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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(Reference Title: CAESAR XIII-61)

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SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

This is a working paper. It traces chronologically the development of aspects of Soviet policy toward colonial areas and the countries regarded by Moscow as having achieved various degrees of independence from "imperialism." The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome comment on this paper, addressed to Lyman Wilkison, who wrote the paper, or to the acting coordinator of the group, in Room 2549 "M" Building

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SUMMARY

Moscow's preoccupation in the period 1945-55 with the task of reconstructing the Soviet homeland, with the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the bloc, and with developments in Western Europe--the main focus of East-West friction--for a decade precluded a dynamic policy in peripheral areas: non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although on numerous public occasions Lenin and Stalin had expressed great optimism over trends in colonial areas, Communist agitation and Soviet action in these areas--until World War II shattered the existing social structure in large sections of Asia and speeded up the tempo of political, economic, and social change on a world-wide scale--had been singularly unsuccessful.

The USSR's failure in late 1945 to adopt a bold program to capture or guide the anticolonialist movements which had matured during the war reflected not only the Soviet Union's desire not to embitter relations with the West on secondary matters, but also uncertainty as to the reliability of non-Communist leaders and movements and the general lack of a Soviet "presence." Stalin apparently evaluated the new governments as transitory, soon to give way before popular pressures in an inevitable evolution of political power to the left. The worsening of Soviet relations with the West was accompanied by a stiffening of Moscow's line in Asia. With the founding of the Cominform in September 1947, moderation toward non-Communists was repudiated conclusively--a decision which was reflected in 1948 in the widespread outbreak of Communist-led strike violence, terrorism, and armed rebellions not only in remaining colonial areas but also in the newly independent states of Asia. The Kremlin apparently believed that nothing further could be gained by Communist restraint or conciliation, and this view was abetted by Communist successes in China and by a consistent overevaluation of Communist party prospects elsewhere in Asia. Asian Communist parties, following Moscow's lead, began freely to prescribe a "Chinese way" for the anticolonialist movement; in essence this meant the encouragement of peasant and workers' armed revolts as well as intensified political struggle. The subsequent suppression of Communist-inspired revolts--with the notable exception of Indo-China--with heavy losses to Communist assets was a serious setback to Moscow's general line that the time was ripe for revolutionary upheavals in Asia.

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The world-wide crisis touched off in June 1950 by the Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea prompted the USSR to mobilize world Communist and non-Communist "peace" forces in support of its Korean policy. Moscow, however, was slow in recognizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and "neutralism" could be turned against the West; even after the war turned into a military and political stalemate and the Soviet Union's general attitude toward Asian non-Communist governments moderated, Stalin continued to rebuff neutralist efforts to bring about a compromise.

At a September 1951 ECAFE meeting in Singapore, Soviet delegates, in an abrupt reversal of their previous tactics, offered to help promote the economic development of Asian countries by exchanging Soviet machinery for local raw materials. At the UN, the Soviet Union's consistent anti-Westernism now was combined with limited overtures to non-Western delegations, a change reflected also in Soviet world-wide diplomatic activity--suggesting that Moscow had upgraded the possibilities for expanding its influence through traditional government-to-government channels. The extensive buildup given the Moscow Economic Conference (sponsored by the World Peace Council) in April 1952 suggested that Stalin also looked to increased economic contacts as a promising avenue for breaking out of the USSR's semi-isolation. The year 1952 also featured a shift toward greater Soviet diplomatic and propaganda support for the Arabs against Israel, to the encouragement of Arab extremists. Stalin's last major theoretical pronouncements pointed toward a greater emphasis on exploiting divergencies of interest between the industrially developed Western powers and the weakly developed or undeveloped "capitalist dependencies," but his continued rejection of a settlement on Korea acted as a powerful brake on Soviet efforts to get a friendship campaign rolling.

Stalin's successors reaffirmed his goals but discarded his methods and attempted to bring about a limited improvement in relations with the non-Communist world. The cumulative effect of minor steps undertaken by Soviet leaders in the six months following Stalin's death made it apparent that a fundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics toward underdeveloped countries was in progress. For the first time the Soviet Union announced its willingness--although qualified--to contribute to the UN's technical assistance program, and

Soviet Premier Malenkov declared a "good neighbor" policy and "a new approach" on economic aid to Asian countries.

The USSR's subsequent economic overtures attempted to play on local popular and governmental concern over export markets and desires for rapid economic development. Moscow's main attention in late 1953 and 1954 was to Asia, although interest in the Arab world increased with the new tempo of political, economic, and social change in the area. The Soviet Union paid little heed to non-Arab Africa or to Latin America--a tacit admission that they were more or less effectively sealed off from its influence.

A Moscow-directed world "peace" campaign, under way since 1950 in an attempt to exploit the universal fear of atomic warfare and generate pressures against military or political cooperation with the West, was intensified in 1954. The USSR extended diplomatic and propaganda support to countries involved in disputes with the West on territorial issues and other matters and stepped up its efforts to introduce detachments of Soviet specialists and technicians into Asian and Arab countries. The Soviet Union's tactical support for nationalist regimes such as those of Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir was based on the expectation that their greater self-assurance and self-expression would have the net effect of reducing Western influence and, to a degree, discrediting Western leadership.

The USSR's intention to seek a closer working agreement with Asian and Arab nationalist regimes was made clear by its February 1955 agreement to help finance and construct a major steel plant at Bhilai, India, and by the fervor of its efforts to identify itself with the views and objectives of the neutralist-convened conference of Asian and African governments at Bandung in April 1955. Moscow's attempts to accommodate its public posture to neutralist-nationalist sentiment was underlined dramatically in connection with the June visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru; having formerly attacked him for his anti-Communist and "pro-imperialist" policies, Moscow now praised him for his "spiritual" and political leadership of Asia.

On the eve of the 1955 Geneva summit conference, the USSR's "posture of peace" appeared to hold out the promise of an improvement in East-West relations and a general

reduction of international tension, not just in Europe but throughout the world. Concurrent with conciliatory moves, however, the Soviet Union set in motion a chain of secret arms negotiations with a group of Asian and Arab states designed to offset pro-Western alliances in the area, a tactic surfaced with the announcement that September of Cairo's arms deal with the bloc.

The Bulganian-Khrushchev visit to Asia in November and December 1955 was Moscow's first big chance to bid for support among Asian peoples. The two leaders dropped their Geneva smiles and attempted to give Asian neutralism a more anti-Western slant by identifying the USSR with Asian neutralist aims and "peace" and the West with "colonialism" and intervention. Agreements on increased trade, technical and cultural exchanges, and credits reached during the tour laid the groundwork for a considerable subsequent expansion of Soviet influence in the area.

The Khrushchev-dominated 20th party congress in February 1956 sought to create the impression that a new era was opening, bright with prospects of Communist victories. The new formulations of the congress were intended to add credibility to the Soviet Union's general line of "peaceful coexistence" and to facilitate long-term cooperation between the USSR and non-Communist countries. Khrushchev confirmed that aid to Asian, African, and Latin American countries for their economic, political, and cultural development was an important plank in Soviet foreign policy, designed to provide "a major stumbling block" to imperialism.

In the series of crises touched off by the collapse in July 1956 of Cairo's negotiations for Western economic assistance to build an Aswan high dam and Nasir's swift nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Moscow encouraged Cairo to resist Western demands. The Soviet Union's diplomatic and propaganda footwork following the attack on Egypt was intended to halt the fighting and embarrass the attacking countries without committing the USSR to all-out support of Nasir. After the cease-fire, Communist propagandists feasted on this "evidence" of imperialist intervention and magnified the Soviet role as protector of Arab interests.

Moscow's efforts in early 1957 to distract world attention from bloc internal troubles centered on a campaign to counter President Eisenhower's "Middle East Proposals"--i.e., to frustrate the extension of pro-Western defense

arrangements and to protect the newly won Soviet influence in some of the Arab countries. The Soviet Union's own growing foreign economic program could point to increased diplomatic and economic contacts both in Asia and in the Arab states, to dozens of new trade agreements with non-Communist countries, and to a generally enhanced impression that the USSR was a serious economic as well as political competitor with the West. Only a handful of countries, however, had agreed to extensive programs of Soviet economic and military aid or of economic aid alone.

Following the frustration in June 1957 of efforts by the "anti-party" group to break his control of the Soviet government and party, Khrushchev led the USSR into bolder foreign moves. Behind a facade of Soviet security interest in Syrian developments and in the context of intense political-psychological pressures following Soviet tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile and claims of a new world balance of power, Moscow set out to test Western reactions and Western resolution. After two months of efforts to intensify and prolong world fears over Syria, the USSR's abrupt reversal reflected apparent disappointment that it was the Arab states--rather than the West--which buckled under East-West pressures.

The USSR's 40th anniversary celebrations and subsequent meetings of world Communist parties in November 1957 reflected an effort to make direct political and propaganda capital out of changes wrought domestically and internationally in the years of Soviet rule. The essence of the new formal policy pronouncements was a call for an intensified struggle by all anti-imperialist elements against Western influence, with top priority to peace forces for a drive against the manufacture, test, or use of nuclear weapons. The practical effect of the party discussions on Soviet policy was slight, with the USSR continuing to profess willingness to enter into reasonable agreements with the West and to assist politically and economically in the development of countries seeking to break away from dependence on the West.

Moscow began 1958 riding the wave of optimism engendered by world-wide reaction to its military and space achievements, and it appeared to count on the cumulative effect over a period of years of the bloc's political, economic, and military aid program--combined with people-to-people contacts, intensive

propaganda, and growing local Communist agitation--to make a growing number of the underdeveloped countries materially dependent on the bloc and politically tractable. However, Nasir's precipitous move toward a merger of Egypt and Syria pointed up the Soviet problem of maintaining good state relations with nationalist governments while supporting the spread of Communist agitation and organization. The Soviet Union ended by grudgingly accepting the formation of the UAR--with its disastrous effects on the Syrian Communist party--and turned its attention to heading off any rapprochement between Nasir and the West, on the one hand by increasing its economic and military support to Cairo and on the other by continuing to fan anti-Western sentiment among the Arab populace.

The USSR's vigorous reaction to the Iraqi revolt on 14 July 1958 and the subsequent American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that these moves were a prelude to a general Western counteroffensive against Soviet and UAR interests in the Middle East. As in the earlier Syrian crisis, Moscow attempted to intensify the air of crisis, to discredit Western moves, and to force an immediate big-power conference to bring about a detente. The Soviet Union moved rapidly to develop close relations with the new Iraqi regime, evidently viewing it as an effective instrument for promoting anti-Western sentiment among Arabs. Anti-leftist coups in the fall of 1958 in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand prompted Moscow to urge on the peoples and governments of the underdeveloped countries a more resolute stand against reactionary influences, both domestic and international.

At the 21st party congress in early 1959 Khrushchev personally spotlighted ideological and political differences which had arisen in Moscow's political, economic, and military support of selected non-Communist countries--support based principally on parallel anti-Western interests rather than on compatible ideologies or common long-term goals. Khrushchev implied Soviet demands in the future for more consistent support of Soviet foreign policy in exchange for Soviet favors. The congress' endorsement of a more active line in underdeveloped countries was reflected in signs of a broadening and deepening of Soviet attention to African affairs and of attempts to step up economic, diplomatic, and cultural contacts with Latin American countries. The general strategy outlined at the congress reflected the USSR's apparent belief

that the stalemate in East-West relations facilitated rather than hampered its policy of driving a wedge between the Western and neutralist camps; support for the latter was justified on the basis that the conduct of the neutralists showed them to be supporters of peace and "well-disposed" toward the bloc.

In mid-1959, under the exigencies of its drive for detente with the West and in reaction to unfavorable developments within key underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union temporarily set aside its activist line in favor of overtures for strengthening friendly government-to-government relations. Moscow apparently hoped that Khrushchev's trip to the United States would help build irresistible popular pressure for an early summit meeting and pave the way for Western concessions. Khrushchev's disarmament initiative at the General Assembly session in New York, which included the promise of vastly greater economic assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America from both the bloc and the West once the arms race was over, was a transparent bid for support for immediate talks on disarmament.

In a different vein, Mikoyan's November 1959 visit to Mexico pointed up the new stage in Soviet efforts to exploit the economic difficulties of Latin American countries in the direction of expanded trade and other ties with the bloc; Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960 reinforced this tactic; at the same time it called attention to Moscow's appraisal that Castro's anti-Americanism opened an unprecedented opportunity for expanding Soviet influence throughout Latin America. Khrushchev's own highly publicized Asian trip in February and March 1960 probably was intended to halt the erosion of Soviet influence and popularity, which had suffered particularly as a result of friction between Peiping and other Far Eastern capitals, and generally to shore up Soviet positions and prestige.

Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks in May 1960 apparently in reaction to the U-2 incident and the dimming of prospects for Western concessions on any of the major outstanding international issues, prompted a major effort by Soviet spokesmen to absolve the USSR of any blame and to convince the world public that the United States alone was responsible. The U-2 incident was used as a pretext for a campaign to frighten America's allies into restricting the use,

and pressing for the evacuation, of American bases from their territory under the threat of a Soviet strike in the event of their use by any future invader of Soviet air space. Released at least temporarily from inhibitions deriving from the desire for negotiations with the US, the Soviet Government adopted a bold line on Cuba which went well beyond any previous Soviet move in Latin America, although Khrushchev's 9 July threat to use rockets against the US in the event of "Pentagon" intervention in Cuba was patently a bluff to impress non-Communist Latin America with the might and daring of the Soviet Union. The stronger line was also evident in Moscow's treatment of the RB-47 incident and its breaking off disarmament talks.

Moscow seized on the crisis in the Congo following its achievement of independence on 30 June as a windfall to discredit the West not only in the Congo but throughout Africa and to establish a Soviet presence through heavy support to Lumumba-controlled elements in the Leopoldville government. Khrushchev's pledge of unilateral aid was implemented dramatically in a fashion to undermine the UN program, which came under heavy Soviet attack for "improperly" supporting colonialist interests. Mobutu's 15 September order expelling all bloc diplomats and technicians brought the USSR's Congo experiment to an abrupt halt and forced the Soviet Union to fall back on diplomatic and propaganda exploitation of the continuing political, economic, and military chaos.

Khrushchev's performance at the 15th General Assembly session in New York in September and October 1960, which managed to keep the idea of a summit meeting at the forefront of world public opinion at the same time that Moscow continued to play up situations making an early meeting of Soviet and American leaders seem imperative, was an effort to influence the countries of non-bloc Asia, Africa, and Latin America--singly and in concert--to a heightened assault on colonialism. Khrushchev's official and unofficial conduct, and Soviet maneuvers generally, added up to a major effort to impress on the leaders of these countries that in the 15 years since World War II there had been a fundamental change in the world balance of power--a fact which had not yet been reflected proportionately either in the policies of their individual governments or in the structure and operations of the UN.

In sum, the assumption underlying Moscow's policy toward the underdeveloped countries--to which it has clung despite heavy pressures from both inside and outside the bloc--is that the world is passing through an interim period of uncertain but fairly short duration, perhaps a decade, during which political, economic, and ideological forces now in motion will bring about a basically new world situation: the predominance of "socialism." Changes within Asian, African, and Latin American countries will reflect the correlation of world forces, resulting in a gradual elimination of political, economic, and ideological ties with the West. In this period, growing bloc economic and political support to underdeveloped countries will help their governments maintain a neutrality increasingly friendly to the bloc and increasingly opposed to Western policies and interests.

I. THE STALINIST LEGACY: August 1945 - February 1953

Moscow's preoccupation in the immediate postwar years with the massive task of reconstructing the Soviet homeland, with the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the bloc, and with crucial developments in Western Europe--the principal focus of East-West differences--precluded a dynamic policy in peripheral areas: non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Nevertheless, the extreme fluidity of the Asian political scene aroused Moscow's revolutionary optimism and called for an updating and clarification of its views on Communist world prospects. Although Stalin at every party congress since the early 1920s--as Lenin had before him--expressed official optimism over developments in "the colonial areas," Communist agitation and Soviet meddling in the affairs of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America had in fact been singularly unsuccessful. World War II, by shattering the existing social structure in large areas of Asia and speeding up the tempo of political, economic, and social change throughout most of the world, opened new vistas for the expansion of Soviet influence.

Moscow's failure at the end of the war to step out immediately with a clear-cut strategy to guide or capture anti-colonial, anti-Western movements, reflected the USSR's desire not to embitter relations with the West on matters which it considered secondary to the overriding necessity of arranging a suitable settlement in Europe. It turned also on uncertainty in top Soviet circles whether to cooperate with non-Communist leaders and movements--and on what terms--or to encourage local Communists to attempt to seize power. The scarcity of solid information, the lack of a Soviet "presence," and a record studded with overenthusiastic appraisals of anti-colonial developments all counseled caution. Although Lenin's vaunted thesis that the capitalist chain could be broken at its weakest line--the areas under "imperialist oppression"--and Stalin's formula for overcoming imperialism by revolutionizing its colonial "rear" were considered still valid, neither served as a practical guide for Soviet policy in this period of widespread revolutionary change.

Whatever Soviet intentions concerning exploitation of the chaotic and near-chaotic conditions in South and Southeast Asia, Moscow was stymied by the fact that relations between local

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Communist and non-Communist independence movements--seldom, if ever, good--had been embittered in most areas over the issue of wartime support for the Allies. Moscow's 1935 adoption and subsequent concentration on Popular Front tactics in Europe--which viewed fascism as a more pressing danger than colonialism--had contributed to the estrangement of Communists from incipient nationalist movements by committing Moscow to collaboration with the Western colonial powers. Stalin's pact with Hitler removed these inhibitions, but following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the virulent anticolonial campaign was suddenly moderated by the requirements of the wartime alliance. With the Japanese defeat, the two-front struggle of Communists and nationalists against the colonial powers--and each other--reached a new peak of intensity.

Moscow, in no position to influence local developments by effective material or political aid, directed a steady stream of charges against British, French, and Dutch military actions undertaken in an effort to maintain their colonial positions, but its attitude toward non-Communist movements coming to power in the new Asian states vacillated. Moscow was publicly cool toward their leaders, and Soviet spokesmen questioned the "genuineness" of their anticolonialism, in light of the compromises which had made early independence possible. Well into the postwar period, Moscow continued to discuss Asian developments in terms of ever-deteriorating political and economic conditions and openly predicted that existing governments and their programs would soon give way before the inevitable evolution of political power to the left. Stalin not only minimized the immediate prospects of Asian nationalist movements, but he apparently also entertained hopes that different views on colonialism, combined with antagonistic economic self-interests, would lead to a serious rift between the United States and its Western colleagues. As a consequence of these views, Soviet propaganda downplayed the American role in attempting to stabilize areas recently freed from Japanese occupation, concentrating its attacks on other Western powers active in Asia.

Moscow's unsure diplomatic hand was reflected in disagreement in top Soviet academic circles as to the meaning of the changes brought about in the colonial world by war. Unanimous only in their appraisals that "tremendous" and "revolutionary" developments had taken and were taking place, Soviet scholars

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and publicists, in the absence of firm guidance from the top, arrived at no consensus which would fit the needs of Soviet policy.

Their considerable differences were underlined by the controversy which sprang up over the September 1946 publication of Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting From the Second World War by Moscow's leading politico-economic theoretician, Academician Eugene S. Varga. Varga's monumental survey of the war's effects on world capitalism, including an attempt to assess the "far-reaching changes in the relationships between the colonies and the mother countries," concluded that on the basis of industrial development and lessened financial dependence, the war years irrevocably had reduced the economic dependence of the majority of the colonies on their metropolises. Varga, in company with other Soviet analysts, cited the growth of an industrial proletariat in a whole series of colonies and the supply of arms to colonial peoples during the war--a part of which they were able to retain and use for the creation of revolutionary armies--as factors facilitating the development of Communist influence.

Although Varga's views found considerable support, the implications of his favorable appraisal of economic developments in the capitalist world were increasingly unacceptable as cold war tensions mounted. Public rebuttal of Varga's views was considered necessary. Published discussions at a joint conference of Economics Institute and Moscow University theoreticians in May 1947 reflected Soviet hostility toward both the Western powers and the Asian nationalist movements. Varga's findings on the degree of economic independence attained by certain colonies and "semi-colonies" (imperialist "dependencies" such as the Latin American countries) were challenged, and it was denied that a basis had been laid in some colonies for independent economic development. Although the regime-sponsored counterattack on Varga served notice that the area for individual interpretation of world events had narrowed considerably, both Varga supporters and Varga detractors displayed uncertainty toward developments in Asia, finding as much to condemn as to praise in the current scene.

The founding of the Cominform in September 1947 marked the conclusive repudiation of moderation as a line to be followed toward non-Communists. Zhdanov's keynote speech emphasized the extent to which Moscow was to commit itself to the

doctrine of two antagonistic world systems, completely excluding the possibility of a third, or neutralist, position. Zhdanov's speech and the early Cominform propaganda had little to say about Asia and served to underline the fact that Moscow's primary concern remained with securing a favorable settlement of European issues. Asian Communist parties within a short time began to reflect this harsher line and to adopt a more vigorous assault on remaining Western colonial interests and on non-Communist Asian nationalist parties. The year 1948 was marked by a widespread outbreak of Communist-led strike violence, terrorism, and armed rebellions not only in the remaining colonies, but also in the newly independent states. Moscow's encouragement of such tactics apparently stemmed from the belief that nothing further could be gained by Communist restraint toward the West nor from additional attempts to conciliate non-Communist Asian governments, a view abetted by Communist successes in China and by consistent overevaluation of Communist party prospects elsewhere in Asia.

An obvious effort was made to exploit Chinese prestige which ballooned in Asia on the heels of the 1948 military victories. Asian Communist parties, following Moscow's lead, began freely to prescribe a "Chinese way" as proper anticolonialist strategy for Asia. The content of this "Chinese way" was not spelled out, but in essence it meant the encouragement of armed revolts by peasants and workers, as well as intensified political struggle to draw additional elements of the national bourgeoisie into the "anti-imperialist" struggle. The foundering of this policy--as evidenced by the general suppression of the Communist-inspired revolts with heavy and in some places catastrophic losses to local Communist assets, with the notable exception of Indochina--was a serious setback to Moscow's general line that the time was ripe for revolutionary upheavals in Asia.

Post mortems on failures of the resort to open force--i.e., the editorial in the April 1949 issue of Problems of History--attacked the degree of cooperation "exposed" between area governments and the "colonialists" and freely predicted a general deterioration of the Asian political situation which would give Communist parties another chance under more favorable circumstances. Soviet scholars were charged with concentrating their efforts on the support of Soviet and Communist goals in Asia by greater attention to present-day developments and to combatting the false theses of non-Communists.

In April 1949 a three-day meeting of Pacific and Oriental Institute specialists was held in Moscow to improve the content of Soviet propaganda on Asian developments and in June there was a joint conference of the Pacific and Economics Institutes. The principal report at both meetings was delivered by the director of the Pacific Institute, Academician Eugene M. Zhukov, since 1943 a top spokesman on Soviet Asian policy.

The proceedings of the two conferences point up the considerable doctrinal backing and filling which was going on in the Communist movement at this time. Having just suffered defeats at the hands of the bourgeoisie in many of the new Asian states, Moscow was in no mood to examine dispassionately current opportunities for playing up existing differences between the new states and the West, and instead increased its isolation from Asian nationalist movements by heaping abuse on their leaders and ideologies. Zhukov, however, made it clear that Moscow even then was less concerned with the social role of various capitalist elements in the new Asian states than with the "main question":

> the progressiveness of one social movement or another, the revolutionary nature or reactionary nature of one party or another, is...determined by their relations with the Soviet Union, with the camp of democracy and socialism.

The conferees' exposition of an Asian strategy welding anti-imperialist intellectuals, petit-bourgeois, and middle-bourgeois elements with a militant proletariat and peasantry largely ignored recent defeats of Communist-led insurrections and, because of "fundamental changes" caused by the war and the "new alignment of political forces" in Asia resulting from the Communist sweep of the Chinese mainland, considered Communist chances in Asia bright enough for the continued advocacy of violence. The general line continued that authoritatively set by Zhdanov at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947--aggressive Communist leadership of anti-imperialist coalitions and across-the-board attack on all evidence of Western influence. Area Communist parties were slow in coming around to the Moscow-charted course; less caught up in international issues, they preferred to attack local class enemies. The Communist party of India, the most important in non-Communist Asia following the suicidal uprising of the Indonesian party in 1948, was split into factions over the question whether

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to continue peasant guerrilla warfare, which had failed in Telengana, or to retreat to more peaceful forms of political agitation in an attempt to win over dissatisfied elements in the Congress party. Cominform efforts to bring Asian Communist parties into line were pointed up by an editorial in its January 1950 journal attacking those Indian Communist party leaders who continued to question the direct applicability of the "Chinese experience" to their own struggle for power, and the Japanese Communist party for advocating "peaceful revolution" for Asia.

On the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday, Professor I. I. Potekhin, long a principal spokesman on African affairs, summarized the Stalinist position on "Colonial Revolution and the National-Liberation Movement:"

> Comrade Stalin warned, and the last quarter of a century fully confirmed, that the complete and final victory of the colonial revolution is possible only under the leadership of the proletariat. Petit-bourgeois nationalist organizations and parties have already proven their incapacity to accomplish national liberation. They limit themselves to constitutional reforms and the achievement of formal, bourgeois democracy which do not and cannot ensure a complete break from the system of imperialism.

In Stalin's name, Potekhin went on to record "bourgeois betrayals" of the independence movement not only by the Chinese bourgeoisie, but also by the big bourgeoisie of India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Egypt.

The Moscow-created crisis touched off by the invasion of South Korea in June 1950, which quickly became a political confrontation of the major powers, provided a new focus for Soviet Asian policy and pre-empted attention from the other areas. Stalin's Korean gambit showed him at least temporarily willing to use Communist armed forces, at the very considerable risk of a general war, to achieve his political objectives. The move obviously stemmed from a monumental miscalculation of the Western mood.

The war made academic further discussions within the Communist world over hard or soft tactics to be followed in the anticolonial struggle. What counted now was the success of

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local supporters in mobilizing Communist and non-Communist "peace" forces in support of official positions. The war also marked the final step in the evolution of Communist propaganda toward singling out the United States as the principal "imperialist" enemy, not only of Communist interests but allegedly of those of the independence movements as well. Presumably the attack on South Korea was initiated as a result of Moscow's estimate that a military shock bringing down one of the weak Western-oriented states in Asia would trigger a chain reaction of revolts elsewhere. By the summer of 1951 it had become obvious that the fighting would continue deadlocked unless one side or the other was willing to take much greater risks.

With the drawing to a close of the military phase of the war, Moscow began to back away from its previous line. The clash of Korean policies had exposed considerable Asian estrangement from the West. Statements by Indian and Arab leaders in particular, and voting records in the United Nations not hostile to bloc positions, pointed up the considerable estrangement which had developed between the "peace" policies of a number of Asian governments and those of the principal Western powers. In retrospect, Moscow, which had acted promptly to organize world-wide condemnation of the UN effort in Korea, was slow in recognizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and "neutralist" foreign policies of Asian non-Communist governments could be turned against the West. To the end, Stalin rebuffed neutralist efforts to bring about a compromise on Korea, a problem in which he was too personally and emotionally involved to permit even the tacit admission of error.

The transition to a more peaceful stage in Communist and Soviet relations with the former colonies of Asia was gradual and uneven. The year 1951 was marked by a considerable tailing off of Communist-led guerrilla wars in Asia--except for Indochina--and renewed emphasis on political agitation by the local parties, but the changeover in tactics was not accompanied by unmistakable public signs such as those on their adoption in mid-1947. Bolshevik in June 1951 commented favorably on the newly adopted program of the Indian Communist party which turned its back on further encouragement of peasant revolts and set the party's primary purpose as the creation of a revolutionary bloc comprised not only of the working class and the peasantry, but also progressive elements of the

intelligentsia and of the Indian bourgeoisie. India has consistently been treated as a special problem by Soviet tacticians. If Moscow intended its endorsement of the Indian Communist party's shift as a signal to Asian Communist parties generally, the message was slow in taking effect, for it was late summer 1952 before the last parties fell in line.

At the September 1951 ECAFE meeting in Singapore the Soviet delegates, in an abrupt reversal from their previous harassment of participating Asian governments, offered to promote the economic development of their countries by the exchange of Soviet industrial machinery for local raw materials --a move which had all the earmarks of a propaganda gambit rather than a policy shift. Better evidence that Stalin's inner circle of advisers had concluded there was little likelihood of an early Communist victory in general Asian revolution, thus calling for a major change in strategy, is presented in the reports of discussions at a 12-day conference in November 1951 of Soviet Asian specialists of the Institute of Oriental Studies and of the party Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences.

Zhukov again fulfilled the role of regime spokesman. The burden of his argumentation was that Asian parties could not count on coming to power everywhere through "revolutionary armies," and that the main significance of the Chinese revolution for other Asian countries was its blending of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal elements into a single anti-imperialist front struggling toward independence. Resort to arms as a political tactic was not specifically disavowed, although it was considerably downgraded by the conference majority. With the pendulum now swinging in the direction of intensified political agitation, the conferees struggled to give more precise content to the concept of a noncapitalist path of development for Asian countries, reopening the debates of the early 1920s over the possibilities of organizing a "socialist" order out of semi-feudal, semi-capitalist societies.

A desire to open a new stage in Soviet relations with non-Communist Asia was apparent in Moscow's behavior in the United Nations, where consistent anti-Westernism was combined with limited overtures to the small-country delegations--an apparent reflection of a worldwide upgrading of possibilities for expanding Communist influence by manipulating traditional methods of diplomacy. Greater Soviet attention to international and

domestic developments having no immediate bearing on Soviet security or on the main arenas of East-West conflict was reflected in the appearance of a symposium prepared by the Institute of Economics on The Peoples of Latin America in the Struggle Against American Imperialism, the first significant monograph devoted to this subject in the postwar period. No tour de force such as Varga's 1946 work, this book in defining the task at hand as the "unmasking of the economic, political, military, and ideological expansion of American imperialism" is typical of Soviet scholarship of the period: the substitution of quotations from the classics of Marx-Lenin-Stalin for original analysis and heavy dependence on second-hand accounts in the local Communist press. The January 1952 Lenin anniversary speech of party theoretician Petr N. Pospelov, surveying the current "crisis of the entire colonial system of imperialism" in optimistic terms, claimed to see "hundreds of millions of formerly backward and suppressed people" now beginning to play an active political role, in fulfillment of Lenin's predictions.

That Stalin looked to increased economic contacts as one of the promising avenues for breaking out of the semi-isolation the USSR suffered as a result of its role in Korea is suggested by the Soviet buildup for the April 1952 World Peace Council-sponsored Moscow Economic Conference. Communist parties and peace council groups throughout the world attempted to drum up invitees, individual businessmen who might serve as future trade contacts or might serve as focuses for local agitation against Western trade controls. Moscow sought to stimulate interest in increased trade with the Soviet Union by a few highly selective trade offers, overtures to establish comprehensive economic relations, and limited offers of technical assistance. Although infrequent offers to exchange Soviet industrial equipment and capital goods for raw materials and foodstuffs produced in the former colonial areas had been made previously, they had met with general skepticism in view of Moscow's general hostility to non-Communist governments.

In seeking to expand trade and technical contacts, Moscow was acting from manifestly economic as well as political objectives. The USSR's desire to break the West's trade restrictions and open up Asia and Africa, if not Latin America as well, as sources of materials vital for Soviet strategic reserves and to facilitate its breakneck industrial expansion were undoubtedly contributing factors. Despite heavy propaganda attention

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controls, asserting that the Soviet Union no longer had a need for imports but could compete with the West on the basis of its own resources. Stalin heir-apparent Malenkov's report to the 19th party congress which followed in October 1952 cited the general poverty of the peoples of "colonial and dependent" areas and forecast a period of continued decline in the economy of the underdeveloped countries which, in combination with a general shrinking of world markets for Western manufactured goods, would "drag down the economy of the capitalist world like a dead weight." Stalin's short concluding speech to the congress was devoted exclusively to problems of the world Communist movement, to exhorting more intense effort, and for reassuring the faithful that greater successes were in the offing. Stalin and Malenkov's statements, in combination with Moscow's stepped-up political and economic overtures to the Asian and Arab states, suggested that the period of relative calm--and neglect--had come to an end. For obvious reasons, Moscow did not spell out its role in the intensifying troubles forecast for the capitalist world, but by implication, Communists would step up efforts to exploit political and economic differences whenever and wherever they appeared. In the November 1952 General Assembly session, Moscow moderated its previous stand on several minor measures involving a United Nations economic assistance role. Stalin, in a Christmas "interview" with James Reston, declared himself in favor of increasing economic and political relations, particularly with the smaller countries. Stalin's continued rejection of Indian efforts to bring about an East-West compromise on Korea, however, acted as a powerful brake to Soviet efforts to get its friendship campaign rolling. With the January 1953 discovery of the "doctors' plot," Moscow's foreign countenance, mirroring its domestic one, abruptly became more hostile.

Particularly during his last years, Stalin appeared to exercise a "dead hand" on Soviet policy with his inherent suspiciousness of all forces which were not under his control. Postwar changes in Moscow's line, as also post-Korea changes, were made in the face of radically changed Asian circumstances --which took place with little or no influence from Moscow-- which Stalin undertook with reluctance.

II. COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP: March 1953 - January 1955

Stalin's sudden demise shook the whole of Soviet society. Since Stalin dominated all aspects of Soviet policy-making and implementation, and since he had taken only rudimentary steps to prepare for an orderly succession, his abrupt departure left his successors as stunned as was the ordinary Soviet citizen and on the defensive. The unsteady coalition which now assumed command turned first to a reduction of tension with the West in order to provide a breathing spell for consolidating their collective authority as well as their individual positions.

First of all, the new leaders sought to dispel the black clouds, domestic as well as international, generated during the dictator's final two months of rule, and to revitalize the moves made the preceding year toward a limited improvement in relations with the non-Communist world. Molotov's funeral oration attempted to affirm the new regime's dedication to carrying out a "Stalinist peace-loving foreign policy," which he interpreted as a desire for the development of "cooperation" and "business ties" with all countries. Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 15 March 1953--just ten days after Stalin's death--sought to reassure the Soviet people and emphasized his intent to pursue peace. By the end of March, Moscow had initiated a series of minor moves and token steps intended to clear the air of the hostility engendered earlier in the year and to support the genuineness of its professed desire for improved relations with the West. A number of Soviet statements culminating in Bulganin's May Day speech emphasized the need for a reduction in the risk of war and called on the West to respond to Soviet peace overtures by abandoning the arms race and dismantling Western military bases close to Soviet territory.

As the new leadership became more confident of its authority, the tempo of reform and improvisation in its foreign relations increased. In succession Moscow succeeded in "normalizing" relations with Greece, Israel, and Canada. Territorial claims against Turkey were abandoned, and new efforts were made to increase diplomatic and trade contacts, especially with Asian and Arab states. The Soviet peace offensive brought diplomacy and propaganda to bear in a combination unknown in Stalin's day. In their handling of various international issues,

the new leaders displayed a considerable flexibility and a marked increase in sophistication as they sought by the very number and variety of their moves, many of which were merely the reversal of Stalin's gratuitous manifestations of ill will, to create the impression of a major shift of Soviet policy in the direction of detente. Soviet diplomats abroad undertook a widespread demonstration of good fellowship for their Western colleagues. The new leaders in Moscow, who stopped short of openly rejecting Stalin's methods in reaffirming his goals, dared privately to deplore "excesses" which had crept into Soviet foreign relations as a result of Stalin's personal direction of day-to-day diplomacy. The new more conciliatory features of Soviet foreign policy were interpreted for the home audience as testimony of the Soviet Union's growing self-assurance and strength. This synthetic official optimism was not accompanied by any appreciable let-up in domestic propaganda hostile to the West, however.

In addition to the peace offensive, which occupied Moscow's primary attention, the regime stepped out in the direction of increased economic contacts with the whole capitalist world. At the Geneva meeting on East-West trade, Soviet officials toned down their propaganda role and showed a marked businesslike approach to the discussions. A May 1953 Kommunist review of the major lines of Soviet economic policy placed Moscow squarely on the side of "widening economic cooperation and normal trade relations with all countries" and for an over-all increase in international trade. At the same time, the author, A. Nikonov, a leading Soviet economist, reiterated the principal lines of Moscow's attack on Western trade policies, which he held to be responsible for holding down the volume of trade, and on Western strategic commodity controls, which he wanted dropped in favor of the "re-establishment of a single international market." Stepped-up efforts through diplomatic channels showed that Moscow was looking toward an expanding exchange of goods with the major capitalist countries as well as with the independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In July it became apparent that the new regime was prepared to carry its overtures to the underdeveloped capitalist countries well beyond the limits implied in earlier overtures. At the 15 July meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council, Soviet delegate Arutyunyan announced Moscow's willingness for the first time to contribute to the UN's technical assistance program. While attacking the Western approach to technical

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assistance and repeating the standard Soviet position that elimination of Western trade restrictions imposed on the weaker capitalist countries and the development of "normal trade" with all countries would do more to facilitate their economic development than any likely UN program, Arutyunyan nevertheless announced that the Soviet Union had set aside four million rubles--supplemented later by token amounts from the Ukraine and Belorussia--for the UN's technical assistance program.* The impact of Moscow's offer was reduced by Arutyunyan's grudging endorsement--"it is better to let them trade normally with other countries and get the money they need that way that to render them so-called aid"--and by the gradual realization that the "contribution" in effect could be spent only within the USSR or for services of Soviet specialists abroad and did not conform to the requirements of the UN program. The initial four million rubles, as a result, went unused. The statement issued on 25 July 1953, on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of Bolshevism, reflected the considerable degree to which the regime was willing to link belief in the possibility of a lasting coexistence with the capitalist world to a drive for increased economic ties with all countries.

The "good neighbor" policy which Malenkov advanced in his 8 August 1953 speech to the Supreme Soviet,

> The Soviet Union has no territorial claims against any state whatsoever.... Differences in the social and economic system...cannot serve as an obstacle to the strengthening of friendly relations....

was intended to follow up Moscow's earlier overtures--such as its well-publicized surrender of nuisance claims against Turkey and Iran--and to pave the way for a bolder across-the-board approach to the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. Malenkov's remarks were keyed to a reassertion of Soviet strength, which within two weeks were buttressed by public claims to possession of the hydrogen bomb, as part of an effort to reinvigorate the Communist movement, which had become somewhat lethargic

*Always constrained to show its policies as continuous and unchanging, Moscow later attempted to cover up its years of opposition to this program by falsely dating the inception of this program as "1953-1954", instead of 1950, and alleged the participation of the USSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia from the beginning.

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in the absence of strong one-man leadership and under the debilitating influence of the concerted effort to play down outstanding differences between the two world power blocs.

The drive by Stalin's successors for "reducing international tension" had helped reduce the diplomatic semi-isolation Moscow had suffered as a result of the Korean venture and had succeeded in part in reducing pressure on Soviet positions both in Europe and in the Far East, but it had failed to attract Western concessions. Moreover, the peace offensive was not a suitable vehicle for helping to create the impression of a USSR rapidly growing in international prestige and authority--an impression which Communist leaders from the early days of the revolution had recognized as vitally necessary both to Moscow and to the world Communist movement. The new foreign policy course indicated by Malenkov represented not so much a break with Stalinist policies as it did a rejection of Stalinist tactics and the recognition that improved government-to-government relations would place the USSR in a better position to conduct a strong global policy. The cumulative effect of the minor moves undertaken by Moscow over the preceding five months made it apparent that a fundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics toward the underdeveloped countries had been decided on.

The August 1953 appearance of academician Eugene Varga's Basic Problems of the Economics and Politics of Imperialism After the Second World War, which according to the author was prepared in 1948-1951 and elaborated on in 1952-1953 in light of Stalin's Problems of Socialism and the 19th party congress discussions, provided an authoritative summary of the world views inherited by the regime. Varga's analysis harped on the coming disintegration of Western imperialism through failure to overcome internal and external "contradictions" and assigned no great role to built-in antagonism between newly independent Asian-African states and the West. Instead, he dwelled on rivalries among imperialist powers for influence and markets in colonial and formerly colonial areas and alleged that the principal goal of American foreign policy was the economic and territorial redistribution of colonial territories of the world to its own advantage--a process he considered well under way. Varga also repeated the standard charge that "rotten compromises" between local bourgeois parties and Western imperialist states had postponed the successful conclusion of the "national-liberation" struggle over much

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of Asia. Varga's work did not reflect the evolution which had begun toward a great accommodation of Moscow's policies toward prevailing moods in the underdeveloped countries nor provide a rationale for the new tack. It did, however, provide a focus for a limited re-evaluation of Moscow's views on "colonial" developments in the guise of scholarly criticism of Varga's book carried out over the succeeding six months.

Following the September 1953 plenum of the central committee, which confirmed Khrushchev as party first secretary and set off the offensive on the agricultural front, the decision to step up the foreign economic program was endorsed publicly in unmistakably official tones. Following up Moscow's grant of one billion rubles for North Korean rehabilitation, Premier Malenkov on 19 September called for "a new approach to solve the question of constructive and effective aid" to Asian countries by "many states," implying Soviet willingness to assist the economic development of friendly non-Communist Asian countries. Malenkov's cautious step was followed by diplomatic efforts to spark mutually reinforcing drives for increased trade and for the "exchange" of technical information and training.

Although the principal reason for Moscow's trade drive probably was the need for greater imports of consumer goods entailed in Malenkov's "new course" promises to raise consumption levels in the USSR, Moscow made a major effort to exploit its interest in increased trade as proof of its good will and as a demonstration of Soviet economic progress. Newly expressed desires to import consumer goods were used as a peg for further allegations of the ridiculousness of Western restrictions on trading with the bloc. Mikoyan's 17 October announcement of a new program on retail trade and production of consumer goods underlined Moscow's interest in increased imports. At the same time, Mikoyan's statement was especially noteworthy for the lengths to which he went in attempting to justify the new program--as well as to bid for added international prestige--by referring to the USSR's postwar strides in economic reconstruction and industrial development. Moscow hailed a growing list of new and revised trade agreements as proof of the fruits of its new program.

Conclusion on 2 December 1953 of a five-year trade agreement with India pointed up the rapid rapprochement which had been developing between the two countries, speeded by the

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moderation of Moscow's Korean stand following the death of Stalin. The agreement, looking toward increased exchange of a wide range of goods, contained in addition a vague clause concerning future Soviet technical aid. At about this time, Moscow apparently made overtures to extend technical assistance to Egypt and pressed similar negotiations with Afghanistan. A handful of Soviet technicians had been sent to Kabul the preceding April in connection with planning for the construction of grain storage facilities, reviving a prewar tactic which had led Stalin to enter into contracts for the construction of several industrial establishments in Turkey and Iran and to "lend" technicians to friendly Afghanistan. The announcement on 21 December of the appointment of five new deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers--Saburov, Pervukhin, Tevosyan, Malyshev, and Kosygin--foreshadowed a broad increase in foreign as well as domestic economic activities. Malenkov, in replying on 31 December to questions submitted by Kingsbury Smith, renewed bids for expanded East-West trade as both a means of expressing and of promoting peace and international cooperation.

Moscow's economic overtures attempted to play on local popular and governmental concern over export markets and the problems of rapid economic development, accompanied by extensive propaganda efforts to discredit Western economic and political influence and to exacerbate commercial as well as political friction between the little developed Asian, African, and Latin American countries and the major Western powers. Soviet spokesmen continued to reject the possibility of any compromise with capitalist methods of economic development and repeated standard allegations of the inevitable failure of bourgeois efforts to industrialize the "East." The first serious post-Stalin study of the problems of economic growth in the former colonies appeared in the November 1953 Problems of Economics. The author, L. Fituni, a specialist in nonbloc economic developments, continued Moscow's attacks on Western-oriented economic policies but veered away from past Soviet condemnation of foreign economic assistance per se, conceding without elaborating the point that the extension of economic aid under proper conditions "promotes" international understanding. A December review of the prospects of international trade in the same journal asserted the "great possibilities" bloc countries now had of developing trade "with all capitalist countries desiring to do so under mutually advantageous terms," and linked the Soviet trade drive with Moscow's continuing "peace" offensive and with moves to "aid the economic development of backward countries."

In response to the need for a thoroughgoing reassessment of Soviet views on developments in the formerly colonial areas and to explore the processes of economic change abroad, a special conference of economists and orientalists of the Academy of Sciences and of the party central committee's Academy of Social Sciences was held in February 1954, ostensibly to discuss the theses of Varga's Basic Problems.... The conference proceedings and lengthy critiques of the book in both Kommunist and Problems of Economics were intended to present an up-to-date summary of Moscow's current interpretation of such basic problems as the short-run prospects of world capitalism and of relations between the Western powers and their political and economic "dependencies." Untenable, as undermining the very bases of Communist evaluation of capitalist-world developments, were Varga's views "minimizing" the extent and the imminence of the "crisis" in world capitalism. Soviet economists seized on signs of a general economic decline in 1953 as proof that the standard thesis was not overdrawn. Reluctant to give up a theme vital to their proselyting effort, they encouraged the expectation that the troubles of the big powers would lead to economic disaster in the underdeveloped areas.

At the same time, Varga was criticized for underestimating the strengthening of the position of "young capitalism" in the former colonial areas, which was looked on as a favorable development because it increased economic and political antagonisms within world capitalism. A concurrent review of world capitalist developments in 1953 published in Kommunist predicted that the 1953 economic downturn would lead the West to step up its efforts to balance its shaky economies by "intensifying the exploitation of backward countries and colonies" --buying raw materials in these countries at lower prices and selling them industrial products at more exhorbitant prices-- and foresaw only further reductions in the standards of living of the peoples in the underdeveloped countries most affected.

Party Secretary and theoretician Pospelov's 21 January 1954 Lenin Anniversary speech--echoing his remarks on the same occasion two years earlier--singled out Asia as the "most vulnerable part of imperialism" and justified optimism among his listeners by citing the continued growth of the "popular resistance" movement throughout that continent. Although Moscow's attentions to the Arab world had increased over the past nine months, this to a considerable degree was a measure of the increasing tempo of political, economic, and social change

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there as the Soviet leaders continued to be suspicious of the revolutionary regime in Egypt. Moscow hailed Nasir's struggle for "immediate withdrawal" of English forces as an essential element in attaining "true independence," but attacked the policies of Egypt's "ruling circles" for their repression of Communists and other "progressives," for using force and meager land reform to quiet peasant unrest, and for their pro-German inclinations. The slight attention laid to non-Arab Africa and Latin America was a tacit admission that these areas, part of the "colonial reserve" of imperialism, were more or less effectively sealed off from Soviet influence.

The conclusion on 28 January 1954 of a $3,500,000 credit and technical assistance agreement with Afghanistan set off an unprecedented propaganda campaign to convince underdeveloped countries of the genuineness of Soviet overtures to initiate trade and broad economic relations of a mutually advantageous, apolitical nature. At the 10th ECAFE meeting in Colombo, Soviet delegates again pressed Asian delegates for commercial ties, for initiation of exchanges, and for acceptance of technical assistance. Moscow's numerous specific offers, public and private, were intended to whet local interest which governments would find themselves unable to resist. In March trade agreements were negotiated with both Egypt and Israel.

The increase in economic overtures was more than equaled by the increase in political and propaganda attention to American efforts to form Asian countries into an anti-Soviet coalition. The decision to bring a rearmed Germany into the Western alliance and to extend the anti-Communist defense structure throughout Asia posed a direct challenge to Moscow's year-long effort for a detente on its own terms. Moscow's public reaction to real or rumored negotiations between Western governments and Asian states on defense pacts and possible military aid reflected great sensitivity over these developments which raised the prospect of transforming areas close to the USSR's southern border into centers of pressure on that extended flank. The USSR's series of diplomatic demarches backed up by propaganda pyrotechnics proved ineffective in heading off the projected alliances in the main, but it did succeed in polarizing Asian and Arab government and popular sentiment around this issue and making it the crucial test of Asian and Arab government relations with one another and with both East and West.

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First of all, Soviet political countermeasures featured efforts to draw India into a strongly anti-Western, anti-American position. Moscow has always accorded India great interest and predicted Indian developments would play a vital role in the struggle against "imperialism" in the East. The sheer volume of material devoted to India in Soviet publications over the years has been impressive. Both the first edition of the "Bolshaya" encyclopedia, published in 1937, and the second edition, published in 1953, gave almost 200 pages to India, much of it highly propagandistic. If developments flowing out of the Korean war had awakened Moscow to advantages of a friendly Indian neutrality, these views were reinforced by Indian attitudes toward Indochina and concern lest the conflict there become an even more sensitive focus of East-West rivalry and engulf greater areas, possibly all of South and Southeast Asia, in the hot war. Moscow's concern was to encourage India and Nehru into an ever-stronger stand in favor of the bloc's "peace" program. Kommunist in February 1954 could now hail

> ...the important role of modern India in the world arena, the positive contribution of the Indian people in the matter of peaceful settlement of controversial international problems, and India's attempts to convert the United Nations into a genuine forum for all the peoples of the world.

The principal factor working for Soviet-Indian rapprochement, however, was the deep-seated antipathy between India and Pakistan which prompted New Delhi's violently adverse reaction to the gradual unfolding of an impending American military aid program for Pakistan. In a solid note of approval for the course of Indian foreign policy, Moscow welcomed the "vigilance displayed by the Indian leaders in connection with attempts of forces of aggression in Asia."

The unmistakable build-up of East-West tension as the result of developments in both Western Europe and Asia prompted an intense policy debate in top Soviet circles revolving around how far Moscow could go in antagonizing the West. Malenkov's 12 March 1954 "election speech" warning that atomic war might mean the "destruction of world civilization"--rather than just capitalist society--marked the high point in his efforts to convince his colleagues of the necessity for an accomodation with the West. His retreat the following month to the old

formulation reflected his failure to carry the majority of Soviet leaders along with him on this issue--and with it the defeat of Malenkov's efforts to dominate the ruling coalition.* At the same time, Soviet propaganda reflected concern that public statements of Western intentions in relation to intensification of the fighting in Indochina gave rise to the possibility that the USSR and the United States might be drawn into atomic war without either side really intending it.

