. Failure of overtures toward Yugoslavia left a powerful, rival force free to subvert the satellites from a position of comparative sanctuary.

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III. THE RETURN TO ORTHODOXY (NOV 1956 - NOV 1957)..... 21

After the Polish and Hungarian debacles, Soviet Eastern European policy was directed primarily at the re-establishment of bloc stability. Subordination of national interests to those of the USSR was called for. A new policy combining political repression and economic concession began to emerge. Soviet policy occupied a position midway between "Stalinism" and 20th congress reformism.

Repression in Hungary..... 22

Kadar abandons hope of ruling by popular consent. Hungary again becomes a police state. General strikes and sporadic armed resistance continue into December, but the revolt has been crushed.

Stabilization in Poland..... 22

Internal freedom marks the atmosphere in Poland. The Polish press attacks Soviet actions in Hungary and accuses present Soviet leadership of sharing guilt for the uprising with Stalin. Gomulka leads a party and government delegation to Moscow on 14 November to regularize relations with the Soviet Union. 18 November communiqué grants Poland political and economic concessions in return for Gomulka's promise to keep Poland in the bloc. The agreement again demonstrates Khrushchev's disposition toward pragmatism.

Peiping Warns Moscow..... 23

Chinese regime's official press organ counsels USSR on 21 November against the possibility of future mistakes in the "proper relations between socialist countries." Peiping calls "great-nation chauvinism" the chief stumbling block to good relations between members of the Communist camp.

Yugoslavia Reacts..... 24

Moscow deliberately stalemates relations with Belgrade in November 1956 in an effort to isolate ideologically the "Yugoslav virus" in Eastern Europe. Tito fights back and accuses Soviet collective leadership of

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lack of progress beyond the negative condemnation of the "cult of Stalin." The Yugoslav leader discloses the failure of his September conferences with Soviet presidium members. Pravda castigates Tito for "meddling" in another party's affairs.

Political Stick and Economic Carrot..... 24

Increased hostility toward local Communist parties reported in the satellites as the regimes simultaneously tighten political controls and relax economic restrictions. Terror increases in Rumania and Bulgaria. "Soft-line" economic policies dictated as much by Soviet self-interest as by the state of unrest in the bloc. All East European countries announce consumer concessions in the months following October.

Moscow's New Conservatism..... 25

Khrushchev admits in December that 20th congress decisions might have contributed to turmoil in the bloc, and promises a special plenum of the central committee to "adapt" the decisions. At the end of 1956 Poland alone remains an unorthodox satellite. Gomulka continues to withhold recognition of the USSR as ideological leader of the bloc, and persists in the liberalization of Polish society. Moscow sets about the political isolation of Poland as a Czechoslovak - East German party communiqué on 21 December 1956 pledges the two countries to combat "Polish...reaction." Yugoslavs offer Gomulka support.

Peiping's Road to Socialism..... 26

People's Daily on 29 December publishes an elaborate statement on the Chinese "road to socialism." The Chinese party concedes the existence of "contradictions" between Communist states and parties, but holds that the "fundamental experiences" of the Soviet Union should guide all Communist parties. The article criticizes Yugoslavia for challenging the rectitude of the Soviet system. Peiping reiterates its belief that the two principal dangers to good intrabloc relations are "great-nation chauvinism" and narrow "nationalism."

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Liberalism on the Rocks..... 26

Soviet-satellite party conference in Budapest in January 1957 ends three years of "national Communist" experimentation in Eastern Europe. "Further consolidation" of the Communist camp is called for under slogan of "proletarian internationalism"--subservience to the will of the USSR. Kadar announces re-establishment of a "proletarian dictatorship" in Hungary. Poland is the only exponent of "liberalism" in Moscow's European bloc.

Chinese Influence..... 28

Mao's "hundred flowers" speech of May 1956 and his February 1957 definition of contradictions within communism created enormous interest in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland. The Chinese have a serious stake in satellite stability. Peiping a logical mediator of Soviet-satellite differences. Chou En-lai's trip to Moscow and Warsaw in January an attempt to compromise differences between the USSR and Poland. Gomulka pledges his regime to the principle of "proletarian internationalism" and praises bloc unity. Moscow accepts Mao's beliefs on "great-nation chauvinism" and "nationalism."

Polish-Soviet Understanding..... 29

November agreement and Chinese good offices result in a modus vivendi between Moscow and Warsaw. Three outstanding points of difference remain. High-level Polish delegation to Peiping in April 1957 garners Chinese praise for Gomulka's post-October program. Gomulka walks a tightrope between placating Soviet demands and preserving his October program.

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Freeze and Thaw Again.... 29

Khrushchev sets about isolation of Tito at the start of 1957. Shepilov deliberately provokes the Yugoslavs. Party relations practically terminated by the end of February. Moscow follows ideological insult with economic hurt. Peiping remains neutral. Decline of satellite unrest in April encourages the Soviet Union to woo Tito again. The Albanian party is again the intermediary. Belgrade responds after the Yugoslav party learns that Moscow has advised all satellite parties to strive for a rapprochement with Belgrade. A joint declaration of desire for closer relations is issued on 6 June.

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Presidium Purge in the USSR..... 32

The expulsion of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov from the Soviet party's presidium gives Khrushchev a free hand in his Yugoslav overtures. Soviet credits to Yugoslavia are "thawed" in July. Tito and Khrushchev meet on 1 August.

Tito-Khrushchev Meeting in Rumania..... 32

The Communist leaders agree on like views and overlook differences. The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of 1956 endorsing "different roads" is revalidated. Joint call for "concrete forms of cooperation" among all Communist parties leaves door ajar for possible Yugoslav participation in international Communist organization at a future date.

Tito-Gomulka Meeting..... 32

September conference goes down the line in favor of Soviet foreign policy. Tito and Gomulka endorse bilateral party meetings rather than the multilateral meetings favored by the USSR. Gomulka continues to withhold recognition of USSR as the leader of the bloc. Both Tito-Khrushchev and Tito-Gomulka conference communiqués demonstrate the conviction that quarrels should be kept in the family in an effort to present a solid ideological front to the capitalist world.

Gomulka Tightens Up..... 33

Gomulka is forced to balance dilemmas in Poland. The first steps to muzzle press criticism of the Soviet Union are taken in February 1957. In March the Polish leader refers to the Hungarian revolt as a "counterrevolution," reversing his position. Polish party disavows the term "national communism." Gomulka vigorously defends his October program at a May plenum of the Polish party's central committee, and emphasizes importance of alliance with the USSR. In an extemporaneous reply to criticism, Gomulka recalls the ravages wrought by the Soviet Union to Poland during and after the war, and claims that his program is designed to prevent a recurrence of similar events. Poland's problems are primarily economic in nature. Gomulka and East Germany's Ulbricht meet in June and Gomulka exacts payment for Ulbricht's earlier reference to "Polish reaction." Polish leader calls for a "Baltic Sea of Peace" and expresses friendship for "all the people" of Germany, a reference obviously directed at Bonn.

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Orthodox Satellites Tighten Policies..... 36

Throughout the winter of 1956-57 the hard-line satellites resort more and more to political repression and terror. The Czech and Hungarian parties follow Moscow's lead and urge multipartite party conferences as opposed to the bilateral discussions favored by the Poles and Yugoslavs. The Czech press publishes the edited version of Mao Tse-tung's "100 flowers" speech on 21 June 1957. Party secretary Hendrych terms its provisions "inappropriate" for Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian party grows more Stalinist.

Post-Presidium Shake-up..... 37

All the satellites endorse the purge of the Soviet central committee. Bulgaria and Rumania undertake local purges. Poland and Yugoslavia interpret Khrushchev's victory as the forerunner of a more liberal Soviet policy toward the bloc countries--a hope not to be realized. Failure of Mao's liberal experiment in China in the spring of 1957 strengthens Peiping's support for the new Soviet line in Eastern Europe. From Moscow's point of view, the reimposition of a hard line in the satellites has been successful.

Mao Grows Some Weeds..... 38

The Chinese reap the bitter fruit of their policy of letting 100 flowers bloom. The spring flood of criticism from party members shocks the regime. The party's "rectification campaign" of April 1957 leads to the curtailment of public criticism in June. "Anti-rightism" and "rectification" become a single campaign designed to squelch all domestic opposition. As a result of bitter experience Mao and other Chinese leaders are more sympathetic to Moscow's problems in Eastern Europe.

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The Polish Exception..... 39

Labor unrest and economic distress severely test the Gomulka regime in mid-1957. Gomulka tightens press censorship. Plenum of Polish party's central committee in October attempts to revitalize the apathetic Polish Communists. Gomulka announces a bloodless "verification" of all party members. The greatest threat to party solidarity, according to Gomulka, is "revisionism."

The Bloc--One Year After Hungary..... 40

Unity is reflected on the surface. Dissidence is under control. Stability increases. "Liberalism" is confined to economics.

IV. 40 YEARS OF COMMUNISM AND A NEW COMINTERN..... 40

The month-long congress of world communism in Moscow. The central "party line" emerges victorious. Lacking a name and nebulous in organization, the gathering was the 1957 version of the earlier Comintern congresses. Provisions made for future meetings. 21 November policy declaration is signed by all bloc parties. The document coordinates attitude toward "revisionism" and formalizes the leading role of the USSR in Communist party affairs. Evidence of some compromise in the document's vague and often ambiguous phraseology of the basic principles of communism. Declaration itself commits the bloc parties to a narrow doctrinal channel. The Moscow conference did not actually solve any of the bloc's problems. Tito's absence an indication of his refusal to accept Soviet sovereignty in party matters at the risk of further alienating the West. The November events reasserted Soviet ideological primacy in the bloc and marked the return of central direction to the world Communist movement.

Introduction

On the eve of Stalin's death in 1953 the Soviet empire extended half way across Europe to the West and included the "heartland" of Asia to the east. With the dictator's demise the USSR was forced to take cognizance of an historical truism. No empire in the history of the world had managed to survive solely through force of arms. The Roman Empire, the longest-lived precursor of Soviet expansionism, had been prudent enough to solicit the voluntary cooperation of its subject peoples in the Romanization of its hinterlands. Such a policy had been rendered only lip service under Lenin and Stalin. The Soviet Union, after World War II, ruled its Eastern European provinces by military might and the frank use of terror. It economically exploited a sullen, uncooperative group of captive states. Productivity in the bloc remained marginal, public opinion was anti-Soviet, and in much of the outer world communism itself was regarded as a distasteful foreign philosophy. The USSR, as the self-styled heir of Marxism, was committed to the ultimate communization of the world and yet had been unable to communize the disgruntled proletariat at its own doorstep. The correction of this situation posed a major problem for Stalin's successors.

The USSR's post-Stalin policy thus was designed so as to transform its slaves into willing allies, and, coincidentally, to render international communism more palatable to the non-Communist world. This paper will examine the manner in which this policy was implemented from the time of Stalin's death through the end of the year 1957, with particular emphasis on the events following the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist party in February 1956.

I. STALIN'S DEATH AND THE NEW LOOK IN THE BLOC

The Soviet empire which Stalin ruled after World War II was a supremely centralized political, economic, and administrative entity. Yet only two years after his death, the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist party enunciated a doctrine of "liberal Communism" based on the sweeping decentralization of powers among the constituent parties of the bloc. The immediate origins of this radical change were two negative circumstances prevailing at Stalin's death in March 1953: the lack of a clear-cut law of succession to power in the USSR, and the state of chronic crisis which characterized the postwar Soviet economy. The new Soviet leadership was initially preoccupied with internal affairs to a far greater degree than had been the latter-day Stalin regime. This shift in political accent made the years from 1953 to 1956 a time of drift and uncertainty for the countries of Eastern Europe. Simple reaction to "Stalinism," rather than a positive approach to the problems of the bloc, was the common denominator of Soviet-Satellite relations during this three-year span.

Economic Relaxation

Moscow's tendency to withdraw into itself was most evident in the economic field. The Kremlin retained over-all policy control of the satellite economies, while striving to disengage itself from the mechanics of day-to-day planning in the bloc.

In 1953 and 1954 the USSR sold its interests in the last remaining joint stock companies in East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. In September 1954, in the new edition of a standard text "Political Economy," it told the countries of Eastern Europe to use local resources more intensively and decrease proportionately their dependence on Soviet assistance. Each country was to base its economy on those factors which influenced its "individual historical development...the level of its own productive forces...special characteristics of its class relationships." A gradual reduction of Soviet advisers and technicians in the satellites contributed to the impression of a return of national prerogatives to the bloc countries.

Political Relaxation

Beginning in the spring of 1954, when it recognized the sovereignty of the German Democratic (East German) Republic, the USSR took steps to foster the illusion of increased political independence in the bloc. A great deal of lip service was paid to

the equality of all socialist countries. Satellite political leaders visiting Moscow were afforded VIP treatment not at all consonant with their former status as Kremlin flunkeys.

There were no "liberalization directives" in the satellites. It was a period of trial and error, with Eastern Europe following Moscow's lead whenever possible. The Beria purge, subordination of the security police to political control, and emphasis on "socialist legality" in the USSR produced counterpart campaigns at national levels all across Eastern Europe.

As the relaxation of controls became more general, popular criticism of the local and Soviet regimes became more outspoken. The East German uprising in June 1953 was the most serious expression of the virulent anti-Soviet feelings which lay just below the surface in the satellites. The USSR prudently chose to regard the development in East Germany as a remnant of the Stalin era, and followed armed suppression of the demonstrations with a number of economic concessions designed to assuage the discontent of the East German workers and to present the new Soviet hierarchy in the best possible light before the world at large.

First Steps Toward Belgrade

In late May 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin flew to Belgrade to do public penance for the alleged sins of Beria and to lay the foundation for a new Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. The communiqué which ended the meeting on 2 June announced that "different forms of the development of socialism are the exclusive business of the peoples of the respective countries." This was a major and far-reaching concession for the Kremlin leadership to make. Not only did it endorse Tito's heretical brand of Communist ideology, but it invited national-Communist deviations in the countries of the bloc.

Effects of the Interregnum

Moscow had opened a Pandora's box in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet leaders failed clearly to foresee the consequences in the first flush of their reaction to the Stalin era. The rapidity with which the doctrine of "liberal Communism" later swept Eastern Europe could only have been conjectured in mid-1955. The policy sought to foster willing cooperation in the building of the Soviet empire by granting a semblance of independence to the builders. The result was, at the start of 1956, a facade of national-Communist states in Eastern Europe whose leaders were both confused as to their precise role in the post-Stalin Soviet empire and unwilling to exercise political initiative in their respective countries.

China--1953-1956

If there was uncertainty in the satellites after the death of Stalin, there was none in Communist China. The Chinese seized the opportunity to increase their stature politically and economically.

In 1953, Moscow found itself doubly in debt to the Chinese. Full payment had not yet been made for Communist China's participation in the Korean War, and Peiping was in a position to create an incident over Formosa which would easily lead to a general war. This latter eventuality was to be avoided at all costs, and in itself was enough to guarantee a sympathetic hearing for Chinese petitioners in Moscow.

Peiping had entered the Korean conflict only after receipt of firm assurances from the USSR that the bill would be paid by the Soviets in the form of a modern army and increased economic assistance. Part of the account had beenprepaid in 1950 when Stalin guaranteed the Chinese against attack by Japan or its allies and extended an economic development loan of $300,000,000 to Peiping. The Chinese considered the balance of the debt due on Stalin's death.

The period from 1953-1956 was marked by sporadic displays of ill temper on both sides as Peiping's prestige in Asia and consequently its bargaining position in Moscow continued to grow. This circumstance, however, was gradually accepted by the Kremlin and was balanced by the USSR's conviction that concerted diplomatic and economic efforts in Asia and the bloc were mutually advantageous. Moreover the stature of the Peiping regime as the first great-power Communist state in Asia and its continued acknowledgment of the Soviet Union's role as leader of the socialist camp redounded to Moscow's benefit in the propaganda battle with the West. A decision was made to go along with Peiping so long as the Chinese remained in close political alliance with, and economically dependent on, the Soviet Union.

In May 1953, the 1950 economic agreement was expanded to provide for Soviet aid in the construction of 141 basic industrial enterprises in China.

In January 1954 the Cominform journal formalized the USSR's acceptance of China's new place in the sun in hailing Mao Tse-tung as "an outstanding captain...who creatively and in a new way has characterized the Chinese revolution as a special type, now typical for the revolution in colonial and semicolonial

countries." For the first time Moscow conceded that a model other than its own might be appropriate for a country seeking the "road to socialism." This relaxed attitude gave the Chinese Communists a free hand in Asia and set up spheres of influence within the bloc. This was more than Tito had been able to achieve in almost six years of wrangling with the Kremlin. Clearly the Soviet Union had recognized and accepted the limitations implicit in any European power's attempt ideologically to proselyte the Asian countries. The Kremlin's collective leadership was more willing to compromise in Peiping than in Belgrade for it stood to lose far more through exacerbation of the Chinese than through antagonizing Tito, the lone heretic on the fringe of the European satellites.

