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VOLUME 7:  
documents issued in 1963 year

Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

Skalozub Publishing  
Chicago

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
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SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM



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
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


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
**SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM**

This is a working paper, a preliminary study of some military aspects of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The paper is one in a series of reports and memoranda on Soviet military strategy and related matters.

The writer has drawn liberally upon the insights and research findings of colleagues in the DD/I Research Staff and in other components of the DD/I, but is solely responsible for the paper as a whole.

The DDI/RS would welcome comment on the paper, addressed to Irwin P. Halpern, the principal analyst, or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the staff. [redacted]

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SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM

SUMMARY

It is the thesis of this paper that the Soviets have not neglected the military implications of the rift with Communist China. Having failed in the 1950s to integrate Chinese military power into a Moscow-controlled bloc-wide military entity, the Soviets have tended since to exclude China and her followers from major Soviet military planning and bloc military and economic organizations. By 1960 the close Sino-Soviet military alliance, as originally conceived, was dead; a victim of the changed political relationship between the two Communist giants.

The new Soviet course has been to strengthen the Warsaw Pact as a military organization, to present it as the effective bloc military force (to the exclusion of China), to devise a doctrine on the primacy of strategic weapons (underscoring China's comparative military weakness), and to make it clear that the deterrent shield protecting China depends on Soviet good will. (The Soviets have implicitly threatened to withdraw the deterrent, which evidently never entailed an automatic Soviet commitment to fight on China's behalf, as late as January 1963.) Peiping recognizes the uncertainty of Soviet military help in time of crisis, and there is now very little military cooperation of any type between the two regimes.

The new Soviet scheme for dealing with China, moreover, appears intended to block avenues for the expansion of Chinese power and influence, and for acting militarily against China if necessary. With these objectives in view, the Soviets have denied China advanced weapons; have sought to delay Chinese development of nuclear/delivery weapons; have reduced economic and military aid to China to the minimum, short of risking the loss of Communist control of China; have formalized the military and economic isolation of the Chinese camp from the rest of the bloc; have sought to check the expansion of Chinese influence in underdeveloped areas in Asia; in supporting the growth of large neutralist countries (India-Indonesia), have been building up long-term counterweights to China in the Far East; and have taken measures to strengthen the security of Soviet borders with China, including the training of troops deployed in the Far East for combat against Chinese forces.

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM

National Interests at Stake

Among the factors underlying the Sino-Soviet dispute, the clash of national interests looms large and clearly permits no easy resolution. Both Chinese and Soviet spokesmen have addressed themselves to the national issue, though mainly in private channels.

In their long-winded polemical articles, the Chinese have been careful to avoid stating explicitly that their dispute with Khrushchev stems largely from considerations of China's national interests (which the Soviet leader has relegated to a secondary position of importance), but they have consistently criticized the Soviet leader for binding the entire strategy of the bloc to Soviet foreign policy requirements. There is evidence that the Chinese would prefer to have this situation reversed, tying the entire strategy of the bloc to Mao's idea of foreign policy requirements for China, while hiding behind a screen of "internationalist" phrases.

As for the Soviets, there is strong evidence from a variety of sources to indicate that the Soviet leaders find themselves at serious odds with the Chinese in the realm of state as well as party relations. Soviet propaganda, as early as July 1960, intimated that the Chinese are guilty of "narrow nationalism." And recently, in the 30 March CPSU letter to the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviets warned against organizing the Communist movement along geographical, national, or racial lines.

Soviet Image of the Chinese Threat

Out of the contest of national interests arises a threat to each other's national security. The Soviet perceptions of the Chinese Communist national threat to the USSR are in some respects apparent to us. Thus, the Soviets have manifested concern over:

- (a) the security of their country's extensive borders with China;
- (b) Chinese aspirations to become a nuclear power;
- (c) Chinese pretensions to hegemony in the Far East, Southeast Asia and South Asia;
- (d) Chinese (racial and national) chauvinism in general;
- (e) the magnitude of the Chinese population;
- (f) Chinese interference in the USSR's pursuit of "normal" relations with the Western powers;
- (g) Chinese efforts to displace Moscow as leader of the world Communist movement;
- (h) Chinese efforts to undermine Soviet policies toward underdeveloped countries; and
- (i) Chinese influence and interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.

At the bottom of Soviet worries evidently is the prospect of China's emergence in time as a powerful military neighbor, independent of control or strong influence from Moscow, and in possession of nuclear weapons. It is in this light that the composite Chinese threat appears particularly sinister to the Soviets.

Elements of Soviet Strategy Against China

The measures of a military-related nature which the Soviets have seen fit to take against the Chinese threat--long

as well as short run--point to the existence of an overall strategic scheme. By this we do not mean a rigid plan or blueprint but a continually evolving strategy that is based on a changing relationship with China. (We also allow for the possibility of differences among Soviet leaders on the Chinese question.) At this juncture, Soviet strategy as we perceive it is generally bent on restricting the growth of Chinese military power, whereas prior to 1960 Soviet strategy sought to promote it within predetermined bounds. The currently operative elements of Soviet strategy for dealing with the Chinese problem, we think, are the following:

- (a) deny China technologically advanced weapons (nuclear and non-nuclear);
- (b) delay for as long as possible, by whatever politically feasible means are available, Chinese development of a nuclear weapon/delivery capability;
- (c) give various types of advanced weapons (non-nuclear) to countries such as Indonesia and India, which may employ them politically or militarily against China as well as against members of Western alliances;
- (d) foster, in general, a policy of containing the spread of Chinese influence in the underdeveloped areas of the world;
- (e) take measures to strengthen the security of borders with China, particularly critical areas like Vladivostok that might be vulnerable to Chinese attack and that may be targets of Chinese long-range irredentism; with the same end in view, encourage anti-Chinese feeling among border peoples in Soviet Central Asia and, in a lower key, subvert border populations in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria;
- (f) isolate China and her followers militarily and economically from the rest of the bloc, changing insubstance if not in form the Sino-Soviet military alliance;
- (g) expand Soviet influence in countries on the periphery of China, using politically feasible if diverse and seemingly contradictory methods, in order to deny them to China;

(h) in this regard, build up Mongolia militarily and economically, through integration in the CEMA community and close ties with the Warsaw Pact;

(i) reduce all forms of economic and military aid to China to the minimum (steps beyond which would give comfort to the "enemies of Communism"); in other words, do not seek the collapse of the Communist regime in China, for such a development might create an even greater threat to the USSR in the form of a neutral or even pro-Western Chinese regime; and

(j) retain sole and complete control over the Soviet strategic deterrent, so as to offer China some protection from a U.S.-led attack against the mainland while minimizing the risk of being dragged into a war with the U.S. or its allies as a result of independent Chinese foreign policy or military initiatives.

The Military Alliance in the Fifties

In the first decade of the Chinese Communist regime, China featured importantly in Soviet strategic military planning. It seems to have been the view of Soviet officialdom --of the Stalin and Khrushchev regimes alike--that the national security interests of the USSR would best be served by building up a strong modernized conventional force in China; that Chinese power would play a viable role in East-West relations, and would help to swing the strategic balance of power in the world decisively in favor of the Soviet-led "socialist camp." Soviet planners must also have calculated that the USSR, through political influence in Peiping, could exercise adequate safeguards over Chinese military forces and assure their close coordination with the Soviet high command in times of political crisis as well as in military combat situations.

A close military alliance between the two states was created in February 1950, a year after Peiping fell to the Communists, with the signing of a thirty-year treaty of friendship and mutual defense. The treaty committed the USSR to support China if attacked by Japan or "any state allied with it," but, at least in the published version, did not underwrite possible Chinese military initiatives. The treaty also provided for the return to China, after a fixed period of time,

of Port Arthur, Dairen, and the Manchurian railways, and granted China a credit of 300 million dollars. A series of economic and trade agreements were drawn up in ensuing months; China was to supply the USSR with raw materials in exchange for arms, machinery, and the services of Soviet technicians and advisers. Joint Sino-Soviet companies, modelled on those in Eastern Europe, were set up to exploit China's mineral wealth and other natural resources. Four months after the creation of the Sino-Soviet military alliance, the Korean War was unleashed by direction from Moscow. The war marked a period of very close military-political collaboration between Moscow and Peiping. It intensified Chinese military and economic dependence on the USSR, which gave generously of its resources. Throughout the conflict Moscow retained overall control of Chinese and North Korean operations, of the protracted and acrimonious negotiations (which constituted an important tactic in the management of the military crisis), and of the decision (made only after Stalin's death) to sign an armistice.

The lessons of the Korean War--notably, the willingness of China to perform loyally as a junior partner in a harmonious relationship with the USSR--undoubtedly strengthened Soviet confidence in the military alliance. Even before the USSR fully emerged from the political succession crisis--in which an important divisive issue among the contenders for power was the question of national defense and resource allocations--a renewed Soviet effort was made to strengthen the military alliance with the Chinese. In October 1954, Khrushchev and some of his supporters went to Peiping to sign the second major economic aid treaty with China, ushering in a period of massive Soviet industrial and military assistance to that country. The Soviets, to be sure, demanded repayment for that assistance. In exchange for the loan of skilled technicians and shipments of machinery and equipment vital to China's industrialization program and armaments vital to her defense, the USSR received raw materials, foodstuffs and textiles that had no direct bearing on Soviet industrial production. The priority contributions to China's industrialization program as the Russians have said, were probably of considerable cost to the Soviet economy and hindered to some extent the equipment of the



programmed Soviet industrial expansion.\* They underscore the importance which the USSR attached to the military alliance at that time.

In keeping with the policy of strengthening the military alliance, Soviet assistance to the Chinese industrial-military machine continued on a large scale from 1955 to 1960. We know very little about the military hardware transferred to China. We do know that in this period the Chinese got favorable treatment among the Soviet satellites and non-bloc recipients of Soviet military aid and assistance. To be sure, the Chinese did not receive much of the first-line equipment that was being issued to Soviet troops, but neither did any other country until the switch in Soviet strategic policy that accompanied

\*According to the original agreement the Soviet Union was to provide the Chinese in the second half of the fifties with approximately 560 million (new) rubles of machinery for the 156 factories which the Soviets were to assist the Chinese in constructing. In addition, there was an agreement for an undisclosed amount of military hardware to be supplied to the Chinese Communists, possibly of the same order of magnitude as the investment machinery. The machinery and equipment to be supplied amounted to only about 1.5 percent of Soviet producers durables production during the 1956-60 period. Nevertheless, the burden on the Soviet Union was quite out of proportion to the arithmetical expression, particularly from 1959 on. During the period 1955-58 the Soviets were able to allocate about two-thirds of the increment to machinery and equipment output to investment but the rising cost of military programs reversed this relationship in 1959. In the period 1959-62 nearly two-thirds of the increment to machinery and equipment output has been allocated to the military, with an attendant slowdown in Soviet economic growth and the continued poor prospects for the growth of consumption which the Soviet leaders have lately communicated to their people. Thus the burden of Soviet shipments of machinery, producers durables and military hardware to the Chinese by 1960 had become an economic burden of considerable significance for the overstrained Soviet economy.

the rapid deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in 1960. (Until then, all advanced weapons in East Germany were in the hands of Soviet troops stationed there. And the armies of the East European satellites, despite their inclusion in the Warsaw Pact organization which was set up in 1955, were not assigned an important role in Soviet military planning.) In short, prior to 1960, the Soviets supplied the Chinese with the most advanced equipment made available anywhere outside the USSR, including later models of MIG's and even a few Badgers (TU-16's) and SAM's. The Soviets also helped to construct and equip aircraft plants in China. But the amount and types of aid that the Soviets gave the Chinese in their atomic energy and rocket programs is still largely a mystery.

One of the most perplexing and critical questions is whether the Soviet scheme in the 1950s--to build up Chinese military might in the "socialist commonwealth" (sodruzhestvo)--included an intention to help China become a nuclear power in a military sense. There are three distinct aspects of the nuclear question. First, it is clear that Soviet leaders from the start had no intention of giving the Chinese finished nuclear weapons. Second, there is good evidence that the Soviets were willing to promote at least a peaceful nuclear energy program in China. Following a "peaceful atoms" agreement with the Chinese in 1955, the Soviets furnished them with a research reactor along with other related equipment and began to train the Chinese in nuclear energy technology. The third and crucial question--which we cannot as yet answer satisfactorily--is whether the Soviets deliberately sought to promote a military nuclear program in China. Arguments can be brought to bear on both sides of the question. There is simply no indisputable evidence of direct Soviet assistance to the Chinese project.

We are inclined to think, on the basis of the available evidence, that the Soviet leaders were never more than very reluctant partners to any agreement to promote a nuclear weapons program in China. We think it probable that in the year or two after the Korean War, the experience of which enhanced Soviet confidence in the loyalty and tractability of the Chinese Communists, the Soviet leaders acquiesced to Chinese requests for assistance in both a peaceful and military nuclear

energy program.\* We think, further, that the Soviets may have helped to get the Chinese military program off the ground by giving Chinese scientists basic training in nuclear technology. And if a gaseous diffusion plant does exist in China, we surmise that the Soviets helped construct it.\*\* (The fact that all work at the suspected plant ceased for at least two years after Soviet scientists and technicians were withdrawn from China points to Soviet participation at that site.) But we think it highly unlikely that the Soviets at any time knowingly gave the Chinese the most crucial, sensitive information on nuclear weapons design. In other words, we are inclined to think that the Soviets never deliberately gave the Chinese much of the kind of technical information (which was not already general knowledge) or equipment needed for the development of an atomic bomb. And we attribute this presumed state of affairs primarily to a growing Soviet awareness in the middle and late 1950s that the Chinese would not be constant in their tractability and loyalty to Moscow.

If our thesis is correct that the USSR withheld information critical to the development and, specifically, the design of the nuclear weapon, how did the Chinese come by the essential information (assuming that they have it)? According to an apparently knowledgeable defector, [redacted]

[redacted] the Chinese acquired the vital information by means of espionage in the USSR. However, there is no confirmation

\*There might even have been a quid pro quo arrangement. [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets agreed to give the Chinese technical know-how in exchange for fissionable materials; the Soviets, according to the source, kept their part of the bargain, but the Chinese reneged.

\*\*Recent U.S. national estimates say it is "probable" that the plant in question (at Lanchow) is a gaseous diffusion plant. But [redacted]

[redacted] that the USSR had never given China help with or information concerning a gaseous diffusion plant.

of this in any of the many public and private Sino-Soviet polemics of recent years.\*

\* [redacted] related the following [redacted]

By 1959, despite the Soviet refusal to provide the Chinese with information concerning the production of nuclear weapons, the Soviets determined that the Chinese had begun the construction of an atomic bomb. The production and research appear to be centered in one of the more remote northern provinces of China. The Soviets upon further investigation determined that Chinese experts and scientists engaged in this project had been trained earlier at Soviet institutions. This led the Soviets to consider the possibility that Chinese intelligence had exploited this exchange and assistance program in order to procure within the USSR itself the details needed for the inauguration of a construction and research program for atomic weapons. Charges to this effect were made by the Soviets. The Chinese denied these charges but with an ever more inflated self-confidence boasted that they would have a useful nuclear bomb in two years. They further felt that with this weapon in hand they could further ignore the strength of the United States, and when the Soviets contradicted them on this, the Chinese implied that the Russians were trying to scare them with a "paper tiger." The angered Soviets charged the Chinese with recklessness. These two Soviet charges, i.e., Chinese espionage in the USSR and recklessness in international relations, paralleled each other since they were precipitated by the same root cause. In answer the Chinese charged that such accusations were undoubtedly the result of some "masked provocation" on the part of unspecified "groups" in the USSR and the situation then rapidly deteriorated. [redacted]

All the while that the Soviets sought to strengthen the military alliance with China on Soviet terms in the years 1955-59, forces were at work in China to reduce Chinese military dependence on the USSR and to improve their junior position in the alliance. As early as 1955, the Chinese leadership had evidently decided to strive for self-sufficiency in armaments production. (Thus, at a National People's Congress in Peiping in July 1955, a senior official, Yeh Chien-ying implicitly deplored China's dependent status, declaring that "our industry must be speeded up in order to remedy China's inability to provide the armed forces with the most modern equipment.") On an either/or basis the Chinese would prefer to purchase the means of production rather than the finished weapons, so as to reduce reliance of Soviet good fellowship.

In the late 1950s, the Soviets saw still more reasons to question their earlier assumptions about the loyal subservience of the Chinese. Following the announced Soviet ICBM test in September 1957 the Chinese began to view the world strategic situation differently than the Soviets. In their public discourse, the Chinese took a more optimistic view of the Soviet strategic position than the Soviets themselves did, and regarded the USSR as capable of taking greater risks than Soviet leaders were inclined to take.

It has been persuasively argued in a number of places that the November 1957 Conference of Communist parties in Moscow was of critical importance in the Sino-Soviet dispute over strategy and the question of nuclear weapons sharing. It was at that time that Khrushchev probably balked at giving the Chinese serious assistance in the development of their own nuclear weapons as well as finished nuclear weapons. This would help to explain why in the following year, the Chinese publicly reasserted the validity of the traditionalist military doctrine expounded by Mao and vigorously disparaged nuclear weapons; rebuked professionalism in the PLA; rejected the implicit pleading of professionals for a crash nuclear program in China; and generally made it clear that Chinese nuclear weapons would have to await the time when Chinese industry, science and technology were sufficiently developed to produce them. If they had been granted substantial Soviet aid for the development of an indigenous nuclear weapons program, the Chinese would not have had to assert the need to develop an industrial scientific base first. Indicative of the pessimism in Peiping on this matter was the statement made by

by Marshal Ho Lung on 1 August 1958 that China could not rely on "outside aid" in trying to solve its military problems. (The day before Ho's warning, Khrushchev, alarmed by a sharp upsurge in Chinese propaganda calling for the "liberation" of Taiwan, arrived in Peiping for an unannounced three-day visit.)

The Taiwan crisis of 1958--the result of a Chinese foreign policy initiative--probably had a critical effect on Soviet attitudes toward the military alliance with China. The eagerness of the Chinese in the Taiwan affair to pit Soviet power and prestige against U.S. power in the area must have had a sobering effect on Khrushchev. The crisis dramatized for him the danger that China could drag the USSR into a catastrophic nuclear war with the United States. Khrushchev's anxiety over the possible consequences of the Sino-Soviet military alliance in the Taiwan crisis is seen in the extremely cautious way that he raised the Soviet deterrent shield to protect China from the U.S. threat. Only after the U.S. made it clear that there was no plan to attack Communist China and Chou En-lai made an offer to negotiate did the Soviet leader recall the USSR's commitment to defend China.

Also during this period the Soviets unsuccessfully sought closer cooperation between the Soviet and the Chinese operational military commands. In this respect, the Soviets made several proposals for military cooperation that were rejected by the Chinese for unspecified reasons. Specifically, Peiping is reported to have rejected Soviet proposals for the establishment of Soviet submarine, missile bases, air bases and radar installations in China.\* Peiping reportedly also rejected Soviet-proposed arrangements for joint air defense in wartime, that is, mutual use of the other's bases.

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A proposal had also reportedly been made to set up a joint naval command in the Far East; although it could not be determined from the reports what the terms of the proposal were or which party initiated it, it seems likely that the Soviets preferred it and the Chinese rejected it on the grounds of being allotted a secondary role.

There is yet another discordant element in the Sino-Soviet military relationship during the decade (the 1950s) of generally close political and military association. This pertains to the historic anxiety that the Soviets have manifested over their borders with China. Since World War II, Soviet military contingents have been constantly deployed at various points along the Sino-Soviet border, in addition to the regular border troops performing routine security duties there. The Soviet forces were kept there with some fluctuations in their complement after the withdrawal of the U.S. ground threat from the area, after a "friendly" Communist regime was set up in China, and after the Korean War was terminated; and they have been deployed in a manner that would permit quickest penetration into China. (In European Russia, the bulk of Soviet combat-ready forces has also been concentrated in border areas to facilitate a rapid thrust into Western Europe as well as to deal with emergencies in the satellites.) Soviet forces deployed near Chinese territory moreover, have never to our knowledge participated in joint military exercises with the Chinese. (In contrast, the Soviets in the 1950s held combined exercises with neighboring Eastern European armies.) As will be shown shortly, Soviet forces in the Far East have been trained to act against a possible Chinese enemy.

#### The New Soviet Concept of Bloc Military Power

Taking stock toward the end of the first decade of Chinese Communist rule, the Soviet leaders saw plainly that they had failed to achieve their main strategic objectives regarding China and that there were very dim prospects for attaining them. The USSR had not managed to integrate Chinese military power into a Moscow-controlled military entity; had not strengthened Chinese loyalty and subservience to the USSR (of the sort in evidence in the Korean War); and had not increased Chinese military dependence on the USSR but lost much

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ground in this respect. The Soviet leaders may also have been concerned that the substantial contributions that the USSR had made--at no small cost--to the Chinese industrial-military machine not only were not paying dividends, but had helped to create a significant potential threat to themselves.

By spring 1960, when political tensions between the two allies flared up, the Sino-Soviet military alliance as originally conceived was all but dead. From the Soviet standpoint, the nature of the alliance had to change once the USSR could no longer sufficiently influence Chinese foreign and military policy from the center--i.e., Peiping. This was a *sine qua non* for the alliance, as conceived by the Soviets. Without confidence in political influence over Peiping, Moscow could not assign China a place of importance in Soviet military planning, for there would be no assurance that the Chinese would execute the military-political tasks assigned it in time of crisis. Perhaps more important, the USSR would be vulnerable to extreme military risks from any commitment to China's defense in a crisis involving the United States. As Soviet behavior in the 1958 Taiwan crisis seems to suggest, at no time was the Soviet commitment to act on China's behalf automatic, but was to be determined at any juncture on the basis of a careful Soviet evaluation of the actual situation. The treaty insofar as it extends the deterrent shield to China was not abrogated--for it still served Soviet purposes: As long as the USSR can manipulate its nuclear deterrent on China's behalf, it is in a position to limit and perhaps define the nature of overt Chinese military moves. For, as the 1958 Taiwan crisis has again shown, China cannot achieve even local objectives in the face of U.S. opposition without overt Soviet backing.

The changed political relationship between Moscow and Peiping resulted in a Soviet decision that the national interests of the USSR would best be served not by the buildup of a bloc-wide, loose military organization, but by the concentrated buildup of Soviet military power and that of satellites militarily controlled by Moscow through the instrument of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the new Soviet course introduced in early 1960 was to strengthen the Warsaw Pact as an operational military organization, while de-emphasizing Soviet reliance on Chinese military strength. By late summer of 1960, the whole complement of Soviet scientists, engineers and technicians, with few exceptions, was withdrawn from China. In doing this

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the Soviets virtually sabotaged the entire Chinese industrial effort. Also Soviet-Chinese cooperation in nuclear energy was henceforth restricted to the innocuous non-military research conducted at the Soviet-controlled Dubna Institute, where most bloc countries have been represented.

It is also noteworthy that in early 1960, the Soviets (at Khrushchev's initiative) came forth with a new military doctrine of primary reliance on nuclear/missile weapons that further widened the gap between Soviet and Chinese military thought, policy, and force structure. The import of the new Soviet military doctrine (which in time underwent important modifications) dramatized China's continuing military weakness compared with the military postures and strategies open to the USSR and the United States. Incensed over this development, the Chinese leadership within a week after Khrushchev announced the new doctrine made it clear (in a resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress) that China had great power pretensions, aspired to become a nuclear power, would not permit its interests to be disregarded by the great powers (the USSR and United States), and would not be bound by Soviet commitments to the West (as in disarmament agreements).