Speeches by both Malenkov and Khrushchev at the April 1954 session of the Supreme Soviet tied bids for a reduction of international tension and "coexistence" with assertions of growing strength, implying no weakening of Soviet opposition to the West nor any concession on its part. Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda support to countries involved in disputes with the West intensified. At the United Nations, Moscow heightened its support for Syrian complaints growing out of border clashes with Israel and over Israeli plans to divert Jordan River water, making a play for general Arab favor by demanding that "measures"--unspecified--be taken against Israel. At the Geneva Conference, Molotov's attempt to champion "peoples struggling for independence" was directed toward tying Western hands in Asia. In asserting the "full right of Asian peoples to settle their affairs themselves" and adopting the stand that developments in colonial and formerly colonial areas are "first and foremost their own business," Molotov sought to build up pressure for big-power agreement to a hands-off policy which would protect recent gains in Indochina. Moscow used the Chou-Nehru talks to further the picture of close Indian collaboration with the bloc and extracted the "Five Principles of Coexistence"--the "Panch Shila"--expressed in the preamble to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet signed 29 April as a charter for Asian-African neutralism, themes given heavy support at the World Peace Council meeting in Berlin in May.

*Because of the demoralizing effect of such a thesis on Communists at home and abroad, Moscow could not publicly endorse this line even if Soviet leaders themselves believed it. Thus Malenkov's aberration proved a handy club in the hands of his rivals to help oust him, one year later, from the premiership.

The USSR's reaction to the June 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan leftist President Jacobo Arbenz, which it alleged to be the result of "intervention organized by US monopolies from Nicaraguan territory," was loud and bitter and attempted to appeal to world sentiment hostile to outside "interference." Soviet propaganda, besides reflecting Moscow's anger at the turn of events and its impotence to reverse them, sought to cover the Soviet Union's own role with this "living proof" of its charges concerning the nature of American imperialism. Appointment of an ambassador to Indonesia in July culminated a period of intense Soviet interest in developments in that country arising out of Djakarta's unstable domestic political and economic situation and, even more, Indonesia's complex international troubles with the Netherlands and the United States. Heavy propaganda support was afforded Indonesian anti-Western moves, and the first order of business for the newly arrived Soviet staff appeared to be to press Indonesia to accept Soviet industrial equipment on easy-payment terms. Moscow's attitude toward Burma also had become noticeably more friendly. If events in Asia favored rapprochement with India, Indonesia, and Burma, Soviet overtures for stepped-up economic contacts, political demarches, and a succession of increasingly sharp propaganda warnings to other Asian governments--notably Turkey, Pakistan, and Thailand--concerning negotiations on area mutual defense pacts proved to little avail.

Moscow pushed two logically contradictory but psychologically complementary courses. On the one hand, its high-powered "peace" campaign was intended to exploit the universal fear of atomic warfare by generating pressures against military preparedness. It seized upon the Geneva Conference results as confirmation of the correctness of its line that peace could be achieved only through negotiations respecting the interests of "both sides." On the other hand, a Moscow-produced or Moscow-maintained climate of great East-West tension was essential to its policies toward the underdeveloped countries. Moscow aimed at persuading people that Western policies had brought the world--and kept it at--the brink of devastating war, and played on apprehensions arising out of the security pact negotiations which allegedly put Asia-Africa on the "front line" in any future conflict. The ineffectiveness of Moscow's efforts to turn its sporadic diplomatic and propaganda support and a modest expansion of economic relations to direct political advantage was pointed up in October by Nasir's signature--despite months of fervent Soviet efforts to dissuade him--of

an agreement with Britain concerning the evacuation of troops from the Suez Canal zone on terms permitting their return in the event of a "third power" attack on the Middle East.

On the economic front, Moscow stepped up its efforts to capitalize on local desire for rapid economic development to introduce pioneering detachments of Soviet specialists and technicians under UN auspices and through direct bilateral agreements. By ostensibly participating in UN-sponsored programs which enjoyed considerable popularity and esteem in the underdeveloped countries, Moscow sought to broaden the impact of its own as yet modest efforts and to introduce Soviet technicians and scientists into countries and fields otherwise closed to it. Further, this contributed to the Soviet effort to play up the growing stature of the USSR as an advanced industrial power and opened the way for undercutting Western--and especially US--economic assistance programs on yet another front. Moscow cited the lack of political stipulations on UN aid and the "willingness of dozens of countries to go along with the UN program," but alleged the United States alone holds aloof for its own political and military motives. Soviet publicists, still obliged to present developments in the capitalist world in terms of an imminent general economic crisis, stressed increasingly more unfavorable terms of trade for the underdeveloped countries. Varga, writing in the first (August 1954) issue of the new semi-scholarly monthly journal International Affairs (International Life), pointed to two years of depressed prices for raw materials and food exports and to repercussions of impending American economic crisis as compelling reasons why underdeveloped as well as Western European countries should turn to expanded trade with the bloc as a solution to pressing economic problems.

The long-awaited Soviet textbook Political Economy, the product of a group of writers including leading ideologists Dmitry Shepilov and Pavel Yudin, signed to the press on 26 August 1954, followed Stalin's two-camp approach to the interpretation of world developments. The authors crudely assaulted economic relations of the Western powers with the former colonies, alleging that foreign trade was "one of the sources of economic enslavement of backward countries by developed bourgeois countries and (that it) widened the sphere of capitalist countries." Political Economy claimed advances for the "national-liberation movements" in Indonesia and India but spoke in terms of greater political roles allegedly being

played by the "proletariat" and Communist parties, and the "national bourgeoisie" continued to be attacked as "weak and indecisive"--even in the struggle against imperialism. The hostility shown to nationalist "conciliatory" policies marked even independent India as a bourgeois entity and thus an enemy. In this and other formulations, the authors showed themselves hesitant to amend fundamental Communist theses to bring them in line with tactics Moscow currently followed in its relations with a number of Asian governments.

In the fall, important works were published on the two areas of the world which to date had been generally beyond the scope of Soviet influence and at best on the periphery of Soviet interest. An imposing Institute of Ethnography symposium, The Peoples of Africa, under the joint editorship of philologist D. A. Olderogge and ethnographer-political scientist I. I. Potekhin attempted a thorough analysis of African cultural achievements and political and economic developments area by area. Their general thesis, and that of Soviet Africanists generally, was that racial discrimination and economic exploitation are the twin bases of Western policy and views on Africa. To combat the West's views and to champion African peoples, Soviet Africanists advanced an interpretation of African developments based on a "long and original path of historic develment," of a past golden age which was destroyed by Western political and economic intrusion, and in general attributing to Western influence all negative features of African life. Potekhin's summary views on the progress of "national liberation" acknowledged the absence of Communist activity in most of Africa, cited trade unions as the centers of anti-imperialist agitation where there are no Communist parties, and payed tribute to growing African participation in world "peace" and other fronts. A less substantial survey of the Institute of Economics by M. Grechev, The Imperialist Expansion of the US in Latin America After World War II, was devoted principally to attacking postwar US Latin American policies and to reiterating a strategy for local Communist parties based on attracting all antiforeign elements around "the working class and its ally the peasantry," a united front on Communist terms to

> put an end to the yoke of foreign monopolies, to give land to the peasants, to facilitate industrial development, to improve living conditions of all workers, and to carry Latin American countries on the broad road of progress and independence.

By the close of 1954, the "good neighbor" policy which the Malenkov regime had followed--if at times halfheartedly--was no great success. The increase in Moscow's influence among extremist nationalist elements had been in direct proportion to the prevalence of virulent anti-Western sentiment arising out of unresolved territorial and other political disputes with the West and to a lesser extent to local frustrations over the failure of political independence to solve pressing political, economic, and social problems overnight. Soviet attitudes toward nationalist movements and their leaders --for example, Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir--reflected only a step in the direction of tactical cooperation. Moscow's dilemma was that as nationalists these leaders had to be praised to the extent they were "anti-imperialist" but as bourgeois they had to be attacked for their commitment to capitalist methods and ideology and for their opposition or suppression of "progressive" elements. By the end of 1954 Moscow had come to the point of supporting nationalist governments obviously not in the Western camp, in the expectation that their greater self-assurance and self-expression would have the net effect of reducing Western influence and, to a degree, discrediting Western leadership. Any further concessions would have led to a deterioration of the morale of local Communist parties.

Moscow scored an impressive propaganda breakthrough with the signing on 2 February 1955, after five months of negotiations, of the agreement to help finance and construct a major steel plant at Bhilai, India. This announcement foreshadowed a Soviet economic assistance program of new dimensions and gave a measure of concreteness to the image of two world economic systems in competition for influence and favor in uncommitted areas.

III. A NEW POLICY TAKES SHAPE: February 1955 - December 1956

The demotion of Malenkov in February 1955 prompted Moscow to step out with a bolder policy both in regard to the Western powers and the politically uncommitted, economically underdeveloped countries. This was done in part to shore up domestic confidence, following the personnel shake-up, with harsher assertions of an increased international authority. Molotov's speech on 8 February to the Supreme Soviet appraised relations with the West wholly in cold war terms and presented an unusually clear rationale for Soviet cooperation with Asian and African governments. Acknowledging that the newly independent governments of Asia and Africa were still economically dependent on the West, the Soviet foreign minister nevertheless found a basis for optimism in the fact that in questions of international relations, "they show concern for the maintenance of peace and the reduction of international tension" and so were worthy of Soviet support. As had other Soviet leaders over the past year, Molotov singled out for particular praise the "international authority" of India. The Supreme Soviet resolution on foreign policy, which set forth the principal guide lines of the subsequent Bulganin-Khrushchev period, also called for the exchange of parliamentary delegations, a tactic Moscow had introduced the previous year by hosting several semiofficial parliamentary groups.

The acceleration of Soviet moves in Asia and the Middle East reflected a recognition of the increased international status of Asian and African states and of the likelihood that their international role would continue to increase in importance. At the same time, it was intended as a partial answer to Western initiatives building up military and anti-Communist political pressures along the USSR's southern borders. The regime's efforts to underscore Soviet military and economic might furthered the impression that the new leaders were less disposed than Malenkov to seek accommodation with the West; in any event, the West's firmness in Europe held out the prospect that any Soviet probing there might lead to a nuclear war.

Moscow's intention to seek a closer working agreement with Asian and Arab countries was made clear in its diplomatic and propaganda reaction to Middle East developments and in the fervor of its efforts to identify itself with the views and

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objectives of the conference of 29 Asian and African countries--including Communist China but not the Soviet Union--at Bandung, Indonesia. A statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 16 April 1955 presented detailed charges of "considerable deterioration" of the Middle East situation, alleged that this was the direct result of Western efforts to form anti-Communist military blocs there, and offered, in terms more specific than ever before, official Soviet support to area governments opposing Western policies. At the same time, Soviet propaganda hailed the prospects of Asian-African cooperation, and Pravda threw Soviet support behind any agreement which might be reached by the Bandung powers in the direction of a common effort against "pressure and threat" from outside powers or in implementing individually or collectively the Chou-Nehru declaration on the "five principles of coexistence." Moscow's current appraisal apparently stemmed from optimism that "parallel" short-term interests of Asian-African states and the USSR, in combination with the inherently weak political and economic positions of area countries, opened the way for a rapid increase in Soviet influence.

Further indications that a fundamental reorientation of tactics was involved was the initiation of a wholesale shake-up of Soviet interpretation of developments in non-Soviet Asia and Africa. In late April 1955 there appeared the first issue of Soviet Oriental Studies, the functions and responsibilities of which were to tie research and Marxist-Leninist interpretation to the immediate needs of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. Kommunist in May kicked off a campaign to bring ideological formulations more in line with the Soviet posture of friendship toward the non-Communist countries represented at Bandung. Kommunist admitted that erroneous interpretations had crept into past Soviet assessments of anticolonial movements, and it criticized Soviet scholars, and by implication Stalin and those responsible for Moscow's foreign policy in the early post-Stalin period, for underevaluating the anti-imperialist significance of the nationalist movements. Foreshadowed in these programatic statements were stepped-up efforts to interpret the present and even the fairly remote past in anti-Western terms and to dissociate the current Soviet regime in the minds of the peoples of the neutralist countries from those past Soviet words or deeds which impeded closer relations. Without providing clear new guide lines, Kommunist nevertheless indicated that a more optimistic appraisal of Asian-African developments was in order and that prosaic,

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mechanical applications of Communist theorems were to give way to a flexibility which owed more to cold war requirements than to the Communist classics.

Moscow's new accommodation to neutralist-nationalist sentiment was underlined dramatically in connection with the June 1955 visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. Nehru, who had been described by Stalin's Asian spokesman Zhukov as "a cunning servant of Britain and the United States and a bloody strangler of progressive forces in India," now was praised on all counts for his spiritual and political leadership of Asia and for championing progressive views on such major issues as Korea, Indochina, military blocs, and the banning of atomic weapons. A Russian translation of Nehru's Discovery of India was published in connection with the visit--despite passages scathingly attacking Communist tactics in India--and long "reviews" of the book in Kommunist and Soviet Oriental Studies used it as a point of departure in setting forth the new Soviet line on Asian and African developments. Apparently encouraged by the prospects of this initial venture into the realm of "personal diplomacy"--Nehru's visit having been interpreted publicly as a "brilliant manifestation" of growing friendly relations between the two countries--Moscow extended invitations to the Shah of Iran and to Nasir. Efforts were initiated on an unprecedented scale to flatter neutralist leaders, the cultures of friendly countries, and Asian-African self-importance. Synthetic Soviet commemorations of Asian and African national holidays became a prominent feature of the new program. Pravda editor Shepilov--newly named a party secretary--was sent to Egypt in connection with Cairo's Liberation Day celebrations as a personal emissary of Moscow's top leadership to impress on Nasir the potentials of closer Soviet-Egyptian cooperation.

Moscow's moves to exploit the "Bandung spirit" as the inception of a coordinated Asian-African opposition to the West was accompanied by a series of diplomatic and economic steps --with appropriate propaganda orchestration--intended to build up a "posture of peace" to improve its prospects at the upcoming summit conference. Moscow's attitude appeared to hold out the promise of a major improvement in East-West relations and a general reduction of international tension, not just in Europe but throughout the world. The Soviet people themselves were encouraged by the regime's propaganda to expect a growing "businesslike atmosphere" in international relations.

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Bulganin's 4 August report on the Geneva talks to a special session of the Supreme Soviet balanced "Geneva spirit" gains--a lessening of tension, increase in "mutual confidence," and the initiation of personal contact among top world leaders--with a rundown of major substantive international problems outstanding.

Concurrent with Moscow's pre-Geneva conciliatory posture to the West and Bulganin's sober appraisal of the results of the conference, the Soviet Union set in motion a chain of secret negotiations designed not to further the possibility of any mutual "hands off" policy in Asia-Africa, but to offset the consolidating pro-Western coalitions with a group of Arab states under its influence. Although Molotov's February 1955 foreign policy survey had been pessimistic on the Middle East,

> We cannot say that the national-liberation movement in the countries of the Arab East has attained the strength and momentum which this movement achieved in a number of other Asian countries....

intensified Soviet overtures to Syria and Egypt in the months following reflected a more hopeful view. Reports of various credibility that Moscow had made offers to sell arms to Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, and Afghanistan were confirmed in essence by Nasir's 27 September announcement of his arms deal with Czechoslovakia--obviously a dodge for a direct agreement between Moscow and Cairo.

The supply of arms to a non-Communist government marked a sharp departure in Soviet practice and was a challenge to Western influence of a more intense and immediate nature than Soviet economic overtures. Discussions with Nasir were well advanced by the time of the Geneva talks, suggesting that Moscow early had hedged its bet that a conciliatory posture and such reasonableness as agreeing to the Austrian state treaty would encourage significant Western concessions. Moscow's immediate reaction to the surfacing of Nasir's agreement to purchase bloc arms was predictably defensive, attributing the Western uproar to a false interpretation of developments based on the West's own "exploitative practices." It went on, however, to assert the "legitimate right" of all states to buy weapons for their defense without outside interference. Moscow's public and private follow-up was subdued, although the "Geneva spirit" in its relations with the West had already

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largely dissipated. Kaganovich's October Revolution speech, concurrent with the visit of Burmese Premier U Nu to Moscow and a definite coolness at the foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva, omitted any reference to a major shift in Soviet policy implicit in the offers and deliveries of trade and technical, economic, and now military assistance to Asian and Arab countries.

Moscow continued the process of reappraising world develments in terms justifying the development of closer government-to-government relations with Asian and Arab neutralists. Kommunist in August had made a pioneering attempt to cite "objective consequences" of policies in the direction of peace, reduction of international tension, and opposition to colonialism as a basis for singling out a category of politically independent though economically dependent states which were worthy of support. Kommunist author Mikheyev's effort to formalize propositions raised by Soviet leaders early in the year did not fully account for the scope and variety of Moscow's tactics, as economic and political blandishments were being offered not only to friendly neutrals but also to countries clearly non-neutral, such as Turkey. The new line on Asia and Africa was reflected in the fall of 1955 with the appearance of the second edition of the textbook Political Economy, which contained drastic revisions of passages offensive to India and other uncommitted countries. By making a neutral foreign policy in effect the sole criterion of Soviet support, Moscow indicated a strategy for local Communist parties which was restrictive and to a considerable degree demoralizing. In adopting such a course Moscow tacitly admitted the relative permanence of the nationalist governments, and in offering these governments many-sided support without extracting any commitment in protection of local Communist elements, Moscow in effect downgraded the latter and left them to shift on their own meager resources.

Moscow's first big chance to bid for Asian popular support was the Bulganin-Khrushchev "visit of friendship" to India, Burma, and Afghanistan from mid-November to mid-December 1955. The two Soviet leaders dropped their Geneva smiles and attempted to give Asian neutralism a more anti-Western slant by identifying the USSR with Asian nationalist aims and "peace," and they attempted to equate the West with "colonialism" and "intervention." Using local sensitivity to the colonial past as a point of departure, the two--especially Khrushchev--launched

bitter attacks on the West and sought to focus Asian and world attention on Soviet economic, political, and cultural initiatives. Khrushchev and Bulganin, by adopting brazen stands on the Asian intramural disputes over Kashmir and "Pushtoonistan," served notice that Moscow intended to step up its diplomatic and propaganda support for friendly neutrals and to increase pressure on pro-Western area governments.

The touring Soviet leaders dramatized to millions of Asian neutralists and to the world in general the USSR's apparent readiness to offer political and material support to new states attempting to establish or secure political and economic independence. Agreements reached on the tour for the extension of Soviet technical assistance, for increased trade, and for greater technical and cultural exchanges laid the groundwork for a considerable subsequent expansion of Soviet influence in the area. Khrushchev's announcement in India that

> If you want help, and you ask us for it, we shall give it. If you want to develop your technology and ask us to help you, we shall help you. If you want to train technicians, send them to us....

appeared to raise Moscow's budding economic aid offensive to new heights--an impression made more concrete by the announcement in Kabul of a $100,000,000 credit to Afghanistan.

The reports of both Bulganin and Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet on 29 December as to the results of their trip served to underline Moscow's optimism over its new thrusts for favor in Asia. For the home audience, Khrushchev made the same impassioned attack on Western economic activities in the underdeveloped countries as he had in Asia, and he implied that one of the aims of the Soviet foreign economic program was to force Western concessions to the underdeveloped countries. Riding the crest of optimism raised by the tour, Khrushchev interpreted Soviet offers of economic and technical help as signs of "our honorable intentions," and, although he cited "mutual advantages" in the program, he nevertheless was encouraged to sound a utopian note, "We consider it our duty to share with our friends and to help them as brothers." Especially since this South Asian tour, Khrushchev has taken great pains to be identified publicly with Moscow's friendship overtures, with the Soviet economic aid program, and with the necessity to increase "person-to-person" contacts, a vital factor in each.

Further steps were taken in Soviet publications in late 1955 to bring Soviet versions of certain standard Marxist-Leninist formulations more in harmony with current policies. One such reappraisal, on the vital and touchy question of the role of the "national bourgeoisie" in the struggle for independence, was undertaken slowly and cautiously. A few passages in Soviet Oriental Studies, which has served principally as an outlet for official views rather than as a clearing house for scholarly papers, allotted a greater role to non-Communists in bringing about the anticolonial revolutions in Asia. In view of the complexity and sensitivity of the reinterpretation of postwar developments and the need to satisfy conflicting demands--to be convincing to Asian-African leaders and intellectuals, to leave undisturbed the dynamic features of the international Communist movement, and to maintain the fiction of the immutability of Communist doctrine, for example--it remained for the Soviet leadership to undertake a "creative" interpretation of Leninism in light of the new situation.

The Khrushchev-dominated 20th party congress in February 1956 marked a supreme effort by the regime to turn world Communist and non-Communist attention away from the past--and away from any need to account for or explain away elements of the Stalinist heritage which now were to be discarded--and to create the impression that with the congress a new era, one bright with prospects of new Communist victories, was opening. A major part of the congress' effort was devoted to attempts to shore up the theoretical bases for the regime's current foreign policy, to justify coexistence with the West, and to give verisimilitude to Soviet overtures to Asian-African countries. All who spoke at the congress attempted to contribute to the aura of optimism, of unprecedented assurance vis-a-vis the physical and ideological challenges of the capitalist world, and of unanimity.

Khrushchev reserved to himself the starring role, but Suslov, Mikoyan, and Kuusinen contributed to the public reexamination of Soviet attitudes to non-Communist governments. Khrushchev's 14 February keynote speech spotlighted a new global view characterized as the "breaking out" of socialism from the bounds of a single state into a world system rivaling capitalism in scope and power. His abandonment of the thesis of the "fatalistic" inevitability of war between capitalist and socialist camps was a necessary, and tardy, step

to add credibility to its "peaceful coexistence" line and to facilitate long-term cooperation between the USSR and non-Communist countries. Khrushchev's admission, under pressure to improve relations with Tito, that there are many possible forms of transition from capitalism to socialism--that no single pattern would be applicable "to Denmark in the same way as to Brazil; to Sweden in the same way as to Malaya"--opened up the whole delicate and complex problem of intrabloc relations. Moreover, by appearing to support social development according to "concrete circumstances" in each country, Khrushchev made an extraordinary concession to the nationalist governments. Khrushchev's third major "modification" at the congress, that the changeover from capitalism to "socialism" need not be violent but could be attained through "the winning of a stable parliamentary majority," had special significance for neutralist countries such as India and Indonesia which had large Communist parties.

At the congress, Mikoyan, as always closely associated with Soviet trade policies, launched Moscow's strongest plea to date for the development of economic relations with non-Communist countries as a means for both reducing international tension and obtaining economic advantages. Malenkov, who had initiated many of the lines of Moscow's revised policy toward the former colonies, was now reduced to a role of seconding currently accepted formulations. He justified the regime's policy toward Asia and the Middle East as "substantially narrowing" Western potentialities for attacking the bloc. Molotov acknowledged that in Stalin's days the USSR had underestimated the importance of the colonial struggle against the West and admitted the correctness of party central committee criticism of his Foreign Ministry for "underestimating the new possibilities."

Khrushchev's survey of Moscow's developing foreign economic offensive left little doubt that this program was to enjoy a high priority. The January 1956 credit to Belgrade of $110,000,000--on top of the theatrical offer of $100,000,000 to Kabul in December 1955--had removed any doubts about the vigor with which Moscow intended to push this program. Khrushchev's revelation that the USSR had granted long-term credits within the bloc totaling 21 billion rubles was intended to contribute to the prestige of the Soviet Union as a world economic power, and possibly to sidetrack bloc criticism of Soviet offers to nonbloc countries. Promising aid

in the economic, political, and cultural development of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America,

> in order to create an independent national economy and a higher standard of living for their people... without making it necessary for them to bow down to their former overlords,

Khrushchev left little doubt as to the political character of this program, or that his intent was to impair their relations with the West, to place "a major stumbling block" in the way of colonial policy.

A month prior to the congress, Bulganin in a 16 January "interview" published in Vision, a news magazine circulated in Latin America, for the first time extended to Latin American governments the same type of diplomatic and trade overtures that Moscow had been making regularly to friendly and not so friendly Asian countries. It was reported that Soviet party leaders at the congress sought out representatives of the Latin American Communist parties present in an effort to improve their morale and to stimulate their activities especially in the direction of attracting broader segments of the population into the front organizations. Party organizational tactics outlined at the congress by Suslov and Kuusinen envisaged sharply increased emphasis on united action with non-Communists, but the Stalinist debate touched off by Khrushchev's secret speech destroyed some of the idealized notions about Communism and the USSR held by party members and sympathizers abroad. For a number of months the controversy over de-Stalinization nullified any gains for the world Communist movement which Moscow may have expected from its moderate formulations at the 20th congress.

The congress provoked a flood of publications to reflect the new views and to attempt to apply them currently and retrospectively in support of Soviet policy. Mikoyan at the congress had provided a strong goad for a thorough-going shake-up in the field of Soviet oriental studies, charging that

> while the whole East has awakened in our time, the Oriental Institute happily dozes away...at a time when our relations with the East are growing in scope and strength, when, with the extension of economic, political, and cultural relations with Eastern

> countries, the interest of the Soviet public has grown to such an extent, as has the need for people who know the languages, economy, and culture of the Eastern countries.

An unsigned lead article of the journal Soviet Oriental Studies which appeared immediately following the congress admitted to organizational and theoretical shortcomings in Soviet studies of the non-Communist East and attempted to translate congress theses into a program of action for Soviet scholars and publicists. Past evaluations were attacked for having failed to give proper attention to the new correlation of social forces in Asia and Africa, and Soviet historians were criticized for approaching their problems from too rigid and dogmatic a viewpoint. A new version of the contradictions between nationalist movements and the West admitted that at the present stage of the "anti-imperialist struggle," the interests of the national bourgeoisie "basically correspond with the interests of the majority of the people." The revised theorem was intended to reduce ideological tension between Moscow and nationalist elements, and was not accompanied by acknowledgement of the role played by bourgeois leaders in winning independence for their countries.

Other public discussion of developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America following the congress reflected Moscow's concession that considerable economic development was possible --at least in the neutral countries--within existing political, economic, and social frameworks. A Problems of Economics article by V. Kollontay, a specialist in free world economic trends, applied the congress' views to economic development of the former colonies and showed Moscow willing to go to considerable lengths to court favor with government parties, including support for efforts to protect local capitalists from the pressures of "foreign monopolistic" capital. Kollontay reiterated the position that economic development is primarily a problem of mobilization and correct organization of domestic resources, and he played up to strong non-Communist sympathies in the area for state planning and regulation of a nation's economic life. "Industrialization" was presented as the only sure path to economic independence, and the securing of political freedom and economic relations with the bloc were offered as the means for bringing it about. Past ridicule of national attempts to solve pressing economic problems and to bring about a rise in living standards was shunted aside in favor of efforts

to stimulate new and expanded political and economic relations with half a dozen states--friendly or at least temporarily cool to the West--ranging territorially from Indonesia to Egypt and economically from primitive Yemen to India, where capitalist development admittedly was "well under way."

Post-congress Soviet overtures were mainly in the direction of further expansion of economic and political ties with Egypt, Syria, and India and in a general increase in the USSR's voice in Middle East affairs. Following a steady stream of arms deliveries to Egypt and heavy diplomatic and propaganda attention to area developments, Moscow issued on 17 April 1956 --coincident with the arrival of Bulganin and Khrushchev in Britain--a Foreign Ministry statement which attempted to pass off Soviet area policy as concerned primarily with protecting Soviet and friendly Arab interests until a basis could be found for top-level East-West talks on Middle East problems. In acknowledging privately the legitimacy of British concern over uninterrupted oil deliveries and publicly expressing willingness to talk about halting arms deliveries to the area if discussions concerned all Middle East countries and not merely the Arab states, the two Soviet leaders attempted to play up the moderation of their position in order to facilitate negotiations and to gain at least a tacit admission of "legitimate" Soviet interests in Middle East affairs.

The 1 June replacement of Molotov as foreign minister by party secretary Shepilov, whose visit to Cairo the previous summer had paved the way for the conclusion of the arms deal with Nasir, augured for an even more daring Soviet foreign policy. Shepilov's trip in June to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Greece, however, was principally a propaganda tour de force, with Shepilov publicly and privately attempting to exploit Soviet "friendship" and "sympathy" for local positions--to build up hopes of extensive economic aid at the same time as he dodged detailed discussion of political questions and avoided all Arab attempts to firm up Soviet commitments on the questions of Israel and Algeria. The USSR on 26 June voted for Security Council consideration of the Algerian question over French objections, but Moscow's subdued propaganda tended to confirm reports that Shepilov had urged a "go slow" policy toward the Arabs. Visits to the USSR that month by the Shah of Iran and Yemeni Crown Prince Badr pointed up the expanding territorial scope of Soviet initiatives.

The series of crises touched off by the collapse of Cairo's negotiations for Western economic assistance to build an Aswan high dam and Nasir's angry nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 was a major test both of Soviet intentions in the Middle East and of East-West relations. Shepilov's second trip to the Middle East in June had left the impression that friendly states could expect practically unlimited economic aid from Moscow on generous terms. Nasir apparently had been all but assured that large-scale Soviet aid for his pet project would be forthcoming immediately if negotiations with the West broke down. Moscow's strong propaganda support for Nasir's move was tempered by Khrushchev on 31 July on his return from a two-week swing through the "virgin land" areas. At that time he minimized the "excitement" and called on the West for moderation.

Shepilov's subsequent tactics involved an attempt to keep negotiations going, as he was apparently convinced of an eventual settlement largely on Egypt's terms. Moscow's strong diplomatic support for Nasir's position--reinforced by such tangibles as the release of bloc canal pilots for duty at Suez--stopped short of any commitment of Soviet military support in the event of an attack on Egypt. Soviet propaganda attempted to protray the crisis as a vivid illustration of "imperialist" reaction to nationalist efforts to remove the vestiges of colonial rule. Khrushchev's 23 August statement at the Rumanian Embassy reception--that bloc volunteers, including his own son, might be sent to aid Egypt in the event of an attack--foreshadowed Moscow's propaganda footwork in the November crisis.

Preoccupation with Suez developments was not so complete, however, as to rule out efforts to extend the Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive elsewhere along now well-established lines. Moscow's year-long effort to woo Indonesia's Sukarno led to a well-exploited two-week visit to the USSR in August-September 1956 and was capped by the announcement in Djakarta on 15 September that agreement had been reached on a $100,000,000 credit for industrial development. In August the USSR set up the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and in September Moscow announced that the Oriental Institute, of the USSR Academy of Sciences, would be reorganized and expanded in an effort to bring its product more in line with the needs of Soviet policy. "Doctor of Historical Sciences" B. G. Gafurov, long-time Tadzhik party secretary and a Soviet party central committee member who was assigned in

May to direct the shake-up said the priority tasks of the institute included the political and economic formation and development of the new states of the East and especially of their experience and problems in relation to the general crisis and disintegration of the colonial system in Asia and Africa.

A landmark of the new school in oriental studies was the publication in two issues of the foreign affairs weekly New Times of an article on "A Non-Capitalist Path for Underdeveloped Countries" by Modeste Rubinstein, chief of the US section of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, which wholeheartedly supported state planning and the development of state-capitalist enterprises in India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, and elsewhere as the only way for underdeveloped countries to industrialize. Further, Rubinstein elicited the backing of local Communists and Communist-influenced elements for the successful fulfillment of these state plans as long as the benefits "go to promote the welfare of the people."

The second stage of Soviet diplomacy in the Suez crisis was touched off by the London Conference of the "Suez Canal Users' Association." The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 15 September, issued on the eve of the conference, for the first time linked the USSR's security to current Middle East developments and made a general call for UN action, though it did not specify what this action should be. Moscow kept up its strong diplomatic and propaganda support of Cairo's opposition to any form of international control over the canal and encouraged Nasir to keep talks going as a means to forestall action by the West. By mid-October, Moscow apparently felt that the likelihood of a Western military response had lessened and indicated informally its willingness to participate in international negotiations to seek a way out of the diplomatic impasse.

Moscow's immediate reaction to news of the attack was a government statement condemning the action and calling for the Security Council to "take immediate steps" to halt the fighting and to force withdrawal of the attacking forces. Soviet efforts to get, and to keep, the issue before the Security Council were intended to embarrass the attacking powers and give Moscow a chance to foment pro-Nasir sentiment while it decided on a counterstrategy. Over the past months Soviet officials informally had left the impression of thorough support, amounting almost to protection, for Cairo; the attack,

however, exposed the ambiguity of the USSR's position. Only after the Soviet leaders became convinced of the serious split between the attacking powers and the United States did Moscow take the initiative, first in a letter to President Eisenhower proposing joint military action under UN authority against the "interventionists," and then in blistering notes to Britain, France, and Israel--exaggerated in the Soviet press--which gave the impression that the USSR would take unilateral action against these powers unless they called off their assault on Egypt.

Four days after the 6 November cease-fire, Moscow made a thinly veiled threat of "Soviet citizen volunteers"--a threat which, in conjunction with demonstrations before the British, French, and Israeli embassies in Moscow and "angry protest meetings" throughout the USSR, was intended to build up psychological pressure against the West. Before settling on this gambit, however, Bulganin on 1 November sent letters to Nehru and Sukarno proposing that they convene a second conference of Asian-African countries to condemn the attack on Egypt and to promote common action against the West.

This first major test of the genuineness of Soviet pretensions to be the "protector" of the peoples of the East was a qualified victory for Moscow's activist policies. Communist propagandists feasted on the "evidence" that imperialism had not changed its willingness to use armed force to keep or recapture key colonial positions, and Moscow's role in bringing about the military cease-fire was magnified after the fact to contribute to the image of the Soviet Union as having a major voice in Middle East developments. At the same time, Moscow was constrained to keep alive world fears that continued tension in the area might lead to further fighting both to forestall additional Western moves against pro-Soviet Arabs and to draw world attention away from the recent Soviet military intervention in Hungary and its aftermath.

Moscow's disappointment over the failure of Asian neutrals to respond to its call for a solid front against "imperialism" was reflected in diplomatic channels. Kommunist in December lectured both party and nonparty elements for underestimating the seriousness of the obstacles remaining in the path of the anticolonial struggle and the "desperate energy" with which imperialists would continue to defend their positions, predicting

a whole series of sharp conflicts, a multitude of battles on all economic and political problems between the newly arising states of the East and the imperialists....

A late 1956 conference of Soviet Asian specialists on "the economic and political positions of the national bourgeoisie in the countries of the East" cited India, Indonesia, Burma, and Egypt for fulfilling "progressive" functions and attempted to quiet doubters of the 20th congress line for "ignoring facts" and "failing to notice new phenomena." The discussions showed Moscow now willing to endorse national capitalism in whatever form as a "progressive historical phenomenon in colonial and underdeveloped countries" and denying that its support was based on temporarily parallel interests. The papers as published showed a considerable disparity of views, but they indicated that those reflecting the orthodox suspicion to lasting commitments to non-Communist governments now were out of favor.

Although political questions entangled with Suez temporarily shifted the spotlight off Moscow's foreign economic program, by the end of 1956 Moscow could point to increased diplomatic and economic contacts in Asia and Africa, dozens of new trade agreements with non-Communist countries--a great many of which either provided for or looked toward the exchange of technical experience--and a generally enhanced impression that the USSR was an economic as well as political competitor for influence in the underdeveloped countries. Shepilov boasted at the United Nations on 22 November that since the war the USSR had granted more than 25 billion rubles in foreign credits; he failed to mention that these loans were principally intrabloc. However, the momentum of Moscow's campaign owed more to promises of aid and prospective economic benefits than it did to solid performance. Furthermore, developments within the bloc in late 1956, especially the Hungarian uprising, and the sharp rise in East-West tensions flowing from both Middle East and Central European crises interrupted the course of Soviet policy, domestically as well as internationally. The December 1956 Soviet party central committee plenum was followed by the most extensive reshuffling of top governmental posts since Stalin's death, by extensive changes in Moscow-satellite economic relations, and by upward revisions of domestic housing and consumer goods goals. There is some evidence that higher political priorities of economic aid to the

bloc--including China--and to Yugoslavia prompted a slowdown in new commitments for aid to non-Communist countries and encouraged those in the Soviet leadership opposed to this program to challenge Khrushchev on the issue.* A slowing up of the tempo of Moscow's economic program was suggested by long drawn-out negotiations with India over a new $126,000,000 credit. Completed in November, the agreement, despite India's critical need for immediate help, carried the restriction that it not be drawn upon until 1959.

*Our best evidence of this split is Saburov's "statement" at the 21st congress charging that the antiparty group, blinded by "ultranationalist narrow-mindedness" had opposed both trade expansion and economic aid to bloc countries as well as to non-Communist underdeveloped countries. The upsurge in Soviet offers following the June 1957 dismissal of the antiparty group tends to confirm this.

IV. SYRIA AND SPUTNIKS: January - November 1957

At the beginning of 1957, Moscow was concerned principally with distracting world attention from intrabloc troubles and with forestalling further Western moves in the Middle East and elsewhere while bloc unity was being restored and strengthened. The series of bloc government and party conferences indicated that a high priority was being given to working out a new program for intrabloc cooperation and to restoring the public image of Communist "solidarity." Domestically, the lessons of Hungary and Suez were exploited to reinstate a vigilance campaign as a means for enlisting greater enthusiasm for official programs and for diverting popular dissatisfaction over the slowness of domestic economic gains.

A continued high level of diplomatic activity, accompanied by appropriately strident propaganda, attempted to keep alive the allegation that Hungary and Suez were merely the prelude to concerted Western efforts designed to re-establish their former world position in all key areas, especially the Middle East. President Eisenhower's 5 January "Middle East proposals" were immediately made the center of Soviet attempts to split the Arab world into pro-Western and anti-Western factions. TASS on 12 January undertook a point-by-point rebuttal of the "proposals" leading up to the assertion that although the program was formulated in terms of opposing Soviet and Communist pretensions in the area, its primary purpose was to halt and reverse the course of the Arab movement toward independence. The ominous, if ambiguous, Sino-Soviet communique of 18 January pledged that the bloc would "continue rendering the necessary support to the peoples of the Near and Middle East in order to prevent aggression and interference" by the Western powers in the affairs of area governments.

Moscow welcomed the 18-19 January discussions in Cairo by Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Saudi Arabian leaders as evidence of closer cooperation among the anti-Western Arab faction and of strengthening the hand of pro-Nasir Arabs willing to accept closer diplomatic and economic ties with the bloc. Acceptance or rejection of American economic aid under the new Middle East program was seized upon by Moscow as the chief criterion of genuine independence.

Soviet moves in the Middle East appeared motivated both by fears that Western moves in the area impinged on the USSR's security and by concern that its newly won influence in the Arab world would erode under combined Western diplomatic, military, and economic pressures. A TASS statement on 23 January alleging that the United States intended to establish atomic bases in Turkey and Iran touched off direct propaganda charges that the "Eisenhower-Dulles" Middle East doctrine was intended to prepare the way for aggression against the Soviet Union. Moscow's generally hostile tone toward the West was backed up by veiled boasts concerning new Soviet scientific-military developments. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov, touring India as part of the increasing stream of top-level Soviet visitors to South and Southeast Asia, asserted a hard anti-imperialist line and focused Asian and world attention on recent more optimistic Soviet public affirmations of comparative military strength vis-a-vis the West, claiming an ability to strike a "crushing blow" against targets anywhere on earth.

Soviet notes to the United States, Britain, and France on 11 February calling for a multilateral big-power approach to Middle East problems, over the heads of local governments, represented a sharp departure from the USSR's efforts to build up Soviet influence in the area through offers and deliveries of both political and material support to Arab anti-Western extremists. Although the notes were framed along lines long used to court these Arabs--noninterference in the internal affairs of Middle East countries, rejection of military blocs, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the encouragement of economic development--the direction of the overture of partial detente to the West, backed by the suggestion of a mutual ban on arms shipments to the area, showed the Soviet Union at this time willing to jeopardize Arab good will in the interest of at least a partial settlement with the West. Subsequently, Moscow has not been able completely to put to rest Arab suspicion that overriding cold war interests may lead the Soviet Union to agreements or a settlement with the West which would be detrimental to Arab interests or aspirations. Moscow may have had in mind a big power conference on the Middle East similar to the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. Its immediate intent was to stall the implementation of the new US Middle East program.

Foreign Minister Shepilov's survey of international relations in an address to the Supreme Soviet on 12 February, on

the eve of his return to the party secretariat and his replacement by foreign affairs "professional" Andrey Gromyko, went to considerable lengths to defend Moscow's policy of "coexistence" with the West as the "cornerstone" of Soviet foreign policy rather than a political maneuver or tactic of the moment. Shepilov promised that the USSR would continue to follow the "greatest self-control, patience, and persistence" in seeking a solution with the West through negotiations. Following a second round of notes to the Western powers on 19 April, Khrushchev, in an interview with New York Times editor Catledge on 10 May, pointed up the analogy of the Geneva settlement on Indochina and said, "It would be wise if the leaders of the great countries met more often." At the same time Moscow sought to limit the negative effects of this tack by attempting to reassure the Arabs that its 11 February and 19 April proposals were designed to strengthen Arab security and promote the rapid economic development of the area.

The general outlines of Soviet views on developments in the Arab world were presented in two monographs, released in late April and early May, by scholars of the Institutes of Law and Oriental Studies respectively. In The State Structure of the Countries of the Arab East, I. Levin and V. Mamayev of the Institute of Law surveyed economic and social forces at work in the area and offered an explanation for Soviet support. An even more impressive attempt to interpret recent area history in such a way as to justify current Soviet support for Arab anti-Western movements was a symposium, Arabs in the Struggle for Independence, prepared by the Middle East experts of the Institute of Oriental Studies, under the editorship of Egyptian specialist L. N. Vatolina and Ye. A. Belyayev. The two works devoted little space to Arab history or political claims, although Egypt's July 1952 revolution was hailed for its successful measures against imperialism and for its start in the direction of antifeudal, democratic reforms. The Soviet authors, citing the predominantly rural character of all Arab states, held out little hope of real economic development until the agrarian problem had been solved along "progressive" lines and large-scale irrigation, electrification, improved transport, and extensive industrialization had been carried out. The subject of joint development of the area was avoided in favor of individual Arab agreements with bloc countries. Making no disavowal of area Communists, admitting that in most Arab countries weak Communist elements are forced to work underground, the symposium stated that Moscow's aim is not the

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dictatorship of the Arab proletariat, but the "strengthening of national independence through democracy, land reform, and the building of socialism in line with the national characteristics of the Arab countries." Hardly a blueprint of Soviet intentions, the two works' essential points presented solid testimony to Moscow's efforts to woo Arab leaders and intellectuals and to accommodate its major propaganda lines to their interests.

The victory of the Communist party in general elections in the Indian state of Kerala pointed up the contradictions inherent in Moscow's attempts to preserve a policy of official good will and exploit an ostensible community of international interests with neutralist countries, while at the same time remaining committed ideologically to assisting the inevitable and historical communization of the world. The installation on 5 April of the Communist-led ministry in Kerala, the first concrete proof of Khrushchev's 20th party formulation on the possibility of the parliamentary path to power by Communist parties, was greeted as testimony to the popularity of Communist ideas in India, but, out of an obvious desire to maintain good relations with the Indian Government and with Nehru, little comment was devoted to Kerala. Considering the magnitude of the victory, the volume of straight publicity was small, although tourist accounts on Kerala subsequently became a feature in Soviet publications. Commentators scrupulously avoided the subject of Indian internal affairs, and until late 1958 there was no indication of Moscow's willingness to champion the Kerala ministry.

In the continuing search for a stronger rationale for its policy toward Asian and African neutralist states, Soviet publicists turned to Lenin's works to cull out applicable views. In this instance the "return to Leninism" represented an effort to legitimize the new course and give it the stamp of greater authority as well as to inject some of the early revolutionary enthusiasm into the new Communist theses. Lenin was cited particularly to justify the temporary alliance with bourgeois-controlled Asian national movements; however, his stipulation that cooperation with non-Communist groups was possible only if Communists were left free to organize and agitate was not cited, in view of the domestic anti-Communist policies of some of the Asian and Arab governments which Moscow was now willing to overlook. Moscow's modernized version of Leninism played down ideological differences in favor of bringing about the

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unity of all national elements in a joint struggle for political independence, which in turn was identified with an anti-Western foreign policy.

The USSR's initial impact on Asian-African neutralism had come about through direct contacts with nationalist leaders such as Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir. Now, Moscow sought to increase its influence with the general public through brightening and broadening the appeal of the traditional labor, women's, student, and other Communist-front groups and by multiplying direct contacts of Asian and African peoples with the bloc. Special attention was given to the trade union movement in an attempt to exploit the historically close emotional relationship between the labor and nationalist movements. Moscow's greatest initiative along this line was directed toward propagating a "Bandung spirit," which it interpreted as general Asian-African neutralist endorsement of bloc policies and attempted to expand to include not only the Bandung Conference discussions and their aftermath but also the parallel "Afro-Asian Solidarity" movement which had been developing along nongovernmental lines since late 1954. Moscow recognized the potential of a movement based on popular enthusiasm for Asian and African cooperation as a fountain of anti-Western propaganda as well as a convenient mechanism for collaborating with and influencing Asian-African nationalist-neutralists.

The participation of Soviet officials in leading organizational roles both in cooperation with and in competition with Egyptian and Indian elements was intended to bring the "Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement" as close as possible to the bloc's peace movement and to further the image of the USSR as an Asian nation. Overtures to Asians and Africans, however, were but part of a general Soviet effort to expand contacts with foreign groups and individuals, in line with the formation on 21 May of a State Committee for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, under the USSR Council of Ministers. Tactical flexibility in dealing with non-Communists, in person-to-person contacts no less than in government-to government relations, was to be the order of the day.

The First All-Union Conference of Orientalists, convened in Tashkent from 4 to 11 June, brought together specialists from all over the bloc in an effort to back up current Soviet foreign policy lines with more skillful and convincing interpretations of area developments and to strengthen the appeal

to Asian-African intellectuals. B. G. Gafurov, a Tadzhik who since the 20th party congress had authored the principal programmatic statements on the new line for Asia-Africa, chaired the conference and shared the spotlight with another Asian, N. A. Mukhitdinov, then first secretary in Uzbekistan and candidate member of the Soviet party presidium. The locus of the conference (the heart of Soviet Central Asia), the content of the major speeches, and the leading role of Soviet Asians underlined the shift to efforts to utilize to the maximum the experiences of Soviet rule in the Central Asian republics as a pattern for the economic development of non-Soviet countries. Gafurov cited the "marvelous experience" of the peoples of these republics,

> which with the active assistance of the Russian people and of other peoples of the USSR, in the shortest historical period, overcame their former backwardness and created a highly developed industry and agriculture.

Mukhitdinov, now tabbed as a leading regime spokesman on national movements, likewise emphasized the political, economic, and cultural achievements of the peoples of the Soviet East in the years of Communist rule as a promising vehicle for making more vivid and concrete the Communist program for Asia and Africa. In the year following this meeting, Soviet scholars expanded their output of analyses of the social and economic development of Central Asia as the path for a noncapitalist path of development from feudalism to socialism. The state universities at Tashkent and Frunze were developed as centers of scholarly and cultural contact with non-Soviet Asia.

The practical applications of these views to pressing Middle East problems showed Moscow engaged in a careful assessment of areas of conflicting interests in which Soviet theoretical prejudices played a limited role. Having scored its advanced in the Middle East on the basis first of giving all-out support for Arab governments against Israel and second of encouraging Arab estrangement from the West, Moscow revised somewhat its earlier views on the shape of the dangers to its position and that of its Arab allies. Months after the fact Moscow revised its version of the Suez crisis to admit that the attack on Egypt came without prior agreement with the United States. At the same time, while tacitly admitting considerable American successes in shoring up the economic and military strength of area countries opposed to the extension of Soviet influence,

Moscow appeared less concerned that major American intervention was imminent and turned its principal attention to firming the anti-Western stand of Egypt and Syria and to winning broader Arab popular support. In the face of the ouster of the Nabulsi government of Jordan in April and the signature of Saudi-US agreements, Moscow blamed reactionary leaders rather than the two kings for these pro-Western moves, apparently feeling that in time these governments would be forced by intra-Arab pressures to follow the lead of Cairo and Damascus.

Moscow continued its offers of economic assistance to almost all area countries and speeded the re-equipping of the Egyptian Army to replace its losses of materiel. Arms also flowed to Syria at cut-rate prices in exchange for Syrian exports of cotton and wheat, necessitating the diversion to the bloc of an important part of Syria's traditional agricultural exports to West European markets and resulting in a dramatic increase in the bloc's share of Syrian foreign trade. Despite Moscow's blanket offers of increased trade, of economic development loans, and technical assistance, by mid-1957 only a handful of countries--notably India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria--had agreed to extensive programs of economic or economic and military aid. Burma, Cambodia, Nepal, Ceylon, and Yemen had agreed to terms with Moscow, but African (other than Egypt) and Latin American countries failed to respond to tentative Soviet overtures.

Moscow's intentions to follow an activist line in the underdeveloped countries--based on a more objective understanding of concrete developments on the one hand and intensified ideological-propaganda attacks on Western policies on the other--were reflected in important publication moves at mid-year. In early June, Moscow issued in 125,000 copies a reference handbook of almost 1,000 pages entitled Foreign Countries. The publication, which gave a run-down of major developments since World War II for all countries except the USSR, presented short geographic and economic surveys, descriptions of organs of state power, leading political parties, the press, etc. An aid to Soviet educators and propagandists, it was notable for its dissimilarity to an agitator's notebook.