In October 1954, Moscow's new collective leadership publicly threw its full weight behind Communist China's new stature in the bloc. Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan led an impressive array of Soviet dignitaries to Peiping simultaneously to salute Red Chinese sovereignty and to conclude a comprehensive agreement on Soviet concessions. The industrial construction program of 1953 was extended to include 15 new projects. An additional long-term loan of $130,000,000 was written into the agreement for the purpose of equating China's level of production in 1959 with that of the Soviet Union in 1932; and an extensive program of Soviet-staffed technical assistance was set up. Joint construction of two new strategic rail links with the USSR and the return of the Port Arthur garrison to the Chinese were provided for. In keeping with the precedent it had set in the Eastern European satellites, Moscow agreed to sell back to Peiping its shares in four remaining joint stock companies.

Moscow's acceptance of the Chinese lead in Asia was underlined in February 1955, after Bulganin and Khrushchev had succeeded the "inexperienced" Malenkov. The Chinese People's Republic was thenceforth hailed by the Kremlin as "coleader" of the Communist camp. The mantle of authority bore with it, however, an implication perhaps not to Peiping's taste. As equal partners, neither Moscow nor Peiping was directly responsible for the acts of the other. The Soviet Union could conveniently deny responsibility for Mao's Formosa policy, for example, should the international climate so dictate. In this connection it is worth noting that the Communist Chinese continued to cite the Soviet Union as sole leader of the bloc, reaffirming Peiping's role as the junior partner.

Moscow's coolness toward the Taiwan adventure eventually had its desired effect. Early 1955 was the high-water mark of Peiping's propaganda preparation for an offshore invasion. By the spring of the year Moscow could assume that those Chinese Communist leaders who may have favored an early assault on Taiwan had been effectively reoriented.

At the beginning of 1956 the Soviet Union and Communist China had reconciled those differences carried over from the Stalin era. Moscow offered Peiping strategic materials and economic assistance at a rate and volume commensurate with Chinese desires, and continued to support Mao's position in international affairs. The Chinese Communists reciprocated by proclaiming the close and indissoluble nature of their alliance with the USSR, by ceding first place in bloc affairs to the USSR, and by avoiding explosive situations which might lead to a general war. There were no known anti-Soviet leaders or factions in the Chinese party, and the Moscow-Peiping alliance showed no signs of cracking in the foreseeable future.

II. THE 20th PARTY CONGRESS: ITS PURPOSE AND ITS RESULTS (Feb-Oct 1956)

At the beginning of 1956 the Soviet Union seemed to be more concerned with normalizing its relations with Yugoslavia and the West than with theoretical dissertations with the satellites over "liberalization."

In February 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev displaced Georgi Malenkov, and collective leadership in the USSR entered a new phase. At year's end they were still intoxicated with the "spirit of Geneva." In a New Year's Eve address, the party first secretary and premier jointly called for a vastly increased program of East-West cultural and commercial contacts, citing the folly of war in the light of Soviet developments in the atomic and rocket fields.

In early September 1955 the USSR and Yugoslavia launched a broad new program of economic cooperation. Agreements were signed providing for increased trade, scientific and technical exchanges between the two countries, and a long-term program of Soviet aid in industrial construction. A draft agreement on nuclear cooperation with the Yugoslavs was concluded on 3 January 1956. Ideological differences remained a potential obstacle to a complete rapprochement, but the impression prevailed that a political meeting of the minds had only to await the next conference between the leaders of the two Communist states.

The Soviet 20th party congress convened on 14 February 1956. The congress legitimized the expression of a negative reaction to "Stalinism," but did not unify the bloc ideologically as may have been hoped for by the Soviet party. Satellite politicians had been too long deprived of initiative immediately to apply the broad generalities of the Khrushchev line to concrete national policy. The congress, therefore, accelerated divisive influences already at work in the bloc.

This, in essence, was the Marxist world outlook which Khrushchev presented to international communism at the party congress:

1) All countries of the world are moving toward socialism. Regardless of national characteristics, a revolution must denote the end of capitalism in each country. This crisis, however, need not be violent in nature, but may assume the form of a "parliamentary revolution," i.e., Communist infiltration of a government as in Czechoslovakia in 1948. Once a workers' government has gained control of a country, it is obliged to select the method of building socialism which best corresponds with the economic, social, and political conditions of the particular country.

2) The "fatal inevitability" of war between Communist and capitalist countries no longer exists since the socialist bloc is in possession of the weapons and technology necessary to prevent such an occurrence, and disavows war as an effective instrument of national policy.

3) The world is divided into two opposing blocs--Communist and capitalist, plus a number of nonbloc "peace-loving," non-Communist states, chief among which are: India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and Syria, Finland, and Austria.

4) It is essential in the interests of preserving peace that the Communist camp of nations assumes the initiative on improving relations with the capitalist countries of the West.

The Soviet first secretary's analysis of domestic issues was another guidepost to the future course of events in the satellites. Khrushchev called for a successful conclusion of the campaign to subordinate the state security apparatus to party control and to restore "socialist legality" to the country's national life, promised a continuation of "collective leadership" in the Kremlin, and emphasized the fact that, although heavy industry was to maintain first place in the Soviet economy, consumer wants would henceforth "not be neglected."

Molotov, on 18 February, admitted that Soviet foreign policy in the past had been inflexible and that he, as foreign minister, had been guilty of "underestimating the new possibilities of the postwar period." He pledged the Soviet Union to extend the hand of friendship to all countries of the world which "opposed military blocs," and to all socialist parties of the non-Communist countries.

Khrushchev's violent 8-hour polemic against Stalin delivered to a closed session of the congress manifested the importance which the Soviets attached to a change in party policies at home and in the bloc. The speech was rife with unpleasant implications for those bloc Communists who in the past had been the most conscientious adherents of the Soviet party line. Past orthodoxy suddenly became an offense against Marxism-Leninism. This speech evoked the most dramatic post-congress reaction in the satellites.

Satellite Reaction to 20th Congress

Satellite Communist leaders left Moscow feeling that Marxist orthodoxy had been rendered even more vulnerable than before the congress to incursions by the liberal factions of their respective parties. The other impressions which they carried home were less defined. "Titoism" was now a respectable credo, a living example of a "separate road" to socialism. Therefore, as "Stalinist" Communists were purged, "Titoist," or national Communists should now be rehabilitated.

Khrushchev had decried the negative features of the rigid Soviet foreign policy of the past, and had indicated that in the future ideology would more than ever reflect, rather than shape, policy. Pragmatism, the Soviet leader's forte, had been reconfirmed.

Bloc Communists could conclude that policy changes as well as personnel shifts were in order. The new policies must be the antithesis of Stalin's rigid rule by terror. This augured the dawn of an era of liberal Communism in Eastern Europe, with two important questions left unanswered by the congress--how much change was there to be, and what were the limits of change? Moscow had told the bloc what it should not do, but had not drafted a practical thesis on what it should do. The result was a policy vacuum in Eastern Europe which persisted through the fall of 1956. For almost a year, events rather than policy ruled the satellites and eventually forced the USSR to suspend its promises of socialist equality in a desperate effort to keep the Communist bloc intact in Eastern Europe.

Yugoslav Reaction to 20th Congress

The Yugoslavs, after the congress, were in an "I told you so" mood. Politika, in Belgrade, termed the Khrushchev program a "new page in Soviet history, a technical and modern, progressive and elastic, and also more humane stage than the previous one." The newspaper particularly endorsed the congress'

formulation of "administrative socialism" and communism through parliamentary forms, and added that these tenets had always formed the basis of Yugoslav communism. In private conversation, however, Vice President Kardelj admitted that he had been "astounded" at the magnitude and scale of the Soviet indictment of Stalin. Kardelj insisted that the Tito regime had not had an inkling in advance of the scope of the denigration campaign, and recalled that Khrushchev and Bulganin had actually defended Stalin, while berating Beria, during their visit to Belgrade in 1955.

Effect of 20th Congress in Satellite Parties

Nationalist elements in the satellite parties began to demonstrate their newly acquired prestige in March. There were reports that a liberal bloc in the Hungarian party's central committee had strongly backed a petititon for reinstatement in the government submitted by ex-Premier Imre Nagy. Nagy had been ousted by arch-Stalinist Party First Secretary Rakosi in 1955 as a national deviationist. Under continuing pressure the Rakosi regime on 29 March ceremoniously rehabilitated a deviationist less likely to embarass the party, Lazlo Rajk, former Hungarian interior minister executed as a "Titoist" in the Stalin era.

In Poland a group of about 250 central committee members were reported by the Western press to have demanded the return to the politburo of the purged right deviationist, Wladyslaw Gomulka. The prototype Polish Stalinist, Boleslaw Bierut, died on 12 March and was replaced as party first secretary by Edward Ochab, a relatively orthodox, Soviet-trained Communist, Moscow-oriented but free from the taint of personal association with the excesses of the Stalin era. Following Ochab's ascent to the top party post, Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw's regime newspaper, aired Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin for the first time in public. After quoting Khrushchev's dictum that from the early 1930's onward Stalin's rule produced "profound distortions, damage and crimes," Trybuna went a long step further and asked where the other leaders of the Soviet party had been during this period.

The sentiment for liberalization in the satellites began to crystallize in April 1956 and resulted in a number of actions directed against policies and individuals associated with the Stalin era. Bulgaria became the first satellite to unmask a home-grown "cult of personality" when the party's central committee leveled the charge against Vulko Chervenkov, outspoken anti-Tito premier. In mid-April, Chervenkov was ousted from his government posts and replaced by Anton Yugov, who had narrowly escaped liquidation as a "Titoist" during the Bulgarian purge trials of 1949.

On 25 April, the Czechs offered a sacrificial lamb to Moscow when they removed Defense Minister and First Vice Premier Cepicka from the government. A son-in-law of Klement Gottwald, deceased party chairman and president, Cepicka had been a "hard-line" Communist, but no more so than many of his accusers in the "model satellite" regime.

The dismissal of three top-level Polish security police officials on 20 April echoed Khrushchev's call for a "return to socialist legality" in the USSR. One of those ousted was Radkiewicz, former minister of state security, who from 1944 to 1954 personified "Stalinist" police terror in the country, having supervised the arrest of Gomulka and his supporters in 1948.

Poland was also the first Eastern European satellite to admit that the public clamor for further reform menaced party control of the country. In mid-April the government announced the removal of the minister of culture for failure properly to control "freedom of expression" in Poland. On 27 April the Catholic bloc of deputies openly challenged an abortion law submitted to the Sejm for approval, and a mass meeting of Warsaw writers accused the regime of harboring "Stalinist remnants." The writers demanded the election of a new party politburo, an unheard-of appeal in the Communist world, one which would have brought instant suppression six months earlier. In late April it evoked only a stern rebuke from Party First Secretary Ochab who, on 29 April, cautioned the "politically unstable" elements in the Polish party against further attacks on party policy.

Cominform Dissolved

On 18 April, satellite Communists were nominally cast adrift from the parent Soviet party when the Cominform was dissolved by Moscow to "facilitate cooperation with the Socialist parties" of the non-Communist world. This move had been anticipated in the West following the 20th congress. The Communist "information bureau" was an embarrassing reminder to both Khrushchev and Tito of the 1948 rupture of relations, and provided the non-Communist countries with a tangible whipping boy for anti-Communist propaganda. The actual business of the bloc could be more efficiently handled by existing organizations such as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA groups, while the current emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" made desirable a de-emphasis of ideological clannishness on the part of the bloc countries. The demise of the Cominform was in the nature of an addendum to Khrushchev's keynote speech at the Moscow congress, and was recognized on both sides of the "iron curtain" as one more tactical maneuver in the Soviet Union's war of words with the capitalist world.

Satellites Continue Liberalization

By the end of May even the most ideologically rigid Soviet satellites had made at least token concessions to 20th congress doctrine. Hungary removed its barbed wire and minefields from the Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers, Rumania reduced its security police by 10 percent, the East Germans announced their intentions to lift restrictions on travel to West Germany. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia promulgated internal amnesties and invited their political exiles abroad to return home without prejudice. The Hungarian Government pardoned and restored to his former post as chairman of the Bench of Bishops the second-ranking Catholic prelate in the country, Archbishop Groesz, sentenced to life imprisonment in 1951 for conspiracy against the state. The Poles ousted Jakub Berman, deputy premier and long-time associate of Stalin, from the government and politburo. The Rumanians similarly disposed of their deputy premier, Petrescu, after accusing him of a whole catalogue of crimes associated with the "cult of personality." The Soviets announced a reduction of forces in East Germany which provided for the withdrawal by May 1957 of 30,000 Soviet ground and air force troops from the ersatz sovereign republic.

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Blossom

On 2 June 1956, Tito arrived in Moscow with Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj and Foreign Minister Popovic to place the final seal on the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement outlined at Belgrade in June 1955. Tito had not addressed the Russians as "comrades" since 1948. He used the term in greeting his hosts at this meeting, saying the time had arrived when all that "separates us will be overcome and when our friendship will receive a new and still firmer foundation."

The outcome of Tito's visit to Moscow, however, was not quite the complete agreement that the Yugoslav leader had predicted. The conference pointed up the fact that basic ideological differences still existed between the two antagonists of the Communist world. Khrushchev, speaking at Moscow's Dynamo Stadium on 19 June, announced that Yugoslavia had once again taken its place "within the camp of socialism," and spoke of the "monolithic unity of the socialist countries" which this development ensured. Tito speaking next reiterated his conviction that "our way is different from yours." The "difference" in building socialism, Tito stated, was no bar to cooperation between the two countries, but the implication was inescapable that Yugoslavia still chose to disassociate itself from the new Communist commonwealth of nations.

This impression was substantiated by the declaration issued jointly by the two parties at the conclusion of discussions on 20 June. The communiqué was a patent concession to Yugoslav ideology. Unlike Khrushchev's Dynamo speech, the communiqué refrained from assigning Yugoslavia a place in the bloc, and went even further than the 20th congress in its assertion that "the roads and conditions of socialist development are different in different countries." Interparty cooperation, the communiqué went on to say, "should be based on complete freedom of will and equality, on friendly criticism, and on the comradely character of exchange of views on disputes between our parties." Both parties recognized the necessity for the development of broader relations between Communist states and "progressive movements" in the non-Communist world.

A reliable Western observer in Moscow at the time of the Tito-Khrushchev meeting characterized the party declaration as a forerunner of closer ties between the socialist parties of the free world and the Communist parties of the Sino-Soviet bloc, a model for future agreements among "progressive" movements of the world. He saw the Yugoslavs as willing to "line up in the Soviet column" as a result of Khrushchev's acceptance of Tito's "different road" to socialism. The USSR's amenity to ideological compromise foretold a period of even more liberal relations with the satellites. This turn of events, the commentary concluded, was not necessarily an "unalloyed advantage to the West" since Yugoslavia, faced with a liberal Soviet policy, had voluntarily chosen to identify itself with the USSR's aims and policies.

Tito's good-will visit to the Soviet Union was paralleled by an incident indicative of the importance which the Kremlin attached to cementing good relations with the Yugoslavs. Molotov, the old Bolshevik foreign minister who had so bedeviled Tito during the Stalin era, was dropped from his foreign affairs post and replaced by Shepilov, a candidate more acceptable to the Yugoslav leader.

Rakosi Ousted

A second occurrence at this time was less publicized but even more significant in terms of Soviet-bloc relations. While Tito was in Moscow, Soviet party presidium and secretariat member Suslov, the USSR's foreign party trouble shooter, journeyed to Budapest to evaluate the political situation in Hungary at first hand. The importance of this trip lay beyond the fact that the Hungarian party was seriously factionalized, or that the party first secretary, Rakosi, was an unreconstructed Stalinist who was despised both within and outside his party.

The Polish party, too, was faction-ridden, and Czechoslovakia and East Germany both were headed by party secretaries no more liberal than Rakosi. But whereas Novotny and Ulbricht maintained a tight grip on their party control mechanisms, Rakosi had lost control of the Hungarian party. His influence, even among the hard-line Communists who had once supported him, was now negative. In addition he was an implacable enemy of Tito, and this was not the time for a manifestation of anti-Tito sentiment in Eastern Europe. This circumstance probably explains the timing of the Suslov trip.

The Soviet emissary may have served Rakosi with an ultimatum, or may actually have arranged for his replacement. A month after Suslov's surprise visit to the Hungarian capital, on 18 July 1956, Rakosi was deposed as first secretary of the Hungarian party and replaced by Erno Gero, a hard-line Communist as orthodox as Rakosi in his ideology, but more acceptable to conservative Hungarian party members and less outspoken in his condemnation of Tito. One of Gero's first acts in his new office was to announce that an open letter would be immediately dispatched to the Yugoslav Communist party expressing Hungary's "profound regret" for the "slanders" of the past.