It has only been in the past three years that the Warsaw Pact--created in 1955 as a political counter to NATO and as a means for exerting control over the satellites--has featured significantly in Soviet war planning. Since 1960, after the fallout with the Chinese, the Soviets have been pressing the development of the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact alliance. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states have been strengthened and re-equipped with up-to-date Soviet weapons; and increased emphasis has been placed on integrating Warsaw Pact forces in exercises. Of late, Soviet military spokesmen have given prominence to the Warsaw Pact, portraying it as the effective military organization of the socialist camp. This was strongly intimated by Marshal Malinovsky in his Army-Navy Day speech of last February. In an obvious rebuff to China, Malinovsky stated that the Soviet armed forces are "developing and strengthening their combat comradeship with the fraternal armies of the socialist countries united by the Warsaw Pact"; he observed that the socialist states--with the implied exclusion of China and its followers--have "merged their economic and military potential," i.e., through the CEMA and Warsaw Pact; and he equated the

Soviet-allied governments with the Warsaw Pact member states, noting that their armed forces were, along with Soviet forces, brought to a state of "complete military readiness" during the Cuban crisis. It is also noteworthy that while China was never a member of the Warsaw Pact, that country was represented at meetings of the organization by "observers." But no Chinese "observers"--whether by their choice or by Soviet decision--have attended Warsaw Pact meetings since March 1961. (China's follower Albania, according to Soviet statements has "excluded itself" from the organization.) Also significant and related to this development was the effective exclusion of China from the future economic life of the bloc with the reorganization in mid-1962 of CEMA, now portrayed as the viable economic organization of the socialist camp.

These developments do not necessarily affect the willingness of USSR to pose as protector of the entire socialist camp and of Cuba as well. Soviet spokesmen continue to do this; witness Khrushchev's 27 February election speech. But what the Soviets are saying now, it seems, is that the bulwark of defense of the socialist camp is the Warsaw Pact and first of all the USSR, not the armed forces of the camp as a whole. Hence, though they "cordially" extend the protective umbrella of the strategic deterrent over other countries building socialism, the Warsaw Pact countries headed by the USSR may withdraw that protection. An implicit threat to this effect was made in a Pravda editorial as late as 7 January 1963. Threatened withdrawal of the Soviet shield against attacks on China was also implied in Soviet statements in the past, as in Marshal Malinovsky's remarks on 24 January 1962, when he spoke of the Soviet ability to defend socialist countries "friendly to us." That ominous distinction between friendly and unfriendly socialist countries was repeated by the Soviet Ambassador in Peiping in the following month and used again in a March 1962 issue of the Soviet Defense Ministry journal,



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KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES.\* In other words, the Soviets have threatened abrogation of the Sino-Soviet treaty in the event that the Chinese do not heel to.

The Chinese, for their part, take a very conservative view of the possibility of Soviet military assistance in the event of Chinese involvement in a military crisis.

[redacted]

(We share the scepticism of the Chinese about Soviet willingness to fight on China's behalf, especially in the event of U.S. involvement in a military crisis with China. We think that it is almost certain that the Soviets would not enter the conflict on a predetermined basis or become automatically involved through a treaty commitment. The Soviet

\*The first threat of this type was made in an article by S. Titarenko in the 16 August 1960 issue of SOVIETSKAYA LATVIA:

Can one imagine a successful construction of socialism in contemporary conditions even in such a great country as, let us say, China, if this country was in an isolated situation, not supported by the cooperation and mutual help of other socialist countries? It would have been subjected to an economic blockade from capitalist countries; such a country at the same time would be subjected to military blows from outside. It would have been tried by greatest difficulties even in the event it could withstand the mad onslaught of the enemy.

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decision to intervene, and the method of intervention, will most probably depend upon a Soviet evaluation of the general situation at the time of the crisis.)

In the current stage of military relations, there is very little military cooperation of any type between China and the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

And the Soviets, significantly have done nothing (apart from taking note, in Soviet propaganda, of Chinese complaints) to bring a halt to U-2 reconnaissance flights over China. In addition, evidence of the lack of liaison between China and the USSR on matters of military policy was provided by Ulbricht last January at the Sixth SED Congress. The East German party chief complained --as no other bloc source had previously done--that China failed to give advance notice to the bloc of its intention to attack India. (By the same token the Soviets probably did not inform any bloc member of their intention to move strategic weapons into Cuba.)

The question of dealing militarily with the Chinese threat has not been raised in Soviet military writings--

[redacted] The subject is obviously [redacted] and could not be expected to be aired publicly. The absence of any reference to the Chinese problem in the available [redacted] military articles may be explained by the penchant of the security-conscious regime to discuss delicate questions--such as the Chinese problem, the role and capabilities of the Soviet ICBM force, contingency planning for local military crisis--only among those immediately concerned--i.e., those having a "need to know." It is also possible that a doctrine has not been worked out, and will not be, that is explicitly addressed to the Chinese problem. It may be felt that this is strictly a political question, that doctrine governing the use of forces against the Western allies may also apply (minus nuclear weapons) to the possible Chinese enemy. (In this respect, it is noteworthy

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that problems of conducting operations in desert regions and in the Far East, in general, have been discussed in the doctrinal materials.)

Strategy to Prevent Nuclear/Missile Diffusion

The USSR, it is clear, has sought to prevent the Chinese from becoming a nuclear power for as long as possible. With this objective, the Soviets have not given the Chinese nuclear weapons (or modern delivery vehicles) and, [redacted] have denied aid to the Chinese nuclear energy program since re-evaluating the strategic consequences of that aid several years ago. The Soviets have also explored, but for the time being evidently shelved, the idea of concluding an agreement with the U.S. with the object of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not now possess them. The Chinese, for their part, have publicly attacked the U.S. position--and by implication the Soviet--on a test ban and nuclear non-diffusion on the grounds that it is designed to deprive China of the possibility of becoming a nuclear power while preserving existing U.S. (and Soviet) military might. The Chinese [redacted] have sharply and directly attacked the Soviets for this attempt. The apparent Soviet decision not to press for agreement on a nuclear non-diffusion pact may have been the result of a decision that such a pact would probably not have any effect on China after all; that the established policy of denying any Soviet assistance is about all the USSR can hope to do to slow down the pace of China's work in the nuclear field.

The Soviets have, of course, also denied the Chinese any finished missile delivery systems of strategic range. It appears in retrospect, however, that the Soviets did help the Chinese to get some kind of a guided missile program off the ground. The supposition that the Soviets gave the Chinese substantial assistance in their guided missile program is based mainly on the similarities of certain Chinese launch facilities to those in the USSR. Since 1960, the Chinese missile program has progressed very slowly, evidently having been set back drastically when the Soviets withdrew. What is more, the Soviets have in the past year evinced a desire to prevent the Chinese from acquiring strategic missiles in the

future through international agreement. In this respect, Gromyko's proposal, first made at the UN in September 1962 and reintroduced only last month at Geneva, that the U.S. and USSR agreed to the maintenance between them of a limited number of missiles for a limited period of time, has strong anti-Chinese overtones. By singling out the U.S. and USSR as the only two countries to be excepted from the provisions for total destruction of delivery vehicles in Stage I of general disarmament, the proposal implied that other countries will not have their own defenses at a time when, presumably, the danger of possible strategic attack remains.

The Soviets, in short, seem to have concluded that they cannot prevent the Chinese from acquiring a nuclear/missile capability; all they can hope to do, it seems, is to defer the time when the Chinese will realize this goal. Various Soviet statements foresee an early Chinese nuclear explosion; even outside Soviet estimates place it within three years time.\* But the Soviets evidently have not yet made adequate preparations for the arrival of that moment of truth. Some kind of detente with the West--perhaps in the form of a disarmament arrangement--may have appeared to the Soviets to be a promising way to put curbs on China once it becomes a nuclear power. But as recent reports have pointed out, the Soviets at the disarmament table are still (early 1963) pessimistic about a breakthrough in disarmament in the near future; they point out that the politicians and the military in the USSR must first reach a common ground before technical plans for an accommodation with the U.S. can even be considered. And, most important, [redacted] reports the view of Soviet colleagues that the Soviets do not even discuss what will have to be done with the Chinese Communists or Chinese resistance in this field, if the accommodation point should be reached."

There are conflicting reports about how the Soviets think the Chinese will act once they acquire a limited nuclear capability. [redacted] the opinion the Chinese [redacted] prone to reckless military

\*Statements of this sort may reflect tactical Soviet positions in disarmament discussions with the West.

adventures; that Chinese leaders really believe that a nuclear war would destroy capitalism and thereby leave the field clear for Chinese survivors to build a new world. Other Soviet officials say in private, that China's apparent propensity to adopt a hard-line and warlike attitude toward the West is nonsense; they characterize the Chinese as "barking dogs without teeth" since they speak of nuclear war without themselves possessing nuclear weapons; and they predict that once the Chinese acquire a nuclear capability of their own, they will speak in a more responsible fashion.

[redacted] Soviet public opinion, registering the effects of the regime's propaganda effort to discredit the Chinese, tends to take a fearful view of Chinese possession of nuclear weapons. Some Soviet citizens commenting on the subject to foreigners reportedly seem to feel that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Chinese would be directed primarily against the Soviet Union. When told that it seemed likely that Communist China would develop a nuclear device within the next year or two, one Russian, for example, observed, "Well, I suppose they will still have to build bombers before they start dropping them on us."

Trade and Aid Developments

The Soviet policy of slowing down China's progress toward becoming a military-industrial power has been in force for three years now. Soviet military aid and assistance to China is now very small, although not cut off altogether. (An example of the extremely selective and low-level military assistance [redacted])

[redacted] And Soviet trade with China has continued to decline. Sino-Soviet trade, according to recently published Soviet trade figures, amounted to some \$600-700 million in 1962. This figure is a third less than it was in 1961 and represents a two-thirds drop from the peak of \$2

billion in 1959. The Soviets still sell China some petroleum products and a few basic heavy industrial items. But even this may go by the board.\*

The Border Problem

Soviet concern over the Sino-Soviet borders long antedates the ideological polemic between Peiping and Moscow. The Soviets since World War II have kept sizeable ground forces in several areas near the Chinese border--and have strengthened those forces in recent years. The Soviets have evidently long been aware that the Chinese might harbor expansionist ambitions, and have of late been given strong reason by the Chinese to fear and take precautionary measures against possible Chinese incursion in Soviet frontier areas. A number of border incidents have probably served to heighten Soviet suspicion of Peiping's intentions. In 1960 [redacted]

[redacted] reported an incursion by armed Chinese from Sinkiang into the Kirgiz SSR.

[redacted] More border incidents occurred in spring and summer of 1962.

\*In March, Ambassador Kohler reported [redacted]

[redacted] that China has decided not to make any further debt payments to the USSR and that the latter in return is suspending all trade relations. (This report has not been confirmed, and seems to us doubtful.)



[Redacted]

Then in March, Peiping openly raised the border question in a People's Daily editorial. The editorial used Khrushchev's sarcastic jibes about Chinese caution in dealing with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as a peg for bitter discussion of the "unequal treaties" by which the Chinese Empire was shorn of its rights and territory. Tsarist Russia was named as one of the offending colonial powers, the author of three of the nine agreements specifically mentioned. This discussion was followed by a restatement of Peiping's declared intention to examine in good time all treaties concluded by previous Chinese governments and to accept, revise, or abrogate them as it sees fit.

The Soviets now maintain just under ten percent of combat-ready forces in the Far East.\* Major concentrations of ground forces in Sino-Soviet border areas include three rifle divisions and one airborne division in the Dushanbe - Tashkent - Alma Ata area; three tank and two rifle divisions in the Irkutsk-Bezrechnaya area; one rifle and one airborne division in the Blagoveshchensk-Belogorsk area; and six rifle divisions in the southern Primorskiy Kray. At least some of these units seem to have trained for the possibility that they would have to protect Soviet territory from an attack by the Chinese. It is also noteworthy that the Soviets have in

\*The paragraphs on the deployment and exercises of Soviet forces in the Far East were prepared with the help of the Military Division of OCI.

[Redacted]

recent months deployed new air defense radar units near the Manchurian border and along the Soviet-Mongolian border. This pattern of deployment reflects a felt need in the USSR to increase coverage of aircraft approaching from the direction of China.

In March 1962 a Soviet field training exercise countered an attack from across the Manchurian border southward into the Lake Khanka area of the Primorskiy Kray. This is an area which Russia acquired by the Treaty of Peking in 1865, which the Chinese have threatened to abrogate. Because large Soviet ground force exercises almost invariably are conducted on the terrain and along the area anticipated under wartime conditions and under as realistic conditions as possible, it appears that the exercise envisaged a Chinese Communist drive from the north toward Vladivostok.

[Redacted]

While this was the first firm indication that training of this scope and nature takes place, there are suggestions that a wariness on the part of Soviet military planners as to China's intentions has existed for several years.

It does not appear that Peiping wishes to become embroiled in frontier clashes with the Soviet Union. Since the summer of 1962, however, there have been a number of reports which suggest Peiping has started to strengthen border defenses in the key Manchurian area by introducing troops where there had previously been only police and frontier guards.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Pursuit of Mongolia

While economic and military relations between the USSR and China have deteriorated to the extent of virtual isolation of China from Soviet-controlled intra-bloc military and economic organizations, Soviet relations with Mongolia have taken a sharp positive turn. In July 1961, Soviet presidium member Suslov was sent to attend the Mongolian Party Congress, at which he made a reference to the "firm security" of the Outer Mongolia borders on both the Chinese and Soviet sides. In this he may have been reassuring the Outer Mongolian Party that Moscow would not tolerate Chinese attempts at border adjustments. (Chinese Communist maps, unlike Soviet ones, have persistently shown the Sino-Mongolian border as undelimited.) In June 1962, Mongolia was made a full member of CEMA, and there is some evidence of closer military ties between Mongolia and the Warsaw Pact--although Mongolia has apparently not been admitted to full membership, evidently for reasons of its very delicate geographical position. In July 1962, Marshal Rokossovsky made a protracted visit to Mongolia that may have had important consequences for Soviet-Mongolian military relations. While there is no evidence of a recent re-equipment program for the Mongolian armed forces (intelligence on this subject is sparse), it seems likely that the Soviets have taken steps to strengthen Mongolia's defenses. Hints of such action were heard in a Soviet broadcast of 18 March recalling the history of USSR-Mongolian military ties. The broadcast claimed that in recent years the Mongolian army has received modern aircraft and tanks. Reflecting Soviet concern over Chinese Communist intentions toward Mongolia, the broadcast also pointed out that the Soviet-Mongolian mutual defense treaty concluded in 1946 has been an important factor in safeguarding peace in the Far East.

The Soviet Strategy of Containment

It is now clear that the USSR wishes to check the increase of Chinese influence not only across the frontiers of the USSR but in South Asia and Southeast Asia as well. It is a well-established fact that the Soviets have for some time been trying by a variety of means to wean Communist North Korea and North Vietnam away from China, and to isolate the

Chinese militarily and economically within the bloc. In this connection, it also appears to be a long-range Soviet objective to support the growth of large neutralist countries in Asia that could be used as counterweights, in a geopolitical sense, to Chinese power in the area. Soviet support to the military establishments of such countries as Indonesia and India, while varying greatly and serving different objectives, seems to be designed to serve this objective as well. Recent indications of Soviet eagerness to render military assistance to Burma and Cambodia--countries in which Chinese political influence already predominates--are also suggestive of a Soviet interest in improving the position of the USSR in the area, at the expense of the Chinese. Similarly, Soviet behavior in the very complex Laotian situation may also be said to have anti-Chinese overtones: to the extent that they have cooperated in sponsoring the present arrangement for governing the country, the Soviets have helped to forestall what would amount to a Chinese Communist takeover of the country.

The anti-Chinese nature of the Soviet decision to supply India with some modern military equipment--including MIG 21's which had been denied to China--for use against Chinese forces in the Indian border dispute is self-evident. To be sure, in supplying India with military aid, the Soviets are seeking to recoup bloc prestige which suffered a general reduction in India as a result of the military clashes along the Sino-Indian border last fall. The Soviets are strongly motivated, further, by a felt need to prevent a drastic swing on India's part from non-alignment to closer relations with the U.S. and U.K. But the fact remains that the Soviet transfer of weapons to India at a time of conflict with China demonstrates additionally the Soviet desire that the weapons be used politically or militarily against the Chinese, as a rebuff to apparent Chinese pretensions to political hegemony in the area. The fact that the amount of Soviet military aid to India is small is not important, it seems to us: the Chinese threat to India was itself small, for the Chinese had no intention

\*DDI Research Staff Intelligence Memorandum 11-63 of 7 January 1963, "Pyongyang-Peiping Ties Tighten Under Soviet Pressure" (TOP SECRET DINAR), deals at some length with Soviet attempts to win North Korea away from China alternately by means of embellishments and threats.

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of overruling India last October. What does seem important is that the Soviets demonstrated an earnest to check the expansion of Chinese political influence in South Asia, notifying Peiping that Moscow would not tolerate Chinese hegemony in that area.

Like India, Indonesia is a powerful force in its area of the world. The military strength of Indonesia, the fifth largest country in the world, is already unequalled in Southeast Asia. And as in India, the Soviets find in Indonesia a useful counterweight to Chinese influence and possible expansionist tendencies in Southeast Asia. The Soviet decision to support the Sukarno regime and to build up the military establishment there, at the expense of the Communist-radical movement in that country, was taken with a number of objectives in mind. As is known, the Soviets have provided Indonesia with a vast amount of military aid and assistance. Beginning in early 1961--after the Soviet fall-out with the Chinese--the USSR began to pour first-line military equipment into Indonesia, much the same kind of equipment simultaneously being issued Soviet troops. Included in the military shipments were SAM's, Komar boats and MIG-21s. Moreover, the Soviets have been urging the Indonesians--who appear to have reached a saturation point, probably because of the great cost of the purchases--to accept still greater amounts of military aid. By the time of the West Irian affair, the Soviets had already provided Indonesia with a much greater military capability than needed to deal with any of her neighbors or even with the Dutch.

Undoubtedly a major objective of the massive Soviet MAAG program in Indonesia is the denial of that country to the West, and it is probably hoped that Indonesia will at one point or another use its forces politically or militarily against a Western alliance member. But it also seems likely that Soviet strategists are counting on Indonesian military power being directed politically and even militarily against China as well. It has no doubt been apparent to Soviet planners that Chinese ambitions for political hegemony throughout Southeast Asia are potentially on a collision course with Indonesian expansionist designs. Indeed, the Soviets have been publicly supporting Indonesian opposition to the proposed Malaysian Federation and have apparently been privately egging the Indonesians to take over Borneo and Sarawak. The Chinese, on the other hand, have given only very weak propaganda support

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for the Indonesian position, harboring as they most likely do grave misgivings about increments in the power and prestige of the third largest country in Asia.\* (Moreover, the willingness of the Indonesians to purchase vast amounts of up-to-date Soviet military equipment may have sprung not only from a desire to possess and flaunt the status symbols of big power, but also from the fear that Indonesia will ultimately have to defend itself against Chinese Communist influence or attack.)

There is yet another important anti-Chinese aspect of Soviet military aid to Indonesia. A fundamental Soviet strategic requirement is of course to prevent China from gaining political control over Indonesia. We surmise that China probably presents a greater threat to Soviet interests in Indonesia than does the United States, and that this threat will increase should the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia be reduced or withdrawn in the future. Within Indonesia, the Soviet MAAG program is bolstering the government and the military establishment, the leaders of which are strongly anti-Communist. While the Soviets almost certainly hope to promote pro-Soviet feelings among the military through close association with Soviet military officers and training in the

\*The strongest statement of Chinese sympathy with Indonesian opposition to the Malaysian Federation was made by Liu Shao-chi during his recent visit to Indonesia and incorporated in a joint Indonesian-Chinese communique marking the conclusion of his talks with Sukarno. But this expression of common views only papers over basic differences in the national interests of the two countries. According to a 19 April 1963 cable from Ambassador Jones, [redacted] voiced agreement with him that the built-in antagonisms between Chinese and Indonesians would over the long pull prevent relations from becoming so close as to endanger Indonesian independence; and that the Indonesians would be more preoccupied over the next years in building a dam against Chinese Communist expansionism rather than increasing their dependency upon the Chinese. On the subject of loss of Soviet control of the Indonesian Communist Party to the Chinese, Ambassador Jones noted [redacted] remark that Soviet Ambassador Mikhailov was no longer urging inclusion of the PKI in Sukarno's cabinet.

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CAESAR XVIII  
Off. Ser. No. 3

OCI No. 2010/63  
Copy No.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ROLE IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY  
OVER SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

This is a working paper, an interim report on recent developments in Soviet strategic thought and military planning. A more comprehensive treatment of the subject is planned, but must await the acquisition of more substantial evidence.

This report focuses on the relationship between the controversy over resource allocations and the dialogue on military doctrine in a period in which the military and economic choices facing the USSR have been acute. In the process of tracing developments in the Soviet economic-defense sphere since the Cuban crisis, we have sought to discover Khrushchev's objectives and scheme of political maneuver, and to gauge his progress in putting his program across. On this basis we have tried to determine the main direction of Soviet defense-economic policy.

Although the writer has benefited from the suggestions and research findings of colleagues, he is solely responsible for the paper as a whole. The DD/I Research Staff would welcome comment on the paper, addressed to Irwin P. Halpern, who wrote it, or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Staff.

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KHRUSHCHEV'S ROLE IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY  
OVER SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

SUMMARY

Since the Cuban crisis, which nurtured the cause of the advocates of greater defense spending, Khrushchev's basic plan has been to keep up the present pace of growth of Soviet armed strength without further impairing the country's economic growth. To his way of thinking, further serious retreats in the economic process of "building Communism" could be as disastrous for Soviet foreign policy and prestige as faltering in the arms race. Khrushchev's method of dealing with the military-economic dilemma has been to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" in the resource allocations equation. Since last November, he has argued that a radical redistribution of resources is not needed to vitalize the economy and meet the country's military objectives; great resources could be found, he has said repeatedly, if "hidden reserves" were exploited, inefficiency in production reduced, and economic management streamlined.

In addition, Khrushchev appears to be campaigning behind the scenes for another substantial reduction in conventional forces--which do not figure importantly in his conception of the requirements for deterrence and waging nuclear war. While he has not yet explicitly called for new cuts, his scheme has been reflected in his recent deprecations of conventional forces; in his likely success in obtaining a troop cut in the Bulgarian army (reportedly made possible by its acquisition of "newer weapons"); in his depiction of future war as lasting one day; in the transformation of his "one-day war" formula into military doctrine in some military forums; in the new emphasis given the doctrinal importance of his January 1960 (troop cut) speech; and in the studied assertion of the prerogatives of the party leadership in the sphere of defense policy and military doctrine, as well as the propaganda effort to build up the image of Khrushchev personally as a military authority.

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In short, we have found Khrushchev to be successful in resisting the efforts of others to shift more of the country's strained resources from the consumer to the defense sector. That his position in the inner sanctum policy disputes has been appreciably strengthened since his gloomy economic forecast of last February is seen in the sustained propaganda emphasis since March on improving consumer welfare. (In this regard, the most notable developments have been an increase in March in the planned capital investment in light industry and the publication in June of Khrushchev's guidelines for the 1964-65 economic plan that give priority to the chemical industry explicitly in support of agriculture and consumer goods.) On the other hand, Khrushchev thus far has been thwarted in his own efforts to cut back Soviet conventional forces, by a somewhat weakened but still unyielding and articulate conservative military element (which, in turn, evidently has important backing in higher party circles.).

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KHRUSHCHEV'S ROLE IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY  
OVER SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

The collapse last fall of the Soviet strategy to put missiles in Cuba seems in retrospect to have generated a strong current of opinion in favor of increasing the defense establishment's share of the country's limited resources. Both the deployment in and the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba were tacit admissions of Soviet strategic inferiority. As Soviet prestige dipped low in the wake of the crisis, the remaining dynamism went out of Soviet foreign policy in much the same way that air escapes from a tire and with the same resultant immobility. The Chinese and their cohorts used the occasion to discredit the Soviet leaders with charges of "adventurism and capitulation." Soviet military morale seemed to slip to its lowest level since the announcement in January 1960 of a drastic unilateral troop-cut. Indirect evidence suggests that there was dissatisfaction among the military over Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban operation.\* Under such circumstances, the need to improve the relative strategic position of the USSR with genuine increments to the military became a politically irrefutable argument, and the position of the advocates of greater defense spending was consequently strengthened.