Of more lasting impact, Moscow brought to life after a decade Varga's journal, a new World Economics and International Relations, the stated purpose of which was to examine economic developments both in the developed and underdeveloped

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capitalist countries and relations among and between them. The renowned economist was listed as an editor and has been a frequent contributor, but the selection of Ya. S. Khavinson,* long head of TASS and former chief of the foreign section of Pravda, as chief editor pointed up the unmistakable political bent of the journal. A second new journal, The Contemporary East, introduced at the same time was intended to serve as a popular voice of the Institute of Oriental Studies both at home and abroad. To date it has not lived up to its initial promise to appear "soon" in the major languages of Asia and Africa, but under Gafurov's editorship it has been used to disseminate official views on pressing international problems especially touching on the interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to publish the parallel views of neutralist leaders, and to point up the significance of cultural contacts, exchanges, friendship societies, and front groups in bringing together non-Communist and avowed Communist activities in these areas.

The step-by step disclosure in early July of the "antiparty" group conspiracy which had come to a head the previous month opened a new era in Soviet relations with the uncommitted world, as Khrushchev used this opportunity to attribute to the group policies which were unpopular or had failed and to associate himself personally with those initiatives which had proved a success or were now to be undertaken. The dismissal of Shepilov, the Soviet leader most closely associated with Moscow's strong pro-Nasir stand, obliged the regime to explain to the Arabs that no change in Soviet Middle East policy was in prospect. The indictment of Molotov, probably correctly, for broad opposition to many of Khrushchev's foreign policy moves cleared the way for a purely Khrushchevian style in foreign affairs. Accusing the whole antiparty group with having opposed such features of current Soviet foreign policy as moves in the direction of peace and coexistence with the West and

*Khavinson, in authoring important articles on international relations in his own and such other Soviet publications as International Affairs and Life Abroad, has used the literary pseudonym M. Marinin.

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"personal diplomacy" were apparently intended to underline these features' sanctity and the importance with which Moscow continued to view reaching a long-range accomodation with the West. No mention was made at this time of opposition by at least part of the ousted presidium members to Khrushchev's policies for intrabloc as well as foreign aid.

The first test of the regime's intentions following the purge was provided almost immediately as a result of the growing intimacy of Soviet-Syrian relations and Moscow's general embroilment in Middle East developments. On 6 August a joint Soviet-Syrian communique issued on the conclusion of a visit to Moscow of a high-ranking delegation of Syrian political and military figures pledged the USSR to further extensive economic and technical assistance for Syria and sought to strengthen the anti-Western hand of the Syrian Government. Following the alleged discovery a week later of an American plot, the Syrian regime ousted the last dissenters to its pro-Soviet policies and set off an area-wide alarm over the spread of overt Communist activities in the Middle East and on the possibilities of pro-Western intervention in Syria. Soviet propaganda seized on the Syrian charges and subsequent Arab alarms not only to intensify the air of crisis in order to increase pressures on pro-Western Arab governments, but also, as indicated by a third round of notes to Britain, France, and the United States on 3 September, to bring about big power negotiations on the Middle East on the same terms as proposed in its notes of 11 February and 19 April 1957.

Behind a facade of exaggerated interest in Soviet security in the Middle East, and in the context of intense political-psychological pressures, Moscow set out to test Western reactions and Western resolution over Syrian developments. TASS' 26 August announcement of the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile touched off a campaign by Moscow to exploit claims of a new balance of power and thereby establish a stronger international authority for itself. This campaign was made more explicit by the publication on 8 September in Pravda of a long "interview" with head of the Soviet air force, Air Marshal Vershinin, depicting overwhelming Soviet military superiority vis-a-vis the West. The 18 September announcement by Moscow that two warships from the Baltic Fleet which were on a good-will visit to Albania and Yugoslavia would also make a ten-day visit to Syria dramatized the USSR's self-appointed role as "protector" of the Arabs at the same

time as it was intended to serve as a concrete reminder of Soviet Middle East interests. A party brochure published on 25 September, The Soviet Union and the Countries of the Near and Middle East, by Kh. N. Grigoryan, claimed that

> tens of millions of people in the Near and Middle East see in the face of the Soviet Union a true friend and supporter of the peace and independence of peoples....

In explaining to wide domestic circles Soviet diplomatic support for Syria and Egypt, the brochure did not intimate that Moscow's backing would be other than diplomatic and economic. Khrushchev's attempts to build up the impression abroad of irresistible Soviet power were intended to inhibit Western moves in the area and to encourage Arab governments to take a stronger line against the West, secure in the belief that Soviet arms would protect them from any Western military reprisal and that bloc economic ties would foil attempted economic retaliation.

Moscow's handling of the second phase of the crisis was more clearly directed over Arab heads at the West. Moscow's 24 September announcement--without comment--that atomic and hydrogen weapons of various kinds had been exploded in connection with military training exercises was a prelude to the recapitulation of Soviet military, scientific, and economic advances which followed the 4 October launching of Sputnik I. Moscow kept the spotlight on military technology with the announcement on 7 October that on the preceding day it had tested a "powerful hydrogen device of new design." Then Khrushchev personally took the lead in magnifying the war scare over Syria with his statement to New York Times correspondent James Reston that Turkey would not last "a single day" in a Middle East war. Again on the evening of the 7th the premier hit at Turkish and Western intentions regarding Syria, adding that it would be too late to reconsider policies when "cannons begin to shoot and rockets to fly." The subsequent transfer of Marshal Rokossovsky to command of the Transcaucasus Military District bordering on Turkey and Iran, followed by an unprecedented press statement that military exercises had been carried out there under simulated atomic warfare conditions, was intended to convince both the Arabs and the West--but principally the latter--that tensions were so great as to require an immediate settlement.

Although both public and private statements of Soviet willingness to undertake, if necessary, military action in support of Syria fell short of committing the USSR to unilateral action, they served to cloak Soviet intentions and to maintain for Moscow as wide an area as possible for propaganda exploitation and political maneuver. When even the Nasir-oriented Arab states moved in the direction of detente, Khrushchev, at a reception on 29 October in the Turkish Embassy, made a theatrical, self-styled "gesture of peace" and attempted to resume the pose of peacemaker. Perhaps in recognition that the very crudeness of its tactics had boomeranged among some of the Arabs and had failed to shake the West, Moscow later made a halfhearted attempt to blame the military pressures to the "adventurism" of then Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov may have favored such tactics and contributed to the atmosphere of crisis by repeating the harsher tones of the Moscow press in his speeches in Albania at the height of the tension, but in view of his three-week absence and Khrushchev's earlier personal identification with the probe, he was an unsuitable scapegoat.

Moscow's subsequent attempts to depict its efforts to intensify, prolong, and manipulate tensions between Syria and its neighbors as another major trial of its role as protector of the Arabs have centered around the undisputed fact that no intervention took place. Although at the time the central press reflected disappointment that the Arab states proved irresolute in the face of East-West pressures, Soviet historians have prefered to skim over the diplomatic and political maneuvering which led to the impasse, to present a caricature of the crisis based on the Western plot thesis, to repeat the "we saved Syria" allegation without specifying the Soviet psychological pressures employed. Although paled by the recent Soviet support for Syria, the signature on 28 October of a $170,000,000 long-term development assistance credit emphasized the close cooperation between the two governments at the same time as it underlined the interplay of Soviet economic aid with both broad and immediate policy aims. Concurrent with the Syrian developments, a major review of the politics of economic aid to the underdeveloped countries by Modeste Rubinstein emphasized the indirect "financial-economic and military-political" methods used by colonialists in enforcing their will on nominally independent states and asserted that Moscow's unselfish aid "truly threatens colonialist policies" in opening the way for the underdeveloped countries to choose freely the course and pace of their economic development.

In 1957, for the first time, economic aid was included as one of the Theses for the October Revolution Anniversary;

> Having become a mighty industrial power, the socialist state not only extends to the countries of Asia and Africa moral and political support in their struggle for attaining, preserving, and strengthening their independence, but also helps them in the creation of the economic basis of independence in building up industry and in developing agriculture.

The 40th anniversary provided a convenient peg for a flood of Soviet publications to attempt to influence the peoples of the former colonies. The effort was keyed to the interpretation of recent world history in terms of a revolutionary struggle against imperialism in which all of these peoples had participated in one degree or another and was couched in localized terms in order to increase its plausibility. Symptomatic of Moscow's more optimistic appraisal of prospects for still greater influence in Asia and Africa was the publication in the journal Soviet Oriental Studies of an article on the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in September 1920 at Baku, which outlined a long discarded program of revolutionary struggle of all peasants and workers of the world.

One of the frankest evaluations of East-West rivalry for the tactical allegiance of the underdeveloped and neutralist countries was given by Eugene Varga on the eve of the November celebration. Writing in "his" journal World Economics and International Relations--hereinafter cited as WEIR--the noted Soviet economist singled out "the three mighty pillars" of colonial rule: monopoly on the supply of industrial equipment and machinery, monopoly on the sources of international credit, and monopoly on the supply of arms. Varga claimed all three were crumbling as a consequence of Soviet policies. He bragged that the economic achievements of the USSR and the bloc permitted them to furnish whole industrial combines to underdeveloped countries and that sound Soviet finances permitted the USSR to make loans on more advantageous terms than those offered by either the United States or Britain. In one of Moscow's rare references to its nonbloc military assistance programs, Varga cited the high stage of bloc industrial development as making possible the sale of arms to former colonies and dependent countries threatened by imperialist aggression, thus eliminating the West's third and last "monopoly" standing

in the way of complete political and economic independence. The near-term implication was that Moscow's call for peaceful competition with the West would feature greatly expanded Soviet efforts along all three of these lines. As for the policies Moscow was urging on the underdeveloped countries, the most important was a pro-Soviet, or at least neutral, foreign policy, plus domestic measures combining

> land reforms and the elimination of feudal holdovers; the liquidation of the economic positions of imperialism in industry, finance, and trade; the creation of a powerful state economy on the basis of an increase of the relative weight and directive role of the state sector in the country's economy; the introduction of elements of state planning of the economy; the establishment of a definite control over the activity of private capital; and the nationalization of foreign property. (From the unsigned lead article in Soviet Oriental Studies, No. 5, 1957, signed to the press on 1 November.)

The 40th anniversary celebration in Moscow, led and dominated by Khrushchev, was keyed to efforts to make direct political and propaganda capital out of the changes wrought domestically during the 40 years of Communist rule. Khrushchev's jubilee speech paraded a list of recent domestic and international achievements--topped off by recent ICBM claims and world-wide acclaim of Sputnik I and, on the eve of the holiday, Sputnik II--to give the impression that the successes of the past year were but the prelude for further Communist advances, and he reiterated standard claims for the ideological and cultural superiority of Communism as a world system. His remarks on the disintegration of colonialism were brief and notable only for the optimistic formulation that the "twilight of imperial rule in the East has arrived," as distinct from the usual equivocation as to timing. Khrushchev's speech did not even imply that up until less than two weeks previously the Middle East, specifically Syria, had been the locus of a major East-West crisis. The following day, however, newly named Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky kept alive the Soviet charge that Western "adventures" such as Syria threatened mankind with the calamities of nuclear warfare.

The meetings and discussions of Communist party leaders who were in Moscow ostensibly to help celebrate the anniversary

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comprised a major effort to resolve intrabloc differences and to establish a greater semblance of doctrinal and organizational unity to the world Communist movement. The "Declaration" issued at the 14-16 November conference of bloc parties --a document Yugoslavia refused to sign--apparently was intended by its formulators as a sort of bloc charter, and was so treated by Soviet propaganda for about a year following the meeting. The "Declaration" reaffirmed the theses of the Soviet party 20th party congress and in effect validated Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement in the interim period. At the same time, however, provisos were added which justified harder lines in both the ideological and political struggle with the class enemy (capitalism) and the bloc enemy (the West). The meeting from 16 to 19 November of 64 Communist parties, claiming more than 33,000,000 members, was concerned with broadening and invigorating Communist tactics and, in particular, enlivening the languishing "peace" movement. The 64-party "Peace Manifesto" called for an intensified struggle by all anti-imperialist elements against Western influence and policies and directed peace organizations to make a passionate drive against the manufacture, testing, and use of nuclear weapons.

The party conferences and the two programmatic documents were intended to close the gap between the correct line being followed by Moscow in government-to-government relations--which accepted differences in social and economic institutions as secondary to the country's stance vis-a-vis the West--and the ideological priorities in local party programs. A survey, The Disintegration of the Colonial System by V. Ya. Avarin, which appeared in November 1957 under the auspices of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, reflected Moscow's willingness to advance a step toward reclaiming class struggle and agitation as motivating forces for progressive world developments, points left unsettled by the concessionary 20th party congress formulations. Avarin cited the position of the working class as "usually the basis and point of departure of the anti-imperialist and antifeudal movement" and hailed the role of labor unrest and strife as an "integral part" of the national liberation movement. Subsequent to the November meetings, Soviet commentators were more cautious in their appraisal of nationalist parties and governments than they had been the previous year. The principal impact of the party get-togethers, however, was not on Soviet policies, nor even on Soviet public attitudes, but on bringing the tactics of local Communist parties into line: to focus the resentment and hatred of all national elements on the capitalist and foreign enemy, principally the United States.

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V. THE INTERIM BETWEEN PARTY CONCLAVES: December 1957 - January 1959

The party discussions had little if any immediate effect on the course of Soviet foreign policy. Moscow's public attitude continued to be comprised of a professed willingness to enter into reasonable agreements with the West and of an extensive commitment to assist those countries wishing to break free of dependence on the West, politically and economically. On 9 November 1957, after drawn-out negotiations, Moscow finally signed a $125,000,000 credit to aid India in developing a domestic heavy machine-building industry. Later in the month, following discussions in Moscow with Nasir's top aide Marshal Amir, the Soviet Union announced its willingness to extend long-term credits to Cairo for projects under Egypt's economic development plan. Concurrently, efforts were made to increase trade not only with the underdeveloped countries, but with the Western great powers as well--to "promote trust," as Khrushchev told visiting American newspaper magnate Hearst on 22 November. One sign that the Kremlin had not forgotten the interplay of Western defense moves and Arab developments on Soviet strategic and political interests in the Middle East was Moscow's continuation of its serious warnings and general diplomatic pressure on Turkey. In December, Moscow issued a first call in a new program for bringing about a summit conference which could lead to a general settlement of outstanding East-West issues and a lessening of international tension.

Khrushchev personally took the lead in extending Moscow's economic assistance and friendship campaign to Latin America, still relatively unaffected by post-Stalin changes in Soviet policy. In an interview with two Brazilian journalists on 21 November 1957, published subsequently in International Affairs, Khrushchev began a new stage of Soviet efforts to break down the resistance of Latin American government and business circles to increased contacts with the bloc. Calling his visitors "the first swallows heralding a new era in Soviet-Brazilian relations," Khrushchev pitched his discussion to the desirability of re-establishing diplomatic relations--the absence of which allegedly was depriving Brazil and other Latin American countries of the advantages of economic and cultural co-operation with Moscow--and to Soviet willingness to expand commercial transactions, extend industrial assistance, and increase cultural contacts. According to local Communist press accounts,

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Soviet leaders had met separately with Latin American delegates at the November meetings in Moscow,--17 of the 21 Latin American Communist parties, many illegal, had representatives at the Moscow talks--and worked out with them regional policies and tactics.

Two articles in the December issue of International Affairs attempted to apply to Latin American conditions the lessons of the 20th party congress and the developments up to and including the November Moscow meetings. It was asserted that the main purpose of the national liberation movement in Latin America was the attainment of genuine economic independence and national economic development in which the national bourgeoisie would be "almost as interested in economic progress and economic independence as the working class." Moscow's transparent intention in seeking friendly contacts with Latin American businessmen and government figures was to lay the groundwork for long-term political gains similar to those scored earlier with similar groups in Asia and the Arab countries by exploiting their current economic difficulties--foreign exchange, export market, and investment capital shortages--in the direction of reduced economic and thus political dependence on the United States and increased political, economic, and cultural relations with the bloc.

Although Moscow often promoted increased economic contacts between the underdeveloped countries and the bloc--and even between the major capitalist countries and the bloc--as a means of reducing international tension and as an antidote for war psychosis, it pressed a program of undermining Western economic influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in unmistakably cold-war terms. At the same time as the Soviet economic assistance program was still restricted primarily to a half-dozen countries of considerable political and strategic importance in the East-West rivalry, Moscow carried out a systematic and widespread campaign to counter Western and particularly American aid programs. A special conference on "American 'Assistance' to Asian Countries," bringing together leading Soviet economists and orientalists of the Institutes of World Economics and International Relations, Chinese Studies, International Relations, and other establishments, was held in December. The condensed texts of the statements presented, as published in the January 1958 issue of WEIR, reflected Moscow's evaluation that Western economic aid programs were a formidable barrier to the extension of Soviet influence throughout the under-

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developed world. Also reflected was the desire to center local attention on political and military "strings" allegedly attached to all Western aid so as to undermine the psychological and political impact of aid programs, with the further effect of diverting public attention in the underdeveloped areas from a consideration of concrete economic measures to political and propaganda side issues which could be manipulated by Moscow and local anti-Western elements to discredit all relations with "imperialists." The core of the argument was not new: Western "assistance" is in fact part of a complex scheme to assure the continued political-economic domination of Western countries over the former colonies. The implication of the conference was that there would be an intensification of Soviet and Communist efforts not only to harrass Western economic programs in these areas, but to step up efforts to disrupt all forms of intercourse between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the capitalist world.

The first impressive public exercise of Communist strategy toward the underdeveloped countries and of tactics to be used to intensify area frictions with the West was the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo from 26 December 1957 to 1 January 1958. Although billed as a successor to the Bandung Conference, only the Chinese and Soviet delegations, plus a few Arab participants, were officially sanctioned by their governments, and a number of the approximately 500 "peoples' representatives" from 45 countries were expatriates or exiles of the countries represented. Moscow's impressive team was headed by Sh. R. Rashidov, "President" of the Uzbek Republic, and A. A. Arzumanyan, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. At the conference Arzumanyan made a bald assault on Western economic positions in the underdeveloped world--an assault framed in terms of a direct challenge to established positions as well as to shifting economic relationships. Simply expressed, Arzumanyan's thesis was that in order to safeguard their political independence and to secure economic independence as well, underdeveloped countries must develop their own heavy as well as light manufacturing industries. To get the capital necessary for industrialization these countries should nationalize the property of "foreign monopolies" and thus gain control for national purposes of their own resources and of the profits which Westerners had been sending out of the country. Underdeveloped countries would then find it possible to mobilize all internal resources and plan their utilization. Increased commercial trade with the

bloc and bloc technical and development assistance extended on favorable terms could supplement domestic resources with no limiting political conditions. Although this was not a new concept, the fact that Moscow chose a hybrid conference at Cairo to spotlight not only its willingness to extend credits to friendly governments but also its ideological antagonism to one of the pillars of the area's economy, foreign investment, pointed up one of the purposes of Soviet political and economic support to nationalist governments--the encouragement of political and economic forays against Western positions.

Besides the forum for attacks on the West, Moscow valued the Cairo conference and the "solidarity" movement behind it as a promising mechanism for maintaining liaison with and influencing neutralist and nationalist sentiment in nonbloc Asia, the Arab countries, and also Black Africa. Having originated principally in Indian and Egyptian neutralist circles, the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, though Soviet influenced, had a respectability and home-grown flavor Moscow could not claim in Asia and Africa for its peace movement. Although Moscow vies with Cairo--as on occasion also with New Delhi and Peiping--for organizational and ideological influence in this movement, the resolutions adopted at Cairo reflected the bond of anti-imperialism in demanding immediate independence of colonial territories, and generally paralleled lines of Soviet foreign policy. The permanent organizational structure which emerged from the conference also provided Moscow with a valuable new channel for direct contacts with African nationalist groups of many hues.

Soviet interests in African events had noticeably quickened during 1957 with Soviet representation at the independence celebrations of Ghana and Tunisia and a broadening and intensification of attempts to initiate diplomatic and trade relations with the independent African states. Soviet publications on Africa, still primarily the responsibility of the Institute of Ethnography, were pointed at winning the confidence of politically conscious African elements by asserting a friendly interest in their coming of political age, and by discrediting on all counts the West's past and present role in Africa. In Moscow's negotiations for the exchange of diplomatic missions and the establishment of regular economic and cultural ties, long-time Soviet Africanist Professor I. I. Potekhin played a pioneering role as scholar, semiofficial spokesman, and proto-diplomat.

Moscow began 1958 still riding the wave of optimism engendered by world-wide reaction to its sputnik launchings, although doubts concerning Moscow's extravagant claims to world scientific and technical leadership began to be more prevalent in non-Communist circles and portended a rapid decline in the political mileage Moscow could expect in this direction. Public expressions of Soviet leaders and Moscow commentary gave the appearance that the Soviet Union was confident that changes taking place in non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America, both in the field of international relations and in their domestic social and economic developments, were favorable to the increase of Communist influence and moreover were irreversible. Moscow gave every indication that it was counting on the cumulative effect over a period of years of bloc political, economic, and, though more restricted, military aid program--in combination with people-to-people contacts, intensive propaganda, and growing local Communist agitation--to make at least a considerable number of the underdeveloped countries materially dependent and politically tractable.

The lines developed publicly at the November party conferences and of the Cairo Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference were picked up and extended in Soviet publications over the first half of 1958. Pravda on 17 January published an article by Mexican Communist party leader Lombardo Toledano, who enjoys considerable prestige throughout left-wing circles in Latin America, in which Toledano indicated that the principal strategy for Latin American Communists was to discredit the United States and its "colonialist" policies. More detailed statements of revised local strategy and of organizational and propaganda tactics were carried in local party organs following the return of party leaders from Moscow--some visited Peiping as well. The report of the head of the Uruguayan Communist party, Rodney Arismendi, to his party congress was reprinted in Moscow's agitprop organ Party Affairs in May--an indication that it was considered both exemplary and programmatic. The kernel of the new strategy as outlined by Arismendi was to infiltrate all parties and organizations which favored parochial national interests and a reduction of ties with the West, and to encourage the initiation or increase of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with bloc countries. Implicit in the new program, local Communist parties were to play down class antagonisms and attacks on capitalism per se in favor of propagandizing national programs of "economic progress and economic independence."

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Ghana on 14 January 1958 marked an important extension of Soviet contacts with African national movements and was hailed by Moscow as acceptance by the Black African community of Soviet support and respectability. Moscow's primary concern, however, continued to be that of disrupting Western ties with African territories and frustrating Western plans to fashion a new framework of political and economic mutual relations. Besides spotlighting and exaggerating racial discrimination in Africa and the United States as evidence of innate Western hostility to Africans, Moscow sought to fan fears of colonialist cooperation under American leadership to extend the network of Western military bases throughout Africa and to tie African territories permanently in a dependent economic and political role through a variety of schemes and slogans; e.g., "Eurafrica." In a monograph entitled African Peoples, released under the auspices of the Institute of Ethnography in February, A. S. Orlova attempted to apply the lessons of the Bandung and Cairo conferences to Africa and claimed progressive forces and their post-Bandung slogan of "Independence in this generation!" as part of the global movement for peace and democracy. Moscow's support for the African struggle for independence was more theoretical than real, however. The April conference of independent African states at Accra--attended by the UAR, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and Ghana plus representatives of several African resistance groups--was solely an African affairs, though Moscow sent messages of support and reported favorably on the results of the conference; conference documents were reprinted in International Affairs.

Although Soviet and Egyptian delegates had worked closely at the Cairo Conference on a general anti-imperialist line for Asia and Africa, Nasir's precipitous response to Syrian overtures for a federation of Egypt and Syria posed a serious challenge to the bases of Moscow's support for non-Communist nationalist governments. Moscow supported the view as long as the talk was still of "federation," but when the outlines of Nasir's planned merger became clearer, Moscow's praise ceased. Not only had Damascus proved a more pliant ally, but diplomatic, economic, and military aid which had built up excellent intergovernmental relations had fostered the rise of left-wing Arab elements which threatened to be the first victims of the union. More than point up the deficiencies of Moscow's simple framework of attempting to evaluate political, economic, and social

changes in Arab and other underdeveloped countries in terms of pro- or anti-imperialism, the move toward merger underlined the differences in long-term aims between Cairo and Moscow and between Nasir-led Arab nationalists and Middle East Communists.

Moscow's pro-forma acceptance of the accomplished fact did not conceal its lack of enthusiasm. Its first cautious appraisal of the new Arab state, presented by K. Ivanov in International Affairs, represented a grudging adjustment to the new circumstances but did not refrain from restrained criticism, citing problems and differences in Syria "which cannot be surmounted at once by decree or government order." Subsequently Moscow was more openly critical of the antiprogressive prospects of the extension to Syria of Nasir's restrictions on labor and political organizations. Although he conceded that the merger played an anticolonial role in strengthening Nasir's hand, Soviet commentator I. Belyayev, writing in Contemporary East, expressed reservations as to the domestic effects of the union.

Moscow's dilemma in facing up to the implications of Nasir's move without surrendering completely its Communist assets in Syria to the demands of continued good state relations with Nasir was pointed up by the fate of the Syrian Communist party. Khalid Bakdash, top Syrian Communist leader, refused to dissolve the Syrian party, publicly denounced Nasir's merger policies, and on 5 February fled with his family and other Syrian Communist leaders to the bloc. From a variety of bloc forums, Bakdash kept alive the thread of an uncompromising Communist program for the eventual communization of the Middle East, in marked contrast to Moscow's official policy of good relations with anti-Western Arab governments.* Both Moscow and Cairo skirted a showdown on ideological issues, but the undertones of the Soviet reaction was that of a retreat rather than a surrender.

*A.Y. Kaznacheyev, the Soviet diplomat in Rangoon whose defection has thrown added light on Moscow's efforts simultaneously to promote good relations with existing governments and to undermine their popular support, reported that in January 1958 the head of the Institute of Oriental Studies, B. G. Gafurov, while on a visit to Burma as a member of the Soviet parliamentary delegation, met secretly with the leader of the Communist underground, U Ba Nyein, and promised Soviet support, advising him not to pay too much attention to Moscow's "official policy."

Nasir's acceptance of a renewed invitation to visit the Soviet Union--originally scheduled for August 1956 but postponed because of the crisis over Suez--capped an unprecedented number of high-level Soviet-UAR exchanges, featuring the parade to Cairo of Soviet ministers to negotiate or implement economic, agricultural, and cultural agreements. For reasons of their own, both Moscow and Cairo sought to limit the areas of their political disagreement so as not to disturb tactical coöperation, which had brought major gains to both parties at the expense of the West. Nasir's arrival in Moscow on 29 April 1958 touched off a major Soviet propaganda effort to portray USSR-UAR political views as identical. Nasir's speeches and his conduct during an extensive tour of the USSR indicated that despite continued Soviet economic and military assistance, he intended to proceed with his recently announced policy of seeking improved relations with the West. He avoided seconding Moscow's anti-Western attacks at the same time as he accepted closer Soviet-UAR economic ties.

Moscow attempted to identify itself in the minds of the Arab peoples with purely Arab goals, but it would not formally endorse Nasir as spokesman for all Arabs, nor was Nasir able to get a stronger Soviet stand on the Arab's war of liberation in Algeria. For their part, Soviet leaders seemed intent on heading off any rapprochement of Nasir with the West by increasing their economic and military backing of Cairo and continuing to fan anti-Western sentiment among the Arab people.

At the same time, the Soviet economic assistance program, as an integral part of Moscow's relations with all the underdeveloped countries, was undergoing continued re-examination and in turn was being diffused into Soviet analyses of the dynamics of social growth in these areas. A special conference on 24 February sponsored by the journal International Affairs, bringing together propagandists such as Ilyichev, the military strategist-theoretician Talensky, and a handful of academicians, discussed the latest achievements of Soviet science and technology and their significance for and influence on international relations. The abbreviated version of the proceedings, as published in the journal, reflected Moscow's determination to push forward an interpretation emphasizing enhanced Soviet prestige, to put new vigor behind its perennial "wave of the future" propaganda line, but also to claim greater international authority as a result of "important changes in the balance of forces between socialism and

capitalism." Propaganda to the underdeveloped countries, in order to keep alive interest in Soviet developments and to pave the way for closer government-to-government relations, featured the sputniks and other "peaceful" embodiments of Soviet scientific advances.

Moscow's general economic aid offensive was pointed up early in March by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin at the ECAFE conference in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time, G. Ye. Skorov, one of the editors of WEIR, attempted a point-by-point justification of Soviet economic assistance to non-Communist governments within the general framework of anti-imperialism. He claimed for bloc trade a "stabilizing" and "favorable influence on the economy" of the underdeveloped countries, with the implication that they stood with Moscow on important international issues and so should be strengthened. He also reiterated current Soviet support for development of the "state sector" but in stronger terms, asserting that

> under certain conditions, the state sector of the economy may become the material-technical basis of a peaceful transition to socialism.

Skorov's most important contribution, however, was an attempt to shore up the ideological basis for Moscow's economic offensive with the admission that although the immediate effect of Soviet aid often was to aid capitalist development, the state independence of the underdeveloped countries involved them in the world struggle against the West and on the long term opened the prospect of social change. Then, in more traditional terms, he asserted,

> Despite the fact that the majority of the nationally independent states remain a part of the capitalist system, the dialectics of world social growth are such that their movement forward along the path of independent political and economic development does not strengthen, but, on the other hand, weakens world capitalism, depriving it of its most important reserve.

Mikoyan's 11 March Yerevan "election" speech, which contained a brief attack on "economist comrades" for taking an incorrect position on certain foreign economic matters, left vague the focus of their opposition. It is not clear whether the erring "economist comrades" were opposed on ideological

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or political grounds, or whether they differed on economic interest and priority--the program appeared vulnerable on a number of accounts. Whatever the case, Mikoyan's defense was along political rather than economic lines:

> In this connection, we must not overlook such an important factor in international life as the role of countries that are liberated from colonial dependence and have earned political independence and which are proceeding on the path of establishing economic independence.

On the occasion of his visit to Hungary in April 1958, Khrushchev gave considerable personal attention to justifying the present Soviet economic program, with emphasis on long-range objectives. At Tatabanya on 8 April he emphasized the role of the working class in each country, the "inspirational example" of economic developments within the bloc, and asserted--without limiting it to the bloc--that the "only correct route to victory is the growth of productive forces in all possible ways." At the Hungarian Academy of Sciences the following day, Khrushchev reiterated the thesis central to the program, relying on the example of Soviet economic advances: "We attack capitalism on its flanks from economic positions, from positions of the superiority of our system." Expressing Soviet intentions shortly to overtake and surpass the West, and particularly the United States, in per capita production of socially necessary goods, Khrushchev boasted:

> Then the ideas of Communism will be understood by many people, not only by means of the study of Marxism-Leninism, but also by the force of example.... People who today cannot utter the word 'communism' without irony will then also be with us. They will take our road without their being aware of it.

The flexibility of the Soviet approach and Moscow's willingness to adapt and modify its tactics to appeal not only to political extremists but also to moderates in the underdeveloped countries was exemplified by a line introduced in March which implied that Moscow might be induced to compete alongside the West for influence in the economic development of the former colonies rather than to keep up a struggle to exclude Western interests. In an interview with a correspondent of Le Figaro on 19 March, Khrushchev picked up a proposal advanced

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by the French at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955--that a real easing of international tension and disarmament "would make it possible to deduct sufficient sums to render real and tangible aid" to the underdeveloped countries. Then in a 24 March interview with an Italian newsman, Khrushchev agreed there was merit in Italian Foreign Minister Pella's suggestion of a joint Western Europe - USSR fund to aid Middle East development, provided such a fund should be set up not by a "narrow grouping" of countries, but by all European countries, including the satellites.

Moscow's "six principles" for Middle East peace, set forth in its February and April 1957 notes to the Western powers, had tied vague "promotion" of area economic development to an arms embargo but had not been followed up. Soviet willingness to participate in regional aid now reappeared in the 5 May memorandum setting forth agenda items for the expected summit conference,

> The necessity arises of also considering the question of economic cooperation with the countries of the Near and Middle East, particularly in respect to assistance in creating their own national industries... without laying down any political, military, or other conditions incompatible with the principles of their independence and sovereignty.

Without committing itself in any way, not even to calling off or toning down its propaganda harassment of Western economic positions in the area, Moscow apparently wanted to put itself on the right side of an issue of much interest to the underdeveloped countries.*

*Subsequently, in his travels to the United States in the summer of 1959 and to France in March 1960, Khrushchev tied prospects of a major increase in economic assistance to progress on disarmament, implying, though carefully not stating, that programs to be paid for by funds released by a reduction of military expenditures could be used for programs carried on jointly with the West.

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Soviet emphasis during the period, however, was overwhelmingly on the side of undercutting Western economic activity in the underdeveloped areas. G. Martysheva, writing in the semipopular monthly Contemporary East, echoed Arzumanyan's Cairo thrust for the nationalization of Western-owned enterprises in the underdeveloped countries:

> The task of liquidating ages-old backwardness cannot be decided without seizing the positions held by foreign capital in the economy;...nationalization is an integral part of the national liberation struggle; its realization will shrink the sphere of imperialist exploitation in the underdeveloped countries and will allow the governments of these countries to turn the profits from nationalized enterprises to the needs of economic construction, and above all to industrialization.

Nationalization, however, was only the logical conclusion of a simple assertion that private capital investment was exploitation rather than assistance toward economic development, and that in effect it is not the countries exporting capital which finance economic development, but underdeveloped countries which provide excessive profits for Western concerns, a fraction of which returns to the same or another underdeveloped country, where the same chain of investment-exploitation takes place. The author also used an artifice of a "balance sheet" purporting to demonstrate that profits American concerns have received from their postwar operations exceed by several times all American capital investments in the underdeveloped countries; this strategem was repeated with ingenious variations by Soviet economists.

The failure of Khrushchev's ideological concessions and continued political and economic overtures to halt Yugoslavia's drift away from the bloc, leading to the second Soviet-Yugoslav crisis, provoked a reassessment of Soviet views on development processes and the relations of bloc countries to non-Communist countries as well as to Communist but revisionist Yugoslavia. In the lead article of Problems of Philosophy, G. M. Gak, leading up to a refutation of Tito's "national communism," sought to establish the essential difference between Communist programs of revolutionary reform and the various stages of the bourgeois-democratic revolution which Moscow for governmental reasons supported in non-Communist Asia. He made it clear that

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support for the national bourgeoisie in its struggle against imperialism should not lead to the conclusion that the nationalists are capable or interested in carrying the struggle forward to Communism. Citing the increasing numbers and influence of Communist parties in India and Indonesia, the author re-emphasized the importance of independent Communist organization and struggle:

> In these countries the Communist parties, supporting general democratic activity for which the national bourgeoisie is capable, at the same time is carrying out a struggle for the extension of its influence for the increase in the role of the working class and the strengthening of its ties with all popular masses in order to carry the country along the path of the construction of socialism....

A two-volume roundup of bloc and nonbloc Communist party leaders entitled The Great October Revolution and the World Liberation Movement, attacked revisionist versions of Marxism-Leninism and underlined the importance of the party's role at the present stage. This work, signed to the press on 19 May for wide public distribution--a press run of 75,000--was attuned to the 40th Anniversary celebrations.

In the vehemence of their attacks on Tito and in the justifications given for cancelling Soviet-Yugoslav aid agreements, Soviet leaders revealed more than was politic about their expectations that political gains should follow economic aid. Khrushchev's assertion on 3 June to the Bulgarian party congress --"everyone knows that the imperialists never give money to anyone for no purpose, just for having beautiful eyes"--was directed at both the Yugoslavs and the Asian-African nations who showed an interest in accepting American aid. In the hastily improvised justifications for unilaterally cancelling--"postponing"--Soviet credits to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev revealed a number of points about the Soviet aid program which hitherto had been hidden or denied but which probably had been the subject of discussion and disagreement among top Communist leaders. On 12 July, in a speech at a Soviet-Czech friendship meeting in Moscow, Khrushchev admitted that

> speaking in general, from the commercial viewpoint, our economic and technical aid to the underdeveloped countries is unprofitable for us. However, we consider

> that aid to the underdeveloped countries is a necessary matter from the viewpoint of humanity and general human solidarity....

This belied past protestations by the Soviets that their economic aid program was based on mutual economic self-interest. Khrushchev's follow-up definition of the special "profit" to Moscow was straightforward:

> by rendering economic, technical, and other aid, we by these means create in these countries conditions so that they, having been freed from colonial slavery, do not enter into any one-sided deal with colonizers, do not go begging to them, do not subordinate their economy to them, and in this way we make it possible for them to oppose attempts to bind them in old colonial relationships, however changed in form.

Moscow's vigorous reaction to the 14 July revolt in Iraq and the subsequent American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that these moves were a prelude to a general Western counteroffensive against Soviet and UAR interests in the Middle East. Nasir's hurried flight to Moscow suggested that the UAR leader shared these views and sought reassurances as to the nature and extent of Soviet support. Soviet intervention was confined principally to a virulent propaganda campaign directed primarily against the United States and secondarily against Britain and pro-Western states of the eastern Mediterranean and to immediate diplomatic and propaganda support for the new Iraqi regime. Contending that the United States and Britain had committed aggression, and that a military conflict was in progress which the West planned to extend to Iraq and possibly the UAR as well, Moscow attempted to apply many of the same psychological pressures which it had brought to bear during the crisis over Syria the preceding summer and fall, including the announcement of military maneuvers in areas adjacent to the Middle East. Soviet efforts to use the crisis to force an immediate conference of the major powers, plus India and the UN Secretary General, showed a considerable public concern for Arab sensitivities over the possibility of East-West agreement on the Middle East to the detriment of Arab prestige and interests, but subsequent exchanges, in which Khrushchev accepted a summit meeting under UN auspices and then backed away in the face of pressures from Peiping, indicated the Soviet Union's apprehensions had quickly

faded. As in the earlier Suez and Syrian crises, after the peak of tension had passed, Moscow continued its concerted propaganda and diplomatic effort to claim that only Soviet protection had prevented a damaging blow to Arab interests.

The Soviet Union's rapid strides in developing friendly relations with Qasim, the flowering of pro-Communist forces in Iraq following the coup, and Qasim's strenuous and successful efforts to keep from being drawn under Nasir's control greatly complicated the lines of Soviet Middle East policy. Hitherto Moscow had relied on its economic and arms aid to Nasir to reinforce the anti-Western, anti-Zionist emotional core of the pan-Arab movement and speed the erosion of Western influence. At an early date Moscow apparently realized the advantages of a second, more radical, anti-Western Arab center as a check on Nasir and as a more effective instrument for the furtherance of its long-range goals of ensuring the anti-Western orientation of Arab governments and of transforming the political, economic, and social structure of the area.

Contemporary East in early July had published a lengthy article--by Ali Yata, head of the Communist party of Morocco--which was one of the strongest efforts to justify, in terms of an ascending scale of unities of interests between Communist and nationalist forces, Communist support for strengthened bloc government-to-government relations with Cairo and Communist acquiscence in Nasir's efforts to be the sole leader of the anti-imperialist Arabs. In sharp contrast, the first issue of the new bloc journal Problems of Peace and Socialism (the English edition of which appears under the title World Marxist Review), released in late August, contained a reassertion by Syrian Communist exile Khalid Bakdash of the need for an independent role for the Communist party in the Arab struggle for independence and unity. Bakdash's article was a summary of views he had expressed at several bloc meetings since his February flight from Damascus: criticism of Arab governments willing to carry on friendly day-to-day relations with the West; scorn for the willingness or ability of the Arab national bourgeoisie to carry out progressive domestic reforms; and flat rejection of Nasir's demand for the liquidation of Arab Communist parties.

The visit to Cairo in September of N. Mukhitdinov, Soviet party presidium and secretariat member charged with Middle East and Asian affairs, was apparently intended by Moscow to smooth

out the whole range of political differences which had become more acute in the two months since the Khrushchev-Nasir discussions on Lebanon. Mukhitdinov, whose government post is chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the USSR Soviet of Nationalities, a pale shadow of his party responsibilities, reportedly made a spirited defense of Moscow's support for Qasim and against Iraqi amalgamation with the UAR, and in support of Middle East Communists as the most reliable anti-imperialist force. A further point of contention was the extent of Soviet support for the Algerian war. With Nasir's encouragement, an "Algerian Republic" was proclaimed in Cairo on 19 September. Although Mukhitdinov's meeting with representatives of the government-in-exile was publicized in the Moscow press and New Times hailed the step as "a logical and natural sequel to the Algerians' long years of liberation struggle," the Soviet Union avoided a stronger line.

For tactical reasons, Moscow apparently felt impelled to attempt to buy off Nasir's displeasure over Soviet policy and over Arab Communist opposition to his pretensions to all-Arab leadership. Having kept Nasir dangling for more than three years after the withdrawal of Western pledges of economic assistance for his pet project, the Aswan High Dam, Khrushchev on 23 October, at a Kremlin banquet for Marshal Amir, Nasir's top aide, pledged Soviet support and offered a Soviet credit of $100,000,000 toward the construction costs of the dam's first stage. Moscow previously had been reluctant to become so deeply involved in Nasir's industrialization program while keeping alive Egyptian hopes for more Soviet credits. A rundown of the USSR's economic assistance to Arab countries in the July issue of International Affairs had concluded on a defensive note,

> ...the positive results of Soviet-Arab relations in recent years and increasing economic and technical cooperation, as well as the existing cultural exchanges between the USSR and the Arab countries, cannot as yet fill all the needs of strengthening the economic independence of the Arab states.... (emphasis added).

A reported disagreement among Soviet leaders as to intrabloc and nonbloc economic programs and priorities led to the ouster in August of Minister of Foreign Trade Kabanov and his replacement by a deputy foreign minister, N. S. Patolichev. Apparently

a decision was made for a considerable increase in Moscow's economic investment in support of long-term foreign policy objectives. Within a matter of days after Khrushchev's Aswan Dam commitment, Moscow agreed to extend a $100,000,000 credit to Argentina for the development of its petroleum industry and concluded its first major economic agreement with Iraq.

Moscow's efforts to give a plausible explanation for its policies and to find patterns in the growing complexity of its relations with the underdeveloped countries, as well as to support current moves, were reflected in the growing volume of Soviet commentary on developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America directed at all levels of sophistication and for domestic as well as foreign audiences. At mid-year a symposium, Africa South of the Sahara, prepared by the new generation of Soviet Africanists, attempted to update Soviet documentation on the decline of Western influence in British, French, and Belgian Africa. Their mentor, I. I. Potekhin, admitted in an introduction to the work that Soviet Africanists were still ill-equipped to explain specific peculiarities of Western colonial policies in Africa or to interpret many of the phenomena of contemporary African life. In a broad study entitled The Colonial System of Imperialism and Its Decay, S. Tyulpanov, vice rector of Leningrad University, criticized those who attempted to explain the rise of nationalism and the successes of the independence movements in Asia and Africa in terms of a worsening of economic conditions there in the postwar period; he asserted instead the importance of a "wide circle" of political questions in determining the speed and direction of their development.

In August a monograph On the Historical Experience of Building Socialism in Formerly Backward Countries, by M. S. Dzhunusov, head of the philosophy department of the Kirgiz State University, attempted on the basis of the experience of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, China and Mongolia to explain how far social laws are universal and to what extent special historical, economic, and socio-political circumstances determined steps in their development--all this in the direction of offering guidance to non-Communist former colonies. Dzhunusov emphasized political struggles which go on within national liberation movements over the direction of their course of future development, and in admitting that social revolution may take many forms, he also cited the basic Leninist formulation that "there are not and there cannot be 'purely' peaceful and purely 'forceful'

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forms of social revolution"--a point considerably soft-pedaled by Moscow following the 20th party congress.

The major task of interpreting developments in the underdeveloped areas in the face of changing circumstances--"renewed imperialist assaults" and the insidious influence of "revisionism"--was entrusted to Boris Ponomarev, a leading ideologist who was head of the party central committee section dealing with nonbloc parties. Ponomarev's long review of "The International Movement at a New Stage" in Kommunist, released on the eve of the 41st Anniversary, admitted recent losses in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand as a result of "imperialist-backed plots." Ponomarev attempted to overbalance these reverses with general claims of successes, which he said included the Iraqi coup, the independence of Ghana and Guinea, and the general development of the progressive struggle in Africa and Latin America. Ponomarev's status report at least implicitly charted a more unyielding line for local Communist parties. It alleged there was a changing ideological content of the national liberation movement, a growing recognition by nationalist leaders that "it is impossible to stop half way...or to retravel the tortuous path which capitalist countries follow." Further, it contained an obvious slap at Nehru, defending the Communist government of Kerala against the "desperate attempts of reactionary forces" to discredit the "Communist experiment." A follow-up survey of the international movement by old Bolshevik Kuusinen in Pravda for 22 November, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Moscow "Charter of Unity", was, like the Ponomarev article directed against revisionist influences, against going too far in conciliating non-Communist elements in the common struggle against the West. In the face of a growing estrangement between key Asian-African leaders and Moscow, Kuusinen, as had Ponomarev, recited a long list of Communist parties which he claimed had increased in power and influence, and he urged "ideological-political unanimity" among Communists.

Ponomarev's attack on Nehru--Moscow's first serious propaganda backing for the Kerala ministry since it took office in April 1957--was followed up in the December issue of the new bloc journal by Pavel Yudin, a leading Soviet ideologist who at that time was ambassador to China. Yudin presented a 13-page rejoinder to a Nehru article criticizing Communist encouragement of class conflict and the use of violence against opposition elements. The critical tone of Yudin's article

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was tempered only by a continuation of the personal flattery Moscow long had lavished on Nehru. Soviet leaders previously had made no move to take issue with Nehru, despite the Indian leader's frequent public statements at variance with Moscow's international line.

Public and private rebuffs at the hands of its principal Asian-African "neutralist" friends--at the Afro-Asian Economic Conference held in Cairo in December the head of the Indonesian delegation challenged Moscow's right to be present, and Arab and Asian delegations combined to limit Moscow's attempt to turn the conference into an anti-Western circus and kept the USSR off the organizing committee--led Soviet spokesmen to devote greater attention to African and Latin American developments in an effort to maintain an aura of optimism around the national liberation movement. It both Africa and Latin America, however, Soviet investment in terms of political, economic, and cultural overtures had so far been insignificant in comparison with its support for such Asian nationalists as Nehru and Sukarno, or of Arab leaders Nasir and Qasim.

Moscow's prompt political, economic, and cultural overtures to the new state of Guinea, following the rupture of that state's political and economic relations with France, were an open encouragement to other members of the French African community to press for more rapid economic and political development. The USSR also was quick to recognize that much of Africa was looking to Accra rather than to Cairo for leadership, and it accordingly lavished great attention on the Nhrumah-sponsored All-African People's Conference, held in Accra concurrent with the Cairo Economic Conference. Moscow's advice to the conferees at Accra--where the Soviet had heavy "observer" and press representation at an African conference for the first time--was repeated in a New Times editorial which was simplicity itself, "Unity--unity within each country fighting the colonialists, and unity of action of all African countries." Soviet propaganda sought to depict this conference as the direct outcome of Bandung, Cairo, and the Accra Conference of Independent African States, intentionally blurring distinctions between governmental and nongovernmental conclaves in line with the USSR's efforts to upgrade the force and validity of international front and similar Communist-influenced or -sponsored popular meetings.

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Moscow also probably valued Accra's ties with dissident and exiled nationalist leaders in the remaining colonies. Red Star on 7 December praised the independence movements in a number of the colonies--including Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, the Cameroons, Mauretania, and the Belgian Congo--acknowledged the struggle as having assumed a wide diversity of form, and admitted "varied" success to date. For the moment, Moscow ignored the controversy which surfaced at the conference over the use or repudiation of violence in order to attain nationalist goals.

It remained for the upcoming Soviet party congress to formulate more precisely the limits within which Moscow's attitude toward developments in the nonbloc "East" would evolve. Just prior to the congress, however, a joint conference ostensibly of the "Editorial Boards" of the Soviet journal International Affairs and its Chinese counterpart on

> the main tendencies of the progressive disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism and on the special features and perspectives of the national-liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America

summarized prevailing views. Leading Soviet spokesmen--Academician Eugene Zhukov and Professors A. A. Guber and V. Ya. Avarin--reflected Moscow's less optimistic appraisal of trends in nonbloc Asia and Arab states and greater emphasis on the clash of progressive and reactionary social forces within individual countries requiring a more resolute stand against imperialist influences, whatever form they might take. As summarized subsequently in International Affairs, any serious exchange of views at the conference was subordinated to a re-emphasis of common interest and a unity of purpose and program.

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VI: THE 21st PARTY CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH: February 1959 - April 1960

The 21st congress of the CPSU, convened in late January and early February in "irregular" or special session to discuss a Seven-Year Plan for the Soviet economy, provided a focus for Moscow's efforts to use the growing economic and military--but primarily economic--development of the USSR for an across-the-board assault on Western positions throughout the world. Second only to the Khrushchev-led strategy of attempting to exploit recent and prospective economic gains for immediate political advantage, especially in the underdeveloped countries, Soviet leaders at the congress continued the process of public re-examination and re-evaluation of Soviet economic and political support for neutralist governments.

The major political thesis of the congress--that in the competition of two world systems the relative decline of the West would soon result in the shift of economic superiority to the bloc, proving not only the greater efficiency of Communist society but also greatly magnifying the Communist voice in world affairs--was underlined by the simple technique of treating medium- and long-range goals on a par with actual achievements. The political aspect of the economic doctrine unfolded by Khrushchev at the congress was tied to two predictions: first, that by the end of the seven-year period more than one half of the world's industrial output would come from the bloc; and second, that within an additional five years the USSR would "occupy first place in the world both in over-all and per capita" production. Both Khrushchev and his principal lieutenants tied the projected economic development of the USSR with an expansion of Moscow's foreign economic activities. Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet commitment to aid the rapid economic development of Asian, African, and Latin American countries on "fair commercial principles," adding the defense "we are not engaged in benevolence." Old Bolshevik Kuusinen, however, relying more heavily on the prospects of the Seven-Year Plan, gave a more liberal formulation harking back in spirit to the utopian internationalism of the early revolutionary period;

> It is true that in the history of socialism there was a time when with all good intentions there

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> simply was nothing to divide. Now this time is past. Having become richer, we have not become misers.... In seven years we will become even richer. This means that not only we ourselves will live better, but our friends too will be better off.