The liberal faction of the Hungarian party won several politburo seats in the wake of Gero's election, but gained little in the way of real political influence. In his initial speech as first secretary, Gero stressed the need for still tighter party discipline; reaffirmed a 30 June central committee resolution condemning the "malignant antiparty movement formed around ex-Premier Nagy," Hungary's outstanding national Communist politician; endorsed the correctness of the Hungarian party's line since the 20th congress; and promised modest improvements in the standard of living and in working conditions. Gero was not the independent-type Communist that the liberal wing of the Hungarian party had hoped for, and the factional struggle continued unabated throughout the late summer and early fall of 1956.

Poznan Riots

The second violent outbreak of worker discontent in the satellites after the death of Stalin occurred at Poznan, Poland, on 28 June 1956. Striking workers, disturbed over police detention of several members of their grievance committee, rioted in the city, damaging party buildings and attacking the regime's security troops.

The Poznan riots appeared to confirm the opinion of that faction in the Soviet party led by Molotov which had argued even before the 20th congress that a little freedom in the satellites was a dangerous thing. First Secretary Khrushchev, however, could still muster a majority of the presidium behind his thesis of controlled liberalization. On 30 June the central committee of the Soviet party issued a resolution explaining and justifying the denigration of Stalin and reaffirming the correctness of the campaign against the "cult of the personality." The central committee denied the existence of a crisis in international socialism, but warned of the dangers of dissension among Communist parties, citing Poznan as an example of the consequences. It appeared that the Russians were content, for the time being, to continue the myth of satellite autonomy.

Bulganin and Khrushchev spent the last week of July in and about Warsaw on a fence-mending, face-saving mission designed to bolster Communist prestige in Poland. The time-tested Soviet tactic of the "carrot and the stick" was never more in evidence. The Soviet leaders for the first time publicly implied that the USSR would guarantee the Oder-Neisse border with Germany, but warned the Polish press against pursuing de-Stalinization too avidly.

Bulganin's address in Warsaw on 23 July was to haunt Soviet leadership throughout the next year. Speaking of Polish internal affairs as if he were a member of the regime, he blamed the Poznan disturbances on Western agents and provocateurs, made no mention of the workers' legitimate grievances which the Polish party had already acknowledged, and warned that the Soviet Army stood ready to intervene in the event that reform should turn to counterrevolution in Poland. The Polish party's central committee met in executive session even as the Soviet visitors were leaving Warsaw, and issued a resolution restating the regime's intention of proceeding with liberalization and correcting the low level of living which had caused the Poznan incident.

Poland's determination to resist the ideological browbeating which the Soviet Union sought to administer was emphasized in two statements which high-level Polish Communists volunteered to a Western official in Warsaw. Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz asserted that his country was steadily acquiring greater independence of action and could be useful to the West in a liaison role with the bloc countries. Julius Katz-Suchy, Poland's ECE delegate in 1956, reinforced this view and added, "Poland has more freedom of action than the West knows," and this is "only the beginning."

Belgrade Reflects Bloc Crisis

Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the early fall of 1956 gave the best indication of a change in Moscow's Eastern European policy. Increasing intellectual ferment in the satellites throughout the spring and summer and the Poznan riots in late July had convinced the Kremlin that it was necessary, after all, to define the limits of the political thaw in the bloc--a serious omission of the 20th congress. Over this point Moscow and Belgrade found each other at odds. Tito wanted Moscow to keep hands off the internal policies of the individual Communist countries. In particular, the Yugoslav leader encouraged a free hand for local politicians in Poland and Hungary, the very centers of revisionist unrest which most concerned Khrushchev. As the Yugoslav press continued in September to hail increasing indications of satellite independence and "different roads to socialism," it was apparent that Moscow's post-Stalin political and economic wooing of Yugoslavia had neither lured Tito back into the bloc nor altered his desire for more influence in the conduct of Eastern European affairs.

The new phase of strained Soviet-Yugoslav ties was introduced by rumors in early September that the Soviet central committee had circulated a letter to all European satellites warning them against imitation of the Yugoslav "road to socialism." After the 20th congress Tito had resumed contacts with the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Rumanian parties and could consider such a warning only as fresh evidence of Moscow's distrust of his political course. The Soviet press contributed to this conclusion. After a flurry of praise for the Soviet-Yugoslav June party communiqué, which confirmed the correctness of Tito's "separate road," it fell silent on the subject until late August when Pravda and Izvestia blasted national communism and praised the unity of the Communist bloc in Europe. Belgrade maintained a watchful silence in the absence of direct action by Moscow. The Yugoslav economy was now tied too closely to the bloc for Tito to risk precipitious action over nothing more concrete than an ideological abstraction. By the end of the summer of 1956, 30 percent of his country's foreign trade was conducted with bloc countries.

On 19 September, Khrushchev flew to Belgrade on 48 hours' notice. The Soviet and Yugoslav leaders conferred for eight days at Tito's Brioni villa on the problems that had driven a wedge between the sometime allies. During this unusual meeting, the Soviet first secretary apparently warned Tito that he (Khrushchev) alone managed to restrain the Soviet presidium from a more overt denunciation of Yugoslav tactics in Eastern

Europe. Reliable Yugoslav officials later reported that Khrushchev adamantly refused to compromise on a single point at issue and almost completely repudiated 20th congress doctrine on "different roads to socialism." Continued Yugoslav encouragement for revisionary movements in the satellites would cost Khrushchev his majority in the presidium, the Soviet leader asserted, and Tito would once again find himself deprived of the ideological and economic support which Khrushchev personified. These threats were hardly calculated to inspire Tito's cooperation in quelling the rush toward national communism, a movement which he had already publicly sanctioned. The same sources which had saved Yugoslavia in 1948 were still at hand, the lifeline to the West was still open and, even in the case of another outright break in relations, "Titoist" Yugoslavia would survive.

The impasse in views at which the two Communist leaders had arrived may have prompted Tito to accept Khrushchev's invitation to return with him to the Soviet Union for continued discussions with other members of the Soviet presidium and Gero, his Hungarian counterpart. This meeting, beginning on 27 September 1956 in the Crimea, apparently served only to define more clearly the areas of disagreement between the two antagonists. The difference basically was the same one that was fought out in Poland and Hungary in October, "hard-line" vs. "soft-line" communism in the satellites. Moscow was ideologically compromised in its attempt to quell the forces which it had unleashed at the 20th congress, and this political embarrassment contributed to the indecision which it carried over into the October events.

The failure of the Soviet-Yugoslav discussions to alter Tito's Eastern European policy was confirmed on 7 October, when Borba, Belgrade's most important newspaper, praised the struggle for revision in Hungary and the replacement of Stalinist norms by "new, fresh tendencies" which made "any attempt to return to the old ways" extremely difficult. At about the same time Belgrade announced that a Hungarian party delegation including Gero and Kadar would arrive on 15 October for bilateral talks. A Bulgarian party delegation headed by Party First Secretary Zhivkov was waiting in Belgrade when Tito returned from the USSR, and, on 7 October, signed a declaration re-establishing party relations with the League of Yugoslav Communists, an indication that Moscow's September warning to the bloc had not been fully heeded.

The Lid Blows Off

Whatever further action the Soviet Union may have anticipated taking to neutralize Yugoslav influence in the bloc was buried beneath the rush of events in late October. On 15 October the Polish party announced that Wladyslaw Gomulka, the right-deviationist heretic of 1948, would participate in a plenum of the central committee on 19 October, at which time his appointment to the central committee and politburo was anticipated. The "Polish October" developed rapidly during the next week. The plenum met as Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan and Kaganovich flew to Warsaw to attempt an 11th-hour reversal of events. Gomulka successfully resisted their threats of armed Soviet intervention, as well as opposition from "old-guardists" within the Polish party, and on 21 October won election as first secretary of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) party, a victory which established him as the strongest single figure in Polish politics since the end of World War II.

The new Polish strong man was outspoken in his opposition to Soviet domination of his country's internal affairs, forced collectivization of the countryside, and one-sided exploitation of Poland's industry by the Soviet Union. He did not, however, favor a break in state or party relations with the USSR, and this critical distinction proved to be his salvation. Gomulka insisted from the moment he took office that alliance with the Soviet Union was an indispensable prerequisite of the "Polish road to socialism." Soviet military garrisons would remain in the country in accordance with Poland's Warsaw Pact agreements. Moscow's guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line was sufficient justification for this concession in the minds of most Poles. Coupled with Gomulka's firmness in linking his regime's future with that of the USSR, his armistice with the Catholic Church guaranteed the initial success of Poland's "quiet revolution." Party and church both worked to channel popular anti-Soviet feeling into activities beneficial to the future of the country. In attaining this end they were assisted by the graphic moral lesson on the folly of an anti-Communist uprising which was simultaneously enacted in Hungary.

Moscow's Reaction to Poland

The upheaval in Poland appears to have genuinely surprised the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's unscheduled arrival in Warsaw was spontaneous, and the Soviet press was caught off balance by the fast-breaking Polish events. On 20 October, while Khrushchev blustered in Warsaw, Pravda charged the Polish press

with seeking to "undermine socialism" and to "shake the foundations of the people's democratic system." The Soviet paper accused the Poles of publicly renouncing Marx and Lenin, and calling for the restoration of capitalism. "Even anti-Soviet pronouncements are to be heard," Pravda continued, a fact which "pains the Soviet people." On 23 October, however, with Khrushchev back home and Gomulka riding the crest of a wave of popular approval in Poland, both Pravda and Izvestia republished an editorial from the 22 October Trybuna Ludu in Warsaw which explained the details of the new "Polish road to socialism," and declared that the keystone of the Polish political structure was firm friendship with the USSR, "based on the ideological unity of Communist parties, complete equality of states, and the full solidarity of our nations." Western sources in Moscow and Warsaw reported that the USSR, caught unawares, had decided to make the best of the situation in Poland and publicly to approve the Gomulka regime at an opportune time.

Hungary Revolts

In Hungary, unlike Poland, events were allowed to proceed too far for any "national Communist," however moderate, to stem the flood of anti-Soviet feeling. Party First Secretary Gero's speech to the nation on 23 October extolling the continuity of Hungary's ties to the "glorious" Soviet Union touched off a spontaneous revolution which forced the Hungarian party to restore "deviationist" Imre Nagy to power as premier, and to elect Janos Kadar, with a reputation as a moderate Communist, party first secretary. The revolt, however, was directed against communism itself rather than against abuses in the Communist system, and Nagy, whatever his coloration, was a Communist politician. His appeals to end the uprising fell on deaf ears, and he was forced to concessions which would have removed Hungary from the Communist bloc if they had been implemented. On 30 October, Nagy called for restoration of a multiparty political system and on 1 November informed the Soviet ambassador of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the neutralization of the country. Suslov and Mikoyan had arrived in Budapest on 31 October, probably with advance information of Nagy's ideological defection.

On 4 November, as the Soviet Army renewed its assault on the Freedom Fighters, Nagy was replaced by Kadar who, regardless of past leanings, was so compromised in the eyes of the population as to be useless in any role except that of a Soviet puppet. In crushing the Nagy regime, the Soviet Union also destroyed the myth of the independence of satellite governments.

Reform without Moscow's blessing was not to be tolerated, and every government in Eastern Europe in the final analysis would continue to owe its very existence to the whim of the Soviet Union. Gomulka reiterated this truism frequently during the next year and used it to his advantage in restraining Polish "revisionism" which, in its more outspoken forms, could have seriously threatened the stability of his regime.

30 October 1956 Declaration

On 30 October 1956, Moscow made its most definitive declaration of satellite policy since the 20th congress. Although formulated against a backdrop of revolt, the statement was more than a Soviet response to the urgent problem of revolution in Hungary; it was a reassessment of 20th congress doctrine, the operations annex so conspicuously absent from the original resolutions of the congress. The paper represented a Soviet attempt to wipe the mistakes of the previous year from the slate and make a clean start. Moscow now declared its intent to play a more active role in the direction of bloc affairs. Unity was to be re-established at all cost. The statement reaffirmed the correctness of "liberalization" in Eastern Europe, but the USSR admitted it had made a number of "outright mistakes" in its dealings with the countries of the bloc. All satellite states would continue to enjoy "equality" in negotiating with the Soviet Union, the declaration continued, provided one vital condition was met--"continuing bonds of interest" between all states in the bloc. This qualification implied the indefinite perpetuation of Communist-controlled governments, "loyal" or at least "friendly" to the Soviet Union. Moscow's confidence in the attainment of this conditional equality, said the Kremlin, was based on the firm conviction that "the people of the socialist states (will) not permit foreign and internal reactionary forces to undermine the basis of the People's Democratic regimes." Having reaffirmed the binding nature of its permanent role in satellite affairs, the USSR conceded the countries of the bloc nominal independence in selecting their specific "roads to socialism." Further, the Soviet Union withheld the hope that intergovernmental negotiations "within the framework of the Warsaw Pact" might lead to the eventual withdrawal of Soviet military forces and civilian "advisers" from the Eastern European countries.

The new policy statement served as a guideline for the satellites in their relations with the USSR throughout the ensuing year. It did not mark a return to "Stalinism," but it was a considerably more conservative and far more detailed document than the ill-starred 20th congress manifesto. This time there was no doubt as to who was to call the policy shots in the satellites.

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

There were a number of urgent reasons for the full-dress review and redefinition of Soviet-satellite policy. Soviet international prestige had suffered a body blow as a result of the Polish and Hungarian events. The situation demanded that an attempt be made to salvage some fragments of 20th congress policy in order to reassert Soviet control in Eastern Europe. Secondly, and probably most important, the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union was based on a foundation of anti-Stalinism and liberalization within its sphere of influence. A radical reorientation of that policy at this juncture would have seriously undermined the power position of the Soviet Union in the world at a time when it could ill afford to appear uncoordinated. Finally, some attempt had to be made to justify the variance in policy existing toward Poland, a government "friendly" to the Soviet Union, and Hungary, a government which had been "undermined" by "foreign and internal reactionary forces." It may even have been hoped that, as a bonus effect, the declaration would enable Nagy to cope with the rapidly deteriorating situation and to establish a Gomulka-like government in Hungary. Khrushchev stated in Moscow on 7 November that the Soviet Government had agreed to support Nagy, and had abandoned this position only when it became clear that "Nagy had lost control and was in the hands of a fascist, counterrevolutionary group."

The End of the Rebellion

By the end of the first week in November all the satellite countries, plus China and Yugoslavia, had endorsed the Kadar regime. On 5 November, the official organ of the Chinese regime, People's Daily, hailed Soviet military intervention in Hungary as the second liberation of that country by the Soviet Army. Peiping had borne with the Hungarian and Polish parties in their demands for the relaxation of controls within the bloc. The Chinese, however, now made it clear that they had no intention of sanctioning any party's secession from the Soviet orbit. Yugoslavia regretted the necessity for armed action but rationalized it as vital for the preservation of socialism in Hungary. The other countries in the bloc continued to condition their citizens to accept the inevitability of Soviet intervention, but released few details on the size and scope of the conflict.

New Problems to Be Faced

The first ten months of 1956 had seen the Soviet Union turn a new corner in its Marxist-Leninist labyrinth. Preoccupied with internal affairs and still mindful of the pointless terror of the Stalin era, the Soviet leadership had sought

to base its power in Eastern Europe on a "commonwealth of socialist states," administered by a hard core of local, "hard-line" Communist leaders. The new Soviet policy was intended to give the appearance of increased national independence which in actuality would ensure more effective control through the willing cooperation of the satellites themselves. Moscow reasoned that so long as the various Communist parties maintained a monopoly of power in the countries of the bloc, and their external and military policies were closely integrated with those of the USSR, internal "liberalization" would have the same beneficient effect in guiding the energies of the masses into productive channels as did the incentive system in the Soviet economy. Independent solutions for internal problems were encouraged, while edicts and directives from Moscow were de-emphasized in favor of general principles within which the local parties were to work out the particulars of execution. The detachment with which Moscow viewed satellite affairs prior to the October events, however, militated against the essential ideological unity which the "commonwealth" idea presupposed. The parties of the bloc had become engrossed in internal squabbles, factional strife, and ideological recriminations. Least of all was there agreement on the application of "liberalization."

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania liberalized their regimes little and Albania, not at all. Hungary, at the opposite extreme, had attempted to de-Communize, the one unforgivable "reform," while Poland had stopped on the brink, and had established a government in some respects more liberal even than Tito's Yugoslav regime.

Moscow erred in underestimating the force of anti-Soviet opinion in the satellites, as Mao Tse-tung was later to err in China, and in overestimating the ability of local Communist politicians to work effectively without detailed instructions from the center. In addition, the failure to cement a rapprochement with Yugoslavia left a powerful, rival Communist camp on the fringe of the bloc, free to exploit Soviet miscalculations in an effort to pry the satellites loose from Moscow's "commonwealth." Even before the Hungarian revolution had ended, polemics between Belgrade and Moscow over the causes of the uprising threatened to widen the breach irreparably.