That the Soviet leadership would give greater impetus to defense was further suggested by the declaration of

\*As a counter, the regime launched a propaganda campaign asserting the wisdom of the party leaders and their prerogatives in the planning of the country's defenses. For example, in RED STAR on 7 November, Marshal Chuikov cited a hitherto unpublished exchange of messages between Stalin and Lenin in 1920 to refute the notion that "our diplomacy sometimes very effectively spoils the results achieved by our military victories." Stressing the dominant role of the party in military affairs, Chuikov criticized unnamed officers for failing to "maintain proper attitudes and opinions."

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military superiority as a goal of Soviet policy soon after the curtain fell on Cuba. In an important pamphlet on Soviet military policy and doctrine published in November, the Soviet Defense Minister wrote: "The most characteristic feature of the present state of the development of Soviet military doctrine is the fact that it bases itself on the superiority of the armed forces of the USSR over the armies of the most powerful countries of capitalism, with respect to military-technological means and moral-combat qualities." Along the same lines, the 30 March CPSU letter to the Chicom Party introduced a new slogan: "As long as there is no disarmament, the socialist commonwealth must always have superiority in armed forces over the imperialists."\* Since Cuba, Soviet propagandists have also proclaimed current military superiority--at times qualified and at times not--over the West. Boasts of military superiority had dropped out of the propaganda in early 1961, and until last fall the Soviets were content to assert military parity with the West. Among the reasons for reintroducing boasts of current superiority, evidently, were the Soviet need to salvage some of the prestige lost in the wreckage of the Cuban operation, and, in the case of some Soviet leaders, to play down the strategic deficiencies of the USSR in order to draw off some of the urgency that other Soviet leaders attached to the problem of improving the Soviet strategic posture.

Despite the strong motivation to improve the country's strategic position in the aftermath of the Cuban debacle, the USSR has apparently not radically stepped up its military program. It does not appear on the basis of available evidence

\*This slogan was subsequently reiterated by Marshal Grechko in IZVESTIYA on 8 May and by RED STAR in an article on the Warsaw Pact anniversary on 14 May. It has been made clear in these and other Soviet materials, however, that the effective military organization protecting the socialist commonwealth is the Soviet controlled Warsaw Pact, in which China is neither a member nor an observer. A thoughtful article in the FBIS Bloc Survey of 31 May 1963 "Military Superiority Declared Basis of Bloc Policy," expands on the subject.

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that there has been a substantial shift in resources from the consumer to the defense sector. On the contrary, from all indications measures taken have tended to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" in economic priorities. (In fact, there have been indications in recent months of a decision to increase the rate of expansion of consumer programs beyond previous plan figures. Thus an article in the March KOMMUNIST, claiming that the "correct proportions" between heavy and light industry are being maintained, changed the figure for the increase in investment in light industry in 1963 from 22.3 percent to 37 percent. However, the possibility that there has been a shift in some consumer residuals to the defense sector cannot be ruled out.)

That the resource allocations equation has not been changed, it seems, is largely the result of Khrushchev's determination (backed by hard campaigning in ruling circles) not to lose more ground in the economic competition with the West. For in the taut economic situation in which the USSR found itself, that would be the penalty of further sizeable shifts in allocations to defense. Khrushchev has consistently regarded the growth rate of the Soviet economy, the improvement of the living standards of the Soviet people, as important an index of the growing power of the Soviet cause as Soviet military might. He has been willing to live with long periods of strategic inferiority so as to promote the country's economic growth. For example, between 1955-1958 he had secured a decline of two billion rubles in military spending, with the savings diverted into investment and consumption, and thereby enabled the Soviet GNP to increase annually by seven percent. This is not to say that Khrushchev has neglected the defense sector; he has in fact led the pack of reformers in remolding the Soviet armed forces for nuclear warfare. But modernization was only one side of his military program; cutting back the conventional arms of service to offset the great cost of advanced weapons and to nourish the economy was the other part of his scheme.

At the height of Khrushchev's power in 1958, the upward trend in production and investment was reversed as the pace of military procurement, R&D and space costs rapidly increased. These trends were the main reason for the slowdown in Soviet economic growth (the rate of GNP increase

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dropped to 4-5 percent) in recent years. Faced with a diminishing economic growth rate and rising costs of new weapons, Khrushchev in January 1960 took steps to moderate the high total defense spending by drastically cutting back (by one-third) the older arms of service and diverting the savings in rubles, materiel and manpower resources to the exotic weapons program and the economy. Once again he was willing to live with real strategic inferiority while basing the Soviet strategic posture to a large extent on deceptive propaganda claims about Soviet ICBM strength. After initial success in getting his troop cut program adopted, Khrushchev saw his program founder as a result of a combination of internal and external circumstances. □ And he himself rendered it the coup de grace in announcing the "temporary" suspension of the troop cut in July 1961. Again in early 1962, in making the decision to place strategic weapons in Cuba, Khrushchev and his colleagues seem to have been partially motivated by economic considerations. The venture offered the opportunity for a relatively inexpensive way to meet the felt need for a trans-oceanic strategic attack capability. The fact that the risks involved in the operation were unusually high, as Soviet foreign policy initiatives go, underscored the desperation felt in Moscow to find a solution to the dilemma of meeting military and economic requirements, as well as to reverse the falling momentum in their foreign policy.

Khrushchev began to unfold his strategy for dealing with the great dilemma of meeting the demands of the economy and the military at the Central Committee Plenum in November 1962, where he acknowledged the continued primacy of defense--heavy industry in the organization of the country's resources. But he also made it clear that he would not accept an "either-or" proposition: he wanted the USSR to stay in both the arms race (to bolster the country's strategic position) and the economic competition (to score important political points).

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For to his way of thinking, to drop back seriously in either competition would have disastrous results for Soviet foreign policy and prestige. Khrushchev's strategy, hence, was to fight a holding action on the allocation of resources. "Although heavy industry has priority, flexible proportions should be maintained," Khrushchev said; "consumer goods are not a second-rate matter." That Khrushchev won the first round of the controversy is seen in the fact that the 30,000-word plenum report contained only one reference to defense. Stating the need to "maintain" national defenses at the "due and proper level," the phrase was much weaker than the version in the Budget for 1962 that called upon the country to "increase in every possible way" its defenses.

Khrushchev again plainly declared for both the arms race and economic competition in his 27 February speech at Kalinin. When assessing available resources, he said, "we must soberly take into account the needs of peace-time economy and the requirements of defense. We must balance both sides so as to prevent one side from being overemphasized." In the speech, Khrushchev painted a gloomy picture of the future, lamenting that the high cost of defense preparedness would not permit a serious improvement in the consumers' lot in the foreseeable future. Thus he forthrightly confirmed what he had indicated in the previous November at the Central Committee plenum--that he had shelved for an indefinite time his long-standing proposals for substantially increasing allocations to agriculture and light industry. This alone could have been sufficient reason for the pessimistic tone of the speech: Khrushchev was apologizing to the Soviet people for not being able to fulfill earlier promises of a change in favor of the consumer by, say, lifting the policies of restraint brought to bear on the consumer earlier in the year as a result of over-committed resources. (In 1962, meat prices were raised by 30 percent, private housing construction was cut back further, and a promised reduction in the personal income tax was "postponed.") On the other hand, Khrushchev's uncharacteristically pessimistic tone may also have reflected the period of greatest weakness in his struggle to resist further inroads by the insatiable military machine into economic

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investment.\* There have probably been starts and stops in a number of directions in the defense-economic sphere over the past half year, as various elements in the military and civilian bureaucracies competed for the country's strained resources. But as subsequent events have shown, Khrushchev succeeded in beating down all attempts to divert more resources from the consumer sector. (This was made clear by the end of March when KOMMUNIST, as mentioned earlier, raised the planned figure for the increase in light industry investment in 1963 from 22.3 percent to 37 percent.)

We are also inclined to view the appointment in March of the former defense industry boss Ustinov to the chairmanship of the Supreme Economic Council not as an indication of a shift in the allocation of resources toward defense, but as an effort to apply the more efficient methods used in the defense industry to other industries. (At the November plenum, Khrushchev had singled out the defense industry as a model of efficiency. Even in his 24 April speech, in which he voiced dissatisfaction with the high cost of weapons in the past, he said that the former defense chief was selected for the new post because "he deserves it." Also, Rudnev, the Chairman of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research privately gave that explanation of Ustinov's appointment to Ambassador Kohler in April.) Such an interpretation is fully in keeping with the march of other developments in Soviet economic policy.

Still more recently, in late May, Khrushchev again made plain his scheme for dealing with the economic-defense dilemma. With high confidence he told [redacted] that the USSR would be able to keep up its armed strength without serious interference with other investment programs." About the same time,

\*About the same time Khrushchev was talking to the electorate in Kalinin, Kozlov was delivering a much more optimistic speech--in which he called for new "huge" investment in heavy machine building enterprises (i.e., defense industry)--in Leningrad.

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on 23 May, he told the Soviet people at a rally for Castro that while the USSR ranks second in the world in volume of production, this is only for "the time being," and that "in five or seven years we shall say: move over and give us first place! And we will unfailingly be first."

This fresh injection of optimism, in contrast to the gloomy speech of last February, undoubtedly reflected Khrushchev's considerable success in getting Castro, during his stay in the USSR, to declare strong sympathy for the Soviet cause in the Sino-Soviet polemics. But the new optimism may also have mirrored Khrushchev's improved situation in the inner sanctum policy disputes. Perhaps the best testimonial of his success was the announcement on 3 June, of the government "guidelines" for the 1964-65 economic plan. Following the general lines of Khrushchev's program set forth at last November's Central Committee plenum, the guidelines reflect his personal concern over the lack of progress in agriculture and his awareness of the need for further improvements in consumer incentives to spark the overall economic program. Significantly the guidelines--a planning innovation--give priority to the chemical industry explicitly in support of agriculture, consumer goods, and chemical substitutes for certain metals. But there was no mention of military priorities in the announcement.

Thus far, we have discussed Khrushchev's program in terms of his objectives--which have become official policy--of keeping the USSR in both the armed and peaceful competitions. We have also discussed his method of dealing with the military-economic dilemma in terms of his efforts to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" in the resource allocations equation (in which defense already had primacy). Let us next consider how Khrushchev has been trying to meet his principal objectives in a very tight economic situation without making bold changes in the allocation of resources.

Khrushchev, it seems to us, intends to find the wherewithal to accomplish the difficult tasks facing the country in two ways:

(a) save by streamlining economic management, reducing inefficiency and exploiting untapped reserves; and

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(b) cut back the conventional--in his view obsolescent--arms of service.

He has voiced confidence that the savings to be had from reducing inefficiency in all sectors of the economy will be considerable. That economic productivity can be raised without new major shifts in resources has been his battle hymn since the termination of the Cuban crisis. But he evidently does not calculate that those savings will be sufficient to meet the rising costs of advanced weapons R&D, production and deployment. Although he has not yet made explicit in a public forum his intention to make further savings by cutting back conventional forces, he has done much short of that to prepare the ground for eventually bringing the issue to a head.

At the November plenum, Khrushchev revealed that a major ingredient in his remedy for the chronic ailments of the Soviet economy was another sweeping administrative reorganization. In his November speech, he called for the bifurcation of the party into two separate organizations, one to control industry and the other to control agriculture; the establishment of five new Central Committee bureaus; the creation of a single agency to be responsible for management of the economy; and a party-state committee to oversee the fulfillment of directives at all levels. By mid-March 1963, these proposals--which amounted to a reinstitution of stringent, centralized control--were adopted with some modifications. However, the effect of the reorganization on productivity remains as yet a question.

A second ingredient in Khrushchev's remedy, it was made clear, was a radical increase in the efficiency of production. Thus, Khrushchev's 24 April speech was entirely devoted to the problem of utilizing "hidden reserves" in all programs, from military to consumer. Repudiating recommendations (made earlier by Kozlov *inter alia*) for huge increases in investment in machine-building, Khrushchev called for a campaign to reduce the "waste" in that industry, which amounted to almost one-fifth of the metal it consumed or 10 million tons. He insisted that there were "great reserves in light and food industry" as well as in the machine building. But most significant was his assault on the defense

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industry. He complained about the high cost of weapons production in the past--under Ustinov's aegis--and argued that with better organization military costs can be lowered. "The defense industry has many reserves for increased production," he said, that are "not being used sufficiently." The new defense chief, Smirnov, is younger, Khrushchev said, and "we shall be able to shake him just as we used to shake Ustinov." And before leaving the subject, Khrushchev announced that a careful study of how production capacities are being used in the defense industry will be made by Ustinov's Supreme Sovnarkhoz.

As suggested earlier, it does not appear that Khrushchev is counting on increased productivity alone to satisfy the financial, resource and manpower increments demanded by the Soviet military-space R&D effort. It is becoming increasingly clear that he is also campaigning behind the scenes to win acceptance for another troop cut. Khrushchev, it seems in retrospect, never gave up the idea of drastically cutting back the older arms of service which do not figure importantly in his concept of deterrence and war. Even before the 1960 troop cut was much underway, he spoke of further reductions as well as the possible eventual conversion of the standing army into a territorial army ("if a disarmament agreement is not reached"). When a combination of circumstances--most notably opposition from the military--brought him to announce the suspension of the troop cut in 1961, he made it clear that he regarded the measure as "temporary." Even after the scuttling of his troop cut program, Khrushchev occasionally indicated that he did not endorse the military's deeply-entrenched position on the need for a large standing army irrespective

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of the international political atmosphere.\* And once again, after the Cuban debacle, Khrushchev could be seen maneuvering against a strong vested interest to cut back the size of the large conventional forces. His urging the military to absorb as much of the higher costs of weapons as possible is one indication of his intent. But there are also other, less ambiguous manifestations of his scheming.

One lever that Khrushchev may be using in his campaign to effect new cuts in conventional forces in the Soviet army is a loyal satellite--Bulgaria. There is strong, but as yet inconclusive, evidence that the Bulgarian armed forces are being reduced.

(That a reduction may already be underway is also suggested by the publication on 23 April of a decree of the Bulgarian presidium amending previous legislation and establishing civilian equivalents for some military specialities.) [redacted] did not state the size of the reduction or give any indication how a cut might be distributed among the armed forces components, other less authoritative sources have said that the cut might amount to as much as 20 percent of the present estimated strength of 164,000.

\*Thus in a message to President Kennedy on disarmament problems, evidently timed to coincide with the celebration of Soviet Army-Navy Day in February 1962, Khrushchev said:

In the nuclear rocket weapons age--and we have entered this age--the numerical strength of the forces does not by a long way have the importance it had in World Wars I and II. War now would at once become total, worldwide; and its outcome would depend not on the actions of troops stationed along the line dividing the combatants but on the use of nuclear rocket weapons, with which the decisive blow can be struck even before vast armies can be mobilized and thrown into battle.

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The reported justification given for the cut is the receipt of newer weapons,\* the same rationale used by Khrushchev for the Soviet troop cut in 1960. Tight budgetary problems in Bulgaria also bear comparison with the USSR. Moreover, any major change in the Bulgarian forces would have to be engineered in Moscow. The Bulgarian armed forces are regulated in large part by the Soviet high command as a result of their inclusion in the Warsaw Pact. And that organization since 1960 has assumed growing importance in Soviet military planning. Also, the Bulgarian Party chief Zhivkov owes his political life to Khrushchev. In early February, according to [redacted] Zhivkov sent his Defense Minister General Mikhailov, to Moscow to do a "sort of public relations job for Comrade Zhivkov with the top echelon of the Soviet army." In April and May, reports reached here on the Bulgarian troop cut decision. In short, it would seem that a decision to reduce the size of the Bulgarian army would mean that the traditionalist officers in the Soviet high command had ceded ground in the controversy over whether massive land armies are essential for the bloc's defenses. (On the other hand, the ground-oriented officers could probably be expected to spring back with the argument that the cuts in the Bulgarian forces make it imperative that no new reductions be made in Soviet conventional forces.)

Khrushchev gave further evidence of his interest in early March 1963, when he told [redacted] that the USSR would not increase its ground forces irrespective of Western increases in their ground forces. (Khrushchev made similar statements in 1960 in defense of his troop cut program.) To meet such a Western move, Khrushchev said, the USSR would increase its rockets. (He also said that the USSR, at the urging of Soviet scientists, is setting up a new nuclear rocket system despite the cost.) He went on to belittle the U.S. calls for building up NATO

\*Bulgaria has recently received new-generation Soviet fighters and surface-to-air missiles and may have received short range surface-to-surface missiles.

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conventional forces, saying that the McNamara thesis of conventional war was a fairytale since nuclear weapons would be used from the outset.\* (Later, on 10 June, he would again belittle conventional weapons. In a meeting with [redacted] Khrushchev reportedly said that the USSR had stopped making strategic bombers and surface warships because of their "total vulnerability.")

We interpret as further evidence of Khrushchev's effort to cut back conventional forces the two unprecedented references in his 27 February speech to a "one-day war." First he said, "if a new war is unleashed, it will end with the full collapse of those who launch it on the very first day of the war." Later in the speech he said: "The imperialists must know that if they start a war our armed forces will deal a crushing blow to the enemy in order to topple him and crush him on the very first day of the war."

Khrushchev may have taken his cue from a statement, in the form of a warning to the West, made only four days earlier by Marshal Malinovsky in a RED STAR article celebrating armed forces day: "The power of our counterstrike is more than sufficient to burn the aggressors in the first hours of war." Both Khrushchev and Malinovsky thus portray a war in which the main enemy is consumed in a nuclear holocaust with the first missile salvos. But Malinovsky is more ambiguous than Khrushchev on the finality of the nuclear exchange for the war. While all three statements are obviously intended for the West, they also figure in the internal dialogue on military doctrine and policy. In the latter context, they lay the basis for a forceful argument against the need to maintain large conventional forces for general nuclear war. Moreover, the statements of the two Soviet leaders have since turned up in the military literature. Thus far, only one senior military figure has

\*Shortly, we shall see how the traditionalist spokesman Marshal Rotmistrov makes a contrary statement on the subject of conventional war in order to justify the maintenance of large conventional forces.

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alluded to the one-day war prediction in a public pronouncement; that, surprisingly, is Marshal Konev, who apparently had left his number two post in the defense establishment in Spring 1960 because of his opposition to Khrushchev's troop cut plan. (The ways of Soviet military leaders are unpredictable: Marshal Rotmistrov, who led the reformers of Soviet military doctrine in 1954-55, has in recent years been a leader of the conservative group in the military.) The fact that more of the top military leaders have not mouthed the one-day war slogan seems to us to point up its polemical nature.

More remarkable still is the transformation of Khrushchev's passing references to one-day war in his 27 February speech into "military doctrinal positions" in recent issues of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, organ of the Main Political Administration. Thus, in an article in the No. 8 issue of the journal (signed to press 4 April 1963), a slight paraphrase of one of Khrushchev's statements on one-day war --with the conspicuous addition of the Russian word for "blitzkrieg"--was included in a list of the "most important positions of Soviet military doctrine." The article as a whole, in terms of the dialogue on military doctrine, is strongly "modernist" or pro-Khrushchev. The authors, two colonels, (1) stressed the party's exclusive capability to decide the complex questions connected with the "complicated tasks in the sphere of military construction"; (2) took potshots at Zhukov, a symbol of military professionalism and autonomy, thereby helping to scotch recent rumors of an impending rehabilitation of the officer whom Khrushchev fired in October 1957; (3) emphasized the contribution of Khrushchev's 14 January 1960 speech to the military doctrine; (4) but made no reference to Malinovsky's 1961 22nd CPSU Congress speech in which he set forth the "tenets of military doctrine" that departed in some important respects from Khrushchev's January 1960 speech; (5) claimed Soviet superiority in the "means of armed struggle" over the armies of the West, showing the adequacy of the party's policy toward the army and deflating the urgency of a rapid military build-up; (6) made no mention of the "traditionalist" catchword "multi-million man armies"; (7) did however, acknowledge the weaker "traditionalist" tenet on the need for combined forces to conclude victory; (8) stressed the

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dependence of military strategy on politics; (9) mentioned the importance of civil defense.

In addition to eclipsing the military's contribution to military doctrine, the article gave greater direct recognition to Khrushchev's January 1960 speech than has been the case since the suspension of the troop cut. Whereas previous articles acknowledged that Khrushchev's speech had "laid the foundations" of Soviet military doctrine, the present article states flatly that Khrushchev's speech presented the "most important positions of Soviet military doctrine worked out by the Central Committee." Among these "positions"--strongly implied to have been stated by Khrushchev in January 1960--were included the references to the blitz one-day war and the need to be able to pre-empt an enemy surprise attack. Khrushchev in January 1960, far from stressing the importance of a surprise attack against the Soviet Union, denied that such an attack could be decisive. It was Malinovsky, in his speech at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, who first presented the problem of preparedness for an enemy surprise attack as the most important task before the Soviet armed forces. In doing so, however, Malinovsky invoked the authority of the CPSU Presidium.

An ancillary development is the renewed effort being made in some quarters to portray Khrushchev as a seasoned military leader. Of late, he has once again been identified in the press as the "Supreme High Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces." (4 May 1963 RED STAR, in an unsigned account of the May Day Parade.) The last previous public references to him as military chieftain, to our knowledge, appeared in the fall of 1961.\* Also, a recent IZVESTIYA (8 May) featured a 1942 picture of Khrushchev in uniform with members of an anti-aircraft crew at the front. And last March, some

\*The 1962 Defense Ministry book "Soviet Strategy" noted that in time of war, the functions of Supreme High Commander will be vested in the "First Secretary of the Central Committee and Head of Government," but did not say that Khrushchev holds the supreme military post in peacetime as well.

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commemorative articles on the Battle of Stalingrad played up Khrushchev's wartime role as a military leader, while others subtly detracted from it. (More will be said on the detractors later.) There have also been occasional references in the military literature in recent months to Khrushchev's other wartime experiences, such as the Kursk battle, in various military publications.\*

\*A recent visitor to the USSR, Fidel Castro, also sang praises of Khrushchev's World War II experience and military prowess in a marathon television interview in Havana on 5 June. Note how he characterized Khrushchev's role in the defense policy fights--which seem to bear on his present as well as past activities--in the following passage:

We must keep in mind one thing: The fact that the Soviet Government, the Soviet leadership, and Comrade Khrushchev have shown great interest--I had a special opportunity to see it in my talks with the Soviet officers on strategic matters--in the decision to build rockets. This was a decision in which Khrushchev contributed with his leadership. He defended this policy consistently, that is, the development of rocketry--a weapon that has made it possible for the USSR to face, from a military point of view, the danger of an imperialist aggression. Part of the technical equipment of the Soviet armed forces has included rockets in the past few years, and the number of rockets is increasing. This is the situation. Aside from Khrushchev's preoccupation with peace, I was constantly aware of his determination to be in a position to resist and of his determination to maintain a firm policy. We must realize that Khrushchev has participated in wars: in the civil war and in the most decisive battles of war. He has participated in war; he has taken part in the most difficult battles, and he showed great audacity in those difficult moments. He was also bold in politics and it is admitted that he is a bold politician. This is the conclusion I drew.

PRAVDA carried this passage in its coverage of the Castro interview.

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Also, since the Cuban crisis, there has been a spate of articles in the military press asserting the prerogatives of the party leadership in the military sphere and rebuking the military for their presumptions in national defense matters. The KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES article discussed above is a good example of the party leadership's claim to exclusive authority in deciding basic defense questions. Another notable example is the widely circulated pamphlet released last November under the signature of Marshal Malinovsky. Entitled "Vigilantly They Stand in Defense of Peace" and issued by the Ministry of Defense, the pamphlet went to some length to ascribe the credit for Soviet military doctrine to the political leadership and to inflate the role of Khrushchev personally in the development of the doctrine. But the pamphlet ignored the contributions of military thinkers to the doctrine, omitting any reference to Malinovsky's own speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress in which he set forth the "tenets" of military doctrine.