Khrushchev himself spotlighted the difficulties that had arisen in Moscow's political, economic, and military support to selected neutral countries on the basis of a parallelism in certain short-range goals--anti-Westernism--rather than of long-range objectives, by unprecedented public criticism of Nasir, in whose government Moscow had made its greatest material and psychological investment. Taking issue with Nasir's recent jailing of Egyptian and Syrian Communists and with the UAR leader's condemnation of Communist policies in the Middle East as anti-Arab, Khrushchev not only refused to repudiate Arab Communist agitation but avowed Moscow's continued support for "progressive elements." The Soviet leader's open challenge to Nasir was continued and developed by Mukhitdinov, now well established as Khrushchev's top aide on relations with Asian and Arab countries, and by Arab Communist leaders Khalid Bakdash and Ali Yata, whose 21st congress views reflected Moscow's turn away from Nasir. Calling on Nasir not to let differences of "ideological views" interfere with friendly relations, Khrushchev reasserted the primacy of the "common struggle against imperialism," praising Nasir's arch-foe Qasim in the same breath as the UAR leader for their "triumphs over imperialism."

The implication of the Soviet premier's stand was that local Communists were to be encouraged to adopt more dynamic programs, in part to prod nationalist movements into adopting radical or at least bolder reforms and sharpening public opposition to Western economic, political, and cultural influence. At the congress, party secretary and top theoretician Suslov specifically admonished Communists on the need to raise the ideological level of the national-liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On the other hand, neither Khrushchev nor any other Soviet leader showed any disposition to continue the polemics with Nehru which were initiated the preceding fall, but on the contrary resumed their studied efforts to win his tactical support, glossing over or denying differences of view. At the same time, the Soviet leaders prepared the way for new

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attempts to arouse world opinion against what Mukhitdinov labeled "collective colonialism" by asserting the might and unity of the socialist camp on the side of peace and attempting to extend the prospect of "zones of peace" to Asian and Pacific areas. In the general lines of Soviet strategy outlined at the congress, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders showed Moscow very much aware that the stalemate of Soviet relations with the Western powers facilitated rather than hampered its efforts to exacerbate ideological and political tension between the neutralist and Western camps.

Soviet evaluations of the "historic importance" of the congress stressed the theme of Soviet economic development, which "speeds up the process of the decay of imperialism and facilitates the transition of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries on the path of genuine progress" and of the competition with the West for influencing the course of economic development in the former colonies. A. Arzumanyan, head of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, writing in Kommunist, gave the international significance of the economic proposals discussed at the congress:

> The achievement in the USSR of such a volume of production and of such a level of material well-being of the population will immeasurably increase the attraction of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism. This will conquer millions of new followers for world socialism and will have a great revolutionary influence on the widest popular masses in the industrial but especially in the underdeveloped countries of the capitalist world.

At the congress itself, Mukhitdinov, drawing on both Lenin and prospective Seven-Year Plan achievements, gave greater weight to the real possibilities for underdeveloped countries to move directly from feudalism to socialism--without an intermediate period of "bourgeois capitalist development"--on the model of the transition of the USSR's Central Asian territories, arguing the thesis that material assistance from more economically developed areas made this possible and practicable. It is noteworthy, however, that Khrushchev's concluding speech to the congress made no such claim for Soviet policy and justified Moscow's economic and political support to non-Communist Asian and African governments on the basis of the fact that their conduct showed them "well disposed"

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toward the bloc and supporters of peace. The congress resolution specifically endorsed increased trade and "contacts" with the underdeveloped countries, but it was silent on future political or economic investment in neutralist governments.

Developments in the Middle East concurrent with and immediately subsequent to the congress helped to dispel any illusions world Communist leaders might have had that political gains would flow all but automatically from their exaggerated claims of economic and scientific accomplishment. Virulent Arab reaction to Khrushchev's blunt criticism of Nasir apparently exceeded Soviet expectations, and an effort was made to persuade Nasir that the attack was "only" political and not personal.

A sharper setback to Moscow's Middle East pretensions came from Tehran. Encouraged by signs of a changed attitude on the part of the Shah, Moscow increased its economic and political overtures to him and in late January and early February apparently had high hopes of prying Iran at least part way out of the anti-Soviet coalition in the Middle East. The sudden collapse of the negotiations in Tehran and the empty-handed return home on 10 February of the USSR's special mission touched off pained and bitter Soviet public reaction. A Pravda "Observer" article on 14 February and Khrushchev in a 17 February speech at Tula slashed at the Shah's sudden reversal. Khrushchev's further attacks on the "faithlessness" of the Shah and the Iranian Government in a 24 February "electioneering" speech to the voters of the Kalinin District in Moscow carried the polemics with the Shah to extremes, making it obvious that Moscow had given up any near prospects of improving relations with Tehran.

The apparent lesson of this episode was that Moscow's psychological-political pressures on pro-Western states could be switched off, given the prospect of a tactical opening or intensified in frustration. In the violence of its new attacks on the Shah, on his regime, and on the socio-political bases of the Iranian Government, Moscow pointed up the shallowness and tenuousness of the ideological roots of its tactical cooperation with non-Communist governments.

The content and tone of Soviet publications of the period tend to confirm reports from a variety of sources that at private meetings with Asian, African, and Latin American party

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representatives, Soviet leaders urged upon local Communist parties a sharper line toward nationalist elements than Khrushchev chose to adopt publicly at the congress. Kommunist claimed to see the countries of Asia and Africa as entering a new stage, in which progress depended on the "alignment of internal forces" and on the character and direction of domestic programs. A summation of the congress' views on Communist strategy in the underdeveloped areas was presented by party theorist Boris Ponomarev on 6 March in Pravda. Ponomarev presented essentially an activist line hewing closely to Communist orthodoxy, emphasizing that it is incorrect to think that social changes are going to occur automatically in the underdeveloped countries without a class struggle and stressing that in this struggle an ever-greater role is marked out for local Communist parties. Stressing the point advanced by top Soviet spokesman six months earlier--that the young governments of Asia and Africa were at a historic "crossroad"--Ponomarev advised local parties that in the current processes of economic, political, and social change new party and class interests had arisen, and that shifts in class and party strengths within nationalist movements were taking place which called for aligning Communist support for those local elements adopting progressive domestic and foreign programs, namely

> full liquidation of the remains of colonialism, growth of national industry, elimination of feudalism, the carrying out of wide-scale agrarian reform, the growth of democracy, a peace-loving foreign policy, and an active struggle against imperialist blocs.

None of these ideas is new, but the current emphasis on Communist support for progressive elements rather than the broader "anti-imperialist" forces represented a further cooling of Moscow's attitude toward non-Communist movements and a marked departure from the synthetic friendliness of the 20th party congress.

Khrushchev's airing of his differences with Nasir at the 21st party congress had resulted in an intensification of press and radio polemics, but it was the revolt on 8 March of a pro-Nasir Iraqi Army Colonel at Mosul which brought to a head political and ideological differences between Moscow and Cairo. Nasir took the lead in public speeches on 11 and 15 March

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denouncing Communists in the Middle East as agents of a foreign power and as enemies of Arab nationalism. This was too direct a challenge for Moscow to ignore. Khrushchev on 16 March, at a reception for a visiting Iraqi economic delegation, surveyed the whole field of Soviet relations with the UAR and with Iraq and the Cairo-Baghdad rivalry, throwing his wholehearted support behind Qasim. Moscow apparently was confident that its considerable economic and military aid to Nasir would work to keep the dispute from seriously harming state-to-state relations; it probably reflected in addition an appraisal that over the past year Nasir's position in the Arab world had deteriorated as the result of the rise of Baghdad and Qasim as a rival center of Arab nationalism, of increasing troubles in Syria, and of setbacks in Tunisia and Sudan to Nasir's efforts to dominate Arab affairs.

On 19 March at a Moscow press conference, Khrushchev expressed the belief that Moscow could continue to have good relations with both the UAR and Iraq, patronizingly referring to Nasir as inexperienced and "hot-headed" and urging Nasir to have patience and end UAR interference in Iraqi affairs. Nasir struck back on 22 March in Damascus with the assertion that in the 1956 attack on Egypt, his country had fought alone against Israel, Britain, and France without "any sign of assistance from any foreign state, including the Soviet Union." Pravda "Observer" attempted to refute this claim, and Khrushchev in a letter to Nasir in April suggested that both sides should tone down their public recriminations. The basic points at issue were left unresolved, however--including the vital question of Soviet and Communist agitation for faster "social progress" in Iraq and the UAR. Moscow appeared content to leave any further move toward conciliation up to Cairo, and Khrushchev on 7 May told the publisher and editor of Indian leftist weekly Blitz, who subsequently talked with Nasir, that "it is up to them to decide--we shall live through it somehow."

The endorsement at the 21st congress of a more active line in the underdeveloped countries was reflected also in signs of a broadening and deepening of Soviet attention to African affairs. The signature on 13 February in Conakry of a Soviet-Guinean trade and payments agreement pointed up the new stage of broad government-to-government relations with individual independent African states, following the general pattern of Soviet overtures to neutralist Asia in the

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immediate post-Bandung era. The March issue of the Institute of Oriental Studies' semipopular journal Contemporary East was devoted almost entirely to African developments, with coverage running the gamut from the cultural accomplishments of African peoples and the mutual advantages of greater contacts between Africans and the bloc to an appraisal of the African movements for immediate independence by top Soviet Africanist I. I. Potekhin. Potekhin's survey brought to a close the period of Soviet public ambiguity on tactics recommended for the African nationalists, attacking those African leaders who would limit the struggle to seeking

> gradual constitutional reform within the framework and on the basis of the laws created by the colonizers, the path of negotiations, and agreements with the imperialists.

and asserted that African experience had proved the necessity of the use of violence against "imperialists." In March there also appeared in important Institute of Oriental Studies monograph, A. Yu. Shpirt's Africa in the Second World War, which emphasized World War II as a "good political school" for giving character and drive to the struggle of the African peoples for political and economic independence. A greatly expanded coverage of African developments in Soviet journals and the press reflected Soviet aims to harass Western economic relations with Africa, to deny the West military bases throughout Africa and squeeze out those already established, and to build up neutralist, pro-Soviet, and intensely anti-Western sentiment among the African peoples.

Soviet views were not so sanguine on Latin American developments, which since the Soviet-Argentine economic agreements were signed had failed to develop in the direction of increased diplomatic, economic, and cultural contacts with the bloc. Despite heavy propaganda attention to the overthrow of Batista, which it interpreted as popular repudiation of US policy in the area, Moscow adopted a cautious attitude toward the Castro government, while hailing the revolution for freeing democratic forces making possible the rapid transformation of the country along progressive lines. Following Castro's visit to the United States in April, Moscow seemed reassured of the anti-US position of the Cuban Government and the intensity of Castro's antipathy to American economic and political interests. A mid-year survey of liberation

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forces in Latin America cited substantial achievements in Venezuela and Chile as well as in Cuba and considered prospects, "despite all the barriers and difficulties," favorable also in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia. Although the claim had been advanced before, there now appeared more substance to Moscow's assertion that Latin America was entering a new stage of its development as an important sector of the world national-liberation struggle.

Moscow-led discussion of Communist strategy in the underdeveloped world continued with the special conference, held in East Germany in May 1959, of bloc theoreticians on the subject of "the national bourgeoisie and the liberation movement". As usual, a major portion of the speakers' remarks, as presented in the bloc journal, represented a concerted attempt to stress the advantages of aid to national bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism and the disruption of political and economic ties of the underdeveloped countries with the West. At the same time, emphasis on the instability and indecisiveness of non-Communist leadership and on the divisions of aims and interests of elements comprising the anti-imperialist front suggested greater local Communist attention to the limits of such tactical cooperation and to independent political activity so as not to lose influence over the popular masses and to preserve and improve the chances for its own leadership of the liberation struggle.

A similar view on the prospects of Communism in the underdeveloped countries and of the role of Communists in nationalist movements was reflected in the long-awaited textbook History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which appeared the latter part of June. Prepared collectively by a group of top-level historians headed by Ponomarev, the new party history devoted considerable attention to the problems of Communist organization and agitation under conditions of a capitalist society. The general thesis deducible from the treatment of the Soviet past and of Lenin's classical formulations was on constant struggle which combines legal, semi-legal, and illegal activity and makes use of even the "most reactionary" elements in exploiting nationalist aspirations for self-rule. In summarizing the textbook's import for the Communist world in the bloc journal, Ponomarev justified joint action with non-Communists:

> though their understanding of the ways and methods

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of struggle differs from that of Communists...the overwhelming majority stand solidly for peace and social progress.

He called for greater vigilance and stepped-up efforts because, as he put it, never before had the forces of reaction waged such an intense and varied struggle against Marxism-Leninism and against Communism.

However, despite the intimations of the fall of 1958, of the 21st party congress and its follow-up, that Communist movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America might withdraw their support for "bourgeois nationalist" movements and move into a new stage--a drive for Communist control against those nationalists who refused Moscow's lead as well as against pro-imperialist and pro-feudal elements--Moscow in mid-1959, under the exigencies of the drive for detente with the West and of unfavorable crosscurrents within the underdeveloped world, again sacrificed an activist line in favor of maintaining friendly government-to-government relations. Events in Iraq touched off by Communist-led riots in Kirkuk and other Iraqi cities in connection with the celebration of the first anniversary of the Iraqi revolution brought about stern countermeasures by Qasim and resulted in a sharp decrease in Iraqi Communist influence both in the government and among the masses. Iraqi Communists, who had been engaged in a bitter intraparty debate on how far to press Qasim for a strong Communist presence in the cabinet and influence in domestic and foreign affairs, found Moscow after the fact supporting their party's minority, which favored continued cooperation with Qasim, and taking to task the militant wing of the party for "irresponsibility."

Friction between the Indian Government and the Communist government of the State of Kerala reached a peak in June and July and posed another serious test of Communist intentions. Although the Communist party of India attempted to rally support for the Kerala government against "acts of hooliganism and violence" inspired by the Congress party and threatened to meet violence in kind, Moscow kept itself apart. When Nehru's central government on 31 July dissolved the Communist ministry and legislature of Kerala on the grounds that it had proven itself unable to maintain public order, Moscow remained passive. In backing away from any stand in support of the Kerala Communist government, Moscow made it obvious that

it valued the friendship and good will of the Indian Government and of Nehru more than it did the prospects of either the Kerala government or the Communist party of India. Moscow sought to minimize the dispiriting effect of such desertion on other Communist parties throughout the world by maintaining silence on the question.

Moscow's greater interest in preparing for high-level negotiations to bring about a relaxation of East-West tensions reinforced the trend toward downgrading party militancy, and Soviet leaders moderated the tones if not the substance of their political and ideological hostility to the West. In singling out Berlin, West German rearmament, disarmament, and detente with the United States as the pressing problems of the day, Moscow did not intend in any way to detract from its long-term program of undermining Western strength and influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but the inescapable result was to reinforce the impression that over the short run Moscow was willing to limit the scope of its assault on Western interests in the hope of gains at the conference table. A world-wide survey of Soviet international relations for the first half of 1959 prepared by six junior editors of the journal WEIR reflected an unusually realistic view of developments at the same time as it toned down the political arrogance and anti-Westernism of Moscow's line without surrendering a point. This and other public commentary in preparation for "another, more realistic Geneva Conference," which Moscow hoped would come out of the exchange of visits with the President, centered on purported changes in the correlation of world forces which had brought about a need to review outstanding international questions in consonance with the new situation.

Assessing current trends from a reasonably detached viewpoint, the authors acknowledged setbacks in Moscow's relations with Arab states and differences within the Arab independence movement. Continued Soviet economic and political support for key Asian states was pledged in order to help them maintain their friendly political neutrality and to stiffen their opposition to the West's anti-Soviet, anti-Communist "penetration" in South and Southeast Asia. The attitude reflected on Latin America was that increased trade and improved economic relations with the bloc offered the most promising road to the erosion of American influence in the area. On Africa, the impression was that Moscow viewed

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sub-Saharan developments as subject to unpredictable vicissitudes, but that the general struggle for political and economic independence would multiply the more or less permanent trouble spots for the West and bog down Western assets and prestige. Implicit in this evaluation was reliance on long-term political, economic, and social processes in the underdeveloped countries at least as much as on an expanded bloc economic, political, and ideological programs for determining the future course of their governments and peoples. Its picture is that of a long drawn-out competition between two social systems for predominance--a situation in which many complex and countervailing influences would be at play, with no simple solution to be expected.

Moscow's considerable tactical flexibility and its ability to seize openings presented was reflected in its cultivation of Ethiopia and its Emperor. The $100,000,000 Soviet loan "for development of industry and agriculture" announced at the close of the Emperor's visit in July was an investment in Soviet respectability and was accompanied by the usual assertions of disinterested motives. Moscow's intention to press on with its economic aid program was pointed up by increased public discussion of the scope and implications of Soviet aid; e.g., an article in International Affairs giving the first comprehensive listing of major Soviet credits to eight underdeveloped countries--totaling over 4.5 billion rubles.

Soviet propaganda and diplomatic preparation for Khrushchev's trip to the United States, epitomized in his article in the American journal Foreign Affairs, prepared for release coincident with his arrival, reflected an optimism and an ill-concealed expectation of concessions from the West. The visit took place amid signs that, in spite of Soviet reaffirmations of opposition to imperialism and colonialism, some pro-Moscow neutrals were concerned that Khrushchev would enter into discussions with the US which might prejudice their interests. Khrushchev's disarmament initiative at the General Assembly was designed to build fires under the alleged Western unwillingness to negotiate seriously on the Soviet proposals. The promise, however illusory, of the release of vastly greater resources by both the bloc and the West for economic assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America once the arms race is halted was a transparent bid for the support by the governments and peoples

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of all underdeveloped countries for immediate talks and agreement on disarmament. Although at the previous session of the General Assembly--in the fall of 1958--Moscow had had little success with its proposals for immediate cuts of 10 to 15 percent of arms expenditures, with part of the savings to be used to step up aid to the underdeveloped countries, Khrushchev apparently counted on the prevailing mood for East-West detente, personal emphasis, and the world spotlight he commanded in New York to give great impact to his Declaration of General and Complete Disarmament. The point as to whether Moscow envisaged parallel or joint aid programs was purposely left obscure in an effort to curry support in the broadest possible circles. Kommunist's follow-up of Khrushchev's New York proposal asserted that the Soviet Union "stood and stands for broad international cooperation in the matter of rendering aid to the underdeveloped countries" and held the door open for cooperation, particularly through the UN.

Khrushchev's interim report of 28 September to the Soviet people on the results of his US trip was little more than a folksy account and reassurance as to its success. Following his trip to Peiping for Communist China's tenth anniversary celebrations, Khrushchev, in speeches at Vladivostok and Novosibirsk on 6 and 10 October respectively, emphasized his commitment to securing a high-level settlement with the West at the same time as he showed concern that tactics used to facilitate the negotiations might have a deleterious effect on Communist elán. At Vladivostok he attempted to make clear that he was searching for a common ground with Americans only on the question of a firm and lasting peace, and that as far as other questions were concerned, "We do not find common language with American businessmen." At Novosibirsk he again sought to emphasize that he had not gone soft on capitalism and, in terms reminiscent of Shepilov's speech of 12 February 1957, defined peaceful coexistence as "economic, political, and ideological--but not military--struggle."

Khrushchev's report on 31 October to the Supreme Soviet, in addition to being an authoritative review of the international situation, was intended to justify the various moves taken in preparation for and anticipation of an East-West summit meeting and to reassure comrades that he had in mind no concessions to the West on matters of principle. In asserting the wisdom of the course adopted, he emphasized that both sides had taken steps toward a "radical improvement in relations

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between the USSR and the US". Although he cautioned against overoptimism and cited the continued influence of reactionary elements, he conceded that the West had given proof of its conciliatory intentions. His central thesis was that "realism" demands a closer attention to changes which have been brought about not only by the growing might and international influence of the Soviet Union and of the bloc, but also by the greater role now played by former colonies, by non-Communist governments everywhere which are vitally concerned with the preservation of peace and the prevention of war, and by peace-loving forces within the major capitalist countries themselves who want the cold war liquidated and oppose measures leading up to a new war.

At the same time, Khrushchev's speech reflected Moscow's marked willingness to moderate its tactics in the struggle with the West for influence in the underdeveloped world in order to promote great power settlement. Soviet interest in not ruffling the surface calm in East-West relations--the "new international atmosphere" claimed as a result of Khrushchev's American trip--was reflected in his deliberately playing down the problem of Laos, which had attracted heavy and vitriolic Soviet comment since Communist-led elements in that country had reverted to guerrilla warfare in mid-July after a year and a half of legal political action. Asserting that the fault was SEATO's and that "a wise approach and observance of international agreements" would lead to the normalization of the situation, he concluded that more noise had been raised in the world about Laos than the situation justified.

Khrushchev's overriding concern with an early East-West summit meeting was pointed up even more clearly in his moderation of the Soviet line on Algeria. Despite a public commitment to independence for Algeria, regular and occasionally intense propaganda support for the Algerian rebels, and token material aid for Algerian refugees and casualties--not to mention sporadic clandestine shipments of arms by East European countries--Moscow's Algerian policy long had toughened or softened in line with prospects of closer relations with Paris. Soviet efforts to exploit public differences between President de Gaulle and other Western leaders on NATO policy and on such other top issues as disarmament and the desirability of top-level talks with Moscow reflected a higher priority for direct East-West issues than for intensifying

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the anticolonial struggle. Citing the "close historic ties between France and Algeria," Khrushchev, drawing the French Communist party along behind him, asserted that de Gaulle's proposals of 16 September for a plebiscite on the future status of Algeria, if followed up, offered the possibility of ending hostilities there.

Kommunist in a feature article in November took up the matter of defining the limits of peaceful coexistence for the benefit of world parties. Asserting that no matter how vital intergovernmental relations are, they do not exhaust the field, the article restricted compromise to a narrow diplomatic field. In defending the permanence and unchangeability of Communist doctrine, Kommunist also reiterated the position that no middle ground exists or can exist between bourgeois and proletarian world outlooks.

The newly released textbook The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism, prepared by a group of party theorists headed by presidium member Kuusinen, was being discussed in the Soviet press and party study groups. It, too, reflected Moscow's persistent problem of harnessing revolutionary enthusiasm to the current requirements of Soviet foreign policy. Kommunist's December review of this new guidebook emphasized the complexity and variability of contemporary circumstances leading to a necessary flexibility in Communist tactics and stated that

> the task of the revolutionary proletariat and its Marxist parties consists in mastering all forms and means of struggle and knowing how to apply them correctly, in accord with the concrete situation.

Moscow's efforts to press forward with a program of large-scale economic assistance to selected countries was pointed up by the announcement in July of its willingness to extend an additional credit of $375,000,000 to India--confirmed in September--to help finance New Delhi's Third Five-Year Plan. This commitment moved India well ahead of the UAR as the principal recipient of Soviet aid and was intended to protect Moscow's political and economic interest and investment in a friendly neutralist India, to keep New Delhi from backsliding as a result of its desperate requirement for large-scale economic assistance, and to dissociate itself from Chinese

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attacks on the Indian Government. Moscow's offer in August of a $35,000,000 long-term, low-interest economic development credit to Guinea indicated the USSR's intention to follow up the flood of economic and cultural contacts it had initiated with Conakry following the latter's October 1958 independence with economic aid out of all proportion to Guinea's size but in line with its new importance as a focus of extremist anti-Western African nationalist sentiment. The lavish reception Moscow gave visiting Guinean President Toure in November underlined the Soviet Union's interest in making Soviet-Guinean relations a model for the newly arising African states.

In a somewhat different vein, the visit of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan to Mexico City in November in connection with the opening of the Soviet industrial exhibition highlighted a new stage in Soviet efforts to exploit Latin American economic difficulties in the interest of expanding trade and other ties with the bloc. Although Mikoyan had long figured as Moscow's top trade expert, his public and private remarks in Mexico were directed as much against political as economic aspects of "colonialism"--US influence in Latin America. His attacks on the policies and activities of the United States and of US firms in Latin America were combined with the reiteration of Soviet interest in increased trade and willingness to extend--"without strings"--development credits to Mexico and other Latin American countries.

Although Mikoyan's visit had little apparent effect on Mexico's economic policies and his attempts to interest Mexican government and business circles in Soviet development credits were turned aside, he nevertheless succeeded in focusing Latin American attention on increased economic relations with the bloc as a way out of the Latin American economic impasse and as a licit means of reducing the predominant role of US economic interests. A more positive response to Soviet overtures was the visit to the USSR of a Brazilian trade mission--for which Moscow had been angling for two years--which resulted in the signing on 9 December of a trade agreement, the first between the two countries, calling for greatly stepped-up exchanges of goods.

Moscow's changing line on Latin America was reflected in an outburst of publications appearing in the latter part of 1959. The general line presented by V. Levin in International Affairs was of a new stage arising in Latin America's

liberation struggle as the result of the overthrow of dictatorships in Cuba, Colombia, and Venezuela and of proletarian-led antifeudal and anti-imperialist agitation in other countries. On 1 December a semipopular treatment of the Cuban revolution by K. M. Obyden appeared--a press run of 35,000 copies indicated that it was intended for a wide Soviet audience--which not only claimed an important role for Cuban Communists in the overthrow of Batista but also warmly supported the domestic and international program of Castro's government and hailed his revolt as the first in Latin America to drive the "capitalist classes, allied with the United States," from power. Soviet historian N. N. Bolkhovitinov presented, under the pretext of a scholarly study of the Monroe Doctrine for the Institute of International Relations, an attack on US policies past and present in Latin America.

The most impressive survey of Latin American political and economic developments in the post-Stalin period appeared in early December in the form of a symposium, The Problems of Contemporary Latin America, under the auspices of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The gist of the argument was that the immediate goal of the Latin American independence movement was the attainment of economic independence from US domination--to be achieved through the development of national industry, the nationalization of local holdings of US "monopolies," legislation protecting local industry from deleterious practices of foreign capitalist trading companies, the development of trade with the bloc, and radical and thorough-going land reform to eliminate the last vestiges of feudalism. At the same time, Latin American efforts at economic and political cooperation were derided. Communist parties were urged to work for these goals through common action with non-Communist groups and particularly through labor agitation. Although it was admitted that the independence struggle in Latin America was at varying stages in the different countries and that it was being carried out in a variety of forms, the conclusion was drawn that Latin America had entered the "final period" in its long struggle for full and complete independence.

Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960 pointed up Moscow's optimistic appraisal of Castro's anti-Americanism (allied with the growing strength of local Communists) as a means for expanding Soviet influence throughout Latin America. The $100,-000,000 Soviet loan announced on 12 February and the associated [illegible]

economic agreements have catapulted Moscow into the role of a principal trading partner and close cooperator in the economic development of Cuba over the next decade and more. At the same time they showed the Soviet Union willing to risk a deterioration of relations with the United States in order to take advantage of an opportunity to improve its relations with Cuba--only weeks before the scheduled summit meeting*

On 11 February, just after a conference in Moscow of the eight Warsaw Pact powers had approved his stewardship of bloc interests and endorsed in advance his position in the expected summit conference with Western leaders Khrushchev began a three-week tour of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. This visit, on the heels of high Soviet officials, suggests that he felt that the weight of his own personal diplomacy was necessary, in the "Leninist style in diplomacy...addressing himself to broad popular masses in other countries," in order to offset the sharp decline in bloc and local Communist popularity resulting from the Tibetan troubles, Sino-Indian border friction, Peiping's attacks on measures taken by the Indonesian Government against resident Chinese, and the popular enthusiasm for the US made evident on President Eisenhower's recent visit to India and Afghanistan. Khrushchev's less than triumphal tour featured a heavy stress on bloc economic competition with the West in aiding Asian nations along the path to economic independence. Offering Soviet material and moral support, which he backed up by a rundown of Soviet assistance already rendered Asian governments, he kept up a heavyhanded attack on Western motives and Western economic practices in dealing with the peoples of the area. In a speech to the Indian Parliament on 11 February, Khrushchev cited "UN experts" as having calculated the annual investment needs of the underdeveloped countries as $14 billion and

*Soviet concern lest it be identified publicly with Castro's blatant anti-Americanism may have slowed Moscow's overtures to Havana. The review of international relations for the second half of 1959, prepared by a group of editors of the journal WEIR, omitted a section on Latin America--and tropical Africa--although both the preceding and subsequent semiannual roundups contained lengthy sections extremely critical of Western, and especially US, policy in these areas.

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asserted that if full and general disarmament were achieved, it would be an easy matter for the great powers to set aside

> fifteen and even twenty billion dollars from the hundred billion dollars saved in order to solve the universal historic task of preserving hundreds of millions of people from hunger and poverty.

In Calcutta on 15 February he reiterated Soviet reluctance to participate jointly with the West in economic assistance programs, insisting that "if aid is to be rendered, we will render it ourselves." No new Soviet economic aid was announced during the Indian portion of the trip, although announcement was made of agreement specifying the uses to which India would put part of the $375,000,000 credit for its Third Five-Year Plan announced some months earlier.

The principal economic highlight of the Khrushchev junket was Indonesia's acceptance of a $250,000,000 loan for development purposes which apparently included provision for additional arms and equipment for the Indonesian armed forces. Khrushchev's heavy homage to Sukarno followed along the lines of Soviet commentary, which not only supported his anti-Western international and domestic measures but also ostentatiously supported the Sukarno-proclaimed "guided democracy." Strong public support for Djakarta's military struggle against rebel forces on Sumatra and Celebes and continued backing for Indonesian claims to West Irian more than offset any losses Moscow may have suffered as a result of Indonesia's quarrel with Communist China over restrictions Djakarta imposed on the Chinese business community in Indonesia. Khrushchev's 22 February announcement that Moscow had decided to establish a "Peoples' Friendship University" was intended to impress on Asians the importance with which Moscow viewed cultural and technical exchanges, and it foreshadowed greatly stepped-up efforts to expand people-to-people contacts. Khrushchev's repeated assertion that China, India, and Indonesia should take part in future great power conferences repeated a hoary Soviet tactic which nevertheless received a heavy favorable response in Asia. His reiteration at Kabul of Soviet support for Afghanistan's claims to "Pushtoonistan," like his earlier backing of Indonesia's claims to West Irian, openly encouraged parochial Asian nationalist sentiment.

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Khrushchev's own summary of the significance of his trip again centered on the growing importance of the new countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He emphasized that it was in the Soviet interest to help these countries become stronger both politically and economically, not only by the continued and increased extension of credits to friendly governments but also by limited grants of material and technical aid, as announced on his visit to Burma and Afghanistan. Khrushchev made it clear that what he had in mind was political and economic assistance to friendly underdeveloped countries so as to stiffen their resistance to Western policies--to colonialism "however disguised." Although Khrushchev again lauded Nehru and Moscow's official line continued to avoid criticism of neutralist leaders and governments, a public lecture on 16 March in Moscow, attended by a Western observer, was more candid in general disapproval of all bourgeois nationalist leaders with the signal exception of Guinea's Sekou Toure. Moscow's endorsement of Guinea's policies was made clear in the publicity it directed at the Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Conakry from 11 to 17 April. A Pravda editorial on 15 April cited Guinea as a "brilliant example" and a model for the peoples of Africa in how to attain and use their independence.

Khrushchev's trip to France from 23 March to 3 April took place in a pre-summit atmosphere, with the Soviet leader's remarks attuned to the suggestion that cooperation between the Soviet Union and France was possible on terms which would result in a greatly enhanced French role in European affairs. Khrushchev's remarks at the Diplomatic Press Association luncheon on 25 March that Moscow stood wholeheartedly behind de Gaulle's proposals for self-determination--an attitude not overwhelmingly reflected in the Soviet press over the preceding months--typified his efforts to allege a harmony of Soviet and French interests. At a press conference on 31 March, Khrushchev refused to discuss the question of Algeria. He also was noncommittal concerning an arms ban to Africa and joint economic aid to the underdeveloped countries known to be favored by de Gaulle. He asserted Soviet willingness to cooperate in rendering economic assistance, but he linked such a posibility to "agreement on disarmament" and rejected the suggestion that all such aid should be under UN auspices, alleging that "such a restriction would inflict great harm to those countries needing assistance." There was no mention of Soviet-French agreement on events in

the underdeveloped areas in the communique issued at the close of the visit, in Khrushchev's speech on his return to Moscow, or in the 6 April Pravda editorial summing up the results of the "historic visit." On the other hand, points of open disagreement were carefully skirted.

Unlike Khrushchev's visit to France, Mikoyan's visit to Iraq in April was keyed to more modest limits--an assessment of Qasim and of the prospects of Moscow's heavy political and economic investment in the Iraqi regime. Mikoyan's 15 April press conference statement that Moscow's failure to recognize the Algerian government-in-exile was done in the latter's interest pointed up the Soviet Union's predicament in attempting to maintain a moderate stand vis-a-vis Paris and at the same time assure the Arabs, and Asian-Africans in general, of the genuineness of its support for the most active of the current national liberation struggles. The visit also called attention to growing coolness between Soviet officials and Qasim and Baghdad's increasingly hostile attitude toward Iraqi Communists. No communiqué was issued at the conclusion of Mikoyan's "unofficial" visit, and both country's press accounts were merely polite. Shortly afterward, however, it was announced that Iraq had accepted a new Soviet credit for modernization of the Basra-Baghdad railroad.

The USSR's further investment in Iraq--in the face of signs of a limited rapprochement of Qasim with the West and of stiffer measures by the Baghdad Government against local leftists--pointed up Moscow's apparent belief that close economic relations with the new Asian and African nations--especially in the case of Iraq, the UAR, and a select few other countries--in combination with its considerable military assistance program would prove decisive over the long term in determining the direction of their policies. The January announcement that the UAR had accepted a long-term Soviet credit for completing the Aswan High Dam, for which construction had just begun, can be viewed as a major propaganda triumph for Moscow.

Despite a willingness to tone down its general hostility to the West, as demonstrated on Khrushchev's American tour and in Moscow's assertion of the importance of the "spirit of Camp David," the Soviet Union's version of "peaceful competitive coexistence" with Western economic interests in the

underdeveloped countries revealed a willingness to employ harsher tactics on an official level. Mikoyan's speeches in Mexico, Cuba, and Iraq exemplified the tenor of Moscow's attacks on "foreign" capitalist influences, as did his recommendation that Latin Americans--presented in an address to Mexican businessmen--expropriate foreign holdings without compensation as a means of recovering some of the value looted from their economy by foreign "monopolies." In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January, Khrushchev also asserted that the West had an obligation to repay to the colonies and former colonies a part of the riches stolen from them; he repeated this line in his 25 January message to the All-African People's Conference at Tunis. Similarly, Mikoyan's Cuban and Iraqi speeches featured sharp attacks on Western trade and investment policy in the underdeveloped countries.

By this time it had become a standard feature for Moscow to emphasize in general terms the magnitude of Soviet foreign assistance and its role as a prime motive force in international relations. Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin, in his 26 October report to the Supreme Soviet on the state development plan for 1960, had stated that in the coming year Moscow would render technical assistance--and in some cases financing--in building 288 industrial projects in bloc countries and 95 in underdeveloped countries. A widely circulated survey of Soviet foreign economic operations and their political significance, The Competition of the Two Systems and the Underdeveloped Countries by A. S. Kodachenko, signed to the press on 29 February, emphasized the broad dimensions of Soviet aid in unusually concrete terms. The 1.5 billion ruble credit to India for financing the Third Five Year Plan was highlighted as the largest credit ever extended by the Soviet Union to a nonbloc country, and the influential role of Soviet assistance in certain of the underdeveloped countries was pointed up by the assertion that Soviet financial assistance to the UAR covered 50 percent of total UAR expenditures for development projects and by the allegation that Soviet credits to Afghanistan comprised 70 percent of that country's total foreign developmental assistance.

Kommunist's pre-summit surveys of developments in the non-Soviet "East," as well as the flood of publications on Lenin as a prophet on oriental developments in connection with Lenin 90th anniversary celebrations, gave heavy emphasis on the scope and intensity of political and social ferment

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in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to the direction of their future development. Soviet publicist K. Ivanov, emphasizing the zigzag nature of events in these areas and characterizing the current path of the liberation struggle as "an extremely complex and confused laberinth," evaluated developments as effectively anticapitalist, though admittedly not socialist. Kommunist editor in chief F. Konstantinov minimized the importance of the "will and desires of the various peoples and governments" of the underdeveloped countries in determining their future, asserting as more important a standard reference to objective economic laws and "the course of the competition of the two world systems"--the interplay of Soviet and Western policies and programs in the area. A collection of articles on Lenin as the precursor of Moscow's current line--Lenin and the East, edited by Gafurov and released in mid-April under the joint auspices of the Institutes of Oriental Studies and of Sinology--was attuned to the struggle of Asian peoples to avoid the burdensome path of capitalist evolution and to proceed more directly to building a higher social order with the advice and assistance of the Soviet Union. The interim and transitional nature of the present political and social structures of the Asian, African, and Latin American states depicted in Soviet literature was not, however, reflected by any diminution in Moscow's willingness to commit itself to short- and medium-term cooperation with existing non-Communist governments, given the current stage in relations between the two camps.

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VII. POST-SUMMIT PROSPECTS OF STIFFER ANTICOLONIAL LINE: May - October 1960

Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks, apparently in reaction to the U-2 incident and the dimming of prospects for Western concessions on any of the major outstanding international issues, prompted a major effort by Soviet spokesmen to absolve the USSR of any blame and to convince the world public that the United States alone was responsible. Claiming that the talks failed because aggressive militarists in the West feared the consequences of serious East-West talks, Moscow alleged that while the Soviet Union had prepared for the conference by adopting concrete measures to improve the international atmosphere and by working out "important proposals" for presentation at Paris, the United States had taken steps intended to make negotiations impossible. Moscow's vociferous attacks on the U-2 overflights as "outrageous" international behavior were designed in part to minimize adverse world reaction to Khrushchev's tactics at Paris and to divert attention from the collapse of its pre-Paris line. Despite the publicized vituperation over the U-2, Soviet officials publicly and privately asserted that if the West did not engage in further "provocations," Moscow would do nothing to disturb the international situation. Nevertheless, with East-West talks not expected soon, Moscow's international posture noticeably stiffened.

The USSR's initial utilization of the U-2 incident to press the US' allies to remove American bases from their territories was unsubtle and violent, in the apparent belief that now as never before the allies were vulnerable to popular neutralist sentiment. Khrushchev warned that "we shall hit at those bases" from which any future flight comes. This warning was repeated in less precise language in the Soviet protest notes of 13 May to Norway, Pakistan, and Turkey threatening "proper retaliatory measures" in the event of a future intrusion of Soviet air space. Moscow's month-long effort to scare peoples in the affected countries to demand that their governments take measures to prevent future flights and that American troops be withdrawn reached a peak with Marshal Malinovsky's statement on 30 May of his order to the commander of Soviet rocket forces that in the event of a future violation of bloc air space, he should strike at the base from which the intruder came; further Khrushchev

asserted in a press conference on 3 June that Malinovsky's warning should be understood "literally." In the absence of any apparent success, this campaign was allowed to taper off but was later revived briefly. In a letter to British Prime Minister Macmillan in early August, Khrushchev reaffirmed the validity of Malinovsky's instructions, but by this time the gambit had taken on a pro forma aspect.

On 28 May, at a labor conference in Moscow Khrushchev reported on the summit breakdown. He assured the assembled "leading workers" from all over the Soviet Union that Soviet policy, as before, would be directed toward reaching an accommodation with the West. At the same time, however, he predicted that "more surprises were in store for American imperialists" in colonial and formerly colonial areas. The mission of Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin to Buenos Aires in late May in connection with the 150th anniversary of Argentina's "May Revolution" attempted to duplicate Mikoyan's anti-US feats in Mexico and Cuba. Kosygin apparently had less success, as the Frondizi government was cool toward his delegation. Nevertheless, a protocol broadening the uses Argentina could make of the Soviet-Argentine economic agreement of October 1958--originally for petroleum equipment--was signed at this time.

Soviet publicists initiated a campaign to acclaim the 1810 Argentine revolution and subsequent Latin American revolutions as part of the world national-liberation movement. The journal Modern and Contemporary History featured articles on these "progressive forces" of 150 years ago, "the direct antecedents of today's patriots," and included a comprehensive bibliography of Soviet monographs, pamphlets, and articles on Latin America published in the Soviet Union since 1945--a scant 70 items, including translations and essays published in Soviet provincial journals over the 15-year period. While these developments implied only a broader Soviet interest, Khrushchev's 28 May acclaim of Fidel Castro as a "fiery patriot" was the public signal of a newly initiated phase of Soviet-Cuban relations.

Since Mikoyan's visit to Havana in February 1960, the Castro government had shown itself willing to expand economic relations with Moscow and the bloc as a whole and, if anything, appeared to be forcing the pace of closer economic and political cooperation. With the breakdown of the Paris

talks, Moscow apparently decided that the advantages of a Moscow-oriented Cuba in intensifying the anti-US line throughout Latin America were worth considerable political and economic risks. Released, at least for a short period, from inhibitions stemming from its efforts to prepare the way for negotiations with the US, Moscow adopted an unprecedented activist line with respect to a Latin American country. In taking this step, Moscow apparently was encouraged both by the steady drift to the left in Castro's domestic and international policies and by the increase in influence and respectability of the Cuban Communist party. Increasing cooperation between the two countries was reflected in the announcement in Moscow on 17 June by Nunez Jimenez, director of the Cuban Institute of Agrarian Reform, that oil-sugar exchanges were being stepped up "at the request of the Cuban Government" and that Khrushchev had agreed to an early exchange of visits with Castro. Moscow's unannounced decision --apparently made in late May--to accede to Havana's request to purchase arms no longer available to it from Western sources sealed the rapprochement. Moscow and Havana tested US reaction first with a commercial transaction involving a handful of helicopters and then, in a rapid series of steps, concluded an agreement for and began the implementation of a major program of Soviet military aid and training.

In a speech to a teachers' conference in Moscow on 9 July, Khrushchev threatened to use rockets against the US if the "Pentagon" intervened in Cuba. This was a crude and synthetic attempt to create for himself the role of "protector" of the Cuban revolution. It also went well beyond the bounds of Moscow's standard tactical exploitation of ready-made opportunities to widen the breach between the US and governments of the underdeveloped countries and, as it was patently a bluff, reflected the USSR's conviction that there was little likelihood of US intervention. Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda follow-up was in much less direct terms, suggesting that the principal purpose of the gambit was to impress on the non-Communist Latin American public the daring and might of the USSR without committing the Soviet Government to any particular line of action in defense of Castro. Khrushchev's press conference statement of 12 July supporting Havana reflected a rapid transition back to generalized political and economic support and away from his rocket threat, although he maintained his activist role with

a thinly veiled suggestion that the Cuban people sometime "will muster enough courage" to ask return of the Guantanamo base.

Khrushchev's denial that Communists controlled the Castro government or the Cuban revolution and his assertion that if they had, "the Cuban revolution would have proceeded differently" in no way detracted from the public image of close harmony between the two governments. Subsequent heavy Soviet attention to Cuba centered on allegations of US economic and political aggression not only against Cuba but throughout Latin America. The joint communique marking Raul Castro's visit to Moscow in mid-July not only publicly affirmed but also gave an added solemn note to the new relationship of the two governments.

Elements of a stronger tone in Soviet policy were also present in East-West relations--Moscow's harsh line in breaking up the disarmament conference and its treatment of the RB-47 incident--and in its exploitation of the Congo situation. The Kremlin's early exploitation of the Congo disorders pointed up the heavy propaganda attention and more restrained official exploitation of anticolonialism which had become standard Soviet practice. Moscow had followed the progress of Belgian-Congolese independence talks from their beginning and endorsed the upsurge of agitation and sentiment for freedom. Moscow's general views on the Congo as it approached independence were summarized in a monograph by V. A. Martynov, one of the younger generation of Soviet experts on Africa in "The Congo Under the Yoke of Imperialism," signed to the press on 26 November 1959, and in an authoritative essay by senior Soviet Africanist I. I. Potekhin, "Characteristic Features of the Disintegration of the Colonial System of Imperialism in Africa," published in Problems of Oriental Studies in February 1960. The gist of their analyses was that the transition of the African peoples to political independence would be fairly rapid, though not uniform. Further, varied transitional political and social forms would appear which, although differing from those Moscow would propose if its voice were decisive, would nevertheless lead to the rapid disintegration of Western political, economic, and ideological influence, and so should be encouraged. A three-man Soviet delegation arrived in Leopoldville for the Congolese independence festivities on 30 June and negotiated agreements leading to the establishment of diplomatic and cultural reations. Such promptness had long since become routine.

Moscow quickly seized on the riots and mutinies and the Belgian reaction they precipitated as a windfall which could be exploited against the major Western powers not only in the Congo but throughout all Africa. Khrushchev's charge, in a press conference on 12 July, that the NATO powers were using the "pretext of alleged disorder" to reimpose their colonial domination--a charge seconded by a strongly worded government statement on the next day--touched off a many-sided propaganda campaign to harass Western interests and intensify tensions between Africans and the West. On 15 July Khrushchev pledged, in response to a message from Kasavubu and Lumumba, to support the Congolese leaders and hinted at unilateral Soviet aid. His promise of "resolute measures to suppress the aggression" was put into action within a matter of days when a dramatic shipment of relief supplies and technicians was airlifted to the Congo. At the same time, Moscow encouraged the Congo Government to appeal to the UN and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and the authorization of a UN force for the Congo. As the crisis worsened, Moscow's attitude toward the UN stiffened, and Soviet spokesmen moved from criticism of UN officers for not moving more promptly to enforce Belgian and Katangan compliance with the Security Council resolution of 14 July to open attacks on the UN for having improperly gone over to support of the colonialists.

A third feature of Soviet exploitation of the crisis was its effort to establish its own presence in the Congo through political and economic support of the Lumumba-controlled elements in the Congolese Government. Taking advantage of the political isolation and lack of finances and of the administrative chaos in the Leopoldville government, Soviet officials began a freewheeling effort to build up pro-Moscow sentiment in government and public circles by rushing in relief supplies, technicians, and advisers, and promising almost unlimited economic aid. The unrestrained efforts of the newly arrived Soviet diplomatic mission to discredit the UN's role in the crisis and encourage the Leopoldville government to open resistance to the UN's demands were typical of Moscow's unsubtle tactics. The forceful role of the Soviet ambassador, Mikhail Yakovlev, was confirmed by documents released by the Congolese Government after the fall of Lumumba. This phase of Moscow's attempt to implant its influence came to an abrupt end on 15 September when Mobutu ordered all Soviet and bloc diplomats and technicians out of the Congo.

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Soviet spokesmen failed to comment on the collapse of the USSR's Congo gambit on the heels of the decline of Lumumba's influence. Moscow found that it had insufficient resources to go it alone, and anti-Western African governments, respecting the considerable strength and prestige of the UN, proved not as resolute in following Moscow's lead as the Soviet Union might have wished. Among other things, Moscow's aborted experiment showed up its poor understanding and lack of skill in dealing with African sensibilities.

Parallel to the development of Moscow's anti-imperialism campaign in Cuba and the Congo, greater attention was devoted after the breakup of the Paris summit meeting to the question of the correct Communist attitude toward efforts by underdeveloped capitalist countries to solve political and economic problems and of tactics and ideological lines to follow in winning over their governments and peoples to close cooperation with the bloc. (Communist strategy toward the underdeveloped countries has become a focus of Moscow-Peiping rivalry, thus taking on a new urgency. As this aspect is discussed in detail in current ESAU series ESAU studies, the present paper makes no attempt to relate Soviet policies and attitudes and guidance to local Communist parties to the Sino-Soviet polemics.) Although Moscow adopted a harsher line against Western governments and against capitalism, it took pains to reassure Western powers that the way to negotiation was still open on its former terms. Moreover, its guide lines for Communist parties in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, insofar as they can be approximated, emphasized that there should be no relaxation of efforts to cooperate locally with as many non-Communist elements as possible in a general effort to reduce Western influence and to reinforce tendencies toward parochial nationalism.

Moscow's post-summit attitude was appropriately summarized in a long article in Sovetskaya Rossiya on 10 June reviewing the expanding role of local Communist parties in the underdeveloped countries. The survey specifically warned against "rushing ahead, putting forward premature slogans of Socialist reforms where conditions are not ripe." It emphasized the "instructive example" for parties of "the East and Latin America" of the Iraqi party's serious miscalculation in mid-1959 when its demands for participation in the Qasim government led to a split with Qasim's nationalist

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Arab forces and to repressive measures against the party by the government. Moscow apparently was concerned over signs of dissatisfaction in some parties with its subordination of the struggle against class enemies to the tactical dictates of carrying out a world-wide anti-imperialist policy, and by the possibility that under urging from Peiping, some local parties would again resort to their inherent propensity for heating up the attack on class enemies, thus interfering with the delicate skein of Soviet diplomacy. Even those Communists not drawn into the intra- and inter-party polemics could not fail to be impressed by Moscow's unequivocal reiteration of its position on 12 August, in a Pravda article by party ideologist Boris Ponomarev, and on 26 August by the dean of Soviet specialists on national-liberation movements, Academician Eugene Zhukov. Other Soviet programmatic statements likewise spotlighted the cold war aspects of these movements. Soviet African specialist S. Datlin, writing in Kommunist in August, hailed the struggle between colonialism and the national-liberation movement in Africa as "a great historical battle...which has far transcended the boundaries of the African continent, with now almost the entire world taking part in it either directly or indirectly."