III. THE RETURN TO ORTHODOXY (Nov 1956 - Nov 1957)

In the year following the Polish and Hungarian debacles the overriding goal of Soviet Eastern European policy was the re-establishment of bloc stability. Moscow continued to back

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away from its imprecise doctrine of "liberalism." The Soviet Union sought to establish a snyonomous relationship between the slogans of "socialist unity" and "proletarian internationalism," the latter a Stalinist dialectic which required the member states of the empire to subordinate their own national interests to those of the USSR. A new policy compounded of political repression and economic concession began to emerge in the bloc. The end result was a formula midway between "Stalinism" and 20th congress reformism.

Repression in Hungary

In Hungary, Kadar at first pledged his regime to the pursuit of a liberal policy not unlike that of Imre Nagy. However, the mass deportation of Hungarian civilians to the USSR and the Soviet kidnaping of Nagy as he emerged from refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy shattered any hope of Communist rule by popular consent. After mid-November, Hungary rapidly degenerated into a police state, a Soviet puppet-province, unrelieved for the moment by any trace of post-Stalin political liberalism.

Spearheaded by the industrial workers' councils which had cropped up at the outbreak of the revolution, the immediate cause for reversion to terror was an extremely effective general strike on 21-22 November. Malenkov arrived in Budapest on 23 November, possibly with new orders for a "get tough" policy, and on the 26th, Kadar told a nationwide radio audience that "counterrevolutionaries must be hunted down and rendered harmless." On 9 December, martial law was declared throughout Hungary, arrests were stepped up, regional workers' councils were outlawed, and the possession of arms by private citizens became a capital offense. Resistance continued. Another 48-hour general strike paralyzed the economy on 11-12 December, and sporadic outbreaks of armed violence were reported in parts of the country. Nevertheless, the back of the uprising had been broken and the pattern of the future hard-line regime established.

Stabilization in Poland

As another generation of terror began in Hungary, Poland exhilarated in the heady atmosphere of internal independence. The Polish press launched a bitter attack on Soviet actions in Hungary. Zycie Warszawy, Warsaw's leading evening paper, likened the Hungarian revolt to the Poznan riots and observed that the Hungarians had been guilty only of seeking to exercise that sovereignty which the USSR had guaranteed them at the 20th congress. The present Soviet leadership had to share with Stalin the blame for the uprising, the press explained, since its policy toward Hungarian reformism had been a "senseless theory."

On 14 November, Gomulka led a Polish party and government delegation to Moscow to re-examine Polish-Soviet relations in the light of the October events. The resultant communiqué on 18 November confirmed the "Polish road to socialism" in return for Gomulka's agreement to maintain close bonds of alliance with the USSR, to keep Poland in the bloc, and to sanction the "temporary" presence of Soviet military forces in Poland. The announcement pledged "complete equality" of the two countries, "respect for territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs," and cited Moscow's 30 October declaration on the satellites as its basis. The political agreement was augmented by an economic accord which granted Poland concessions greater than had ever been extended by the Soviet Union to a satellite country, including trade with the USSR at world market prices and the cancellation of Poland's postwar debt.

Khrushchev as usual had subordinated ideology to politics. With the signature of the Polish-Soviet "truce," the USSR admitted that national communism--even though both parties refrained from so designating the Gomulka regime--was not heretical per se, so long as the practitioner maintained a close alliance with Moscow. Actually the Kremlin had little choice in the matter. Soviet pressure for tighter controls in Poland at this point would probably have resulted in another satellite bloodbath, with the fighting possibly spreading to the two Germanies, almost certainly leading to a general war. The USSR was no more inclined to gamble on such an eventuality in Europe than it had been in Asia. This logic placed Poland in a most favorable bargaining position. Gomulka took advantage of the circumstances to make Poland the outstanding exception to the more reactionary Soviet policy toward the satellites which followed the Budapest declaration.

Peiping Warns Moscow

Although Peiping joined the other countries of the bloc in the accolade of praise for the Polish-Soviet truce, the Chinese added a note of warning. People's Daily counseled on 21 November against the possibility of future mistakes in the "proper relations between socialist countries." The editorial condemned both "great-nation chauvinism" and "narrow nationalism," but emphasized that the former abuse of power continued to constitute the chief stumbling block to good relations between the members of the Communist camp. Peiping thus informed Moscow that it did not consider the Kremlin an infallible executor of Marxism-Leninism, and made it clear that the Chinese would continue to reserve the right of independent judgment in the event of new difficulties within the bloc.

Yugoslavia Reacts

As Yugoslav-Soviet relations had faithfully mirrored Soviet policy in Eastern Europe in the pre-October period, so now they reflected the swing back to orthodoxy in the bloc. Moscow's primary task, the re-establishment of tight control over the bloc countries, predicated the ideological isolation of Belgrade and the discredit of the Yugoslav pattern of independent communism. Recriminations were again in order, and the Kremlin chose to use Albania to this end. On 8 November, Enver Hoxha, the Albanian party's first secretary, an unreconstructed "hard-line" Communist, strongly implied in a Pravda article that Tito had been to blame for the Hungarian revolt. Yugoslav Vice President Colakovic was reported to have commented on 11 November that the Hoxha article was the "final blow" to Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement and that henceforth relations, particularly party relations, would be only "correct."

The Yugoslav President took the offensive personally in a speech to his party activists at Pula on 11 November in which he laid the blame for the Hungarian revolution squarely on Moscow's doorstep. Collective leadership, according to Tito, had failed to progress beyond the negative condemnation of the "cult of Stalin," had "ignored the strivings of the working masses," and had permitted the survival of elements "endeavoring to revive Stalinism" in the USSR and other Communist states. Tito explained that his September meetings with Soviet leaders had convinced him that the "Stalinist faction" had "forced its attitude...to a certain extent" on the liberal wing of the Soviet hierarchy, and had prevented the spread in other Communist countries of the "separate roads" doctrine which had been endorsed by the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1955 and 1956.

Pravda rebutted on 23 November with a long editorial accusing Tito of spreading the propaganda of "reactionaries who endanger international proletarian solidarity" by distinguishing between Stalinist and non-Stalinist factions within communism at a time when party unity was the only significant issue. Tito was in error, Pravda added, in trying to establish the Yugoslav road as the only one and in "meddling" in other party's affairs. The Soviet-Yugoslav feud, thus publicly joined, grew progressively more bitter during the winter of 1956-57.

Political Stick and Economic Carrot

Ripples from the Polish and Hungarian events were felt throughout the satellite world. The regimes reacted more or less uniformly by tightening political controls while simultaneously relaxing economic restrictions. Increased hostility

toward local Communist parties was reported in Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Rumanian and Bulgarian regimes resorted to frank terrorist tactics and began to carry out mass arrests. The Czechs and Rumanians initiated vigorous anti-American propaganda campaigns and increased their harassment of Western diplomatic communities.

The continuation of "soft-line" economic policies in the satellites was dictated as much by the self-interest of the USSR as by the state of unrest in the bloc. After 11 years of Soviet domination the Eastern European countries were more than ever dependent on economic assistance from the Soviet Union and, as their state of industrial sophistication continued to advance, the attendant drain on Soviet resources threatened to curtail the Communist economic offensive in the nonbloc countries of Asia and Africa. Economic incentives had proved a predictable and efficacious means of increasing industrial production in the USSR, and the same system was now applied piecemeal to the satellites. Pacification of the populace was a bonus effect of the policy which compensated to some degree for the sudden political crackdown. In the months immediately following October all Eastern European countries announced price reductions, increased wage scales, raised family allowances, reduced quotas for compulsory deliveries of agricultural products, set more ambitious housing goals, and promulgated other consumer concessions. Moscow's failure to object to Poland's bid for American economic aid in November was at least partially due to the Soviet desire to escape the burden of fiscal succor for its satellites. Political factors alone are not enough to explain the relative grace with which the Kremlin reacted to the news of Polish-US negotiations.

Moscow's New Conservatism

Moscow's new political conservatism was confirmed on 13 December 1956 when Khrushchev for the first time admitted that the decisions of the 20th congress might themselves have been the catalyst for the subsequent turmoil in the bloc. The Soviet first secretary told a European minister that that body's decisions, although correct in essentials, had to be "adapted to developments which have taken place since the congress." Khrushchev promised consideration of these matters by a special plenum of the central committee before the end of the year.

At the end of 1956, Poland alone continued to defy classification as an orthodox satellite. Gomulka still withheld his recognition of the USSR's ideological primacy, and persisted in the actual political liberalization of Polish society. Moscow's

desire to isolate revisionist Warsaw was plainly evidenced on 21 December when a Czech-East German party communiqué pledged the two countries to combat the "attempts of Polish and foreign reaction to weaken Poland and the entire Socialist camp." As though in reply, a high-level Yugoslav party delegation traveled to Warsaw to join the Poles in reasserting their contention that many roads led to socialism. In a communiqué on 29 December, both sides agreed that bilateral interparty relations "under present conditions" constituted the "most correct" method for effecting cooperation within the bloc. Negotiations of wider scope on "individual questions" were not excluded, but it was clear that both Tito and Gomulka foresaw few occasions on which multiparty discussions would be appropriate.

Peiping's Road to Socialism

Communist China clarified its views on intrabloc relations when Peiping's People's Daily on 29 December published the most elaborate statement on the distinguishing features of the "road to socialism" to emerge from any capital in the bloc. In a 14,000-word article, "More on the Historical Experience of the Proletariat," "antagonism" between "imperialism" and "socialism" was held to be the basic fact of the world scene. The article admitted that there existed "contradictions" between Communist states and parties, but insisted that these must be "subordinated" to the "struggle against the enemy." Those who cannot see this, the Chinese grumbled, are "definitely not Communists."

Peiping followed Moscow's lead in chastising the willful Yugoslavs. The paper contended that the "fundamental experiences" of the Soviet Union must be adopted by all Communist states. Further, Tito was criticized for claiming that Stalin's "mistakes" were inherent in the Soviet system rather than personal perversions of Communist principles. "Mistakes" of the sort Stalin propagated, the article continued, "did not originate in the Socialist system."

The statement concluded with a warning that only "relations of equality" among Communist parties could guarantee the unity of the bloc and safeguard its members against the two principal internal dangers of the contemporary era--"great-nation chauvinism" and "narrow nationalist tendencies."

Liberalism on the Rocks

A conclusive period was put to national communism's brief day in Eastern Europe by the Soviet-satellite party conference in Budapest during the first week of January 1957. In deliberate

contrast to the Polish-Yugoslav position on bilateral party relations, the conference was attended by delegations from five bloc countries--the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. "Socialist equality" was honored in word, but the real business of the meeting was to augur the return of "hard-line" communism to the satellites. The West, it was explained, had mounted a new "cold-war" threat which had almost succeeded in wresting Hungary from the bloc, and which demanded "further consolidation" of the Communist camp and concentration on building a solid front of bloc unity under the cloak of "proletarian internationalism"--subservience to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev and Malenkov steered the conference away from "separate roads to socialism" or the Yugoslav position on the Hungarian revolution.

The Hungarian Government on 6 January implemented the "freeze" which the conference had ordained. Kadar, on that date, proclaimed the return of a "proletarian dictatorship" in Hungary and gave first priority to "proletarian internationalism" as a motivating influence in the formulation of national policy. He attributed the October revolution to "foreign elements " and accused the Nagy regime of "treachery," the first time since the revolt that a high Hungarian official had attributed antistate motives to the deposed premier. Kadar further decreed a speed-up in the "reconstruction of the countryside" in the socialist pattern, with particular emphasis on a renewed collectivization campaign. During the uprising the collectivized portion of agriculture had shrunk from 20 percent to 3 percent of the country's arable land, and this was the first call for remedial action by the government.

"Revisionism" was dead in Hungary, and the camp of "liberalism" had been reduced to a single exponent, Poland, in the USSR's eastern sphere.

Following the October 1956 events, satellite leaders began a round-robin of visits to Moscow and to one another's capitals. The themes of the ensuing talks were those stressed in Moscow's 30 October declaration on the satellites and in the 4 January Budapest communiqué--solidarity of the socialist camp, a new Western threat to bloc stability, and status-of-forces agreements sanctioning Soviet arms in the satellites. East Germany was repeatedly assured of its sovereign status.

Chinese Influence

The Chinese diagnosis of socialism's ills in December 1956 was one of a series of theoretical dissertations from Peiping which influenced bloc affairs during the troublous 1956-57 period. Mao's "hundred flowers" speech of May 1956 and his February 1957 dictum on the nature of contradictions within socialism were seized on by the Poles as proof that liberalism and communism were not mutually antagonistic concepts. Reduced to simplest terms, what Mao actually believed was not nearly so important in Eastern Europe as what satellite politicians said he believed. Polish Communists interpreted Mao's theories as implicit support for Gomulka's "road to socialism." There were reports in December 1956 that Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz had been in touch with Peiping on several occasions during the October crisis and had received renewed assurances of Chinese Communist support for the Warsaw course of action.

China, for its part, had a double stake in satellite affairs. Peiping's economy was heavily reliant on the $400,000,000 worth of industrial and transportation equipment which arrived yearly from Eastern Europe, and Communist prestige had been badly undermined in Asia by Moscow's military adventure in Hungary. Restoration of stability in Eastern Europe was vital to China. Mao's party had always acknowledged the Soviet Union as the model for all socialist countries even while sympathizing, in part at least, with Polish desires for more freedom in the determination of internal affairs. Peiping was thus in a peculiarly favorable position to arbitrate outstanding differences between Moscow and the independent-minded Poles. It was in the role of arbitrator that Chou En-lai visited both Moscow and Warsaw in January 1957.

Gomulka conceded more in the joint Sino-Polish communiqué of 16 January than in any other policy statement he had made since his ascent to power in October. The document acknowledged Gomulka's position that national differences exerted sufficient influence on the development of socialism to require different forms of communism in different countries. But in return Gomulka committed himself to the support of "proletarian internationalism" and "the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism"--pledges omitted entirely from the Soviet-Polish agreement of mid-November--and praised bloc unity. The Polish first secretary was not ready, however, to ratify the Soviet version of events in Hungary or to tender the Soviet Union first place in bloc affairs.

The Warsaw declaration was a forerunner of the Sino-Soviet communiqué signed in Moscow on 18 January. This document again emphasized bloc unity in the face of renewed "Western imperialist" threats, prescribed "genuine consultation" among bloc states as the solution for future difficulties, and repeated Peiping's December warning against both "great-nation chauvinism" and "narrow nationalism." In deference to the Poles, there was no mention of who led whom in the bloc.

Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz and politburo member Ochab garnered further moral support for the Polish brand of communism during their visit to Peiping in early April 1957. A joint Sino-Polish statement reaffirmed the January declaration, praised Gomulka's post-October accomplishments, and anticipated Poland's "increasingly important contributions to...the great family of socialist countries." As they had in January, the Chinese omitted the customary obeisance to Moscow as leader of the Communist bloc and refrained from terming the Hungarian revolt "counterrevolutionary."

Polish-Soviet Understanding

As a result of the 18 November Polish-Soviet agreement and Chou's good offices in January, Poland and the USSR arrived at a modus vivendi. Both countries gave ground from earlier held positions, until only three outstanding points of difference remained: Moscow's right to rule the bloc, the interpretation of events surrounding the Hungarian revolution, and whether Gomulka was truly building socialism. As late as December 1956, Kommunist, monthly periodical of the Soviet party, accused the Polish party of conducting "an offensive against the most sacred possessions of the working class...the great experience gained by the Soviet people and its Communist party on the road to socialist construction." Moscow's tone of voice was lower after the January communiqués, and Gomulka's ability to placate Soviet demands while preserving intact the essentials of his October program contributed to his overwhelming victory at the polls on 20 January in Poland's first relatively free election since World War II.

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Freeze and Again Thaw

By the end of January 1957 the first phase of the reconsolidation of the European satellites had been completed. Nonbloc Yugoslavia was alone an outspoken critic of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, and, in February, Khrushchev assigned himself the task of cutting Tito off from the party councils of the bloc until the harder Soviet line had had an opportunity to

re-establish orthodoxy fully in the Eastern European parties. The Soviet party deliberately checkmated its relations with Belgrade when Shepilov, in his final report as foreign minister, told the Yugoslavs on 12 February that there would be no improvement in relations between the two countries until Yugoslavia changed its ideological attitude. As Khrushchev probably anticipated, the Yugoslavs replied in kind on 14 February when Borba retorted that further developments would depend exclusively on the Soviet attitude and that Yugoslavia's policies remained unchanged. On 26 February, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic told the Yugoslav Parliament that if the USSR still hoped to see Belgrade in its "socialist camp," it was "wasting its time." By the end of February, party relations between the two Communist powers had all but terminated. Moscow's ideological boycott was reinforced by economic chastisement calculated to hurt the Yugoslavs in the critical area of industrial development. A moratorium was placed on further Soviet aid under the terms of the economic agreements of 1955. Outright repudiation of the agreements was withheld, however, which contributed to the impression that the move was in the nature of economic blackmail, intended to inspire Belgrade to cease agitating for reform in the bloc.