In part, the reassertion of party prerogatives is no doubt intended as an answer to military critics of Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban affair. But it also seems to answer those who may question the authority and wisdom of the party leaders in deciding on other issues pertaining to the nation's defense. By the same token, the recent tendency to put fresh paint on Khrushchev's portrait as a military theorist and to present his January 1960 speech (in which he announced the troop cut) as the principal embodiment of Soviet military doctrine may be designed to strengthen Khrushchev's authority in arguing for changes in military policy.

What we have presented thus far is only one side of a continuing dialogue between Khrushchev and his supporters on the one hand, and those who oppose his military-economic policy views, on the other. Let us next consider the "opposition's" side of the dialogue. Khrushchev's "opposition" in the sphere of national defense-economic questions, from our perch, is a changing, amorphous body of military and political leaders, of whom we can identify only a small number by name. We have been able to deduce the existence of elements in the Soviet civilian and military bureaucracies that (1) desire to maintain or even strengthen the conventional

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forces of the Soviet Union while moving ahead in the advanced weapons field; and (2) consequently urge a shift in resources from the consumer to the defense sector. We can also gauge the relative strength of these elements in terms of the observed trends in Soviet defense-economic policy. Thus far, as maintained earlier in this paper, Khrushchev has, since last October, been able to thwart the efforts of the champions of a shift in resources to defense. In doing so, he has had to make concessions in their direction--he has shelved his own long-standing proposals for a major change in priorities in favor of the consumer; he has given in on some political-ideological questions such as the "economics over politics" issue, after deflating them of much of their policy significance. Moreover, he has not as yet been able to put across his program for a reduction in the conventional arms of service. And until he does, the USSR will be at an important policy impasse--with an evidently generally accepted policy of forging ahead with the expensive development of advanced weapons, but evidently without sufficient where-withal to support it.

The entrenched ground-oriented opposition among the military elite have used a variety of verbal weapons to resist further cuts into the conventional forces. Last fall, two defense ministry books were published that stressed the need for multi-million man armies, the likelihood that the war would be long and drawn out, and that the economy would play a vital role throughout the war. On 11 January, RED STAR ran three articles defending the retention of a large standing army. One of the items stressed the need to be ready for protracted war with "mass, multi-million man armies." Another emphasized that only a regular cadre army can meet the country's defense requirements. And the third article concluded that military science "has profoundly substantiated the doctrine that under present conditions the waging of war requires mass armies."

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In February,\* Marshal Rotmistrov--an outspoken leader of the traditionalist group--made a strong case for conventional forces in his article in the No. 2 issue of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES. In that article, he attacked the notion, which he ascribed to the imperialists, that a nuclear war will be a "push-button war." While acknowledging the established doctrine that strategic missile troops will play a "decisive role" in a future war, he went on to assert the continuing importance of other types and branches of the armed forces. To show the compatibility of these ideas, he portrayed

\*In another journal in February, PROBLEMS OF HISTORY OF THE CPSU (No. 2), General Yepishev--whom Khrushchev last year appointed to head the Main Political Administration, a Central Committee department--made a statement that appeared to be at odds with Khrushchev's way of thinking about the size of the armed forces. Yepishev wrote that the "views of some theoreticians about the need to stop developing mass armies, but instead replacing manpower by technology, have proved unfounded," and that, in fact, "the role of mass armies has grown with the increased importance of technology in modern war." (Yepishev made these points after stressing the leadership of the party in developing military doctrine and policy.) We are admittedly mystified by these remarks by Khrushchev's political watchdog for the military. They may have signalled a low point in Khrushchev's fight in party circles to cut back the size of the army; it will be recalled that he was very pessimistic in his February election speech about the burden of defense costs. On the other hand, Yepishev's remarks may have been intended to strengthen Khrushchev's position by dissociating him from the most radical proposals such as the complete scrapping of the standing army (Khrushchev had hinted at this in 1960 in proposing a territorial militia system) or the paring down of the ground forces to some 30-40 combat divisions (which Gen. Gastilovich had proposed in 1960); the net effect of ~~these remarks~~ to make Khrushchev seem more moderately disposed toward the force-size issue. Yepishev, it should be noted, spoke of "mass", not of "multi-million man armies."

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nuclear war in terms of two wars to be fought in basically different ways. "If all the weight of war with a trans-oceanic enemy is placed on the strategic missile troops," he said "nevertheless on the continent the missile troops will operate in close coordination with land troops, the main striking force of which will be composed of tank units and formations." Rotmistov was thus willing to concede that the ground forces will not play a combat role in the war against territorial United States. The standard formula on the need for combined forces to secure final victory makes no such distinction, but implies universal applicability of the formula.\*

More recently, in the English language MOSCOW NEWS of 11 May 1963, Rotmistrov authored a highly unorthodox statement which, irrespective of its foreign propaganda purpose, provided strong justification for the maintenance of large, versatile armed forces:

The Soviet Army has at its command an absolutely new arsenal of weapons, with well trained men able to wage both atomic and conventional warfare, on a large scale or small scale, in any climate and on any territory.

\*The USSR, of course, has no serious capability for a trans-oceanic landing of troops--and a Soviet military planner Admiral Bogolepov, [redacted]

[redacted] was very pessimistic about attaining such a capability within the next decade or two. Yet, military spokesmen occasionally talk as if such a capability exists. Thus, a naval journal (MORSKIY SBORNIK, No. 1, 1963) review of the Soviet book Military Strategy notes agreement with the book's statement on the need to occupy strategically important areas on the enemy's territory, but takes the book to task for ignoring the role of the navy in carrying out an "offensive on the territory of an enemy across a sea barrier." The naval journal, in making this point, may be lobbying for the acquisition by the navy of such a capability.

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The standard doctrinal-propaganda position, rarely departed from in the Soviet press, virtually precludes the involvement of the Soviet armed forces in a large or small conventional war with U.S. forces. Any direct clash between Soviet and U.S. troops in a local war, according to the established doctrine, will inevitably develop into a general nuclear war. Neither open nor classified Soviet literature reveals the existence of a large-scale conventional war or local war doctrine, although some open literature in recent years has stressed the need for Soviet military strategy to take account of the problem of local war in the nuclear age.\* Moreover, previous explicit arguments for maintaining strong conventional forces have been in terms of nuclear battlefield requirements. Now Rotmistrov has for the first time in open or available classified Soviet literature extended the grounds for justifying the maintenance of large conventional forces to the realm of non-nuclear warfare. (The irregularity of this position may explain why it was presented in a very obscure propaganda organ, MOSCOW NEWS, that is not intended for a domestic audience and not even available in the Russian language. MOSCOW NEWS, it might be said, is a poor excuse for "equal time" for the traditionalist viewpoint.)

Khrushchev's military "opposition" also tends to question the Party's claim to exclusive authority in the determination of military doctrine and policy. They gently protest the tendency of Khrushchev's supporters to eclipse the military's role in the sphere of doctrine and defense policy. Thus, Marshal Rotmistrov in his KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES last February acknowledged that Khrushchev's January 1960 speech was a "major contribution to Marxist-Leninist science on war and the army"--but went on to assert as few military spokesmen do nowadays the contribution of

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the military leaders themselves: "We find a detailed development and exposition of the essence of Soviet military doctrine in reports and speeches by the Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky and other military figures."

Another possible manifestation of the "opposition's" effort to press the military's prerogatives in the defense sphere is the attempt of some to detract from Khrushchev's prestige as a military savant. Thus, on the occasion of the last Stalingrad battle anniversary earlier in the year, one group of Marshals--Yeremenko, Chuikov and Biryuzov--placed the main credit for the victory with the local command, meaning Khrushchev among others. A second group of Marshals--Voronov, Rotmistrov, and Malinovsky--singled out officers of the high command in Moscow as the main architects of the Stalingrad war plan. Of the latter group, Voronov is on the retired list and is eager to uphold his own World War II record as Supreme Command Headquarters officer. That Rotmistrov was among Khrushchev's implicit detractors is consistent with his steadfast support of the traditionalist position. But it is difficult to say just where Malinovsky stands on basic military questions. In debates among the military, he usually straddles the fence, taking a centrist position which more often than not turns out to be an expression of the current stage of official military doctrine. At the same time, in his relationship with Khrushchev, he has alternated between the roles of grovelling sycophant and stalwart spokesman for the prevailing military viewpoint, even when that conflicts with Khrushchev's expressed views. The fact that Malinovsky in his PRAVDA article on 2 February named Marshal Zhukov as one of the Supreme Headquarters officers who played a key role in planning the Stalingrad operation tends to support the political imputations of the article.

That some influential people were trying to rehabilitate Zhukov, who has been a symbol of military professionalism, was made evident when, on 10 April, a Soviet military-liaison officer suggested to U.S. military attaches that Zhukov be invited to the U.S. Armed Forces Day celebration. The Soviet functionary stated that "as far as we know" Zhukov's only difficulty was that he ignored political training in the armed forces five years ago. Yet, only a few days earlier,

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General Yepishev's journal KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES lambasted Zhukov in a lead editorial and in an inside article for his responsibility for early defeats in World War II. This difference over Zhukov's status, it seems to us, is another expression of the clash of views among the Soviet leaders over such fundamental policy questions as Khrushchev's efforts to economize on conventional forces. As it turned out, Zhukov has not been rehabilitated; and neither he nor any other Marshal attended the U.S. reception.

Whether or not a substantial reduction in conventional forces will be forthcoming will mostly depend upon Khrushchev's ability to dislodge the strong traditionalist-minded faction that still holds sway in the military establishment, as well as to overcome the important civilian supporters of that group in the higher party bodies. He has already carried his fight to the military academies and barracks, propagandizing his preferred conception of the nature of future war and the country's requirements for both preventing it and fighting it. But he has not as yet explicitly called for another force reduction; so as not to place his prestige at stake, he may not do this until he has actually won the policy fight. He may also have made his first major move since Cuba to replace ground-oriented officers in the military high command with people more sympathetic to his own philosophy of deterrence and war. In this respect, in late February or early March he replaced Marshal Zakharov with Marshal Biryuzov as Chief of the General Staff. Zakharov, who served in World War II as chief of staff of Malinovsky's Second and Third Ukrainian Front and Trans-Baikal Front (1943-45), authored a "swan song" article in the March issue of MASTER SERGEANT in which he made a strong argument for maintaining large ground forces. (According to the U.S. Army attache in Moscow, some 20 Soviet Marshals and Generals attending a Finnish Armed Forces Day Reception in Moscow on 4 June greeted Marshal Zakharov with "unusual warmth" in a blatant show of sympathy over Zakharov's demotion.) Biryuzov, who headed up the anti-air defense of the country before his appointment in 1962 to succeed Moskalenko, comes to the General Staff with a strong background in strategic warfare. The appointment may have signalled a new effort to reorganize the General Staff--the "laboratory" of Soviet military science--the leaders of which up until now have been disinclined to break with the tested, traditional concepts of war which accord the conventional arms of service a very important role.

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


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UNORTHODOX IDEAS IN THE U.S.S.R.


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UNORTHODOX IDEAS IN THE USSR

1. This survey represents the first systematic attempt to deal with a growing volume of classified reports on attitudes and views expressed by younger Soviet citizens in conversations with Western nationals. As might be expected, the Soviet citizens are, with few exceptions, members of the intelligentsia, i.e., students, doctors, scientists, economists, etc. They are often members of the CPSU or of the Komsomol, but seldom members of the Party apparatus. The views are selected and presented under the following headings:

- The Goal of Communism
- Present Socialist System of the USSR
- Religion
- Soviet Economic System
- Soviet Foreign Policy
- Socialist Brotherhood
- Marxist-Lenin Doctrine
- Membership in the Communist Party
- Membership in Komsomol
- Regime Deceit
- Collective Guilt for Stalin's Crimes
- Attitude Towards the Regime
- Capitalism and the West
- Concepts of Freedom and Democracy

2. The analyst, Miss Marion Shaw of the Soviet Internal Branch, Office of Current Intelligence, cautions the reader against drawing any conclusions about popular opinion in the Soviet Union from what at best may be a representative sample from the exceptional and not

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the average group. It is not surprising but still of interest to note, however, that insofar as the reports studied deal with desired changes in Soviet society (toward political liberalization and economic abundance) the assumption seems to be that the changes will take place by evolution and not by revolutionary violence.

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UNORTHODOX IDEAS IN THE USSR

The Soviet press normally presents a stereotype picture of "the Soviet people" unanimously enthusiastic in their support of regime policies. Occasional references to "slandering of our people who try to morally corrupt the inexperienced with spiritual slush" have not specified the "slush". In an unusual moment of frankness, however, Pravda last September published a letter from a reader who complained that she had suffered defeat in attempting to defend Soviet international and domestic policies against the criticisms of her friends and neighbors:

"Whatever their ages, whatever they begin to talk about, inevitably they all switch over to the international and internal situation. Then and now. In America and at home. Under Stalin and today and so forth. There are many, many questions... They said that we give much help to underdeveloped countries. I answer them roundly: yes, we help. And truly it is essential to help underdeveloped countries so that the capitalist system will be more quickly buried all over the globe. Also, I spoke of the fact that to reduce prices each year would mean the weakening of agriculture. The kolkhozes slumped completely, but the price of food was reduced. But now our party follows a real policy. And we are proud of our military force. And I well know that if we did not have our military, then America would immediately attack us. And although I am a non-party woman, I entirely support the party, Comrade Khrushchev, and his persistence in following a policy of peace in the world. For our people this is most essential.

Yesterday I argued much... I tried to explain to someone why our country had not gotten stronger in all respects. Our country was attacked many times, how often was it invaded and robbed, and after this we immediately want manna poured into our mouths... But there are people who do not understand all this. Not only the elder ones, but also the youth who have not seen war... I am sure that if once a

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week there came to us a good man, a good party member, and he conducted a debate on exciting subjects, everyone would be pleased... Let him be one who knows well how to answer all the political questions which were put to me yesterday. Of course, I suffered failure because I am inexperienced..."

The "political questions" which she found herself unable to answer can be inferred - foreign aid and defense expenditures, food prices, the availability of consumer goods, Khrushchev's foreign policies. Even such an indirect admission that "political questions" are being asked is unusual in the Soviet press.

A glimpse of what some of these questions may be, however, can be gained from fragmentary reports of conversations in the past two years with individual Soviet citizens from the American and British Embassies in Moscow, from Western tourists in the USSR, and from participants in East-West exchange programs. This paper is an attempt to identify some of the subjects on which unorthodox opinions have been expressed by individual Soviet citizens. It is not a study of popular opinion in the Soviet Union. The individuals quoted here do not represent the average Soviet citizen. The mere fact that they voiced unorthodox opinions in the presence of foreigners makes them exceptional.

There is no way at present to measure the frequency with which such opinions are held. Each of these reports indicates that one Soviet citizen had contact with one foreigner who was able to establish personal rapport, who was sufficiently familiar with the USSR to recognize unorthodoxy in Soviet thought,

How many such conversations have gone unreported is unknown. It is equally difficult to weigh the relative importance of the subjects themselves, since the conversations were usually by-products of the contacts and the choice of subject matter was often a matter of chance.

Such expressions of non-conformity by private Soviet citizens are a relatively new development in the post-Stalin USSR and reflect the modification of police terror which has been accomplished under Khrushchev's leadership. There is no evidence that they go beyond the realm of opinions. On the one occasion in recent years where the speakers appeared to be moving toward translating their

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ideas into action, the discussions in Mayakovsky Square in the fall of 1961, the regime acted decisively to imprison the most vocal speakers and to break up the meetings.

What has emerged from this survey is a remarkably wide range of non-conformist ideas expressed, for the most part, by young men and women whose parents were young at the time of the Revolution in 1917, and who have spent their entire lives under the Soviet system of indoctrination. None are defectors. Most of them have made a place for themselves in the USSR and appear primarily concerned with retaining or improving that place. One, a 34-year old doctor explained: "My homeland will always pull me home and I say these things not to run down my country, but because I want my country to be better."

Their non-conformist ideas have included serious doubts about the ultimate goal of communism, about the Soviet economic system with its alleged "people's" ownership of land and factories, and about the practicality of collectivized agriculture. They have suggested that Khrushchev sabotages Western efforts to solve problems in the international field and they have shown a disposition to put their trust in the UN rather than in the Soviet government. Marxism-Leninism has been described as nonsense, and as not applicable to conditions in the West. Official deceit and collective guilt for the crimes of Stalin's years are recurring themes. And despite the years of regime-imposed double-speak, Soviet youths have used the words "freedom" and "democracy" in the sense in which they are used in the West in citing them as goals for the future. These youngsters, at least, have not been molded into "The New Communist Man".

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#### The Goal of Communism

The "shining summits of communism" since 1917 have been held up to the Soviet populace and to the world as the ultimate goal justifying all demands for sacrifices in the present, a unique promised land attainable only through faithful adherence to the teachings of its prophets, Marx and Lenin. In some private conversations with Soviet citizens, however, this goal has taken on surprising connotations.

A young Soviet who described himself as a political economist felt that full communism is inevitable, but viewed its coming with foreboding:

"Yes, progress brings optimism, great optimism for society as a whole, but it also brings immeasurable misery for 99% of the world... Let us face it. It is not the horror of thermo-nuclear war or its variations in the form of bacteriological and chemical wars, it is prosperity itself, prosperity as a foundation for a new high level of human culture that will bring ruin to billions of people... Here's the question - will future social progress need billions of people? Wouldn't it be more correct to suppose that only a few creative minds would be needed to face and solve problems... We are facing a very real problem of society, with thousands of scientific workers, artists, actors, men of letters, social workers, and billions of farmers, manual workers, technicians, statesmen, whose labor will be obsolete in the years to come..."

(Here he cited a series of what he regarded as major historical turning points - the Communist Party's shift from underground work to a power position, the New Economic Policy in the USSR of the 1920's, the Japanese and German surrenders after World War II.)

"But what follows? Mass suicides... And all these switches and changes would seem only skin deep when compared with the Great Change to come, with the emergence of the Society of Plenty, of Prosperity, of New Humanism... Social progress does not need billions of minds. The ideal republic

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of Plato consisted of ten thousand people. It seems to me, a million would be more than enough. And I don't consider myself to be worthy of being even the one millionth member of that society. It will be a society of harmoniously developed men and women, strong of character and sensitive of nature, with deep probing minds and eager healthy bodies. This society will be one of Gagarins, Titovs, and Kennedys."

Other views of a future of "Communism have been more prosaic if less gloomy. According to a young history professor at Moscow University,

"We realize quite well that our leaders are living in a world of illusion, aspiring to some kind of ideal communism. In actual fact, however, our country will be forced to take part in the general progress of the entire world, without imposing our ideology on anyone. Every Soviet citizen who has been in the West can see perfectly well that colossal achievements have been brought about in the West. We must exchange our experience and follow each other's example, a fact which is now being realized by everyone, even by many members of the government."

In the view of a young Soviet translator,

"If it comes to war, we shall all die, both right and wrong, without ever knowing which was which. If it comes to a stable peace, then I am sure it will be no win for anybody, or rather a victory for everybody, for the whole of mankind. America will have to socialize, one way or the other. If not after the Soviet pattern, then after the British and Swedish. Russia will have to liberalize, which changes each side will ascribe to its own influence and rightness, but who will care, even if it's true. Soviet society will become more individualistic, American society will become more collectivistic, with spiritually deeper and richer individuals. This is my personal belief and hope."

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"It is not excluded that the two opposing systems --the American (sic) and the Soviet--may finally supplement each other" was the prediction of a Soviet engineer in his late 20's, impressed by what he had seen on a trip to London.

During an eight-hour drinking bout in Helsinki this summer, two Moscow journalists scoffed at the idea that anything approaching the dream of communism would ever be achieved in the USSR. Rather they foresaw future internal relaxation and improvement for the people as a process of Westernization. They made clear their conviction that the fundamental difference between the West and the USSR is the greater amount of freedom in the West, but they felt that this difference was decreasing as conditions improved in the USSR.

A professor at Moscow University who is in his middle thirties explained his views in the fall of 1961:

"We don't shift to Communism but to Americanism. The new Party Program elaborates how to catch up with the U.S. and how to overtake America, but not how to bring about Communism. We say Americanization but not Communization of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, and we must thank him for helping, has long ago thrown Communism into the garbage can. Communism is just a screen. And I must tell you, the majority at the University shares this attitude; we are tired of Communism, tired of ideologies, tired of programs. The people wish to take a rest after all this -- war, camps and Stalinist rule. What the people now need is this: a healthy baba (woman), a pot of cabbage soup, a hunk of bread. Everything else will come by itself. Of course, there are still fanatics with whom I argue once a week. They are somewhat crazy about ideology. The majority, however, stands for these principles: 'not by bread alone', and 'nobody will sing on an empty stomach.' Well, after we get apartments and are dressed like in the West, we'll also talk about ideology."

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The Present Social System of the USSR

The most sweeping indictment of the present social and economic systems of the USSR came from a mid-career official who is a Party member of long standing.

"Forty years of Soviet rule has taught the people many good lessons. The historical experience of the development of the Soviet Union during this period of time has been such as to shake to a certain degree the belief in the propriety of the internal policies of the Soviet government. There are many Soviets who believe that if there were a war at this time -- that is another World War such as the last one -- then the Soviets couldn't possibly win it. The reason for this is, of course, the fact that no one would want to fight and protect the type of system under which they are living. This is very clear."

A Soviet exchange student, in the United States for ten months this year, in discussing shortcomings in the Soviet economic system said: "We are young in our revolution yet. When we of my age group take over we will modify and change certain aspects of our system... Some day we will be more free than we are now. When the younger generation takes over more freedom and less regimentation will exist."

During a literary discussion held in the Cultural Club of Moscow University last February, a young worker asked to speak. Not in a spirit of complaint, but rather pointing to a gulf which must be bridged, he asserted that in his view, most Soviet students were completely divorced from the life of the working population. (It might be noted that the stereotypes of current Soviet fictions reflect a bias against higher education--villains are generally better educated than their fellows, but misuse their talents, often through idle malice.)

In an underground magazine written by Soviet students and circulated in Moscow in 1961, a young would-be poet commented: "A poet's serving the people, as something unitary and whole is impossible, because the people have never - either economically or intellectually - constituted a unitary whole."

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Another article in this magazine warned, "Poets should recognize that service is possible only in army barracks, in political institutions and in churches. The poet should not merge himself with the power of the state. So merging himself, he loses his individuality, turns into a worker on a production line, the goal of which is outright apologetics for the state power, and consequently for all the vices as well which it bears within itself."

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Religion

This youth's inclusion of "churches" among the institutions where service is possible is curious in the light of the intensive campaign waged by the regime for many years to indoctrinate all Soviet citizens in "scientific atheism". There have been similar statements from Soviet youth on religion and a belief in God, although not necessarily in connection with an organized church.

A young Georgian girl, a member of the Komsomol and a graduate of a music institute in Tbilisi confided to an American in the summer of 1960 that she did not believe in God, but she thought there might be "a god inside people". She felt that religion was needed by people to turn to as they got older.

Another young Soviet remarked to a guide at the French Exhibition in Moscow in 1961: "The church, of course, is nonsense. But God exists. Otherwise life would be without any sense and not justified. Dudintsev was right when he wrote that man does not live by bread alone." When told that these words were not original with Dudintsev but were from the Bible, the youth was much astonished and said that he would get a copy of the Bible from friends and look them up.

A young VUZ graduate explained to a Western European friend:

"You might think that I am a Bible-hater. This is not so. There are so many planes from which to look upon the book. I am interested in it because of its being a reflection of basic and historic truths of life...I am also well aware of the special humanistic trend in Christianity... O.K. let's have Biblical translations but let's also include Buddhist and Moslem, Taoist, Judaist beliefs too, and above all, let us be aware of independent individual total reactions. All that I say reflects only my own attitude toward religion, my ideas on the further development of religion..."