Moscow's "peace" line was eclipsed in May by the first phase of its strident attacks on the West for making the summit talks impossible and its allegations that Western "provocations" undermined the very basis of international relations. With the new Soviet disarmament proposals of 2 June, Moscow began a new campaign to enlist support in the underdeveloped countries for its position on disarmament. Again Moscow linked disarmament to prospects of vastly increased outside aid for economic development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; in the authoritative journal International Affairs, A. Kodachenko presented a "tentative" figure of $50 billion a year which,

> it can confidently be said, general and complete disarmament /would release/ for financing the economic progress of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The figure mentioned by Kodachenko does not bear up under analysis, but it is interesting as a reflection of the lengths to which Moscow has gone to build illusory and unrealistic expectations of rapid economic development, to assert that

not economic but political factors stand in the way of a five-fold increase in foreign assistance, and to point to sources of added capital--the elimination of military expenditures on the part of underdeveloped countries, the use of current foreign military aid for peaceful constructive purposes, greater trade receipts, and profits of $15 billion annually--which Kodachenko alleges flow out of the underdeveloped countries--in addition to increased foreign assistance made possible by disarmament of the major powers. Soviet propagandists also used the line that "unequal exchange is a weapon of colonialism," citing spurious figures of Soviet economist A. A. Santalov as evidence that colonies and former colonies lose approximately $9 billion a year from "unequivalent" exchange--unfavorable terms of trade--with Western powers.

Moscow did not rely on these suspicious statistics alone. A joint session of the editors of International Affairs and the "Scientific Council" of the party's Academy of Social Sciences which was devoted to "The Two Socio-Economic Systems in the World Arena" emphasized Soviet and bloc production achievements in the race to overtake the US economically as having the greatest significance for determining the course of world affairs. With his usual flare, Khrushchev asserted in Bucharest on 21 June that bloc economic advances, "like a multistage rocket, will certainly lead the people of the whole world into the orbit of communism."

The eight-day XXVth International Congress of Orientalists, held in Moscow in August, brought together almost 2,000 delegates from 60 countries--with the conspicuous absence of a single delegate from China, although the Soviet press some months earlier had predicted a Chinese delegation in the hundreds. This meeting was a prime example of Soviet manipulation of a respected, scholarly, international organization to support its current policies and to discredit the West politically, economically, and ideologically in the underdeveloped "East." Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's official greeting to the congress, and the opening and closing speeches of Moscow's top orientalist-administrator, Gafurov, reiterated Moscow's dedication to liquidating "as soon as possible" the remains of colonialism. Moscow's "unselfish" economic and moral support and the "priceless" Soviet experience in developing its Central Asian republics--some Asian and African participants were escorted through these areas after

the congress--were emphasized in support of efforts to impress visitors from the underdeveloped countries with the validity of Marxist-Leninist interpretation of current developments and with the practical aim of Soviet policy--to help backward peoples become politically, economically, and ideologically free from Western influence. Although the congress revealed no new tack in Soviet policy in Asia and Africa, it underscored Moscow's preoccupation with increasing the political and psychological gap between the Western powers and their colonies and former colonies, as well as the scope of Soviet interest and the resources behind Moscow's anticolonial campaign.

Khrushchev's performance at the 15th General Assembly session in New York, where he gained for himself an unprecedented audience of world leaders and held the world spotlight for weeks, was to a great extent pointed toward impressing on the world public--especially the peoples and governments of the underdeveloped countries--the high priority of the task of putting an end to colonialism. While Khrushchev managed to keep the idea of a summit meeting at the forefront of world public opinion, and while Soviet policy continued to create conditions making an early meeting between Soviet and American leaders seem imperative, the weight of the Soviet premier's official and personal diplomacy was in the direction of influencing the countries of non-bloc Asia, Africa, and Latin America, singly and in concert, to a heightened assault on colonialism. Khrushchev's demands for an immediate end to the remaining vestiges of imperial rule over alien peoples dramatized a stand long implicit in Moscow's foreign relations and, of course, explicit in world Communist agitation. He managed to give the appeal to popular opinion an unusual degree of vividness and of urgency, reinforcing it by gestures of personal and political friendship to neutralist and nationalist leaders.

Radiating from Khrushchev's official and unofficial conduct and the Soviet delegation's maneuvers at the assembly was a fundamental effort to impress on the leaders of the governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that in the 15 years since the end of the war there had been a major change in the balance of world power which had not yet been reflected proportionately in either the policies of these governments themselves nor in international organizations--specifically the UN. This involved both a restatement of

Moscow's long-standard claim to have risen to a position of parity with the United States and the assertion that the disintegration of the colonial system, which had resulted in the creation of dozens of new states, freed those states from having to submit to political and economic domination, either domestically or internationally, and thus opened the way for the former colonies to play a new and decisive international role. Khrushchev's bizarre public behavior and characteristic mingling of friendly and belligerent postures may have stemmed in part from a desire to emphasize that Soviet strength and confidence was such that he could ignore Western norms and sensitivities.

Khrushchev's initiative in seeking a fundamental reorganization of the UN which would reflect his views on the current correlation of forces was intended to stimulate Asian and African demands for a greater voice in UN affairs, as well as to lay the groundwork for future major changes in the UN structure and staffing which would assure Moscow that the UN could no longer be used effectively to oppose Soviet policy anywhere in the world. His demand for the immediate abolition of all military bases on foreign territory--a demand he linked with the move for immediate liberation of all areas still under colonial rule--showed that he recognized that this was another issue capable of arousing the masses and that even a partial victory where Western bases were most vulnerable to popular pressures would be an important gain for Moscow.

Khrushchev's report on 20 October to the Soviet people on the results of his New York stay, which he defended as not only worthwhile but necessary, gave prime emphasis to his proposals for reorganizing the structure of the UN to reflect three major blocs, and to a reiteration of Moscow's disarmament position rather than to its more aggressive anticolonial line. Khrushchev did, however, confirm Moscow's stronger stand on Algeria when on 3 October in New York he embraced Algerian Deputy Premier Krim Belkacem and said at a luncheon on 7 October that recent Soviet-Algerian contacts meant in effect de facto recognition of the provisional Algerian government. Khrushchev's assertion on 20 October that "we have rendered and will continue to render them all the assistance we can"--accompanied by an increase of material aid to Algerian refugees by Soviet "public organizations"--confirmed the view that, at least for the time

being, Moscow had given up hope of wooing France and French President de Gaulle away from close cooperation with NATO, West Germany, and the United States in particular.

The assumption underlying Moscow's policy toward the underdeveloped countries, an assumption to which the Soviet Union has clung despite heavy pressures from both inside and outside the bloc, is that the world is passing through an interim period--of uncertain but short duration--during which forces now in motion will bring about a basically new world situation. Changes within the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America will reflect a shift in the correlation of forces of the two world power blocs. This in turn, centers on the successful completion of Moscow's short- and medium-range economic plans, achievements which will allegedly convince everyone of Communist economic--and by extension also military--superiority over the West in terms which will make Moscow's international voice decisive. Within this framework, Soviet leaders continue to display an interest in keeping crucial issues with the West, such as Berlin and disarmament, from coming to an early showdown, and the new forms and novel lines followed in the Soviet Union's broadened and intensified foreign activities, "to answer fully contemporary demands," have been directed toward making this interim period as short and as politically profitable as possible.

Moscow's "modernized Marxist-Leninist" approach has been designed to bring about a rapid transition of the political and economic policies of the underdeveloped countries toward joint or parallel opposition to the West--including voting with the bloc in the UN, acceptance of close economic ties and cultural relations with Communist countries, and, in the guise of "solidarity" and common interest of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, closer alignment of these countries behind the leadership of anti-Western extremist leaders. More and more, Moscow has committed its prestige to a small but growing number of focuses of anti-Western sentiment such as Indonesia, Guinea, Cuba. In a greater number of the new states, Soviet policy is based on the diplomatic and economic encouragement of narrow nationalistic sentiment, in the expectation that tensions between anti-Western extremists and pro-Western elements for leadership of these governments will lead to a gradual elimination of political, economic, and ideological ties with the West. In this respect,

Moscow's political and economic support for non-Communist neutralist and nationalistic governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has not been a pure gain for local Communists, whose major role, as the most dedicated anti-Western element, has been reduced to propagandizing Moscow's current international line. Flexibility of tactics, with traditional big-power politics playing a more serious role than classical Marxian formulas, and a generally pragmatic diplomacy since the advent of Khrushchev to top Soviet leadership--spiced by an element of experimentation--probably will last as long as Khrushchev has the decisive voice. The increasingly daring note in Moscow's post-Paris policy toward "imperialism" apparently reflects a conviction that world public opinion, backed by the vaunted might of the "socialist camp," can be manipulated to deter effective Western counteraction.

The world-wide expansion of Soviet political and economic activity, which has led to a Soviet "presence" in the remotest areas of the world and made the Soviet Union a bargaining factor, either directly or indirectly, in every political and economic transaction of an underdeveloped country with the outside world, has yielded political and economic gains of no mean order. Moscow's selective use of its resources to achieve maximum effect on key countries--with a consequent relatively modest drain on its own resources--does not suggest that economic criteria will force any curtailment of this program, even allowing for a considerable intensification of domestic demands for a higher standard of living and real or anticipated intrabloc requirements. Granted the overriding influence of the temperature of East-West relations on the tactics--though not the direction--of Soviet policy, the prospects are overwhelmingly on the side of an even greater Soviet effort to influence the course of developments in the underdeveloped areas.

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

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE WAR

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

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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE WAR
(Doctrine and Debate Since 1960)

This is a working paper, a preliminary and uncoordinated examination of the predicament of Soviet military thought on the question of general war, particularly with regard to questions of strategic importance. Other papers on Soviet military doctrine and policy will follow.

This paper is based entirely on open Soviet materials, principally the theoretical military journals and textbooks on military science addressed to audiences of professionals. These materials taken by themselves are not, of course, a sure guide to Soviet strategy, as they are in part designed to serve foreign policy and propaganda objectives. Nevertheless, the materials contain very useful indications of Soviet military thinking on future war, including areas of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion. We think that we can distinguish between articles of doctrine which are unquestioned and those which are subject to dispute, and that we can identify the schools of thought among military officers.

The writer has had encouragement and assistance from Howard Stoertz of ONE and from Matthew Gallagher of OO/FBID: the latter wrote our last examination of Soviet military thinking, CAESAR XI-60 of January 1960. Neither Mr. Stoertz nor Mr. Gallagher is responsible, however, for the conclusions of this paper, which are controversial.

The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome comment on this paper, addressed to Irwin Peter Halpern, who wrote the paper, or to the coordinator of the SSSG, [redacted]

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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE WAR
(Doctrine and Debate Since 1960)

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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE WAR
(Doctrine and Debate Since 1960)

Summary and Conclusions

Soviet military thought on a general war of the future, as revealed in the open discourse, has been in a fluid state in recent years. Faced with the vast destructive potential of thermonuclear weapons and an accelerating weapons technology in both camps, many Soviet leaders have found it no longer possible to formulate modern strategy and tactics simply by applying time-tested principles of warfare. Incited by Khrushchev, who appears to outpace most of his experts in theorizing, some military officers have been trying to break old doctrinal molds and then to generate new concepts and fresh interpretations of existing ones. In a number of places, however, these pioneering theorists have met with resistance from their more conservative colleagues.

Far from congealing military thought, Khrushchev's presentation in January 1960 of his outline of a future war and his "New Strategy" for winning it stimulated debate among the military on the character of future war and the strategic as well as tactical conceptions relating to it. For one thing, an important segment of military opinion lacked confidence in certain aspects of Khrushchev's presentation, and in any case did not regard it as the complete or final word on the subject. While reaffirming the main lines of Khrushchev's doctrine, military officers quickly added important qualifications to it. In their view, the USSR could not rely on nuclear/rocket weapons to the extent that Khrushchev had implied, but required diversified military forces to cope with the varied and complex situations of a future war. Khrushchev himself, in speeches in 1961, modified his earlier positions to some extent along the lines of the prevailing military views. His newly voiced appreciation of the need for all types of forces, bomber aviation, and a large standing army, among other things, may have been influenced by Soviet military argumentation as well as by external circumstances.

In elaborating a theory of future war, the military have had only limited success in reaching agreement among themselves. Over the past two years, the literature has carried a multiplicity

of views on future war, placing cheek by jowl contradictory answers to strategic and tactical questions. "Traditionalists," secure in the thought that future war will in many respects resemble World War II, have been pitted against "progressives," who predict that future war will be completely different from past wars. Different positions have been taken over such questions as the role of conventional forces and weapons, the nature of combat, the duration of the war, the effects of the first nuclear attack, and a host of substrategic matters such as positional warfare and stable defense. Military thought, in short, is in a dilemma: while encouraging widespread debate and discussion to improve and refine doctrine, the military leaders lament the fact that military opinion is seriously divided.

On the Start of War: That a new general war will probably start with a surprise attack is not disputed. Emphasis is placed, of course, on the possibility of a Western surprise blow against the USSR. Although Soviet leaders have presented conflicting views on the possible effects of a surprise attack, military leaders have tended increasingly to stress the grave danger to the USSR of a Western first strike. These statements have reflected much less confidence in a Soviet ability to absorb such a strike than expressed by Khrushchev in 1960. Such statements may be applicable, in Soviet military thinking, to the United States as well as to the USSR. In this connection, although Moscow has disavowed both a "preventive" and a "pre-emptive" strategy, important Soviet spokesmen, including Defense Minister Malinovsky, have hinted strongly at the need for a pre-emptive strategy. Such statements, if not reflecting a change in policy, may be arguing for one. This concept of pre-emption, in our view, would not mean a clumsy last-minute effort to unload attack weapons, but rather the deliberate assemblage of a military force capable of delivering an effective forestalling blow. In this connection, Soviet statements, while not suggesting an ability to destroy long-range attack forces based in territorial United States, do suggest a belief that a substantial blunting of US attack forces could be achieved by a Soviet first strike.

War After the First Attack: There is general agreement among Soviet spokesmen on some propositions as to how war might

develop after the first attack. Basic is the doctrine that the war will inevitably involve the widespread use of nuclear weapons. (While acknowledging the primacy of nuclear/rocket weapons in future general war, however, the military differ among themselves over the role that conventional forces and weapons will play in it. "Traditionalists" tend to emphasize the importance of conventional weapons while "progressives" minimize it.)

It is also the general view that war will be global in scope and involve large coalitions of states; whole continents will become theaters of war; and there will be no borderline between front and rear areas. "Mass, multimillion armies" will take part in the conflict. The war will be characterized by the "extreme decisiveness of the political and military goals of the combatant sides"; it will be waged ferociously and will impose severe destruction on all warring parties. (Boasts of Soviet victory in future war are offset by near-admissions of the possibility of defeat.)

The immediate strategic aims of the USSR in war are if possible to "prevent," and at the least to repulse, an enemy surprise attack, and to deliver a "crushing" counterblow. Soviet strategic objectives for the war as a whole are more difficult to ascertain. The "full defeat" of the enemy is desired, but the meaning of this term is left ambiguous. The primary objectives of strategic strikes are said to be both groupings of enemy forces in theaters of operations and the disruption of the enemy's rear area. The complete smashing of the enemy's armed forces is stressed at least in traditionalist quarters; but it is not clear whether maximum or limited destruction of Western countries is planned on.

Confronted with divided opinion among its officers on the problem of conducting war after the first attack, the Defense Ministry appears to hedge in its military policy, without commitment to either side. On the one hand, Defense Minister Malinovsky acknowledges the possibility of a short war and hints of a "country-busting" mission for Soviet strategic rockets. On the other hand, he makes it clear that Soviet planning for theater warfare is predicated on the assumptions that war will be more than a missile duel, will be fought on an important scale after the first nuclear blows have been struck, and will require the coordinated employment of various types of forces. It is a cautious, if somewhat ambiguous approach, apparently in preparation for any eventuality.

The above-mentioned elements of doctrine that are firmly defined in the open discourse suggest that the Soviet military leadership has achieved a greater flexibility for military response than would have been possible had Khrushchev's strategic pronouncements of 1960 been translated into doctrine without qualification. But the leadership has adopted a more rigid strategic posture than was evident earlier, say in 1957, when the then Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov left open the possibility (in his public statements) that a future war might be fought entirely with conventional weapons.

The elements of uncertainty, division and anxiety that we have detected in discussions on future war over the past two years in themselves have implications for policy. Unable to agree in a number of important respects on what shape a future war will take, Soviet military leaders probably have had serious doubts and differences about what measures to take now in regard to troop training and force structure. The ferment in military thinking, moreover, could have been causally related to the announced military policy changes in 1961 and may foreshadow more changes, in that certain expressed military viewpoints may become incorporated in strategic doctrine.

I. THE MAKING OF MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE USSR

A. Military Science Under Stalin in the Post-War Period

Both the content of Soviet military doctrine and the atmosphere in which it is formed have changed drastically since the days when Stalin's heavy hand checked the growth of military thought. Then, Stalinist pronouncements on the winning of the Second World War were decreed immutable laws. In an order promulgated in February 1946, Stalin declared that "the skillful mastering of the experience of the recent war" was to be the single basis for the development of military science in the future. In a Stalinist world, no cognizance could be taken of the need to alter principles of war to fit advances in weapons technology. Mass destruction weapons, then possessed only by the United States but under development in the USSR, were miraculously obscured in Soviet military doctrine. Soviet officers were ordered to prepare their strategic analyses on the strength of a simple assumption: victory in war would always be assured to the side superior in "the permanently operating factors" which determine the outcome of war. These were solidity of the rear, moral spirit of the army, number and quality of divisions, armaments, and organizational ability of the "leading staff." In the Stalinist view, the USSR was endowed with superiority in each of these factors.

Commenting on this period, a RED STAR editorial on 21 January 1962 related in a scornful tone that Stalin had regarded himself as the "only expert" on military affairs and military theory. Even his "erroneous positions" on military science, the editorial said, were postulated as "genius-like discoveries" and he was pictured in the literature as the "direct organizer and leader" of all strategic operations of the Soviet army. If military science moved ahead in Stalin's time, the editorial said, it was in spite of him--and owing to the efforts of courageous military leaders and lower-ranking party officials. Military officers in such an atmosphere, as Marshal Grechko recalled in the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL of February 1961, were afraid to express their own views and were content to mouth "standard phrases and follow rigidly patterned schemes."

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B. Military Thought Under Khrushchev, 1953-60

Upon the death of the dictator, the military establishment was among the first elements of Soviet society to feel the thaw of the long Stalinist winter. In the second half of 1953, isolated voices began to question basic military doctrine in public for the first time in decades. The nascent reformers worried particularly about the need to overhaul Soviet strategic doctrine in order to take full account of the U.S. capability to deliver (with impunity to the American continent) a nuclear surprise attack against the USSR. Though the atmosphere had become freer, most military leaders, trained to operate according to fixed "scientific" principles of war, were loath to abandon cherished maxims of the past. All the same, Soviet military thought had at last embarked on the tortuous road of modernization and adjustment to the swift developments in weapons technology. And the new political leadership would allow no turning back: "Soviet military science must be moved ahead in every possible way," Khrushchev told military academy graduates in November 1957.

In the process of the transformation, Stalin's "permanently operating factors" of war were de-emphasized and recast in a different form, but were not expunged from Soviet military science. Military spokesmen continued to acknowledge the great importance of the stability of the rear area, the morale of the army, the number and quality of divisions, armaments, and the competence of commanders in the conduct of war. But they no longer attributed discovery of these factors to Stalin; rather, they said, these "basic" factors were well known to such outstanding military leaders of old Russia as Peter I, Suvorov, and Kutuzov. Moreover, the reformers declared that these were only some of the factors that may influence the course and outcome of war in the present era--as strategic surprise, science, and technology may also exert a "decisive" influence on the war as a whole.

More important is the belief now that superiority in the so-called decisive factors (which the Soviets tend to claim for the USSR) does not automatically bring victory; the

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factors only provide "possibilities" for victory.* These possibilities can only be realized by "much organizational and creative work by people"--the total efforts of commanders, soldiers of the line, and civilian workers in the rear areas. (Maj. Gen. M.V. Smirnov, et al., "On Soviet Military Science," USSR Ministry of Defense: Moscow, 1960.)

As regards the basic revisions in Soviet military doctrine that have been made, the years 1953-55 and 1957-60 stand out as major watersheds--the first period registering the impact of the nuclear and thermonuclear weapon on Soviet strategic and tactical concepts, and the second the organizational integration of the ballistic missile into the Soviet force structure. In neither period was there a full disclosure of the scope of doctrinal change involved, although such evidence as was made available indicated that the tactical and strategic conceptions of Soviet military planners were now keeping pace with the implications of technological progress and political change. Moreover, with the advent of the ICBM in 1957, important differences in view became apparent among the military officers, on the one hand, and between the officers and Khrushchev, on the other, over the strategic significance of the new long-range rockets and their implications for Soviet military doctrine and force structure. Military theorists exchanged contrary views on such a critical question as strategic surprise, while Khrushchev and the military dickered (without directly confronting one another) over the relative importance of conventional forces and strategic nuclear/rocket weapons.

Soviet military doctrine, as it emerged from the theoretical reassessments that accompanied the development of the ICBM, was sketched out by Khrushchev in his January 1960 speech. In that presentation, he defined the strategic conceptions underlying his decision to reduce by one third the size of the Soviet armed forces--a justification which underscored the new role assigned the nuclear/rocket weapon

*Thus, they say, superiority in firepower (armament) is essential for victory in combat on a tactical or strategic scale, but does not automatically or necessarily lead to victory. Lt. Col. Popov, RED STAR, 18 July 1961.

in the Soviet Union's future political and military strategy. Superiority in "total firepower" was defined as the criterion of military strength; the ballistic missile was designated as the principal instrument of Soviet "firepower"; and the newly formed "rocket troops" were named the "main type" of force in the Soviet military establishment.

The political concept underlying the "new strategy," it was implied, was an estimate that the Western states could be deterred from launching general war by the fear of massive retaliation. Khrushchev's image of the character of a future war, in the event that deterrence failed, was more difficult to deduce from his speech. Khrushchev drew a picture of a rapid exchange of massive strategic blows between the major antagonists during the first hours of a future war, but he said nothing about subsequent stages of war or the role of conventional forces in it. Rather, he left the impression that there would be only the first stage--which would take the form of a nuclear/missile duel; and that one of the warring sides would then capitulate.

The fact that a major reorganization of the armed forces accompanied the Khrushchev statements seems to indicate that the Soviet leader's picture of future war was drawn from a sober military estimate. (During his speech Khrushchev even assured his listeners that he had consulted the General Staff beforehand.) The estimate on which the speech was based, however, was not necessarily geared to 1960, the year of the speech, but might have been related to a future time when the USSR would possess the rocket weapons necessary to fulfill their projected strategic tasks. Furthermore, Khrushchev's January 1960 pronouncements on strategic doctrinal matters were taken by a number of military spokesmen at the time as a "genuine contribution to Soviet military science" and have since been similarly applauded by some of the military theorists and leaders.

C. Military Thought Since January 1960

One might have expected a "definitive" presentation such as Khrushchev's to have signalled the end of contention in the military literature about the significance of nuclear/

rocket weapons for strategic doctrine. But as it turned out, Khrushchev's characterization of future war and doctrine was neither the complete nor the final word on the subject. Military officers speaking or writing during the next few months reaffirmed the main lines of Khrushchev's doctrine, but added qualifications and personal touches that tended to invest that doctrine with greater professional sophistication. All acknowledged the new primacy of rocket weapons in the Soviet military arsenal, and some asserted that the initial period of a future nuclear war would be of overriding importance. But along with this, many of the military spokesmen professed undiminished devotion to some of the classical principles of military theory significantly ignored by Khrushchev. Most notably, many stressed the continuing validity of the combined-forces doctrine--the view that victory in war requires the coordinated action of all arms of service. In making this point, the military spokesmen may have been concerned merely with insuring a role for their own individual services in a period of rapid reorganization. But they were also expressing a basic military estimate: that the Soviet armed forces could not rely on a single weapon system to deal effectively with the complex and varied war situations which they might be called upon to face. As professional specialists they seemed to be recognizing that however effective it might be as a political strategy, Khrushchev's doctrine of massive retaliation did not offer a complete blueprint for the construction of a modern and diversified military establishment.

Even after the amendments and qualifications to Khrushchev's outline of strategy and future war were proffered in the months following his speech, one could not say that the major disputed issues were resolved. On the contrary, over the past two years, the military literature has burgeoned to an unprecedented degree with differing viewpoints on future war and expressions of uncertainty about existing doctrines on the whole spectrum of issues which Khrushchev had ostensibly ironed out in January 1960. The whole body of Soviet military doctrine has in fact been undergoing close review as to its adequacy for future war conditions. This process has been fostered by the military leadership, which has enjoined the entire officer corps to help develop, test, and refine the concepts that will govern the conduct of a third world war and the preparations for it.

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Military writers have stressed the need to re-examine the substance of "certain concepts" which are "now firmly integrated" in military and naval doctrine, but which have not yet received "a new scientific interpretation in connection with changes in the conditions in which military operations are conducted." (Rear-Admiral V.S. Sysoev, NAVAL JOURNAL, No. 4, April 1961) They stress the need to "support and encourage original, independent decisions, bold strivings toward new methods of combat commensurate with contemporary weapons." And shunning the alternative of exclusively private debate and review, they have insisted that the problem can effectively be tackled only by drawing upon the "widest circle" of officers. (Col. Sushko, et al., KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 18, September 1961) In short, debate made public in military journals has become an accepted method of developing military doctrine as well as of educating the troops.

Additional evidence of ferment in Soviet military thought is seen in the extent to which Khrushchev himself has deviated from his earlier statements on war, in the course of explaining the changes in force structure that took place "as a result" of the U.S. arms build-up and the Berlin crisis in 1961. For example, in speeches made last summer Khrushchev acknowledged the need for a large standing Soviet army despite his earlier claims that increments in Soviet firepower made this unnecessary regardless of the size of armies in the West. He acknowledged the need for all types of services to fulfill the country's defense requirements, although previously he was content to rely almost entirely on nuclear/rocket forces. He called for the further development of military aviation, whereas he had earlier sought its demise. He admitted the possibility that a general war would begin along the frontiers in Germany, although he was the author of the formula that war would begin with strategic strikes against the rear areas of the antagonists.

Taken together, these changes add up to a shift in Khrushchev's thinking: a step in the direction of the commonly held viewpoints of Soviet military leaders. Again, Khrushchev's change of mind amounts to plain evidence that an important segment of military opinion lacked confidence in his military estimate of early 1960. The Soviet chief himself was persuaded in 1961--probably through the give-and-take of argument among the military as well as by external circumstances--to modify his own strategic outlook.

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It should not be inferred from the above discussion, however, that Khrushchev has done a complete turnabout from his earlier positions. Khrushchev may have begun to think more like his military lieutenants in a number of important respects, but, as recent evidence reveals, he has not cemented all the fissures between his and their conceptions of future war. There is at least a basic philosophical difference--which may have implications for policy--between Khrushchev and the military. Whereas he is inclined to stress weapons and to belittle the role troops will play in future war, the military stress the role of man as well as weapons in war.* (Albanian press organs on 22 February 1962 made a point of this distinction with some accuracy in attacking their bête noire: "What disgust and aversion is aroused by Khrushchev's revisionist views in his appreciation of men and technique

*Thus, in a recent message to President Kennedy on the problem of disarmament Khrushchev said:

> In the nuclear rocket weapons age--and we have entered this age--the numerical strength of the forces does not by a long way have the importance it had in World Wars I and II. War now would at once become total, worldwide; and its outcome would depend not on the actions of troops stationed along the line dividing the combatants but on the use of nuclear rocket weapons,with whom the decisive blow can be struck even before vast armies can be mobilized and thrown into battle. (TASS, 23 February 1962)

A contrary picture of the importance of troops in future war was painted in an editorial in the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL for December 1961:

> ...Final victory over the aggressor can be attained only as a result of joint operations of all types of armed forces. Future war, if unleashed by the imperialists, will be waged by multimillion mass armies. Its course and outcome will be to a decisive extent dependent on armies and the people alike, on the firmness of communications between front and rear, on the ability of the Soviet system to pour all forces and means into the struggle with the enemy.

during war. With undue emphasis on the technical side, he minimizes the decisive role of man, of the soldier on the field of battle, and he makes a wrong evaluation of the role of the various elements on the battlefield.")

D. The Search for a Single Military Doctrine

Soviet military thought as revealed in open sources is in a dilemma. On the one hand, the military leaders encourage widespread debate and discussion on doctrinal matters; on the other hand, they find the fact that military opinions have not been able to congeal into a single military doctrine very disquieting.

Writing in the May 1961 issue of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, of which he is an editor, Major General P. Zhilin lamented the absence of agreement on a single military doctrine. He wrote that in contrast to the "exhaustive" presentation of the political aspect of military doctrine--betraying his conservative colors, he relegated Khrushchev's 14 January 1960 speech on war and strategy to this category--there are still "many disputable and vague propositions in the elaboration of the military-technical part of the doctrine." Evidence of this, he said, could be seen in the fact that despite numerous discussions in the military press and within the General Staff and Frunze academies, "a unity of views has not been achieved" on the "laws" and "regularities" of military science. It has been necessary, he said, to review the fundamental postulates of Soviet military doctrine owing to the political and military changes that have taken place in the world. But he implored that it is also "necessary, now as never before, to have a unity of views on all of the most important questions of military art and the employment of troops in war." This unity of views, he added, must be achieved not only in the USSR armed forces, but also in the armed forces of all member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

Underlying Zhilin's concern is the belief, widely in evidence in Soviet literature on military science, that a fully developed military doctrine is a *sine qua non* for the successful conduct of armed struggle. Military science textbooks published by the USSR Defense Ministry declare that the success of military operations "on any scale" depends

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greatly on how correctly military theory has been elaborated in peacetime and mastered in troop training. (E.g., Maj. Gen. Smirnov, et. al., "On Soviet Military Science," 1960.) Military leaders place particular emphasis on the need to perfect a doctrine that would define the requirements for strategic as well as other forces at the start of a future war. In his speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress last October, Marshal Malinovsky invoked the highest political authority on this very point:

> The Presidium of the Central Committee of the party and the Soviet Government have demanded and do demand that we devote special attention to the initial period of a possible war.

Moreover, the penalty for not having a fully-developed theory and a viable, up-to-date doctrine for the conduct of war once the fracas begins has been inscribed in bold letters in recent Soviet military historiography. A number of military historians--including the collective that prepared the latest official multi-volume history of World War II--have come to attribute the calamitous defeats of the Soviets in the early part of the last war mainly to the inadequacy of prewar military doctrine.*

E. The Contending Schools of Thought

Military spokesmen generally acknowledge that, owing to the presence of stockpiles of modern weapons in the arsenals of East and West, a war of the future will be waged differently than any war of the past. Sharp differences in view have been registered, however, over the degree to which a future war will differ from World War II. As we have noted above, contrary positions are taken on such questions as the applicability of experience of past wars to a future war, the viability of long

*This has been a hotly disputed issue in the historical literature. Because of its relevance to the problem of military thought on future war, a discussion of the debate is appended to this report.

established military doctrines on strategy and tactics, and the role of conventional types of weapons.

Among the theorists, there appear to be basically two schools of thought as to the best avenue of approach to the problem of theory and doctrine on future war. One school--let us call it the traditionalist--tends to be conservative, reluctant to make radical changes in time-tested concepts and practices, and relies heavily on the lessons of the past--particularly those of World War II--in working out problems of military science. The theorists of this school do not rule out but soft-pedal the use of prognosis and non-historical theory. They tend to believe that future war in many important respects will resemble World War II. Such leading military figures as Marshals Grechko and Rotmistrov* and Army General Kurochkin appear to belong to this school. The MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, a sophisticated historical monthly of the Ministry of Defense, tends to be its principal public forum.

The attachment of the "traditionalists" to the past is at once apparent in their writings on future war. Thus, in an article in the historical journal stressing the close relationship between military history and military theory and doctrine, Marshal Grechko declared:

> Only those who are ignorant of Marxist dialectics maintain that the new historical period wipes out the past in the field of military affairs and military thought.
>
> Despite the fact that a future war...will be conducted with new, unprecedentedly powerful means of destruction, elements of military art known from the experience of the past war will nevertheless remain /in use/. Concentrating now all energies on the study of the new and striving to look into the future, it is necessary along with this to continue

*Marshal Rotmistrov, a doctor of military science, was ironically one of the most prominent revisionists in 1955.

> mastering the experience of the Second World War with the aim of using everything that has not lost significance for contemporary conditions. (Marshal Grechko, MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 2, February 1962)

In a similar vein Marshal Rotmistrov expressed the view that a mastery of World War II experience is essential in working out doctrinal problems of future war:

> Successful solution of the problems connected with determining the methods of conducting modern battle, operations and war as a whole is impossible without skillful theoretical study and the use of the past, especially experience of the Great Fatherland War. (Rotmistrov, MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 8, August 1961)

No one advocates a return to the Stalinist period. Even the most stalwart conservatives--who expect to fight future war in much the same manner as in World War II--deplore a return to Stalinism. Thus Marshal Grechko, in his article stressing the usefulness of military history in developing a theory of future war, took pains to separate himself from the slavish, uncreative tradition of military and theoretical writing under Stalin. He called for the serious study of Soviet military failures as well as successes, for the study of the military experience of the capitalist countries in World War II as well as that of the Soviets, and emphasized that, above all, research into military history must be conducted objectively. In his opinion military history is too closely tied to the problem of drawing up a dynamic military doctrine to permit the "mouthing of standard phrases and drawing of stereotyped schemes" that characterized the Stalin period--when both military history and doctrine were utterly stagnant. (MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 2, February 1961)

The second school of thought--let us call it the progressive one--tends to shun or, at the very least to deemphasize, the historical approach to working out a theory of future war, contending that it will be completely different

from the past. This school reasons that in the absence of experience in nuclear/missile warfare, one must not look to the past but peer into the future--to foresee and foretell the prospects for the development of armed combat on the basis of profound logical analysis and troop exercises under simulated conditions of nuclear warfare. The articulate adherents of this school appear to be mainly lower-ranking officers--such as Colonels P. Sidorov and S. Kozlov--who have been principals in the movement to revise Soviet military doctrine since 1955. Among the senior officers, Marshals Moskalenko and Yeremenko seem to share the outlook of this school. The official view of the USSR Defense Ministry--revealed in the pronouncements of Marshal Malinovsky and in RED STAR editorials--is inclined to sympathize with this school. The theoretical journal, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, is perhaps the principal forum for expression of the progressive viewpoint.

The progressives teach that one must theorize about the character of future war through "scientific prediction" based on "theoretical study" (as opposed to historical study) of the tendencies of development of social conditions and military technique. (Col. Sushko, et al., KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 18, September 1961) The school's emphasis on prognosis is summed up in the following passages:

> The significance of prediction in military affairs has grown unusually great under contemporary conditions. Over the expanse of a long period of history, military theory was limited to the generalizing of past experience of armed struggle. The absence of sufficient prognostication into the future was not very much reflected in its service role. Since the development of military affairs proceeded slowly and the technical base and the firm material conditions of armed struggle changed gradually, the generalized experience of the past wars could be used over a long period.
>
> For this reason, big mistakes in the past in evaluating prospective war frequently were corrected during its course. A

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> completely different situation has taken place at the present time. The main powers of the world have created and continue to accumulate and modernize weapons which must play an enormous role right in the beginning period of war. Therefore, military science right now must work out methods of applying new superpowerful and superlongrange weapons, despite the fact that these weapons never were used, excepting Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
>
> The task of working out new methods of struggle can be resolved only by scientific, military-theoretical thought relying on all around practical experience of the troops and the generalizing of it. (Col. Sushko, et al., KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 18, September 1961)

The philosophy of the progressive school hence puts little store by past experience and takes few time-honored concepts at face value.

> We can no longer be satisfied in any sense with those methods of combat organization which were characteristic of the period of the Great Fatherland War, including even its final periods. (RED STAR editorial, 8 June 1960)

How sharply different this approach may be from the historical method is illustrated by the following, somewhat extreme, statement by a "progressive" spokesman.

> Rocket technique remolds all previous concepts of the character of war: in particular, of its initial period, of battles and operations, of the front and the rear, of the use of space and time, of the character of this or that theater of operations, and of other problems of military art. Khrushchev has spoken in detail about this....(Col. P. Sidorov, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 12, June 1961.)

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The distinction between this school of thought and that of the traditionalists is also sharply drawn in the statement (by a less extreme progressive than Sidorov) that the method of approach to reality from study of the past represents "the main danger for military theory in the current stage of its development." (Col. S. Kozlov, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 11, June 1961) According to this writer, "adherence to the past always entails an underestimation of the new and...a hostile attitude toward it. This is the main danger of dogmatism." Col. Kozlov sees battling with "dogmatism" and overcoming stagnation and routine in military affairs, as inseparably connected to the primary task of revealing the new in military science. But at the same time, he deplores extreme positions: "Soviet military science also has to "struggle with extremes engendered by the turbulent growth of techniques, with exaggerations of all types, with unfounded conjectures and projection, and an alienation from reality." Finally, he condemns those who, "nihilistically reject experience of the past," though warning again that it has very limited value.

The schools of thought discussed here are of course not mutually exclusive--they undoubtedly do not embrace all military viewpoints, and individual military leaders in an effort to be openminded may sometimes favor an opponent's approach, depending on the specific issue at hand. Also, within the schools, as within individual journals, there may be a sharp difference of opinion expressed over various doctrinal matters.

A case in point is the debate carried on in the pages of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL between October 1959 and July 1961. The debate was especially remarkable for the vigor and directness of its disputes and its generally inconclusive, protracted character. It affords revealing insights into the atmosphere of the Soviet general staff. The debate ostensibly centered on problems of World War II historiography, but the purpose of the debate in raking over the lessons of World War II was admittedly to help work out a

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theory of the initial period of future war.* The points of disagreement often exceeded in number the areas of agreement. And such questions of critical doctrinal significance as the character of the first phase of war, the role of weapons and high command, that were aired in the debate were not resolved.

Unfortunately, the open materials do not carry enough evidence of the kind required to pin a progressive or traditionalist tag on most of the senior Soviet military leaders. Recent policy statements by Marshal Malinovsky, however, do reveal that the progressive approach currently has an important edge over the traditionalist outlook in Soviet officialdom. This is seen in Malinovsky's pronouncement of last October on the new study year. (PRAVDA, 24 October 1961) The statement emphasizes the working out of a theory of future war on the basis of maneuvers and training under simulated conditions of nuclear war--particularly its initial phase--but makes no mention of the usefulness of studying the lessons of past wars. In addition, the recently stepped-up official attacks against Stalin, for inhibiting the development of Soviet military science, undoubtedly has been grist for the mill of the progressives in their efforts to discredit the views of their more conservative colleagues. As recently as 21 January 1962 the Defense Ministry, in a RED STAR editorial, urged conservative-thinking military officers to keep pace with the mainstream of developments: "Much remains to be done in liquidating the consequences of the cult of personality in the sphere of military theory, construction and history."

*An article by Maj. Gen. I. Rukble and published in the October 1959 issue of the journal served as a catalyst. A vigorous discussion of the article was held in the Military Historical Section of the Military-Science Society of the Military-Historical Department of the General Staff on 18 December 1959, according to a report published in the April 1960 issue of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL. A number of articles addressed to the subject were then published in succeeding issues of the JOURNAL, culminating in an article, in the July 1961 issue, by the chief of the General Staff himself, Marshal Zakharov.

II. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST ATTACK

How war will begin and what the consequences of the first nuclear strikes will be for the warring sides are questions of greatest concern to Soviet military leaders. Since at least 1955, this matter has commanded the most attention in theoretical discussions of future war. Judging from recent evidence, the heavy emphasis on the importance of the initial phase of war has been sustained if not increased. And the concern voiced by Soviet military leaders over the possible effects of a Western surprise attack against the USSR would appear to have important implications for Soviet military planning.

A. Surprise As a Likely Trigger of War

Entangled as it is in a whole series of political and military issues, the question of initiation of war is bound to be handled in Soviet discourse in a manner that would best serve policy or propagandistic aims. It would of course be folly to take such statements at face value. Yet it would be useful to identify the expressed Soviet views on this question, in order to relate them later in this study to other conceptions of future war and to probe their implications for Soviet military strategy.

To begin with, no Soviet spokesman has voiced expectation that a declaration of war would precede the outbreak of hostilities between the major powers. Rather, military discourse has repeatedly stressed the likelihood that a future general war would begin with a surprise attack with mass destruction weapons by the West against the Soviet camp. In an article in the April 1961 MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, Major General M. Cherednichenko cast this view in terms of a rigid formula:

> It is becoming a definite lawful regularity that wars in the contemporary epoch are being unleashed by imperialist aggressors by surprise, without declaration, drawing into the conflict enormous forces from the very first days of the war for the attainment of the most decisive objectives.

Writing in the August 1960 issue of the same journal, however, two other military writers left open the possibility that either side might launch a surprise attack: "As shown by past experience, wars most often are started by surprise attack by one of the sides...."

While ruling out the possibility that a major power would willfully forewarn its opponent of a definite intention to attack, the Soviets have considered that a threat period could precede the first nuclear salvo, if the countries were in the midst of an international crisis. (A complaint heard during the Berlin crisis in 1961 was that the USSR is confronted with "the prospect of war only because it wishes to sign a peace treaty with Germany.")

Soviet military spokesmen have also said that a third world war could begin under any of the following circumstances:

1. Local war (small-scale war between states) which in certain cases would "inevitably" and in others would "tend to" develop into a general war. Soviet spokesmen agree that any armed conflict will inevitably develop into a global nuclear/rocket war should the nuclear powers become involved in it. (Marshal Malinovsky, speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress, 23 October 1961)

2. Attack against a satellite of the Soviet Union. "The armed forces of the Soviet Union," Marshal Malinovsky declared in PRAVDA on 24 January 1962, "are always ready to retaliate with a crushing blow at the aggressor and we shall smash those who attack us or our allies." (In other recent statements of this nature, however, Soviet leaders--including Malinovsky--have exhibited some reluctance to pledge to defend all satellites indiscriminately. In the heat of the polemic with the Albanians and Chinese, for example, Soviet leaders early this year spoke of defending the "socialist countries which are our friends.")

3. Accidental war, which could be set off by defective radars or by "the 'accidental' appearance of a foreign aircraft and the 'accidental' dropping of a bomb." (Khrushchev, PRAVDA, 15 March 1958)

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Each of these possibilities is invoked in the propaganda from time to time in order to inhibit Western military activities detrimental to Soviet interests. This is not to say that the various notions on how future war might begin are without significance for Soviet military doctrine. The fact that Soviet military discourse focuses mainly on the problem of surprise attack (or first strike) against the USSR is in itself significant from a military standpoint. This significance will be brought out in the ensuing discussion of other dimensions of the problem of surprise attack.

B. Views On the Importance of First Strike

During the past two years Soviet spokesmen have presented conflicting views on the possible impact of a surprise attack on the USSR.

On the one hand, in his speech announcing the troop cut in January 1960, Khrushchev had denied that "any country" would derive decisive advantage by launching a surprise attack against another nuclear power: "The state subjected to a sudden attack--if, of course, the state in question is a sufficiently big one--will always be able to give a powerful rebuff to the aggressor." Khrushchev clearly had political reasons for saying this. A major objective of his speech was to assure his listeners--both domestic and foreign--that the proposed troop cut would in no way affect the capability of the Soviet Union to defend itself. In denying the effectiveness of surprise attack, he was buttressing the image of an assured Soviet capability to retaliate in force, even under the worst possible conditions. In support of his argument that the USSR had a guaranteed capability to strike second with its nuclear/rocket weapons, Khrushchev said that Soviet territory was immense and that Soviet missile facilities (threatened by NATO bases along the periphery of the USSR) were located in such a way as to insure duplication and triplication as well as adequate dispersion and camouflage. Later, in the wake of the U-2 incident, Khrushchev again sought to assure the West as well as bloc leaders at the June 1960 Conference of Communist parties in Bucharest that the USSR could strike second even if the United States discovered the location of Soviet rocket bases: "It is not possible to put a rocket base out of commission by one, two, or several attacks; rocket

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technique insures a counterattack in every instance." In neither instance in which he evaluated the strategic significance of striking first did Khrushchev seem to vouch for the capability of the West's strategic forces to survive a surprise attack by Soviet missiles, although this possibility cannot be ruled out.*

Another authoritative disparagement of the ultimate effect of surprise attack was contributed by Lieutenant General Krasilnikov in RED STAR of 18 November 1960:

> Soviet military science affirms the following: Regardless of the fact that a sudden attack can cause very great harm, it still cannot become a decisive factor in the course and outcome of the war.

This statement too, when examined in context, seems designed to emphasize the Soviet Union's ability to retaliate, rather than the West's. For the preceding sentences were: "By means of a massed sudden attack the imperialists dream of inflicting blows on the socialist countries which would immediately decide the war in their favor. We cannot afford to ignore such intentions of the enemies of socialism."

Statements such as these, in short, implied that the Soviet leaders had a high confidence in a Soviet (but not necessarily Western) strike-second capability. But neither military spokesmen nor Khrushchev have belittled the importance of surprise attack or boasted of an assured Soviet strike-second capability in public since 1960. The prolonged reticenceon such a critical issue as this could mean that the Soviet

*For obvious reasons, Soviet spokesmen do not directly and openly discuss the question of the possible effects of a Soviet first strike against the U.S. The marshals give assurances that the USSR "will never strike the first blow." They have made sweeping threats in the mass propaganda, such as Malinovsky's boast in PRAVDA on 24 January 1962 that the USSR could destroy "any target, all political-administrative centers of the US" with a single nuclear/rocket attack. But they have not specified that such an attack would be launched under conditions of a first strike or surprise attack.

leaders are less certain now than they were in 1960 about the Soviet ability to withstand a first nuclear strike by the West.

In this regard, it is also significant that since the Khrushchev speech of January 1960, and in subtle rejection of it, a number of military spokesmen have stressed the possible decisive effect that a surprise attack might have on the war as a whole. Statements to this point made in 1961 by two ranking military leaders stand out as most important.

In an article summing up a lengthy debate on the initial period of war, developed in consecutive issues of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, the Chief of the General Staff endorsed the view that strategic surprise could be of overriding importance in a future war. In the July 1961 issue of the journal, Marshal Zakharov focused on the danger to the USSR (with possible reference to the West as well) of a successful surprise attack:

> The nuclear-rocket weapon, having enormous destructive force and practically unlimited in its radius of operations, opens before the aggressor wide possibilities for delivering a surprise blow of enormous force. Nuclear weapons permit in the very first hours of the war the delivery of such blows as can turn out to be decisive for the course of the war. In these conditions, lack of military preparedness for resistance against an aggressor attack can entail far heavier consequences than was the case [in the USSR] in 1941. Of highest importance here is the attainment of high vigilance and constant preparedness of armed forces to prevent a surprise blow.

Marshal Malinovsky, in his speech to the 22nd CPSU Congress on 23 October has provided the most authoritative opinion on strategic surprise to date. His view of the issue was consistent with the military literature stressing the decisive role of strategic surprise in a future war but, like Zakharov's, was out of step with Khrushchev's presentation of January 1960. Malinovsky seemed at pains to get across the idea that the political and military leadership were now

fully in accord in their estimate of the importance of surprise. Thus he took the rare step of invoking the authority of the CPSU Presidium in emphasizing the need to study the problem of the initial period in a war:

> The Presidium of the Central Committee of the party and the Soviet Government have demanded and do demand of us that we devote special attention to the initial period of a possible war. The importance of this period lies in the fact that the very first mass nuclear strikes are capable, to a vast extent, of predetermining the whole subsequent course of the war and could lead to such losses in the rear and among the troops as would put the people and the country in an exceptionally difficult position.

In stressing the grave danger to the USSR should the West succeed in striking the USSR first, the senior military leaders betray their doubts and fears about the ability of their country to withstand a massed nuclear attack. At the very least, their statements reflect much less confidence in the USSR's ability to absorb nuclear blows and to strike back effectively than Khrushchev and General Krasilnikov had expressed in 1960. At the same time, the statements on the possible decisiveness of strategic surprise may bear on the ability of the United States to withstand such an attack. Were this the case, the statements could be used in support of an argument for a Soviet strike-first strategy and for the USSR's acquiring a weapons capability commensurate with that task.

More will be said shortly on the probable implications of the heightened Soviet concern over the question of surprise for Soviet strategic planning. Suffice it to note here, that the evident Soviet uncertainties about the effect of the first attack has probably contributed to the disarray in military thinking on such questions as the duration of the future war, the kind of role the older component forces will play, the relative importance of conventional weapons, the scale of wartime economic production, and a variety of related questions.

C. Strategy For the Initial Stage of War

As revealed in the open sources, the Soviets envisage fighting a "defensive" war in the political sense but an "offensive" war in a military sense. They give no indication in their writings or pronouncements of planning for a "preventive" war--that is, a deliberate, unprovoked attack against the West. The fact that they plan to fight a "defensive" war, however, does not rule out their striking another power first, by surprise, should they deem this important to their security. A USSR Defense Ministry book, "War and Politics" (signed to press in December 1959), thus rationalized a first-strike strategy for the USSR within the framework of a "defensive" war in a political sense:

> Contemporary methods of conducting wars have greatly increased not only the significance of surprise but also the role of attack--which is the basic and most important way of conducting war, and of providing for the decisive destruction of the forces of the enemy and the preservation of one's own forces. Attack in the military sense of strategy by no means contradicts the defensive character of war in defense of the socialist fatherland from the political point of view.
>
> Marx and Engels constantly advised communists that a...just war, defensive in character, does not preclude strategic attack operations but on the contrary presupposes them.

According to numerous Soviet military statements, preventing, and at the least, repulsing an enemy strategic attack, and delivering a crushing counterblow, will be the most important of the immediate strategic aims of Soviet forces in a future war. From other statements on how the war will develop in its initial phase, it is clear that seizing the strategic initiative and creating favorable conditions--through strategic nuclear strikes--for the further development of operations are included among the immediate objectives.

To prevent an enemy surprise attack, should deterrence fail, means to destroy the enemy's nuclear striking force--or as much of it as possible--in good time. The best and perhaps only way to achieve this is by striking the enemy first. Such was the thinking of a group of Soviet military theorists who, in 1955, advanced the view that a surprise attack could be frustrated if the enemy were himself surprised as he prepared to strike.