During this name-calling interlude in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Peiping occupied neutral ground. The Chinese Communists opposed the dispute in a relatively passive manner, avoiding explicit censure of either participant. On 5 March, Chou En-lai observed that until such time as the outstanding differences between socialist states could be resolved by comradely discussion, the correct course would be to "reserve differences while upholding our solidarity." March statements of other Chinese leaders continued to refer to Yugoslavia as a legitimate socialist state and tended to minimize the bitter exchanges between Moscow and Belgrade.

By mid-April the decline of unrest in the bloc made it expedient for Khrushchev once again to better his relations with Yugoslavia. It was no more politic now than it had been in 1955 to allow a free hand to a hostile Communist state on the border of the empire. Yugoslav influence no longer posed the threat to bloc solidarity that it had in the fall of 1956 and the winter of 1957. All the satellites, except Poland, were again approaching political conformity, and Poland did not now pose a serious threat to stability because of Gomulka's reassertion of internal control, the country's geographical situation, and its professed alliance with the bloc. Khrushchev's first peace feeler was directed through the same channel as his declaration of hostilities the previous fall--the Albanian party. On 15 April the

Soviet first secretary told the Albanians that the Soviet Union wished to concentrate on "what brings the people of...two countries together in the struggle for socialism," the first indication of a shift in the wind from the USSR. On 24 May, apparently after some soul-searching, Belgrade rose to the bait when Politika, the Yugoslav's theoretical journal, quoted Tito's statement that Yugoslavia intended "to take the initiative" to prevent "the further sharpening of relations" with Moscow. Tito took note of the fact that the USSR had stopped attacking Yugoslavia and had "insisted that other countries also treat Yugoslavia differently and not attack it from unprincipled positions." This seemed to confirm a late May report from Belgrade that the Yugoslav party was in possession of a confidential Soviet memorandum advising all satellite parties to strive for improved relations with Tito's regime and the Yugoslav party "for the time being...in spite of ideological differences." On the same day that Politika printed the Tito interview, the Soviet party's central committee sent cordial birthday greetings to the Yugoslav President, and was rewarded by a reply in which the marshal predicted an immediate improvement in Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the bloc. A visit to the Soviet Union by Yugoslav Defense Minister Gosnjak in June, Tito added, would be in the spirit of "coexistence and cooperation with everyone."

On 6 June, Moscow and Belgrade issued strong declarations of their desire for friendlier relations with each other. Pravda sounded the keynote of the Soviet campaign--"only the imperialists stand to gain" by a continuation of the Soviet-Yugoslav feud. Nevertheless, the old ideological differences remained unresolved. Pravda classified the proposed rapprochement as "an advance in the spirit of proletarian internationalism," while Belgrade's Borba termed it an expression of Yugoslavia's policy of "active coexistence" with all countries of the world. Moscow thus stressed the oneness of the socialist camp, while Belgrade emphasized the independence of the Yugoslav position.

Despite these initial overtures, positive Soviet action to effect a reconciliation with Tito was delayed until after the Soviet presidium purge of late June. The Molotov faction apparently had resisted even tentative attempts to renew party relations with the Yugoslavs because of their conviction that Yugoslav influence had been instrumental in causing the acute unrest in the satellites the preceding fall.

Presidium Purge in USSR

The expulsion of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov from the presidium of the Soviet party gave Khrushchev a mandate for his policy of "aggressive friendship" with Yugoslavia. Immediately following the Moscow house cleaning, Khrushchev told the Czechs that he intended to seek an understanding with Tito "at the first opportunity" despite the theoretical differences which still separated them. In mid-July, Yugoslav Vice Presidents Kardelj and Rankovic conferred with Khrushchev in Moscow; Soviet credits to Yugoslavia were "thawed" on 29 July; a "working level" Soviet delegation, the first since 1948, arrived in Belgrade on 1 August; and the same day Tito and Khrushchev met personally in Rumania.

Tito-Khrushchev Meeting in Rumania

The Rumanian meeting was keyed to the Soviet statement of 15 April. No signed communiqué was issued, but Radio Moscow indicated that there had been a prior understanding to agree on like views and to overlook differences of opinion. The conferees confirmed the "actual significance" of their 1956 declaration that "roads and conditions of socialist development are different in different countries" and advocated "concrete forms of cooperation" among all Communist parties. This latter invocation left the door ajar for a future attempt at Cominform - or Comintern-like cooperation without the irksome restrictions of these earlier organizations.

The Soviet-Yugoslav understanding on the Danube set the stage for a new round of Yugoslav-satellite party conferences. Tito's immediate and enthusiastic acceptance of the 10 September Rumanian proposal for a Balkan conference strongly suggested that this gesture had been one of the topics on the Tito-Khrushchev agenda.

Tito-Gomulka Meeting

The Tito-Gomulka conference which began in Belgrade on 10 September may be regarded as an extension of the Soviet-Yugoslav August meeting. The two independent Communists endorsed Soviet foreign policy point by point and minimized the ideological differences which still separated them from the Soviet party's position. The conference communiqué, however, used the same terminology as the December 1956 Polish-Yugoslav party statement in encouraging bilateral party relations as the most valuable form of interparty cooperation. Gomulka referred to the USSR as "a neighbor and ally, the first and strongest socialist

state," a Communist verity to which Khrushchev could hardly object, yet one which withheld recognition of the USSR as leader of the bloc. Tito's strong endorsement of Poland's Oder-Neisse border with East Germany removed a major point of distinction between Yugoslav and Soviet foreign policy.

Conclusion of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement was a testimonial to Tito's belief that Khrushchev represented a new school of more flexible Soviet policy which might one day bring Soviet communism closer to the Yugoslav model, and to the conviction of both parties that the unity of the international Communist movement must take clear priority over ideological squabbles "within the family." It was not, however, an ideological surrender by either party. In this sphere sharp differences were suppressed, not solved. Although Eastern European communism was still ideologically muddled and internally factionalized, its parties were agreed on the advantage of presenting an unbroken front to "capitalism." To this end Yugoslavia and Poland both found common cause with the Soviet Union and with the countries of the bloc.

Gomulka Tightens Up

Like Tito, Gomulka had accepted Soviet emphasis on Communist unity and had withdrawn from some of the more radical implications of his October policies. Like Tito also, however, he insisted on the inviolability of what he considered the essentials of his reforms, and based his compact with the USSR on mutually acceptable compromises rather than on ideological surrender. In January, Chou was reported to have told the Polish first secretary, "Do what you want but don't talk about it," a frank warning against irritating Soviet sensibilities during the unity campaign. This problem plagued the Polish leader throughout the year.

Gomulka had promised freedom of the press in October, but had also warned against "antisocialist forces" at work within Poland. He kept the "revisionist" press in check during the first half of 1957 by balancing these two abstractions in the desired proportion. The outspoken "enragé" journals continued to demand more liberal actions than the regime was prepared to take, but because of their limited interior circulation, and unofficial status, they escaped the full weight of government censorship for some time. Zycie Warszawy and Trybuna Ludu, the principal government and party organs, could not be permitted the same tolerance, however. When they persisted in taking a dangerously anti-Soviet line, Gomulka dismissed their editors and replaced them with more "conservative" journalists. On 27

Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

February he warned that most of Poland's journalists and writers had "broken with socialism" and had become the "mouthpiece of 'petty bourgeois' ideology." This was strong language in the new Poland, although liberal sentiment was still too strong to permit an effective crackdown on the press until the fall of 1957.

Gomulka's desire to minimize his ideological conflict with the Kremlin became more evident in March, when, for the first time, he referred to the Hungarian revolt as a "counterrevolution and termed it "a mad attempt to overthrow the Socialist system" at the very moment when Hungary had stepped onto the road of the correction of past mistakes." Prior to that time the Polish party had held that the uprising was a product of the same forces which had caused the Poznan riots, legitimate popular grievances against a reactionary Communist regime.

In March, also, the Poles disavowed the term "national communism" as descriptive of the "Polish road to socialism." Such a description, according to the party's theoretical journal, Nowe Drogi, implied the limitation of Communist influence to "narrow national confines," the antithesis of Marxist theory. These semantic distinctions cost Gomulka little in popular support, but contributed to the appearance of the outward solidarity of the Communist camp. The cause of "right communism" for the present was a dead letter in Hungary, and the mass of the Polish population paid little attention to the party's ideological gyrations. Gomulka's domestic popularity had other than theoretical roots, and so long as he held out against Soviet dictation of Poland's internal policies and a return of economic exploitation by the USSR, he was on reasonably firm ground in paying lip service to the Kremlin's version of abstract Communist theory.

At a mid-May plenum of the Polish party's central committee, Gomulka reaffirmed his October policies, and indicated that his subsequent concessions to Soviet policy had been little more than superficial adjustments to a difficult political situation. "The road to socialism in different countries can take forms other than those of the road to socialism in the Soviet Union," Gomulka told the meeting. The Polish party, its first secretary said, would continue to oppose forced collectivization, restrictions on free speech, and would support coexistence with the Catholic Church for an indefinite time to come. Poland, Gomulka said, would stand firmly behind its alliance with the Soviet Union, its friend, ally, and protector of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

Gomulka's true feelings toward the USSR were revealed in his extemporaneous reply to a direct attack by one of the "Stalinist" members of the central committee who had demanded a return to orthodox communism on the Soviet model. The first secretary heatedly recalled the ravages which the Soviet Army had wrought in Poland in the course of its "liberation" in World War II, the imprisonment of Poland's wartime party leaders on a whim of Stalin, and the ruthless exploitation of the Polish economy by the USSR in the years before the October events. Repetition of these humiliations was a certain consequence of a return to the pre-October party line, he said, and all his actions were directed toward avoiding this ultimate folly. The transcript of this speech did not appear in the published text of the plenum, but tape recordings of it were circulated among high echelon officials of government and party. The Soviet leadership could thenceforth have suffered no illusions as to the fact that the USSR's physical proximity, far more than a common view of a shared philosophy, kept Poland in the Soviet bloc.

Gomulka's most urgent problem was economic in nature. Low productivity, low wages, and a low standard of living were a vicious cycle that beset the almost bankrupt country. The only immediate source of relief appeared to be foreign aid. The Soviet Union in November 1956 had underwritten a portion of Poland's debt; but credits, foreign exchange, and machine goods from the West were badly needed, and Gomulka was not one to permit ideology to stand in the way of national survival. Between October and June he concluded economic agreements with Austria, England, Sweden, and France and in June received his first American aid in the form of a $95,000,000 trade agreement. Trybuna Ludu characterized the agreement as "exactly what we had asked for," and as significant in helping "to break down East-West trade barriers" and "lessen international tension."

At the end of June, Gomulka conferred in Berlin with Walter Ulbricht, East German "hard-line" party leader, probably at Moscow's suggestion. The Poles had been highly indignant at Pankow's reference in December to "Polish and foreign reaction," and took the occasion of the June conference to exact payment for the insult. Ulbricht, in a joint communiqué utterly at variance with his prior position, endorsed the actions of the Polish party since October 1956 and agreed with Gomulka that "historic conditions and national characteristics" may determine the forms and methods of approach to communism in different countries. This was a far cry from the bristling hostility which the East Germans had previously displayed toward the "Polish road."

The bilateral government communiqué went down the line with Soviet foreign policy and introduced a new note in calling for a "Baltic Sea of peace." A neutralized Baltic had traditionally been a dream of Russian policy makers, and the inclusion of the satellite governments in the scheme was probably envisaged by Moscow. Poland's role in Baltic negotiations, and its future relations with other riparian countries, however, could differ materially from Moscow's script for the plan. The Baltic is Gomulka's only window on free Europe, and Soviet sponsorship of the "sea of peace" plan could afford Poland an opportunity to widen its contacts with the West without antagonizing the USSR.

Another indication of Gomulka's desire to foster closer contacts with the Western European community was his use of the Berlin conference to express his desire for friendly relations with "all the people" of Germany. Gomulka had sporadically pressed for diplomatic relations with Bonn, but the highly volatile Oder-Neisse question prevented serious negotiations in that direction. This reference let the Federal Republic know that Poland still hoped for a rapprochement.

Orthodox Satellites Tighten Policies

Throughout the period of the 1956-57 winter "freeze" in Eastern Europe the orthodox satellites consolidated their "hard-line" policies. In April the Bulgarian regime increased its use of terror to dispel the last remnants of Hungarian sympathy in a still restive population. Mass deportations and student expulsions were reported, and the government admitted that its intellectuals refused to conform to strict party discipline. In Hungary the reactivated security police again put a tight lid on "illicit" political expressions, the liberal Hungarian writers' union was suspended in January and its leading figures arrested, and Minister of State Marosan declared that since not enough "fascists" had been hung in 1945, "they had better be hung in 1957." Rumania struggled with widespread unemployment and stilled a brief flurry of intellectual dissent in the spring. Albania was still a product of the Stalin era.

The orthodox political line of Poland's satellite neighbors was typified in the Czechoslovak party conference held in Prague from 13 to 14 June 1957. The Czech central committee urged "multipartite discussion of important political and ideological questions," an unabashed criticism of the Polish and Yugoslav position. Party Secretary Hendrych found "important strata" among the intelligentsia and working class susceptible to "Western-sponsored subversive concepts--revisionism, national

communism, and people's capitalism." Of these alien deviations, "revisionism" constituted by far the greatest threat to international communism. These mistaken notions, Hendrych continued, must be replaced by traditional Marxist-Lenist concepts and a return of "socialist realism" in Czechoslovak arts and letters. For two years Czechoslovakia had experienced the stirrings of liberal thought each spring, and dissatisfaction with the regime's cultural policies persisted, particularly in independent-minded Slovakia. Hendrych termed this attitude "ultimately unacceptable." A renewed drive for collectivization of agriculture, the bellwether of orthodox communism, was promised the nation's farmers. Above all, the secretary concluded, Czechoslovakia's indissoluble ties of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union must be further strengthened and defended.

The Hungarian party had already denied the validity of Mao Tse-tung's "100 flowers" theory, but had not published the text of the Chinese leader's speech. The Czech press became the first in the satellites to reproduce the edited edition of the speech on 21 June after Hendrych had termed it inappropriate for application in Czechoslovakia, where traces of "imperialist espionage and subversion" survived.

The newly constituted Hungarian Socialist Workers' (Communist) party held its "first annual" conference two weeks after the Czechs adjourned, and echoed the Czech line without significant variation. The conference packed the party's politburo and central committee with ill-disguised "Stalinists," elected Jozsef Revai, former hard-line ideological czar, to the central committee, and condemned "counterrevolutionaries" who sided with Nagy against the regime. Kadar told the conference that "brotherly friendship with the USSR must be represented courageously and without shame."

Post-Presidium Shake-up

Another indication of the return of regimented uniformity to the satellites came following the Soviet presidium shake-up which was announced on 3 July. Every satellite, without hesitation, endorsed the purge unequivocally. Bulgaria and Rumania purged their politburos; Hungary belatedly reaffirmed the essential correctness of 20th congress doctrine but gave no indication of reimplementing liberal policies.

Poland and Yugoslavia welcomed the Khrushchev victory as indicative of a more liberal Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. Khrushchev, however, during the remainder of the summer, made it clear that regime stability, not a particular political shading,

was the sine qua non required of each satellite leader. The Soviet first secretary smiled on the ultra-Stalin-like Novotny in Czechoslovakia, and called East Germany's Ulbricht the "most faithful of all the faithful." This was not liberalism, no matter what the standard of measure. Everywhere Khrushchev went he was met and followed by slogans of bloc unity, the basic theme of Soviet policy since October 1956. This was not at all incongruous. Khrushchev had been sufficiently shaken by the Hungarian and Polish events of the fall of 1956 to accept the conclusion that a relaxation of political controls in the bloc was the surest way to dissipate Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

From the Soviet viewpoint the reimposition of a hard line had been reasonably successful. Controls in each country, except Poland, were now adequate to suppress public displays of dissidence, and a firm and rapid endorsement of Soviet policy decisions could now be relied on in Eastern Europe. There was no incentive for further ideological experimentation.

Mao Grows Some Weeds

During the spring of 1957, the Chinese Communists, too, harvested the bitter fruit of their "100 flowers." Mao Tse-tung in an unpublished address in February had urged his party cadres to stimulate criticism from the people. The order was carried out with exemplary Communist zealousness, and throughout the spring a torrent of intellectual criticism against the party's monopoly of power and basic policies rained on the regime. Some of the most vociferous complainants were Communist party members. The entire experience was a bitter one for Mao and those advocates of the "hundred flowers" policy who, like him, had overestimated popular support for the regime and underestimated the depth of the unreconciled opposition.

A party "rectification" campaign, designed to improve party agitators' techniques in handling the masses, was launched in April. In June, Peiping published a strenuously edited official version of Mao's February speech which put severe limitations on popular criticism of the party's power position and major policies, including its policy on relations with the USSR. Simultaneously the regime unveiled an "antirightist" campaign aimed at those who had heeded the earlier parole to attack the regime. In August, as reaction gathered momentum, "antirightism" and "rectification" were merged into a single steamroller effort to squelch antiregime utterances in the country.

These developments, whatever their consequences in the domestic context, undoubtedly rendered Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders more sympathetic to Soviet problems in Eastern Europe, and more ready to agree to the hardening Soviet position relative to the satellites.