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"One may feel the multitude of forces around him, forces beyond one's comprehensive abilities, but should this lead to one's surrendering before these forces? On the contrary, it increases the inner convictions of one's responsibility in this big world, the responsibility of one's every action. And I may add here, as now I speak seriously, that this is why Jesus Christ, or rather the Sermon on the Mount is so valuable. For it reflects the increased demands toward one's responsibility, it reflects a new stage in human development. Does this responsibility lead toward mental enslavement? Surely not. On the contrary, it leads toward liberation of all the creative abilities of society and all individual human beings. But is it the way of modern churches? To me, so much in modern religion is pervaded by blind belief, which as I have already said, seems to me nothing but retreat from one's responsibilities, that actually it makes all forms of modern religion a refuge for superstitious feelings, for blindness, for weakness. But not only churches represent a way of escape from facing realities, from shifting responsibilities to someone else. Personality cults of leaders, belief that those in the government, those in big industries know better, blind following of styles and fashions - in clothes, in tastes, in thinking and traditional dark superstitions, just blind trust in anyone who once made one correct appraisal in advance of this or that - the ways of finding a loophole from one's responsibility are extremely numerous... Certainly there is a difference between rational entrusting of authority with specific social functions, and blind uncritical belief in every word and action of authority."

At a literary seminar at Moscow University last April, the playwright chairing the session opened the meeting by reading extracts from a letter from a seventeen-year old. The letter listed "religiosity" as one of the preoccupations of this age group. The audience, mostly students, responded with a general giggle, for which the chairman quickly reprimanded them. He pointed out that in the very heart


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
of the artistic and intellectual life of Moscow there is a church where not only are the numbers of worshippers increasing, but where the "quality" of the faithful is also "improving." He developed his point by telling the story of a Soviet schoolboy discovered wearing a small cross on a chain around his neck. When asked about his family background, the boy replied that his father worked for the government and his mother for the Ministry of Culture.

The official atheist magazine, Science and Religion, recently published a letter from a man who said that from childhood he had always considered himself an atheist. "Following...the development of science and theoretical thinking, I have come to the conclusion that atheism in its present form cannot claim to be scientific, does not satisfy man's spiritual needs, and does not correspond to his feelings." He invoked the support of physicists in particular for his contention that the criterion of "common sense" so dear to atheists is not considered acceptable to science.

Perhaps the most peculiar statement is that reportedly made by V.V. Belousev, a prominent Soviet geophysicist, president of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, and Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. During a trip with an American scientist in the spring of 1961, Belousev said that he had seen statistics from studies made in the USSR which show a disturbing moral breakdown in Soviet cities, particularly in the new ones where there are no churches. Some Soviet sociologists, according to Belousev, now feel that there is an inverse correlation between the incidence of moral collapse and the number of churches in a given area, moral collapse increasing as the number of churches declines.

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The Soviet Economic System

Soviet propaganda maintains that the means of production, including the land itself, belong to "the people". The interests of the worker in "the people's" factory are, therefore, supposed to be identical with those of management. A Soviet exchange student who spent 1961-62 in the United States studying the development and inner workings of the U.S. labor movement at first faithfully repeated this line. Toward the end of the year, however, he admitted to his faculty adviser that labor-management squabbles exist in the USSR, and that in the event of such a disagreement, labor had little recourse except production slow-downs.

"We worked with Russians," reported a French fitter who helped prepare the French exhibition in Moscow in the fall of 1961, "but they were slow and did everything half-heartedly. Although we were not in any particular hurry to finish our job, one of us asked the Russians why they were working more slowly than the French. The Russian's answer - because you didn't have a revolution."


Cynicism about "our ownership" has appeared in other conversations. "The Palace of Congresses, the cosmonauts and the space vehicles are acclaimed as belonging to the Soviet people, but the intellectuals and scientists know that this is a sop and full realize that these things are coming out of the people's collective hide," according to a Soviet geneticist. "The people are told of these glorious achievements and then are expected to be content to go home to their six square meters of inadequate, shabby, over-crowded rooms and their poor diet, and their drab, grubby clothes."

Americans visiting a worker's apartment during a trip through the USSR last summer congratulated their host on the launching of the two Soviet manned satellites, at that time still in orbit. The worker made a spitting gesture and said sardonically: "What good is that to me? I want to raise a family and not a bunch of paupers."

Less than a month later, the same Americans, visiting in Orel found their Ford surrounded by a curious throng of about 200 Soviets. One of the crowd commented:

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"That's better than ours." One of the Americans replied: "But you have cosmonauts." Someone else in the crowd answered in a loud voice: "But what can you do with cosmonauts?"

In a seminar on civil law held in the Moscow University law faculty last year, discussion centered around court cases involving transfers of land. Land, as a basic means of production, is state property and in Soviet civil law this is interpreted to mean that land cannot be sold, leased or otherwise transferred by individual citizens, or by state or cooperative organizations. A house can be sold and an orchard can be sold, but the land under the house or orchard cannot be sold.

One of the cases discussed involved the sale of a house and orchard which was struck down by the courts as a disguised sale of the land because the purchase price was higher than the value of the house and orchard. In another case, a lease of land by a collective farm to a state farm was struck down. According to an American law professor who had obtained permission to sit in on the classes, the Soviet students pressed the professor in questioning these decisions, citing analogies based on sales and leases of capital equipment between enterprises, and other analogies and arguments. The professor's answer was always the same: land is state property - it cannot be sold or leased.

After class, the American commented that the students had seemed to be trying to get an answer to the question of why land should be treated differently from other forms of property, whereas their (Soviet) professor had kept answering in effect that land is sacred but had never explained why. The professor replied: "I think your criticism is valid; I should have answered their question." Then, after a pause he added: "But you know, it is a very difficult question to answer."

Collectivization of agriculture seems to have been in the mind of a Soviet engineer discussing the situation in China where he had worked for six years: "We have

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made mistakes in the past and they should not have been repeated. But the Chinese began to copy us, making even worse mistakes. The result, famine."

"Soviet farmers won't work unless they get some real incentives", according to a young Soviet biochemist, explaining to an American why the 1962 crop prospects were bad. He added: "If the land were divided and each farmer had his own land, then they would succeed."

There are distinctly capitalist overtones in several conversations about investment of capital. M. Ye. Rakovsky, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Automation and Machine Building, on an exchange visit to the United States in March 1959 was deeply interested in a comparison of methods of financing and of cost determination in the U.S. and the USSR. He explained to the American escort officer that he was perturbed about the Soviet system of providing capital and operating funds for manufacturing plants through increasing the cost to the consumer of the finished product. He was especially interested in the American system of stocks - how much can an American individual buy, how does he buy it, what does he get for it, could he as a Soviet citizen buy stock, for example, in AT&T. The American felt that this was a very real search for information impelled by dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the Soviet economic system.

In March 1960, a group of Soviet scientists on an exchange visit in the U.S. were discussing common professional problems with American scientists over dinner. The Soviets commented that a major problem for them was finding the incentive to go on working full-speed when they already made more money than they could fruitfully spend. This was especially true in households where both the husband and wife worked. It was not worthwhile to pile up great savings accounts because interest rates in the USSR were so low. The Soviets, talking among themselves during the evening, evolved the suggestion that they band together and form a small firm, putting their excess salaries into a plant and laboratories, plowing their profits back into the labs, and taking care to

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keep the undertaking sufficiently small so as not to attract official attention. The American listeners had the impression that this would not be strictly legal but that the Soviets felt it could be wangled.

Yuriy Zhukov, until recently Chairman of the State Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, was also exercised about incentives when he visited the United States this November. In comparing U.S. and Soviet policies on economics, culture, sociological, and political problems, he stated that he felt U.S. taxes were too high and were removing incentives from the minds of both professional and non-professional Americans. By contrast, he pointed out that the highest Soviet tax bracket was 30% and that most incomes were only taxed from 9% to 12%.

A 34-year-old Soviet doctor answered an American's question about private patients:

"That's the trouble. You have to have special permission for that, and those people are specially selected professors and party members. I would be severely punished if I took money. They say I must cure people for free. My idea would be if the government would just "free" me, I would heal rich and poor. I would charge the rich high fees. A writer like yourself, for example, I admit frankly, I would make pay large sums. But the poor I would treat for little or nothing. Then I would pay taxes on my earnings to the state and it would be a profit for us both --much more than it is now. Of course, that is only my own idea...I believe there will always be rich and poor people. Some are born with brains to make money, some with brains to make other things, and some with no brains for anything. There must always be both rich and poor, but that, mind you, is just my own private idea."

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Soviet Foreign Policy

The break-up of the Paris Conference in 1960 was, of course, presented in the Soviet press as entirely the responsibility of the West and especially of the United States which had sent the U-2 "spy plane" for this evil purpose. A member of the Soviet intelligentsia with considerable stature in his own field, however, had another interpretation of the international situation:

"The Russian people want peace. They know this depends upon an agreement between the United States and the USSR. Therefore, the breakup of the May 1960 Conference in Paris was a heavy blow. Among the Moscow intelligentsia there were complaints against Eisenhower because he did not apologize, on the grounds that this made it easier for Khrushchev to break up the conference. It was clear that the Powers incident was only an excuse since it was apparently known that American intelligence planes had been flying over the Soviet Union for a long time. In fact, a year before the incident an acquaintance had talked about this to me."

A young Soviet engineer complained to a visiting American last September that he had been completely unable to understand the Soviet handling of the 1960 U-2 incident. Since similar matters in the past had always been handled through diplomatic channels, he could not see why Khrushchev had made such a tremendous issue of it. He commented that he was forced to suspect that Khrushchev's actions had been prompted by a desire to sabotage an impending agreement and that, frankly, he was now completely confused by his government's foreign policy.

Another young engineer told Americans whom he met sunning on a Leningrad beach that he thought it was terrible that Khrushchev had talked only about the U-2 at the Summit meeting in Paris when there were so many other important issues to discuss.

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A Soviet student at Moscow University in 1961 commented to a group of fellow students that he saw no point in a Khrushchev-Kennedy-Macmillan meeting because Khrushchev unfortunately had no intention of agreeing with Kennedy or Macmillan. According to a foreign student attending Moscow University at the time the remark was reported to the authorities by a cleaner who had overheard it. The other students denied having heard the remark, however, so the speaker was sent to the virgin lands for six months, instead of to prison.

There is a hint of this same attitude in a remark made by a Soviet official who visited England last August. Toward the end of his visit, he found himself alone with one of his English hosts. He immediately said that he was glad of such an opportunity as he wanted to say something that had been on his mind for a long time. "Please don't think that what our leaders say is a reflection of what the people in the Soviet Union think or feel. Policy is one thing and true feelings are quite different. Soviet people do not want war and will never agree to it. I want you to believe me -- these are the true feelings of the Soviet people." He then burst out with the further comment that if only a universal law could be passed which would automatically sentence all leaders, "irrespective of who they are" to death in the event of a war being declared, there would not be any danger of war and international relations would improve out of all recognition.

Other more generalized critical comments have also been reported. "Americans owe it to the world to stand firm in Berlin," a Soviet geneticist told an American visitor in Moscow last July. She added that the effect on the Soviet populace of the Cuban rebuff to the U.S. in the Bay of Pigs was electric; therefore, the U.S. should never again allow any taint of weakness or irresolution to be attached to its actions.

On 25 October, at the recent Cuban crisis, a Komsomol leader at Moscow University remarked to an American that all the meetings being held around the USSR to condemn U.S. actions were really quite silly. "How," he said, "could people vote on condemnatory resolutions when they did not even know what President

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Kennedy had said." "The proper way to remedy this defect," he added, "would be to have the full text of the President's speech printed alongside the Soviet government statement and then let the meetings hold their vote."

An American who attended the Moscow World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace last July reported that during the Conference, a Soviet village school teacher showed up at the Moskva Hotel, carrying a signboard with three typewritten pages addressed to officials of the Congress. He criticized Lenin's theories for their advocacy of violence, suggested a kind of neo-Tolstoy pacifism, and urged a strengthened UN without a veto to stop all nuclear tests. Hotel authorities tried to chase him out of the lobby, but he held his ground, embraced several western observers, and there were tears all around.

Soviet doctrine holds that objectivity, in the sense in which the word is used in the West, verges on the subversive, indicating at best a lack of devotion to the cause of communism. Nevertheless, two young VUZ graduates whose analyses of the world situation have been reported, have shown remarkable objectivity in their views of international differences.

One had been discussing with a Western European friend various national art exhibits held in Moscow last year. He was particularly impressed with the Indonesian exhibit as illustrating

"the very real differences in which different nations look at the world. It is so closely connected with the deep conviction that 'our' way of life is about the most humane, natural way for all people to take, and those who invent something else are doing monkey business. I quite agree with your criticism of American idealism, that is, your criticizing Americans for being confident that their way is the best for all others to take. I might add that, to a great extent, this is true of many people in the USSR. Too many are sincerely sure that the most natural and humane way to take is the way Russians live... And sometimes this narrow way of looking at other countries, present

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not only in Americans and Russians but, I'm sure, in all peoples, makes me feel really pessimistic... In fact, sincere sticking to convictions that 'our' is absolutely right, 'theirs' is wholly wrong, too many times leads people to alternatives parallel to 'Red or Dead' with the choice for the latter."

One of the young men who participated in the Mayakovsky Square discussions (and who was subsequently arrested for his part in them) wrote an analysis of the world situation as part of his draft program for a proposed World Federation of General Disarmament. His arguments, addressed to Soviet citizens, were in part as follows:

"First of all, we should recognize that, in fact, with the discovery of nuclear means of destruction, the act of global war is in and of itself absurd... There is a view according to which a world war is already in fact going on. It is assumed that the world, divided into two inimical blocs, restrained from global war by the presence in both spheres of an enormous destructive potential, is carrying on local wars on a gradual basis, now in one, now in another part of the world. Each of the quarreling sides thus tries to enlarge its sphere of influence. But even if this is the case, who can affirm that such a course of events will not lead, in the final analysis to global war?..."

"At present, the effort to accumulate the maximum destructive potential is interwoven with the tendency to concentrate this in the inimically opposed spheres. Blocs arise. Blocs and the tendency toward maximum concentration, and consequently the tendency, as well, toward the maximum extension of their spheres of influence. The targets of the contemplated extension of the spheres of influence are the neutral countries and countries which find themselves in the other bloc, or within the sphere of

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influence of the other bloc. The bloc has its nucleus, around which are grouped the elements which constitute, as it were, its shell. At present, the elements of the shell are relatively constant and the shell itself is consequently relatively stable. But it is important to note that some fall-out of individual elements of the shell, as well as some accession of new elements is constantly going on.

"In this connection, the posing of the question of the formation of a neutral bloc, whose military potential would be fully liquidated or reduced to a level little above zero, is timely. The mission of the neutral bloc would consist in the creation of conditions which would intensify the fall-out of elements of the shells and in maintaining them within its sphere of influence. The neutral bloc would thus in practice be a wedge, driving the inimical blocs more and more asunder, or more precisely, weakening them quantitatively and qualitatively..."

(He noted that neither bloc would be able to commit aggression on the neutral bloc since this would instantly provoke the opposition of the other and the conflict would inevitably grow into a global war.)

"The presence of an enormous destructive potential in the inimical spheres excludes the possibility of a conflict and is a reliable guarantee of tranquility. It is self-understood that the element of chance is not excluded even here, but the probability of a clash is enormously reduced."

Among the already existing conditions which he saw as facilitating the creation of this neutral bloc were "the striving of the Afro-Asian continent toward independence (which) carries with it the tendency toward

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neutrality and consolidation" and "the existence of countries which, as the result of certain circumstances, had entered the blocs but which have tendencies toward neutrality."

The school teacher who showed up the Moscow World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace placed his faith in a strengthened UN without the veto. The young man quoted above showed a similar disposition to trust an international organization, rather than to rely on Soviet organs. In his draft charter for his proposed World Union of Partisans of General Disarmament, he appealed to all peoples and all governments "to raise the prestige of the UN and the International (World) Court, ... to turn the UN into a supra-state organ which would act in strict accordance with the norm of international law and would... have its own most highly developed apparatus of compulsion, exceeding by several times the most powerful apparatus of compulsion of any state... The UN should create its own institutions in all the strata of the population of all states.---"

In the provisions of his draft charter, he went to some pains to ensure that his World Union would not fall under the control of any one national section, including the (presumably founding) Russian one, and he provided for secret ballot in all cases. Most startling of all from the Soviet security forces' point of view, he specified that "the activity of the World Union can be altered, partially arrested or fully terminated only by a decision of the International Court" and that "every member of the World Union has the moral right not to subordinate himself to the laws in effect on the territory of his place of residence, if those laws contradict the ethical norms of international law."

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Socialist Brotherhood

For fifteen years, the Soviet people have been told of the unity and brotherhood of the "socialist camp". Some doubts have been expressed by individual Soviets, however, concerning their "socialist brothers". A student at Moscow University commented as early as 1958 to an American professor for whom he was acting as guide, that the differences between communism and capitalism were not nearly as great as the differences between cultures, and, as an example, cited the differences between the Russians and the Chinese.

An American who attended an international meeting of physicists in August 1960 reported that the Soviet physicists whom he met were openly uneasy about the single-mindedness and discipline exhibited by Chinese students studying in their universities. They cited, in tones of horror, an anecdote which has been told so often in recent years by Soviet students and professors that it has almost attained the status of a folktale. According to the story, a group of Chinese graduate students who were studying in the USSR, were existing on mere pittance, barely sufficient to purchase food and lodging. One student managed somehow to save enough money from his allowance to purchase a small radio. This so incensed his fellow students that they not only made him give up the radio, but threatened to throw him out of their living quarters for exhibiting such weakness.

A guide at the French exhibition in Moscow in the fall of 1961 reported witnessing the following incident. A Chinese shouted at a Russian: "Why do you push me, Russian 'scum'?" The Chinese was quickly surrounded by a hostile crowd. People yelled. "Away with you, go back to China." "Punch his ugly face." The Chinese had already been slapped in the face when militiamen put an end to the scene.

An American exchange student at Moscow University in 1961-62 reported that on several occasions Soviet friends said to her in so many words: "Some day the U.S. and the USSR must join together against the Chinese."

The most telling personal insult in Soviet society today is a charge of being uncultured. During a violent argument in a taxi queue near the Kremlin, witnessed by

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a visiting American last June, one Soviet accused another of being uncultured. The accused, in rejoinder, asked him whether he thought he was Chinese.

Soviet students were loud in their ridicule of the attention paid by Khrushchev to the seven-year-old son of Fidel Castro, according to a foreign student who attended Moscow University last year. They were particularly derisive of an announcement in the Soviet press that Khrushchev gave the boy, who attends school in Moscow, an "interview" lasting one and a half hours.

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Marxist-Leninist Doctrine

A young Soviet philosopher, discussing philosophy with a prominent French intellectual in 1957 asked him: "Shall I go on talking as the official interpreter of Soviet philosophers? If I do so, I shall be in a position of inferiority with regard to you because I shall be obliged to talk nonsense. Wouldn't you rather I spoke my own mind?"

A nineteen-year-old Soviet expressed it more emotionally, when he confided to a guide at the French exhibition in Moscow in the fall of 1961: "Marxism is like a mathematical scheme. I am cramped in it. It does not inspire me."

Soviet physicist Igor Tamm asked a visiting American what had struck him most about the USSR. He was told that it was the complete disappearance of Marxist ideology with which the American had become so familiar in the 1920's and 1930's. Tamm agreed that "we are no longer dogmatic." He added that in the present Soviet state, Marxist values are no longer as true as they were and that a reconsideration is sometimes necessary.

Peter Kapitsa, also a noted physicist, voiced this same theme in an article in the Soviet newspaper, Economic Gazette (March 1962) in which he charged that attempts to apply Marxist-Leninist dialectics as the unique clue to scientific correctness have hampered the progress of Soviet science.

A Soviet exchange student in the U.S. in 1961-62, specializing in U.S. labor organizations, confided to an American that he now realized that Marxist class structure as he learned it was not applicable to U.S. society and that Americans could not be categorized as Marx tried to do. He also commented that the basic attitudes of workers were the same in the U.S. as in the USSR, particularly with regard to on-the-job problems, relations with superiors, etc. It might be noted that this particular student's background was impeccable in terms of orthodox Communist training and experience -- a member of the Young Pioneers, then of the Komsomol, and thereafter a member of the Communist Party. He fought in World War II as an infantry officer, and before coming to the U.S. was a history instructor at a pedagogical institute.

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Membership in the Communist Party

Membership in the Communist Party has always been held up by the regime as a great honor, as well as a responsibility, awarded to the "best" people. A director of research projects at the Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR who was born in 1920 replied in response to the question of a visitor that he was not a member of the Party. He explained that he would not dream of paying 3% of his salary to the Party; it was quite enough to pay 1% to the Soviet trade union.

A mid-career official of the Soviet bureaucracy, himself a Party member of long standing was more explicit:

"All these Party meetings have been reduced to mere form. Take any regional Party chief - the only reason he calls a Party meeting is so that it can be on the books that a meeting has been held. Everyone attends these Party meetings just to get it over with. No one is really interested in these things any more. Take the Party members. Why do they belong to the Party? It is not because they believe in the system or in the ideology of the Party. No, not at all. I can state with assurance that 99% of the so-called Communists in the Soviet Union are not Communist at all. They are people who joined the Party in order to have a greater opportunity to gain a good position which would be impossible for them to gain without being in the Party. That's what it means to be a Communist. Just as previously the Party members were truly dedicated to that ideology - fully dedicated - so, now, just the opposite is true."

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Membership in the Komsomol

According to an Eastern European student who worked in the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute from 1956 to 1959, the director of the institute cited the Komsomol as an example of how not to arouse young people's interest and enthusiasm:

"Look at the Komsomol which has completely lost its hold on the students. In their first year of undergraduate work the Komsomol still operates, but in the second year it is quite impossible to get an organization going and from then on the Komsomol is completely extinct."

The Soviet press has frequently published letters from disillusioned Komsomol members, usually using them as a springboard for exhortations to greater enthusiasm. The following are fairly representative: In 1960 Pravda angrily criticized a letter which it published from a Komsomol member who refused to believe the published story of a model Komsomol brigade in Baku which allegedly had donated its services to repair apartments free: "To use one's free time for working and then to say: 'Thank you, we need no money, we are Komsomol members'... Who would believe such a fairy tale?--just a clumsy lie."

In 1961, Komsomolskaya Pravda told the cautionary tale of a Komsomol member, Yuri Belousev, who resigned from the organization because "I do not wish to bear any burden nor do I wish to pay membership dues." The director of the factory where he had formerly worked withdrew the factory's approval of his continuing in school and refused to promote him. Belousev complained to the newspaper, and Komsomolskaya Pravda sent a correspondent to investigate. Belousev told her: "If everyone worked and lived honorably, then it'd be a different matter. But how many bureaucrats, careerists and cheats we have... What are meetings and Sunday labor donations to me - I have enough work at home."

In 1962 the Belorussian Komsomol newspaper reported the case of Grigory Zuyev, a Komsomol member and student who was "infected with alien influences and worshipped the West." Zuyev was expelled from the Komsomol, but then various party organizations began trying to reform

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him by means of "persuasion." Eventually, Zuyev made the following open statement:

"I am speaking here on behalf of a group of youth who have been hounded... I don't understand why people bother me. I didn't steal anything from anybody. People try to read my soul. They say I'm not a patriot. But I love our woods, our fields, our native land where, maybe, I shall die. However, I tell you that I love all mankind, the English and American peoples, world civilization, foreign literature. I am interested in everything good that exists in the West. What difference does it make that there is capitalism there. As for the Komsomol, it is a local concept, it does not suit me. What did it give me?"

In 1962 Komsomolskaya Pravda described with horror a secret society organized by the students at the Moscow Library Institute, including "some" Komsomol members. The "World Association of Young Troglodytes" was organized with the avowed aim of "the gradual peaceful transformation of man into monkey." Every member had the "right to place his personal interests above those of society." All members were to "struggle for the liberation of man from technical progress." Two members of the society explained that boredom was the reason for its formation: "Komsomol members have no vital matters which would keep their minds and souls occupied."