It has not been the policy of the Soviet Union to admit in public the adoption of a pre-emptive strategy. On the contrary, on a number of occasions since 1955 Soviet spokesmen have explicitly disavowed it.* Nevertheless, in the period under review, there have been some crystal clear allusions to the need for the USSR to be in a position to strike the first nuclear blow, should war become inevitable. Thus, in a debate in the military historical section of the General Staff (reported in the April 1960 issue of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL), a Colonel Nazarov made the following statement about the "new problems" in the preparation for war and the conduct of armed struggle in its initial period:

> The first problem is insuring for oneself the advantages for the successful realization of a surprise first blow or the prevention (predotvarshchenie) of such a blow on the part of a probable enemy. This problem, as history has shown, has become the central one in the preparation of countries for war and in the preparation of armed forces and of the military high command.

In an article in the March 1961 issue of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, Army General Kurasov hinted, though in more cautious language, at the need for the USSR to strike first in the event of war. He quoted Lenin to the effect that

*The above-mentioned book, "War and Politics," for example, said: "It is well known that, unlike the imperialists, military and political leaders of the Soviet Union have many times stated that the USSR will never start wars. They have always denied the strategy of 'pre-emptive blow'."

it would be "stupid and criminal" not to attack an enemy "acting against us." He recalled that Lenin wrote (Works, Vol. 26, p. 152) that "one must try to catch the enemy in disarray, to strike at the moment when his troops are assembled." And he noted Lenin's adage that "in war you do not communicate to the enemy when you are going to attack."

Voicing concern in his 22nd CPSU Congress speech last October about the possibility of a Western surprise attack against the USSR, Marshal Malinovsky not only called for preparedness to repel such an attack, but hinted strongly at a pre-emptive strategy. He said that in 1961 the armed forces were called on to work out means of "exploding" the aggressor's plan by a "timely and devastating blow against him":

> In realistically appraising the situation, one must hold that it is precisely a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that the imperialists are preparing. This is why Soviet military doctrine regards as the most important, the principal, and primary tasks of the armed forces to be in constant readiness to repulse reliably a surprise attack of the enemy and to thwart his criminal plans. The point at issue is that, in contemporary conditions, any armed conflict will inevitably develop into a universal nuclear-rocket war, should the nuclear powers be involved in it. Thus we are forced to prepare our armed forces, the country, and all the people primarily for a struggle against the aggressor, mainly in the conditions of nuclear warfare....
>
> The main common task posed for all our armed forces in military training [In 1961] was the study and working out of the means of reliably repulsing a sudden nuclear attack by the aggressor and also the means of exploding his aggressive plans by a timely and devastating blow against him.

There are two important differences between the present and past treatment of the pre-emptive question in the open discourse. First, although allusions to a pre-emptive strategy have been carried in less authoritative sources in the past, only recently has the concept of pre-emptive action been incorporated in the stated mission of the USSR armed forces.* Second, the strident confidence expressed by some military spokesmen prior to 1960 in having ample warning of an impending enemy attack has not appeared in recent military discourse. Rather, emphasis has been on vigilance and split-second reaction in the expectation that there will be little advance warning. The spokesmen give as the main reason for this the threat posed by American overseas bases. "The presence of numerous military bases of imperialist states around the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp determines that the time for bringing out forces to immediate combat preparedness must be measured not in days or even in hours, but in a series of cases literally in minutes and seconds." (Major General N. Kiryaev, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 17, September 1961)

American overseas bases, moreover, are given first priority among the prominently announced targets of a Soviet counter-strike. The whole system of bases ringing the Soviet camp, they boast, can rapidly be knocked out of commission. But the Soviets have observed a curious reticence with respect to SAC and missile bases located within the United States. At the most, they speak of attacking "very important targets" within the United States or imply a capability to destroy them by drawing on authoritative American statements bearing

*Thus in February 1961, Malinovsky said only that the Soviet armed forces would "repel the attack of the enemy and deal him immediately a crushing, retaliatory blow."

on Soviet strategic attack forces.* More common in military discourse are references to strikes against such rear area targets as "industrial and vital centers," "communications junctions," "political-administrative centers," "naval bases," and "everything that feeds war."

The fact that there is little if any specific mention of hitting long-range attack elements located within the United States cannot be explained simply by a reluctance to broach a subject that impinges on a strike-first strategy, for Soviet spokesmen forthrightly speak of a counterforce strategy--implying first strike--with respect to American rocket and SAC bases overseas.

There are several possible explanations for Soviet reticence on the subject of mainland U.S. military targets. It could, for example, reflect a military estimate that U.S. overseas bases, being mainly rocket bases, represent the primary threat to the Soviet camp; whereas the long-range attack forces based within the United States are still mainly aircraft, a part of which are on air alert, and can be dealt with by existing Soviet air defense forces (whose role is heavily stressed in the literature). A second possible explanation is that Soviet military planners lack confidence in their ability to strike at ICBM sites and SAC bases within the United States--or at least in good time--with existing capabilities. Still a third possible consideration is that the Soviet leaders, desiring to give stability to mutual deterrence, find it in their interest to maintain American confidence in SAC's retaliatory capability to deter the USSR--but at a level low enough to discourage an American surprise attack against the USSR.**

*"The strength of our rocket weapons is also acknowledged abroad. For example, commander of US SAC General Thomas Power declared openly that under present conditions any target can be destroyed with an accuracy of up to 95%, even if this target is at a distance of 8 to 10 thousand kilometers. Power draws the conclusion: 'In effect all the Soviets need to put our atomic weapons out of commission are 300 rockets. All this in some thirty minutes.'" (Marshal Moskalenko, RED STAR, 13 September 1961)

**Another method the Soviets have used in maintaining American confidence in its ability to deter the USSR is the practice of publicizing expectation of the vast destruction that the USSR would suffer in the event of a new war.

D. Conclusions

What is most striking about Soviet statements on the problem of the initial stage of war is the uncertainty that underlies them. The fears of Soviet leaders regarding the effects of a surprise attack carried out against the USSR have already been mentioned. We also encounter evidence of uncertainty in the fact that some officers have voiced doubts over whether strategic decisions taken by the military leadership can control events in the first phase of a future war.*

That such fears and uncertainties are in evidence undoubtedly has important implications for Soviet strategic planning. This has been made clear in allusions by top military leaders to a pre-emptive strategy. If not reflecting a change in policy, their statements may be arguing for one. For they seem to compel the practical doctrinal conclusion that the Soviet Union ought either to prepare to accept a surprise nuclear attack by the United States or to launch one itself.

The Soviets do not, of course, spell out for us the meaning of pre-emptive action. In Soviet thinking, the

*In 1960, a sharp controversy took place in the military-historical department of the General Staff, as reported on the pages of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, over the relative importance of the decisions of the military high command on the one hand, and technique (armaments) on the other, in forming the initial phase of war. Some officers contended that the military high command can in peacetime predetermine the character of the initial period of war; opponents of this viewpoint argued that the character of the initial period of war is above all determined by methods and weapons--that is, by factors independent of the will of individual persons. Marshal Zakharov, who summed up the debate in an article in the July 1961 issue of the MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL, sidestepped this contention, leaving the question among a number of others unresolved. He was content to say that the character of armed struggle in the initial period of war is determined by "many conditions," including plans and armament.

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concept of pre-emption may not necessarily entail a strategy on which military planning is based. It may have no bearing on the choosing of weapons in the USSR. It may simply mean a last-minute attempt to unload the country's strategic attack weapons in an effort to blunt an impending enemy attack.

Such a concept of pre-emption, however, would imply an irresponsible attitude on the part of thinkers so committed as are the Soviets to the principle of total planning. We believe it much more likely that their concept of pre-emption is indeed expressed in planning, is organic to their war planning. In this sense the concept not only means the launching of a forestalling first blow (as opposed to an unprovoked first strike against an opponent); it also means a strategy that would dictate the assemblage of a military force that is capable of delivering an effective forestalling blow, even though such a blow would not absolutely destroy the enemy's capabilities.

As to current Soviet calculations of the effects of a Soviet first strike against the United States, we can only guess in the dark. The military do not come to grips with this question directly in the open discourse. At the most, one could point to indirect indicators of Soviet thinking on this matter, without drawing any firm conclusions. In electing, as they appear to do, a pre-emptive attack strategy, the military leaders imply the belief that substantial blunting of the enemy's attack forces could be achieved by a Soviet first strike. This hypothesis is buttressed by their expressed confidence in an ability to destroy the whole system of American overseas bases, as well as by their statements that a surprise attack could be decisive. On the other hand, their statements bearing on strategic targeting in the first phase of war seem to reflect a lack of confidence in an ability to destroy the long-range attack forces based within territorial United States. This would seem to suggest that, in their view, an important part of the U.S. long-range attack force would survive even under the most adverse conditions of a Soviet nuclear attack. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the level of destruction would be higher in a pre-emptive blow than in a retaliatory blow, so the inability to effect total destruction would not invalidate a pre-emptive strategy.

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III. DOCTRINE FOR WAR AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK

The Soviet military leadership, from all indications, is preparing the Soviet armed forces for future war on the guiding assumptions that it will involve more than a missile duel between the major powers and will continue on a large scale after the first nuclear blows have been struck. On the same assumptions, the military leaders have sought to work out a body of theory on the character of the entire course of future war as a basis for Soviet war planning. The fact that they have not had complete success in this enterprise has already been noted in this study, as has the tendency of groups of officers to take traditionalist or progressive positions. In the sections that follow, we shall first outline the specific conceptions of how war will develop after the first attack, distinguishing, as we go, between points of agreement and controversy in the military literature. Then we shall assemble evidence of probable Soviet strategic objectives for war as a whole and of methods of attaining them.

A. Characterizations of Future War

1. Duration of War

The question of a future war's duration is a contentious one in the Soviet military establishment. There is no hard and fast doctrine on this matter, although there once was. Up until 1960, the notion that future war would be very long and attritional was not disputed in the military literature.* In fact, as late as 1959, a Defense Ministry textbook, "In Aid to Officers Studying Marxist-Leninist Theory," envisioned a third world war as lasting longer than World War II. But since 1960, many views have been expressed on the subject. Some writers, principally military economists, continued to predict that a future war would be lengthy because of the fact that both coalitions possessed immense human and material resources as well as a large territory, which could not be knocked out by nuclear blows in a short time. (Major General Lagovsky, SOVIET FLEET, 6 February, 1960; V. Uzenyev, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 6, 1961)

*Calls for upgrading the importance of surprise may have implied short war.

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On the other hand, others have mused over the possibility that war might be concluded with the first nuclear broadsides. One source went so far as to acknowledge the feasibility of a blitzkrieg in the future under the "right conditions," but went on to discount it at least as a practicable Western strategy against the USSR with its vast territory and possibilities for dispersion of means of defense.*

The likelihood that a future conflict will take the form of a blitzkrieg or single-stage war is clearly a minority viewpoint in the Soviet military, however. Even the outspoken progressive experts on military science now tend to discount this notion. Colonel S. Kozlov, one of the co-authors of the 1960 textbook on "Soviet Military Science" that entertains the possibility of a blitzkrieg, in 1961 wrote disparagingly about unnamed Soviet officers who privately look toward a blitzkrieg as the war of the future. (KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 11, June 1961)

Prevailing military opinion, avoiding both the extremes of blitzkrieg and of a lengthy war of attrition, anticipates a war which will continue beyond the first stage but which will not be long and drawn out like World War II. Military spokesmen tend to agree that at least the initial phase of war--which, by definition, will end when one of the sides attains its immediate strategic aims--will be very short. Khrushchev's picture of the initial phase of future war, drawn in January 1960, had scheduled the delivery of the decisive strategic strikes "not only during the first days but during the first minutes of the war." Similarly even certain of the more conservative military types (who, incidentally, expect much to be done in the initial phase, including the completion of troop mobilization and transformation of the economy to a war footing) say that the first stage will be counted in "hours or in days." (Colonels Kolgushkin and Bershadsky, MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 8, August 1960)

*"Soviet military science does not deny the blitzkrieg method of conducting war. It points out, however, that the successful conduct of a blitzkrieg requires an advantageous combination of economic, political and military conditions..." (Defense Ministry textbook, "On Soviet Military Science," Moscow, 1960.)

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More noteworthy is the fact that senior military leaders, notably Marshals Malinovsky and Moskalenko, have of late conveyed the impression for the first time that they expect not only the initial phase of war but the war as a whole to be short. They divulged this outlook in the course of dramatizing the swiftness with which strategic objectives could be attained with the use of ballistic missiles. Moskalenko, in an article on Soviet rocket power in RED STAR of 13 September 1961, explained the new outlook in terms of the revolution in weapons technology.

> Until the appearance of rocket-nuclear weapons there were no means with the aid of which it would be possible to attain the decisive goals of a war within brief periods of time and in any theater of military operations.
>
> In the past the strategic goals of a war were attained by means of consecutive or simultaneous solutions of tactical and operative tasks in theaters of military operations on land, and this was accompanied by a considerable loss of time, effort, and means.
>
> Today our armed forces dispose of powerful strategic rockets with nuclear charges which make it possible to attain the strategic goals of a war within short periods of time. The rocket troops are capable of conducting operations of varying scope in any area of the globe, and they can exert an essential influence not only on the course but also on the outcome of a war as a whole.

And Malinovsky underwrote his colleague's statements in a speech before the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961:

> The use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons with unlimited possibilities of delivering them to any target in a matter of minutes

> by means of rockets makes it possible in the shortest period to achieve decisive military results at any range and over immense territory.

2. Weapons of War

Khrushchev's pronouncement of January 1960 that nuclear/rocket forces will play the main role in future war is now an unquestioned article of Soviet military doctrine. Unchallenged though it may be, this canon is open to different interpretations as to its meaning for the ways in which war may be conducted after the first strategic strikes.

Soviet military spokesmen do not, as a rule, go so far as to say that future war will simply be a "missile duel or a "push-button war." (Khrushchev had implied that war would take such a form in January 1960, and again in February 1962 in a note to President Kennedy on disarmament issues.) While acknowledging the primacy of nuclear weapons, the military nevertheless see a place for conventional types of forces in a future general war. They differ among themselves, however, over the kind of role that conventional forces and weapons will play in it.

Progressive-minded individuals, on the one hand, minimize the importance of conventional weapons and similarities between methods of waging the future war and those of the past. In their view, only nuclear/rocket weapons can fulfill strategic missions in modern warfare. (Marshal Yeremenko, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 6, June 1961) Even in tactical situations, they say, battles will be decided by blows dealt by nuclear weapons; and they picture battles as generally being fought with nuclear weapons. (Lt. Col. M. Popov, RED STAR, 18 July 1961)

Traditionalists, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the importance of conventional weapons. They raise the possibility that conventional weapons might even play a primary role in secondary theaters of operations, or in the main theaters at certain stages in the war. Typical of this viewpoint (its popularity is indeterminable from available evidence) is the following estimate by General of the Army P. Kurochkin:

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A future war is unlikely to have identical forms of struggle in all theaters of military operations. The most powerful weapons will obviously be concentrated in the chief theaters and directions. But in the other theaters and sectors of the struggle it is not excluded that military operations may be conducted in the main with conventional weapons. Thus the battle itself in these theaters will acquire forms which will be in some degree similar to those which characterized the Second World War. (MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 8, August 1961.)

Defense Minister Malinovsky himself takes a more balanced, open-minded view of the relative importance of modern and conventional weapons in his statements on policy for Soviet force structure, as will be seen in discussion of Soviet strategy for theater warfare later in this study.

It should also be pointed out that Soviet literature takes into account the possible use of chemical-biological warfare in a future general war. Attention has been drawn to the fact that advances in rocket techniques may radically increase the military effectiveness of chemical and bacteriological weapons "whose development in the West is proceeding intensively." (Major General N. Talensky, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 10, October 1961) Curiously, discussion of CBW is limited to the use of such weapons by the West and defense against them by Soviet forces.

3. The Role of Man in War

The new emphasis on weaponry notwithstanding, military thought stresses the role that men will play in modern warfare. Understandably, troop indoctrination in the USSR emphasizes this point in an effort to buoy up morale and to impart a sense of purpose and importance to officers and men. There is, however, a technical military dimension to this question as well. Doctrine now categorically states--as it had before 1960--that future war will demand the participation of "mass, multimillion armies." (Marshal Malinovsky, 23 October 1961 speech) Khrushchev had evidently tried to get the military to break with this old maxim in playing down the need for large armies in his January 1960 presentation. His viewpoint found

expression in articles by some military officers in early 1960. Thus, Major General G. Pokrovsky (in SOVIET FLEET, 9 March 1960), hailing the announced troop cut as consistent with the general trend of the history of warfare, argued that a war of the future would be waged with smaller land armies than in the past. Even Colonel I. Grudinin, who treated the troop cut as a peacetime measure, foresaw only a "certain" increase in the size of the armed forces in case of war. (RED STAR, 16 February 1960)

In late 1960, however, the old maxim reappeared in the military literature. In a new war, General Krasilnikov wrote in RED STAR in November of that year, "mass, multi-million strong armies will participate."

In early 1961, there were stirrings among the military about the practicability of large-scale mobilization in wartime. A military economist seemed to question the wisdom of those who believed that massive military mobilization could be realized after the shooting had started. He wrote:

> The constant increase of military action at the rear of warring countries causes great losses among the civil population and cuts down on the number of reserves which can be mobilized. An increase in the strength of the armed forces of the warring coalitions is possible only under conditions of a great increase in the number of countries actively participating in the armed conflict. (V. Uzenyev, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 5, March 1961)

By April 1961, it had become clear that the question of the need for large armies in wartime (at least) was resolved for Soviet military doctrine. RED STAR of 5 April 1961 carried what appeared to be a definitive article on the subject, and the military literature has since not questioned the "mass, miltimillion armies" concept. The doctrine (adopted in early 1960) that makes a country's military potential dependent primarily on firepower rather than numbers of troops has been retained at the same time, however.

4. The Scope of War

Another basic tenet of military doctrine is that future war will be global in scale and involve large coalitions of states in armed combat against one another. "A considerably greater number" of countries are expected to be drawn into a new war than took part in the last. (Lt. Gen. Krasilnikov, RED STAR, 18 November 1960) Europe, America and "other continents" will become "theaters of war."*

Military opinion envisages the conduct of theater warfare throughout the course of a future war--however long or short it may be. Theorists picture the war as starting with a strategic attack by "nuclear-tipped rockets, aviation, or combined strikes by those and other means." At the same time, they say, "several fronts would spring up in different theaters of military operations" in which the other types of service would go into action. (Col. P. Sidorov, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 12, June 1961)

Taking a page from Khrushchev's book, they say that there will be literally "no borderline between the front and the rear area; the territory of each state that is involved in the war will become a theater of military operations." (Col. A.M. Yevlev, RED STAR, 5 April 1961) With some exceptions,** they add that the war will be waged on land, sea and in the air simultaneously and in many theaters of operation. (Major General (Res.) V.A. Semenov, "Short Outline of the Development of Soviet Operational Art," 1960)

*Col. R. Gridasov, RED STAR, 18 June 1960. Major General N. Talensky may have had Communist China in mind as well as the United States when he wrote, in an article in KOMMUNIST of May 1960, that there cannot be a "third and winning party" in a future war.

**The authors of the 1960 textbook "On Soviet Military Science" were taken to task by Col. General N. Lomov (RED STAR, 10 May 1961) for "incorrectly" implying that in a (hypothetical) short war, there would be no land, sea, and air battles, that the war would simply consist of a missile exchange.

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5. Decisive Character of War

Military doctrine also teaches that the warring sides will strive for total victory in war. Discussions of future war often mention the "decisive" political and military aims or goals to be pursued, and emphasize the severe consequences that will befall the warring parties--though not in equal measure. A future war, according to Marshal Malinovsky, will be,

> with respect to its political meaning, a decisive armed clash of the two opposing social systems. It should be quite clear to us that the sharp class nature of such a war will predetermine the extreme decisiveness of the political and military goals of the combatant sides....The employment of means of mass destruction and annihilation will impart to war an unprecedentedly destructive nature. (PRAVDA 14 September 1961.)

Discussion of the consequences of war generally appear in political contexts and cannot readily be evaluated for the meaning it might have for serious Soviet military thinking. It is noteworthy, however, that no Soviet source has indicated that the prospect of war is agreeable to Soviet military leaders; nor has the tenor of military literature as a whole borne a highly optimistic outlook with respect to the outcome of a future general war for the USSR. Military leaders, on the contrary, tend to paint a gloomy picture; in keeping with the mainstream of propaganda, they predict that a nuclear war would entail great disasters for all participants, indeed for all mankind. Thus, Marshal Malinovsky wrote in PRAVDA on 24 January 1962, a future war would do "irreparable damage to all countries." Spokesmen frequently assert that the USSR would vanquish the imperialists and capitalism would meet its demise in the event of war; but only infrequently do they speak in terms of a clear-cut military victory. They never directly admit the possibility of defeat of the USSR

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in war, although several public statements carried in the mass propaganda media during the past year have come close to such an admission.* It should be noted however, that the Soviet losses that have been explicitly conceded refer to a war initiated by the West. The Soviet leaders' estimate of the losses that the West might be able to inflict on the USSR after being subjected to a Soviet first strike, of course, has not been discussed.

The statements acknowledging that the USSR would suffer greatly in the event of war obviously are publicized for propaganda effect--to underline the sincerity of the Soviet government in its striving to avoid a new war and to stabilize mutual deterrence. The extent to which the statements reflect actual military estimates of anticipated levels of destruction cannot be determined. It can only be surmised from the general tenor of open military discourse--the fears of a Western first strike, the appreciation of nuclear weapons effects, etc.--taken together with the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the expressed fears on the consequences of war are quite genuine.

B. Alternative Strategies: Maximum or Limited Destruction

Soviet strategic objectives beyond the immediate strategic aims of the war are difficult to distinguish with

*Thus Malinovsky, in his 22nd Congress speech last October, expressed agreement with Kennedy's statement (as did Khrushchev in the previous month) that the superpowers are "capable of destroying each other." Although the Defense Minister went on to make the customary boast that the USSR would destroy any aggressor in a new war, he did not assert that the USSR would survive it. The mass propaganda also came very close to admitting the possibility of a Soviet defeat in war when TASS, on 22 January 1962, quoted Togliatti as saying that "neither of the two sides can say that it has the slightest confidence that it will survive an armed conflict with its opponent." A PRAVDA version of the Togliatti speech in which that statement was made significantly omitted it, but carried another forceful statement of the same tenor: "War must be averted at any price."

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certainty. The "full defeat" of the enemy is desired, but the meaning of this term is not spelled out. It is not clear how close the Soviet forces must come to total annihilation of the enemy--his armed forces, his civilian population, and his overall war-making capacity--to accomplish the "full defeat" of the enemy.

The Soviet strategic attack effort, as explained in open sources, will be diffused. Groupings of enemy forces in theaters of military operations and important targets in the enemy's rear area will both be "primary objectives" of strategic strikes. The destruction of the enemy's forces in the field is seen as a major prerequisite for victory. At least in traditionalist quarters, emphasis has been placed on the complete smashing of the enemy's armed forces. (Marshal Grechko, PRAVDA, 9 May 1960) On the other hand, this principle no longer enjoys the overriding emphasis which was placed on it before the 1960 doctrinal revision. Once the guiding strategic concept, it must now, under "progressive" influence, share primary importance with rear area bombardment in official (public) doctrine.

The present emphasis on rear-area bombardment appears to be predicated on the assumptions (1) that at the very least, the destruction of rear area civilian-military targets would bring victory more quickly than if the full weight of the Soviet attack were directed against groupings of armed forces in the field; and (2) that under optimum conditions, heavy rear area attack might bring the swift capitulation of a number of countries, thereby precluding the need for major engagements with enemy armed forces in the field and the complete destruction of those forces.

With regard to the fight against enemy rear areas, open discourse unfolds a variety of strategic designs, interwoven with propagandistic aims. Which one or which combination of the following strategies plays a part in Soviet war planning cannot be determined from the open sources alone.

(1) Maximum retaliatory damage or "country-busting" (not a Soviet phrase) is one likely alternative suggested by the public Soviet statements.

a. In Western Europe, certain countries subjected to Soviet nuclear strikes may, because of their small

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size, be "knocked out of the war" with the first salvos. "Whole countries will be turned into lifeless deserts covered with ashes." (Malinovsky, 23 October 1961) These countries will be the ones which house U.S. or NATO strategic attack forces and thereby present a grave danger to the USSR.

b. Regarding the United States, the USSR will "wipe from the face of the earth any aggressor, wherever he may be" should he "try" to encroach upon the Soviet camp. (Marshal Malinovsky, PRAVDA, 23 February 1962) Up until late 1959, the propaganda pictured only the NATO allies as vulnerable to a Soviet attack on a "country-busting" scale. But in November 1959, and again in the following two months, Khrushchev by implication directed his "country-busting" threats against the United States as well.

(2) Limited destruction of different countries, on the other hand, can also be seen as a strategic objective underlying certain statements made over the past two years.

a. Western European allies of the United States may not be designated for complete destruction; indeed, the thorough destruction of the Western coalition may not be foreseen as a strategic aim of war. The brunt of the Soviet nuclear/missile attack might be directed against the U.S. land mass and its overseas bases, whereas less drastic means might be used to neutralize the European allies (should they survive the strikes against the American bases on their soil). This distinction appears to be made in the following statement: "We have at our disposal the necessary means of combat not only to deal a crushing blow against the territory of the United States, but also to render harmless the aggressor's allies and to crush the U.S. military bases scattered all over the world." (Khrushchev, PRAVDA, 8 August 1961.)

b. As for the United States, many threats of Soviet retaliatory blows bear the implication that this country will suffer more limited destruction than its smaller allies and overseas bases because of its great size and widely dispersed population and industry. It has never been said by Soviet spokesmen about the United States, as it has about Western Europe, for example, that a specified number of nuclear weapons would knock out this country. The distinction is apparent in the following statement by Army General Ivanov,

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made in a message to U.S. veterans over Radio Moscow last September:

> About ten Soviet nuclear bombs would be sufficient to wipe out countries like Britain, West Germany and France. The United States would not escape either.

The picture painted above of mixed objectives--if assumed to be a deliberate and coordinated one--probably is designed to keep the West off balance as to where to expect the main direction of Soviet strategic attack. On the other hand, if it is not the result of a coordinated effort, the picture could possibly reflect indecision or differences in view among the Soviet military planners themselves over basic objectives and capabilities required to attain them. Indeed, it is difficult to know whether Soviet strategic planning, as revealed in the open sources, is purposefully confusing--or merely confused.

It may shed some light on the problem to study the contradictory nature of the alternative strategies of maximum and limited destruction of enemy countries. First, if maximum destruction of NATO allies in Europe by a single nuclear salvo were planned (logic tells us, as it probably has Khrushchev), the war in Europe would be short; there would be no expectation of massive land engagements between Western and Soviet armies; and there would be no need to occupy enemy territory (which according to Malinovsky would be reduced to "lifeless deserts and heaps of rubble"). Soviet doctrine, stipulating that the immediate strategic aims of war can now be achieved in a very short time, is consonant with such a strategic outlook. But doctrine calling for a "mass, multi-million" army would appear to be anomalous for such a situation. Yet both points of doctrine are simultaneously espoused by the military leadership.

Soviet writers have offered justifications for a massive Soviet land army that tend, if somewhat weakly, to reconcile it with a "country-busting" strategy. The high attrition rate due to enemy nuclear strikes and the depth and breadth of operations (even if conducted with small units) are given as reasons for needing "great reserves of command personnel and enormous contingents of rank and file troops." (Lt. Gen. Krasilnikov, RED STAR, 18 November 1961)

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Also, the argument has been advanced that great numbers of troops may be needed for defensive operations on Soviet soil:

> In addition to the troops that will conduct the combat operations directly, a great number of troops will be needed for anti-aircraft, anti-atomic and anti-chemical defense, to guard the communications, to liquidate the consequences of the employment of means of mass destruction, to destroy airborne and naval landings, etc. (Col. A.M. Yevlev, RED STAR, 5 April 1961)

On the other hand, if only partial destruction of the NATO allies were planned, there would be clear justification for a powerful Soviet land army, and the belief that there would be intensive theater warfare on ground, sea and air. In this event, large groupings of NATO forces would be expected to survive the initial nuclear exchange and there would be important, inhabited territory to be seized and occupied by Soviet forces. Logic tells us, though it does not assure us, that the USSR would prefer to leave as much of Europe as possible intact in order to have benefits to reap in the event of victory.

Taking the problem of conflicting evidence of Soviet strategic objectives a step further in our discussion, we can draw some tentative conclusions about the strategic outlook of the Soviet military leadership.

In his policy statements, Marshal Malinovsky has acknowledged the possibility of a short initial period of war if not a short war as a whole; he has given strong hints of a "country-busting" policy with respect to Western Europe, if not to the United States as well ("we will wipe any agressor from the face of the earth"). At the same time, he has carved out an important role for the conventional arms of service in a future war, taking into account the possibility that war might last well beyond the initial nuclear exchange.

Clearly this is a markedly cautious if somewhat contradictory approach to the problem. The Defense Minister is preparing Soviet forces for a number of eventualities. He is seeking a flexibility that would have been denied the Soviet armed forces had Khrushchev's strategic blueprint of

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January 1960 been translated without modification into military policy. He would not gamble, as Khrushchev seemed willing to do, on relying almost completely on nuclear/missile weapons. In his view, nuclear/missile weapons might be sufficient to the task of deterring the enemy from going to war; but should war break out, other weapons and forces would be required to see it through to victory.

C. Strategic Planning for Theater Warfare

> Soviet strategy has not exaggerated the importance of the newest weapons. The mass application of atomic weapons does not at all eliminate waging future war in the form of land, sea and air operations. Without these forms of armed forces, and without their correct inter-coordination, it is impossible to wage war successfully. The construction of the Soviet armed forces as well as their operational-tactical training is being conducted in accordance with this precept." (Maj.Gen. V.A. Semenov, "Short Outline of the Development of Soviet Operational Art," 1960)

Such is the credo of Soviet military science, the keystone of doctrine for theater warfare.

The inter-coordination of nuclear/rocket and conventional forces is central to this credo. The theater warfare missions assigned to the nuclear/rocket forces of the strategic command and to the other types of forces in the USSR are at once different and complementary. In the Soviet view, the nuclear salvos on a strategic and tactical scale serve as an entree for follow-up operations by other types of forces. Through its nuclear/rockets, according to a prominent progressive view "the strategic command influences the subsequent operations of groups of armed forces, predetermining their success as a whole." On a tactical scale, nuclear/rocket strikes solve the main tasks and the operations of other types of forces realize and improve on what was accomplished by the nuclear/missile attacks. (Col. S. Kozlov, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 11, June 1961)

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1. Ground Warfare

Soviet military leaders foresee an essential if secondary role for Soviet ground troops in a future war. "It is only with the help of the ground troops," they say "that the successes gained with the new means of warfare can be secured and expanded." (Marshal Yeremenko, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 11, November 1960) Until January 1960, the ground troops played the leading role in Soviet strategic planning and were regarded as the "main type" of armed forces. Now, however, the Strategic Rocket Forces, as the basic force for the employment of nuclear weapons, are officially regarded as the "main type" of service. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, some of the more conservative military thinkers envision the ground troops as playing even the principal role in "secondary" theaters of operations.

According to authoritative Soviet statements, the ground troops have themselves been transformed into a nuclear/rocket force. Rocket units of "operational-tactical designation," with ranges up to "many hundred kilometers," have supplanted the artillery as the "main fire striking force" of the ground troops. In an article in RED STAR of 18 November 1961, Chief Marshal of Artillery Varentsov presented a list--"by no means complete"--of the tasks of operational-tactical rocket units:

> Dealing blows to targets situated in close proximity to our tanks and infantry, destroying the most important groupings of enemy means of nuclear attack, major control points of operational significance, important communication centers, and airfields of atom-carrying aircraft that are located in the deep operational rear.

At the same time, military doctrine has stressed the limitations of even the tactical nuclear/rocket weapons, warning that they alone cannot bring victory in combat. "It is not profitable to use atomic weapons against targets which are very widely deployed and dispersed," said a military lecturer. "Some targets cannot be destroyed by nuclear weapons when one's forces are in close proximity to those of the enemy. Moreover, as a result of highly developed engineer fortifications (inzhinernoe oborudovanie mestnosti) much of

the firepower of the enemy can remain intact in a region subjected to an atomic blow." (Lt. Col. Abramov in a talk over RADIO VOLGA to Soviet forces in Germany)

Reasoning thus, the military leadership continues to equip the ground troops with conventional types of weapons. Marshal Malinovsky made a point of this in his speech before the 22nd CPSU Congress last October:

> We are not relaxing attention to the conventional types of weapons, in particular to artillery. Our motorized rifle division is considerably smaller in number of personnel than it was at the end of the last war, but its firepower--exclusive of rocket weapons--has increased over fourfold. As regards tanks, there are more of them in our modern motorized rifle and tank divisions than in the mechanized and tank corps of the Great Fatherland War, and in the corresponding divisions of any NATO country. /In addition,/ much attention is being paid to the airborne troops and military aviation transport.

Doctrine, it would seem, assigns the ground troops the task of destroying enemy troop concentrations not taken out by strategic missile strikes. But it is not clear whether the doctrine envisions massive and extended land campaigns or only smaller, "mopping-up" operations for the combined ground and supporting air teams. Estimates of the strength of enemy troop formations that might survive the blows of the strategic rocket forces are not given. A number of writers appear to be open-minded on this question, allowing for operations of both large, head-on engagements and small detachments.

Seizing the enemy's territory is implicit in the mission of the ground troops of following-up strategic strikes and consolidating victories, but is seldom mentioned. The subject was broached, however, in a 1960 textbook on military science, which spoke of capturing the "economic material bases" of the enemy, and included among the goals of a military campaign in future war the gaining of effective control over the enemy's territory. (Maj. Gen. M. V. Smirnov, et al., "On Soviet Military Science.")

Khrushchev in January 1960 had publicly disavowed the idea of occupation of an opponent's territory, breaking with the military doctrine which stipulated that "despite new weapons, troops occupying the opponent's territory would determine the outcome of war." (SOVIET FLEET, 5 January 1957) His motivation in doing so may not have been entirely political: he may not have been able to reconcile territorial occupation with his strategy of "country-busting." In his January 1960 speech he justified the Soviet troop cut not only on the grounds that firepower rather than numbers of troops was the chief indicator of a country's military potential, but also on the grounds that the Soviet strategy was to develop a force capable only of destroying an enemy, not of occupying his territory. Only a country bent on aggression, desiring to conquer another people, he said, requires a large army.

2. Naval Warfare

The importance of the Soviet naval arm in a future war against the United States has recently been underscored in Soviet statements. As depicted in Soviet military discourse, the war will be carried to the United States via nuclear strikes from rockets, submarines and possibly manned aircraft. No mention is made of the possibility of conducting ground warfare in this country. The strategy that is discussed for the second stage of war against the United States is to inhibit forces and material based there from crossing the ocean. Khrushchev made a point of this defensive strategy in his address to the 22nd CPSU Congress last October. He stated that an enemy attacking the USSR--namely the United States--must achieve supremacy of the seas in order to be successful. But this requirement could not be met by the United States, said Khrushchev, owing to the enormous capability of the Soviet submarine fleet to interdict foreign shipping and to deny command of the seas to the enemy. In stressing this point, he repeated the claim first made a week earlier in an IZVESTIA article on Soviet atomic submarines

that the Soviet underwater fleet is equipped with "target-seeking" rockets for use against moving targets.*

Soviet military writers have dealt with the question of dominance of the seas in the past but have not in recent years posed it as a requirement for victory over the USSR. They have always regarded America's geographical separation from its allies as a serious liability, however. (Marshal Vasilevsky, for example, in an article in RED STAR on 14 August 1957 stressed the Soviet advantage of not having the American problem of vital communication lines over the sea with its allies.) And they have consequently regarded the increased vulnerability of surface vessels, owing to modern weapons developments, as a tremendous advantage to the USSR.

Despite Khrushchev's indiscriminate disparagement of surface ships in the past, Soviet naval leaders speak of important and varied roles for surface vessels of different classes as well as submarines in a future war. The atom-powered submarine equipped with nuclear rocket weapons is now regarded as the "backbone" of the Soviet navy, and the submarine arm is portrayed as its main striking force. But voices are heard cautioning against placing excessive emphasis on the submarine at the expense of other naval weapon systems. According to Rear Admiral V. Prokofiev:

> Soviet naval thought opposes the onesided exaggeration to an extreme of any particular arm /of the navy/. Naval combat operations will develop over enormous ocean and coastal areas and will require the

*Soviet submarine armament is said to include long-range ballistic rockets with nuclear warheads, self-homing rockets (winged rockets) for firing at various naval targets, and an assortment of torpedoes--magnetic, self-homing, and others--for attacking surface ships and submarines. An atomic submarine with its rockets can destroy "a large naval base of the enemy, a large industrial center, or a formation of aircraft carriers." (IZVESTIA, 10 October 1961)

cooperation of all forces as well as comprehensive combat support for the main striking forces--the submarines. Surface ships in particular will have to solve a large number of tasks, which in contemporary warfare conditions have become exceptionally complex. (RED STAR, 13 January 1962)

The general missions of the Soviet navy, equipped with rocket cruisers, atomic and conventional submarines, and cutters armed with rockets, have been cited by a number of different Soviet sources. These are

(a) to conduct battles against a strong naval enemy, destroying its striking power;

(b) to break ocean and sea lines of communications;

(c) to destroy ports, naval bases, and other installations on the shore;

(d) to influence the achievement of the general aims of the armed conflict; and

(e) together with other arms, to defend the shore from enemy invasion from the sea and from strikes from the direction of the sea.

Concern over the U.S. Polaris submarine has for a long time been registered in Soviet military discourse. (Malinovsky boasted that the Polaris submarines will not escape destruction, in an Army-Navy Day article in PRAVDA of 23 February 1962). Against these and other NATO submarines, the Soviets will deploy their naval air arm and killer submarines. Thus rocket-carrying naval aircraft, which were demonstrated for the first time at Tushino in July 1961 are said to be capable of detecting at great distance and destroying enemy ships of all types, "both on the surface and submerged." (Marshal Vershinin, RED STAR, 16 September 1961) Another source has said that, in a future war, underwater combat will be one of the basic methods of defending sea borders against the approach of enemy submarines: "The new power and the new weapons open for the /Soviet/ atomic submarines great opportunities for the struggle against the enemy submarines." (IZVESTIA, 10 October 1961)

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3. Aviation and Air Defense

The Soviet air forces will also be assigned varied and important support missions in a future war. Air force leaders have consistently declared that manned aviation will play an important role irrespective of developments in rocket technology, even when Khrushchev and certain military leaders voiced contrary views. Now there appears to be a concensus among the party and military leaders on the need to develop manned aviation for offensive strategic and tactical missions as well as defensive missions. The change in Khrushchev's view is striking:

"The military air force and /surface/ navy have lost their previous importance.... Almost the entire military air force is being replaced by rocket equipment. We have already sharply cut and it seems will continue to cut sharply and even discontinue, the manufacture of bombers and other obsolete equipment." (14 January 1960 speech.)

"In equipping the armed forces with rockets and an atomic submarine fleet we do not discount the air force but continue to develop and improve it." (Speech delivered at the 22nd CPSU Congress, October 1961)

The new optimistic view of the usefulness of bomber aviation in a future war seems to spring mainly from the new possibilities given it by rocket armament. Soviet officers describe air-to-ground rockets, which they now claim for the USSR air forces, as "bomber aircraft weapons" which permit the bombers not only to avoid entering the anti-air defense zone of the target but "to avoid approaching it." And they ascribe to such rocket-equipped bombers a "considerably lowered vulnerability." (Col. Gen. A.N. Ponomarev, RED STAR, 18 November 1961)

Bomber aviation is apparently slated for a supplementary or support role in the fulfillment of strategic as well as sub-strategic missions in a future war. According to Marshal Malinovsky, the Soviet air force is capable of delivering nuclear strikes against an aggressor "jointly with the strategic rocket troops." (Speech of 23 October 1961, at the 22nd CPSU Congress) This capability, he says, derives

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from the "new" jet aircraft, including "intercontinental supersonic bombers," which carry rockets capable of destroying enemy installations "many hundreds of kilometers from the spot where the rocket is launched." (PRAVDA, 23 February 1962)

As for air defense, other elements of the air forces, notably, fighter aviation, "working in cooperation with the anti-aircraft defense forces of the country," will strive to repulse air attacks. (Malinovsky, 23 October 1961 speech) Military doctrine provides that in a future war, "the crushing of the nuclear-rocket and rocket-carrying forces and the nuclear air force of the enemy will become one of the main /strategic/ tasks." (Lt. Gen. Krasilnikov, RED STAR, 18 November 1960) Accordingly, the air defense forces must give timely warning of the threat of a nuclear attack and detect and destroy approaching enemy forces before the deadly payloads reach their targets. There is no disputing these basic imperatives in the military literature.

The time factor is repeatedly underscored as being vital to the success of the operation. Inasmuch as the outcome of battle will be decided in "not only minutes but even fractions of seconds," the enemy must be "wiped out on the first attack or the first launching of a rocket." (Marshal Biryuzov, RED STAR, 23 September 1961) Air force commanders are admonished that to permit even one target to reach the objective can have "very unfortunate consequences," and that the NATO forces have powerful means of long-range attack and will use radar interference on a "wide scale" to prevent counteractions by Soviet forces. (Marshal Savitsky, RED STAR, 14 November 1961)

Now, the Soviets say, the anti-aircraft defense of the country is based primarily on the anti-aircraft rocket troops. But they already look forward to the time when a substantial antimissile force will also protect the USSR. In evident anticipation of this capability, Marshal Malinovsky --having previously announced that the USSR had solved the problem of destroying missiles in flight--now claims that the Soviet air defense forces "possess equipment and weapons capable of destroying enemy air and space methods of attack at great heights and distances." (PRAVDA, 23 February 1962)

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The projected role of a missile defense system for the USSR is worth mentioning. For advanced weapons technology now has a coveted place in Soviet military thinking on the waging of a future war as well as on the problem of deterring it. Frequently in the military literature--as well as in Khrushchev's speeches--attention is drawn to the need for the USSR to have a weapons superiority over the probable enemy. The concept of superiority, in so far as it is revealed in the literature, is derived from an assessment of qualitative criteria as well as numerical comparisons. They say that "if one side has a more effective weapon, it is possible for that side (all other things being equal) to hold the upperhand over the enemy which possesses inferior weapons." (V. Uzenyev, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 6, March 1961) Reasoning thus, they emphasize scientific and technological capabilities as such, and are very much concerned with gaining lead time over the United States in the development of weapons and countermeasures. "The Soviet Government is not limiting itself to those military means which the adversary already has," said a USSR Defense Ministry book, "for undoubtedly this would be insufficient. Any preempting of the adversary's potential in the creation of the newest means of combat not only gives undoubted superiority in case of war, but also makes it difficult for the aggressive imperialist forces to unleash wars." (E. I. Rybkin, "War and Politics") And they warn, furthermore, that "slowing down in any of the links of the complex system of defense or in the construction on a broad scale of contemporary technology, can lead to the most difficult consequences for armies and countries." (General V. Kurasov, MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. 3, March 1961) If we may hazard a conclusion from this brief discussion of the concept of military superiority, it is that the Soviet Union is not necessarily committed to maintaining a substantial lead in the quantities of modern weapons: it may rely to a considerable degree on technological (qualitative) advances in the development of weapons for future war.

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IV. APPENDIX: THE STATUS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II

The search for a dynamic military doctrine which will facilitate accurate prognostications for the future war is having a salutary effect on Soviet military historiography. The trend toward greater objectivity is becoming more pronounced as more and more participants in World War II are being encouraged to write memoires and tracts in a forthright and objective manner. Soviet military leaders who put much store by past experience insist that the objective truth must be found and stated in the writing of military history in order that the proper lessons can be learned and a viable doctrine prepared for the contingency of a future war. Whether truths will be stated even if politically inconvenient, however, remains to be seen.

In the process of rewriting military history, one of the central issues debated has been the question of the status of Soviet military doctrine on the eve of World War II. Although a contentious question, it served the purposes of the various debaters who were intent on impressing others with the importance of having a fully elaborated, up-to-date theory of future war and the inevitable penalty to be paid in the absence of such a theory. Because of the relevance of this question to our study, and because of the insights the discussion affords us into the process of reassessing established doctrines in the USSR, we shall by way of a postscript outline the principal arguments on the status of pre-war military doctrine that were published between 1959 and 1961.

* * * * * * * *

In October 1959, prior to the publication of the latest official multi-volume history of World War II, Maj. Gen. I. Rukhle set off a sharply-worded debate in the pages of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, with a free-wheeling criticism of both the pre-war military doctrine and the specific contributions of certain Soviet military theoreticians. Most of the participants in the discussion in the JOURNAL materials were inclined to support Rukhle's view--which eventually became the official view--but there were some notable departures.

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The following views on the subject are presented in chronological order to give the flavor of the debate as it unfolded on the pages of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL.

In December 1959, Rukhle's position was debated in the General Staff military section, and an account of the debate was carried in the April 1960 issue of the journal. A Col. Nazarov recalled that pre-war military doctrine had considered the possibility of surprise attack--but had not drawn the necessary conclusions:

> ...The possibility of starting a war with a surprise attack and striving to deliver the first powerful blow was examined in the theory of military art between the first and second world wars. However, neither ours, nor foreign military theory, foresaw all the consequences of a surprise blow, and neither worked out measures for its prevention.

Col. Verzkhovsky, in the same discussion, was fully sympathetic with Rukhle's position:

> Before World War II, this problem /the initial period of the war/ was not worked out in sufficient degree. Perhaps this played a certain rôle in our failures in the first days of the war.

Lt. Gen. Skorobogatkin, on the other hand, attacked Rukhle for berating pre-war military doctrine. The same issue of the JOURNAL reported him as saying at the meeting:

> I cannot agree with Rukhle's assertion on the backwardness of Soviet military science before World War II. Soviet military science worked out, earlier than the German, not only the theory of battles and operations in depth, but also organization of troops, as well as the practical decisions of this theory. We had the first mechanized corps, we earliest of all began to apply air strikes and to introduce the use of tanks in large formations (soedinenia). All these problems were already worked out by our military science by

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1937. In the Red Army large scale maneuvers were conducted with the participation of mechanized corps. But later, the mechanized corps, in spite of the theory, were disassembled. During the war we could not for a series of reasons realize our theory in the first period; later, however, it justified itself.

Rukhle's position won out, for the time being, and found its expression in Volume I of "The History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45." (Signed to the press 28 May 1960). According to that authorative source, Soviet military doctrine was inadequately developed to meet the situation encountered in the early part of the war. The following excerpts represent the gist of the official position on the pre-war doctrine:

> Soviet strategy /on the eve of the war/ recognized the defense as a necessary form of armed struggle but subordinated its role to the offensive. As regards the question of defense, our theory was not fully worked out. It considered defense as possible and necessary in separate directions, but not on the whole strategic front. In principle, strategy considered a forced withdrawal possible, but only on separate sectors of the front and as a temporary phenomenon connected with the preparation of an offensive. The question of withdrawal of large forces from the threat of an encirclement had not been worked out.
>
> The question of the counteroffensive as a particular kind of strategic offensive before the great patriotic war was not posed despite the rich experience of the counteroffensive in the civil war of 1918-20.
>
> A major shortcoming in the training of the high command cadres of the Red army on the eve of the war was the absence of a manual on attack.

> The whole organization of the defense of the state border proceeded from the fact that a sudden attack by the enemy was excluded...

The issue was not yet resolved, however. In the September 1960 issue of the JOURNAL--several months after the publication of the official history of the war--Maj. Gen. Mernov offered a dissenting view. Like General Skorobogatkin, he defended the stature of the pre-war doctrine:

> We consider that Soviet military theoreticians studied the new character of armed forces...and had provided for the strategic deployment of armed forces in the event of enemy surprise attack as well as in the case of a declared war. For this purpose it was recommended that there be an army of defense in constant military preparedness as a first strategic echelon. These views were based on a correct understanding at that time of the nature of future wars as wars of long duration involving multi-million mass armies, with the deployment of subsequent strategic echelons.

The pendulum swung the other way in the following spring, however, when Lt. Gen. Kolchigin--in the April 1961 issue of the JOURNAL--rapped the knuckles of Mernov for being an apologist for the pre-war military theorists:

> ...Maj. Gen. Mernov in his article tries to deny the mistakes committed in the pre-war period by certain of our military theoreticians (Melikov, Eideman, Tsiffer) in questions of the initial period of war, in particular in respect to the organization of defense.. These theoreticians, as Rukhle correctly observed, "mistakenly thought that the initial period of the war would involve operations of small armies defending 'the right to be deployed.'" (pravo razvernut'sia) They did not foresee the possibility of the application by the enemy

> of secret methods of mobilization and deployment of armed forces with the objective of a surprise attack at once by the main forces and therefore considered that the initial period would be characterized by operations of small armies under defense which would be effected by the strategic deployment and actions of the main mass of armed forces. Not denying this position, General V. Mernov writes: "Maintenance in constant readiness of a strong army of defense along the border would have facilitated the transition of the army of peacetime onto a war footing under any circumstances." In our view, this is a mistaken point, since it was made without account of the situation of 1941,.... Despite the opinion of General Mernov, we also consider that the prewar theoreticians insufficiently studied the new character of armed forces and in particular, the rapid and deep invasion by enemy armies.