The Polish Exception

The Gomulka regime in Poland continued to walk a narrow tightrope between accommodation to Soviet wishes and the preservation of its independence. A wage strike of 12,000 transport employees in Lodz tested the economic policy severely in August 1957, but Gomulka remained firm and the strikers returned to work convinced that the country lacked the funds necessary for an increase. The failure of the economy to improve at the rate anticipated by most Poles was reflected in increasingly caustic press treatment of the regime and its policies. In early fall Gomulka tightened censorship and, in October, closed down the "revisionist" student journal Po Prostu. The student demonstrations which ensued were not directed against Gomulka personally so much as against the bureaucracy of the lower echelons of the regime. They became disorderly only when rowdy delinquents turned them into a violent holiday, representative of the frustrations of Polish youth in general.

The 10th plenum of the Polish party's central committee from 25-27 October concerned itself less with relations with the USSR than with Gomulka's call for a new spirit of vitality in the party. Liberalization had continued to a point at which party influence had all but disappeared in the countryside, and was only nominal in the other strata of society. The plenum emphasized Gomulka's determination to adhere to the "broad democratic liberties and national freedoms" which had been instituted in October. The press was promised that its right to "constructive criticism" would be preserved, but was told that "anti-socialist" or "anti-Soviet" criticism would not be tolerated. Gomulka announced a bloodless "verification" of all party members designed to weed out the opportunistic and apathetic. The fight, as the first secretary pictured it, was to continue against both "revisionists" and "dogmatists," those who advocated a return to "Stalinist" principles, "revisionism" being viewed as the greater of the two evils. No new action to solve the economic crisis was projected.

Gomulka's problems were now internal. If he could succeed in stabilizing his economy and in restraining his press from ill-considered attacks on Soviet policy, he would stand to gain from Khrushchev's status quo outlook on the bloc.

The Bloc--One Year After Hungary

Eastern Europe on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Russian revolution was again a functional unit in the Soviet empire. Dissidence was under control, bloc solidarity was externally a fact, and liberalism had been confined to the economic field, where it existed more by definition than as a reality.

IV. 40 YEARS OF COMMUNISM AND A NEW COMINTERN

On 6 November 1957 Moscow became a stage for the most imposing array of Communist notables to gather in 22 years. The meeting was ostensibly in honor of the achievements of 40 years of Soviet communism, but Khrushchev's anniversary-eve keynote address served actually to kick off a month-long congress of world communism. This occasion, for the Soviet Union, marked the accent of the steep hill up from the 1956 nightmare of Budapest and Warsaw, the culmination of a full year's effort to achieve a multilateral declaration of faith in the future of Soviet-style communism. The Kremlin badly needed, for propaganda purposes abroad and for psychological effect within the bloc, a spectacular demonstration of the restoration of Communist unity in its sphere of influence, and this was its chosen forum. Sixty-four Communist parties celebrated the return of the tent-meeting as a facade for Moscow's central direction of the international party line. Although the gathering was nameless out of deference for the sensibilities of the Polish, Chinese, Yugoslav, and Italian parties, nevertheless, a new Comintern was born in Moscow in November. The participants took care to establish the precedent-setting nature of their convention by announcing, before adjourning, their intention of convening as often in the future "as the need arises."

Of the three policy statements issued by the Moscow conferees, by far the most important in terms of Soviet-bloc relations was the joint declaration of policy signed by the USSR and the 11 other parties of the bloc on 21 November. Khrushchev's 6 November speech outlined the essential points of this document, and the "peace manifesto" signed by all attending parties on 22 November reiterated well-worn Soviet foreign policy aims, never the object of serious controversy in the bloc.

The policy declaration itself was more notable for its 12 signatures than for any inherently new ideas. Substantively the document paraphrased 20th congress doctrine, with the addition of new, admonitory control clauses. For the first time,

however, all the parties of the bloc agreed, publicly and in concert, that, while "dogmatism" remained a serious threat, "the main present danger is revisionism."

In Moscow the recent Chinese inclination to condemn internal satellite revisions became clearly evident. The Chinese Communists had maintained since the revolutionary fall of 1956 that "great-nation chauvinism" constituted the principal threat to the ideological solidarity of the bloc. Peiping now withdrew from this position in favor of the USSR's contention that "revisionism" was the acute present danger. This policy switch directly reflected Mao's unsettling experiences at home the previous summer when the attacks on his regime by Chinese "revisionists" had attained an unexpected degree of intensity and bitterness.

Mao also joined Gomulka in acknowledging the ideological leadership of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Peiping had habitually hailed the USSR's state leadership, but always before had stressed the "equality" and "independence" of all Communist parties. Even now the theoretical concession, which Mao's adherence to the policy declaration implied, was not absolute, for he reserved the right to continue to innovate "socialist development" within the Chinese party and to exercise guiding influence over the other Communist parties of Asia. In like manner, Gomulka could take refuge, should an occasion demand, behind the extremely broad generalities which the declaration proposed as the nine basic principles of communism. Nothing in these relatively innocuous platitudes interdicted the Polish party's post-October course. There was evidence, on the contrary, that Moscow had leaned over backward to satisfy Gomulka in the formulation of the principles. No other explanation, for example, so plausibly accounts for the curious, Bukharinistic phraseology of the basic principle on agricultural policy which calls for "gradual socialist reconstruction," entirely omitting specific references to collectivization.

Despite the anomalous wording of portions of the declaration, the countries of the bloc, in following Moscow's political lead, committed themselves to an extremely narrow doctrinal channel. Implicit in this endorsement was a profession of the correctness of the USSR's role as custodian of true Communist doctrine. Both ideological heresies cited in the declaration, "dogmatism" and "revisionism," were, by definition, deviations from a correct, doctrinal norm, to be enunciated and interpreted by the Soviet party. The Soviet Union thus regained, by default, its unique role as oracle of the Communist world. By common consent Moscow was awarded the right to condemn as "dogmatic" or "revisionist" any politically embarrassing independent satellite action, a development fraught with future significance.

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Nothing was really solved at the Moscow congress. Behind the spangles of ideological unity, the basic problems of the individual differences which distinguish and separate the countries of the bloc remained. The remarkable thing about the policy declaration was the fact that a group of influential Communist leaders, so acutely aware of national prerogatives, could agree among themselves not to disagree in public. This, in a sense, was a tribute to Mao who, throughout 1957, had urged public agreement on the countries of the bloc. The Moscow meeting put this advice into practice on a grandiose scale. Pressing problems, involving obvious conflicts of opinion, were either discussed in private or were filed for future disposition. Nothing, for example, was said about the extent of legitimate self-determination permissible in Communist countries, or the future course of agricultural collectivization in the bloc. The nine principles were worded to promise all things to all people yet nothing specific to anyone. The show was the thing in Moscow in November. And this came off almost without a hitch.

A discordant note in Moscow's carefully staged chorus of Communist unity was managed by Tito, sulking in Belgrade with a sudden attack of political lumbago. The Yugoslav leader found himself in late October in a particularly delicate political position which manifestly excluded his participation in the founding convention of a Comintern-type organization. Tito's recognition of the black-sheep East German regime had struck a sensitive nerve in the West, and had placed in serious jeopardy Yugoslavia's professed intent to arbitrate East-West differences as a nonbloc neutral. Khrushchev's rude dismissal of Zhukov, Belgrade's candidate for champion of the liberal line in the Soviet presidium, undoubtedly served to weaken further Tito's resolve to consumate his previously burgeoning rapprochement with the Kremlin.

As early as 7 November, Belgrade's Komunist blasted the product of the Moscow meeting as unrepresentative of the Yugoslav viewpoint. The party weekly restated Tito's "separate roads" thesis, and concluded that socialist forces were so varied that it was "incorrect to supply universal recipes prescribing how the rule of the working class should be achieved... what should be the forms of authority, which are the compulsory forms of social ownership, etc." Tito thus succinctly dismissed the bloc's nine principles before they had been committed to paper. Even without the East German complication, it would have been incongruous for the Yugoslavs to bind themselves to an ideological commitment such as that drawn up at Moscow. The declaration was weak enough in its final form; compromises of the type which Tito would certainly have demanded would have rendered it entirely meaningless.

In summary, the November congress reasserted Soviet ideological primacy in the Communist bloc and signaled the return of a centrally conceived and promulgated world Communist "line." November gave no cause for revision of the early fall's assessments of Soviet-satellite relations, although it presaged a resumption of the Soviet-Yugoslav vendetta as the coat of ideological whitewash applied in August 1957 began to peel. Unity under duress continued to characterize interparty relations in the bloc. The manner in which the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution was celebrated guaranteed the continuation of a "hard-line" policy in the Soviet sphere for a considerable time to come.

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[redacted]

3 November 1958

SOVIET STAFF STUDY

THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT
(Reference Titles: CAESAR VI-B and VI-A-58)

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THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT

This study is a working paper circulated to analysts of Soviet affairs as a contribution to current interpretation of Soviet policy. This particular study is part of a series prepared under the general title "Project CAESAR," designed to ensure the systematic examination of information on the leading members of the Soviet hierarchy, their political associations, and the policies with which they have been identified.

--30 September 1958

THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT

The breakdown of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in recent months can best be approached by a review of Moscow's expectations when the rapprochement began and the uneven course of relations since that time. The difficulties that beset the rapprochement and that have led to its failure resulted from Nikita Khrushchev's policy of trying to establish party relations with and to integrate Yugoslavia into the bloc. If Moscow had been content to accept Yugoslavia as an independent neutral, and the Yugoslavs had refrained from meddling too actively in satellite affairs, Belgrade's demonstrated willingness to pursue a foreign policy close to that of the USSR would have precluded serious conflicts between the two states.

For over three years, even before Khrushchev led a Soviet delegation to Belgrade in May 1955, the aim of restoring it to the bloc underlay Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia. Essentially, this was Khrushchev's policy, apparently originated by him and publicly associated with him ever since his visit to Belgrade. It contrasted with the views of Molotov, and perhaps other Soviet leaders: to treat Yugoslavia simply as a neutral and thus to avoid the risks of seeking its re-entry into "the Soviet camp."

After the party break in 1958, Khrushchev, in a speech on 3 June at the Bulgarian party congress, gave a clear description of these two different objectives.

> It is not disputed that those who struggle for socialism consistently struggle for the cause of peace. But many leaders who do not support the principles of socialism also struggle for peace.... Thus in the struggle for peace, forces and organizations of various views and political opinions can be united. It is another question when we speak of the struggle for the victory of socialism.... It is necessary to strengthen in every way cooperation between all states in the struggle for peace and for the security of nations. We want to maintain such relations with the Yugoslav Federal Republic. But we, as Communists, would like more. We would like to reach mutual understanding and cooperation on the party plane.

Although when Khrushchev spoke he had in fact given up the hope of party ties with Tito, this is a good description of the views he had held in 1955.

The fact that Khrushchev was closely identified with the policy toward Yugoslavia was probably a major reason why that policy remained unchanged for so long despite the evidence that Tito would not associate himself with the bloc on Moscow's terms. There was speculation that Soviet criticism of Yugoslavia after the Hungarian revolution indicated that for a time Khrushchev did not have complete control over this aspect of policy, but, on the other hand, the improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations later in 1957 was attributed to his efforts.

Therefore, the change in Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia in April and May 1958 inevitably raised speculation that Khrushchev's leadership was again being challenged or that he was under heavy pressure from other leaders to shift his policy. A review of Soviet-Yugoslav relations suggests, however, that while such pressure on Khrushchev is a possibility it is not necessary as an explanation for the reversal of Soviet policy. Khrushchev on a number of occasions in the last three years has expressed views concerning relations with Belgrade that were clearly in conflict with Yugoslav concepts.

The break with Yugoslavia was a by-product of the decision to impose much stricter standards of conformity on the bloc. A major step in that direction was the meeting in Moscow in November 1957 on the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and the resulting 12-party declaration, a document not signed by the Yugoslav party. Soviet-Yugoslav relations cooled noticeably after that.

The break was precipitated by the Yugoslav party congress in May 1958 and the party program drawn up for approval by the congress. The USSR was forced to decide whether or not to send delegates. It felt that a justification of its negative decision was necessary, particularly in order to assure complete bloc conformity with the decision. Moreover, it felt that the Yugoslav party program was an ideological threat to the bloc. When negotiations on the program failed to move the Yugoslavs significantly, the Soviet leaders finally recognized that Belgrade could not be shaken from its insistence on independence. Moscow then decided that Belgrade must be discredited to destroy its influence, existing or potential, in the bloc. While Soviet dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia and concern over bloc discipline had been growing for a long time, the Yugoslav party congress forced a firm decision regarding relations with Yugoslavia.

The Genesis of Party Rapprochement: The normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav governmental relations started soon after Stalin's death and gained momentum in the last half of 1954. Although

public Soviet statements in this period centered on the need for improving state relations, there were indications that in private talks the Russians were already urging a party rapprochement. Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj told a Western journalist that, in numerous secret talks in 1954, Soviet officials had sounded the Yugoslavs out on the prospect for renewed party relations, had recognized the Yugoslav principle of "many roads to socialism," and had sought ways of drawing Yugoslavia back into the bloc. Tito said privately in April 1955 that the Russians wanted Yugoslavia back in the Cominform. The Yugoslavs insisted to Westerners that they were rebuffing such approaches.

The Soviet interest in a party accord with Yugoslavia was made public in May 1955, when Khrushchev arrived at Belgrade airport to make a plea for the "re-establishment of mutual understanding" between the two parties. Placing primary blame on Beria,* he went as far as could have been expected in admitting Soviet responsibility for the breakdown in relations. Khrushchev apparently considered that this apology was the major prerequisite to re-establishing party contacts. How much this subject was discussed during the visit is not known. The Yugoslavs, who emphasized to Westerners that they had resisted Soviet approaches for party contacts, were probably overstating their case. The Russians accepted an important Yugoslav thesis by agreeing in the joint communiqué that "different forms of development of socialism are the exclusive business of the peoples of the respective countries." The communiqué said nothing specifically, however, about establishing party relations although there was a reference to cooperation between "social organizations."

During the Belgrade meeting, outstanding Soviet-Yugoslav differences were not settled but appear to have been ignored by mutual agreement. Khrushchev told the Bulgarian party congress on 3 June 1958 that Tito agreed to forget past differences and establish a new basis for relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Khrushchev said that the Soviet party was willing to do this even though it recognized that there remained "ideological differences on a number of important questions." His statement makes it clear that he expected the Yugoslavs gradually to conform to the Soviet viewpoint on these issues.

* Subsequently it has been reported that Khrushchev originally proposed that both Djilas and Beria be blamed for the break.

Khrushchev has claimed (in a speech to the East German party congress in Berlin on 11 July 1958) that during the Belgrade meeting the Soviet leaders made it clear that they felt the 1948 Cominform criticisms of Yugoslavia had been correct. There is other evidence that within the Soviet party at least, this position was maintained at that time. In accord with the agreement to ignore past differences, however, this question was apparently not stressed and was ignored in public statements. The Soviet leadership does appear to have been concerned at the Belgrade meeting with the problem of American aid to Yugoslavia and is believed to have asked unsuccessfully for Yugoslav assurances that this would soon end.

Yugoslavia's Role in New Soviet Bloc: Khrushchev's decision openly to seek Yugoslav membership in "the socialist camp" was a bold move and perhaps an impetuous one which he had not thoroughly considered in all its implications. Khrushchev recognized that Tito did not want to become dependent on the West and did not feel comfortable in his Western alignment. He seems, however, to have underestimated Yugoslavia's passion for independence. He overestimated the attractions for Yugoslavia to return to the "socialist" fold. An optimistic and militant Communist, Khrushchev believed there was no place for "socialist" states outside "the socialist camp." A Pravda editorial on 16 July 1955 reflected his views.

> Adherence to the necessary socialist foreign and domestic policy, the expansion and strengthening of political and economic ties, and cooperation on the part of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies are of great importance to the further development of Yugoslavia along the road of socialism.

Khrushchev's aims with regard to Yugoslavia cannot be understood except in the context of his plans for replacing the Stalinist methods of control over the satellites. He intended to develop a more loosely knit bloc, with control based less on force and economic exploitation. He apparently had not carefully thought out his plans, however, or clarified his intentions enough so that other bloc leaders knew what to expect. He had certainly not fully appreciated the risks of the new policy.

Khrushchev's plan for the Soviet bloc both permitted and necessitated the reincorporation of Yugoslavia. In a more loosely knit bloc, it would be possible to permit Yugoslavia--at least temporarily--an extraordinary degree of freedom of action. Conversely, in a period of liberalization, Yugoslavia

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might be a source of dissension if it were permitted to remain as an independent center of Communism. Khrushchev was taking the risk that Yugoslavia might have a greater unsettling effect if it were encouraged to expand its contacts with the satellites while the party rapprochement was in process and Yugoslavia was still largely independent. Parenthetically, it should be noted that Khrushchev's revised concept of the bloc was not only intended to accommodate Yugoslavia but to recognize the fact of China's more independent position. The trip to Belgrade in May 1955 followed Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to Peiping in the autumn of 1954.