In a question-and-answer session at the University of Moscow last November, three Soviet professors met with their Soviet students to answer questions on ideology, Party history, and domestic and international affairs. The session differed from most such meetings in that there were no set speeches by the professors and questions were asked orally from the floor instead of being passed up to the rostrum in written form.

Some of the most outspoken students were neither stilyagi nor "intellectual" types, but active Komsomol members. The professors were pressed hard by the students to explain how the Soviet withdrawal of rockets from Cuba could be considered a "victory" as claimed by the Soviet

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press. Several students expressed the opinion openly that the outcome of the Cuban crisis was a clear defeat for Soviet foreign policy.

Even more remarkable was the line of questioning followed when the subject of Stalin's role came up. One questioner asked how Stalin's dictatorship could be considered basically different from Hitler's. The professor who answered the question (who was handicapped in replying convincingly because his own rise in the academic world occurred during the purges of the 1930's and who still speaks in a semi-literate manner) sputtered that the class structure of the two countries made all the difference. According to a Western observer, the students were obviously not convinced.

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Regime Deceit

The difference between Soviet claims and Soviet reality must often be most apparent to the Soviet people themselves. A 34-year old doctor, a veteran of World War II, told an American: "If you go to a small village half an hour from town, you'll see how they really live on collective farms. There are no 'show farms' there. You know what I mean - farms for showing to foreign delegations. They still wear bast shoes in those villages - it is frightful."

When a Soviet reporter complained that he had been shadowed by the FBI while visiting the Seattle World's Fair, even when he went up in the Space Needle, a Soviet exchange student in the U.S. remarked: "I was with the man when he went up the Space Needle, and I didn't see anybody following us. I even went on an automobile ride with him and I saw no agent, unless the driver was an agent -- which I don't think possible because the driver was our host and also he is a faculty member of your university."

A taxi driver in Moscow, talking to his foreign diplomat fare insisted that Khrushchev was "a very poor speaker." The diplomatic diplomat said: "Oh well, Khrushchev is a clever man, anyhow," to which the driver rejoined: "We shall know about that when he's dead."

Resistance to indoctrination and interest in "forbidden fruit" on the part of individual Soviet citizens has been reported many times. A foreign student at the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute reported the following incident which occurred in the fall of 1959. A forthcoming lecture was announced on the subject of "Non-linear Mechanics - a New Look at Problems of Time and Space" by N. A. Kozyrev. The Soviet students knew that Kozyrev had been imprisoned under Stalin for the formulation of theories which were not in line with the demands of dialectical materialism. Immediately following the announcement of the lecture, practically all the books in the school library on time and space and the theory of relativity were suddenly in great demand. One of the instructors commented bitterly that "all these years we have been trying to get youth interested in our lectures, but without success." The day before the lecture, Kozyrev was criticized in Pravda for lecturing to audiences who could not properly evaluate his views in the light of

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ideology. As a result, two hours before the lecture was to begin, the hall was filled to its capacity (600), and about 1800 more students jammed the hallways, staircases and neighboring classrooms, packing them so tightly that it was impossible to move through the area. The director of the institute, perturbed by what he considered a political demonstration, appealed to the students to clear the halls in the interests of safety, but was ignored. Two hours later, after three such appeals, he threatened to cancel the lecture. When the students still remained in place, he announced the meeting closed, with the promise that the lecture would be rescheduled at a later date, but with a limited number of admission tickets. The students suspecting a trick, remained in place for yet another hour before they finally left.

During a performance by the Moscow "Estrade" (light entertainment) company at Moscow University last February, the master of ceremonies so antagonized the audience by recounting between acts edifying anecdotes about the "new Soviet man" that he was jeered into silence. The final breakdown in his control over the audience occurred when he refused to permit a second encore to a comedienne who had just performed satirical sketches in which she parodied both a Soviet spaceman and a worker who had overfulfilled his norms. The master of ceremonies finally retaliated by closing down the performance.

Komsomolskaya Pravda last January carried a letter from a student in Kharkov in which the writer complained: "Our students are sufficiently mature for discussions and debates, and the time has come to stop leading them by the hand." He felt that "the whole purpose of higher education is to teach the student to have his own point of view" and urged that the best means of developing this capacity for independent thinking is through discussion... and not when "truths are handed down in a ready made and already decided form."

A Soviet historian talking to a British friend in 1961 explained:

"We historians know perfectly well that Trotsky played a positive role at certain moments of his career, but on the whole, his role was thoroughly negative so that is the thing that has to be stressed... And in the long run, there

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will not be any discrepancies between 'factual' history and 'objective' history...Our young generation knows exactly what is what...As regards Soviet history they know better and better every year what the facts are, but they also know why certain facts should be played down and others played up."

The historian may have spoken more truly than he knew. An American visiting the USSR this year reported that Soviet students had discussed with him the relationship between Stalin and Kirov, a subject which has not yet been touched on in the "revelations" concerning Stalin's years. In the students' version, Kirov in 1934 received more votes for the party secretariat than did Stalin, which should have made him Stalin's superior. Despite this, he had to bow out in Stalin's favor, accepting the second most important post (secretary of the Leningrad district). Following this election, Stalin had him murdered to get rid of a dangerously popular rival.

This open secret of incomplete or slanted history was also admitted by one of the Soviet exchange students in the United States this year. When his American professor asked him whether there are any fair, factual writings on the U.S. trade union movement in current Soviet literature, he replied that there were not. He said that the only people writing on the subject do so for propaganda purposes, slanted and colored so as to give the desired picture for Soviet consumption.

In an article in an underground magazine written by Soviet students and circulated in Moscow in 1961, a young literary critic commented: "Every claim to be serving the people is either a conscious or an unconscious lie. This criterion of the correctness of the path of a poet, of his ideological purity, can profitably be used by every rogue who serves the power of the state, which so skillfully identifies itself with the people. How many talented people have been deceived and destroyed."

In a superbly impudent "explanation" addressed to the KGB, one of the students involved in the Mayakovsky Square discussions in the fall of 1961 described the after-effects of Stalin's "excesses":

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"People were coerced too much - the reflex action was resistance. People were deceived too much - and they became accustomed not to believe anything. The most noble ideas lost all their attraction, because the ideas came from the lying lips of a constellation of scoundrels and murderers...I recall a small brochure in which Lev Sheynin (a Soviet journalist) writes about how humanely the workers of the KGB treated the students of a certain organization, about how, according to him, the students confessed and broke down crying, and so forth and so on. What a terrible savage! The impression is created that the author was purposely trying to make sure that no one would believe him. In the reading of such a base concoction even the truth sounds like a lie. On me personally that most stupid brochure produced a diametrically opposite effect."

Another member of this group commented on the poet Yevgeny Yevtusheuko's lines on the joy of marching on the road straight to the commune. "We smile, not because we don't believe in the possibility of unfurling the banners and going straight to the Commune. We stand precisely for that straight road to the Commune and not for the one that is marked out with lies and meanness which they are trying to palm off on us... You are inclined to proclaim mould and decay as signs of growth. Sated swinishness is, to you, a tactical move."

Two poems from underground magazines circulated in Moscow in 1960 and 1961 echo this theme of regime deceit.

#### Cocktail

Everything round about  
Is a melancholy cocktail:  
One part truth, one part lies,  
One part dreams and wishes...

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Moscow Gold - by A. Onezhskaya

Golden stains of pain  
In the pitch-black darkness,  
Golden thoughts in slavery,  
Golden people in prison.  
Treasures everywhere: the gold of bread,  
The golden tassels of banners,  
And in the golden manure of the cow-shed,  
A golden deposit of names  
Glorifying this city,  
This land, and this world.

Among them, proudly glistening  
In golden praise, an idol,  
The newest and brightest,  
Gladdening his people,  
Sprinkles golden gifts  
Into the mouths of the grateful simpletons.  
Golden teeth on skulls,  
Golden promises in newspapers -  
Everything is splendid in my fatherland  
Built on bones.

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Collective Guilt for Stalin's Crimes

The regime's handling of revelations of Stalin's crimes has emphasized that the books are closed on those guilty of being his accomplices and that what remains now is to rehabilitate the victims and to look to the future. This effort to absolve the survivors of the period of any taint of guilt has not been entirely successful. An article in an underground magazine circulated in Moscow in 1961 described the revelations concerning Stalin's "errors". "Next, (1956) it appears, everything is very simple. It turns out that the friend of progressive mankind (Stalin) ruled the country as though it were his own patrimony. The rooting out of mistakes begins. Those mistakes cost thee dear, Russia. They devoured millions of the best sons... Someone wanted Russia, entering the struggle against the cult of personality, not to think too much about the reasons which had given the cult birth."

At a meeting of Moscow University students in April 1962, reported by Le Monde correspondent, Michel Tatu, one student speaker said: "Of us also they (future generations) will demand a rendering of accounts concerning the past. They will demand to know what we did to struggle against the results of the cult of personality which poison the atmosphere." Another added: "The best thing that the older generation did was to give us birth. For that we owe them our gratitude, but it is too bad that among that generation those who ought to have survived in the first place did not survive."

An American exchange student at Leningrad University reported that Leningrad students organized a formal debate addressed to the question then being asked many fathers by their sons: "What were you doing while the crimes of Stalin's years were being perpetrated? Why did you let them happen?"

During a hotly debated writers' meeting last September a "liberal" work was under attack as being unfair to "conservative writers. One of the editors responsible for the work finally delivered a particularly passionate defense of the work. He turned to the

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attacking conservatives and shouted: "And where were you when Zoshchenko was being hounded to death? Did you protest when they were starving Anna Akhmatova? We don't want your dachas and your automobiles. All we want from you is decent behavior." (Mikhail Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova were the primary targets of the savage campaign for ideological "purity" in literature in the late 1940's)

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Attitude Toward the Regime

One of the poems circulated in an underground magazine in Moscow in 1961 described the regime thus:

People Need an Idol - by I. Peresvetov

People need an idol,  
They hang on to him tightly, with a death-grip.  
The voluntary icon-daubers paint his portraits.  
The voluntary preachers ecstatically proclaim his Praise.  
The worshippers study his blameless Life and the fanatical zealots of this blamelessness Scour about in search of heretical apocrypha.  
But idols decay.  
And when people finally understand that their idol was Not, goodness knows!, so great, and that they, his Creators, risk being damned together with their idol,  
They become brazen and their consciences no longer Clean, continue their dirty business with Ten times the effort, for after all (as Victor Hugo Said), "How nice to be a flea on the body of a lion!"

A young Soviet translator complained to the American newspaperman for whom he worked: "As for me, I don't like being a receptacle of irritation from both sides. The Russian officials growl at me as if I were John Foster Dulles, while you say such things and make generalizations in my presence as if I were a dummy, or rather a representative of the very bureaucracy we both hate."

A 20-year old Soviet commented to a guide at the French Fair in Moscow in 1961: "I was a boy during the Stalin period. Stalin, of course, was an animal, yet the people felt his strength, greatness, ideas. But what kind of ideas does Khrushchev have? None - a retreat on the entire Communist front. It's correct, life under Stalin was rough, as old men say, but now life is empty. Everything is falling to pieces."

The extreme of this sense of alienation from the regime is seen in two of the 1961 underground poems:

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To My Friends - by N. Nor

No, it is not up to us to fire the pistols  
Into the midst of the green columns!  
For that we are too much the poets,  
And our opponent is too strong.  
No, the Vendee will not be reborn in us  
In that coming, decisive hour!  
After all, we are more concerned with ideas,  
And the cudgel is not for us.  
No, it is not up to us to raise the pistols!  
But the age created poets  
For the most important moments  
And they created soldiers.

The second, untitled, was published under the motto:

Let Yourself be carried away, somersaulting  
In blinding music.  
Remember everything in the world...

You, nineteen years old,  
Gurgling tomato juice,  
I'll teach you to learn sonnets  
To the snick of flying bullets.

Thick-skinned ones, how many of you  
Covered the whole square: "Brand-new!"  
Suppose it weren't a square but a place of execution?  
You'd close your little eyes from the drops of blood!

Believe me, I'm no beacon,  
I only want you to be genuinely unlucky and happy!

There are so many fights ahead,  
So many Senate Squares and showers of bullets!

Russia is struggling in her strait-jacket!  
But she'll never be curbed!

Arise!  
Now!  
During this blue night.

WE'RE FED UP! WE'VE HAD ENOUGH! CUT IT OUT!

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Capitalism and the West

The Soviet exchange student whose year of study in the United States had convinced him that the "laws" of Marxist class structure are not applicable to the United States has already been noted. A young Soviet engineer visiting London also found his belief in Marxism shaken by what he saw: "According to Marxism, capitalism and unemployment are inseparable. Yet I could not find any beggars or impoverished people in the streets of London...When I saw the Labor Exchange, I was very much impressed by the absence of those long lines of unemployed which are often described by Soviet propaganda." He added that his former belief in the inevitability of proletarian revolution in capitalist countries had been destroyed.

The conclusions concerning the American economic system, reached by a Soviet biochemist during his visit to the U.S., are somewhat startling. At the beginning of his visit, he was convinced that U.S. income tax laws were for propaganda purposes only, since if they were enforced they would "eliminate incentive." He reasoned that since the American scientists whom he met obviously had incentive, no one obeyed the laws. He was finally convinced that even though income taxes are progressive, one still takes home more money if he makes more, and that there are, moreover, other incentives to consider. He then commented that the U.S. system was far too socialized and would not work in the USSR where, according to him, you do not accept more responsibility unless you are paid more.

A French intellectual reported that one young philosopher whom he met on a trip to the USSR in 1957 made the following statement about the alleged pauperization of workers in the West: "Pauperization in its ordinary sense is not to be taken seriously. In the end, wages in all countries are in proportion to the community's resources. Everyone knows that, and I shall not try to defend the contrary theory, the official (Communist) theory, which one cannot take seriously."

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Concepts of Freedom and Democracy

Soviet "theorists" for years have labored to change the meaning of these words to conform to Soviet conditions. A typical formulation is the one used recently by the Soviet newspaper, Literary Gazette, to describe the regime's demand for intellectual conformity: "Laws which protect people from those who endanger the freedom of normal life are the expression of the loftiest democracy." Despite the years of double-speak, however, individual Soviets have on occasion used the words "freedom" and "democracy" in the same sense in which they are used in the West. The youngsters against whom Literary Gazette was inveighing were described as demanding "freedom of the soul, freedom to disagree, freedom to be sad."

A Soviet engineer, about 35 years old, explained to a guide at the French Exhibition in Moscow in the fall of 1961:

"Now everything is on the right track. The present development must inevitably lead to real freedom, to your Western freedom and not to our faked Soviet freedom. Several years ago the spiritual oppression was still very heavy. But at that time, the material conditions were very bad too, and for this reason the spiritual oppression was not felt so much. We had other problems - to do our job and get the most necessary things. Now the situation as far as the necessities of life are concerned has improved and there is time available to think about different questions. That's why the spiritual oppression, although it has become less violent, is much more strongly felt.

"In less than ten years, Communism will disappear. Communism has done its part and now away with it. We have outgrown Communism. It is boring to be

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[redacted]

considered juveniles, it is boring to be under the Party's guardianship. The Party must understand that we need freedom, not for revolutions but for a human way of life. However, the Party will never understand that. Therefore, we will liquidate the Party."

When asked how the Party would be liquidated, he gave only a generalized answer. Ironically, however, he turned the weapon of the Party on itself, using the phrasing of the dialectic: "The Party will be liquidated by time itself, by the circumstances and by the dialectic development of history, in accordance with the teachings of Marx."

[redacted] clearly knew [redacted] when he said in the government would just 'free me', I would heal rich and poor." He went on to add: "Now my idea is that everyone should be allowed to say exactly what he wants to, and if it's good people will approve it because people are good..."

The would-be poet, writing in a 1961 underground magazine in Moscow, might equally well have been writing in the West: "The spiritual individuality of the poet is incompatible with lies. I therefore fight for conditions which will facilitate the development of the individual. No matter what sort of opinions the individual may express, we cannot fail to call them a vital truth..."

[redacted] reported that while most of the Soviet students present seemed to agree with their government's position, they shouted down efforts by the authorities to curtail the time allotted to the [redacted] and insisted that they be given adequate time to present their case.

[redacted] declared that since the Communist Party had failed to justify the faith of the people, it should disband and free elections should be held in the USSR. These students "disappeared" from the University.

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In 1959, however, [redacted]

[redacted] similar demands were made concerning the Komsomol organization. At a general meeting of the university Komsomol organization, the secretary of the Komsomol opened the proceedings with a long speech concerning Komsomol goals for the coming year. In the debate which followed, many students demanded (1) that the structure of the Komsomol organization be changed to make it more responsive to the wishes of the majority of its members and (2) that the plan drawn up and sent down from above without consulting the students, be abandoned in favor of a plan to be drawn up by those present at the meeting. After an hour-long discussion, the group voted to reject the secretary's proposal. The session was then adjourned by the secretary with no subsequent meeting scheduled. Six more students "disappeared" from the university.

Despite this incident, [redacted]

[redacted] appeared to the Central Committee of the Communist Party to authorize a discussion club for Moscow youth, to be completely unaffiliated with any existing organization including the Communist Party:

"We say, give us a club. We shall occupy ourselves with literature, art, science and politics in it. The country has felt the refreshing wind of democracy and this democracy should speak a wholly new literary and political language. This democracy should put forward wholly new scientific, esthetic and technical values. This democracy should completely restore legality and assure the constitutional liberties of the citizens. Only thus can it inspire the people with confidence, only thus can it achieve a conscious movement of the masses."

The most explicit statement on democracy came from [redacted]

[redacted] he described the Soviet political situation thus:

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"You must realize that the chairman of a village Soviet, for example, represents nothing as an individual. Everything is decided by the Communist Party. It is a dictatorship, pure and simple, and from the bottom to the top, without the slightest attempt toward democracy."

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TRENDS IN SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

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CAESAR XXI  
Off. Ser. No. 15

TRENDS IN SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

This is a working paper, prepared in support of NIE 11-14-63, "Capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1963-1969." Primarily on the basis of open Soviet military and political writings, this report attempts to identify new trends in Soviet thinking on limited warfare and to probe their possible consequences for Soviet military policy, or foreign policy as it relates to the management of local crises.

Although the writer has benefited from the suggestions and research findings of colleagues, he is solely responsible for the paper as a whole. The DD/I Research Staff would welcome comment on the paper, addressed to Irwin P. Halpern, who wrote it, or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Staff.

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TRENDS IN SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

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TRENDS IN SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

Summary

Responsive to a changing world around them and seeking new opportunities to advance the power and prestige of the USSR, the Soviets have embarked on a new course in their thinking on the question of limited warfare. Whereas the Soviets had earlier assumed a rigid negative stance on direct involvement in limited warfare, especially in Europe, they now appear to wish to have the option to use their military forces on a sub-strategic scale. In general, they evince a strong interest in gaining greater flexibility in the management of local crises and, in recent military writings, have sought to communicate this interest to the West, particularly the United States, which has also evinced an interest in reducing the risks of rapid escalation from small-scale warfare in Europe as well as in other critical areas of the world.

There is no indication, however, that the Soviets are interested in bringing greater flexibility to the realm of strategic warfare. On the contrary, the Soviets consistently reject as impracticable, immoral, and unacceptable to them U.S. theories on controlled strategic warfare. Rather, the Soviets stress that the adversaries will fight to a decision in a general nuclear war; they dramatize the horrors of such a war and the certainty that none will escape widespread nuclear destruction. The Soviets, hence, wish to preserve the idea of nuclear stalemate or strategic military stability--not to undermine it. This closes the circle, for the freezing of strategic military power tends to make the local use of military force possible with a low risk of escalation. In short, greater "tactical flexibility" and mutually-acknowledged "strategic inflexibility" appear to be correlative objectives of the Soviet leadership.

It is perhaps too early to estimate with confidence the impact which the observed trend in Soviet thought will

have on military policy, both in regard to the management of crises and the training and equipping of Soviet troops. For one thing, Soviet doctrine still appears to be in a formative state, as is U.S.-NATO doctrine on the problem of limited warfare in the European theater. Even if entirely firmed up, the doctrine would be an inadequate basis for forecasting Soviet behavior in a local crisis because, in the final analysis, how Soviet leaders react will depend not on any established doctrine but on their assessment at the critical time of the risks involved and of their capabilities to exercise various options. That the Soviet leaders appear to be reaching for the option to use elements of their military forces to resolve local issues does not, of course, mean that the Soviets will use them for that purpose. But they probably calculate that such an option is indispensable in an environment of mutually acknowledged strategic stalemate.


Where increased tactical flexibility is likely to affect Soviet policy in Europe, in the absence of an ideal stalemate, is in situations in which the U.S. and Soviet interest in preventing escalation takes precedence over the issue immediately at stake. Thus, it is unlikely that the Soviets would attempt to settle the Berlin question by military means as long as the United States makes clear and credible its determination to defend the Western stake in Berlin with strategic military power, if necessary. Similarly, it is unlikely that the Soviets would launch an all-out conventional attack against Europe as long as tactical nuclear weapons are on standby in NATO forces there, and U.S. doctrine states that the self-imposed armaments restraint would be abandoned if it interferes with the business of winning. Rather, under such conditions (of an imperfect strategic stalemate) Soviet expectations for Western acceptance of their bid for "tactical flexibility" seems to be in the sphere of plainly defensive actions, such as a rebuff of a West German attack against East Germany. Thus, they now appear to be reassessing the risks of rapid escalation to general war--risks they had previously regarded as so great as to inhibit even a Soviet defensive operation if this meant engaging the attackers in a large scale military action in Europe.

It is hard to estimate the scale of limited warfare in Europe on which the Soviets would be willing to fight without resorting to strategic weapons. Full-scale conventional war in Europe, while tactical nuclears are available to both sides, seems improbable as a Soviet expectation. The deep-grained fear of the consequences of a direct massive confrontation between Soviet and American troops in Europe will almost certainly continue to work to avoid such a clash. It is still not clear whether the Soviet conception of tactical flexibility extends to the use of tactical nuclears in limited warfare in Europe. Doctrinal pronouncements on the problem tend to be ambivalent. While some statements consider tactical nuclears a realistic possibility with which Soviet forces must be prepared to deal in a local crisis, most stress the likelihood of escalation if nuclear weapons are employed. The ambivalence may, on the one hand, be intended simultaneously to deter the United States from resorting to tactical nuclears and, failing that, to avoid confronting the United States with an unambiguous promise of escalation; on the other hand, it may reflect different assessments by Soviet specialists of the risks involved in either initiating the use of tactical nuclears, or responding in kind to the opponent's initiative in a local conflict. Outside the European framework, in limited conflicts in underdeveloped areas where there is no direct confrontation between U.S. and Soviet forces, the Soviets, by omission of statements to the contrary, seem to regard the use of tactical nuclears by one of the major powers as a less dangerous course of action.

Distant Limited Military Action


The Soviet search for greater tactical flexibility in the Middle East and Southeast Asia has already affected policy. Beginning in 1962, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to use Soviet troops in combat situations in local crises on an unacknowledged basis. The Soviet experience in the Indonesian-West New Guinea crisis and the UAR-Yemen war reflects at the very least a policy decision to use trained Soviet crews while indigenous crews are still in an early stage of training. Beyond this, however, it






is difficult to say how much Soviet philosophy regarding the use of Soviet troops in local wars in underdeveloped areas has already been changed or will change. We do not know, for example, whether the Soviets would favor the use of their troops on an acknowledged basis, under any circumstances, nor how large a military force they would be willing to commit in a local conflict in the Middle East or Southeast Asia. In all probability, the Soviets have not yet changed their estimate that direct involvement of Soviet and U.S. forces even in distant areas, would be extremely dangerous. (There was evidently never any plan to employ Soviet troops based in Cuba in a strictly local war between the United States and Cuba.) There is not only the fear of escalation that restrains the Soviets. There is also the fact that the USSR has a very limited capability for conducting warfare at any distance from the bloc. Therefore, unless and until these restraints are lifted, the USSR will probably try to avoid (1) any direct involvement with U.S. forces in distant areas, and (2) any public knowledge of the employment of Soviet troops in combat in distant areas.