Major Gen. Cherednichenko came to Rukhle's and Kolchigin's support in the same issue of the JOURNAL, once again underscoring the shortcomings of the pre-war doctrine and the mistakes of the strategists in the first days of the war:

> Rukhle in his article, in our opinion, has correctly observed the mistakes of military theoreticians in the prewar years, including V. Melikov and R. Eideman, on questions of the initial period of war....Soviet armed forces by the beginning of the war turned out not to have been (deployed) in an appropriate strategic and operational way, battle-ready, or prepared to rebuff a surprise attack by the ground and aviation forces of fascist Germany. All this had serious consequences on the course of the initial period of war....Events at the beginning of the war would have taken a different character if our armed forces had in good time been battle-ready and properly deployed; if aviation and artillery had immediately directed counter-strikes against the advance groups

> of the fascist troops, their artillery and aviation; and if fronts and armies had at once developed active and organized combat operations to frustrate the aggressor's attack. There were possibilities for this, but they were not utilized.
>
> Our army, having suffered serious losses at the start of the war, needed to retreat deep into the country. Such operations came as a surprise to the operational and strategic leadership as well as to the troops. Great flexibility, a rapid evaluation of the complex situation, the posing of correct tasks to the fronts, aviation and fleets and the organization for fulfilling these tasks were required, under the new conditions, of the strategic and operational leadership. However, in the first days of the war, because of incorrect evaluation of the situation, the Soviet forces were given unfulfillable tasks, and their position was further aggravated and made more difficult.

Finally, Marshal Zakharov, in an article concluding the debate in the July 1961 issue of the JOURNAL, also reinforced the official position in a brief but sharp criticism of the pre-war doctrine:

> It must be said that on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, despite the fact that the aggressors had already had experience in conducting surprise attacks in the West, little attention was paid to the conduct of beginning operations in our military theory. An especially big omission from theory and practice as well,...was such an important question as conducting operations under conditions in which the enemy takes the initiative from the outset of the war; /In short/ measures for resisting a surprise attack were not foreseen. Therefore, since the situation at the start of the war was unforeseen by our side, the Soviet high command had to take hasty, partially improvised decisions, not responding quickly to the changing situation.



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

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

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SECRET

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE "ANTI-PARTY GROUP" (1953-1957)

This is a working paper, a reconstruction of the challenge to Khrushchev by the "anti-party group" led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich.

This paper represents one of the two principal types of papers which appear in the CAESAR, POLO and ESAU series. One type, which now comprises the bulk of our papers, deals with important current intelligence problems such as the present state of the Sino-Soviet dispute, or of the Chinese Communist leadership, or of Soviet military thinking--the subjects of three of our five papers thus far in 1962. The other type, represented by this paper, offers a reconstruction of an important period in Communist history when enough information has come to hand to provide a good account. We believe that this effort to get history into place is also of value to the analysis of current problems.

This paper was written by Avis Bohlen of the Soviet Internal Affairs Branch of General Division of the Sino-Soviet Bloc Area of OCI. We would welcome comment on the paper, addressed to Miss Bohlen at Ext. 7415 or to the co-ordinator of the Sino-Soviet Studies Group

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Very shortly after the defeat of the anti-party group in June 1957, enough became known about their attempt to oust Khrushchev to put together a fairly coherent picture of events. Within a matter of weeks, it was fairly clear that Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich had forced a showdown in the presidium, and that Khrushchev at one point had found himself in a minority but had nonetheless managed to defeat his opponents by summoning the central committee for a plenum. Much new information has come to hand since then--most of it consisting of details which clarify the incomplete version available in 1957.

The reconstruction of events offered in this paper differs from previous versions in that the addition of this new material has filled in many important gaps; but the basic outline remains the same. A summary, which by definition omits details, would reflect the similarities rather than the differences. For this reason, we make no further summary of the June 1957 events. We offer the paper to those who are interested in as nearly complete an account of the June 1957 events as we are now able to construct.

SECRET

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE "ANTI-PARTY GROUP" (1953-1957)

The attempted coup against Khrushchev in June 1957 had its antecedents in the struggle for power which had been taking place in the presidium since Stalin's death in 1953. All the four principals in the June events--Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Khrushchev--were deeply involved in this struggle and, at first, independently of one another; but as Khrushchev continued to rise at the expense of the other three, the lines of the conflict came to be drawn between the first secretary, on the one hand, and Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich on the other.

Over the past four years, much new data on the June 1957 attempt of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich to oust Khrushchev has come to light, and it is now possible to offer a detailed account of what happened. It should be recognized, however, that even this version cannot be considered definitive. The information provided by official Soviet sources is filled with distortions and omissions, and gives only one point of view: that of the victor, who is always right and becomes more so as time goes on. Although Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich are usually portrayed as greater villains than their five allies, the difference in treatment is quantitative rather than qualitative. This has tended to obscure the divergencies between the eight members of the group which unquestionably existed, and to oversimplify the substantive problems in dispute in 1957 and before. In addition, the issue of the anti-party group, artifically kept alive since 1957, has often been used for purposes which have no relevance to the June 1957 events per se. At the 22nd Party Congress, Khrushchev used the anti-party group to attack Stalin on the one hand and the Albanians and Chinese on the other.

Official sources have been supplemented by the many rumors to which any political event in the Soviet Union gives rise. The only criterion for judging the reliability of these reports, which are often vague and contradictory, is the extent to which they conform to verifiable facts. Such corroboration is available for most of the reports used here. However, the account of the June presidium meeting is primarily based on unofficial sources, and hence is more open to question than the rest of the paper.

Malenkov and the New Course

There were indications of a rivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev at least as far back as 1949 when Stalin brought Khrushchev from the Ukraine to reorganize the Moscow party organization and to join the central committee secretariat. The rivalry was intensified after Stalin's death in March 1953 when political maneuvering within the presidium began in earnest and Malenkov was forced by his colleagues to share the powers bequeathed him by Stalin. Malenkov took over the premiership, leaving Khrushchev the most powerful member of the secretariat. During the next two years, the first secretary moved constantly to the front at the expense of Malenkov. He built up his strength in the party apparatus, garnered more and more public attention for himself, became the major spokesman on agriculture and set up the virgin lands program, the initial success of which strengthened his hand politically. As Khrushchev's prestige mounted, Malenkov's correspondingly seemed to decline. Undoubtedly, as Stalin's heir, Malenkov was regarded by many of his colleagues as the main political threat, and their fear of his ambitions may have indirectly helped Khrushchev, who was in any case the more skillful politician. Aimed primarily at producing more consumer goods, Malenkov's New Course became one of the focal points in the general debate on the allocation of economic resources. In addition, it encountered serious economic difficulties and was held responsible by many for the disarray in the industrial sphere. Malenkov's consumer goods program ran into conflict with Khrushchev's virgin land development over investment priorities and set up a competition for resources which did little to diminish the rivalry between the two men. Another area of disagreement appears to have been the issue of government-versus-party control.

In any event, Malenkov was no match for the first secretary, and in February 1955 Khrushchev forced him out of the premierhsip for the ostensible reason that Malenkov's consumer goods program had threatened the primacy of heavy industry. On this issue, Khrushchev probably had the support of Molotov and Kaganovich, as well as other members of the party presidium. At the same time, the policy debate provided Khrushchev with a useful weapon for removing his chief political rival, of which he took full advantage. Although the policy shift may in itself have called for a high-level scapegoat, the fact remains

that Malenkov, Khrushchev's chief opponent, was demoted, while Mikoyan, also an advocate of increased consumer goods, was not. And after 1955, Malenkov, who held the less influential position of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, clearly had lost most of the power he once had.

Molotov Versus Peaceful Coexistence

Since Stalin's death, Molotov had undoubtedly been uncomfortable with the forms and intent of the "peaceful coexistence" line which had dominated Soviet foreign policy. He was uneasy even over the relatively cautious démarches initiated by Malenkov, and, after the latter resigned in 1955, Molotov made a "tough" speech to the Supreme Soviet which seemed to presage a return to a harder line. However, when Khrushchev not only returned to but expanded the policy of peaceful coexistence, Molotov's reluctance to go along turned into stubborn opposition.

The particular issue which brought him into direct conflict with Khrushchev was the proposed reconciliation with Tito. Throughout the spring of 1955, he apparently kept up a stubborn resistance to this policy and even after the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to Belgrade in May and June 1955, he continued to regard Tito as a heretic and the concessions made to him a mistake. For his position, Molotov was censured by a plenum of the central committee in July 1955. With the possible exception of Voroshilov, he seems to have been alone in his defiance, for official accounts indicate that he got no support from either Kaganovich or Malenkov.

Thereafter, as Khrushchev assumed a firmer direction of foreign affairs, and as the policy of peaceful coexistence began to be applied more and more boldly, the disapproving Molotov was consistently pushed into the background. One reason for this was Molotov's obvious incompatibility--both by personal inclination and because of his close identification with Stalin's foreign policy--with the new Soviet image in foreign affairs. Moreover, the frequent clashes between Khrushchev and his foreign minister appear to have provoked a personal animosity between the two men which may also have been a factor in Molotov's loss of influence. Khrushchev at any rate

seemed to take great pleasure in reminding Molotov that his voice was no longer as powerful as it had once been, and frequently made fun of him in public.

In addition, Khrushchev's domestic policies undoubtedly caused Molotov much uneasiness, and he was no more receptive to the first secretary's virgin lands program than he had been to Malenkov's policy of increased investments for consumer goods. In general, he maintained a stubborn resistance to any major changes aimed at partially liberalizing the regime, and he dragged his feet whenever possible. His opposition to liberalization at home and peaceful coexistence abroad probably resulted not only from a conservative "Stalinist" mentality which saw in all change a form of revisionism, but also from apprehension that such measures as Khrushchev was implementing might lead to instability at home and to a serious weakening of the party's hegemony.

Molotov's continued intransigeance apparently convinced Khrushchev that his wings would have to be clipped further. In the summer of 1955, Kommunist carried a letter from Molotov "recanting" his statement that the USSR had not yet built socialism--a statement which other evidence suggests was not Molotov's belief, but a slip of the tongue. This artificially inflated issue was an obvious effort to add ideological deviation to the list of Molotov's sins and was a further step in the downgrading of the Old Bolshevik. At the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, both he and Malenkov were obliged to repudiate the policies they had earlier advocated, and Molotov heard his conduct of Soviet foreign policy described as "ossified." In June 1956, on the eve of Tito's return visit to Moscow, Molotov was replaced by Shepilov as foreign minister.

Decline of Kaganovich

The ouster and vilification of Kaganovich is especially ironic. There is much evidence that he was an early patron of Khrushchev and helped him on his way to the top. After Stalin's death Kaganovich became a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; his influence increased and, until the end of 1955, he apparently remained the regime's top industrial specialist. He

undoubtedly sided with Khrushchev on the issue of heavy versus light industry in December 1954, since, as a long-time advocate of rapid industrial growth, he must have regarded Malenkov's consumer goods concessions as recklessly unorthodox.

In May 1955, as part of the government reorganization which followed Malenkov's demotion from the premiership, Kaganovich was appointed chairman of a new State Committee on Labor and Wages, an important assignment. When Khrushchev and Bulganin went to the Geneva conference in July 1955, Kaganovich reportedly was left in charge on the home front.

However, Kaganovich, the embodiment of the militant Old Bolshevik, undoubtedly shared some of Molotov's difficulties in adapting to the new policies introduced after Stalin's death, and may have become increasingly disturbed over the Khrushchev experiments. His four public speeches after 1953 reveal a continuing orientation toward a Stalinist style of thought, a rather reluctant endorsement of the post-Stalin "new look," and a tendency to emphasize a tough foreign policy. The most remarkable in this regard was his 7 November speech in 1955, which stressed the continuing validity of classical Marxist-Leninist theory--a somewhat discordant note at a time when Kommunist and other theoretical journals were inveighing loudly against the "isolation of theory from life." In contrast to Molotov, who actively resisted, Kaganovich seems to have become increasingly less flexible as a result of his uneasiness and disorientation. He was later accused of having obstructed work in the presidium with his long confused speeches. He opposed the virgin lands program, and as chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wages reportedly accomplished nothing, his one goal being to dissolve the committee. This dogmatic inflexibility, which limited his usefulness in the Khrushchev era, probably explains why, towards the end of 1955, Kaganovich appeared to be undergoing gradual eclipse at the hands of younger economic administrators, particularly Pervukhin, with a corresponding decline of his influence in the presidium. In June 1956, Kaganovich was released from his position as chairman of the Committee on Labor and Wages, and in September was appointed Minister of the Building Materials Industry, a lower ranking post.

DeStalinization

Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 appears to have been the first major issue that found Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich in any way united against the first secretary. Shortly before the congress, Khrushchev reportedly told the presidium that he intended to make a speech in closed session denouncing Stalin. This bombshell produced a violent reaction from Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov, who, according to Khrushchev later, came out strongly against the exposure of the "cult of personality" and of the "violations of socialist legality." Khrushchev attributes their opposition to fear that their role in the purges would also be revealed; this was perhaps one factor, but it also applied to Khrushchev, and in any case the problem was undoubtedly more complicated than that. Stalin had undergone a gradual downgrading since his death, apparently by common consent; but a dramatic exposé such as that proposed by Khrushchev was a different matter and probably seemed, to those who opposed it, both unnecessary and unwise. They may have anticipated--unlike Khrushchev--that such an abrupt deStalinization might create more problems than it would solve. However, Khrushchev as usual steamrollered his opposition and threatened to make the speech to the entire congress. So Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov finally gave in and agreed to let Khrushchev take up "the question of the cult of the individual" in a closed session.

Closed session or no, the opponents of deStalinization were clearly unhappy about the whole matter. At the 20th Party Congress, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov were very reticent in commenting on the cult of personality, which Kaganovich described as "no easy question." As the policy of deStalinization began to be implemented, their uneasiness must have increased. Khrushchev has accused them of obstructing investigations into the purges and of opposing rehabilitation of purge victims. Ponomarev relates that Kaganovich and Molotov strongly resisted the idea of a new deStalinized party history, and Molotov continued to praise the old "short course" in the press.

Thus by the summer of 1956, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich all had good reason to be dissatisfied with Khrushchev's leadership. All three had suffered substantial loss of power and influence since Stalin's

death--a fact which Khrushchev did not let them forget. Perhaps even more important than their frustrated ambition, they had become increasingly concerned over Khrushchev's policies and style of leadership. At the same time, there was little unity among the three men, and over the past four years they had more often than not found themselves on opposite sides of the fence. As individuals with little in common, Khrushchev had reduced them at leisure. Although they did not achieve real unity until early 1957, the issue of deStalinization did bring them somewhat closer together and made possible a certain unity of action.

Khrushchev Suffers A Temporary Setback

During the fall of 1956, Khrushchev seemed to be somewhat on the defensive. He appeared to be modifying his positions somewhat, particularly in regard to Stalin, and his major preoccupation seemed to be maintaining the status quo rather than trying new or unorthodox solutions to current problems.

While Khrushchev himself probably recognized the need for adjustment to the problems arising from the deStalinization campaign and the crises in Poland and Hungary, his unwonted moderation may also have been the result of strong pressure from his opponents in the presidium. It seems likely that they took advantage of the difficulties caused by Khrushchev's deStalinization campaign to reassert their influence and to put the "collectivity" back in the "leadership."

In October 1956, Molotov and Kaganovich accompanied Mikoyan and Khrushchev to Warsaw for the talks with Gomulka; the following month, Molotov was appointed Minister of State Control. Although the Hungarian revolution was apparently handled primarily by Mikoyan, Suslov and Khrushchev, Malenkov accompanied the first secretary to a high-level meeting of satellite leaders in Budapest from 1 to 4 January. During this same period Khrushchev's position was reported to be shaky: in mid-November and again in December there were rumors that he would be replaced. These rumors subsided when the December plenum took place after a three-day postponement and no personnel changes were made. In early January there was a rumor circulating in Warsaw that he had retained his leadership by only a "slim majority" at the plenum.

Shortly thereafter, however, Khrushchev again emerged as the dominant figure on the Soviet scene, and Malenkov did not participate in the 10 January talks with Kadar in Moscow. Khrushchev's public appearances and the programs with which his name was associated began to multiply. By February the first secretary appeared to have fully regained his preeminent position, and he had no trouble pushing his economic reorganization plan through the central committee.

The December 1956 Plenum

The economic reorganization plan was one of the end results of a process set in motion by the December 1956 plenum, which met to discuss economic problems. There seems to have been general agreement at the plenum that the regime faced serious economic difficulties, but there apparently was disagreement as to whether the fault was in the goals of the draft Sixth Five-Year Plan, approved by the 20th Party Congress in February, or in the administration of the economy. The two were not mutually exclusive, but in the minds of the protagonists probably became nearly so.

The industrial administrators, critical of the very high goals and the pattern of investment allocations contained in the Sixth Five-Year Plan, wanted a more economically realistic plan and some relief from the tensions produced by high growth tempos.

Those opposing this view--mainly party functionaries and military men--were concerned lest the goal of "catching up with the West" in per capita output be relegated to the museum of Communist antiquities. In their view sufficient reserves existed in the Soviet economy to enable the plan to be met, and the real culprits were the industrial administrators whose departmental empire-building, featherbedding and red tape prevented full realization of the USSR's economic capabilities.

The conflict ended in a standoff, and the plenum apparently decided that both criticisms had merit. It decided, on the one hand, that the Five-Year Plan should be revised as proposed by the administrators, but reportedly it ordered also, in an unpublished decision, an immediate examination of the problems of interdepartmental barriers.

The party presidium members were probably as divided on these issues as was the plenum. One Soviet source has reported that Molotov defended the Five-Year Plan and that Khrushchev attacked industrial administrators for maintaining interdepartmental barriers. Malenkov probably sided with the industrial administrators, since he had long considered retrenchment and correction of disproportions in the economy a vital necessity. Saburov, more than likely, was unsympathetic to attacks on the plan, since he had helped develop it and had been responsible for presenting it to the 20th Party Congress. The plenum, reflecting on his performance as planning chief, replaced him with Pervukhin as chairman of the State Economic Commission for Short Term Planning of the National Economy.

Judging from subsequent events, it seems likely that Khrushchev argued against any substantial downward revision of the plan, that Saburov criticized "administrative deficiencies," and that Molotov and Kaganovich may have seen in the attack on interdepartmental barriers a dangerous move toward further decentralization. Malenkov, Pervukhin, and Shepilov may also have resisted any reorganization, although it is possible that they only opposed the plan in its final radical form.

The plenum, therefore, set in motion two apparently separate sets of activities. Pervukhin, aided by a team of top-level administrators, proceeded to create the annual plan for 1957, ostensibly in accordance with the plenum's directives. Another group, composed of all the members of the presidium, both full and candidate, tackled the problem of interdepartmental barriers.

February 1957 Events

On 5 February 1957, Pervukhin presented his 1957 annual plan to the Supreme Soviet, which dutifully adopted it after three days of "debate." Planned growth of industrial production was cut from the 10.8 percent achieved in 1956 to 7.1 percent, the lowest in any peacetime year since 1928. If the annual plan was any forecast of the changes to be made in the Sixth Five-Year Plan, scheduled for revision by midyear, then the victory of the managerial elite was complete. Pervukhin's group apparently went even further with economic retrenchment than the December party plenum had intended.

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Meanwhile the group working on the problem of administrative deficiencies had partially discarded the traditional Soviet method of merging ministries and had worked out a radical solution involving a sharp reduction in the central ministerial apparatus in Moscow and an expanded co-ordination of activities within regions. The new plan was designed in part to break up the ministerial empires, blast entrenched bureaucrats from their chairs, and distribute both men and administrative authority widely over the geographic face of the Soviet Union. It was also designed to "release" the economic reserves tied up by interdepartmental barriers, bureaucratic red tape, and other administrative deficiencies.

Although neither Molotov nor the economic administrators can have been very enthusiastic about this scheme, apparently neither he nor any of the others who subsequently opposed the plan expressed their disagreement while it was being drafted. The issue was brought up for final consideration at a presidium meeting which took place shortly before the central committee plenum on 13 and 14 February. The opponents of the reform again remained silent; however, at 3 a.m. on the eve of the plenum, as Furtseva later revealed, Molotov delivered a short note to his colleagues registering his opposition to the reorganization, on the grounds that the country was not yet ready for such a reform.

Khrushchev Regains the Initiative

The Supreme Soviet ended its work on 12 February and the central committee's two-day session began the next day. Although Khrushchev had remained very much in the background at the Supreme Soviet, the plenum which followed appears to have been completely dominated by him. The adoption of the reorganization scheme was a personal triumph for him. At the same time it marked a defeat for his political enemies and the destruction of the ministerial empire as a political base. In addition, Khrushchev was able to bring about the appointment of one of his supporters, Frol Kozlov, to the party presidium.

During the spring, Khrushchev initiated the practice of sending personally signed congratulatory telegrams to agricultural workers and officials and in March participated in the first of a series of much propagandized

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regional agricultural conferences. At the end of the month, his theses on the economic reorganization were published for discussion.

During the month of May, Khrushchev's publicized activities reached an all-time high. In the volume of personal publicity and in the number and diversity of policies associated with his personal sponsorship, he surpassed all the other members of the collective leadership put together. Early in the month he presented his theses to the Supreme Soviet, was named chairman of the commission elected to draft the law and again addressed the session after the law was passed.

At an agricultural conferences in Leningrad on 22 May, in a manner clearly revealing his continued dominance over agriculture, Khrushchev boasted that the USSR could overtake the United States in per capita output of meat and dairy products in the next few years. It was also at this conference that he discussed the possibility of discontinuing the compulsory deliveries from private plots, a subject which had not yet been fully decided in the presidium. In between these activities, he was interviewed by CBS on television and received a plaque from a group of Leningrad workers with a highly laudatory inscription. No Soviet leader had received similar approbation since Stalin's death.

Formation of the Anti-Party Group

Precisely at what moment Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich decided to join forces for an attack on Khrushchev can only be conjectured. However, the imminent economic reorganization, which would seriously weaken the political power of the managerial elite, their strongest element of support, must have made it clear that they would have to act soon or not at all. In addition to the threat to their position inherent in the reorganization itself, the adoption of the reform clearly reflected Khrushchev's renewed preeminence and his continued ability to impose his policies arbitrarily against the wishes of his colleagues. The combination of past grievances and this latest threat--the most serious to date--effectively overshadowed the differences between the three men and made united action at once possible and necessary. Hence it was probably in the spring of 1957 that Molotov,

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Malenkov and Kaganovich first made tentative plans to oust Khrushchev. Of the three, Malenkov was allegedly the practical organizer--which probably meant that he recruited supporters--while Molotov was the ideologist.

A few ominous indications that Khrushchev was planning to implicate the Molotov group in Stalin's excesses may well have given its members a feeling of desperation. Malenkov had reportedly received warnings that Khrushchev intended to accuse him of complicity in the Leningrad affair. At a presidium meeting which took place not long before the June plenum, the rehabilitation of Tukhachevsky and other military figures was discussed and unanimously approved. Khrushchev, as he told the 22nd Party Congress, then asked Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich whether they were sincere now, in voting for the rehabilitation, or then, when they had concurred in the execution order. Clearly this boded ill.

The Anti-Party Group Recruits Supporters

At the presidium meeting on 18 June, the original group of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich was supported by five other members of the presidium; at what point their support was obtained is unclear. Undoubtedly the industrial reorganization plan had also created great dissatisfaction among many important political figures in Moscow, including members of the central committee and presidium. Their bureaucratic empires were being dissolved and many of them were personally threatened with transfer to the hinterlands far from the comparative luxury of Moscow. To many, the radical degree of decentralization envisaged in Khrushchev's scheme must have seemed a dangerous move, possibly putting in jeopardy Moscow's control of industry and hence weakening the party. Khrushchev's claim that the USSR could overtake the U.S. in per capita production of meat and dairy products by 1960 saddled the Soviet economy with a strenuous agricultural program on top of the economic reorganization and threatened to further intensify disruption of the economy resulting from unrealistically high goals. Undoubtedly deStalinization and the autumn events in Poland and Hungary had already created some general apprehension.

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According to the official line, which must however be regarded with some caution, the anti-party group recruited supporters "with Jesuitical finesse" and launched its attack "trusting in contacts previously made." The group has frequently been accused of lacking a program; however, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to find a program or platform to which all eight men would agree. From the point of view of the three leaders, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, a tactical alliance was probably sufficient for their purposes and moreover much easier to achieve. It appears likely that by adopting a somewhat different approach to each member of the presidium, the anti-party group successfully translated a general uneasiness over Khrushchev's policies into political support for its move to oust the first secretary.

Many of the reports describing the June meeting indicate that the attack on Khrushchev at that moment took by surprise many of the presidium members who subsequently supported the opposition. This suggests that some, although generally aware that an attempt to remove Khrushchev was in the offing, may not have known that it would take place when it did. Others, while agreeing in principle to support the factionalists in opposing some of Khrushchev's policies, may have known nothing at all about the more ambitious plan to remove him from the leadership.

Bulganin, by his own confession, joined the anti-party group well in advance of the June presidium meeting and clearly participated in the plot to oust Khrushchev. His office became a meeting place for the conspirators. By virtue of his position as premier, he was made the nominal leader of the opposition. If his involvement is clear, his motives are less so. Bulganin had been the chief beneficiary of Khrushchev's rise to power. The first secretary's policies had apparently received his consistent support, although he may have come to share some of the general anxiety about Khrushchev's course. He did not speak up in favor of the economic reorganization at the February plenum, although he later contended that this measure also had his support. In addition, Ignatiev charged later that Bulganin was dissatisfied with his status in the party and had joined the factionalists out of ambition; it is just possible that he was tired of playing second fiddle to Khrushchev.

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Voroshilov, publicly identified at the 22nd Party Congress for the first time as a member of the anti-party group, was at that time linked with Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich in such a way as to imply that he had been one of the original conspirators. This is difficult to believe, if only because he was in the Far East from the middle of April to the end of May--probably the very time when the three leaders began to lay their plans. Moreover, by Khrushchev's account, Voroshilov's relationship with the other three was far from cordial. Voroshilov has himself admitted, however, that he supported the policies of the anti-party group. As an Old Bolshevik who had served for years under Stalin, he may well have shared some of the doubts of the "dogmatists" about the wisdom of Khrushchev's course; he had openly opposed the deStalinization. His fear of being implicated in the purges, as Khrushchev suggests, may also have been a factor. Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, by skillfully playing on his doubts and fears, may have found Voroshilov--already somewhat senile--readily susceptible to their forcefully presented arguments. At the 22nd Party Congress, Voroshilov denied the charges that he had been a conspirator or that he knew of their factional activities. While Voroshilov's memory may not be altogether reliable, it is entirely possible that he did not know of the plan to oust Khrushchev until the presidium meeting--at which point he wavered but finally gave his support, or that he was persuaded that policies could be changed only with the removal of Khrushchev. In any case, most reports indicate that he vacillated throughout. Although they undoubtedly knew that Voroshilov would be inclined to waver, the three ringleaders appear to have considered his support important; the prestige he enjoyed in the party would be a useful tool.

Shepilov's immediate expulsion from the presidium and central committee in 1957 suggested that he had been deeply implicated in the anti-party conspiracy. However, later accounts, coupled with the accusations of careerism and doubledealing thrown at him, indicate that he changed sides fairly late in the game and that his ingratitude came as an unpleasant surprise to Khrushchev. Long considered a protégé of the first secretary's, Shepilov had apparently given his firm support to Khrushchev's policies, both foreign and domestic. It is true that he was openly unenthusiastic about the economic

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reorganization and is known to have joined Molotov and Pervukhin in forming a triumvirate of opposition. However, it was apparently opportunism rather than ideology that determined his position: according to the official version, Shepilov switched loyalties when he decided that victory lay with the insurgents, who, as he thought, would be able to obtain a majority. On the basis of this calculation he gave the anti-party group his full and unequivocal support and stayed with them until the end. Because of his well known sympathies, the others had probably not attempted to recruit Shepilov, who moreover was only a candidate member of the presidium without a vote, but they undoubtedly would have welcomed his support. Shepilov was the only member of the party secretariat to join them, and had, moreover, extensive ties with the cultural intelligentsia.

The inclusion of Shepilov clearly illustrates the heterogeneous character of the anti-party group, since he had little in common with its other members. Shepilov was closely identified with Khrushchev's foreign policy, which cannot have endeared him to Molotov. His liberal tendencies, which earned him the name of "Dmitri progressivniy," and in particular his leniency towards writers, were clearly at odds with the more hard-line attitude of his fellow conspirators.

Judging from what appears to have been the line-up at the June presidium meeting, it seems a fair guess that the factionalists considered Pervukhin and Saburov to be potential supporters, somewhat in the same category as Voroshilov. Pervukhin had vehemently opposed the economic reorganization, which, among other things, eliminated his job. This, he later confessed, encouraged the opposition to count on his support. In addition, Pervukhin had clashed with Khrushchev on the issue of hydro- versus thermo-electric power stations. Saburov was probably counted as less certain than Pervukhin. Although formerly a Malenkov protégé, he had supported Khrushchev's policies over the past few years; on the other hand, he had recently been removed from his position as head of Gosplan. On the basis of later evidence, it seems likely that the anti-party group did not expect support from either Mikoyan or Suslov and almost certainly not from Kirichenko. Most of the candidate members of the presidium were Khrushchev appointees, but they had no vote. According

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to one report, Malenkov had hoped to obtain the support of Zhukov--a valuable ally, even though only a candidate member--but was unsuccessful.

The Anti-Party Group Plans Its Strategy

The anti-party group evidently intended to keep the attack against Khrushchev wholly within the confines of the presidium; to do this, it needed the support of a majority within that body. As it turned out, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich did have more adherents than Khrushchev, but this support, while probable, could not be considered altogether certain in advance. Even if the potential majority did materialize, the group could not be sure that its allies would not withdraw their support if pushed too far or if faced with determined opposition from a large body of Khrushchevites. The unstable coalition put together by the anti-party group would be a useful weapon against Khrushchev only if supplemented by skillful tactics. Timing would obviously be an important factor; the opposition presumably planned to move against Khrushchev at a moment when his allies, both real and potential, would be at a minimum, while the anti-party group would be at its strongest. The factionalists might also have reasoned that the weaker their opposition, the more strongly their potential allies would come out in their behalf. Clearly, 18 June was a propitious moment; on that date, many of Khrushchev's supporters would be away from Moscow. Suslov had been away on vacation since 19 May; Kirichenko would be at a plenum of the Ukrainian central committee; Saburov was scheduled to attend a CEMA meeting in Warsaw. Among the full members, that left only Khrushchev and Mikoyan to face five dissidents, in addition to Pervukhin, a potential ally. Of the candidate members, Kozlov would be in Leningrad, preparing for the celebration of the city's 250th Anniversary; Mukhitdinov also would probably be in his "constituency" of Uzbekistan; Shvernik was scheduled to attend celebrations in Ufa. The anti-party group may also have expected that Zhukov would be in Leningrad, where in fact he was until 17 June, playing host to General Gošnjak, the visiting Yugoslav Minister of Defense. Of Khrushchev's presumed supporters, this left only Furtseva and Brezhnev in Moscow. It is true that many of the leaders scheduled to be absent on 18 June were also due to return very shortly, but the anti-party group evidently expected Khrushchev to give in at once, thus

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presenting Khrushchev's adherents both in the presidium and in the central committee with a fait accompli and rendering them virtually helpless. (This is, in any case, the strategy officially attributed to the anti-party group.)

Bulganin and Khrushchev were in Finland on a state visit from 6-14 June, during which time the anti-party group, minus Bulganin, probably laid its final plans. When Bulganin and Khrushchev returned, they were met at the airport by Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan, Pervukhin and Saburov. At some point after Khrushchev's return (some reports say on the same day), Malenkov requested a presidium meeting to decide which members of the presidium would attend the celebrations in Leningrad on 22 June. Khrushchev reportedly questioned the need for such a meeting, since the arrangements had already been made, but finally agreed; and the presidium met on 18 June. The meeting probably did not begin until late, because during the day Khrushchev was interviewed by a Japanese editor; the presidium members known to be in Moscow (including Zhukov, by this time) received a delegation of Hungarian journalists; and Saburov left for Warsaw. Probably none of these developments would have taken place had the battle already begun.

Showdown in the Presidium

The fight apparently began at once, with Malenkov questioning Khrushchev's right to preside over the meeting, as Khrushchev had apparently been in the habit of doing by virtue of his position as first secretary. An acrimonious debate ensued. In the end a vote was reportedly taken which removed Khrushchev and placed Bulganin, who had abstained during the vote, in the chair. Continuing in the same vein, Malenkov, as principal spokesman for the insurgents, reportedly stated that Khrushchev had consistently violated the principles of collective leadership, and he demanded that the first secretary resign. Malenkov accused Khrushchev of having carried out many measures without the concurrence of the other leaders, particularly in agriculture--the most recent instance being his speech in May announcing the abolition of compulsory deliveries from private plots and the goal of overtaking the USA in per capita production of meat, milk, and butter by 1960.

This debate soon turned into a major policy battle, in the course of which most of Khrushchev's innovations since 1955 came under attack. The opposition appears to have concentrated its fire on the reorganization and Khrushchev's milk and meat goals, but the discussion seems to have eventually extended to the larger questions of resource allocation and investment priorities. Khrushchev's meat and milk goals were assailed as unrealistic and untimely; he was accused of taking "a purely practical approach," of "trying to put economics above policy," and Molotov is said to have called him a "demagogue without any ideological basis." His agricultural policies in general were denounced as a "rightist deviation" which threatened the "Leninist general line on the preferential development of heavy industry." His foreign aid program is also said to have been attacked as detrimental to the Soviet economy. The economic reorganization, it was charged, would lead to a serious dilution of political power and control--a process which Khrushchev's opponents undoubtedly thought had already gone too far. While it seems an over-simplification to state, as does the official party line, that the anti-party group wanted a complete return to hard-line Stalinist policies, it is not unlikely that the factionalists, as they were reported to have done, advocated tightening up controls. Judging from their past record of opposition to deStalinization, they probably attacked Khrushchev on this issue; there is also some evidence that the question of government versus party control may have arisen.

Molotov led the attack on Khrushchev's foreign policy, which he reportedly assailed as "Trotskyist and opportunist." Shepilov also joined in the fray, attacking Khrushchev's hard-line speech to a group of writers on 19 May. Later it was revealed that Shepilov had a booklet, "a unique file of his perfidy," in which he had entered bits of scandal about his colleagues. He presumably put this to good use at the presidium meeting.

Bulganin, Voroshilov, and eventually Pervukhin also participated in the attack, although somewhat more moderately and not, according to most reports, until the discussion had been raging for some time. Pervukhin joined in denouncing the economic reorganization, accusing Khrushchev of having an "organizational itch" and hinting at a "bias" (presumably in favor of the party) in the idea of reorganization.

The real battle, however, focussed on the attempt to remove Khrushchev from his position as first secretary. Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich had reportedly prepared a new list of candidates for the secretariat and the presidium, in which one of them was to become first secretary and Khrushchev was to be offered the ministry of agriculture. Although some of the anti-party group may have been unaware previously of the plot to oust Khrushchev, they nonetheless appear to have ultimately concurred in demanding that he resign. Khrushchev's energetic self-defense must have made it clear to them that he would not yield to pressure from his colleagues on policy matters and that a change in policy--presumably their motive for supporting the factionalists--could be effected only with his removal. They may also have felt that in supporting the anti-party group thus far, they had committed themselves irrevocably.

Khrushchev, however, aided by Mikoyan, defended himself vigorously and categorically refused to resign. He apparently argued that the presidium's demand was illegal, since only the central committee could remove him. Khrushchev's intransigeance must have come as something of a surprise to his opponents; they had probably assumed he would bow to the demands of the majority, as Malenkov over his consumer goods program and Molotov over Yugoslavia had done in 1955. Since the first secretary's substantial political strength in the central committee would clearly guarantee him an easy victory, the anti-party group vehemently opposed Khrushchev's demand that the matter be submitted to that body; keeping the battle within the presidium was obviously their only chance of success.

In Stalin's day, the use of force would have been the next step. Bulganin had in fact placed guards around the Kremlin, and in particular around the building where the presidium was meeting, with orders to let no one through without specific instructions from him. Since their whole strategy suggests that the factionalists expected an easy victory, the guards seem to have been intended more as a potential than an actual threat. But when Khrushchev did not give in, their use would have seemed logical and indeed imperative. However, the more vacillating supporters of the anti-party group, having perhaps already been pushed farther than they originally intended to go, may have got cold feet and opposed the use of Stalinist methods to bring about Khrushchev's removal.

Khrushchev Rallies His Cohorts

At this point, a new development occurred which strengthened Khrushchev's hand. The central committee members residing in Moscow were informed of the battle within the presidium--probably by Furtseva, although possibly by another presidium member. Khrushchev's "healthy core" in the presidium was undoubtedly instrumental in rallying the central committee to the support of the first secretary, but it is not clear which of his supporters was the most active. Furtseva is generally credited with having played a major role; apparently she not only got in touch with the central committee members residing in Moscow, but also alerted the provincial party bosses and summoned them to Moscow immediately. Another version circulating in Warsaw after the 22nd Party Congress assigns this role to Mikoyan and Polyansky, while Furtseva rendered an equally important service by conducting a filibuster in the presidium. In any case, the provincial central committee members were urgently summoned to the capital--transported, according to one rumor, in special planes supplied by Zhukov. Central committee members abroad were also informed of the situation and several ambassadors--Malik, Vinogradov, Ponomarenko, Pegov, and Yudin--left their posts hastily to return to Moscow. As the central committee members arrived in Moscow, they were very likely briefed on the situation by either Furtseva or Mikoyan and given instructions on how to act, both then and subsequently at the plenum.

Members of the presidium who had been absent were also returning--many of them Khrushchev supporters. Shvernik had returned on the 19th; Suslov, Mukhitdinov, and Kirichenko arrived back in time for the plenum on the 22nd; Kozlov, who had been in Leningrad when the presidium meeting began, was there again on 22-23 June, but may have returned in the interim. Saburov, the only returnee to support the opposition, was publicly identified in Warsaw on the 19th and so could not have returned before the 20th or even later. However, from his own admission, we know that he took part in the later presidium meetings, where he seems to have taken a somewhat ambiguous position. In general he defended Khrushchev's policies and resisted "the attempts of Kaganovich and the others to besmirch the name of Khrushchev," but apparently he did not come out firmly on Khrushchev's side. He admitted giving the factionalists some support, but only "on the basis of easily eliminated shortcomings, which were not of a fundamental nature."

The Central Committee Enters on the Scene

Meanwhile, before the arrival of their colleagues, the central committee in Moscow sent a delegation of 18 or 20 to the presidium. The envoys, armed with a petition from the central committee as a whole, made their way "literally illegally" past the guards posted by Bulganin and presented themselves at the door of the building where the presidium was meeting, demanding to be received by that body. Although they were unable to see the leaders, they managed to deliver the central committee petition requesting that the issue of leadership currently under discussion in the presidium be submitted to a central committee plenum, which alone had the right to decide such a question.

The intrusion of the central committee into the affairs of the presidium caused an uproar. Khrushchev's opponents heaped abuse on the central committee for daring to interfere: Kaganovich, who was particularly insulting, spoke of pressure being put on the presidium; others raged that the central committee did not trust its ruling body. Although Khrushchev demanded that the delegation be received, the three leaders of the anti-party group for a time flatly refused.

However, the tide was rapidly turning in the first secretary's favor. By this time, Khrushchev's strength in the presidium had greatly increased with the return of his supporters, and the anti-party group was probably under pressure from some of its own erstwhile adherents to agree to a plenum.* More and more central committee members were arriving in Moscow; as they joined the delegation in the Kremlin, bringing its strength up to 70 or more, it became clear that the factionalists would have to receive the envoys and probably agree to a plenum as well. Meanwhile, however, the hard core of the insurgents had been fighting a desperate rearguard action. While agreeing in principle to a plenum, the anti-party group apparently continued to demand that Khrushchev resign first, judging, probably correctly, that the

* Most reports suggest that Pervukhin, Saburov, Voroshilov, and Bulganin had by this time become somewhat lukewarm in their support of the factionalists.

central committee would not oppose a fait accompli. The announcement of his resignation, together with a policy statement to be drafted by Shepilov, was to be published in the press. Khrushchev, however, undeceived by this rather obvious strateagem, rejected this proposal. According to Khrushchev's own account of this episode, his opponents then suggested that Voroshilov be sent to meet the central committee members alone, apparently calculating that his stature within the party would influence them. This Khrushchev also refused to accept. He insisted on going with Voroshilov, stating that no one could deprive the first secretary of the right to meet members of the central committee which had elected him. In the end, it was agreed that four members of the presidium would go, two from each side: Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, and Bulganin. The convocation of a plenum--already virtually certain--must have been formally agreed on at this meeting; this marked the de facto end of the anti-party group's revolt.

Central Committee Plenum

The plenum of the central committee opened on 22 June. Present were members of the central committee, both full and candidate, and members of the auditing commission--a total of 309. Roughly a third of these men clearly owed their careers to Khrushchev; many others were probably indirectly indebted to him. Although the anti-party group may have counted on dissatisfaction with the economic reorganization to undercut some of Khrushchev's strength in the central committee, they probably did not expect the battle to go beyond the presidium, and there is no evidence to suggest that they had attempted to build up active support in the larger body. Khrushchev, in addition, had the advantage of superior organization: the central committee had probably been well briefed by his supporters and its loyalty assured. This, added to his existing strength--which was probably greatest among the very members summoned to Moscow--effectively guaranteed his victory. The length of the session--eight days--indicates that it turned into a full-scale rally of support for Khrushchev and a forum for detailing the "perfidy" of his opponents.

The only item on the agenda of the plenum was consideration of the issues raised by the anti-party group. Suslov, who apparently presided over the meeting,

presented a report on the presidium meeting which had just taken place and was probably able to manipulate the speakers in favor of Khrushchev. The four insurgents were each allowed to speak twice during the plenum. One after the other, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov defended their positions at length and reiterated their charges against Khrushchev. With the possible exception of Bulganin, who was later accused of having tried to shield Malenkov during the discussion, the former supporters of the group apparently did not speak up in their defense and in fact began to gravitate towards the other side. Saburov, under the influence of Mikoyan and Kirichenko, deserted even before the plenum began. If the anti-party group had any adherents in the central committee, they were either not allowed to speak or preferred to remain silent.

The speeches of the four insurgents were followed by those of Khrushchev's well-briefed supporters. Of the 215 members who requested permission to speak, 60 were allowed to do so, and the rest submitted written statements. All allegedly supported Khrushchev and fiercely denounced the anti-party group. Following what was probably a carefully planned line of attack, one speaker after another rose to defend the line laid down at the 20th Party Congress. The members of the anti-party group were attacked not only for their continuous and stubborn resistance to implementation of party policy, but also for their nefarious role in the purges. Malenkov was reportedly singled out for his role in the Leningrad affair and in the liquidation of Voznesensky, while Molotov and Kaganovich were accused of having participated in the mass repressions in innocent cadres. This caused Voroshilov to jump up from his seat; waving his arms in the air, he shouted to the central committee: "You are young! We will correct your brains!" Shepilov, dubbed a "political prostitute," was denounced for his hypocrisy and doubledealing.

As the isolation of anti-party group became increasingly evident, its adherents, Saburov, Voroshilov, Pervukhin, and Bulganin began to desert one by one. Towards the end of the plenum, each of these four rose to denounce the anti-party group and to "expose" its activities, confessing at the same time their own

errors.* Zhukov allegedly appeared towards the end of the plenum, when he reaffirmed his support for Khrushchev and his opposition to Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich. This was probably the final blow, for on the last day of the plenum Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov recanted and confessed their guilt; Shepilov tried to absolve himself on the grounds that he had only joined at the last minute. According to one report, the factionalists first tried to make a partial retreat and to mitigate their demands, but the plenum demanded a full recantation, which it got, apparently in the form of written statements from the three men. Molotov alone held out and stubbornly refused to repudiate his position.

The central committee, on the last day of the session, 29 June, drew up a resolution condemning the factional activities of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, and expelling them from the central committee; the resolution was adopted unanimously, except by Molotov who abstained. At the same time, the four leaders were all removed from the presidium, as was Saburov, while Pervukhin was demoted to candidate member, and Shepilov was removed from the secretariat. Voroshilov and Bulganin, apparently treated as lesser offenders because of their recantations, reportedly received official reprimands (which remained secret) but retained their positions. The changes in the presidium, together with the resolution of the central committee, were published in Pravda on 3 July; on 5 July, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Pervukhin, and Saburov were released as deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers.

Somewhat surprisingly, the four ringleaders--Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov--remained in the party. Although their activities would certainly seem to have warranted expulsion, and while the central committee resolution specifically cited Lenin to the effect that party members might be expelled for factionalism, no action was taken against them either then or later. At the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, despite repeated calls for the

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* This is suggested in the "confessions" of these four men: Bulganin's at the December 1958 CC plenum; Saburov's and Pervukhin's at the 21st Party Congress, Jan.-Feb. 1959; and Voroshilov's statement to the 22nd Party Congress; also Khrushchev's speech at 22nd Party Congress, 27 October 1961.

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removal from the party of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, these demands were not incorporated in the final resolution of the congress. However, it has been rumored that expulsion proceedings are currently under way, although, as retribution for events which took place four years ago, expulsion now seems a rather belated and irrelevant gesture.

Although the threat to Khrushchev's leadership ended with the central committee plenum of June 1957, the anti-party group as an issue has been kept very much alive, and, over the past four years, the propaganda campaign against the factionalists has been repeatedly revived. The gradual unmasking of the other four villains--Bulganin in December 1958, Saburov and Pervukhin in February 1959, and Voroshilov in October 1961--has provided a more or less continuous opportunity for virulent attacks on the group as a whole. Whether Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich are expelled from the party or not, the anti-party group seems likely to remain a standard item in the party's propaganda repertory for some time.

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

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR THE START OF WAR

This is a working paper, the second in a series of CAESAR reports on problems of Soviet military thought and policy. This paper deals with Soviet strategic doctrine for the start of a general war.

The predecessor in this series--CAESAR-XIV of 3 April 1962, "SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE WAR: DOCTRINE AND DEBATE SINCE 1960"--was based entirely on open Soviet materials, principally professional military publications. The present study, dealing with the narrower subject of the first attack, draws upon classified Soviet documents as well as upon very recent public materials. Because the paper draws heavily on IRONBARK material, this study must remain within the IRONBARK community. Its distribution within USIB agencies should therefore be confined to normal readers of IRONBARK reports. This study may not be quoted in briefings or publications without prior consultation with the originator.

Although this paper has not been coordinated with other offices, the author has benefited much from discussion of the topic with colleagues in other components of the DD/I. Special thanks are due to [redacted] of ONE and [redacted] of ONE for their insights and advice. It should be understood the author alone is responsible for the paper's conclusions, some of which are controversial.

The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome comment on this paper, addressed to Irwin Peter Halpern, who wrote the paper, or to the coordinator of the SSSG, [redacted]

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

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

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Summary and Conclusions

Both classified and open Soviet military sources indicate that the USSR has added to its strategic concepts the doctrine of pre-emptive attack. This is not a strategy for a premeditated war, but a meaningful course of action in the event deterrence fails (or is thought to have failed). We have found no indication in the military materials examined for this study that the USSR intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against the West at any time except under the threat of imminent attack by the West, or in response to a Western attack. But inasmuch as the decision to go to war is still the prerogative of the political leadership in the USSR, it would be imprudent to draw firm conclusions about Soviet intentions from the military sources alone.

The doctrine of pre-emptive attack, which was evidently added to the extant doctrines of deterrence and retaliation in 1961, gives the USSR a more flexible strategic posture, if a more complex basis for military planning. Deterrence undoubtedly remains the first mission of the Soviet military establishment, but Soviet military leaders see an urgent need for a pre-emptive capability, as their confidence in their capability to retaliate has diminished. Chary of suggesting that the USSR might initiate war, Soviet military spokesmen have tended to avoid the term "pre-emption." Nevertheless, they have made it abundantly clear that the USSR has a strike-first-if-necessary doctrine which bears important implications for the planning of Soviet strategic forces.

Our finding that a doctrine of pre-emptive attack has been adopted in the USSR is based mainly on the following evidence:

(1) Defense Minister Malinovsky's incorporation of the doctrinal formula on pre-emption in the stated mission of the Soviet armed forces for the first time at the CPSU Congress in October 1961. (The formula is: forestall a surprise attack by dealing the enemy a "timely and devastating blow.")

(2) The frequent reiterations of that formula in recent open publications of the USSR Defense Ministry.

(3) The evolution in top secret Soviet publications, from hints in 1960 of a need for a pre-emptive doctrine, to virtual acknowledgment of its existence by July 1961.

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(4) The public disclosure in 1961 of the adoption of a doctrine that stresses the possibility of a decisive initial phase of a future general war. In conjunction with this, the assigning to the strategic missile forces (privately in 1960 and publicly in 1961) the mission of achieving the principal goals of war in a very short time. (The Soviets hedge against the possibility of a protracted war by maintaining large, versatile forces.)

(5) The priority given counterforce objectives--notably enemy missile launchers--in official strategic target lists published in top secret Soviet materials.

(6) The doctrinal provisions that strategic missiles should be used suddenly, purposefully, *en masse*, against the most important enemy objectives.

The pivotal problem in Soviet military planning, it is clear, is that of preparing the armed forces to deal with the possibility of an attempted Western surprise attack. Soviet political leaders might have little genuine fear that the West intends to mount a surprise attack against them. But the military leaders take a very serious view of the problem of surprise attack. It is their task to fight a war, should deterrence fail, and the probable enemy they face is an awesome one. They see a rapidly expanding nuclear attack force in the United States and feel the blanket of secrecy over their own strategic forces gradually receding. They are faced with the prospect of not being able to deliver an effective second strike in a nuclear war and they are aware of this. They seem to reason, in drawing up a doctrine for the start of war, that only by striking first, by blunting much of the enemy's attack forces, can the USSR survive the first nuclear phase of the war. The programming in the United States of immense nuclear attack forces may thus be said to have a dual effect on the USSR: on the one hand, the possibility of deliberate Soviet resort to war is reduced; on the other hand, the possibility of a Soviet pre-emptive attack has increased as a course of action, should deterrence fail or be thought to have failed.