The Soviet leaders had other reasons for seeking a rapprochement with Tito. Their action, showing that Stalinism was dead, contributed to the general Soviet campaign for reduced tensions and improved relations with the West. This had an important, but only temporary, effect on world opinion. As the Soviet objective became more clearly one of drawing Yugoslavia back into the bloc, it appeared menacing rather than reassuring to the West. The entire campaign stimulated Western distrust of Yugoslavia and consequently weakened Yugoslavia's ties with the West, making Belgrade more dependent on the USSR.

Achievements and Obstacles in the First Year: In the year that followed the Belgrade visit in May 1955, Soviet-Yugoslav governmental relations boomed. There were agreements on trade, loans, and nuclear cooperation. Ideological differences were not apparent in the press. Although Yugoslavia sent no delegation to the 20th party congress, Tito did dispatch a cordial message. While informal talks may have occurred, there were no formal contacts or discussions at the party level during this first year. The Yugoslavs warmly welcomed the decisions of the party congress which pointed to further liberalization in Soviet policies and seemed to cater to Yugoslav principles. The attack on Stalin revealed later was especially welcome to Belgrade. The dissolution of the Cominform in April 1956 was also considered to be a concession to Tito.

The first year was climaxed by Tito's visit to the Soviet Union in early June 1956. Khrushchev and Tito signed a communiqué calling for the "further development of relations and cooperation" between the two parties, implying there had been some previous unpublicized relations. The communiqué listed some specific forms of contact--delegations, exchange of literature, and meetings of party leaders--and it spelled out in more detail the principles of the Belgrade declaration drawn up a year earlier which were dear to the Yugoslavs.

> The ways of socialist development vary in different countries and conditions, the wealth of forms of the development of socialism contributes to its strength.... Cooperation should be based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely exchange of views on the contentious issues between our parties.

Behind this facade of agreement, however, certain major disagreements continued to exist between Tito and Khrushchev, some of which were suggested by events during the Moscow meeting. The fundamental difference involved the question of Yugoslav participation in the bloc. In the final speeches in Moscow, Khrushchev spoke of a "monolithic closing of ranks and unity among the socialist countries." He stressed the paramount importance of unity among the bloc states and the role that interparty cooperation played in creating such unity; he implied that Yugoslav-Soviet party relations were essential in order to achieve a similar unity between the two states. He asserted that Western "friendship" for Yugoslavia was false, intended only for the malicious purpose of winning Yugoslavia away from "socialism." Tito, by contrast, emphasized that there were different "roads to socialism" and that "our way, too, differs somewhat from the road you traversed." He stressed Yugoslavia's interest in continued good relations with nonbloc countries.

There were numerous reports, some of them not received until later, of specific differences that underlay these contrasting speeches. The USSR was critical of Yugoslav dependence on trade and aid from the West. There were sharp ideological debates in Moscow. The USSR allegedly pressed Yugoslavia to join a new international Communist organization. Moscow also reportedly criticized Yugoslavia's failure to recognize East Germany.

Tito disclosed later in his Pula speech on 11 November 1956 that differences over formulations on party relations in the Moscow declaration were

> a little difficult to settle. Here we could not completely agree but, nevertheless, the declaration was issued which, in our opinion, is intended for a wider circle than Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. We warned that those tendencies which once provoked such strong resistance in Yugoslavia existed in all countries, and that one day they might find expression in other countries, too, when this would be far more difficult to correct.

Tito also claimed to have argued that

> Rakosi's regime and Rakosi himself had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state and to bring about inner unity, but that, on the contrary, their actions could only bring about grave consequences. Unfortunately, the Soviet comrades did not believe us.... The Soviet comrades said he (Rakosi) was prudent, that he was going to succeed, and that they knew of no one else on whom they could rely in that country.

Mounting Crisis in the Satellites: In the last half of 1956, while Yugoslavia was resisting Soviet efforts to curb its independence and avoiding incorporation in "the socialist camp," Tito also increased his pressure on Moscow for liberalization in the satellites. Yugoslavia did not want to be bound by the obligations of a bloc member, but it was eager to assert the privilege of advising Moscow on satellite problems. This conflict over the satellites was a very serious obstacle to improving Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

Tito later charged that Moscow had failed to apply the principles of the Belgrade and Moscow declarations to its relations with the satellites. It is certain that Moscow had no intention of extending to the satellites the degree of freedom of action it was willing to extend, at least temporarily, to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav demands for liberalization in Eastern Europe coincided with the first spark of revolt in the satellites, the Poznan riots in Poland late in June 1956. These and other signs of unrest in the satellites, and to a lesser extent the chaos in Western Communist parties following the denigration of Stalin, inspired a series of impassioned edicts by Moscow for unity in the Communist ranks.

A central committee resolution issued in Moscow on 30 June 1956 warned that bourgeois ideologists were seeking to sow confusion in international Communist ranks. On 16 July, Pravda denounced "national Communism." Bulganin, speaking in Warsaw on 21 July, warned that opportunists in some "socialist" countries were aiding the imperialists in attempts to weaken international "socialism under the banner of so-called 'national peculiarities.'" Moscow realized that it had underestimated the centrifugal forces at work within the bloc and consequently the dangerous results both of its own steps to relax controls and of the theories advocated by Yugoslavia and given some lip service by Moscow.

The repeated Soviet attacks on national Communism and the stern demands for unity and uniformity were viewed in Belgrade with serious concern. The final straw was a secret circular letter which the Russians sent to the satellites in early September warning them against following the Yugoslav example and citing the USSR as the proper model.

These difficulties precipitated a two-stage meeting between Khrushchev and Tito in September 1956, first in Yugoslavia and then in the Crimea. The satellites were presumably the main subject of conversation. Tito later said publicly that Yugoslavia was advocating further liberalization while the Soviet leaders resisted. The serious differences which had led to the meeting clearly persisted at its end. Tito suggested in his Pula speech that during this meeting "Stalinist elements"--presumably not Khrushchev--were influential in the Soviet leadership. There is no evidence, however, that Khrushchev had lost control of policy toward Yugoslavia at that date. On the contrary, it seems evident that Khrushchev was just as concerned over developments in the satellites and just as reluctant to take Tito's advice as were other Soviet leaders.

The Effect of Hungary: The upheaval in Poland and especially the revolution in Hungary at the end of October shook the foundations of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. There followed several months of polemics, primarily in the press, between the two countries. These arguments revealed more clearly the underlying differences between Moscow and Belgrade which had been aggravated by the upheavals in Eastern Europe.

Tito's frank speech at Pula on 11 November 1956 laid bare the disputes over conditions in the satellites that had preceded the Polish and Hungarian upheavals. He charged Soviet and satellite leaders with timidity in making reforms, continued subservience to Stalinist principles, and consequently responsibility for the upheavals. He claimed that changes in the Soviet system itself were necessary if a revival of Stalinism was to be prevented. He questioned Soviet willingness to carry out the principles of the Belgrade and Moscow declarations as they applied to the satellites. Other Yugoslav leaders emphasized that the primary issue was the Soviet insistence on bringing Yugoslavia into "the socialist camp" and Belgrade's determination to remain independent.

In a series of newspaper editorials and high-level statements during the winter of 1956-1957, the Soviet leadership spelled out its policies toward the bloc and Yugoslavia. Moscow elaborated a formula which recognized both the principles of unity among "socialist" countries and "national variations," but it gave greater emphasis to the former aim.

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> Given unity of purpose with a view to securing the victory of socialism, varying forms and methods of the solution of the concrete problems of socialism may be applied in various countries, in accordance with historic and national peculiarities. (Pravda, 23 November 1956).
>
> He who, like Rakosi and Gero, cannot and will not correctly and creatively apply the basic principles of Communism to national state conditions inflicts great harm on our cause. He who puts national state differences in first place forgets the basic principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and inflicts no less harm on the cause of socialism. (Pravda, 18 December 1956)
>
> Concrete and objective conditions determine the creative variety of the only road to socialist progress in different countries. (Pravda, 23 November 1956)

Pravda denied that the USSR demanded submission from anyone and it asserted that mistakes in relations with the satellites and Yugoslavia had been corrected. But unity remained the strongest theme in the Soviet argument.

Moscow emphasized occasionally the leading role of the USSR in the bloc. Kommunist said that all Communist parties looked to the historical experience of the Soviet Union as an example to follow but that some Yugoslavs took just the opposite attitude. According to Pravda of 11 March 1957,

> in the mutual relations of socialist countries, relations with the Soviet Union as the first country of victorious socialism, as a state which has accumulated the richest experience in socialist building during 40 years of its history, are of no small significance.

Moscow's few references to "national Communism" were in critical terms. In January 1957 Khrushchev called it a divisive tool used by the enemies of the working class. He warned that the legitimate variations in socialism in different countries must not be given priority and could not invalidate the "basic laws of the Socialist Revolution." The communiqué signed in

Budapest on 6 January by leaders of the USSR and four satellites (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria) warned that the "false slogan of the so-called 'national Communism'" was being used by imperialists to undermine international Communist unity.

In addition to these general pronouncements with obvious implications for the Yugoslavs, Moscow directed some attacks specifically at Belgrade. In November 1956, Pravda charged Yugoslavia with claiming that its "road to socialism" was the correct one, interfering in the internal affairs of other "socialist" states, and trying to divide "the socialist camp." Pravda criticized some aspects of the "Yugoslav road," particularly its dependence on Western aid, which Moscow claimed was an unstable basis on which to "build socialism." The newspaper also said that some Yugoslav leaders were guilty of deviations from Marxist-Leninist theory and the principles of proletarian internationalism but said that Moscow would be tolerant and patient in reaching agreement on such questions.

The line that Moscow was developing publicly during the winter of 1956-1957 was not a new one. But as long as these principles had not been made explicit, they did not have a divisive effect on Soviet-Yugoslav relations. When the Hungarian revolt split the USSR and Yugoslavia, these underlying issues rose to the surface and made it difficult to repair the break. The views expressed in Moscow endorsing unity and criticizing "national" Communism probably reflected rather accurately Khrushchev's views in that period. All of the Soviet leaders obviously thought it necessary to discredit Yugoslavia in the Communist world and to isolate it from the East European satellites as much as possible. At the same time governmental relations cooled, and in February 1957 promised Soviet loans were indefinitely postponed.

Although it seems likely that Khrushchev agreed with the direction of this policy as a temporary tactic, it seems doubtful that he was responsible for the full intensity of the anti-Yugoslav campaign. This was a time when there were reports that Khrushchev was under fire within the Soviet leadership from such men as Molotov because of the apparent failure of his policy toward the satellites and Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's later policy suggests he was probably still determined to heal the breach with Yugoslavia and make another attempt to restore it to the bloc. Some of the Soviet tactics after the Hungarian revolt, however, seemed calculated to destroy the prospects for a reconciliation between Moscow and Belgrade. The polemics against Yugoslavia lasted as long as Moscow appeared seriously worried about re-establishing stability in the bloc and nearly as long

as Molotov retained a place on the presidium. With the easing of the crisis in the bloc, Khrushchev began again to talk of better relations with Yugoslavia.

A Pragmatic Rapprochement: During the visit of Albanian leaders to Moscow in mid-April 1957, Khrushchev emphasized the Soviet desire for a restoration of good relations with Yugoslavia. He thought this could be accomplished by emphasizing points of agreement rather than differences; the latter he thought were greatest in the ideological field. Pravda echoed this theme on 2 June. This was the principle that was to guide the revival of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Theoretical differences were ignored rather than resolved. Polemics in the newspapers of both countries came to a virtual halt. In mid-May Moscow allegedly sent a directive to the satellites advising them for the time being to improve their relations with Yugoslavia despite ideological differences.

The dismissal of Molotov from the party presidium in June 1957 was a new spur to the rapprochement. The central committee statement on the June purge of the "anti-party group" of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich in Moscow cited Molotov's mistakes in policy toward Yugoslavia. Shortly afterward, Khrushchev made an impromptu speech in Czechoslovakia that provided a clear description of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia.

> Marxist convictions demand that we advance with all revolutionary forces. The front of the revolutionary working class must be broadened, and Yugoslavia must not be deprived of this front. So we did everything to achieve that. I consider that at present conditions are forming between us and Yugoslavia that will improve relations both between our countries and between our parties, and we will make every effort to reach complete, so to say, unity and ideological understanding and unanimity of action of the revolutionary force and Communist parties of the whold world, including Yugoslavia!... What do we want? We want unity, closed ranks, and rallied forces. We acknowledge different paths, comrades. But among the different paths, there is one general path, and the others are, as you know, like a big river with tributaries.... We must develop friendly relations between the socialist countries, between our Communist and workers' parties,

> and strengthen our socialist camp in every way. Of course, it is true that our friends, the Yugoslavs, somehow badly pronounce the words "socialist camp." However, Yugoslavia is a socialist country and this fact remains.

Khrushchev warned that the two countries should avoid criticism of each other's internal policies and he again cautioned Yugoslavia about its dependence on American aid.

The next major step in the rapprochement was the meeting between Khrushchev and Tito in Rumania early in August 1957. How much agreement resulted from this meeting is not clear; the press statement following it was vague, shedding no light on the outcome of the talks. Soviet propaganda concerning the meeting stressed the importance of the unity of aims and interests between the two countries and said that the prospects for cooperation had been improved by the ouster of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich. The frequently well-informed Italian Communist paper L'Unita said that the two leaders discussed Yugoslavia's relations with "the socialist camp" and Belgrade's economic ties with the West. Yugoslav officials confirmed to Westerners that Yugoslavia's relations with the bloc were a subject of debate and also said that there were differences over the statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting.

Later, Khrushchev (in a 3 June 1958 speech in Sofia) claimed that the Bucharest meeting left certain ideological questions unsettled. He asserted, however, that the Yugoslavs agreed to attend the November 1957 party meeting in Moscow and to participate in drawing up the party declaration there. It also appears likely that the Yugoslav agreement to recognize East Germany, announced in mid-October, was reached at the Bucharest meeting. There have been reports that the two sides agreed to avoid polemics and keep any future disagreements from becoming public. Khrushchev said in his Sofia speech that he warned the Yugoslavs that Moscow would reply to any Yugoslav criticisms of bloc countries or parties. For a considerable time after the Bucharest meeting, the two sides did avoid bitter public exchanges.

Moscow's Satellite Policy: Soviet policy toward the Eastern European satellites has been a major determinant of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's liberalization of controls over the satellites made possible the original rapprochement with Tito; the Hungarian revolt caused the first breakdown in relations with Belgrade; and the effort to intensify controls in the satellites has been a primary cause of the most recent breakdown.

While the USSR had been trying to establish stability and unity in the satellites ever since the Hungarian revolt, the most formal and important step taken in that direction was the November 1957 conference in Moscow. On this occasion, the USSR succeeded in winning bloc-wide acknowledgment of the necessity of bloc unity. Moreover, it created the precedent for similar meetings in the future--such as that held in May 1958--as a technique for ensuring unity. At that time, also, the preliminary decision was taken to publish a theoretical journal--although it did not appear until August 1958. While the USSR would probably have preferred a more formal organization, this apparently was resisted by some Communist parties; a series of ad hoc meetings, however, should serve most of Moscow's purposes.

Marshal Tito's decision not to attend the November conference in Moscow and the Yugoslav refusal to participate in talks on the 12-party declaration or to sign it undermined the newly reborn Moscow-Belgrade rapprochment. At the East German party congress in Berlin (on 11 July 1958) Khrushchev said the Yugoslavs had seen an advance copy of the party declaration. The Yugoslavs have recently confided that this draft was so bitterly anti-Western that at the time they realized they could not possibly sign it, since this would commit them completely to the bloc. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union subsequently modified certain formulations for the benefit of the Yugoslavs, but these modifications were nullified by Mao's proposals at the November meeting which were unacceptable to the Yugoslavs. There were also rumors that Soviet leaders had revised a speech Tito proposed to make in Moscow, which so provoked the Yugoslav leader that he refused to attend. Whatever the reason for the Yugoslav abstention, the apparent lack of Soviet interest in negotiating revisions in the declaration to suit Yugoslavia indicates how much greater was the priority Moscow attached to solidifying bloc unity. The dismissal of Marshal Zhukov on his return from Yugoslavia shortly before the Moscow conference had also increased the friction between Moscow and Belgrade.

The Soviet position on intrabloc relations was spelled out in Khrushchev's speech on 6 November and in the 12-party declaration of 22 November: unity and agreement on fundamentals are essential within the bloc. The variations to be permitted are in the details of executing policy. The Soviet Union, with the help of "other socialist" countries, has already established the "high road to socialism." For each country to start looking for "some kind of completely new, artificial road to socialism" would play into the hands of the imperialists who are trying to promote divisive theories of "national Communism." "Revisionism" is the greatest danger in the bloc, although in some bloc parties dogmatism may be a more pressing problem at a given time. Intrabloc

relations are based on equality, independence, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual aid. All "socialist" countries must accept certain basic laws, including the leadership of the Communist party, public ownership of the basic means of production, gradual socialization of agriculture, and "proletarian internationalism." All the signers of the Moscow Declaration also accepted the pre-eminence of the USSR in "the socialist camp."