Soviet thinking on limited warfare seems to be moving in the direction of attaining still greater political-military maneuverability in distant areas. Because the Soviets are severely limited in airlift, sealfit, and naval support suitable for distant military actions, they might find the idea of a system of foreign bases attractive from the standpoint of their utility in enhancing Soviet limited warfare capabilities. Indonesia, for example, could provide a valuable logistic base if the Soviets decided to give more open support to revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. However, the leaders of the young states, jealous of their newly acquired sovereignty, are loathe to have it compromised; and, for that reason among others, we are unlikely to see the establishment of full-fledged Soviet military bases in Asia, Africa or the Middle East. If, on the other hand, the USSR manages to win over one of the small countries as an ally or to subvert its government, or if a small country should desperately need Soviet aid in a crisis, the possibility of the creation of a Soviet base on that country's territory would become quite real.



Effect on Weapons

While the change in Soviet thought on limited warfare might have an important impact on the training and equipping of Soviet forces, the basic orientation of the armed forces toward general nuclear war will almost certainly be retained. Where we might expect to see change, if the idea of limited warfare preparations becomes firmly implanted, is in the one-sided emphasis on nuclear warfare evident in Soviet military doctrine, planning and training. Because of the Soviet expectation that a major conflict in Europe would either be nuclear from the start or would rapidly escalate into a global war, virtually the full weight of professional Soviet military thinking on large-scale combat in Europe has up to now been brought to bear on problems of nuclear war. Now, however, Soviet military specialists may be concerned that the overwhelming emphasis in Soviet doctrine on general nuclear war is eroding the USSR's conventional war-making capability, and that in a future situation of a strategic nuclear stalemate or stand-off this could be disastrous for Soviet foreign policy. The dilemma of having to prepare the armed forces simultaneously for nuclear and limited warfare may, in terms of the ideal, be insoluble, inasmuch as the nuclear and conventional battlefields make very different, and at times, contradictory demands as regards mode of operations and equipment. And the USSR is bound to be more constrained in respect to satisfying dual force requirements than the United States because of more limited resources. But a compromise may be reached in Soviet military planning, whereby the erosion of conventional capabilities is slowed down or arrested and specific kinds of capabilities for limited warfare are added that do not now exist. The recent appearance, after a long absence, of a spate of articles in the Soviet military press on the subject of amphibious landings may be an indication of such a readjustment.



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I. THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE

In recent years, Soviet doctrine on limited warfare has been in the process of adjustment to new strategic objectives and opportunities. The focal point of change which at times has been so gradual as to be barely perceptible, has been the critical question of escalation from a local conflagration to general nuclear war. There has been a distinct if somewhat tortuous movement away from earlier categorical positions on the danger of escalation from limited warfare in various parts of the world. The major watersheds in this process have tended to follow, usually after a good interval, important shifts in U.S. foreign policy and strategic thought bearing on limited warfare. Though reflecting the keen responsiveness of Soviet leaders to such developments in the West, the changes in Soviet doctrine have been not imitative but singularly opportunistic. Their common purpose appears to be that of affording Soviet leaders greater flexibility and maneuverability in dealing with local issues, particularly in political and military crises. But there may be other, more parochial reasons for changing the doctrine, such as the desire of various military leaders to justify the maintenance of large and versatile conventional forces.

In the mid-and late fifties, the Soviets assumed a very rigid posture in Europe where they deliberately fostered a politically taut situation. If Europe becomes an "arena of war," the USSR Supreme Soviet solemnly declared in February 1955, such a war "would inevitably develop into another world war." The Soviets were content to live without any military flexibility in Europe and with the alternatives only of all-out nuclear war or humiliating surrender in the event of a serious Western military probe or political challenge. They did not seem to find this an unacceptable position because, at the time, the U.S. was similarly constrained.

Outside Europe, in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, the Soviets saw a less rigid political and military environment and consequently greater opportunity for expanding Soviet influence in those areas. In the fall of 1955, the

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USSR (through the Czechs) made its initial arms deal with a non-bloc country, Egypt, at Egypt's initiative, at a time when the primary Soviet objective in the Middle East was the destruction of "aggressive military blocs"--notably the New Baghdad Pact. In 1956, the Soviets offered the Indonesian government arms for the first time, perhaps sensing a good opportunity there to have Soviet weapons used directly against NATO countries in the area. Military assistance then became and has remained a major part of the Soviet aid program to non-bloc countries.

At no time between the Korean War and 1962, however, did the USSR assign elements of its own forces a combat role in local conflicts outside satellite countries. Soviet intervention in the Suez crisis of 1956 took the form of strategic threat--the rattling of missiles capable of hitting Britain and France--and the threatened dispatch of "volunteers" to participate in the local crisis. But in actuality, the Soviets were so anxious not to become involved militarily in the local crisis that they forbade the Egyptians to use forty-five IL-28 jet bombers supplied earlier by the USSR. Moreover, Soviet bloc advisers and technicians in Egypt were instructed not to take part in the fighting and, immediately after the first air attacks, most of them were withdrawn from the crisis area. Thus, while they were willing to export arms (albeit obsolescent by Soviet standards) to small countries with the aim of altering the power balance in the area and to run the risk of those weapons being used against members of the Western alliance, the Soviets nevertheless were extremely anxious (especially in time of crisis) to avoid becoming directly involved in a local war.

The Soviets might for a short time have assessed the danger of direct involvement in local war somewhat differently when, in the glow of the first successful ICBM test in August 1957, they jubilantly claimed that the correlation of forces in the world now favored the socialist camp and that the advent of strategic rockets nullified the strategic advantages formerly possessed by the United States. In bringing the Syrian crisis to a pitch in October 1957, the Soviets evinced a new emboldened assessment of the risks of involvement in local war: they publicized both the dispatch of Marshal Rokossovskiy to the Trans-Caucasus Military

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District and the holding of joint maneuvers by that command and the Black Sea Fleet. Against this backdrop, Marshal Zhukov warned from Albania, where he was visiting: "We are all ready to strike at any military adventure organized by the United States near our southern border." Several days later, however, directly after receiving a communiqué affirming U.S.-British solidarity with Turkey, Khrushchev turned up at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow in an affable mood and thereby ended the crisis. And shortly after that, on 2 November, the Central Committee announced that it had expelled Marshal Zhukov from that body as well as from the Presidium on the grounds that (1) he undermined Party leadership of the army and (2) he was "disposed to adventurism in his understanding of the USSR's foreign policy."

The charge of "adventurism" implied that it was Zhukov's heavy hand that had steered the Soviets toward military intervention in the Syrian-Turkish affair. We of course, do not know what really happened, but it appears from the immediate aftermath that Khrushchev and his associates at least in retrospect regarded the moves toward direct intervention in strength as a serious mistake entailing great risks of escalation to strategic warfare. The lessons that the Soviets appear to have come away with from the crisis are these: (1) It is one thing to intervene in an uprising in Hungary, a satellite; it is quite another thing to intervene in support of a sympathetic elite in Syria, which is neither a satellite nor a contiguous country, by making war against Turkey, a NATO ally of the United States. (2) The much vaunted demonstration of a Soviet ICBM capability did not make the West any the less reluctant to meet local Soviet challenges head-on, risking strategic warfare if necessary. (3) New methods had to be found to defend political gains at a distance from bloc territory without becoming involved in a direct clash between Soviet and American forces.

The impact of the crisis on Soviet doctrine was reflected in the renewed emphasis by Soviet leaders on the strong likelihood of escalation from all types of local wars. Khrushchev, for example, declared in an interview in November 1957: "We must not think that under present conditions minor wars would be localized. Should such wars break out,

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they could soon grow into a world war." A prominent Soviet military writer and mouthpiece for Khrushchev's views, Major General Talenskiy, was even more categorical in March of the following year:

....Contemporary strategy stresses with all clarity that the all-embracing nature of war is an inevitable and logical development. At present a local war can be nothing but the initial stage of a world war. (Talenskiy's emphasis)

Over the same span of time, 1957-58, the U.S. doctrine of "massive retaliation" was being transformed at the hands of the Secretary of State, into a more flexible policy which involved a new concept--the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a localized conflict. This development evidently sparked concern in Soviet military quarters over its import for Soviet doctrine and military capabilities. Although his was then a lonely cry in the wilderness, a Colonel Petrov in a May 1958 issue of the now defunct newspaper Soviet Aviation had called upon Soviet military science to "develop methods and forces for conducting armed struggle on any scale."

#### Toward Greater Tactical Flexibility

An important watershed in the transformation of Soviet doctrine on limited warfare was reached in January 1961, when Khrushchev delivered one of his rare discourses on the subject. In a speech which heralded a massive offensive aimed at expanding Soviet influence in the underdeveloped areas, Khrushchev de-emphasized the probability of escalation of certain types of local military conflicts. He distinguished between "local wars" and "national liberation wars," describing the latter as "inevitable" and implying that Soviet bloc encouragement of them (which he advocated) would not lead to general war. Subsequent official Soviet pronouncements on the subject of local war went even further in de-emphasizing the danger of escalation. For example, the CPSU Program published in July 1961 did not

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even include a warning that local war might spread into general war. Nor did Khrushchev himself refer to the danger of escalation from local conflicts outside Europe the last time he made a policy statement on the subject of local wars, at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961.

Also in 1961, in open military publications, such "conservative" officers as Marshal Rotmistrov and General Kurochkin, began to urge the study of local wars of the postwar period as well as World War II, as a basis for solving contemporary problems of military science. This new interest in the study of local wars was not however reflected in [Redacted] military writings [Redacted]

What the Soviets were suggesting in 1961, in effect, was that the danger of escalation had diminished in the underdeveloped areas, especially on the Asian periphery and in the Middle East, but that the strategic situation remained taut as ever in Europe. The new turn in doctrine on local war was accompanied by a major change in the Soviet military aid and assistance program. In early 1961, the Soviet Union for the first time granted up-to-date military equipment to Indonesia. Since then, Egypt, Iraq, Finland, Syria as well as Cuba also have received first line Soviet equipment. That is to say, most equipment furnished the major recipients of Soviet aid has been identical with the material that the USSR is manufacturing for its own armed forces, including equipment not yet fully deployed in the bloc and not even made available to Communist China.

As regards Europe, there has been in addition to public statements, good collateral evidence that Khrushchev thought a local war there to be out of the question in 1961.

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The military, of course, would have preferred that any combat in Europe be localized, but [Redacted] military writings at the time saw this as only a remote possibility at the very least.

The publication of the book "Military Strategy" in May 1962 marked another watershed in the evolution of Soviet doctrine on limited warfare. It revealed an awakened Soviet interest in extending to the European theater the flexibility which the USSR by then enjoyed in the management of local crises in underdeveloped areas. Certain Soviet leaders had evidently come to regard the established doctrine on local or conventional warfare in Europe as too dangerous and restrictive for Soviet political and military maneuver. Their malaise was probably one of envy of the United States leadership, which more than a year before had discarded its strategic strait-jacket and developed a theory of "flexible response" applicable to the European theater. (In its April 1961 statement to the NATO Council, the U.S. had called for

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

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conventional forces at least strong enough to effect a pause in the event of substantial Soviet conventional aggression.)

The fact that the book, "Military Strategy," appears to be at cross-purposes with itself on the question of limited warfare (this is true of the revised edition as well as the original) may, in part, reflect a continuing internal dialogue on that question, and in part, the complexity of the problem and the multiple purposes which publicly enunciated doctrine may be intended to serve. In some places the book (in both its versions) stressed the improbability of limited warfare in Europe, emphasizing that if nuclear powers are drawn into an armed conflict it will "inevitably develop into an all-out nuclear war," and threatening that a "direct attack against the USSR or other socialist countries...will obviously lead to a new world war." But elsewhere the book discussed local war situations and operations, including a hypothetical large-scale non-nuclear "local war" in central Europe, and urged that a place be carved out for local war in Soviet military strategy. Thus, the book strongly implied an active role in small-scale war for the Soviet military establishment: "Soviet military strategy calls for the study of the means of conducting such wars in order to prevent them from developing into a world war and to bring quick victory over the enemy." In another place the book (in its first edition) called for the study of local war on the grounds that "such a war might also be thrust upon the socialist countries" by "imperialist circles fearing that world war might be completely disastrous for capitalism." (The reference to socialist countries was dropped in the revised edition, which generally played down the Western threat.) The fact that for the first time in a long while the book discussed types of operations that would be distinctly applicable to limited war, is also suggestive of strong interest in the problem. Geographic areas are unfortunately not mentioned in the context of such discussions, as in the following examples:

A local war might be another matter. Here, as before, the main events might develop in the areas of military operations near the front, although the methods of armed conflict in this case as well have been




changed considerably compared with the past war, since the war would be conducted with different weapons and the threat of nuclear war would hang constantly over the warring countries.

.....

Each of these types of strategic operations will be manifested in a world-wide nuclear war. In local wars, certain of these types of strategic operations may not be used or will be used on a limited scale. This would be particularly true of military operations deep within enemy territory. Military operations in land and naval theaters acquire decisive significance in such wars.

Although the revised edition of the book, published in autumn of this year, also appeared to be at cross-purposes with itself, it plainly sustained the previous emphasis on the need to prepare Soviet forces for limited warfare, even in Europe if necessary. Equally significant is the fact that since last winter there have been a number of articles in the Soviet military press urging that Soviet forces be prepared for local war contingencies, including the use of tactical nuclears. Note how the statements, in chronological progression, tend to become more specific and clear:

Last January, Col. Gen. S.M. Shtemenko, chief of the main staff of the ground forces, could have had a non-nuclear conflict in mind when he wrote in RED STAR that Soviet tank and motorized infantry troops can "operate successfully under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons as well as of the use of only conventional means of destruction." He also wrote elsewhere in the article in a similar vein that field training of ground troops includes consideration of both the "conditions of a mutual and wide application of nuclear weapons, and of conventional means of





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combat." But again the statements could also have referred to isolated situations in a nuclear war in which battles are fought with conventional weapons alone.

This ambiguity was removed in February when the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, Army General M.I. Kazakov, stated that the USSR was developing its conventional forces because the West was planning to fight local wars, presumably without nuclear weapons.

In May, articles by a "radical" and a "conservative" indicated that both schools of thought had a common interest in adjusting Soviet doctrine and capabilities to local war contingencies. In what was generally a strongly Khrushchevian article, Major D. Kazakov wrote in the No. 10 issue of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES:

Based on the dialectics of reality, Soviet military science believes that a future war, if it is impossible to prevent, can begin suddenly as a world nuclear and missile war. However, this conclusion does not exclude the possibility that under certain circumstances a world conflict may burst forth from a local war. We should also not lose sight of the fact that the imperialists, terrorized before the inevitability of a mighty return nuclear missile strike, may force upon us another form of war, without the use of nuclear weapons. The practical conclusion here is that our Armed Forces should be prepared to offer proper resistance with conventional weapons, maintaining missiles and nuclear weapons at the highest degree of combat readiness.

And Marshal Rotmistrov, one of the leading conservative spokesmen, wrote in the 11 May issue of the English language MOSCOW NEWS:

The Soviet Army has at its command an absolutely new arsenal of weapons,

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with well-trained men able to wage both atomic and conventional warfare, on a large or small scale, in any climate and on any territory.

The fact that this statement appeared in a newspaper published only in English meant, of course, that the message was intended expressly for American and British eyes. (The idea to which Rotmistrov has alluded, of employing tactical nuclears in a small-scale war is a nettlesome and evidently highly controversial question for the Soviets, and we shall discuss it in various places in this paper.)

Finally, the most recent evidence of change in Soviet thinking on limited warfare is also perhaps the most striking. We refer here to an article published in RED STAR on 2 November 1963, in which four of the authors of the book "Military Strategy" lambasted the U.S. editors of the English translations (of the first edition) for their "slandering" commentaries on the work. Escalation and limited war were among the questions on which they showed special sensitivity. They insisted, in the first place, that the U.S. editors were in gross error in saying that "A retaliatory strike by the USSR as a result of an attack against one of the states which are members of the Soviet bloc would mean that the Soviet Union would strike the first blow against the United States." Obviously, the Soviet authors retorted, "the unleashing of war against the Soviet Union as a result of an attack against one of the socialist states would not mean a 'strike against the USA.'" They next said that in the book they were not speaking about the U.S. but about an attack by "imperialist forces." If, of course, the U.S. itself were the aggressor, then the retaliatory blow would be struck against that country. Clearly, these writers too, are trying to get a message across to the U.S.; they are making a pitch for flexibility--they want it known that they, too, wish to respond to a local military action in Europe in proportion to the situation, without automatically provoking an attack by U.S. strategic forces.

In the same article, the Soviet authors also sought to clarify their position on escalation. They described as an outright falsification a truncated statement lifted

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from the U.S. editors' annotations that the Soviets say that local war will inevitably turn into a global war. Much exercised over this, the Soviet authors retorted that nowhere in the book was it said that "any local war will inevitably turn into a global war." This was an "absurd conclusion," they said--perhaps with the Chinese in mind, for they are the ones who have accused the Soviets of advancing such a line. The authors then noted that since the Second World War, there had been some 70 military conflicts and local wars. What was actually said in the book, they declared, was that any local war "can" turn into a world war. "Obviously, the words 'inevitably' and 'can' have a different meaning." As if that were not enough, the Soviet authors proceeded to rebuke the U.S. editors for saying that in the Soviet view any war "must... take the form of a world nuclear war." (Their elipsis and italics.) According to the Soviet authors in their article: "What is emphasized in the book is not that any war will turn into nuclear war, but only such a war in which the nuclear powers are involved."

The foregoing, in short, are the best available examples of the darts and turns in recent Soviet writings on the question of limited warfare. They are plainly suggestive of new interests, new ways of thinking and planning for local war contingencies. Yet, they have appeared along with reiterations of elements of the established doctrine that tend to suggest that little if anything has really changed in Soviet expectations about limited warfare. The case in point is the periodic reiteration right up to the present time of the doctrinal formula which states that if the major powers are drawn into a local war (evidently anywhere in the world) the war will inevitably escalate into a global nuclear war.

Because the picture is not yet clear, the evidence being not only thin but mixed, we cannot draw firm conclusions about the present status of Soviet doctrine on limited war. What we can say with confidence, however, is at least this: Soviet thought on limited warfare is in a highly formative stage; political and military leaders are sensing new opportunities and requirements in response to changing political and strategic relationships. Above all, it is

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clear that the common direction of their thinking is toward increased flexibility in sub-strategic crises.

#### Toward Strategic Nuclear Stalemate

There is also an important corollary to the search for greater tactical flexibility. The Soviets have made it abundantly clear that they have no interest whatever in introducing any flexibility into the realm of strategic warfare. They consistently reject as impracticable, immoral, and thoroughly unacceptable to them current U.S. theories on controlled strategic warfare. In the course of repudiating these theories, the Soviets usually impugn U.S. motives, saying that the real intention of the "Pentagon brass hats" is to convince the U.S. people that nuclear war need not be horrible. The Soviets, for their part, dramatize the horrors of general nuclear war and the certainty that neither side will escape widespread destruction; they stress, in addition, that because of the ideological problem, the adversaries will be bound to fight to a decision in such a war.

In our view, this public stance is not simply a propaganda harangue intended to portray the USSR as a champion of peace. The Soviets obviously have a strong interest in avoiding general war. They have made it clear that they fully understand the size and power of American strategic forces. And there is no reason to believe that they have been shaken of the manifest conviction that a general nuclear war would not spare the USSR unacceptable destruction, irrespective of the conditions under which the war had begun. As stated in a recent U.S. national intelligence estimate, the available evidence does not suggest that the Soviet leaders are building their forces to achieve a position from which they could launch a deliberate attack on the West and count on reducing retaliation to levels that would be in any sense tolerable. Unless and until the Soviets achieve such a position, they almost certainly will not regard the initiation of strategic warfare by themselves a rational course of action.

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Whether or not the Soviets really believe that, once the strategic threshold is crossed, the war cannot be brought under control, is, of course, beyond our ability to know. Whatever they believe now, there is always the possibility that they might act differently in the midst of a real emergency. All we can say at this time is that it is plainly not in the interest of the USSR to admit to the possibility of controlling general war once it has started. To do so would have the effect of undermining the notion which the Soviets are trying to preserve of a strategic stalemate. General war has got to be thought of as an almost impossible course of action if the stalemate is to be generally acknowledged.


Motivating Factors

Apart from the wish to avoid general war and the propaganda benefits to be derived from deploring the idea of making it manageable, there are a number of strong political reasons why the Soviets are seeking to make the strategic power situation more, not less, rigid. For one thing, theoretically, a strategic nuclear stalemate--which diminishes greatly the credibility of strategic threats and tends to prevent the use of strategic military power--makes possible the use of military force on a sub-strategic scale (not directly involving the territories of the major adversaries) with a low risk of escalation. The achievement of "strategic inflexibility," as it were tends to be a sine quo non for greater "tactical flexibility" in the sense of limited warfare possibilities. They are, in short, correlative aspirations of the Soviet regime.

As a practical problem, the Soviet design for tactical flexibility and strategic inflexibility is readily understandable in terms of the European situation. It is clear to the Soviets that the United States defends its stakes in Europe primarily with strategic power, and the lessened possibility of its use through acquiescence in a strategic nuclear stalemate is therefore an important Soviet goal. The Soviets are quick to agree with any American suggestion that a "balance" of military power has been reached, whereby

neither side can impose its will on its adversary by the threat or use of strategic forces. At one point, in the first edition of the book "Military Strategy," the authors wrote that American strategists "have begun to understand" that the multiplication of strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. and USSR has already brought about a nuclear stalemate. The original edition went so far as to say (implying that the Soviets endorsed this notion) that "the growth of nuclear-missile power is inversely proportional to the possibility of its use." To suggest that the massing of weapons has increased stability, of course, contradicts the traditional Soviet line that the arms race increases the danger of war; it was probably for this reason that the revised edition of the book dropped the sensitive statements, but nevertheless retained references to strategic stalemate. In addition, the fact that the revised version dropped a reference to a statement by President Kennedy (November 1961) on the need for the United States to have a choice somewhere between "humiliation and holocaust" also seems to point up Soviet sensitivity on this question: for this is precisely the predicament in which the Soviets now find themselves.


This leads us to another consideration: Soviet envy of the new military flexibility sought and partially attained by the United States in the international arena, particularly in Europe. The Cuban experience may have underscored the need to prevent the United States from acquiring in Europe the advantageous position it enjoyed in Cuba, of being able to use superior forces in a localized conflict with fair confidence that the opponent would not expand the conflict to strategic nuclear warfare. The Soviets seem to envy also the political advantages which the United States might gain from military flexibility, such as increased credibility for its threats of counteraction and greater maneuverability in local crises. There is, for example, an unmistakable air of seriousness in Soviet criticism of the United States for abandoning the "massive retaliation" doctrine and developing instead its local war theories for carrying out "aggressive designs" without risking the collapse of the capitalist system in a world war. The envy of which we speak is particularly in evidence in statements made by Soviet military leaders over the past year (such as those cited earlier in this paper) promising not escalation, but



an appropriate rebuff--i.e., a response in kind--to any local acts of aggression by the imperialists. A self-conscious power, the USSR feels obliged to declare its acceptance of the U.S. political and military challenge anywhere in the world, and hence finds that it must claim or imply a military doctrine and capability commensurate with the challenge. Thus the assertion (quoted earlier) by Marshal Rotmistrov that the Soviet army is capable of fighting any kind of war, on any scale, anywhere in the world, is a direct reply to the challenge implicit in U.S. doctrine. The book "Military Strategy," had earlier made clear the nature of the U.S. challenge, as in the following quotation:

The strategic concept, the President's message of March 28, 1961, stressed, "must be both flexible and determined" and must prepare for the conduct of any war: general or local, nuclear or conventional, large or small. This concept is based upon the same idea as a "retaliatory strike" the only difference being that, whereas previously the threat of such a strike implied the unlimited use of nuclear weapons regardless of the scale of the existing conflict, i.e., a general nuclear war, now the "retaliatory strike" must be appropriate to the nature of the potential conflict.