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IRONBARK Soviet leaders evidently believe that a strategic doctrine of pre-emption is feasible: that in all probability they will have sufficient warning time to initiate military action. However, the fact that unofficial opinion is divided as to how much and how good warning will be may reflect irresolution on the question on the official level. In any case, we cannot answer the critical question, as to what kind of evidence the Soviet leadership will act on pre-emptively. We think that, owing to the improbability of their having incontrovertible evidence of an irrevocable Western intention to attack, the Soviet leadership would act on less than certain evidence. The risk to them, they may reason, is too great not to attack first; there may not be a chance to retaliate with sufficient force to enable the USSR to pursue the war.

The Soviets have already taken steps to speed up the process of making the decision to go to war as well as the implementation of that decision. These steps include the assignment of the strategic missile forces to a Supreme High Command, which exercises exclusive control over their deployment and use, and the placing of Khrushchev at the head of the country's strategic arm in the post of Supreme High Commander. This post, we think, enables Khrushchev personally, without prior consultation with the ruling collegium, to push the war button.

To the Soviets, pre-emption means more than a last-moment attempt to unleash existing weapons in the face of an imminent enemy attack. As a doctrine, it provides a basis for military planning, a guide to the development of a force structure. It defines the mission and role of Soviet strategic forces in a general way. But the doctrine of pre-emption is not a war plan that defines specific missions or a blueprint that dictates precise numbers and types of weapons. We cannot, on the basis of the doctrine alone, estimate the numbers of weapons which the Soviets regard as necessary to fulfill the tasks outlined by the doctrine. In arriving at force levels, however, the Soviets use a requirements approach, taking account of the numbers and types of important enemy targets as a basis for calculating Soviet force needs. The targeting emphasis is on the enemy's means of nuclear attack, on a strategic as well as tactical scale; industrial and administrative objectives are included, but purely population targets apparently are not.

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR THE START OF WAR

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem

The Soviet classified documents which we have examined for this study, taken together with the open military literature, offer us insights into the thinking and planning of Soviet military leaders for future war, and specifically for its initial phase. We can reconstruct, on the basis of the Soviet military materials, the main elements of strategic military doctrine of the USSR for the start of war. Our conclusions, in a number of cases, must be inferential owing to the circumspection with which the critical question of the first attack is generally discussed--in the private as well as in the public discourse. Although the classified documents used for this project have been classified top secret by the USSR Ministry of Defense, they do not betray the highest military secrets of the USSR; they do not discuss official war plans; they do not give numerical data on existing or projected Soviet force levels; they give no detailed data on the use and deployment of Soviet ICBMs, etc.

Hence, in this paper, we do not presume to duplicate Soviet war plans; the available evidence does not enable us to do this. Nor does it fall within our competence to comment on the actual present or possible future capability of the USSR to mount an effective first strike. There is not necessarily a direct correlation between doctrine and capability. Rather, our aim in this study is to describe and analyze Soviet strategic doctrine for the initiation of a possible future war, as the doctrine has emerged since January 1960; and then to relate the doctrine to the problem of force structure in order to determine the path being taken in the development of the strategic missile forces.

When we speak of Soviet military doctrine, we have in mind the Soviet meaning of the term. It is generally understood to be a guide for military planning,

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for defense policy and strategy. In this sense, military doctrine describes the character of future war; outlines basic strategy for the war, and indicates the kind of force structure needed to fight the war envisioned.

Soviet military doctrine, as the classified materials bear out, has to a large extent been made public. This may seem paradoxical in view of the Soviet obsession with secrecy in military matters. Yet the classified literature confirms that the current doctrine for nuclear war was largely formulated in the public speeches of Khrushchev (beginning in January 1960) and in the speeches and orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky. No reference has been made in the available secret materials to a secret speech or article on doctrine by Khrushchev; Malinovsky in recent years has apparently delivered only one major secret speech on doctrinal matters--in May 1960--and that is discussed in several of the classified sources. The somewhat tortuous evolution of the "new military doctrine" has already been described at some length in our CAESAR XIV study dated 3 April 1962. Suffice it to note here that the secret literature examined by us reinforces the openly published evidence that Soviet military doctrine was in a highly formative stage in 1960-1961; and that the major doctrinal questions bearing on the start of war have since been resolved and removed from the realm of theoretical controversy.

Our task, then, is to discern the doctrinal concepts that guide Soviet planners in determining the make-up of the strategic forces. We leave the much more complex task of estimating numbers of existing and planned missile sites to more competent hands, for doctrine is but one of many inputs in the estimating process.

We wish to note also that our paper focuses on problems of the start of a general war, which, in the Soviet view, will inevitably involve the mass use of nuclear missile weapons. The paper does not deal with problems bearing on the outbreak of limited or localized conflicts involving Soviet forces. In point of

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fact, there has been no discussion of a local war role and mission for Soviet armed forces in either the open or available secret Soviet military literature. Local war is discussed only in terms of a trigger for a global nuclear war. This is not to say that local war doctrine and operational plans do not exist in the USSR. We know from open sources that Soviet military cadres have been called upon to study the experience of local wars and Western local war doctrine. Undoubtedly there are contingency plans for the employment of Soviet troops in limited actions. But inasmuch as Soviet political doctrine rules out the use of Soviet troops in "national liberation" struggles in underdeveloped countries, it is unlikely that there is a military program for the use of Soviet troops in those places.

B. The Principal Sources Used

The principal source for the present study, the "Special Collection of Articles from MILITARY THOUGHT" (hereafter referred to as the "Special Collection"), merits some explanation because of its singular nature. It is classified TOP SECRET--by the USSR--but is an unofficial document. Its special status stems from the fact that it was established, in early 1960, as an ad hoc discussion forum for the airing of frank, controversial and free-ranging views of senior military officers. The articles, according to an editorial note, express only the opinions of the authors on the problems dealt with. The articles chosen for publication in the "Special Collection" were evidently regarded as too sensitive for publication in the SECRET "Collections" of MILITARY THOUGHT articles, or in the more widely circulated monthly MILITARY THOUGHT, which is evidently restricted to military stations.*

The circulation of the publication is limited to army commanders and higher. The contributing writers, for the most part, are drawn from the same narrow circle of military leaders. Numbered among the contributors are deputy ministers of defense, military district commanders and senior staff officers, chiefs and officials of military directorates, and military academy heads and theorists.

*None of the classified Soviet materials used in this study are dated later than fall 1961. Issues of the SECRET version of MILITARY THOUGHT, published in late 1961, became available too late for consideration in this paper.

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Constituting a vehicle principally for the exchange of unofficial or individually held viewpoints, the materials contain a multiplicity of recommendations for the planning and conduct of strategic and front operations in a future general war. Now and then, however, the writers allude to elements of official doctrine--upon which we have based our conclusions in large part. The articles in the collection vary in quality. Some are distinguished for the care and thoroughness exercised in their preparation. Other articles are disjointed, strikingly naive, and woefully incomplete. The unevenness, we surmise, stems from different levels of competence and different degrees of access to data on modern weapons among the contributors.

We have also found some useful information on our subject in other top secret issuances of the Soviet Defense Ministry. One such document has been particularly valuable for this project. It is the authoritative INFORMATION BULLETIN OF THE MISSILE TROOPS, which was first issued in serial form in July 1961. The BULLETIN, as opposed to the "Special Collection," does not carry unofficial or controversial articles; its usefulness to us is principally in its technical information bearing on strategic missiles.

II. SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FIRST PHASE OF NUCLEAR WAR

The main concern of Soviet military leaders is that of fighting a war, should it break out. Yet, the nature of modern warfare is such that the questions of deciding when to initiate war and how to fight it have become inextricably linked. In the USSR, the military leaders have hence taken a strong professional interest in the circumstances under which future war might begin. Technical requirements, such as the need for short reaction time in the initial employment of strategic weapons, have tended to increase the influence of the military in the making of critical strategic decisions. While the final authority in the launching of the first attack will, of course, be exercised by the jealous political leadership, the military--charged with reading and interpreting the military-

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technical indications of a possible enemy attack--will exert important influence in the making of the fateful decision. As we shall demonstrate shortly, they have demanded a voice in determining the timing and conditions for the launching of the first attack. They have built a case and they have, from all indications, received the approval of the political leaders for a doctrine of <u>pre-emptive attack</u>.

The critical question of Soviet <u>intention</u> to go to war does not properly fall within the scope of this paper. Inasmuch as the decision to go to war is the exclusive prerogative of the party-government leadership, (the classified materials underscore this point), we cannot draw firm conclusions about Soviet intentions to initiate military action on the basis of the available military literature. We can, however, identify the elements of Soviet strategic doctrine that will <u>guide</u> the USSR in preparing its forces for the start of war, and that will suggest when and how military action should be initiated.

A. <u>How War Will Begin</u>

Future general war will begin, the Soviets predict, with a surprise attack. They give heavy odds, so to speak, that the first attack will take the form of <u>massed nuclear strikes</u> by one major power against another. In no available Soviet source is there even a trace of a hint that a formal declaration of war might under any circumstances precede the outbreak of hostilities.

We find no indication in any of the Soviet materials, open or classified, that the USSR plans to initiate military actions against the West deliberately, without serious provocation, and at a time entirely of their choosing. However, there is good evidence, which we shall discuss shortly, of the existence of a doctrine that calls for the initiation of war by the USSR under conditions of threat of an imminent attack against the bloc by the West. The USSR may initiate war, in short,

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but only if the war is justified as "defensive" in a political sense.* This does not rule out the possibility that Soviet leaders might fabricate grounds for launching a preventive war. While there is nothing in the sources in our possession to suggest the possibility of a military deception on the part of the Soviets, one contributor to the "Special Collection" ascribed the possibility to the West.

The classified as well as open military materials depict a Western effort to launch a surprise nuclear attack as the most likely trigger of a future war and the most dangerous threat to the security of the USSR. We cannot say with certainty whether this represents a genuine estimate of Western intentions. Soviet political leaders on the one hand may harbor very little real fear that the United States will mount a surprise attack against them. Khrushchev, it will be recalled, had told

*This presents no real problem for the USSR. A Soviet Defense Ministry book, "War and Politics" (signed to press December 1959), has already rationalized a possible first-strike strategy for the USSR within the framework of "defensive" war in a political sense:

"Contemporary methods of conducting wars have greatly increased not only the significance of surprise but also the role of attack--which is the basic and most important way of conducting war, and of providing for the decisive destruction of the forces of the enemy and the preservation of one's own forces. Attack in the military sense of strategy by no means contradicts the defensive character of war in defense of the socialist fatherland from the political point of view.

"Marx and Engels constantly advised Communists that a...just war, defensive in character, does not preclude strategic attack operations but on the contrary presupposes them."

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an American visitor [redacted] in 1958 that the United States could not initiate war because of its constitutional system, although he has recently made several public allusions to the dangerous implications of President Kennedy's statement that the United States might initiate nuclear war under certain conditions. Khrushchev's major military concern, too, appears to be that of deterring probable enemies of the USSR from initiating a nuclear conflict and he claims a credible deterrent force for the USSR.* If he is satisfied, as he appears to be, that the United States is deterred, then he would have no logical reason to fear a U.S. surprise attack. His estimate of the possible future correlation of forces may, of course, be different. Soviet military leaders, on the other hand, may look at the problem somewhat differently. Their professional concern is principally that of fighting a war, should deterrence fail. Hypothesizing that a war will take place, for purposes of preparing for it, the military specialists conclude that the probable enemy will attempt to gain important advantages in the war by striking first. From this, they draw conclusions about the high probability of an attempted surprise first strike--but not about the probability of war itself. Hence, their representation of surprise attack as the main danger fosters a "prepare-for-the-worst" philosophy in planning for future war. The force structure, readiness and vigilance that will result from preparing above all to forestall an enemy surprise attack, the Soviets seem to think, will prepare the armed forces optimally for any other general war contingency.

The possibility of war by accident or miscalculation has also been acknowledged in open publications, but it has not been taken up in the secret discourse. We do not know how serious a view Soviet military planners take of this possibility. But it seems, in any case, that the strategic requirements placed on

*A credible deterrent force is one that can withstand an enemy surprise attack and retaliate with such destruction as would be unacceptable to the attacker.

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the state to deal with such a contingency are probably much the same as the ones for dealing with an enemy surprise attack.

Much has been said in the propaganda about the grave danger of a local war escalating rapidly into a global nuclear war. In his speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress, Marshal Malinovsky postulated a rigid formula on this problem: any armed conflict, he said, will "inevitably" develop into a global nuclear/rocket war should the nuclear powers become involved in it. Somewhat earlier, in articles in the top secret "Special Collection," several military leaders mentioned the possibility that general nuclear war might start with a "local war" between the superpowers in "one of the areas of the world." One writer, Col. Gen. Pavlovsky, hypothesizes in the "Special Collection" that the West might first attack a bloc satellite. The USSR would then enter the war to defend the "friendly country," and the conflict would turn into a world war. Aside from this instance, no other types of local war situations are specified in the classified materials.

No explicit allowance has been made for a "pause" in localized hostilities between the superpowers, in which time a cessation of hostilities could be brought about. At most, a "pause" may be implicit in the statement by Pavlovsky in an early 1961 issue of the "Special Collection," that an attack against a Soviet satellite could "scarcely" be confined to a local war and would "most probably" lead to a world war. This is a less rigid formulation than the one presented by Malinovsky at the 22nd CPSU Congress last October. As far as we can discern, the Soviets regard the possibility of a local war escalating into a general nuclear conflict as part of the problem of surprise attack. Forewarned by the existence of a threatening period in the form of localized hostilities, the Soviet military leaders would probably expect the enemy to use the element of surprise in order to mount an attack against strategic targets in the USSR should the local war situation become unfavorable to him. (American doctrine has been made

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clear on the point of initiating nuclear warfare, but not a general nuclear war, should the Soviets take advantage of a local preponderance of conventional forces to overrun NATO positions.) Soviet strategy would thus have to be that of denying the enemy the opportunity of striking first. Thus, the danger inherent in a local war involving forces of the major powers, as the Soviets probably see it, is that the pressing consideration of preventing a possible enemy nuclear attack may be translated into action before a peaceful settlement of the local fracas could be arranged.

B. The Importance of the First Attack

Soviet concern over the importance of the first massed nuclear strikes in a future war has increased demonstrably in recent years. The heightened concern has emerged against a backdrop of significant increments to US strategic attack forces and the shrinking of the veil of secrecy surrounding Soviet strategic forces. The subject of serious debate in Soviet military circles until about a year ago, the question of the importance of the opening phase of a future general war, has since been answered by official military opinion. Military doctrine now assigns overriding importance to the initial strategic operations in a future nuclear war.

The extant doctrine on the start of war was publicly revealed for the first time by Defense Minister Malinovsky in his speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress last October, and has subsequently been reaffirmed and clarified. The principal elements of the doctrine illuminating Soviet official thought on the vital importance of the opening operations are as follows:

(a) The initial period of future nuclear war might be decisive not only for the course but for the outcome of the war as a whole. (Malinovsky, KOMMUNIST, No. 7, May 1962)

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(b) Strategic nuclear missile weapons, which will play the primary role in the initial period of the war, make it possible to attain the strategic goals of war "within a short period of time." (Malinovsky, 23 October 1961 speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress; Moskalenko, RED STAR, 13 September 1961).

(c) The very first mass nuclear strikes are capable of predetermining the whole subsequent course of the war and could lead to such losses in the rear and among the troops as would put the /Soviet/ people and the country in an exceptionally difficult position. (Malinovsky, 23 October 1961 speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress).

So serious is the Soviet military view of the initial phase of war, that Malinovsky in his speech at the Party Congress last October took the rare step of invoking the authority of the CPSU Presidium in emphasizing the need to give "special attention" to the initial period in the course of military study and training. This step might also have been taken with the aim of conveying the impression that the political and military leaders now share a common view of the problem.*

It should be noted that the doctrine does not say categorically that the first strikes will decide the war: the problem is stated in terms of "possibilities" and "capabilities." The emphasis placed on

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*For a discussion of earlier differences over this question between Khrushchev and the military leaders, see CAESAR-XIV of 3 April 1962, "Soviet Military Thought on Future War: Doctrine and Debate Since 1960."

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the initial operations does [of course] suggest an estimate of a [fairly high] probability that the first phase of the war will be the decisive one. Herein lies an important guide to military planners in determining the future composition of Soviet forces: strategic forces are of cardinal importance. By the same token, the allowance made in the doctrine for the possible indecisiveness and inconclusiveness of the first phase of war also provides a guideline for the structuring of the armed forces: a basis is thereby laid for a more flexible and varied military force than would be needed for a short nuclear exchange.

In stressing the importance of the initial phase of war, the doctrine is primarily concerned with the possible effects of the first Western nuclear strikes against the USSR. At the same time, the doctrine--which is formulated as a sort of objective law--seems to bear on the ability of the United States to withstand the first nuclear blows from the USSR. In either case, the doctrine implies a high premium for the first massed nuclear strike. It indicates that Soviet military planners fully appreciate the advantages of launching the first as opposed to the second blow, but is not in itself proof of the adoption of a strike-first-if-possible strategy.

C. Hedging: "Try For a Short War, Prepare for a Long One"

Consistent with the doctrine which stresses the importance of the first phase of a future war is the doctrine on the anticipated duration of the war. We are afforded a clear picture of this latter doctrine by the classified materials. It is, in effect, a doctrine of hedging: it says that strategic planning must take account of the possibility of either a short or a prolonged war.

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Whether future war will be long or short was for some time a bone of contention in the open periodical press and in the top secret "Special Collection," as well. Some officers, who proposed a blitzkrieg strategy for the USSR in the top secret organ, predicted that the hostile state or coalition of states could be deprived of the capability to resist "in the course of a few hours or, at the outside, within a few days." Others argued equally categorically that the initial operations would not predetermine the outcome of war, that a war between two world systems "cannot be of short duration." Most contributions took a position somewhere between the two extremes, saying that the war might be relatively short; that it might even assume a fast-moving "blitz" character, although this was "improbable"; that the war would "not necessarily" be prolonged; but that in any case the USSR must prepare for a "protracted, hard war."

The question was resolved by Soviet officialdom in the spring of 1960. In a report (kept secret from the general public) to the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations in May of that year, the Defense Minister eschewed both extremes, calling them "one-sided." The USSR, he said, must develop and perfect the means and methods of armed combat with a view toward achieving victory over the aggressor "above all in the shortest possible time," but at the same time must prepare seriously for an extended war. This doctrine, he said, governs the direction of military organization.

It might be added that this doctrine has, in substance, been made public although not spelled out. It was incorporated in Malinovsky's speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress last October: the Defense Minister at that time stressed both the

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importance of the initial stage of war and the continuing need for varied and large armed forces. And he reiterated that position most recently in an article in the May (No. 7) 1962 KOMMUNIST.

Thus, calculated to finish the war in the shortest possible time, the doctrine is predicated upon the assumption that the strategic missile forces will play the decisive and principal role in the war. But considering the possibility that the strategic missile forces would fail to bring about a decision in the short run, the doctrine calls for the maintenance of other types of forces (equipped with nuclear weapons and operating as combined arms) which would be prepared to wage extended war.

One of the spokesmen who supported this cautious strategic concept explained the reasoning underlying it. Major General M. Goryainov wrote in an article in the "Special Collection," that past experience teaches that estimates of enemy strength at the beginning of a war have usually proven incorrect and that "not a single war has ever gone the way it was planned." He also pointed out that a number of <u>strategic missiles could turn out to be unreliable</u>, and only partially fulfill the immediate tasks of war without a decisive result. In this eventuality, the author said, during the time needed for restoring the combat capability of strategic missile troops, the ground troops and aviation would play the decisive role. This is the most acceptable concept, he said, despite the fact that it is the <u>costliest in expenditures</u>, both before and during the war.

One cannot, we think, draw the conclusion from the doctrine of hedging--that is, preparing

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for either a long or short war--that the USSR plans to maintain a dual capability for either nuclear or conventional general war. The build-up of the older branches of service, which have been re-equipped with nuclear missile weapons, is depicted as necessary to meet the requirements of a protracted nuclear war, not an exclusively conventional war. There is nothing in the military literature, classified or open, to suggest that a separate body of doctrine for a non-nuclear war is being retained. Rather, the literature has on many occasions underscored the inevitability of the employment of nuclear weapons in a general war: that nuclear rocket weapons will play the main role in such a war is an unquestioned article of doctrine. Only within the framework of a nuclear war does the literature provide a place for conventional weapons.

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

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III. THE CASE FOR PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK

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A. The New Doctrinal Formula

It has already been pointed out that Soviet military planning for future war focuses primarily on the problem of preparing to ward off an enemy surprise nuclear attack. The Soviets say that an enemy surprise attack, if carried out, would place the USSR at a very great disadvantage in the war. The problem is also expressed in terms of the immediate strategic aims which the USSR will try to attain in the first phase of the war. According to a number of statements, carried in open as well as classified military sources, preventing, or at least repulsing, an enemy strategic attack, and delivering a crushing counterblow, will be foremost among the immediate strategic Soviet aims in future war.

There are two ways of "preventing" an enemy surprise attack, according to the Soviet viewpoint. The first, and evidently preferred, method is to prevent war itself from breaking out by deterring the enemy. Deterrence is, of course, the first mission of the Soviet military establishment. This has been made abundantly clear in numerous Soviet statements. For example, the Party-Government appeal of June 1962 on the question of raising meat and milk prices stated, in justification of heavy defense expenditures, that

> the imperialists are used to respecting force only, and if so far they have not begun a war, it is only because they know our economic and military might, and know that the Soviet country now has everything necessary to cool down the militant ardor of any aggressor.

The second method of preventing an enemy surprise attack--the method that would be used should deterrence fail--is that of destroying the enemy's nuclear striking force, or as much of it as possible,

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

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IRONBARK in good time. The best and perhaps only way to achieve this is by striking the enemy first, that is, by pre-empting him. Such was the thinking of a group of Soviet military theorists who, in 1955, advanced the view that a surprise attack could be frustrated if the enemy were himself surprised as he prepared to strike. This is now, from all indications, the thinking of the Soviet military leadership, and it is reflected in recently pronounced doctrine for the start of war.

At the 22nd CPSU Congress last October, Malinovsky said that the Soviet armed forces must be prepared "above all else" for the eventuality of a Western surprise attack. With clear allusion to a strategy of pre-emption, he said that military training in 1961 posed as the main task "the study and working out of the means of reliably repulsing a sudden nuclear attack by the aggressor and also the means of exploding his aggressive plans by a timely and devastating blow against him." Although less authoritative sources have implied the need for a pre-emptive strategy in the past, this statement represents the first time that the concept of pre-emptive action was incorporated in the stated mission of the Soviet armed forces. The new doctrinal formula--which is about as far as the Soviets can go in speaking of a pre-emptive strategy without suggesting that the USSR might initiate war--has since been reiterated several times in other authoritative contexts. The statement on the need to "wreck the aggressor's plans" by dealing him a "timely blow" was, for example, carried in a RED STAR editorial on 21 January 1962 and again in RED STAR, on 11 May, in an exposition on Soviet military doctrine. The latter source described this mission as "the most primary, the most important and the main task of the armed forces." The doctrinal formula has also been carried in various signed articles in consecutive issues of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES in recent months. Malinovsky too, in an article in the May KOMMUNIST, the authoritative CPSU organ, came close to repeating the formula in speaking





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> on the basis of recently held exercises, methods were worked out for the reliable rebuff of an enemy surprise attack and the explosion of his aggressive plans by means of the timely delivery of a crushing blow against him.

B. The Evolvement of the Concept in Secret Discourse

Various articles in the top-secret "Special Collection" also throw light on this question, suggesting that Malinovsky's thinly-veiled reference to a pre-emptive strategy in October 1961 signalled a change in military policy. To the then existing doctrine of deterrence and retaliation was added the doctrine of pre-emption, which, in our view, calls for a larger force than was previously envisaged and one which is principally counter-force in mission. More will be said later about the force implications of the new doctrine.

There was a discernible evolution in the way in which the question of strategic pre-emption was treated in succeeding issues of the "Special Collection" between 1960 and 1961. Among the articles in the "Special Collection" published in 1960, we find a number of hints of the possible need to engage in pre-emptive action on a strategic scale. Thus various articles published in that year listed counterforce targets, notably

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rocket bases, first among the objectives of Soviet strategic missile strikes. Also several articles endorsing a blitzkrieg strategy gave logical grounds for placing a high premium on striking first.

Several articles in the "Special Collection" for 1961 treated the question of strategic pre-emption more directly. Two articles carried in the first issue of the top secret organ for 1961 (signed to the press 13 January) developed a case for a strategy of pre-emption. An article by the late deputy chief of the General Staff, Colonel General N. Pavlovsky, who had died in October 1960, stressed that the chief task in the event of an enemy attack will be to "prevent" mass nuclear strikes by the enemy, instantly to deliver crushing nuclear strikes, and to initiate vigorous military operations by all types of armed forces. Pavlovsky's method of disrupting an enemy surprise attack entailed the delivery of a powerful first blow against him. The blow, he said, must be directed against the enemy's industrial and economic centers; against his missile, aircraft, and naval bases; against his stockpiles of nuclear weapons, aircraft, nuclear submarines, missile vessels, and aircraft carriers; and against the most important groupings of his ground troops, radar facilities and other objectives. By delivering its "first" massed nuclear strike "at the right time," he said, the USSR could "considerably weaken" (blunt) the strikes of the enemy, paralyze his operations for a certain time, and under favorable conditions, force him to cease active military operations. In his view, the success of such a strike would depend on (a) the readiness of all forces and weapons used to deliver it, (b) the validity of information on the objective to be destroyed, (c) the proper selection of those objectives, and (d) the skillful use of the nuclear weapons.

In the same issue of the "Special Collection," Colonel General Babadzhanyan (Odessa MD commander) pointed out that NATO did not then represent a grave threat to the USSR. He saw the West as now

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deterred from striking first by its inability to prevent the USSR from delivering a "devastating counterblow."* But he admonished that this situation could not be permanent. He expressed fear of the future, when the West "will" have a greater capability to deliver a surprise massive nuclear strike which could "destroy the most important and crucial installations of the country, disorganize national control, disrupt mobilization and deployment of armed forces, and severely reduce the combat effectiveness of the army and the country as a whole." This prospect is so serious, he said, that "every measure must be taken in order that, if the imperialists try to start a war, it will not begin by a surprise massed enemy nuclear strike." Rather than wait for the new conditions to come about, he argued for the adoption of a new strategic concept now: that concept is clearly pre-emption. He said that "if it becomes evident that aggressive forces have decided on war, and that the initiation of military operations is only a question of a short time, and if we fail to prevent the aggressor's attack by diplomatic means, then it is necessary to wreck the enemy strike by all our available forces and means during the first days of the war." What should be done "now and quickly," he emphasized, is to prepare Soviet intelligence and the armed forces in such a way that they will be in a "constant state of readiness to deliver such a/pre-emptive/ blow against the aggressor."

Unfortunately, the writer does not elaborate on the implications of the strategic concept which he recommends for Soviet force structure. He does say, in concluding his discussion of the first attack, that

*"The strategic missiles at their disposal clearly cannot satisfy the requirements of a major war and their quality is not high, since, according to assertions by Americans themselves, only 50% of the missiles launched reach their target."

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the possibility of having only a "last minute" warning of enemy preparations for attack necessitates a "new approach" to the "preparation and definition" of the stage of readiness of Soviet means of attack.

In a second article, carried in the third issue of the "Special Collection" for 1961 (signed to the press 10 July), General Babadzhanyan spoke of pre-emptive action still more directly, not in the form of argumentation, but as if it were now official doctrine. He said that " a counterstrike, or a strike to frustrate a surprise enemy attack" would be carried out--mainly by strategic missile forces--upon the decision of the party-government leaders. He developed a strategic concept for operations of troops of a front after the launching of either a "counterstrike or a strike to frustrate a surprise enemy attack." He rejected a "widespread" point of view that front nuclear/missile weapons (i.e., tactical nuclear weapons) must participate in a "counter-strike or a first nuclear strike." The phrase shows that the writer assumed the existence of the alternative strategies of retaliation and first strike.

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C. Soviet Strategic Target Lists

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Evidence bearing on the types of enemy targets selected for destruction by Soviet strategic rockets is fully consistent with a pre-emptive strategy. The "Special Collection" materials for 1960-61 give greatest emphasis to the problem of countering the enemy's means of nuclear attack on a strategic as well as tactical scale. It appears to be a common view among the contributors that the need for a counter-force capability for the USSR is a foregone conclusion. Even more compelling evidence of this outlook is to be found in the official INFORMATION BULLETIN OF THE MISSILE TROOPS. More authoritative than the "Special Collection," this top secret serial contains only articles that reflect official doctrine and regulations. The first issue of the journal, published in July 1961, included a target list for strikes by strategic missiles (in this case, 1100 n.m.) which was headed by enemy missile launchers. The list, evidently in order of priority, was as follows:

- --strategic missile launch sites;
- --sites for the production, assembly and storage of nuclear weapons and of means for delivering them to the target;
- --large airfields, air force and naval bases;
- --centers of political administration and of military industry;
- --large communications centers;
- --large factories and power centers;
- --arsenals and depots with strategic stocks of armaments, military equipment or strategic raw materials;
- --strategic reserves and other targets of strategic significance in the deep rear of the enemy.

Significantly, purely population targets are not included in any of the classified target lists. Aside from the proposal of a small minority that the USSR adopt a country-busting strategy with regard to Western Europe, none of the spokesmen in the top-secret Soviet materials has called for the indiscriminate destruction of cities. On

the other hand, the fact that official strategic target lists are not exclusively counter-force in composition but include industrial and administrative objectives, points up the versatile character of Soviet strategic doctrine: the target lists are evidently designed to promote the war effort in the most effective way, whether the USSR strikes first or second.

D. Doctrine on the Use of Strategic Missiles

In addition to the above-mentioned target requirements, other Soviet concepts governing the employment of the strategic missiles are also fully in keeping with a strike-first-if-necessary strategy. Soviet military doctrine, as unfolded in the top-secret "Special Collection" materials, dictates that nuclear missile weapons must be used suddenly, effectively, purposefully, economically, and en masse. Designed to perform the leading role in the initial period of war, the missile forces will have the principal aim of radically changing the strategic situation as a whole --first of all, ending the war in the shortest possible time.*

*There is general agreement in the "Special Collection" that strategic missile forces might be called upon to support armed combat in theaters of operations, destroying main groupings of enemy forces. But according to Marshal Varentsov, the chief of the Soviet tactical-operational missile units, the strategic missile forces must concentrate on the main tasks, and the interests of the front will be served by them only if suitable reserves of their means exist. It seems to be generally understood, in short, that the strikes of the strategic missile troops will be mainly directed toward attaining the principal goals of the war.

Official Soviet military thinking also stresses the importance of concentrating the massed nuclear blows against the "main enemies,"* and striking at "the most important objectives." Maximum destruction of the enemy, the annihilation of whole countries, was not included among the official missions of the strategic missile forces. This is despite claims (quoted in the Special Collection) by Khrushchev and Malinovsky of a Soviet capability to "wipe any aggressor from the face of the earth" or to reduce small countries to a "radioactive desert."

E. The Feasibility of Pre-emption

Before exploring the meaning and implications of strategic pre-emption, let us tie together the threads of evidence to be found in Soviet military literature in support of our hypothesis that a doctrine of pre-emptive attack was adopted by the USSR sometime in 1961. We have thus far founded our hypothesis upon

(a) the incorporation of the concept in the stated mission of the Soviet armed forces for the

*According to [redacted] Khrushchev also believes [redacted] strikes should be directed principally against the "main partners" of the Western coalition. Khrushchev is said to have told a meeting of the Soviet Supreme Military Council (date not given): "Cut down a tree, and the boughs will fall off--destroy the United States and with it England, and the other capitalist fortresses will surrender."

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first time, in Malinovsky's speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress last October;

(b) the evolution in the treatment of the question in the "Special Collection" between 1960 and 1961;

(c) the doctrine that stresses the possibility of a decisive initial phase of war;

(d) the doctrine that assigns the strategic missile forces the mission of achieving the principal goals of war in a very short time;

(e) the priority given counter-force objectives in official target lists; and

(f) concepts calling for the use of the strategic missiles "suddenly, purposefully, en masse, against the most important objectives of the main enemies."

This same body of evidence suggests that the Soviet military leaders regard strategic pre-emption not only as a desirable course of action but also as a practicable one. But does their outlook make good sense in the light of U. S. plans for a massive strategic striking force composed mainly of Minuteman and Polaris ballistic missiles?

There is a belief among Western students of military strategy that as the size of the U. S. long-range striking force grows and its vulnerability decreases, the advantages of striking first diminish. This reasoning is perfectly sound, it would seem, as regards the question of deterring the USSR from initiating a "preventive" war. Indeed, this reasoning properly underlies the U.S. strategy of deterrence: the enemy cannot hope to knock out all or even most of our strategic attack forces with the first blow and is consequently discouraged from embarking on the path of premeditated war to attain his foreign policy aims.

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But, in our opinion, such reasoning does not make the choice of a pre-emptive strike any the less desirable to the Soviets. On the contrary, it seems to us that an important reason why they are seeking a pre-emptive strike capability is because the United States has undertaken to build an immense missile attack force--even though it was conceived here as primarily a retaliatory one. Rather than discourage the Soviets from planning for pre-emptive action, the trend toward more powerful and less vulnerable U.S. nuclear forces compels Soviet military planners to tailor the characteristics of their strategic forces to the target requirements. One effect that the trend in U. S. weapons developments has had on the USSR already is the stepping-up of the Soviet ABM program.

The Soviets probably reason that the U.S. nuclear missile forces are becoming so powerful that there may not be a reliable alternative to striking first. In other words, should the United States succeed in striking first with its massive forces, the USSR may not have the opportunity to strike back with the force necessary to continue in the war. On the other hand, should the USSR succeed in striking the first blow, while it would surely be subjected to powerful strikes from numerous surviving U.S. forces, it might be afforded the opportunity of carrying on the war and winning it.

It could be said, in short, that the U.S. weapons program is having a dual effect on the USSR: On the one hand, it reduces the likelihood of war by assuring the Soviet leaders of widespread nuclear devastation should they elect to launch premeditated war; on the other hand, it tends to heighten Soviet concern over the first nuclear attack and elevates the importance in their eyes of a strategy of pre-emption.

To be feasible, a pre-emptive attack need not result in the absolute destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack. The available evidence suggests that Soviet military planners will settle for

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much less than the absolute destruction of the enemy in the first massed nuclear strike. Nowhere in the "Special Collection" materials or in the open sources has the thought been expressed that the USSR might emerge barely scathed from a nuclear war--started under any conditions. The one contributor to the top-secret "Special Collection" who called for dealing country-busting blows to the enemy (he had European countries in mind) framed his strategy on the assumption that the USSR would be struck first. (Col. Gen. Gastilovich, first issue for 1960.) Other contributors who addressed themselves to the question in the "Special Collection" wrote that a successful pre-emptive blow could substantially blunt ("weaken") enemy retaliatory strikes and "under favorable conditions" even cause the enemy to cease active military operations. And a Colonel General Tolkonyuk made the bald statement, without reference to strategic pre-emption, although he may have had this in mind, that it is neither possible nor necessary to destroy all the states comprising the enemy coalition. To effect a blitzkrieg, the writer said, it is necessary to strike with nuclear blows only "the main partners" of the enemy coalition; to take out "the most important" of the enemy objectives; and to destroy the minimum number of targets necessary for the success of the operation.

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

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IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PRE-EMPTION

A. Pre-emption As a Guide to Force Structure

None of the materials in our possession provides a clear-cut explanation of the Soviet understanding of pre-emption. Yet, from what we know of the Soviet conception of military doctrine, we can conclude that the doctrine of pre-emption serves as a guide for the planning of the USSR's future strategic offensive-defensive forces. What we are suggesting is that pre-emption means more to the Soviets than a last-moment attempt to unleash the country's strategic attack weapons in an effort to blunt an imminent enemy attack. To the Soviet military leader, pre-emption is more than an action; it is a strategy on which military planning is based. Its recent adoption as official doctrine is bound to have an effect on the size and shape of Soviet strategic forces programmed for the future.

A few examples from the Soviet materials will illustrate our point about the link between the doctrine and force structure. In the top-secret "Special Collection," it will be recalled, Col. Gen. Babadzhanyan argued in early 1961 for the adoption by the USSR of a "new" concept--strategic pre-emption. Not stopping there, he called for improvements in the intelligence collection system and for other unspecified measures to be taken to bring the armed forces into line with the doctrine which he proposed. That he had in mind as one of the measures a sizable increase in strategic missiles is suggested by the thrust of his reasoning. To call flatly for a larger strategic missile force than was already programmed might have been considered too presumptuous an act for a second-level military leader, even within the covers of the closely held journal. The first order of business, as Babadzhanyan probably saw it, was to sell the idea of a need for a doctrine of pre-emption; therein would be the policy guide to the force structure, and the battle would be partly won.

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

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Later, after the adoption of the pre-emptive doctrine, Col. I. Sidelnikov, in an article in the 11 May 1962 RED STAR, made a strong pitch for a force structure that would meet the requirements posed by the new doctrine of pre-emption. He spoke only in generalities, but his point was clear. Defining and outlining present-day Soviet military doctrine--the "guide" to defense policy--the author stated that "it is not enough to possess a correct and scientifically elaborate military doctrine." The lessons of the Second World War, he said, teach that it is also necessary that the combat might and readiness of the armed forces "fully correspond to the requirements posed by war and derived from Soviet military doctrine." As regards World War II, the author had said that the fatal Soviet error in the beginning of the war lay not in the basic tenets of Soviet military doctrine--"which were correct"--but in the fact that military combat readiness, weaponry, and organization did not conform to the "requirements of the doctrine."

The thrust of his argument, in short, was that the question of the doctrine had been settled; now it was necessary to obtain the hardware commensurate with the doctrine.

Then Marshal Malinovsky, in a KOMMUNIST article--signed to the press only four days after Sidelnikov's article appeared--also made it clear that the question was no longer one of doctrine but of military spending and choice of weapons and forces. The question as to "how and in what direction to take the construction of the armed forces" had already been worked out by Soviet military doctrine, he said. He went on to present an unusually explicit defense of the military budget, which could also be taken as an argument for continued high allocations or even increased allocations. He declared that Soviet military expenditures are "absolutely necessary," that they are "strictly regulated," and that there cannot be any "exaggeration" of them.

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The Malinovsky and Sidelnikov articles, as it turned out, preceded by less than three weeks a government announcement of an increase in meat and milk prices. The announced price increase was, in classical simplicity, a guns-for-butter decision. It made it plain that a decision had been reached to provide additional funds to agriculture without diverting resources from either defense or heavy industry. But it is not clear whether the decision also signified the planning of further increases in the military budget to buy the hardware needed for an effective pre-emptive capability.

In short, doctrine is closely tied to the planning of forces and weapons in the USSR. And the decision made sometime in 1961 to adopt a doctrine of pre-emption bore far-reaching implications for the planning of the strategic forces of the USSR. It was but one of a number of important military policy decisions that were taken in that year--others included the suspension of the troop cut, the resumption of nuclear testing, the expanding of the (overt) military budget, the frustrating of efforts (mainly Khrushchev's) to divert resources from heavy industry to consumer welfare. Taken together, these measures signaled that a major reassessment of the military needs of the country had taken place.

B. Some Notes on Estimating Force Levels

A knowledge of the military doctrine guiding the development of Soviet strategic missile forces is an essential ingredient in the process of estimating Soviet force levels, but it is not sufficient for that purpose. Estimating force levels is not simply a matter of extrapolating numerical data from military doctrine. The estimating process is far more complex and requires other types of inputs which

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

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cannot be analyzed in this paper. What we do gain from a knowledge of Soviet military doctrine is, above all, a rough idea of the mission and role designated for the strategic missiles. This provides a sound foundation for the other building blocks of the estimating process. This foundation has been laid, we think, in the preceding sections of this paper.

There is yet another important service that the Soviet materials render as regards the problem of estimating force levels. While devoid of hard information on the size and composition of present or projected Soviet strategic forces, the classified sources do offer insights into the Soviet methodology of planning strategic forces.

First there is good evidence--especially in the form of Soviet target data--that the "requirements approach" is being used by the Soviet military planners. Perhaps the most explicit statement to this effect is the following extract from an article by Major General I. Zavyalov in the first issue of the "Special Collection" for 1960:

> It is beyond any doubt that both sides... will attempt to discover and to study all of each other's most important targets and particularly those such as missile sites, nuclear weapons storage sites, and military-industrial and political centers. The opponents will estimate and prepare the quantity of nuclear weapons needed for the annihilation of these targets and will take every measure required to accomplish the tasks of the war with the first massive salvoes of nuclear/missiles, using fixed launch sites already prepared in peacetime, and missile submarines and aviation.

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This approach is also reflected in statements in the "Special Collection" bearing on strategic weapons. Major General Gorbatov, for example, chided his comrades for talking imprecisely about having "sufficient quantities of weapons" without saying what this means in terms of numbers. In his view, the numbers of weapons needed will depend "entirely" on how many weapons the enemy has. Moreover, there is nothing in the materials to suggest that the USSR would count on the absolute destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack in the first massed nuclear strike. As pointed out earlier in this paper, doctrine stresses the economical and purposeful use of strategic weapons as well as the importance of destroying "the most important" enemy objectives.

Also, there are strong indications that the USSR is approaching the problem of preparing its armed forces for the start of a new war not in terms of all-offensive weapons but in terms of a versatile mix of weapons systems to meet the challenges posed by advances in Western weapons technology. Soviet requirements for a strategic force structure are calculated in terms of an <u>attack-defense</u> equation. Doctrine stipulates that "the success of nuclear/missile strikes, on the one hand, and of operations of the PVO Strany, on the other, particularly at the beginning of a war, will determine its further development to a great extent." (Pavlovsky) Through active and passive defense measures, the USSR evidently hopes to minimize the loss of life and general destruction expected to accrue from the enemy weapons not taken out in the Soviet first strike. It would seem from the impetus given the ABM program in the USSR, not necessarily to the neglect of offensive weapons, that the Soviet planners are placing increasing emphasis on their <u>defensive</u> requirements for a strike-first as well as retaliatory capability in view of the trend toward reduced vulnerability of U.S. attack systems.

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These insights permit us then to reconstruct, in part, the kind of methodology that the Soviet military planner uses in determining the force requirements appropriate to a doctrine of pre-emptive attack. First, he has to take into consideration the size, hardness and mobility of the enemy forces, as well as their communications and control systems. He must also weigh such factors pertaining to his own offensive weapons as C.E.P., yield, reliability, and assurance of delivery to target. He must consider his active defense (ABM and SAM) and passive defense capabilities and programs. And finally, he must take the value judgement as to what level of damage the USSR could absorb and still remain a great power, in order to determine the minimum force needed to do the job of pre-empting.

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C. The Problem of Warning

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There are, of course, a number of prerequisites for a successful pre-emptive action on a strategic scale. These include such factors as advanced warning, a high state of readiness, the proper hardware in the proper amounts, the reliability and accuracy of the delivery systems, the timing and evenness of the first volley, and so forth. For the purpose of this report, and adhering to the limitations imposed by our source materials, we shall discuss only two of the prerequisites for a pre-emptive strike: warning and readiness of the high command.

The classified materials air unofficial military views on the problem of warning, but shed little light on official military thinking with regard to how much warning they expect to have and how good the evidence will be regarding an attempted enemy surprise attack. The materials do not provide the answer to the critical question--on what evidence would the Soviets decide to launch a pre-emptive attack? Articles in the top secret "Special Collection" materials for 1960-61 do reveal that there was a sharp difference of opinion over whether a threatening period would precede a Western effort to mount a surprise attack. Some writers said categorically that a threatening situation would always occur, even if very short in duration. Others insisted that it would be foolhardy to count on a threatening period--i.e., aggravated international tensions. One writer stated that "if the armed forces are ready when there is no threat period, then they will always be ready when there is one." But he did not spell out what he meant by readiness when there is no threat period.

It is probably the case that the difference of views among individual military officers in the "Special Collection" reflects uncertainty and irresolution on this question on the official level. In any event, Soviet military planners must reason that the probability of having ample advanced warning of an enemy attack is great enough to justify the adoption of a pre-emptive

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during such a threat period. They made such recommendations as putting forces in a state of readiness for "immediate" employment, protecting troops, issuing them ammunition, giving them advanced orders, and, "above all," exercising secrecy in these matters. But the critical question--on what evidence would the Soviets attack pre-emptively?--still remains unanswered. There is the possibility that the minimum threshhold for taking the fatal decision to attack pre-emptively may not yet be determined in the USSR. For the party leadership jealously guards the prerogative of deciding on war, and might be loath to relinquish this decision to a fixed set of criteria that would automatically cause military action to be initiated. What the political leadership has done to safeguard its prerogative is the subject of the concluding section of the paper.

D. Strategic Command Machinery Streamlined

There is good evidence that the Soviet leadership has already taken measures of a command and organizational nature designed to speed up both the process of deciding to initiate war and the implementation of the decision. These measures enhance the feasibility of a strike-first strategy, whether or not they were taken for that purpose. They include the establishment in peacetime of a Supreme High Command, the direct and exclusive subordination of the Strategic Missile Forces (and possibly Long Range Aviation) to that authority, and the placing of one man--Khrushchev--at its head in the post of Supreme High Commander.

From their inception as a separate organizational entity in the USSR military establishment, the strategic

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

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missile forces have been centrally controlled. The establishment of "rocket troops"* as the "main" type of service, it will be recalled, was first announced by Khrushchev in his speech on the new doctrine in January 1960. Public statements by Khrushchev and Marshal Grechko in May 1960 made it clear the missile troops had their own command administrative structure comparable to other component force headquarters. But not until February 1961 was it made public, by Marshal Sokolovsky in a TASS interview, that the missile troops were divided into separate strategic and tactical elements, and that it was the "strategic" missile forces which constituted the main branch of service. The classified materials throw additional light on this matter. They indicate that in early 1960, the decision had already been taken to establish the "strategic missile forces" as a separate component force controlled exclusively from Moscow, and to subordinate tactical-operational rocket units to the Ground Troops and other major force components. They also indicate that provision had been made at that time for the creation in peacetime of a Supreme High Command to exercise control over the strategic missile forces.

The post of Supreme High Commander was apparently established more recently. In public statements made last fall, first Marshal Malinovsky and then Marshal Varentsov--commander of the tactical missile and artillery forces--referred to Khrushchev as the "Supreme High Commander." None of the classified materials which we have thus far examined--all of which were prepared before last fall--mentions the title.

*We use the terms "rocket" and "missile" interchangeable in this paper. "Rocket" is a literal translation of the Soviet "raketa"; "missile" is the preferred American translation of that term.

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

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Both that post and the institution of the Supreme High Command existed during World War II. Stalin, of course, wore the mantle of Supreme High Commander of the armed forces, relinquishing it at the end of the war. The revival of this command structure in peacetime is an extraordinary step--forced, it seems, by the nature of modern warfare. It is the Soviet view, apparently, that the vital requirements of constant readiness and of greatest speed in deciding on war and in implementing that decision do not permit a time-consuming transition to an alternate command structure--at least so far as the strategic forces of the country are concerned. Moreover, these requirements commend the placing of the decision-making power in the hands of one man. The assumption of the post of Supreme High Commander by Khrushchev--which of course implies his personal favor for the doctrine of pre-emption--effects the union of the highest political and military authority in one person, and gives Khrushchev a stature and authority comparable to that of the President of the United States.* Previously, the highest constitutional military authority in the USSR was in the person of the Minister of Defense, who held (and probably still holds) the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The highest actual military authority in the past (in the post-Stalin period) was, of course, centered in the ruling Party Presidium. Now, however, Khrushchev personally has assumed--or perhaps more correctly,

*Khrushchev recently alluded to his personal authority to initiate future war. At a rally in Sofia on 19 May, Khrushchev said, with reference to President Kennedy's statement on the circumstances under which the United States might initiate nuclear war:

> Does not this statement mean that the President of the United States wishes to urge me to compete with him in who will be the first to push the button?

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has been granted--the power personally to make the decision to initiate military action, and if necessary to circumvent the ruling party collegium in doing so. This, of course, has important political implications in that it undermines further the principle of collective leadership. Inasmuch as Khrushchev has already established a definite style of rule and has concentrated great powers in his own hands--he heads the government, the party, bureau for the RSFSR, and the Supreme Military Council--his assumption of control of the military will probably not result in any major changes in the internal political situation.* We surmise that, time permitting, Khrushchev would consult with the other Party Presidium members, or at least those representing the Party on the Supreme Military Council.**

Khrushchev's occupancy of the highest military office also has important implications for the political-military relationship in the USSR. As pointed out earlier, the technical nature of modern warfare, notably the need for short reaction time, has tended to increase the influence of the Soviet military in the making of critical strategic decisions. In placing himself at the head of the military establishment, the country's political leader counters this trend and re-asserts party-political supremacy over the military.

* But should the institution of Supreme High Command become a permanent one, as it seems to be, it might create a serious problem in the struggle for succession after Khrushchev leaves the scene.

**We have learned [redacted] that a Supreme Military Council exists. We are not informed of its precise functions, but it appears to be a high level military policy-making body consisting of several party presidium members and a number of senior military officers.

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At Khrushchev's disposal are the strategic missile forces. According to articles in the "Special Collection," the strategic missile forces are under the direct operational control of the Supreme High Command and are designated as "Reserve of the Supreme High Command." (A recent open source--KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 6, 1962--identified the strategic missile forces as the "instrument of the Supreme High Command.") They comprise a sizable organization with all the staff and support services usually associated with a full-fledged branch of the armed forces.

The decision regarding the objectives, the timing and the force of the strikes of the strategic missile forces is said to be entirely the prerogative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The decision will depend on the Soviet capability at the time to use the strategic nuclear missile weapons as well as on the nature of "the total situation." In this latter regard, the "political" factor is said to be the decisive one. It will, in short, be Khrushchev's decision.

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