Following the November 1957 meeting in Moscow the USSR intensified its efforts to keep the satellites in line, and its propaganda line reflected strong concern with the problem of "revisionism." Several of the satellites stepped up their efforts to collectivize agriculture, and in April Kommunist urged that these efforts be further intensified, especially in those satellites which are furthest advanced in socialization. The Soviet bloc Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) met in December and held a high-level meeting in May as the USSR sought to effect an increase in economic integration and industrial specialization in the bloc that would serve political as well as economic ends. A meeting in May of bloc party and governmental leaders also appeared aimed at achieving greater political unity in the bloc. There were a series of visits within the bloc by various bloc leaders, including Khrushchev--who went to Hungary in April, to Bulgaria in June, and to East Germany in July. In June the execution of Nagy et al and reports of subsequent trials in Hungary provided even stronger evidence of Soviet intentions to impose conformity on the bloc. Even if the Hungarian trials are not duplicated elsewhere, they have served as a stern warning to other Eastern European states. The bloc is likely to continue holding more frequent consultations, as the USSR seeks to minimize political and economic controversy among the satellites and to obtain recognition of Soviet hegemony in principle.

Period of Watchful Waiting: From the November 1957 conference in Moscow until the Yugoslav party platform was published in mid-March 1958, Soviet-Yugoslav relations appeared to be at a standstill. There were no major steps toward improving relations, such as high-level visits or publicly announced agreements--although on international questions the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry appeared to echo every Soviet position. On the other hand, there were no outbursts of polemics. The Soviet press and radio studiously ignored Yugoslavia's--a tactic which Tito finally complained of in mid-March.

Khrushchev's remark, however, at the East German party congress, that the bloc parties "drew their own conclusions" from the Yugoslav behavior at the time of the November conference is supported by other reports*. Khrushchev clearly set great store by the November conference, and by Yugoslav participation in it. He had tried patiently but unsuccessfully for well over two years to bring Tito back into the bloc, even to the point of risking the unity of "the socialist camp." The November meeting accordingly represented the culmination of all his long-drawn-out efforts, and he apparently had had reason to believe from Tito's assurances in Bucharest three months earlier that Yugoslavia would participate in some way in the bloc declaration. Thus, his disappointment was the more extreme and, as indicated by his reported remark to Kardelj, his attitude toward Yugoslavia perceptibly hardened. Tito's unwillingness to abandon his independence and either join the bloc on favorable terms or break his links with the West was not clear. Tito's reluctance to forego Western aid was particularly offensive to Khrushchev, and Pravda's emphasis on it as an issue when the break occurred in May 1958 suggests that it was one of the major reasons for Soviet frustration with Yugoslavia. The announcement in December that Yugoslavia would not receive further military aid was only a limited concession because it did not apply to economic aid.

Despite the hardening in the Soviet attitude toward Tito which resulted from the events in November, the Soviet leaders were determined to learn from Stalin's mistake of 1948 and avoid making a martyr of Tito. Soviet-Yugoslav relations were to continue with correct but cool formality until some Yugoslav initiative should present the Soviet leaders with a suitable excuse to make an open break.

The Yugoslav Party Congress: The party congress and particularly its preliminary draft program provided the chance for which the Soviet leaders had been waiting. Moscow could not ignore the congress; it was forced to either send a delegation or boycott it. Moreover, if it decided on a boycott, other members of the bloc must be prevented from attending in order to maintain bloc unity. Moscow therefore criticized the Yugoslav draft party program, not only because it challenged the Soviet gospel but because a public justification of the boycott was required.

* According to [redacted] when Kardelj and Rankovic went to Moscow without Tito and were unwilling to sign, despite earlier assurances they were cold-shouldered by the other delegates. Finally, Khrushchev saw Kardelj alone and told him "All right, it's your decision, but if that is your decision then we are going to attack you."

Yugoslavia released the party program on 13 March. On 5 April Moscow privately informed Belgrade that no Soviet delegation would attend the party congress, but not until 18 April did the Soviet Kommunist article criticizing the Yugoslav party program appear. Prior to that date there was no public Soviet comment. In the interim, however, Moscow, and some of the Eastern European parties engaged in private negotiations supposedly aimed at obtaining modifications in the Yugoslav program. Khrushchev met with the Yugoslav ambassador on 15 April apparently to discuss the program. On 17 April the Yugoslavs announced some modifications, apparently intended to meet some of the Soviet party's objections and perhaps those of other Communist parties, particularly in the area of foreign policy and in references to the Soviet and Western blocs. Some of the points Kommunist criticized had been revised by the Yugoslavs on the previous day. Kommunist had gone to press on 15 April. Possibly the Yugoslavs had already offered these revisions in private talks with the Russians, only to have them rejected as inadequate. The Kommunist article did include expressions of hope that the Yugoslav congress would make changes in the program, but it is unlikely that Moscow at that point expected Belgrade to retreat.

Intensification of the Controversy: In order to estimate the present objectives of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia, it is necessary to survey briefly the developments following the Belgrade congress in May 1958. On 5 May the Chinese Communist party newspaper, People's Daily, printed a sharp personal attack on Tito, echoed verbatim the following day in Pravda, that labeled the Yugoslavs reactionaries and called the 1948 Cominform resolution basically correct. The Soviet party central committee probably discussed Yugoslavia during a plenary meeting on 6 and 7 May, although this was never admitted publicly. On 9 May Pravda sharpened the attack, clearly threatening to stop aid to Yugoslavia and warning that state relations could not improve if party relations deteriorated. The Soviet party reportedly sent a letter to the Yugoslav party stating that it was up to Yugoslavia to change its independent policies if relations were to be improved. On 11 May Belgrade announced that Voroshilov had canceled a previously scheduled visit to Yugoslavia, and on 27 May the USSR announced a five-year postponement of its program of credits for Yugoslavia.

On 3 June in a speech to the Bulgarian party congress Khrushchev broke his curiously long silence on the Yugoslav dispute and for the first time savagely attacked the Yugoslav regime. Seeking to overcome any impressions of intrabloc differences on Yugoslav policy, he called the Chinese and other

bloc criticisms of Yugoslavia fully justified. He echoed Peiping's description of the 1948 Cominform resolution as fundamentally correct and maintained that the Yugoslav party platform represented a fundamental revision of Marxist-Leninist theory containing insulting appraisals of bloc parties. Khrushchev asserted, however, Moscow's continued interest in party contacts with Belgrade if the Yugoslavs yielded on points of ideology, and if party relations were impossible, the USSR would still "develop normal relations with Yugoslavia on the state plane."

In speeches on 11 and 12 July in Berlin and Moscow, Khrushchev again emphasized that the dispute with Yugoslavia was an ideological one involving Belgrade's attempt to split "the socialist camp" with its "revisionist" theories. He avoided any threat of breaking state relations and tried to rebut the charge that Moscow had used the withdrawal of aid as pressure on Belgrade. He insisted that the suspension of aid followed naturally and necessarily from what was in effect Yugoslavia's formal withdrawal from "the socialist camp." Except for certain underdeveloped areas, the USSR could not afford to aid nonbloc countries, although it always welcomed mutually profitable trade.

In the light of the evidence of the Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia, Soviet sensitivity to the Yugoslav party platform, which was in effect an indictment of much of Soviet policy and practice, is not difficult to explain, particularly when the Soviet party had failed to come up with a new program of its own since 1919. The Kremlin's initial criticism was much more restrained, however, than what subsequently appeared in the USSR and other bloc countries, and it avoided threats to damage state relations. Moreover, Moscow had originally announced Voroshilov's visit to Yugoslavia, apparently as evidence of its desire to maintain good state relations, shortly after informing Belgrade privately that it could not send delegations to the Yugoslav party congress. Many theories have been developed to explain why later bloc attacks on Yugoslavia became so intense and embittered and why Moscow then extended the party dispute into the area of state relations. While these theories have been and may yet be extensively debated, a few observations here may be pertinent.

It is possible, although extremely unlikely in view of previous events, that Moscow felt its public and private criticisms would lead to a reversal of Yugoslav policy at the party congress. When this did not occur, Moscow abandoned its restraint. It may have been that the initial restraint was merely a tactical pose of reasonableness and that Moscow intended to intensify the attack later. The USSR could have been waiting for other bloc

members, such as China, to take the lead in order to avoid the impression that this was just a bilateral dispute. It may, in addition, have anticipated the sharp Yugoslav reaction at the party congress and felt that this would then justify a stronger Soviet line of attack. It is also possible that this dispute began to snowball into a major break because a more violent Yugoslav reaction materialized than Moscow had anticipated.

These explanations all contain some logic. While Moscow may have believed that its original criticisms would be sufficient to discredit Yugoslavia in Communist eyes and to isolate it from the satellites, there are other possible explanations for the intensification of the dispute that could have far-reaching implications.

One possibility is that Khrushchev was under pressure from other Soviet leaders to break more completely with Tito. Khrushchev was personally associated with the policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia from the beginning. It seems likely that this fact accounts in large part for the persistence of Soviet attempts to salvage the rapprochement even after the Hungarian revolt and repeated Yugoslav refusals to join the bloc had demonstrated the failure of Khrushchev's policy. This paper has also sought to demonstrate, however, that Khrushchev's views on Yugoslavia's relations with the bloc were sharply at variance with Tito's and that Khrushchev became increasingly disillusioned with Yugoslav policies. It seems probable, and his subsequent statements reinforce the view, that Khrushchev himself considered it necessary to attack the Yugoslav party platform and to brand Tito as an ideological heretic. He may have been reluctant to make a complete shift in his policy, however, and to force any more of a break with Yugoslavia than was necessary to save the satellites from contamination by Belgrade. Some of the shifts in Moscow's tactics during this period could have resulted from differences inside the Kremlin, not over the basic direction of policy toward Belgrade but over how far it should be carried. Khrushchev's more recent speeches, which have avoided some of the clear implications of a break in state relations evident earlier, may mean that Khrushchev won a victory for a compromise position. It certainly appears that, whatever disagreements he may have encountered over Yugoslav policy, Khrushchev maintained political authority in Moscow.

The harshness of Chinese attacks on Yugoslavia and the fact that several specific charges against Belgrade were made by Moscow only after they had been made by Peiping have led to speculation that Chinese pressure resulted in the intensification of the Soviet attack on Belgrade. Here again, there is so much evidence

of growing Soviet disillusionment with Yugoslavia that Chinese pressure is not necessary to explain the original Soviet decision to attack the Yugoslav party platform. It can be argued that the promptness with which Moscow reprinted Chinese criticisms of Tito, and Khrushchev's public endorsement of the Chinese attacks as just, indicate some coordination of Sino-Soviet treatment of the dispute with Tito. It is possible, that Moscow preferred to have the sharpest attacks come from other members of the bloc. However, the Soviet leaders may not have anticipated the degree of savagery of the Chinese attack, which seems most plausibly prompted by Peiping's own domestic concern since the spring of 1957, with the dangers of "revisionism." To preserve appearances of unity, then, the Kremlin may have had to intensify its own position but, after the point had been made and it was possible to discuss the situation at length and with calmness, again obtained agreement for its more restrained line.

Even though some such Chinese pressure is plausible it does not seem reasonable to assign to China a major role in changing Soviet policy in this area of concern. Even less likely is a combination of theories in reports emanating largely from Warsaw: that Chinese leaders plotted jointly with Khrushchev's opponents in the Soviet leadership to force a change in his policy toward Yugoslavia. The Chinese went out of their way in November 1957 to praise a cluster of Khrushchev's policies, and in the following May to approve his past efforts (with which they had been associated) to effect a rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

One further explanation is that the reluctance of some East European parties, particularly the Polish and to some extent Hungarian parties, to join in the attack on Yugoslavia led Khrushchev to believe that he must intensify his attack on Belgrade in order to accomplish his purposes in the satellites. This paper has sought to demonstrate that Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia is inextricably tied to Soviet policy toward the satellites and that the decision to condemn the Yugoslav party platform was originally taken to undermine Tito's standing in Eastern Europe and to assure that the satellite parties would boycott the Yugoslav congress as well as cut party ties with Belgrade. The condemnation of Yugoslavia represented, above all, an increase in pressure on Poland. Poland was slow and cautious in joining the criticism of Yugoslavia. Moscow and Peiping may both have felt that, as a result, it was necessary to take a more rigid stand, and to make the condemnation of Yugoslavia so strong that Poland would not dare to try to find a middle ground on which to stand.

In this connection, too, the harsher line adopted by the Chinese against Tito would demonstrate once and for all to the Poles that they could not hope to play off China against the USSR in order to get support for their own position within "the socialist camp."

The USSR did not begin to break with Yugoslavia until it was evident that the policy of winning that country back into the bloc had failed. The criticisms of Yugoslavia were not made with the primary hope of winning Yugoslavia back, therefore, nor in the hope of crushing the Yugoslav party. Rather they were designed to preserve intact what Moscow still had in the bloc. There were probably private debates between Moscow and Warsaw that revealed more clearly to Khrushchev than any public disputes how necessary it had become to tighten discipline in the bloc. (The substance of his talks with Gomulka in January are still not known.) The Hungarian executions are the strongest proof that such discipline seemed necessary to Moscow. If the Yugoslav situation is placed in proper perspective as part of the broader satellite problem, and the dangers of Polish nonconformity are kept in mind, the intensification of the attacks on Yugoslavia appears to have been motivated primarily by an increasing struggle to assert Soviet authority over the satellites.

CONCLUSION

At the end of July Khrushchev traveled to Peiping for talks with Mao Tse-tung and on 3 August 1958 the two issued a joint communiqué which proclaimed that

> The unshakable unity of the two Marxist-Leninist parties will forever be the reliable guarantee of the triumph of our common cause.
>
> The Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist party of China will unflaggingly guard this sacred unity, will fight for the purity of Marxism-Leninism, will uphold the principles of the Moscow Declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties and will wage an irreconcilable struggle against the chief danger of the Communist movement, revisionism. This revisionism has found clear expression in the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Following this statement of common purpose by the leading members, and despite its emphasis on ideology, i.e., "revisionism," bloc policy toward Tito soon began to shift from ideological attack to criticism in general of Yugoslavia and its policies. By the end of the summer of 1958 the Sino-Soviet leaders may well have felt that their ideological attacks were becoming counterproductive. Rather than direct attention specifically to Yugoslav theory, they decided to move into the next phase of the campaign: coordinated political and economic pressure on Tito for the purpose of further weakening his position and influence at home and abroad.

The USSR, Communist China, and Albania undertook the initial moves. Moscow restricted the distribution of Yugoslav publications in the USSR, vacillated regarding promised shipments of wheat and coal to Yugoslavia, and attacked Belgrade for alleged discrimination against Soviet citizens in customs procedures. The Chinese "relieved" their ambassador in Belgrade, and, according to the Yugoslavs, began to boycott Yugoslav ships and ports. Albania renewed its old tactics of diplomatic protests and retaliation for alleged mistreatment of its nationals in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria joined Albania by reopening attacks on Yugoslavia's "chauvinistic" policy in Macedonia. The other satellites, except for Poland which was relatively inactive, have contributed varyingly to the anti-Yugoslav campaign.

Thus the lines were drawn again for isolating Yugoslavia from any participation in the affairs of "the socialist camp:" But in 1958 there was to be none of the 1948 Stalinist heavyhandedness. Khrushchev had told the East German party congress in Berlin on 11 July that "we must not devote more attention to Yugoslav revisionists than they are worth," but he wished to "preserve some spark of hope and to search for acceptable forms of making contact on certain questions" with the Yugoslavs. Subsequently, however, while maintaining that they wished to conduct correct state relations with Belgrade, the USSR and other bloc countries were trying to impose an effective quarantine on Tito by a campaign of harassment and irritation.

The Yugoslavs, in the meantime, sought to give the impression of a reasonable attitude, commenting publicly and quickly on bloc discriminatory practices and stoutly asserting the correctness of their own policies.

By the end of September 1958 it appeared that this stalemate could continue indefinitely. Each side had its own reasons for avoiding an open break: Moscow and Peiping wished to destroy the influence of Titoism in the satellites but did not care to make Tito a martyr again; Tito did not wish to lose whatever influence he still had in Eastern Europe and, as a Communist, was not anxious to cut himself off from the bloc. Perhaps the best commentary on contemporary Yugoslav - Soviet bloc relations was the 29 September Borba report that the Chinese Communist Embassy in Prague had recently asked the Yugoslav ambassador there to return his invitation to a Chinese party for "correction." The only correction made, according to the Yugoslav newspaper, was to change the address from "comrade" to "mister." "And so," concluded Borba, "at the last minute, a dangerous rightist deviation was avoided and at the same time another decisive blow was delivered to revisionism."