The Soviets, by the way, have long been responsive to developments in Western strategic thinking and doctrine, as well as to military hardware in NATO arsenals. Thus, it was above all owing to their fear of strong Western reliance on nuclears, in the event of war in Europe, that the Soviets took a very dim view of the possibility of limiting the scope of armed conflict there. Soviet military documents (published prior to May 1962) asserted that NATO has no limited war doctrine, that it does not plan to fight any serious conventional war, that the (imputed) inferior conventional strength of NATO is compensated for (in Western planning) by nuclear weapons, and that all calculations of the NATO command are based on



the use of nuclear weapons. Now it is true that the Soviets have for several years closely followed strategic debates in this country and have witnessed the build-up of certain conventional forces for specialized local war operations. But they did not associate these earlier developments with Western strategy for Europe. In their view, while the U.S. massive retaliation strategy was by 1958 all but dead and buried as far as the rest of the world was concerned, it was still very much alive as a strategy for Europe.

Since 1961, however, the Soviets have been witness to concerted efforts by U.S. leaders (as revealed in speeches by the Secretary of Defense among others) in radically altering NATO strategy for Europe. Soviet publications have observed a U.S. preference for staged responses to Soviet bloc initiatives and for strengthening NATO conventional forces in Europe in order to reduce NATO's dependence on nuclears. Other steps taken by the United States may also have served to confirm in Soviet eyes this trend toward developing concepts and capabilities for non-nuclear war in Europe.

In May 1962--with the publication of "Military Strategy"--the Soviets indicated that they understood that the doctrine of "flexible response" was now being adapted to the European theater:

The strategy of "massive retaliation" which existed prior to 1961 in the U.S. and NATO ...has become obsolete and is being replaced by the strategy of "flexible response" which provides for the preparation and conduct not only of general nuclear war but also of limited wars with or without the use of nuclear weapons against the socialist countries.

However, the fact that the U.S. strategy of "flexible response" has been the subject of controversy between the United States and some of its NATO allies who fear that the strategy will undermine the nuclear deterrent, probably has kept the Soviets from drawing firm conclusions for their own military doctrine and estimates.



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## II. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

It is perhaps still too early to estimate with confidence the impact which the observed trend in Soviet thought on limited warfare will have on Soviet military policy, both in regard to the management of crises and the training and equipping of Soviet troops. What can be said at this time is largely of a hypothetical order. There are, in addition, several considerations which bear directly on the relationship of doctrine and policy that must first be sorted out and acknowledged as qualifiers to any conjecture subsequently set forth in this paper.

To begin, we are most constrained when attempting to forecast Soviet behavior in a military crisis on the basis of explicit Soviet military doctrine. Whether and how the Soviet leaders will react in a military way in any crisis anywhere in the world will undoubtedly depend not on any established doctrine, but on their assessment at the time of the crisis of the risks involved--what they may believe they stand to gain or to lose; the local and strategic apportionment of power; and how they assess the actions and policies of the opponent. Surely, Khrushchev will not be bound by any doctrine, but will reserve maximum freedom of action to manage the crisis (as he did in the case of Cuba), probably as any head of state would do.

In the case of central Europe, at this juncture, any Soviet assessment of the risks of engaging in limited military actions in Europe is likely to be complicated by a number of factors. There is first of all the uncertainty about how far the United States would be willing to go in a military engagement without using its local nuclear power. There is also the uncertainty about how individual NATO countries would react when warfare is conducted or about to be conducted on their soil. (What may be "tactical" to the United States and Soviet Union may be "strategic" to the NATO allies.) The Soviets are fully aware of the penchant of certain continental NATO countries for a front-line nuclear defense and an independent strategic nuclear deterrent. We do not yet have a clear reading of how Soviet military planners are reacting to these developments.

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Secondly, Soviet declaratory policy on military doctrine plays an important role in the contest of power politics, East-West as well as Sino-Soviet. (Marshal Sokolovskiy and his colleagues, in their preface to the second edition of "Military Strategy" made it clear that the book was intended for Western eyes as well as Communist.) Consider the question of escalation, around which Soviet discussion of limited warfare has mainly revolved. The Soviets often reiterate the doctrinal formula which states that if the major nuclear powers are drawn into a local war, the war will inevitably escalate into a general nuclear war. Obviously (although pure determinists may disagree), war will not escalate automatically; escalation will depend on the will of the antagonists. (The style of leadership of the present Soviet regime is suggestive of supreme pragmatism and opportunism in reaching the "determined" historical objective of a world-wide Communist triumph.) The main purpose of reiterating this doctrine in public forums is to deter the United States from undertaking military actions against the USSR in local situations. In their propaganda, the Soviets exploit the danger of escalation in such a way as to threaten a would-be adversary with more serious counteractions than he might wish to accept; they try to instill doubt in his mind as to the risks of the venture; and, generally, they try to deter him from initiating a military action in a political crisis or, as in the case of Cuba, to inhibit him from effectively responding to a local Communist challenge.

It might have been the case, moreover, that in deciding to undertake the Cuban venture of 1962, the Soviet leaders calculated that their U.S. counterparts found credible the Soviet threat of automatic escalation from a local conflict in which U.S. and Soviet troops were directly involved. Khrushchev may have thought that U.S. fear that a general war would rise out of a conflict over Cuba, where Soviet troops were stationed, would deter the U.S. from attacking Cuba--or at least would delay U.S. military actions long enough to gain time to place strategic missiles in Cuba. In fact, even now the Soviet leaders may calculate that the retention of some Soviet troops in Cuba acts as a strong deterrent--a reminder to the U.S. of the danger of escalation in the event of a U.S. military initiative against Cuba.

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Of course, the continued token Soviet military presence in Cuba is based on the safe assumption that the United States will not attack Cuba--at least not without warning, in which case the troops could be hastily withdrawn or be declared "non-belligerent."

At the same time, to be sure, the Soviets are genuinely concerned about the danger of escalation--as many people are in this country--in the event of a direct military clash between U.S. and Soviet forces. In this respect, the residual Soviet fear of general war serves to regulate the peacetime exploitation of the country's military power, especially in the management of political or military crises. This built-in element of restraint may even operate independently of any expressed U.S. resolve to escalate a conflict. There is also the possibility, depending upon the credibility of the threat of "inevitable" escalation, that once U.S. and Soviet forces come directly to blows, the doctrine would be a self-fulfilling prophesy. This is because each antagonist might believe that the other really believes in "inevitable" escalation and would act on that belief to secure the great advantage of striking first. Theoretically, however, in a situation of acknowledged strategic stalemate, this possibility is remote. And practically, in terms of the existing relative capabilities for the ultimate situation, the Soviets would be strongly reluctant to assume this "inevitability."

Recently, in using military doctrine as an instrument to communicate intentions or threats to the West, the Soviets have slipped into a dilemma. On the one hand, they wish to deter the United States, as suggested in the foregoing paragraphs. With this aim in view, they stress the danger of escalation from local conflicts. On the other hand they wish to attain greater flexibility so as to be able to use military forces at their disposal in a local situation without bringing on a devastating attack by SAC against the USSR. It is no wonder, then, that Soviet military writers often appear to be at cross-purposes with themselves in dealing with the question of escalation from limited warfare.

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A good example of the contortions to be found in recent Soviet literature is the disavowal in the November 2 RED STAR of any intent to attack the U.S. first in the event of an attack by a NATO ally against a Soviet satellite, four months after the assertion by Marshal Yerezenko in an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article that

The laws of modern war are implacable: no matter which NATO country sows the wind, the whole NATO bloc would reap the whirlwind. This is axiomatic nowadays.

This is not necessarily a case of flat contradiction, however. When read in the general context of his article, Yerezenko's statement applies almost exclusively to a situation in which a NATO country ("Federal Germany above all") strikes a nuclear blow against the USSR--hardly a "local war." Yerezenko presumes a situation in which West Germany has a nuclear capability. The motive behind Yerezenko's threat is clear: the Soviets are intent on forestalling the creation of a multilateral nuclear force (desired by the United States) or a multinational nuclear force (the variant desired by some West European countries). In fact, in the course of discussing the idea of "multinational nuclear forces," Yerezenko acknowledges that the arguments in support of this concept "might carry some weight" if it were a question of conventional arms.

Finally, while we may benefit from the fact that Soviet military doctrine sets forth the guidelines for the development of the military establishment, it is still hard to estimate on that basis the future course of training and equipping of Soviet troops. This is because Soviet doctrine is still very much in flux, a fact which is suggestive of indecision on a number of basic military policy questions. (There is substantial corroborative evidence of such indecision, as for example, in the continuing dispute over the prerogatives of the military and political leaders in the sphere of defense planning, and in the interminable debates over resource allocations.) That Soviet doctrine has not yet been worked out on a whole range of questions pertaining to the conduct of a possible future war is made clear in the following paragraph found only in

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the revised edition of the book "Military Strategy," published this fall:

These questions are subject to polemics. Essentially, the argument is over the basic ways in which future war will be conducted, whether this is to be a ground war with the employment of nuclear weapons as a means of supporting the operations of the ground forces, or a fundamentally new war in which the main means of deciding strategic tasks will be nuclear-rocket weapons.

The European Theater

That the Soviet leaders appear to be reaching for the option to use elements of their military forces to resolve local East-West confrontations even in such a critical area as central Europe, does not mean, of course, that the Soviets will use their forces for that purpose; it means a greater willingness to use them if they regard the risk of escalation from their action as low or controllable in a given situation. Such an option, ideally, presumes (1) a diminished credibility for strategic military threats and (2) an understanding by the opponents that there is room for fighting to a decision over the local issue without either side causing the conflict to escalate. The option also presumes that the interest which both sides have in preventing escalation to strategic proportions takes precedence over the interest immediately at stake.

Were this situation applied to Berlin, to take an extreme but critical case, the Soviets would clearly be in an advantageous position, given the present deployment of forces on both sides. The Soviets could use their local military preponderance to resolve the Berlin question in their favor overnight. For what has made Khrushchev accept this "bone in his throat" for so long and after so many ultimatums is not the military garrison in

West Berlin but the fear of U.S. determination to defend the Western stake in Berlin even if it means resorting to strategic nuclear weapons. By the same token, as long as the United States succeeds in making credible its determination to protect the integrity of West Berlin with strategic firepower, if necessary, Soviet policy regarding Berlin is not likely to be affected by changes in Soviet doctrine on limited warfare in Europe.

As to the possibility of an all-out Soviet conventional attack against Europe, given the present array of military power and commitments, this, too, seems out of the question irrespective of a softening of the Soviet position on limited warfare in Europe. As a prominent Western student of strategy has pointed out, the inducement offered to the Russians to stay non-nuclear in an all-out premeditated attack has been accompanied by the proviso that we will abandon the armaments restraint as soon as it seems to interfere with the serious business of winning. As long as this remains a credible U.S. doctrine, and as long as tactical nuclear weapons are on standby among NATO forces in Europe, the Soviets would almost certainly estimate that the tactical nuclear weapons would be used to stem the aggression.

Where increased tactical flexibility will have an impact on military policy under conditions of an imperfect strategic stalemate is, as suggested earlier, in those situations in which the U.S. interest in preventing escalation plainly takes precedence over the issue at hand. One such situation might be an attack by West Germany against East Germany, or intervention by West German troops in the event of a major revolt in East Germany. The first case is not our scenario, but a Soviet one. It appeared in both editions of the book "Military Strategy."\* In such a case, Soviet bloc forces would counter the aggression,

\*It has also appeared in RED STAR on 26 December 1962, written by one of the authors of "Military Strategy," Maj. Gen. A. A. Prokhorov.

might strike certain bases in West Germany ("There may also be attempts to strike rear objectives with the help of aviation, although it is doubtful whether such strikes will take place on a large scale..."), but probably would not "go beyond the Yalu" in the sense of overrunning and occupying parts of West Germany--for fear of triggering escalation to general nuclear war.

Another case in point is the illustration mentioned earlier in RED STAR on November 2, in which the Soviets claimed that they would rebuff an "imperialist attack" against a socialist country, but would not attack the United States unless it had first attacked the Soviet homeland.

The point to be made here, it seems is that up to now, the Soviets have been inclined to regard the risks of rapid escalation to general war, in the event of an attack by one or more European NATO countries against an East European satellite, as being so great as to inhibit (or even prohibit) a suitable rebuff, if that meant engaging the attackers in a large-scale military action. Now, the Soviets look at the risks differently and appear to be eliciting Western reactions to this change. It is, in short, in the sphere of plainly defensive actions or inadvertent confrontations that the Soviets would hope to gain most from their bid for "tactical flexibility." And it is probably only that kind of flexibility in Europe to which the Soviets might realistically expect the United States and its allies to accede.

The deep-grained fear of the consequences of a direct massive confrontation between Soviet and American troops in Europe will almost certainly work to avoid such a clash. Yet the present realities are such that Soviet forces would necessarily be drawn into any serious military conflict between say, West Germany and East Germany; in that event, U.S. forces would also very likely become involved. What the Soviets might attempt to do in such a situation --if their interest in preventing escalation is stronger than their interest in the matter being fought over--is to depict the bloc military forces engaged in the conflict as a Warsaw Pact operation under the command of an East German. This might serve to deflate the anxiety on both

sides about escalation, for the operation--especially if it is a defensive one--would be depicted as serving an East German political aim rather than a Soviet. That is, it would be a kind of Soviet political-strategic disengagement, despite Soviet local military involvement. It would probably be the closest thing to a proxy war in Europe.

That the Soviets might have given some thought to such a political safeguard, flimsy though it may seem, is suggested by a trend begun in September 1962, of publicly naming an East European officer of ministerial rank as being in command of a joint Warsaw Pact exercise. There have been three such exercises to date.

The Nuclear Problem

It is not clear whether the Soviet conception of "tactical flexibility" includes room for the tactical employment of nuclear weapons. When the Soviets address themselves specifically to the use of nuclear weapons in limited warfare (we have only open sources to go on here), the picture becomes very hazy. We have, again, only been able to perceive trends. The Soviets had consistently deprecated the very idea of "tactical" nuclear weapons until they themselves had succeeded in equipping their own forces with such weapons in strength. Since early 1961, the Soviets have taken a more sober look at the prospects for using tactical nuclears in local warfare as well as in general war. They tend to treat the employment of nuclears in local crises in general as a possible contingency with which Soviet forces must be prepared to deal. One wonders whether some Soviet theorists might also be inclined to see it as a more probable development in the event of a stable mutual strategic deterrent, which we believe is a Soviet goal (and an expressed American expectation). Under such a condition, as persuasively pointed out by some Western analysts, the factors which inhibit escalation from a limited war to a general war should encourage the use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war.

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The striking ambivalence evident especially since last fall in Soviet statements on the probability of escalation from a local nuclear conflict is plainly suggestive of an intent to keep the West off balance and deterred from introducing nuclear weapons. (In the latter respect, the ambivalence is probably seen as a way of discouraging escalation to general war in the event that the antagonist fails to be deterred from resorting to tactical nuclears in a local crisis.) The ambivalence may also reflect different assessments among Soviet military specialists of the risks involved in either initiating the use of tactical nuclears, or responding in kind to the enemy's initial use of nuclears in a local conflict.

Up until 1962, Soviet military writings had consistently promised automatic escalation to global war if tactical nuclears were introduced in a local war. But in November of that year, Marshal Malinovskiy made a statement in an important political-military pamphlet that could be read to mean that the Soviets would reply in kind to the use of tactical nuclears, but would not necessarily escalate the conflict. In May, in another important pamphlet Col. Gen. N.A. Lomov made the following flat statement without a caveat about certain escalation: "In local war, which can grow into a world war, nuclear means of armed struggle may also be used."

On the other hand, the older line stressing the likelihood of escalation has also found its way into print in recent months. Thus, the revised edition of the book, "Military Strategy" carefully weighed the problem (as if in refutation of opposite arguments by other Soviet theorists) and came to the conclusion that a tactical nuclear exchange in the course of limited warfare was certain to cause escalation:

It could also happen that the antagonists in the course of the local war employ nuclear weapons of operational tactical designation, without resorting to strategic nuclear weapons. This radically changes the character of military operations, giving them great dynamism and decisiveness.

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However, it is doubtful whether the war will be conducted with the use of only some operational-tactical nuclear means. Once it has come to the point that nuclear weapons are being used, the antagonists will be forced to put into action all their nuclear might. The local war will change into a nuclear world war.

But this quotation characteristically harks back to a situation in which major nuclear powers are drawn into a local conflict; and on this point, doctrine has consistently stated that conflict would inevitably spread into a global nuclear war. Hence, to the Soviet way of thinking, the most dangerous situation in a local military crisis is when the USSR and the United States both resort to tactical nuclear weapons to defend their stakes. This view, as is known, is shared by some framers of U.S. defense policy. What remains--on a much less dangerous level--is the use of tactical nuclears in a crisis in which only one of the major nuclear powers is involved. Thus, by omission of statements to the contrary, the Soviets have left a lower risk opportunity for the United States to use its nuclears in local crises in such areas as the Far East and Southeast Asia, without threatening immediate escalation to general war.

#### Distant Limited Military Action

The Soviet search for tactical flexibility in the Middle East and Southeast Asia has already been reflected in policy. Beginning in 1962 the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to use Soviet troops in combat in local crises on an unacknowledged basis. From the time of the Korean War to 1962, the nearest that the Soviets came to direct involvement in local war outside the East European satellites was in their backing of the Pathet Lao. That effort, however, was confined to training and logistic support. There was never any sign of direct participation of troops in combat in Laos, not even under the guise of training. However, as the Soviet military aid program

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expanded over the past two years, it added the feature of limited, secretive employment of Soviet troops in combat situations on behalf of some states receiving Soviet aid.

The Indonesia-West New Guinea crisis and the UAR-Yemen war reflect at the very least a Soviet policy decision to use trained Soviet crews while indigenous crews are still in an early stage of training. But beyond this, it is difficult to say how much Soviet philosophy regarding the use of Soviet troops in local wars in underdeveloped areas has already been changed. We do not know, for example, whether the Soviets would favor the use of their troops on an acknowledged basis, under any circumstances, nor how large a military force they would be willing to commit in a local conflict in the Middle East or Southeast Asia. From the political standpoint, the Soviets have publicly pledged themselves to render support to newly emergent states but have never explicitly mentioned the possible commitment of Soviet troops.

The Cuban episode is of an entirely different order. In this case the deployment of combat ready Soviet units was intended not for use in a strictly local war between the United States and Cuba, but to serve a larger Soviet strategic objective which placed the USSR on the firing line. By the same token, Soviet pledges made after the crisis to defend Cuba implied defense from afar--involving the national security of the Soviet homeland and not Soviet troops in the locale alone.

In all probability, the Soviets have not yet changed their estimate that direct involvement of Soviet and U.S. forces, even in distant areas, would be extremely dangerous.

There is not only the fear of escalation that restrains the Soviets. There is also the fact that the USSR has a very limited capability for conducting warfare at any distance from the bloc. Unless and until these restraints are lifted, the USSR will no doubt try to avoid (1) any direct involvement with U.S. forces in distant areas, and (2) any public knowledge of the employment of Soviet troops in combat in distant areas.

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The march of Soviet thinking on limited warfare seems to be in the direction of overcoming the major obstacles in the way of attaining still greater political-military maneuverability in distant areas, and consequently greater Soviet prestige. The Soviets have expressed concern over the development of U.S. capabilities for distant action; they have called for close attention to be paid by Soviet military specialists to the problem of local wars; they have urged that local war problems be taken into account by Soviet military strategy; they have observed that local wars are most likely to break out in the near and Middle East, Far East, Africa and Cuba; and they have acknowledged the possibility that socialist countries could be involved in local wars.

The yearning for greater military prowess in distant areas may already have led to a quest for Soviet base rights or logistic support rights in some non-bloc countries which are recipients of Soviet aid.

The Soviets might find the idea of a system of foreign bases quite appealing from the standpoint of their tactical value--notably their importance to the Soviets in regard to enhancing Soviet limited warfare capabilities. Indonesia, for example, could provide a valuable logistic base if the Soviets decided to give more open support to revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. As others have pointed out, the placement of medium range missiles in Indonesia under Soviet control could have a great influence on developments in Southeast Asia (depending not only on the U.S. response but on the Chinese Communist response as well). The mere presence of the Soviet missiles would have considerable influence on events: medium range missiles based on Java could cover all of Southeast Asia; and the Soviets could see in that a useful symbol for Soviet support of wars of liberation and a counterthreat to U.S. intervention in such wars.

The fly in the ointment, however, is the political reality. The leaders of the young states, jealous of their newly acquired sovereignty, are loathe to have it compromised.

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




Thus Indonesia has rejected the idea of Soviet control of bases on its territory. Syria wants aid, but does not want Soviet technicians and instructors in the country. And so forth. Under such circumstances, we are not likely to see the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Middle East, Asia, or Africa. If, however, the USSR manages to win over one of the small countries as an ally or to subvert its government, the possibility of the creation of a Soviet base on that country's territory would become quite real.

Effect on Weapons and Training

The change in Soviet thought on limited warfare will probably have an important impact on the training and equipping of Soviet forces. The basic orientation of the armed forces toward general nuclear war will almost certainly be retained, however. Thus, we expect requirements for general nuclear war to continue to be the principal factors determining the structure and size of the Soviet theater forces. The requirements themselves have been the subject of a long controversy, but the underlying strategic assumption that the armed forces must be trained and equipped to fight effectively under the worst conditions--general nuclear war--has not been questioned.



Where we might expect to see change, if the idea of limited warfare preparations becomes firmly implanted, is in the one-sided emphasis on nuclear warfare evident in Soviet military doctrine, planning and training. Up until 1962 the Soviets expected that any major conflict in Europe would either be nuclear from the start or would rapidly escalate into a global war. For that reason, virtually the full weight of professional Soviet military thinking on large-scale combat in Europe has been brought to bear on problems of nuclear war.



In short, there was no evidence of the existence of a military doctrine for the training and equipping of Soviet forces for large-scale limited warfare.

It may well have occurred to Soviet military specialists, as it has to some of us, that the overwhelming emphasis in Soviet doctrine on general nuclear war will probably erode the USSR's conventional war-making capability over the long run. (In a future situation of a strategic nuclear stalemate or standoff this could be disastrous for Soviet foreign policy.) This erosion has already begun. While some changes in Soviet force structure have no doubt improved Soviet conventional war machinery (motorization of infantry and increments to infantry conventional firepower), other measures (such as cutbacks in frontal aviation and tube artillery) have tended to have a detrimental effect on the conventional capability of the troops. The same may be said for the planning of operations: doctrine demands that nuclear weapons be the basis for planning of major military operations.

The dilemma of having to prepare the armed forces simultaneously for nuclear and limited warfare may, in terms of the ideal, be an insoluble one, inasmuch as the nuclear



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and conventional battlefields make very different, and at times, contradictory demands as regards mode of operations and equipment. And the USSR is bound to be more constrained in respect to satisfying dual force requirements than the U.S. because of more limited resources. But a compromise may be reached in Soviet military planning, whereby the erosion of conventional capabilities is slowed down or arrested and specific kinds of capabilities for limited warfare are added that do not now exist.

The recent appearance, after a long absence, of a spate of articles in the Soviet military press on the subject of amphibious landings, may be an indication of such a readjustment.

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Until this time, evidently, the Soviets had no serious amphibious landing capability. The acquisition of one would importantly add to their capabilities in some of the underdeveloped areas where the Soviets have demonstrated the greatest willingness to become involved in local conflicts. It might have been this very capability, in addition to a new troop organization,

[REDACTED] Finally, it might signify that the Soviets have at last begun to develop a military capability to defend their political interests in distant areas, and perhaps additionally to offer new challenges in the underdeveloped areas.

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Collection of declassified CIA Cold War documents  
Compiled by Lydia Skalozub

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